so i have just begun work on that book and going to be able to interview grady this week, matter of fact. >> well, thank you so much for your time. >> thank you, rachel. >> up next on booktv, jim rasenberger presents a history of the bay of pigses crisis that was supported by the united states government and resulted in the capture or death of over a thousand men. this lasts about a an hour. ..

>> he was also the author of high steel, the daring man who built the world's greatest skyline. in this book, dr. rasenberger views the cuba invasion in 1951, one the most ill faded american blunders. he draws on cia documents and delivers as never before the vivid truth and consequences of the five pivotal days in april '61. here to tell us more, please give a very warm welcome to mr. jim rasenberger. [applause] [applause] >> yeah, perfect. perfect. thank you. thank you for that introduction. and thank you to books and books for having me. this is a wonderful bookstore. i had not been here before i came earlier today. and it is fantastic. so support it. i urge you to buy a book before you leave tonight.

it doesn't have to be my book. but if you want it, that's fine with me. as i'm sure all of you know by now this is the eve of the 50th anniversary of the bay of pigs invasion of cuba. i can't think of a better place to launch my book than here with you. i know many of you probably have personal history of the event and deep knowledge of it. i thank you for coming. i'm honored to be here. now this is a story that i wanted to tell for a long time. i think it's -- there are a number of reasons that i wanted to tell it for a long time. i think it's one the most fascinating and important stories in modern american history. and i hope if you read the book you'll share that opinion with me. before i go into any detail, i should probably give a brief overview of what the bay of pigs was for those of you who don't know. if there are any of you. i'm -- suspect anyone my age or

older, i was born just after the bay of pigs, is pretty familiar with it, simply because we grew up hearing about it. those of you who are younger are forgiven. you are not forgiven for being younger, there's no forgiveness for that, but you are forgiven for not knowing much about something that happened before you were born. for the sake of those not familiar, let me go through a brief overview of the basic facts. the bad pigs was five day event that occurred in april 1961. for those of you who were madmen fans, i think that's just after season one if that helps orient you. that april a group of cuba exiles trained, supplied, and backed by the united states government attempted to invade cuba and overview fidel castro. the attack began on april 15th, 1961, when a fleet of eight b-26

bombers flown by cuba pilots attacked castro's airfield. they bombed, intended to destroy fidel castro's air force. two days later, the invasion itself began. about 1400 men, cuba exiles, known as brigade 2506 came ashore at the southern coast of cuba at the bay of pigs. the plan was to establish and hold a beachhead and eventually spark an uprising against fidel castro. that was the plan, anyway. but it didn't quite work out that way. the brigade man into trouble almost immediately. within two days of landing, it was over. of the 1400 men that came ashore, over 100 were killed and the rest sent to sea, some tried

to escape in boats, or into the swamps. there was a vast overlay. there they were taken by fidel castro and thrown into jail. for fidel castro, who looked like the david who slayed goliath, this is a victory. it is still a victory that cuban's celebrate today. i was in cuba for 39th anniversary. it's remarkable there are billboards all over the place, celebrating the victory against yankee imperillism. this anniversary will be marking with the parade and all sorts of celebrations. i'm not expecting too many celebrations here. that's, of course, because for the united states, it was a disaster. it was a personal tragedy for the men who took part in the invasion, of course, and it was

a humiliation for the kennedy administration which had only been in power less than three months. at first the administration tried to insist that the united states had nothing to do with this. that it was just the exiles had gone in on their own. that charade did not last long. pretty soon the world knew the truth. which was at the brigade had been trained by the cia, had been supplied with american equipment, and the invasion has been approved by the joint chief of staff, the president, and ultimately the united states. in short, this had been a united states operation, and it's failure was a distinctionly american embarrassment. one american general said it was the worst defeat the u.s. had suffered since the war of 1812. that was about the kindest thing that anybody said. everybody agreed it was a mistake that they would never forget and they must never repeat. well, they were wrong.

not only is it largely forgetten, maybe not here, but in much of america, it is. but we went on to repeat some of the same mistakes that we made in cuba in other parts of the world. in fact, the bay of pigs turned out to be a curtain razer on a whole new ere ere -- new era of troubled intervention. the united states engaged in two dozen forceful interventions in 1961. that's not including the 21st century entanglements in afghanistan, iraq, and libya. given all of the other interventions, you maybe asking yourself, why should we still care about the bay of pigs? i mean next to vietnam and iraq, it seems like a fairly minor event. an appetizer of the huge feast. and add to this the fact that it lasted just five days and it cost a near $46 million.

that's about, i think, less than the average budget of a hollywood movie these days. then, of course, fact that it was an embarrassment. and it has everything to recommend it. but here's the thing. it changed this country in some very important ways. it change how americans look at their government and it changed how the rest of the world looked at us. part of the bay of pigs it would have been cynical american who doubted that he lived in a good nation led by competent men and engaged in worthy exploits. that was certainly a plausible view for americans 50 years ago after world war ii. the bay of pigs made that view a lot harder to hold on to. it had the distinction of making the united states look both bullying and weak. this is what kennedy's eight author on schlesinger jr. wrote, we not only look like imperillism, we look like

ineffectual imperillist, and we look like stupid ineffectual imperillist, which is worst of all. the question began with the bay of pigs. this was the first step into the vietnam era. even before vietnam. actually what you may not realize, what i did not realize until i wrote the book is how much the vietnam war itself owes to the bay of pigs. if we have time, i'll delve into that more later on. right now, i want to go back a bit in time. back a few years before the pay of bigs and focus on the causes of the invasion. here's the really central question, one we don't have a good answer to even yet. how does something like this happen. my ambitious in this book beyond telling what i think is a fascinating story as well as i could, was to go back once more and look at the events as clearly as possible.

with no access to grind, no finger pointing, not trying to blame anyone, not trying to exonerate anybody, just trying to find out as best as i could the truth. so with that goal in mind, i begin my narrative well before the invasion. because i think to understand it, you need to know not just what happened, but the context in which it happened. so i begin two years before the bombs began to fall on cuba. exactly two years, in fact, to the day president april 15th, 1959, that evening fidel castro arrived in the united states for a visit. this was his first visit to the united states since he's taken over cuba at the start of the year. dwight eisenhower was still president, richard nixon was vice president, john kennedy was still a junior senator from massachusetts. castro came to deliver the speech to newspaper editors, but the visit was something more

like an invasion in it's of own right. a charm offensive. he and his bearded entourage arrived in washington with the cuban rum and castro spend most of his visit hugging and smiling and saying all of the right things. there were some americans, including some in the eisenhower administration, including dwight eisenhower himself who had serious concerns about eisenhower. mainly that he was a communist in the making. many found him to be quite charming and certainly charismatic. after a few days in washington, castro took a train to new york city. from the moment he arrived at penn station, where he was greeted by 20,000 people, he had a grand ole time. he went to the top of the empire state building, shook hands with jackie robinson, went down to city hall, up to columbia university. having less fun in new york city, were the policemen that were assigned to protect him. there were all of the

assassination plots surrounding castro. these were reported in the press. none of these turned out to be real. the police didn't know that. castro was impossible to protect. he'd throw himself into crowds hugging and kissing people with no concern for his safety. one afternoon on a whim he decided to go to the bronx zoo. the press followed, federal agents followed, new york city police followed, and cost tremendous did what everybody does at the zoo, he ate a hot dog, fed peanuts to the elephants, rode a miniature electric train, and before anybody could stop him, he climbed over the protective railing in the tiger cages and stuck his finger through the cage and pet the tiger on the head. this is the thing that he did that made people think he was crazy. trying to decipher the politics,

was fidel castro a communist? you have to recall in the 19 50s and early 1960s, the battle against the international communist conspiracy was the organizing principal on which american foreign policy was based. it wasn't just the spread of communism, it was the fact that the communist had nuclear weapons. given the rhetoric, christoph was saying we are going to bury them. literally. i emphasize the communist country 90 miles from american shores was intolerable. not just the conservatives like barry goldwater, or richard nixon, but really to everybody. so fidel castro was interrogated on the subject of communism everywhere he went on his visits. the vice president nixon, by congressional subcommittee, by scores of journalist, everyone

asked him the same question. are you a communist? he answered the same every time. he was not a communist. never had been. never would be. when castro finally left new york on april 25th, the police were relieved to see him go. most new yorkers were happy he'd come to visit. editorial in the "new york times" summed up the general attitude. quote, he made it clear neither he or anyone of importance in the government so far as he knew was a communist. by the same token, seems obvious that the americans feel better about castro than they did before. that changed. that changed very fast. in the book i go into detail regarding what happened after castro turned to cuba after his american visit. how things went sour so quickly. for the sake of time, i'm going to jump ahead.

suffice it to say, he provoked the american government. he started appropriating american property, delivering speaks filled with anti-american rhetoric, cracking down on cubans who made aunt communist statements and most worrisome, began accepting overtures from the soviet union, and acting like the communist that the eisenhower administration feared that he was. within months, washington decided that good relations with castro were going to be impossible. by the end of the 1959, less than a year after castro came to power in cuba, the eisenhower administration was taking aggressive steps against him. the great irony is after devoting millions of dollars and hundreds of men to protecting him from assassins, the united states government now began to plotting his demise. generating these plots was the central intelligence agency. with encouragement from

president eisenhower. some the early idead explored by the cia were interesting. one was to place a drug in his food that would make him behave strangely in public and make him appear. the drug wasn't specified but it was probably lsd, which the cia had worked with. it sounded like something inspired by james bond, because it might have been, allen, the director of the cia was a big fan. at one point, ian fleming happened to be visiting washington. he had dinner at the home of jack kennedy and jacqueline kennedy, and somebody asked him tongue in cheek if he had any ideas for offing fidel castro. he said he would drop leaflets advertising that radiation was

in the air. it tended to cling to the beard beards. therefore, all of his minions would shave and lose their power. he tried to track down fleming while he was in washington. too late. he had flown back to london. one idea was not assassinate not just fidel, but his brother raúl. the plan was approved in 1960, the central intelligence agency's famously brilliant director of plans was to use some of the cuban who's had been flees castro, mainly to florida to return to cuba and over throw him.

originally, it was to infiltrate in small groups. it seemed like an invasion. the plan was never the 1400 were supposed to over run cuba and defeat the army of 25 or 30,000. rather, it was to land the brigade on a significant piece of cuban real estate and hold it for a length of time. maybe a week, up to 10 days. at some point, the brigade would fly in the provisional government which the cia had assembled and was being kept at the safe house, and the government would set up shop on the beach, and what was supposed to happen after that was not that clear. the plan sputtered out. one home as i mention, the cuban population would rise up in support. another possibility was that the government after establishing itself in cuba would invite the united states to assist, much

the way the rebels in libya invited the united states to assist recently. and then the united states could come in overtly and legally, or at least quasi legally or settle that. the cia set up camp in the mountains. on a coffee plantation and airstrip nearby. in late spring, the agency began to recruit cuban exiles, mainly in miami, and to transport, assemble, and train them in guatemala. they came from an array of backgrounds. some were former soldiers who served in bautista's armies, some were soviets, many moderates or leftist who supported castro when he first came to power, and then grew disenchanted with him as he left. later there would be lawyers and doctors and farmers, whites and blacks, young and old, rich and poor, fair cross section of the cuban population. while the military operation was

coming together in guatemala, the presidential campaign of 1960 was heating up in america. in the close contest between richard nixon and john f. kennedy. from the outset, nixon realized that fidel castro was either going to be an opportunity or a problem for him. pretending on whether castro was still in power or gone by election day. in the fall of 1960, john kennedy was beating the eisenhower administration over the head with fidel castro. kennedy didn't realize that no subject rosed american voters more than the sector of communist cuba. and in every stop, he reminded voters that the island was near eight minutes away. and he blamed eisenhower and company, including vice president nixon for letting this happen. imagine being in the shoes of richard nixon. he had a well earned reputation as a communist buster, and along comes the democrat from

massachusetts, suggesting that he, richard nixon, was not quite anti-communist enough. kennedy somehow managed to out flank nixon as an anti-communist hawk. probably the best example of this occurred in one the nixon kennedy television debates. not the first, the one that's most famous, but the fourth debate. this debate may have been the most important in the campaign. at the very least, it offered a glimpse into the wonderful strangeness that was richard nixon. kennedy came out in the press the previous day in a statement about cuba. in his statement, kennedy suggested that the eisenhower administration was negligent against castro. of course, this was exactly what the eisenhower administration was trying to do. when nixon saw this in the newspapers, he was outraged. somebody in the cia, he thought, must have told kennedy about the

cia's plan. and now kennedy was claiming this as his own idea when richard nixon had been pushing for the operation for months. but nixon couldn't say that, because it was a covert operation. so he just had to shut up and let kennedy pretend the whole thing was his idea. or that's probably what he should have done. that's not, in fact, what nixon did. instead, in the fourth debate, he lashed out at kennedy's statement, denouncing it irresponsible and foolish. he gave a long thoughtful argument as why the covert military operation was a material idea. dangerously irresponsible as he said in the debate. nixon later explained that this lie of his was very painful, but that it was his quote uncomfortable and ironic duty. and then he added, from that point on, i had the wisdom and we we weariness of someone who had

been burned bit -- by the kennedys. i vowed never to enter again. it's a lesson that nixon learned well. and it let right to watergait. that's a story for another time. john kennedy got what he wished for. he came the 35th president of the united states. he entered office and handed the plan under the eisenhower administration. he did know something. he had been briefed and detailed after he won the election. he knew something. but still it came as a shock to discover first of all how big the operation was and secondly that he had to deal with it immediately. the cia told him that the cubans were about to get a large arm shipment from the soviets, including fighter jets, which would make it more difficult for castro to get in the future. this is true. from day one, the pressure was

on kennedy to decide what he wanted to do. it fair to say that john kennedy was not thrilled by the cia's plan. his main concern was that the involvement of the united states would not be hidden enough. and if it were not, it would very well provoke castro's new friends, the soviet union to take retaliatory action, most likely in west berlin, a city that christoph had been threatening to cut off from the west. kennedy did not want to get into a risky gamer tit for tat with the soviets. he knew that would escalate to war. like everybody else, he wanted castro gone. since he ran for president, he needed to do something. if he canceled the plan, he'd look like a hypocrite. worst, he'd look soft on communism. which was the last thing that john kennedy wanted to see. conventional wisdom has it that the cia misled kennedy about the

essentials of the operation. that they really tricked him into going ahead by misleading him, for example, about the chances of the cuban population rising up against castro. i don't think the cia was upfront. richard bissell later admitted he was fooled hard. i don't think kennedy was fooled. i think he knew what he was getting into it. he got into it anyway, because he didn't know how not to get into it. by the way, most americans were in the same corner with him. everybody wanted castro gone. the operation moved forward almost immediately through february and march. and finally in early april, after weeking of hemming and hawing, president kennedy gave it the thumb's up. he still held out the possibility of canceling it, but he never did. for reasons that he mentioned, i don't think there was ever a good chance that he would have.

and so back to where we began, april 15th, and the opening attack on the cuban airfields. the attack that was meant to destroy fidel castro's air force. i cover the invasion and the after math in great detail in the book. but it's hard to do it justice in a few minutes. so i'm afraid you are going to have to read the book if you want to find the full story. but for the most, i'll just say that the important thing about the air attacks on april 15th is that they did not completely take out castro's air force. they left about half a dozen. that was half a dozen too many. on the following evening, president kennedy canceled the airstrikes planned for april 17th. why kennedy canceled them is a mystery. he had become the -- the most common explanation is that he

had the interaction, among other things, it had become clear to the whole world that they realized the united states was behind the attacks almost the moment that it fell on the 15th. and kennedy is always -- was very concerned about provoking something big, about lighting a match that would lead to the great nuclear match. so with the advise of his secretary of state deane russ, he called off the airstrikes. now among the cia planners when they discovered this on the evening of april 16th, they were horrified. it had always been understood that for the invasion to have a chance, castro's air force had to be taken out. it was actually schematic. and the moment ken kill canceled the follow-up strikes, everybody understood what it meant. the brigade was doomed. there was confirmed the following morning before the we

are fade had completed it's landing. castro's plane showed up over the bay of pigs and very quickly sunk two supply ships. the four other ships, also under air attack fled for international waters. with those two sunken ships, and a way with the other four ships went the brigade's ammunition, and virtually any fighting chance the brigade had. this is not to suggest that if second area strikes had not been canceled, the invasion would have achieved what the cia or brigade want it had to achieve. but there's no question that at the moment, the air strikes were canceled, it was over. which is why to this day many cuban exiles who fought at the bay of pigs hold a deep animosity for john kennedy, even 50 years later. the brigade was stranded there on the beaches running out of

ammunition and under constant bombardment as castro sent his army in column after column. by the 18th, the brigade was withering and on the 19th, it game to an end. castro's troops swept in and the brigade scrambled for the swamp. not before one last tragedy. the final morning, april 19th, four american pilots from the many alabama air national guard who had been brought into help train the brigade pilots flew from the brigade to cuba. they did this because the brigade pilots had been flying nonstop and suffered numerous casualties. these americans volunteered to fly. that morning, their planes were shot down and all four killed. including the 30-year-old pilot named thomas pete ray. thomas ray's daughter, janet

ray, is here tonight. she was a big help when i was writing the book. as veteran to the brigade when i visited them two years ago, over the 48th anniversary of the bay at pigs invasion. i'm grateful for their help. i'm grateful for all of you coming and listening to me tonight. what i want to do now is give you a chance to ask any questions that you might have, or make any brief comments. we've got c-span here with us, so you please wait for the microphone to come over before you speak, and please because there are so many of us here tonight, try to keep it brief so everybody gets a chance who wants to say something will get a chance to do so. okay? thank you very much. [applause] [applause] >> okay. thank you. thank you. i'm going to start this with the gentleman right here.

go ahead. you are moved as the first one of the many. i mean i have read them all. that nations on the meeting of january the 28th when allen briefed kennedy and his entire team for the first time, at the end -- >> i can't hear the question. >> at the end of the memo -- the question was coming in a moment. at the end of the memo that was prepared by bissell, it comes out that the end of the operation would be for the u.s. to come in after the beachhead had been established. >> uh-huh. >> my question to you, i know because i've read it, that wasn't the first plan. where you able to find that anywhere else? and were you able to find information of that anywhere else? >> what specifically do you mean? >> the fact that the u.s. was going to come in after the

beachhead. >> yeah, that was always part of the original plan. that the -- again this was -- the idea was never that these 1400 men were going to take over cuba. some people seem to think that. that wasn't the plan. the plan was to set up the beachhead and then they would call for help. that's why i haven't mentioned this. there was a fleet of american aircraft just over the horizon during the brigade. aircraft carrier and seven destroyers. they were there to help out when they were called upon. one of those ships had 30,000 rifles to give to any cubans who would want to join in the invasion. there were tanks on those ships, trucks on those ships, they were set just waiting for the word go to bring the equipment in and help the brigade out. yes? i mentioned you. >> good enough. i have a question. the decision that john f.

kennedy made at the bay of pigs, do you think resulted in his assassination or played a part in that decision? >> i think probably lee harvey oswald's mind this. there was a question of whether lyndon johnson ordered it. castro knew that kennedy wanted to kill him, so he killed kennedy. there was a lot of speculation that castro nay have -- castro may have ordered it himself. he denies it. we know he visited the cuban embassy and got some sort of signal or communication there. we know for sure, oswald was in the soviet union when the bay of pigs happen and was infour -- infuriated by it. he thought he was doing fidel castro a favor by going after

john kennedy. indirectly, yes, i think the bay of pigs leads to the assassination of kennedy. it may have had a more direct link. that's very difficult and maybe impossible to prove. over here please. i'll come to you in a second. yes? >> what's confusing to me is if after the first day of the invasion it became clear that the u.s. is behind it and then if it was known that without the secondary aspects of the 17th the invasion was doomed, are you basically stating that the cause kennedy was afraid of lighting the match against the soviet union that he was willing to sacrifice the 1400 men for the good of the bigger picture? because it's a harkening question. how you portrayed this -- >> yes. >> whether we're in favor or not in favor of war, or in favor,

not in favor of getting rid of castro, but putting the plan in place, we had already committed. and anything short of that, though you said there's no guarantee it would work, anything short of that would be a disaster. so it's hard to imagine that 1400 lives will be sacrificed for whatever bigger picture. >> i'm sure john kennedy never thought in those chilling terms. i'm sure he never thought, i'll just sacrifice those 1400 lives. i think what he wanted was to have the cake and eat it too. he wanted to have sort of an immaculate invasion. he wanted to invade cuba, get castro out, but he didn't want to start anything with the soviet union. did he sit there on the evening of the 16th saying to himself, too bad for those guys? you know? i'm canceling the follow-up airstrikes. i don't think so. but the conflict he had in

himself from the very beginning came to haunt the operation. in many ways, it had been set up long in advance. because he was always conflicted about it. that's what he did. the cia knew that's what he had done. he had basically set them up to fail. but i guess i don't -- i've never seen anything that makes me think that he was coldhearted enough to do it intentionally. we do know he did really feel very truly depressed about it afterwards. he went into a deep depression. i'm sure it was because he knew he had done something pretty terrible. i think he did it in his own mind for the right reasons. clearly, he knew he had set these guys up to fail. i'm going to come to this side of the room please. >> i was told there was american warships ready to insist in the invasion. there were tanks coming off of carrier ships.

>> right. >> there there were obviously sophisticated weaponry, and a large-scale invasion, how can anybody talk in an otherwise intelligence person like the president of united states into saying that we could deny that we were behind. even if we had won the war -- >> right. >> the invasion, how could anybody talk him into that. >> yeah, this gets into the oddness of plausible denial in the cold war. the idea of plausible denial was not total denial. it was that you could hide behind this covert front and it lowered the heat. it lowered the stakes. for example, the u2. the famous spy plane that america flew, we were trying to u2 over the soviet union, the soviets knew, and we knew they knew. but nobody said anything.

because nobody wanted to admit weakness. so to go back to your question, i don't think anybody thought a week we'll be able to completely deny it. the hope was that we can plausibly deny it. we can say we were there to help out if they asked, we were there as a friend, we were no way behind it, we weren't the ones instigating or funding it. so they could deny key parts of it and while accepting other part was it. does that answer the question? this gentleman here. and then i'll come to you. >> aside from the lack of power and cover, did you find the information regarding infiltration of the brigade by castro intelligence officers that already gave up the plane even before they landed? >> i did not. but it's not -- that's not because it's not out there. i think it's commonly assumed

that he did know. it's hard to believe -- he had spies in miami. certainly he knew what was going on among the cuban exiles in miami. he probably had spies in guatemala. by the way, he really just had to pick up the newspaper if he wanted to know what was going on. there were newspapers reports about the training camps in guatemala. on january 10th, "the new york times" ran a story that said the training camps ended up not being that bad for the cia. because "the new york times" reporter was fooled and thought the soldiers were guatemalans, rather than exiles. and when john kennedy had the press conference before the invasion, said that should there be an invasion of cuba, there would be no american involvement in it. for castro, that said it all. clearly, these guys are coming

any second. now there's also, you may know, a story that somebody leaked to soviet intelligence the fact that the actual invasion day. that's probably true. there seems to be a lot of evidence for that. i don't know if it made much of a difference. because castro knew anyway. castro had been on high alert all winter and spring. he was ready. he didn't sleep. he stayed up all night smoking cigars. and when it did happen, he sprang to action. the only thing he didn't know, where it was going to happen. once he found that out, he was ready to go. >> this young woman here. >> i'm the god mother of allen's great grandson and my husband is cuban. and when my -- when i found out that my friend's last name and

she knew my husband was cuban, she asked me can we still be friends? what i'm asking you is how liable is allen zellous for all of this? >> well, i don't think that cubans -- cubans exiles would be update. dulles was on their side. he also wanted president kennedy to rescue them. dulles for odd reasons was not actually in the country. he was in puerto rico. richard bissell made a number of attempts to get john kennedy to approve air cover. that was an enormous amount of american fire power, including an air force carrier with a-4

fighter jets. they said let us have these to give air cover. you have to remember the brigade is there, pinned down, begging for help. if you read the intercepts coming in from the beaches, they are just heart wrenching. please help us, please come. we are dying here. rescue us. just send in one plane, send in some planes, please. kennedy never did. and -- but the cia pushed for it. some people think bissell didn't push hard enough. certainly dulles wanted that. so i think that certainly you and this woman could be friends. [laughter] >> here please. >> i just saw the series on television. the kennedy series. one the segments they covered in detail the invasion. two parts. my first part is how accurate, if you saw the theory --

>> what theory? >> i'm sorry. one the things that brought out the theory, i don't know, they said it was true, i lived through that invasion. one of the things they said was that to the present day, they acknowledge one the mistakes they made was that there was a full moon on the night of the invasion. and i remember -- >> that was true. >> because that made no sense. >> no, it was a rumor. >> no obviously -- they made a big point of that in the -- one the other other -- >> on the morning of the 15th, the cuban ambassador also made the point that there were sun spots that day. and somehow the cia was so diabolical, they had arranged the invasion to occur while there are spots to screw up

radio equipment or something like that. but i don't know that much about the meteorology of the day. it was intentionally done on a moonless night. >> of course. >> anybody else? standing back here in the yellow shirt. >> does your book go into how kennedy changed from the invasion plan from trinidad to the bay of pigs? >> yes. >> because that was pivotal. >> that was pivotal, yes. >> as far as leaks, they rounded up 150,000 people right before the invasion who were supposed to take part in all kinds of antigovernment activities, they filled stadiums in havana and throughout cuba. that would have been pivotal. do you cover that also? >> i certainly cover the fact that these people were rounded up. it goes to the problem of hoping for a popular uprising against

castro in cuba. because anybody against castro is either in jail or in miami. and there weren't many people left who were free in cuba who were against castro? >> i asked because we had seven members of our family go to the bay of pigs discipline is that right? >> yes, sir? >> they didn't send us. she was five and i was five and a half. otherwise, we would have gone too. >> only 1200 to 1400. my uncle went in, he never landed. they found out about the invasion later. have you found out about that? >> there were many units, false

distractions, and the actually brigade that landed was about 1400. but there were hundreds of others involved in operations against cuba at the time. >> i've heard the planes on the airfield the day before the attack were painted in cuban colors to make it seems the planes for cuba itself. is that true? >> that is true. the whole plan was to try to make the air attacks look as if they had been carried out by castro's own pilots. part of that plan was to have -- you got eight b-26 bombers that flew to cuba. you also had a 1926 flown by the pilot, who flew directly from nicaragua to miami, landed and climbs he was part of the conspiracy of cuban pilots who had bombed their airfields and now was coming to the united states. that fell apart very quickly

though for a number of reasons. for one thing, his b-26 was different than the b-26s in castro air force and some enterprising journalist figured that out fairly quickly. for example, he had his machine guns in the nose cone. castros were under the wings. that was part of why kennedy ended up canceling the airstrikes. once people realize it was not true, it was a charade, they realized wait a minute, something is not right. they starletted -- started looking at the americans for answers. they were all marked to look like castro's planes. somebody over here. i'll come to you in a second. yes. >> in your opening remarks, you refer to the fact that kennedy was concerned that -- about provoting russia. and by his actions in the bay of

pigs invasion. do you go into that in the book and what subsequently happened, because, you know, four or five months later, the berlin wall went up. i'm sure that was triggered by his weakness in the bay of pigs. eight months later, vietnam exploded. that was all in consequence. when they detected that he was what they interpreted to be weak, that triggered a lot of progress. >> and john kennedy knew that. he went to the summit in vienna in june with christoph. and christoph just ate his launch. kennedy afterwards said he thinks i'm stupid and weak because of what happened at the bay of pigs. and certainly, you can make a connection then to christoph making the move to put up the berlin wall. in some ways the berlin wall confused the situation.

that's a rather complicated story. but certainly -- >> it was the trigger of the wall being built. >> it did trigger -- >> and the bay of pigs. the same thing happened in asia. >> that's true. and it was certainly -- kennedy certainly was very aware of that when he went to the summit with christoph. the repercussions of the bay of pigs just kept going. all through. they didn't end for kennedy until the cuban missile crisis. you know, a lot of things -- the vietnam war in many ways started on april 20th. the day after the bay of pigs. john kennedy needing a victory against the communist ordered the task force in the pentagon as a way to stop communism and stop vietnam. very quickly after that, sent 400 more men to vietnam. really the first step into vietnam began on the beaches of

cuba. this gentleman here, and then i'll come over here. >> yes, thank you. in many mind, there must have been some sort of call that -- conflict that caused kennedy to back away from the airstrike. immediately after the first airstrike, are you aware of any conversation between kennedy and christoph? that may have caused john kennedy to back out? >> no, the conversations were with dean ross, mainly his secretary of state who advised him to stop. christoph did on the 18th send a threatening letter. really saying if you value the lives of your people, you better back off. you know, in the cold wars, the stakes were always so high. i think that's why we have to have the sympathy for the presidents that served when -- there were always a few

decisions away from nuclear war. at least they thought they were. christoph said if you -- i can't quote the letter. it's not book. but you better get out of cuba or we're going to come after you. so there were certainly communications after that. kennedy responded to that. >> yes? >> during your research, did you come across any documentation that after the election the republican administration either wanted to back off, or wanted to accelerate it or? >> the -- there was a cia history done in the 1970s. and he was -- he remarked upon the fact that eisenhower for some reason really seems to start pushing again after the election. just before kennedy took over. and it may be because eisenhower

was afraid to muck up nixon's chances. it maybe because he was trying to hand kennedy a tough probably. i doubt it. i think they wanted to hand off something that was ready to go. eisenhower did later say he never meant this to be a plan. he called it a program. in other words, it was an asset. it wasn't something that had to be done. so he later denied responsibility. and the plan lived under kennedy for three months. i think question take a few more questions. somebody who's not hassling yet. >> can you elaboration on the four alabama national guards. i don't think it was made clear they had gotten shot down for several years.

what was the status of those gentleman now? >> this woman knows more about that that than i do. her father was one of them. they had been brought in to train the cia pilots. they weren't meant to fly. there was always a backup plan that maybe they would be used to fly. that wasn't really their main function. and it is true that when they were killed, the kennedy administration and then the cia denied that this happened. they came up with a cover story for how they died. and it's really one the most shameful parts of the whole thing. because these men died trying to serve their country. trying to do the right thing. and then their families were lied to about how they died. through the efforts of janet ray, mainly, and other people, that is not -- the truth came out. and we know now what the truth is. that these four men died in battle fighting for their country. let me take one more question.

does anybody -- you had one. do you want to ask one? okay. >> he said that president kennedy felt personally guilty for not ordered second area strike. you made it clear that he was upset with the cia, after the invasion of the pigs, because he fired the heads. >> that's right, allen, charles, and mr. cabul. who was the second in command. he fired the top. he wasn't upset with the cia, he thought they misled him. that was scapegoating. before, schlesinger wrote a memo, if something bad should happen, somebody's neck has to go on the chopping block. it can't be the president's. so it was the cias. that was partly the job of the cia. you know, they have to take the

heat when things like this happen. and they -- they, you know, it was their baby. and bissell it was the end his career, certainly. he went in and worked at the corporation in kentucky the rest of his life. and it changed the lives of many people in the cia's who's careers were basically not just the top three, but ended with that. kennedy's quote was he wanted to shatter the cia into a thousand pieces. he didn't do that. he was certainly upset. can we have time for one more. let's do one more question here. then we'll -- >> just ask you, does the book explore the issue of why allen dulles was in puerto rico, left to run probably one the highest profile operations the cia had planned in many, many years to joe bissell -- >> richard. >> or richard bissell.

was there any further delving? >> yeah, it was invitation has been proper to dulles. and in dulles papers, i found the invitation. it was from the young president's association. basically, it was a young american retreat. they invited dulles to come talk to them. dulles went, because it was thought if he didn't go, it would be a stepoff to castro. if he did go to port -- puerto rico, it would be one more indication that the united states had nothing to do with this. now in moscow, the newspapers immediately as early as the 18th, he was intentionally in puerto rico. at the same time, he was chatting to the group of young executives. it is rather bizarre. it was thought to be the right thing to do. he didn't know much about what was happening until he came back

that evening and learned at the airport how badly things were going. then he told the aid, let's get a stiff drink. that's how he handled that. i think we need to cut it off here. i'll take your -- can we do any more questions or are we -- okay. yes. all right. >> i don't understand how it -- if everybody in the world knew this was going to happen, the cia didn't know that castro knew? did they not have any people infiltrated in the castro organization at the time? if everybody knew, how did dulles not know that everyone knew? >> yes. it goes back to the weird psychology of the cold war. everyone knew. but again it wasn't that they thought they were going to get away and nobody would ever suspect the united states. it was just that they wanted to -- enough deniability to hide

behind that, really so that christoph wasn't put in a position where he had to escalate. do you understand? because if it was too obvious that the united states was behind this, christoph would have no close for the own political reasons was to escalate probably in berlin. then john kennedy would have no choice for his political reason to escalate someone else. that's how it worked. it worked on so many levels. if there's one thing i learned writing the book is that you don't want to be a president certainly during the cold war. i mean you are faced minute by minute with these life or death decision. and they are incredibly difficult. i'll end by saying the point that i sort of -- the moral for me is that when people write about the bay of pigs or talk about the bay of pigs, there's anger involved. there has been over history. and a lot of blame goes around. my impression was that most of the people involved in this on all ends were doing it for what

they thought were the right reasons. they were basically good people trying to do the right thing for the country. the problem was that it was a very difficult thing to do. and the way they did it was not the right way. now you know what the answer should have been still isn't clear to me. should john kennedy have thrown in the u.s. military entirely into this? well, we can say yes to that. but then we have to ask what would have happened afterwards. what if he had done that. if it marines had gone into cuba in april of 1961? it's hard to know how that game would have played out. what we do know is what happened. and what happened was a tragedy. thank you all very much for coming tonight. i really appreciate it. thank you. [applause] [applause] :