the middle of the cold war. and they lived nine days together in space, and that's an extraordinary human interest story. to see the relationship of those three american astronauts, now deceased, and the two soviet cosmonauts. but you chronicled an additional comment about this relationship evolving into what we see today. you want to give us more comments for the record as a contribution of space? >> i'd be glad to. when the shuttle mir program was a decision to bring the russians into the space station, mir was already on orbit.

[inaudible] they had learned to operate the space station. we've not yet -- [inaudible] i think 87 days. at a time. so, it was an opportunity for us to participate with someone who is already doing this. but also because they would be brought in as an important partner providing significant segments of the station that would allow us to be flyable and operate. it was important for us to learn to work with them before we start putting pieces together in orbit. so, together we build a docking module which allowed the shuttle to dock so we could more easily a patch to the near station, transfer people. kerry not on our crew member but also the cargo associate with

the experiment and also to supplement what is going on on the mir as a cooperative partner. to do all of that we had to learn each other's way of doing business, each other's way of doing engineering, each other's way of doing operations. we had to basically live in each other's control centers, each others' factories. and eventually, visit each other in their homes. and at the working level, the management level, it became a very close knit, tight team that was able to do with almost any problem that came up including the life-threatening ones that occurred during the program. that literal trial by fire allowed us to develop the trust that was necessary to go from there to the international space station. because at this point we do depend on each other. need of the two countries could go it alone on my assessment at this point, and the other partners depend on both of us to do our part to keep it working and to keep it as a valuable research station.

and so, that development of that relationship was critical going forward. if i could expand on that just a little bit. the relationship that we're developing now within this country in the commercial world in relation to what nasa is doing is a developing of something critical that goes beyond the technology and the hardware that is being built. and understanding how to bring commercial practice to development of spacecraft and rockets, that will make things more cost effective, but ring the lessons learned at nasa, the oversight and the key areas of the decades of flying people in space and flying hardware in space, and combining those two makes a very valuable experience. and so, we can't overlook the relationship and operational capabilities that we're developing as we are going forward. i'd like to see that continue. and so, engaging with the russians to finish answering your question, was critical to be successful in the station. we learned a lot about each

other. still to this day are sort of overly everything, but allow us to make a phone call between program managers and make a decision in a few minutes on what needs to be done in the next hour to keep the crusade. >> and we often forget that. when we talk about the contributions of space the national priorities, which you all have very eloquently outlined a number of them, the technological spinoffs and so forth. but the one that captain culbertson has just mentioned was and has been invaluable. just a speck if i could just add. the first time to the voters were put together, one with the russian, one was an american can put. they had never touched each other prior to going into space. they were attached more than 18,000 miles an hour and a baguette and fit perfectly the first time. that's been true of every component between our various countries that we have taken up there.

because we've worked on, first of all, the trust. and secondly, the key mutation that allows us to understand each other's capabilities, each others' hardware. and it allows us to know more about each other as a people, to. of ourselves and the people we're working with. and i think that in itself helps make us good leaders, and helps to keep the peace where we can in the world. >> well said. senator hutchens? >> senator boozman? >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. slazer, what actions do you believe that congress could or should take that would enhance the ability of the u.s. aerospace industry to continue its record of supporting the nation's technological superiority and competitiveness in the global economy? >> you know, to follow up on the earlier comment, transport,

satellites were put on the list, one of the few, maybe the only thing, except for overt weapons which was never put on the list. and its regulation has caused or helped cause the decline of u.s. market share and commercials satellite by 70%, down to 25%, its upload it lately but it is still well below its historic norms. on the comput level, i used to work on delta launch vehicles, we would have clamp pads from sweden, nozzles from france, would have other competitors would have there is from switzerland and other countries in europe. we don't export. we have such a difficult time exporting hardware, and some of the suppliers with u.s. industry are the best in the world, and could compete but for the difficulty of getting things exported. and so i think that we look at a

national import initiative yet to look at were issued sustainable industry, where do you really excel and tried to make those industries excel. we excel in aerospace. and overall in aerospace as a nation, i should note the fact that we are the large contributor to the balance of trade and the surplus category, about $53 billion last year. but it could before. it could be more on this day side if we could look at the rules. and nothing i would offer is that would make us better into other ways. one is to maintain an industrial base requires a certain level of activity. to the extent that exports could be part of that level of activity it would make it easier for the air force and for nasa to not have to spend so much for what they get from industry or to try to maintain capability. it would also make us better competitors. one of the reasons why our i.t. industry is as good as it is is there's a lot of competition. owing is better because it's an airbus. the two of them are costly trying to outdo each other.

so having an industry that it is allowed to compete, one, that one lower costs, and i think that's one of the best things we could do is reform in our export regime. >> very good. thank you. mr. pulham, what role does nasa's missions play in america's leadership in space? >> senator, i think there's a number of things. clearly, as discussed in my remarks, the impressiveness of what we have done contributing to our soft power and our leadership as a nation, you know, whether it was apollo soyuz, whether it was a shuttle mir, you know, when we do these things, there are technical aspects. there are financial aspects, but the message that we send around the world about what kind of a nation we are, we are a nation

of leaders, but we ar are a natn of great technological prowess, really causes the world to view us in a way that they would not come if we could not do those things. and so i think the contribution of nasa through soft power is just paramount. but i also think the contribution that nasa makes to the intellectual capacity of this nation is not totally and thoroughly understood, and i wouldn't pretend to totally and thoroughly understand it but i do know a few things. that is, that students -- whatever grade level, and believe it or not we are teaching space in pre-k now, they grasp what is going on in space. they grasp what nasa is doing, and then they get very excited about it. and that changes fundamentally the way the we look at the study of science and engineering and mathematics. we have referred to jack's like a academy.

we have students who are 92%, 94% of the students are on free or assisted lunch with most of them have never touched a piece of tech bubble and come in, to come after laboratory and you space sensors and space software to measure distances on their campus and figure out where everything is in relation to their own lives. the other part of the education piece and becomes, what do we do at the college level. and i think one of the things that nasa is not really appreciated for is the amount of investment that nasa makes in the university research, and graduate studies at our universities, and how that influences some of the career decisions that people make when they're in graduate, postgraduate school. our organization is international but we are headquartered in colorado, and

unconscious of the fact that the university of colorado of all institutions have traditionally been one of the largest recipients of nasa research dollars. and because of that we have developed a center of excellence in the northern part of the state in satellites, and sensors in manufacturing aerospace manufacturing and so. and so i think, i think nasa plays a real, real important role. and i think we need to work on ways to have whatever nasa is doing be more visible to the american public so that the american public can't embrace all the benefits of this activity. >> i want to follow-up with asking you about, if we don't aggressively move forward and begin work on a heavy-lift rocket and the orion crew, but

that will have an art international space leadership. and then secondly, dr. chyba, you can think about this because what you alluded to i think is so important, mr. pulham. if you would come in a second, dr. chyba, about your perspective from an academic experience which you believe is the best way to attract students and interest them in the field of study that are needed for maintaining strong and effective space exploration program. mr. pulham and then dr. chyba. >> thank you, senator. i think that in terms of the importance of having a new heavy-lift vehicle, you really only need to look as far as the james webb telescope program to understand where we are. the james webb telescope, when it is highly put into orbit, will be put into orbit on a european vehicle, the oriana five, because that vehicle is

capable of taking the web telescope and putting it in an insertion to get to lagrange point where it is going to be stationed. having that kind of capability, that the mass of a large vehicle really enables you to do things we can't do now. unit, the space shuttle can carry a huge module, 40,000 pounds or so, but, you know, if you capability of putting 200,000 pounds or taking that 80,000 pounds payload and putting it on a trajectory to the moon, that's a real game changer. and so i think it's important for us to get that heavy lift capability, just as quickly as we can. >> senator, thank you. there are a few comments i would make. one is a broad one that, over my career, i've had the opportunity

to talk to kids that sort of all levels from first grade up through a course graduate students. and so my first comment is a very broad one. something that he knows what i started doing this when i was in my 20s was that there was an enormous enthusiasm for space, and i see that in my son's daycare currently. enormous enthusiasm for space in kids who young. and somehow by the time you are talking with high school kids, it's a very different, very different level of enthusiasm. and that is at nasa's problem. i think that's a broader societal issue. somehow we are squeezing that enthusiasm out of too many of our students, and we not need not going to speak to the students who make aerospace or science of their career, but we need to speak your whole population and keep them excited about science. a second comment i would make is

the importance of honesty, of what i called scientific integrity. and this is why i pushed for it in the augustine committee report. the students that are in college, or especially in grad school, especially the ones in grad school, they can really smell if they feel like they are being told a story about the space program that doesn't stack up scientifically. if claims are being made that this or that mission will lead us to a cure for cancer when the connection just clearly isn't there, that really immediately translates into deep cynicism. and skepticism about the program. and i have seen that too often. a third comment is that the program needs to be, not only doing exciting things, it also needs to be seen to be at the cutting edge of what's happening.

i had a tremendous graduate student in aerospace at a major university who worked with me for a year, one of the best students i've ever had, really sharp. i mean, did stuff that i didn't expect him to do, did stuff, he would come in the next week and would come and show me why what i was doing was wrong. really terrific. he didn't want to go work for nasa. he wanted to work for one of the space startups. and my sense from talking to him what he felt like mass have become kind of a dinosaur. and this left me disheartened, and feeling, you know, sad for my country. i'm glad the startups are there, but by god, we need a nasa that also make students feel that way about it. and you know, the idea that our best and brightest would be ruling out nasa because it's not exciting enough, there's something deeply wrong. that's just an anecdote but for me it was a powerful one. i had hoped in that respect,

because, in the augustine committee we rolled up our sleeves and work very closely with nasa engineers and nasa managers, and because i know that there's been at times a difficult relationship and some of that has been referenced in this hearing today, i'd like to say for the record, if i may, that so many of those people are the absolute best in the world, and they're deeply dedicated. so there ought to be -- i mean, there is that nasa not only a reservoir of deep knowledge and dedication, the best in the world, but also deep motivation to make this happen. that's why they are their picks i really hope it's going to be possible moving forward for there to be a cooperative environment in which all sides work together and roll up their sleeves to achieve this major national objective. and i think, you know, students will see that. >> thank you very much. i think that is very well said, and i'm ready believe with all my heart that we will see that

happen. we appreciate you all being here so much. this has been a very good hearing, very informative, very helpful. and we look forward to working with you in the future.

>> no one succeeds in life by themselves. you must be willing to lean on others, to listen to others, and yes, love others. >> watch 2011 commencement speeches on c-span memorial day weekend and search more than 800 past commencement addresses from politicians, activists, authors, presidents and other world

leaders and more online at the peabody award-winning c-span video library where you can search come watch, clip and share everything we have covered from 1987 through today. it's washington your way. >> the former director of national intelligence, dennis blair, says the absence of white house support undercut his efforts to build a more efficient intelligence community. mr. blair testified yesterday before the senate homeland security committee. recommending several structural changes to the cia. and the office of the national intelligence director. this portion of the hearing is 45 minutes and we'll show you as much as we can and to our live event at 10 eastern. >> the hearing will come to order. good afternoon. this is our second hearing on the topic, 10 years after 9/11, intelligence reform working? this is part of a continuing series of hearings that our

committee is convening this year on how well the secure -- security reforms enacted after 9/11 have protected our homeland, obviously with a night on the 10th anniversary of 9/11 coming up. during our hearing last week we explored a variety of issues related to intelligence reform. this hearing is surely going to focus on a single big question, but a lot of sub questions. and that is, does the director of national intelligence have the authorities needed to lead our sprawling intelligence community as we want it to be led. we are very honored to have with us as our sole witness today the immediate past director of national intelligence, admiral dennis blair. admiral blair is an extraordinarily talented and dedicated public servant who has had an exemplary career as a senior military commander, and,

of course, as a continuing consumer of intelligence before he overtook his production and one of washington's, i was the most challenging jobs, the director of national intelligence. therefore, he is uniquely qualified to help us answer the questions we have about how the dni has performed, and his willingness to testify today i think is in keeping with admiral blair's lifetime of service to our country. so i thank you for being here today. the committee, this committee committed to deny as part of the intelligence reform on terrorism prevention act of 2004 at the recommendation of the 9/11 commission, which concluded that basically no one was in charge of the u.s. intelligence community. and that lack of leadership resulted in dysfunction and

disunity that led us vulnerable to the attacks that occurred on 9/11. the nature of the threat has changed certainly from a post second world war period and cold war, even since 9/11 with the dispersion and the metastasizing of the islamist terrorist movement, and also the developer for instance, of a very serious cyberthreat to our security. in the midst of all that, our intention was that dni would bring the necessary unity of command and effort to our 16 intelligence agencies. so, we come together today to ask on a day-to-day basis, does the dni have the authorities needed to lead the intelligence community effectively, doesn't dni have the ability force the effort across the community, and

achieve the level of integration that is necessary to meet the range of security challenges that our nation faces and the range need for intelligence are very stable and our government have. these are the overarching questions that i hope will have the opportunity to post to admiral blair today. with that, i'm going to put the rest of my opening statement in the record, and call on senator collins. >> thank you, mr. chairman. the operation that tracked and killed osama bin laden demonstrates the kind of successful collaboration between our intelligence and operational capacities that we envisioned when we reformed our intelligence community in the wake of the attacks on our country on 9/11. this was undoubtedly a great

victory for our intelligence efforts, and a great blow to al qaeda. but the fact remains that al qaeda and other terrorist threats are not going away. that is why it is time for congress to examine and build upon the successes since the intelligence reform, and terrorism prevention act was passed. that bill created the director of national intelligence. it is an opportune time to identify any shortcomings in that structure, and to work to correct them. i look forward to hearing from admiral blair about what words during his tenure at dni, what didn't work, and what might be changed about the structure that we designed seven years ago. i would note with great pride

that admiral blair is a fellow manner, hailing from the home of the portsmouth naval shipyard. so we are coming from a great navy town or following five generations of naval officers, perhaps preordained his career. we all hope that he has what we call a great navy day here, as we hear from him about his experiences as the dni, as well as his recommendations now with the benefit of actual experience with 20/20 hindsight. almost 10 years since september 11, 7 years since our landmark legislation, we are safer as a nation but not yet safe. our intelligence community is stronger and more effective than ever before, but plenty of turf battles remain. during his tenure, admiral blair

was at the center of some unusual refuse with the cia. to help address lingering deficiencies in the intelligence community, that dni must be the quarterback that the nine 9/11 commission envisioned and that we intended. and at last week's hearing, general hayden prefers the term coach. i will be interested to hear whether or not admiral blair believes that dni has been empowered to fill this critical role, regardless of what you call it. at the first hearing in this series, the leaders of the 9/11 commission, governor kaine and congressman hamilton, agreed that presidential advisers john brennan is in many respects performing the role that we envisioned for the dni when we offered the law. that troubles me, not due to any

doubts about mr. brennan's capabilities, but because of that choice, that structure undermines the statutory role of the dni. we assess therefore the fundamental question, are changes in the long required in order to realize the potential of the dni, or is this simply a matter of more fidelity to the 2004 law. admiral, thank you for being here today, and i look forward to hearing your testimony. >> thanks very much, senator collins. admiral blair, it's all yours. thanks for being here. [inaudible] >> sir, could you just push the button on the microphone. they can expect think you for inviting me here today. it's common to improve the effectiveness of government after some disaster or crisis. and, in fact, intelligence act of 2004 the board of 9/11 as you

mentioned, mr. chairman. but i think that reform in the wake of success also has a history. those who live the great victory of world war ii knew that there were major improvements to be made in the national security organizations and when the prayed for over a passable legislation to make the country safer. so, as we support, as we celebrate the brave talk and brilliant work of those of down and attacked osama bin laden in his hideout, i believe that now is a similar time for both lost to make this nation's intelligence enterprise even more effective than india's. and as i look to our future national security challenges and opportunities, i'm absolute convinced we need an intelligence community that operates under authorities that are relevant to the future, not to the past. and intelligence committees organized on a rational basis, and an intelligence community that is integrated under a strong and competent director of national intelligence. i is that the administration a year ago frustrated with lack of

support for a strong dni. but i've been reluctant to publicly before this committee were my comments could perhaps be misinterpreted. .. or service intelligence organizations along with the other seven intelligence organizations of the government, these people who are in that

organization are every bit as patriotic and skilled as members of the armed forcess and first responders whose heroism makes us proud. we owe them integrated leadership. let me run down areas where i think we can do more. first, organization. the department of defense and the intelligence community conduct operations together under separate titles, title x and title l. to take action against al qaeda or drug cartels or outlaw states, a new title is needed for joint interagency task forces that can bring the abilities of both organizations under unified direction. we need a title lx. the structure of the central intelligence agency, one of the most important of the agencies, is one organization that collects human intelligence and covert operations and another organization that provides intelligence analysis of which the greatest proportion is

provided by the nsa. the procedure and cultures of these two organizations are very different and the co location yield little synergy and has little disadvantages. i recommend that the cia be broken into and analytical agency and national service each led by a career professional with fixed term, each reporting separately to the director of national intelligence and i recommend some elements of the defense intelligence agency is performed an analysis on human intelligence and be added to those two agencies. moving to authorities, current constitutional precedent have little application of the information age and the efforts to adapt them have been unsuccessful. the national security agency have the world's best ability to provide protection for the country's internet domains yet it is not securing the important

dot.gov domain that you use in congress and the vital infrastructure of the dot.com domain. the cyberdefense should report to the secretary of homeland security and the director of nsa to bring nsa's capabilities to bear to protect the vital systems. right now there is no legislation that authorizeds cyberoperations by the united states against enemy that use the internet to threaten american lives and property. extremist websites provide practical bombmaking advice. drug cartels use the internet to arrange delivery of drugs and purchase weapons. for an outlaw nations are making a cyberplans that threaten vital interests. because these threats are carried out on american internet servers or there's a possibility of collateral damage from an attack or the hostile actor and a legal action has not occurred

the united states has no basis to serve quick effective action we need against these threats. the country needs such legislation. it should include limitations related to the proportion of what is being done, related to avoiding collateral damage that these oversight mechanisms and legislative branches provide a basis for action commensurate with the threat. the authority of the dni within the intelligence community. you both stated -- i believe it was correct, intelligence community leader -- needs a leader. and integrator, latka coordinator. the intelligence community does not self synchronize. you organizations do. we learned that on 911. the white house has neither the staff nor the time to lead it and approved misguided schemes of the country learned to lazaro in the past, in past instances. the authority that congress intended to -- is not intact.

a portion migrated to the director of the cia and it is up to the national security council staff. the result is a confusion of responsibility and gaps our enemies can exploit. we can strengthen the accountability of the dni. first, personnel. addition to naming or concurring with the head of the intelligence elements currently provided, the dni should approve the appointment of second or third level officials. this of 40 will ensure community minded officers occupy important posts for much of the real work intelligence has done. second, budget. dni budget authority is armstrong in future years but relatively weak in the current fiscal year. he or she should have the authority to initiate reprogramming of agency budgets

for urgent and emerging from the active -- objectives like network security against new threats. success against osama bin laden should not cause us to arrest. we are long way from integrated intelligence community's smoothly interacting with the department of defense and homeland security. with integration driven by a strong dni and competent staff and i believe congressional action is indispensable. the intelligence community is an unfinished piece of business. i find it reassuring that you see fit to keep this challenge a law that takes seriously the progress we need to make and i am happy to answer your questions. >> thanks very much the personal admiral blair. i appreciate what you said at the beginning but no one listening to your statement could think you were here all of

some personal belief. the fact is we asked you and it is totally substantive and exactly why we ask you because you are part of a very small group of people who have been in the dni. you have that perspective and bring to it everything else you have done. we will do seven minute rounds of questions. let me ask you this question to begin with adjusted some up what senator collins said. i was fascinated by different points from witnesses which were jane harman and general hayden, suggest that it may be as critical, accepting the bowl, the strength of legitimacy of

intermediate precedents 4 be critical to achieving that goal to the president and congress in a different way to add on to the statutory authority of the dni. i wonder what you think. it may not me and either/or question. give me an impression how the non statutory recognition authority given to the offices? >> i would agree with that observation. active support from the white house and the congress make it a lot easier for a director to fill in the gaps of authority and legislation. that would be a good thing. however, i don't think that is the reason for the congress not to continue to strengthen the

intelligence community integration in a way that irtpa was designed to do because administration and personalities come and go but the responsibility to the legislation to establish the structure in accordance with what we have learned over time. what we have learned over time, this is not the lead time the congress has attempted to integrate related but not really cooperating agencies, national security legislation of 1947 which brought the services together based on the results of world war ii. the goldwater nicholas act, creation of the department of homeland security, difficult to bring children who think they're happy into an orphanage. it doesn't always go easily. it takes persistence and

dedication to believe this is the right thing and i think congress has a role. right now there are two models of an intelligence community we have seen in the last five years. one is one in which the director of national intelligence is expected to integrate the community and to be responsible and another in which that authority is spread around people and the white house picks and chooses what it will use. right now we see the model going towards that second model which the executive branch now believes, i think the first model is more correct and i think that is what the congress intended and we need to continue to push that and five years into dni, we had -- actually six years -- we are making good

progress and continue to bring that out. >> let me talk about some of the authority the dni has and later i would like to come back to your very interesting suggestions. the 2004 legislation gave budget authority to the dni. that includes having final say over the intelligence community budget that is presented to the president and certain authorities, budget allocation and personal authority related to how the intelligence community spends its budget during the fiscal year. in your prepared testimony you call for the dni to have increased, quote, controllership over authority so that agencies under the dni could not seek to circumvent the dni on the budget

issues. i want to ask how strong the authorities the dni had over the budget have been in the practice at least during your period of time and whether you think the dni has full utilized those authorities over budget development for future fiscal years and research transferred during the fiscal year. >> yes, sir. there are two important background points. in the last ten years, a time of rising budgets for the intelligence community for the department of defense of the tough budget trade-offs have generally been taken care of by putting more money on them rather than read prioritization. we so -- we shall see budgets that are flat and perhaps decrease in and that will make the central ability to make trade offs more important.

the second item was just due to the number of tasks in dni early on, there was not a strong support structure for budget trade-offs. my experience was in the department of defense. analysis and evaluation, the strong established comptroller of the secretary of defense had not been established. those were coming into majority when i was dni and i spent a great deal of time trying to strengthen them. i find for the end of my time i had the tools to use the budget authority. let me give you two examples of what i am talking about because they came out during my final months in the job. i came back from a trip to afghanistan horrified by the lack of language ability that we had among our officers in that country. i won't give you the numbers but

a number of dashed in --pashtun speakers was more than i thought was safe. language ability in the beginning, agencies were -- it was time to say all right, now. we will move the money in and make it happen. that is the sort of thing i am talking about. well-meaning agencies with their own authorities gave national priority to drip down. you need to be able to punch it. >> were you able to do that at that point? >> at that point it was -- we had to come to another conversation and i was going to give them one more chance to do it themselves and i left. that is where it stood. >> do you feel you had the

authority -- >> i was going to find out. that would have been the first one. >> you were right. >> the more usual thing is what happened after the detroit bombing in december of 2009. abdul matullah. we have obvious problems in the search engines that were available to counterintelligence that required banks of computers and different skills on different systems. you heard from the final report we missed some of those and part of it was due to analysts not being able to hit one quick or have the answer come back. a lot of skill which people often don't have everything they need. we needed more money to fix that problem and my job was to spread it out. there were different battle on how to spread it out and each agency said i ought to get the lion's share of the work so

those are different problems legal putting it on the thing i was talking about in terms of real controllership which i was used to the secretary of defense being able to do routinely. that is what i am talking about. >> well said. senator collins. >> thank you. you were talking about abdul t matullah and the programs brought about by that intelligence failure. were you consulted by the attorney-general on the decision to charge him as if he were a criminal suspect? >> i was not consulted on that particular decision, nor do i think i would have had much to

add. i think the key role of the director of national intelligence during the questioning phase of a suspect once apprehended were arrested, how much do we mean on intelligence gathering and how much do we lean on gathering material for a prosecution which involves different sets of protocol. the most famous one everyone talks about is the reading of miranda rights and the provision of lawyer and so on. abdul matullah was not consulted on that either. you know from hearings that the decisions made by the agents at the scene, it was not really supervise and we didn't have the high value interrogation group to take that. but i believe strongly that would be point at which the director of national intelligence was represented and should make and put. the goal is to do both. so the attorney general can make

a decision. unmuted -- military tribunal or nothing. if you have to make a trade-off you need to say ok, we are drilling ahead to get intelligence information and we will back off on gathering evidence. that is what we should be involved in. >> i realized we had gone through that issue before but the reason i brought it up again is i want to lay the predicate for my next question which is what is the role of the dni when a terror suspect is apprehended? it seems to me that one of the first calls, if it is a surprise apprehension, should be to the dni so that a surge can be done immediately of all data bases so

that intelligence analysts -- which is now set up, could be flown out to wherever they need to go. but i wanted to hear from you more what you see as the role -- you are starting to get into that. i was not trying to relive who told what but for those who were not around when we explore that before. i wanted to lay the predicate. >> the theme from your speech and my testimony and thinking, i have become passionately to believe that we need to be able to quickly bring together the skills of anybody in government and many outside of government who can apply their skills to us. let's say on a surprise we apprehend a number of al qaeda in the arabian peninsula. we should get the best intelligence, the best counterterrorist analysts. at the same time the best fbi

interrogators, the best people in the fbi who have been working terrorism. it should be structured process with a quick conversation. different equis and approaches. we have a decisionmaking process that a call can be made in terms of that balance and under tremendous time pressure, minutes, hours at the most, people proceed in accordance with that guidance. you have to practice some first. people can't meet the first time when it is a real one and set up those procedures that can do it. have such good people that they can do the job perfectly but there are certain key questions. the balance between gathering evidence and gathering intelligence that need to be made at the top and there's a

conflict and in the case of abdul matullah we have done all we -- we had all the evidence. the guy had a bomb and tried to blow it up. we didn't need a lot of self recrimination in that category and we should have leaned harder on intelligence throughout than we did because we had a special conviction, i thought. that is the kind of decision you need to make and practiced procedures to do it. >> as i look at the dni or any position in washington, there are really three levels of power. one is access to the president. the second is authority over personnel. and the third is control over the budget. i would like to talk about those issues with you starting with the personnel issue. part of our work concept was to try to have a goldwater nichols

like joint approach to service in the intelligence community. i am sure it took the military and awful long time to embrace that. but now, at least from my outside perspective, the military really have largely embraced join this -- jointness. where are we in having that kind of joint approach where personnel is shared among agencies and where your ability to advance in your career in the intelligence community depends on joint service? >> senator, i think your provisions were exactly right. they are biting within the intelligence community. i tried to compare it to the

five years in to the goldwater nichols act. it is sort of comparable to the effect it is having and it will take time. two trends encourage me. number one, as i talked to people the under they are the more they get it. half of the heroes in the intelligence community joined after 9/11 for the right reasons. they are prone to sharing. they don't care the baggage of bureaucratic prerogative and all that we grew up with, the past bureaucratic wars we felt were so important and which didn't help the country much. so as they age and get to jobs, trends are good. the second one is in the field and you have taken many visits, you walk into an intelligence center in afghanistan, in iraq, just about anyplace in the

world, you find people, cia, the armed forces, other pieces of information, they are growing up in this atmosphere. as they bring us back all we have to do is provide a modicum of structure so you are not rewarded for bad behavior or forget the stuff -- you ought to bring it back and use it and it will take over. we are ahead in the right direction but i am impatient at the scale. i thought we decided this. let's get on with it. the next generation, right on the cusp of leadership within the agency, is going to be more joint minded and if we get the structure is right they will fall into it. you have to realize you can be proud of your own agency. you can say i am a cia person

but you need this pride in the team and in every body doing well and you do well too. when you haven't experienced it, you faint pride is a fixed amount. if somebody else gets some it subtracts some from what you said and what we found in both pride and effectiveness go up exponentially when you can sort of get over the hump of that jointness and working together. putting special attention on second or third level people is a piece of that. >> thank you. your point about the generational change is absolutely right. we are seeing that with the use of technology and networking and sharing data bases, that is what the next generation does

naturally. thank you. >> the others thing i would add is i hope cents 9/11, people within the intelligence community understand that they can come under great public including congressional criticism, in a look back, and appears one or another part of the community including the military, we were talking about playing on the team and the team suffered for. tea change i have a couple quick questions. general hayden testified there needs to be a balance between freedom of action, the effort for the hole. is that balance achievable given the current structure of the i see and and what relationship between the dni at 16 intelligence agencies be

improved or strengthened? >> freedom of action and what was the other dilemma? >> freedom of action for the part in the unity of the effort as a whole. is that balance achievable? >> i think it is very much achievable. what you find is in the best organizations that achieve that balance people come in as an expert in their own field, they are more than just sitting there waiting to say if you want a piece of human intelligence i will gather that for you. they go in with an attitude of being able to contribute what they can do and based on their better understanding of other people's problems, how they can contribute in ways that are not traditional. i see that word time and time again when you run these games, bring people in with the attitude that everybody needs to

contribute all they can and may be more and magic happens in that interaction. i see that in terms of the intelligence community that can gather intelligence, using our wondrous collection capabilities in new ways. i have seen it in action teams. one of the most poignant things i saw when i was visiting one of our bases in a dangerous part of the world and a young case officer told me the story she had been on her way to a meeting in a restaurant with a new recruit, complete -- agency monitoring the situation picked up warning of danger. they had been able to get a phone call to her and turned around and go to the restaurant and say lesson learned. it is that kind of teamwork in the field that i think becomes -- you create an atmosphere in

which it is expected and valued. >> i want to say thank you for your service in your position. general hayden testified the creation of the undersecretary of defense for intelligence undermined congress's attempts to strengthen the dni because of secretary rumsfeld's authority on direction and control of the major defense intelligence agencies to the usdi. explain your relationship and does the role hindered the dni's authority in the future directions of the entire ic? >> that was not my experience. i talked to the undersecretary of defense he and i worked well

together and if he were sitting here i am confident he would say the same thing. senator lieberman was involved in some of the thanks from the department of defense when irtpa was written. it dissipated by the time i had the honor of being dni. i think there are two important reasons for this. number one is the importance security challenges we face these days have so much military aspect mixed with non-military aspect, economic, social, others. to get off of the military aspect of a problem and say that is for the pentagon and this other stuff is for dni, it is long gone. if you look at our big problems on terrorism and iraq the military aspects and nonmilitary aspects are all together and you

have to use your intelligence capabilities whether there signal intelligence which happened to be eco located in dod or a hybrid -- look at the whole question. we are driven towards this unity. second, the officers or civilians in the case of the head of indy a have grown up in this join gary weaver discussing earlier and they understand the advantages of teamwork and the synergy that can come from that. i didn't have any strong her teammates than community integration and general alexander and general burgess, that leadership was strong and the usdi in my observation was part of the team also. i didn't see that. i know the historical fault line, it seems to have been

helped and secretary gates had some piece of my job previously. >> thank you, appreciate it. >> thank you, senator brown. for the record, jennifer -- general clapper -- a good working relationship. he had with you. these are interesting comparisons because this is a case where the personalities that exist in these positions under secretary rumsfeld were part of the problem if i can call it that. as you said correctly secretary gates comes to this position after spending most of the military intelligence community but you must have no general clapper before. you have knowledge of each other and a willingness to work together and did for the

nation's benefit. it is interesting as i told you that during the legislative battles on the intelligence reform act of 2004 that the toughest ones were with the defense department. the changes we were bringing about, strengthening dni. and yet in practice, the tension between the dni and the dod have been less than what was negotiated at the negotiating table. without being specific i would say it was the opposite for other components of the ic. i apologize for having to break the flow. the vote is going on on an important judicial nominations so i will ask that we stand in recess and i will be back as soon as i can to continue the questions. thank you.

[inaudible conversations] >> we are live this morning is the u.s. institute of peace and the asia society released a report on the future of pakistan recommendations for improving the country's government, economy and security situation. we expect reports from a former pakistani government official and a pakistani journalist. is live coverage on c-span2. >> all right. if we could come to order of a sort. good morning and welcome to united states institute of peace. we are particularly happy that you are among the first to enjoy the conference facilities in our new headquarters here. it looks like one more closed room. it has a lot of capabilities and i hope you will get a chance to

see some of the rest of the building even though parts of it are in secure areas. high and the deputy provost the international conflict management and peace building. you sip as many of you know was established by congress in 1984 as an independent national institution dedicated to preventing, resolve and manage 5 international conflict around world. the subject of our panel today, pakistan is a place where we are thinking about preventing by the conflict, is on everyone's mind. like the asia society which is hosting the event we are a non-profit and non-partisan institution. we worked in the field, in the classroom and do comprehensive research and publications, have many partners in the asia

society. one of them. i won't mention all the things we worked with the we did a joint grand project. we have an ongoing series of events at the asia society headquarters in new york on korea, another very important issue in international conflict, war and peace. and the asian society helped us with one of the first courses we did in the new academy with some expertise on china. another very important part of the world. no country in asia is more central to questions of peace and conflict then pakistan. we are pleased to offer this then you in washington for the asia society to launch its report on pakistan 2020 -- "pakistan 2020: a vision for building a better future".

usip's adviser who will be part of the study group that put this together, we think it is a good report that will be an interesting battle and we look forward to your active participation under the ground rules that we set forward. i would like to turn this over to my colleague and counterpart from the asia society who will give you the second welcome for the day and we will get to the panel. suzanne dimaggio of the asian society. >> thank you and good morning. and thank you for that introduction. let me begin by saying how thrilled we are, me and my colleagues, to be part of one of the inaugural events at this fabulous new building. we hold our partnership with usip and we look forward to continuing our work together. let me begin by thanking members

of the study group who put this report together. several of them are here for our discussion in addition to our director hassan abbas who i will introduce momentarily. we have christopher candland from wellesley college and our special guest and our special guest is najam sethi and travel away from pakistan today. i would like to extend our gratitude to the late richard holbrooke who served as chairman of asia society for seven years prior to becoming the u.s. special representative for afghanistan and pakistan and we dedicate this report in his memory. the asia society established a study group to assess the political, economic and social developments and challenges faced by pakistan today. it provides recommendations on a way forward, how the country can

pave a path towards peace and stability in the coming decade. the group's report which we are launching today in washington presents a comprehensive package of recommendations aimed at promoting sustainable, constitutional democracy, credible and effective rule of law, significant expansion and improvement in social development the especially education and health sectors and a peaceful resolution of the conflict with india. as you can see we set an ambitious goal for ourselves. before i turn the podium over to hassan abbas who will present the key findings, i would like to take notes of a few unique aspects of this initiative. which i think sets it apart from other efforts. firstly, it is really the first report of its kind in recent years to include a significant

number of leading experts from pakistan and the united states. 31 representatives in all representing a range of sectors. members include not only former diplomats, military leaders and intelligence officials, but also economists, specialists, scientists and experts in the fields of health, education, governance and natural resources management. additionally, rather than viewing pakistan exclusively through a security lens which seems to be the norm these days, we focus on the security challenges but also the economic challenges. we think this is important to get a fuller picture of the way forward. finally, rather than dwelling on what is wrong with pakistan, relief easy to be cynical about it and rather than quick

temporary fixes the group focused on generating pragmatic recommendations aimed at improving the country with a long-term -- this past wednesday we had the new york city launch event at asia society headquarters in new york. that event is on our web site if you like to view it at asiasociety.org/pakistan2020. other resources are available there too. you can follow us on facebook at asia society and also at twitter at asia society and even created a tag for the report. pak20 pak2020. social in the conversation. i am pleased to introduce hassan abbas. you all have his bio in front of you. in the interest of time let me just say hassan abbas is one of the leading experts on pakistan and u.s./pakistani relations.

he is a fellow at the asia society and professor at columbia university south asia institute. he previously served as a government official in the administration, prime minister benazir bhutto and president purpose. our of. please join me in welcoming hassan abbas. thank you. [applause] >> thank you. welcome once again on behalf of the asia society. i welcome pakistan at the institute here. we are very pleased to oversee this event with the asia society. i want to set a few ground rules to let everyone know how we will proceed and sayre couple words. please make sure your cellphone are turned off or on silent and make sure you remember to turn them on when you leave the room.

also for the panelists since we are on tv i request you speak from the podium and speak as close to the mike as possible to -- the trajectory of the mike will work. we will begin with hassan abbas giving a report for ten minutes or so. after that, we have our two panelists say a few words about the report. i will come back to hassan abbas if he has any response to what was set on the panel and make sure we have ample time for intervention from the floor. i also request members who say anything from the floor if they want. let me join in congratulating you for this report. the number of activities which are ongoing on the future of pakistan seems to be the flavor

of the day. so projections and predictions and forecasts which i am part of myself as well. this is the most comprehensive and holistic product which i have seen so far so i want to congratulate you. it has the right mix of people. still i think it had a right mix of people which we don't see, pakistani and international experts. thank you very much. >> thank you very much, usip and asia society. it is an honor to be here for the third time in a month or so. i want to begin by thanking the asia society for the freedom to work on this project that they gave me and support from all the members. you see the names on the list.

from the former chief of pakistan to the human rights activist on the other side and some of the leading names who have worked on pakistan for years and many others. i am honored that he is here also. former diplomat -- very interesting combination and different viewpoints. i want to begin by framing the issue by saying that in south asia, you mention the word 2020, first thing that comes to mind is cricket. that is so because a new form of cricket has come in to play. we had a one day cricket match. 2020 is the limited overmatch. you need a lot of hard hitting.

it is very unpredictable. it takes a lot of energy and can go anywhere. still talking about cricket. the next thing i did which i encourage you to do is google 2020 or pakistan 2020. on the very first page, the second and third reports are very interesting. the second is in 2008 or 2009 that by 2020 pakistan will be a super power. the third report says 2020, pakistani will be erased from the map of the world. the person who wrote that report -- in capital letters. our conclusions are in between that. [laughter]

exactly. i will come to that in detail. let's go to the courage of philosophy which was behind this. there is nothing very unique in terms of the proposal but this is a set of proposals -- very different viewpoints. in many cases -- i was confirmed by the former army chief who were very supportive. some very strong criticisms and i would like to mention two of those because they were off of significant value. a final critique in terms of look at the whole concept again. look at optimism again. those are important questions. my mentors and very seasoned

established and respected scholars. i mention that because to challenge each of those things we decided to focus on seven issues. ranging from military relations and democracy to issues focused on education and health care and focused on energy. the next point was the relationship with india. these forces within the and in the neighborhood and glad we have implementation. it is not that we do this randomly. i go to these not in the manner of the frequency we mentioned in the report but the kind that we tried to devise and focus on one or two recommendations, the central recommendation, democratic control should expand.

there is no rocket science involved in this but how will that be done? we are talking about a country where democracy is not new. i need not remind this audience -- the democratic leadership in pakistan in many ways, at the end of the day the people of pakistan and four opinions pushed the military to get us out. in one case -- the other died in a plane crash. otherwise many people really pushed the dictators out. the question is despite -- the democracy rate, very poor understanding of how democracy should work. as i mentioned, dictatorships and military, it is irrespective of civility that it brings but

the central issue here is democratic control can expand. it comes from education and providing basic resources and no elected city. and shortages and no difference for that whether it is a political or military leader in pakistan. they are very well aware of the new parliament house, to buy the new staff for the f-16, for political leadership to come up with new aid packages. y no one sat together across from people and said what is our energy demand? one section on education, we must be commended, the government of pakistan established a task force called

education, going on for that called education images, some very brilliant pakistani is produced an excellent report. it used to be on the web site. after the report came out people said this was government funded and state control but they are very critical of government policies and everyone appreciated five or six day ago even the web site of that should be gone. just try it. educationtaskforce.com. it is not there. even the group is this man. i can guaranteed -- of the military, they were extremely

serious. the government issue of political leadership. it can make a difference. and the education budget after 1.5 at the least, spend that on the schools. this is very simple and clear. that is why we are suggesting at the top, should have discussion in the parliament. we are in greasing the amount of nuclear weapons, the amount of schools. and in pakistan, the most suspect and seasoned journalists inspired so many in pakistan and successful off of these big

names in pakistan. a little bit of problems that is working. the question i am working for is why media is not challenging this issue. this is not against military or one group or the other. it is a fundamental question. a country which needs aid after every other year, why they are using that outside aid not for -- that is where democracy is an issue. the government of pakistan, political leadership, that will be done by government. we tried to give that agenda. education and health care, i can show you the amount of money in something that was manageable. let me link this to two other issues. proposing for that to happen,

for this reform development leaders the extension of democratic government, for that to happen, very critical. both pakistan -- realized they had every trick in the book from supporting not state actors to going to the united nations to making the legal case to talking through political dialogue and so many other ways. there is no way out but for pakistan and india to strengthen the peace process. this is not unique. is not out of the box. 2004-2007 pakistan -- quite a successful and effective use of forces has restarted. that has to be strengthened. without that, without that, development of democracy in pakistan might not be able to

get -- the second -- what has to be done in that reform is to work out two or three more. the second thing that has to happen is -- in that sector a difficult section of internal security. many of the urban centers, the flag is no longer being hoisted. in the beginning of school time, the national anthem is no more be insane. this is very serious. is not unprecedented but it is very serious. this new political government and military leadership, they are thinking about this. a financial package to talking to some of the leaders. that is happening. the central thing which needs to be done and this is something i talked-about at least twice before the last couple of

months, it deserved to be emphasized again reform of law-enforcement in pakistan. the report i was involved in which was part of this effort, we are talking about the organization, intelligence organization that law enforcement organizations, significant energy available. there is a reform effort in pakistan going on. am especially mentioning this

outside support will only work hard and develop capacity for democracy or x project for 20 years. it is not enough -- commitment or political debate on this side for long division. and law-enforcement and restructuring pakistan. in many cases, in a couple of cases related to osama bin laden and others being pursued by pakistan there was -- received by the pakistani. military intelligence said we can handle this aspect better.

they were not trying to save that. it is just they held him in custody in such a fashion that this person was returned to police and they had to take him to court. he was announcing questions of interrogation. he gave some information out to the investigation. this is to the united states policy also but when the person was taken to court there was not enough evidence. so law enforcement was critical without that, cannot work out. i would like to close. i have taken my time with a glimpse of some of these ideas in that report. we wanted a comprehensive approach. thank you to others who recognizes this because looking -- so deep into one issue that

we forget the conflict. the criticism of house things develop in an progress but if this criticism develops an alternate idea, that is meaningless at the time. our ideas will work, we are not very sure but we want to start and encourage this. the ideas matter. it is not a lost cause. don't give up on pakistan. and close this rift as a point of a legendary pakistani and we have that point right in the beginning of the force and just see one of these and i will drop this and that is the message and its self. president purpose spend of the new year and is most famous. this tells folks something about what pakistan expects. it is called humdinger.

[speaking foreign tongue].. >> in the current circumstances it may go in the direction. that's why we are saying the time for remedial years, reform is now. otherwise it might be too late.

thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you. thank you, hassan. i can tell you have taken these critiques too hard. you haven't left me optimistic, that's for sure. let me introduce our next speaker, he was the editor in chief of the friday times leading pakistani weekly. also has one of the most popular media talk shows in pakistan on geo television. also runs a publication, and much, much more. the bios in details outside your for me, especially in but also because i started my writing with the friday times and row four about six years. so, mr. editor, all yours.

>> ladies and gentlemen, i am pleased, delighted, honor to be here today amongst this gathering. thank you very much for inviting me. pakistan-u.s. trouble, some of us -- one reason only. the relationship has been since 9/11 ambiguous on both sides. and that ambiguity is now coming to haunt this relationship. but i'm sure we will have time to discuss that relationship in the session that follows. i've been told to just refine my remarks to this report for the time being. i will talk very briefly of two issues. to critical core issues that hassan has raised if the question of civil military relations, and the question of

india-pakistan relations. in many ways, these are the necessary conditions for any reform to take place in pakistan. and so, therefore, these are core issues. civil military relations, hassan has a list of all the things that need to be done to restore this balance in favor of the civilians. that, of course, is easier said than done. the question is not what needs to be done, but how to do it. and that is an issue that has grappled the minds of all our analyst at all our politicians today. and every government to date has been hostage to the military. but there is some good news on that school. and in an ironic sort of way, it's the recent incident that has triggered this new debate in pakistan. and, frankly, it is an

unprecedented intervention right now that is taking place in pakistani politics. until now, the national security doctrine, has formulated by the military, has never been the subject of any debate or discussion inside parliament or a months the main street political parties. or indeed among the sections of the media. this has been taken for granted. i.e. that pakistan's obsession with its security problem with india is a correct obsession come and that there is such a threat. and, therefore, we need to retain a strong military presence in the country. that is now being debated. and it's ironic that were as we should be asking about the u.s.-pakistan relationship, and why the incident happened, what led to it, we are instead asking in pakistan about where all that

money is going that we've been feeding our military, if the military couldn't stop two helicopters from coming in and operating in pakistan for three hours. so, what has been happening to all the money that has been earmarked for the military year after year after year? if the military cannot even locate two helicopters or is completely unaware of the existence of its backyard for stitches. this is making the military very uncomfortable. the question everyone is asking in pakistan is, not whether the military was complicit, but whether the military is up to the job is even something to do. so in that sense, chickens are coming home to roost. and it's not just the question of is the military up to the job, the media is now talking about the defense budget.

the media is saying, tell us how much money we've been getting over the years and where it's going. and the media is saying, we want accountability. the media has always talked about the accountability of the politicians. it's been out of session, corruption amongst the civilians. the dysfunctionality of the civilians. but for once the boot is on the other foot. it is not the military that is the object of divisions and criticism. there is better news. the leader of the opposition who, as everyone knows, was in many ways the creation of the regime. has suddenly woken up and

realized that the civil military relationship has to be changed completely overhauled. number one. and no less significantly, he has said publicly that our obsession with india must end. india is not the enemy. this is unprecedented. and it's significant that bush arif is saying it. people's parties always said it. we always said it. but it didn't matter. when we said it -- when the people's party said it, it was a security hazard any security risk. but what can they say? he is the son of the soil. the same so the sustained military. they can't call him an indian agent. he has said we want accountability of the military. and most significant, he said i'm not asking for the

resignation of president or prime minister. i want accountability of the military. i want an institution inquiry, an independent inquiry. and this military does not want that inquiry. this military has been everything to stall such an inquiry. which is why the ask the general to conduct an inquiry, first to say that they should be no inquiry, we only had a review. but then under pressure from the media, they have succumbed to the notion of the idea of an inquiry. and then they went to parliament to ensure that the inquiry would be not terribly embarrassing. and again, it was the opposition to put pressure on parliament on the other members of government to go through the motions of a more serious and cori. and we still have to see where that would go. so there is good news.

the civil military is under discussion. militaries budgets are now the focus of attention. the other area i wish i would like to just make a brief remark is, of course it's not enough for nawaz sharif to say that india is no longer be any pickup for him not to be branded as in any nation because you cannot be more patriotic than the son of nawaz sharif. so what is the status of india-pakistan relationships? i remember going on a trip with former prime minister to india in 2004. just when the diplomacy was launched. and this was a solemn occasion, and he was talking to india about the proposed pipeline.

the indians in turn said will talk about the pipeline but what about our trade? what about other issues in pakistan was not right to talk straight. well, today, the situation is that pakistan is ready to talk straight. and the foreign secretaries, the secretaries of various departments in the area of commerce, foreign office, everybody is on the way to india and india is on their way to pakistan to talk. this is a very, very good development. it has the support of the opposition. the government is in favor and the army is not opposing it anymore. the interesting question that i want to raise here is, at the back channel worked beautifully, was about to achieve something.

certainly that was not a solution as position of u.n. resolution. far from a. gourmet concessions made in the back channel. which is why it went along well with india. but when we should have got into trouble in 2007, that process came to a halt. because indians felt that we got to get out of this before they could carry that process forward. and so maybe the pakistanis also said hey, hold on, let me get out of this trouble first. but, of course, that didn't happen. what did happen was mumbai. and, of course, the process was delayed. and i remember saying to my dear friends, don't derail the process. get back on track. this is why this thing happened in order to go. but, of course, in the politicians have to look at their own constituencies. and 43 years that process

stalled. and there was no obstacle from the pakistani side. i know that for a fact. he obstacles were all from india, the conditions are now being put forward by india. first do this, first do that, first do this, first do that. this despite the fact that the india prime minister i mentioned on two occasions, the indian prime minister was very keen to get back on track. but domestic politics stopped him from doing so. and yet they continue to put precondition. the preconditions are off the table. three years down the line we've lost a lot of time. but my great fear is preconditions are off the table, you as -- between india and pakistan, the u.s.-pakistan relations are important. and in many ways this is preeminent dialogue that determines everything else in that region in many ways. it's also the dialogue that has

an impact of civil-military relations in pakistan. and my fear is that just as there was once mumbai, there may be another. and then what will happen? will they be derailed again? and what if the responsible remarks from the indian side, as we saw recently by the indian army chief, that if the americans can do it, so can we. well of course the americans can do it. and, of course, you can't do it. and the appropriate response was given not to the americans, but to the indians, which has created another problem. intelligence had told parliament that if india would want to undertake any such, regardless of whether we knew that they were doing it or we found out later, we had already earmarked

targets and done rehearsals and exercises in the way in which we would hit back. cause parliament to give him a thunderous applause. so those are the issues right now. there is good news and there is bad news. thank you. [applause] >> thanks, as always. eloquent to the point. mr. christopher candland, our next speaker, is the associate professor in the department of political science and codirector of the south east asia society. is also been a fellow at the woodrow wilson international scholars and has written extensively on south asia. >> thank you, we. i want to begin by thanking suzanne dimaggio and hassan

abbas and robert you and all the other folks at the asia society who have undertaken this important work. as hassan said earlier this morning, the purpose of this report is to take a comprehensive look at the problems facing pakistan, and toward that end i'd like to make three points, three related point. the first is that the stage relationship with pakistan has predominantly been in relationship with pakistan military and pakistan intelligence agency. whether it's been intentional or not, the fact is that u.s. government supported strengthen institutions of coercion in pakistan, and weakened institutions that promote rule of law. as the report notes, quote, top western civilian leaders, especially from washington, d.c., continue to meet with top military commanders in pakistan and one on one meetings without the involvement of officials in pakistan's ministry of defense. end of quote.

in another example the supreme court justice insisted that security agencies act in accordance with the constitution of pakistan, some years ago, by producing people for the security agencies have in their custody. and for that he was dismissed from office. it was convenient for the dingy the united states government, that general musharraf got rid of the supreme court justice. the u.s. government was then more concerned with pressing the war on terror in pakistan than in promoting the rule of law in pakistan. and it was not u.s. pressure that returns the justice to his chair. it was a movement, a popular mood in pakistan that led to the justice's reinstatement. we heard recently that more than 70% of the 20 billion u.s. dollars that have been given to pakistan since september 11 have gone to the military, and we've

heard this morning that it's unclear what the military has done with that. it's also unclear what has happened to the other 30%. that $6 billion over the last 10 years. and i also like to put that figure to perspective, it sounds like you a lot of money but it should be noted that the pakistani american community contributes an estimated $1 billion annually in cash, another 4 billion annually in labor to philanthropic activities. the second point, the people of pakistan should not be punished for the failings of their government. the military and intelligence agencies in pakistan has repeatedly undermined and overthrown civilian governments in pakistan. and the people of pakistan, as hassan mentioned overcome have repeatedly rose in defense of the democratic ranks. but we have witnessed recently

in tunisia and egypt has already happened three times in pakistan. in the late 1960s, in the late 1980s, and most recently in 2007 until 2009 in the so-called lawyers movement. there's no country on the planet, according to the pew charitable trust, whose population has a more this favorable view of the united states government than pakistan. the major source of anti-americanism, which i believe is really anti-u.s. government is a, in pakistan, is the popular perception that the u.s. government supports military governments for u.s. geostrategic interests, including the proxy war in afghanistan to dispel, to dispel the soviet union, and a direct war against the taliban today. and in the u.s. government abandons or even punishes the civilian government when u.s. geostrategic interests have been satisfied. the clearest example and most damaging instance of this

occurred in 1990 when president george herbert walker bush allowed sanctions against pakistan for its nuclear weapons program, only after the soviet army was out of afghanistan. as long as the soviet army was in afghanistan, u.s. presidents prevented those sanctions authorized by congress from going into effect. the military component of those sanctions in 1990 was lifted in 1995, but it was only after september 11, 2001, that the nonmilitary component of those sanctions was lifted. that's of course because the u.s. government needed the support of the pakistani military and intelligence agencies to prosecute the war in afghanistan. as hassan said on wednesday come in new york, at the launch that i watched, u.s. policy to

pakistan has included cared for the military and sticks for the people of pakistan. continued debate on the second point. the pakistani economy is in a very precarious state. at the government of pakistan is likely to cut government expenditure when the budget is announced next week's was the international monetary fund targets for government deficit reduction. that's not going to make it any easier to increase funding for health and education. a tax surcharge was imposed on those who are already paying taxes, and import duties will raised for the floods of last year. home and i want to note the discussion, the mayor discussion determined in u.s. aid to pakistan has already had a very negative effect on the precarious economy. earlier today in karachi the state bank of pakistan out of concern that the u.s. government might cut off aid to pakistan

decided not to pause its rays in the discount rate so as to dampen pakistan's inflation, which is running at 15% and is truly devastating for the tens of millions of pakistanis who managed to scrape by on the equivalent of two u.s. purchasing power dollars per day. so deep in the talk of cutting u.s. aid to pakistan is having a damaging effect. the third point, and final point, that i would like to make is a component of the report that i believe needs some greater attention, but is vital to pakistan's future. and that's the role of women in creating a just and peaceful pakistan. women's participation in public life is highly constrained by the neglect of their reproductive rights. on average, pakistani women have almost four children. at these rates pakistan will have a population of 450 million people by 2050.

research indicates that women in pakistan would like to have, on average, two children. arthur lewis, famously wrote in 1954, that the whole secret to economic development is raising the national saving rate from 2% to 4%. i believe that the key to pakistan's development is reducing pakistan's fertility rate from near 4% to more like 2%. i'm not saying this because pakistan's resources would be severely taxed and stressed with a population of 450 million people, although that is true. pakistan already suffers water scarcity crisis, an energy crisis, 3 million people enter the job market every year in pakistan and there are not 3 million new jobs for them. but the reason for saying that pakistan's fertility rate needs

to be lowered, more importantly come increasing women's opportunity for participation in public life. government attention to public health is very poor in pakistan. it was not until 2006 that the government about the word condom to be shown until the. president obama mentioned yesterday morning the commitment of u.s. government to infant and maternal health will increase and that pakistan should be focus of that commitment. 18,000 pakistani women die every year giving birth. that's far more than the number of women who died at the hands of militants in 2001. but the everyday security of women gets very little public attention. in pakistan there eight soldiers for everyone doctor. there's no secret to the key to higher public participation of women in lower fertility. it's a girl's education.

and in this regard, the report's recommendation that public expenditure on education the race from 1.5% to 4% is crucial, as is i think the proposal for quote and accountable and predictable system of teacher recruitment, and, of course. thank you. [applause] >> thanks. thanks a lot, chris. three very interesting sets of remarks. let me, if i may, take the moderate prerogative and just throw out a couple of questions to the panelists, and then after that we will open it up. hassan, you mentioned and najam also mentioned, the civil-military relations. and people in democracies and military. i think that's a popular view. you've got to look at what point

are looking at. if you go for an opinion poll in 2008, yes, because people were tired of which are. if you lived in 1998 or perhaps two years from now, the way things are going, you may have a different outcome. which is not to say people don't want democracy. i think is a more important point. i'm talking of the average man or woman on the street, not the middle-class. and so my question to you is something i have grappled with for a long time. which is, does civilian supremacy in pakistan, when the military, the status quo power, basically decides to go back to the barracks, which i don't know why it would? or that the civilians perform well enough, that the credibility of the government gets to the point that the people, this is the system we want. i think the feelings lie on both sides. you mentioned this issue of

india and pakistan. i have argued for the long street of time that pakistan's stability traveled to new delhi, whether we like it or not. the question is out if you're saying the problems, the conditions are being pulled from the indian side, india in this case is the status quo power and yes, there is the argument there is normalizing with pakistan. but is this going to a process, pakistan's stability, would it be held hostage to the peace process? if that doesn't move, and interactive always be problems? or is there a way that pakistan can move internally to appoint even without -- isn't necessary and self-sufficient or do something that must happen but if it doesn't we must move on? and chris, you raised the point of fertility rates, but i want to take it to a slightly deeper issue, which relates to this, which is here is a country that has multiple problems.

you've got to do all these things. the only problem i would have is i don't of any country in the world that can do all of this in a given period of time. there is not a country with all sorts of problems. and so the fertility part is also a sensitive, not just about education. there's a lot of a lot of undertones attach, et cetera. is there a way pakistan can prioritize what this report has put out? and perhaps if you can comment on this as well. because in some ways you are overwhelming a state which is are we so much in trouble by saying this is it, and good luck. how does one go about? again, you don't have to enter everything but i thought i would throw these out. >> thank you very much. first i want to make a connection, and then becomes which would message which is a website that a major, pakistan education task force was indeed off but it is back up and i

checked it so that is good news. and they say was because of a server problem, which i doubt. [laughter] but the good news is, the good news is that it is up and it is back and it means it is not dispense i must correct my words that and i had mentioned that is a really great effort. it will test. about police question, i think it is a central question about democracy. my point of view is and i think that's also reflected from the views of other people in the mention of that report. democracy takes time. it is a step-by-step process. one example, 99 years, pakistan -- got almost largely discredited. a military dictator by coming in made those even discredited leaders are discredited parties to come to extend. made them relevant again.

if the process -- this is one argument. irrespective of the performance, 11 or 12 years at a stretch, the challenge comes up for 10 years. are democracies in the first two years people start asking questions. partly because people you're actually right, but we, because expectation can be voted, we want change. but the role of a pakistani intelligence agencies, especially isi in 1990, it's now very well documented, how they would play a central role in making an and making of the government. if that role is taken out, military, no decide to go back on its own. they are pushed out. i don't want to repeat the slogan because you're on the street when you have to go out. even his own, he went to his home and one of his children was using that against him, not know what it means because it was so popular.

it was heard everywhere. he was pushed out. another was too busy to spend pakistan but he also at the end of it he couldn't stay. another lost a lot of credibility. musharraf, loyalist movement, and in the current context pakistani political leadership, it seems learned the lessons. he very rightly said, nawaz sharif has played the game in 1990 whenever he can get a chance to come back into the government with the support of the military, he might, had a good he might need some support from the military. in a way, but by and large just taken a very strong stand which was unexpected, unprecedented also. let's talk very briefly about this political government. yes, there is a credibility issue but look at the things they have done. constitutional amendments, bringing all the parties together, the national finance,

talking to the rebels, going to a party in karachi, ensuring that all the coalition remains in place, starting a few other party systems. this is happening with pakistan is facing this activity. their military is not ready to go back. where u.s. demands are increasing, the united states when it comes to the military leaders, and i'm thankful for reminding me of that statement about carrots, military and sticks for the people of pakistan and large accepting the last two or three is, maybe kerry-lugar bill change that forced there by thousand historic. i was making the case that whenever there's a military leader, united states is somewhat soft in dealing or interacting with those whose. when they come into government,

american demand also skyrocketed at times making demands which are well-intentioned, which are the right policy but basic impossible for the political leader to remain popular and get elected next time. so despite these challenges it is a political government which is surviving, that's a big thing. this is how it will change. it again you're right, what is the feeling on the street? i 100% agree. people say we need stability. maybe we want -- an issue of identity. when you start reading in the fifth grade books that all your great invaders from central asia to south asia, but also the leaders are heads of state, when it is in your mind to it is the islamic tradition every great leader, when you see a general you feel this is according to the book that i read, this is according to the narrative, so

those things change in a step-by-step process. >> you know what? one reason why i talked only of two issues in the india-pakistan, and a civil military, it's because they are linked. and governance is linked to that. at it is a link to that. everything is linked to the. political stability is linked to the. so to answer your question, yes, i think the peace process has to come to a combination. it is a necessary condition. it's not a sufficient condition at all. sufficiency will require good governance and stability in pakistan. having said that, you talked about the military's popularity going up and down, yes. the military's population was down in 1971. the military's popularity was up whenever military dictator seizes power.

and it was down when ever we kicked dictator out. and the same thing happened with musharraf. he was very popular when he took power. and extremely unpowered when he lost power. the interesting thing is that apart from the time for that military men were able to leave, there are other times you can also gauge the popularity of the military. and only recently, until this particular incident, general kayani and the military enjoyed a very high degree of respect and confidence. and all have shown consistently that the people of pakistan trusted and believed in the military more than any other institution, by far, including the judiciary. but a few to take take a poll today, that would not be the case. so we now have a situation which is different. from what we have seen in the past. this is not a moment when the military, the military's stock

is high, not what it was in power but when it was out of power. the military's stock is down, even at -- so this is the first time you have to indicators. my feeling is that this is a very significant moment for pakistan, and that the military will have a hard time living this down. partly because for the first time the media has come in to ask very important questions, which has never happened before. this is the same the media who in 2009 was actually saluting general kayani for having had to restore the judges because without his intervention they might not have been destroyed. and today they are seeing very hard questions, not just of the military role in this whole affair, but also about the military resistance picks i

think these are significant moment. for the first time the opposition and the media and the people of pakistan are asking the right questions. so this is going to take a lot of doing. and i don't think it will be turned back because i think there will be more discussion. if it doesn't come through they will be continuing discussion. and it is not entirely inconceivable that new facts may be revealed relating to that particular episode which will continue to put pressure on the military. and even the reason, he may be under pressure to do things to that. so, i think to answer your question, this is a different moment. whether or not we, the politicians and the media and the government are up to it, or the parliament can seize this moment and institutionalize it, it may be too early to say. but i think there will never

have been a better moment. >> chris? >> thank you. thank you for your two-part question. i think i'd like to take the second part first, and that's about religious sensitivities in pakistan that you mentioned fertility is not merely about education, and i took a question to me don't religious sensitivities undermined attempts to lower fertility in. again, and i want to note that survey research indicates that women presently prefer to have half as many children as they do. and i also want to reiterate, my point is not the answer the point that few people need fewer mouths to feed and less stress on natural resources, less stress on the labor market. mine is a principled point, that this is what pakistani women

themselves indicate that they want. and that this would allow them to greater opportunity to participate in the public sphere. i'd also like him it was a your question exactly, but i'd like to take this notion of religious sensitivities. there's nothing in the koran, and there's no saying or action i've the prophet mohammed which indicates that women should have as many children as they can, or that families shouldn't use family planning techniques. in fact, the prophet mohammed himself recommended the family planning techniques of his day to his companions, and others. this has been noted in iran and other countries. and indonesia for example, they have been very successful in promoting family planning campaign, showing that the

sooner in the koran indicates that what islam suggest for families is a healthy family, not a large family. a healthy family can be promoted i proper birth space and the use of contraception. the second point you made was about the feel of this report perhaps looking a bit like a laundry list. i took your question to mean is this not a laundry list. [laughter] >> i think not. i think what could be referred to as a macro policy. jack montgomery at the harvard kennedy school of government wrote about macro policies for many years. unfortunately, he passed away i think before trying to do you start your fellowship there. he wrote about macro policies, and i see this comprehensive perspective on pakistanis future

as being highly integrated. we think of all the components, civilian supremacy, the rule of law, focus on health, on education, on energy, on internal, entrée with india, all of these point to the same thing, which is a human centered security policy. thank you. >> thank you. that will reflect my own failure. i'm going to open it up with the caveat of course we don't have to stick to only the issues discussed here. if there's anything else on pakistan in the future, we can of course discuss it. i just want to ask steve cohen said she is part of this, if you want to say something, steve, on this? we have mike max our site. because where life could i please request people to go to the microphone. and ambassador and others come if you could just come to the microphone one by one and ask questions as close to the mic as

possible. and please introduce yourself of course. >> thank you, moeed. i am an independent scholar. and delighted to see so many friends whom i commend for putting out comprehensive report which gives a lot of way to the subject were i spent much of my career. is not a report about u.s.-pakistan relations. indeed, that may be one of the strengths. there's lots of it these days. but there's an implicit recommendation to the united states to support the kind of goals that are in the report. and in that spirit i want to take issue with a couple of things that my friend, chris can lend said, and to bring this back to the issue of civil-military relations. my reading of history is, in fact, that the united states ended part of the civilian

sanctions in the late 1990s. the military sanctions were in fact not ended until after 9/11. and the pakistan didn't even get back the money that it had paid towards the f-16s until 1998. and if you want to read the long story of that, it's in my book which usip published. [laughter] the second point, chris's description of the history of u.s.-pakistan relations is what i would describe as the pakistani narrative. they are is a quite different u.s. narrative. the burden of which is that we've had three marriages and two divorces. each of the divorces came about because pakistan, for whatever reasons, wasn't willing to live with the markers that the united states had laid down in 1965. it was using u.s. weapons in the war with india. in 1990 it was the nuclear program.

but buried under these two narratives, this in fact is a gap between the two countries strategic objectives. and i don't think the united states need to apologize for falling its geopolitical interests, but, of course, that has consequences. and where this comes back to my question about civil-military relations, is i think in order to deal with the u.s. side of this because it is inevitably going to have an impact, even though i am a proponent of keeping economic assistance stable, i think you have to start addressing both questions and civil military, and military accountability questions. i was moved by your optimism that this is going to be the moment when, for the first time, there is an investigation of a pakistan army failure. but i'm afraid i wasn't

convinced by it. and i wonder how you envisioned pakistan and the army going from calling for an investigation to actually doing one that is reasonably candid, and releasing it. >> let me take another question from this site and then we can come back. >> brian with usaid. questions along the same lines, looking at the report on the issue of civil-military relations, i was very encouraged by that been the focus. there was -- the question i have, moving forward, how should this affect u.s. policy? there's a reference in here, a report to the united states and important allies, the better

prioritizing relationships with democratic leadership. is that all or is there more? and in this particular u.s. assistance, military assistance, what does that mean for u.s. assistance? and also, what does that mean for u.s. priorities in terms of support for the military going after the taliban and al qaeda? >> thank you. brief interest, please. >> military accountability, i said this was a very important unprecedented movement. i also said that in the event that this inquiry doesn't reveal anything, and i indicated earlier that the military was close to it, i don't expect it to do anything but it remains a nagging issue in the media and with the opposition. i think that's very good. that's a great start. considering we haven't had a start ever. i don't think the media in pakistan wants to know why the military failed.

and the military doesn't want to actually explain why it failed. but the issue is we have the right to ask this question. we have the right to put the pressure on them and this is the first time this is happening and they're uncomfortable. that's good enough for me. it's a great step forward. second, you talked about u.s. aid, and i think the gentleman on the side said something about u.s. policy. well, i'll tell you something else that is happening there in connection to the u.s.-pakistan thing. and that's what looking at seriously. again, the same media, the same opposition that is demanding accountability of the military is also sang we don't really need is relationship with the united states. they are saying we don't need is u.s. eight. and i tell you what the are saying, what is their argument. today there was an article by former governor of the state that, former senior vice president of an american

institution who today has written an article in the media saying that we don't need usaid. and we shouldn't go for u.s. a. why is it that this issue has come up? this issue has, for two reasons, partly because congress make a big and american media has raises issue of hey, where's our money going to virginia so much money and what are you doing about it but here's the answer. in 10 years, maybe 20 billion has come into pakistan. as chris said, maybe 14, 15 billion has gone to the military. of the five that is coming, maybe a billion has been skimmed off by politicians. of the other four, gone for budgetary support in terms of the balance of payments. it hasn't really gone into development expenditures.

or it's going to get services. now, the thing is people in pakistan are saying where is this u.s. aid? we don't see it anywhere. we don't see it in the form of hospitals. we don't see in the form of dance. we don't see in the form of rising affluence. you know, poverty is increasing in pakistan so where is this u.s. aid could? why our they hooked on this u.s. aid? at the beginning of the day and at the end of the day, close to the military, this is what the military has to show for itself. and our politicians this is the embrace of the united states. the civilians, the people of pakistan are getting nothing out of it. and then they say what is this big deal about 1.5 million that everybody in america is talking about? this year, hardly three or 400 billion has been disclosed. even in the coalition support, for the first time the destinies is now challenging the pakistani

army's. three years ago the challenge was maybe 2% or 3% rejection. it's got up to 40, 45% now. so at the end of the day, where is this u.s. aid? that's why the opposition and the media today is saint we don't want is u.s. eight. perhaps this that we get from time to time, which is really doing nothing for us, as a politicians are not taking the hard decisions that need to be taken, to put the economy right, to tax themselves, to oppose can't have laid before him to do all the other things the military to do to build up -- bail that country out. if we don't get that u.s. aid, a politicians wife to take the hard decisions that you are not taking today. and that is what we really need. we need to stand up on her own feet so we can send go to united states on the basis not of any independency but on the basis of

interests. so, you know, people over here in the united states are talking about this carrot with a great stick, i repeat myself, we have seen part of that stick from 1989-2001. we were the most sanctioned country in the world. so, but we went along with 2%. things went from bad to worse, all right. our military went off to get sick and technology from china and elsewhere. okay, maybe that was just as well. maybe if anything to do a bit longer we might come to his senses and put our house in order. because u.s. aid when it comes in, it gives our ruling class and a really passionate and our ruling elite anti. to have to take responsibly for doing the things they need to do. so instead of debate in this country about hey, what's happening to our money, our taxes, the taxpayers money, the debate in pakistan is we don't

need it, we don't want to. let's tell the united states we don't want a. the media is come across the board, putting an end to our debate on the estate. regards of the fact that the military is hurting and that the opposition leader has come out openly and said we don't want it. >> let me take two other questions and then come back to the panelists to address. why don't you ask and i will come back. >> you mentioned two indicators which led you -- marvin weinbaum with a middle eastern, sorry. is mentioned two indicators that du heart here, particularly as recent developments unfolded. but isn't there a third indicator which i think would really suggest that maybe some people are coming to their senses cracks and i'm thinking

here about reference to something which i know is in the report but was not part of this work, and that is the existence of the fact that pakistan is an insurgency on his hands. it's got extremist groups whose agenda is a radically different kind of pakistani state. so, isn't it going to require comment even in progress in his other two areas, that pakistan, the public, the elite and the public take a far more realistic view of the threat that is facing, instead of recognizing or experiencing the results of that without being willing to place the blame for it. where in order kashmir because as we know, they have constantly redirected that towards the united states.

so, i'm asking really, is that not a third indicator which is i think going to be critical, particularly the other two? [inaudible] >> i wanted to ask a question -- [inaudible] a couple of reasons for anti-americanism and pakistan. you're one of the few and one from journalists and commentat commentator. how much of a role does the media play in shaping public perception as far as the fostering conservative theories who were in the best states in relation to what was said, in relation to policies, really buy that much of a role where the media can go blow that off.

[inaudible] >> thank you. >> i would like to start by addressing the professors question. i thank you for the clarification. the history of the sanctions as you know better than i come is a bit more complicated and neither you nor i have time for just now. i mean, i mentioned the lifting in 1995 and another thing again in 2001. i did mention the nuclear test in 1998, and the sanctions that followed that. and i would recommend for everybody who's interested in thinking more about this, ambassador schaffer's book which is on how pakistanis negotiate and agree to the court in about in my my course on international relations and south asia next year. it's really great to know that you're going to have a good textbook for your course a month in advance. the deeper issue i think it's about the conditionality of the

relations between these essays and pakistan. i don't think that a relationship based on conditionality is the basis for a solid relationship. so i don't think it's surprising that, as najam has mentioned, the political opposition in pakistan and much of the population of pakistan is now publicly in favor of declining all u.s. aid. and i'd like to note here that even that jerry berman, the kerry-lugar-berman act has conditionality's that the united states has to provide access to a.q. khan for example. so even in an initiative which is meant to build goodwill and -- [inaudible] >> there were conditionality is about pakistan maintaining civilian governments and so forth. and about access to a.q. khan. so my -- all right.

so, my sense is that if the conditionality themselves which may, which give the impression. it's not a question of whether pakistan has returned what the states has paid for. it's about how the united states pays for it, and if there are those sanctioned mechanisms, then one feels that such a solid relationship. >> closer to the mic, please. >> closer, okay. i talked about my sources of optimism. i didn't talk about my social. so now that you raised it let me tell you more to make you unhappy. [laughter] >> the thing is that there is no consensus in the state government or opposition, or media. that the issue that you talked about needs to be said -- needs

to be dissolved. this is the incredible thing. the debate in pakistan is about the violation of sovereignty by the united states. it is not about a violation of sovereignty up on the taliban and al qaeda and the media. and that is -- there's no changing that. and you know, the interesting thing is that this is partly because of the way the military has leveraged anti-americanism and pakistan. in order to negotiate for the united states. and now as i said the chickens are coming home to root. where will this go? i don't know. the security operators that hassan talks about, police, to deal with internal security, today in washington you have a friend of mine, i don't know how many of you met him, he is in washington today, he was ahead

of nafta, no decision that was created to deal with this issue of terrorism. he had his office in the prime minister secretary. something something for terrorism counterterrorism. he sat with 26 employees waiting for the budget to come through. first the budget wouldn't country because there was no way to get him, even $2 million to start this. and this was supposed to be article of your national intelligence, one that you set up after 9/11. and he is a fine officer. and then when he finally got the money, they couldn't pass an ordinance legalizing his set up. why? because the isi said the prime minister should have this task force here and the interior

minister said no. the interior ministry should have this task force. and so the ordinance was never passed because of this conflict. and he resigned from office three months ago. so, to talk about any internal security or integral action against terrorism, i don't see it happening in the short term. i really don't see it happening. number one. number two, something else is happening. again, in relation to the war on terror. and this is the bad news, too. that the media and opposition are now saying to the government that you must order the pakistan air force to shoot the drones out of the sky. and they are saying if you are failing an american response to

join the role of the drones, pakistan should stop nato containers are moving to pakistan. this is part of the revolution -- resolution that was pushed through by nawaz sharif and supported by the media. ..

the good news and bad news, which is why it is a very difficult conflict. if you want to listen to the analysis that najam is mentioning, i encourage you to watch this program on geo television, which means them between now and i hope someone is translating it. but for ordinary people, that is a perspective that is now one of the most popular tv programs in pakistan. i also recommend other than the book the initiating strategy called south asia hand, which is

also the question about what this means for you as a. one is at least 50% of the money should go to police. i agree with najam. huge police potential exists in pakistan. the money we mentioned in military is intelligence bureau. the war on terror, even the frontier corps is part of money from the civilian touch it. a chunk of the money -- even that money should get focused towards police and law enforcement process.

>> technically of course if you would equip the police and give them lots of money, they'll do it. but the army won't allow that because the army has assets all over the place. if the police even touch them the army will go up. part of the reason why the army walks around the policy of counterterrorism internally is because the army has a complex network that we must protect. [inaudible] >> can you hear me? >> no. >> i'll just be glad. dennis kirks from the woodrow wilson center. i'd like to congratulate you all, all those who participated in this report. you think it's very, very timely and i look forward to reading it. sounds like it's a real contribution. i have two points in a question. the second point i'd like to

associate myself in this discussion of u.s.-pakistan relations. it seems to be the problem today is what it's always been. sometimes our interest: i didn't sometimes they don't and that doesn't make for a very steady relationship. of course today is much more working. the risks are greater, et cetera, et cetera. the underlying problem hasn't changed. but my question is they are seeking a vice and the pml. the wilson center is in the process of doing a study on u.s. aid to pakistan. poly mac is the director and about one of the participants. and we've come up with some givens that are dirty obvious and you've alluded to some of them, namely we've got to do a better job of explaining the mechanics of aid, you know, what is the difference between

appropriate money and obligated money so you don't have the spectacle youth had of the finance minister saying we got $345 million in the american sites they know that's wrong. we're giving you 900 billion. well, we had to be on the same sheet of music in my something on our site is certainly up have to be done to clarify and make a major effort to explain what it is and what it is and then when it's going to come out and when it isn't going to come out. also, it seems to me and this is my personal view that we need a sharper focus. even though there are five priority areas, energy, education, health, i forget the others, it seems to me one of the net this day it's all wash. it would be a lot better if we only did one or two things where we could make a difference and it could be just education are just hope, something like that. but that's not my question.

it turns out bothering a lot of folks on our side, one of the changes that holbrooke institute was than 50% of the aid is going through the government of pakistan with ministry said the government of pakistan. quite apart from the administrator problems for devolution causes and that's just one of those things. there are all sorts of complaints that there is a lack of capacity which surprises me frankly after all these years. there is corruption and most serious of all perhaps as when we put money in my favor education. we allocate $5 million, will pakistan does is cut $5 million from the education budget. well, how do you do with? one idea we have had or has been discussed tonight that is what i would think your reaction to this instead of just creating

money, we got to do certainly cash on delivery arrangement for the building that is a school building should be built, pakistan built it and then we pay for you to a partnership where there is 50/50 or whatever it is, that pakistan puts a the 51st and then we follow through and that's what -- i think your comment on that reaction. >> mike what is relating to that -- [inaudible] pakistan needs democracy company's governance. the way you get that is the pakistani results. i think frankly that opposition is going by historical evidence.

no country has really developed on the basis. i think 10 years from now that is the question. the point i am trying to make [inaudible] [inaudible] today's income is all kinds of ozone whistles. you must do this and it's really a serious question. but i just put that in foreign aid. >> thank you.

thank you very much for your points. you are not making a case for more aid for afghanistan aid relationship. they have not looked at the changes within pakistan since the transition. it would not come with establishing islamic relays. [inaudible] [inaudible]

this was published a few years ago by harvard university. how much money pakistan as for north america and europe is sending in. there is recently an article by a pakistani politician in a political party he was headed the group called pakistan 2010. he says that i'm sure it was published recently that the amount of money that pakistan has for north america and europe is $8 billion per year, three times more than the aid. some may be providing them with more direction and that kind of support is what we want. >> e-mail, only a few of usaid

and i'm absolutely convinced some of the frustrations and reservations usaid. i have a different way of looking at this. i want to ask this question of what is the objective? is that short-term? trying to turn anti-americanism back with hearts and minds or is it nationbuilding? i think even the legislation is not clear about this over here. there are many different object is, seven or eight different object is even in the legislation and may vary from short-term to medium-term to long term, which is how you have $5 million in $2 million in a school project in so many million. there's 40 different projects on the pipeline. partly because of the things. now, there was a paper that

general kayani gave president obama and i'm sure many people have seen it. general kayani says to me that one of his recommendations was instead of all these projects come and maybe the u.s. should have come in on a big project and had no more than 10 or 15 or 20 positions in the small secretary big project that might have been better. and i think on reflection i tend to agree with that. this is what i was talking about. either we or the hospital for the poor in every city of pakistan and make it self-sustaining so that that helps to turn the americanism back. we need dan's. remain money for big dams, but

do something that is substantial. this potential for spreading across the length of the country is bleeding to this question is how much money we are kidding about the money is not coming and so on and so forth. you have people on both sides wringing their hands in despair. people over here must be doing the same thing. the pakistani government don't know whether they're coming or going. maybe need to very seriously rethink your short-term goals and long-term goals and about which has more priority for you. >> yeah, my view on ambassador ki baat's question about the mac as my 50 mechanism and the cash on delivery mechanism with the focus on infrastructure rather

than maintenance of that infrastructure and that would be a downside. building schools is not so important as the training and hiring and retaining teachers. i think the cash on delivery mechanism i put the focus on the infrastructure rather than the teaching and curriculum. and the 50/50 suggestion does and i think some of the phone transfer issue that you mentioned earlier. so my thoughts are that her signature projects, big projects are more track due to corrupt people and it would be better to identify those who are proven effective philanthropists, like arthur ed or home on time and there is a very links to the u.s. government and said i would

be my suggestion is to have a mechanism where one identifies those things and working without largesse from the united states or from other foreign sources. >> let me take the last three questions together and then look at the panel is the last one. >> actually my question follows up on previous comments. my name is tony dressler, an international health consultant and i guess my first comment would be that it is interesting to note that almost all of the suggestions and comments in the port appeared to be pretty much the same as the ones that we identified and asked for solutions to emanate a 90s, so where have we gone? and secondly, this discussion seems to be an tiredly oriented around the u.s.-pakistan

relations, whereas i think the most critical facts, particularly in the social sector development programs is the gradual discouragement of the international community and the increasing citizens of the community about -- and if they can the world bank, developing bank, i am not, the whole range of them under results that pakistan has been able to achieve and in many ways the rock edge that has been done by a good deal of the pakistan bureaucracy, civil service on the implementation of many of the programs. i have a question also. >> that's enough.

[inaudible] >> my question is about the military to mitigate medical -- militants from pakistan. i went to distract this team from musharraf and so many other attacks on the military institution. is it still that the military will want to clean the house from this rmn for my question is, it is not capital. if it is in fact true that the military does not allow the military finding in 2012.

but why military is not able to take any action. and then, coming to the military is one thing. >> thank you. >> and kumar but the private sector and i agree of the importance of india. what are the value of improving trade? i'm not quite clear as to why that is not having increased trade. >> final question. >> you have six chapters in your

report on the structure and on philosophy. none of those mentioned the yoshio. >> sorry and hurrying everybody because we actually have to be on the train to new york. >> i'll try to be brief. i think it might have been something about whether we should take the emphasis off of government to government relations. i'm guessing. i'm doing more than guessing. i'm hoping because that is what i would also recommend, that with regard to the comment earlier about how the decision that usaid and some other aid agencies in the united states is to work with the government. the thought there is to increase the credibility and capacity of pakistani government, and the other side is it also increases the perception of pakistan, that the united states is supporting

corruption. and i would recommend again more attention to supporting nongovernmental organizations directly. >> there are areas to trade with india. this positive all the way from both sides. the value to trade with india is the pakistan army and the national top of the army. the position is trade would lead to creation a vested interest on both sides for peace and that is not acceptable or was not acceptable until recently, until necessity forces you to open up some thing but the other. the national security doctrine does not allow for peace with india and linkages between india and pakistan. my problem with bad is bad i've been saying to the indians, you don't have to do an isopropyl

policy. if pakistan doesn't want to give visas to pakistani businessmen to go to india, you should allow to open up visas so that businessmen businessmen can go to india. unfortunately indian security services are now a problem on the other side as well after mumbai and is not easy to shun them away. the second thing is on the question of the invention in capability and capacity to tackle terrorism, the military is all set not to give up referring to parliament sooner or later and the gist of the briefing will be that we are -- we need 100% increase in our budget because there is completely a lack of policy to do anything in that briefing is ready. i have seen it in their view is we need our money, need more of this company like that. we've got our hands full with india's military capacity building on one side and the

taliban and waziristan creating difficulties for us. we just don't have the capacity to open up another front. so that's not going to happen. >> thank you very much for talking about those two sections. it damaged pakistan's infrastructure in significant ways. but it's surprising -- were surprised to see it's not all in the media and the scores than what happened because the sound is much affected where we are making a case for strengthening some of the institutions, which can tackle these upheavals. i'm afraid there's not much time to talk about the treaty. there is one mention of that indeed, but not as much as it should've been. and then there's the question of harvard, namely who mentioned

about the military. my assessment is in the pakistan army to tackle this, yes there is sheer incompetence at one level. trying to micromanage things, but there is one model which worked, which i think will work in some divisions within the military as well get the patch has been the case. from our experience, military we fail to see taliban the station entrance. there is some of junior ranking officers responsible for looking at the isi interest in that region. look the other way and the whole world can see the people at the head of the tajik here at this radio station with military attack on who was responsible is not helping.

change have been on pakistani been asked this question. what do you think about human rights? what to think about democracy? his answer was shocked everyone. change public opinion and then the media showed the girl be wiped in a change of public opinion forced the military to ask. it gave more courage to political leadership. i think that may be the way forward. as kind of a side comment by rethinking about the danger. and in fact, publisher robbers who is the manager showed me

three colors. red and danger, the second is green, which had a religious connotation of source when looked at pakistan and then the blue. they say blue is the color of peace. we said yes, blue is the color of peace. and then that's enough. >> lobby wants -- let me once again commend bringing up this positive aspect of what can be done. somebody like me who lives companies embrace pakistan, a moment of optimism is welcome. so thanks for that. i think a few other things that come out. the civil military relations have a moment for pakistan again to agree with how it plays out. certainly i think that is to be acknowledged.

we have attached enough about because we are talking about the u.s. and sitting in a u.s. audience, this question which keeps on coming back as to what the u.s. can and cannot and should and should not be. i remember this discussion of what happens if usaid goes in the forest. part of saying this before, but in 2007 were involved in a one-on-one debate at howard or somewhere. this very question on what the u.s. can or cannot do. i think it is reflected here, where one side says the u.s. can help bring the civil military, you know rebalance, bring another issues, where pakistan needs correction. the other view, which i've been saying for a while that has to be pakistan. the best we can do is not hinder, but perhaps the changes have to come from within

pakistan. i think that's an open question again the remains. can the military relations remain, i seriously doubt it. but let me -- let me also add here that i i think there is another discussion about the u.s. and pakistan and perhaps there is need for more discussion and then we may see some policy change. let me just remind you that this report is available on pakistan 2020. there also copies i believe outside if any of you want to pick it up. and finally, can't leave you without an infomercial. our next pakistani meeting is on the 26th, next week on india-pakistan relations. as much is talked about here, the critical issue and the speaker as you might mention the former chairman of the national counterterrorism authority.

thank you once again and please join me in thanking the panel. [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

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