likely taped on the c-span website. we will also be putting a link on our website to broadcast at a later time. you can visit the program.afsa.org. afsa is approaching 16,000 members. the organization represents over 20,000 to employees at the department of state and agency for international development as well as the foreign agricultural service for foreign commercial service in the international broadcast. our foreign service making the distance for the united states and we honor them with this

particular discussion. again, for more about apps under programs you may visit her website at afsa.org. afsa poconos programs and similar to the deeds we do public outreach event are sponsored by the fund for american diplomacy, which is our charitable or educational entity. we appreciate the support that goes in this room perhaps providing our listeners and viewers. few questions about questions about how to support, feel free to send me an e-mail at houston@ afsa.org. it is my pleasure to introduce the presiding officer and president of afsa, susan johnson. susan is a 31 year career diplomat and i appreciate being able to turn the podium over to her associate diplomat.

thank you for being here. clap [applause] >> welcome the thank you very much. many thanks to all of you and a warm welcome. ian has told you quite a bit about afsa, pilot that fits fit the pressure to meet to welcome someone like ambassador hull who in my represents the mastercard tichenor now moved into academia putting forth books like this and is part of the great national asset we have inherited that generally are very much included. so i'd like to echo and warm welcome any welcome to you, ambassador hull. we are going to be treated to a discussion on a theory important

topic, the emerging middle east and yemen as one of its many unfortunate hot spots. in the context of the presence of al qaeda payer. given the development of the last several months, the program could hardly be timelier and that also applies to the publication of ambassador hull spoke. i've not had a chance to read it myself. i very much look for to doing, but those tellme is a great read. so i'm sure we'll all feel that more so after this morning's discussion. our guide to this discussion is very distinguished retired diplomat, ambassador edmund hull in his new book, "high-value target: countering al qaeda in yemen" will be sorted the basic roadmap for the discussion this morning. ambassador hull served as ambassador to yemen from 2001 to

2004 and has extensive experience working on counterterrorism issues at the state department. those of you who were at the event this morning will have the same and more expensive bio details and data in the announcements. so is expensive credentials both in terms of the middle east, fluent arabic speaker in terms of counterterrorism. without further ado, i'll turn the podium over to ambassador hull and he will be speaking for 20 minutes or so and then there'll be plenty of time for questions and answer. thank you very much. ambassador hull. [applause] [inaudible]

>> testing, one, two. okay, that's the hard part. i want to thank susan johnson for the creationist discussion and for hosting this event today in a to thank all of you for coming here. i know there's not a lot of time and some of you are taking time away from the important work. i hope i can make it worthwhile. what i'd like to do is really make three propositions and then turn to your questions and talk about what you want. the first proposition is that the state department is not by a marriage a learning institution. the state department has many,

many stirring in his heard some of the best and brightest generally. it takes care of them and challenges them. however, unlike the military, my experience as little systematic attention to lessons learned. unlike u.s. business again in my experience, there is little or no emphasis on best this is. rather, the state department tends to recruit very smart individuals provided the screen and asked them to improvise solutions. and a lot depends on the foreign service on who you work for. if you work for someone like henry kissinger, you're likely to get good lessons in few political strategy and how to develop real options. if you work for somebody like jim baker, you're likely to

learn a lot about dealmaking as he did in getting assaulted the madrid conference. if you work for somebody like dirk berg, you're likely to get humility and significance of an initiative like middle east partnership initiative. unfortunately, we have so many exemplary individuals and we have such a small workforce that it does fairly well with these personal examples that not i suggest anywhere. as susan was suggesting, i think we should be more deliberate in tapping best says so that even if you're not so fortunate as to work with one of these people, you can run lessons from such

practitioners. it's helpful, for example, to see how george tenet analyzes the forces of soviet conduct or to learn how someone like holbrooke tries to end a war or how colin powell leads. wouldn't it be great to have a poke from ryan crocker on expeditionary diplomacy. from jack kennedy on management and diplomacy. gorey book sunday from marc grossman on diplomacy. so i believe this is an area for improvement. masm of diplomatic studies and training with this series on diplomats and diplomacy and its

ambition for my titular book, "high-value target" appeared in the second proposition i'd like to meet you this morning is that effective counterterrorism argues in this book that counterterrorism should not be conceived narrowly as an intelligence matter or a military question, but rather should be conceived as a broad strategy. and yemen, we encapsulated our strategy is no development and no security without development. to work very well in arabic. and that strategy arose from extensive contacts with the

yemenis themselves. high officials and low average individuals. building 12 is important to us, moving against al qaeda and in effect the way to what was important to them, which was developed and. he was summarized in a very simple formula, which yemenis could remember, could make their own. and one of the gratifying phenomenon at the end of our effort a gemini with come up to us and propose our strategy is their strategy and we could agree with it. so one of the object is that this book, "high-value target," is to show how such a strategy is formulated.

now in the wake of the dramatic success in killing of osama bin laden, it is tempting to believe that there is a shortcut and that shortcut is jay's or perhaps predators. nic and yemen, economic operation to predator strikes was necessary, but it was far, far from sufficient. individuals, even bin laden can be replaced. genetic successes give up momentum and they give us faith to apply broad counterterrorism. and that is brought counterterrorism must include the flow to motivate government with diplomacy to create force among their population.

political and economic development to address the underlying drivers of extremism, law enforcement to promote an international rule of law, as well as military cooperation, often in the second screening in intelligence to protect ourselves and to expose al qaeda. and all of this effort needs to be sustained so that al qaeda cannot adjust to set that can reconstitute itself in a more formidable form. the demise of bin laden presents a great opportunity but no inevitabilities for success. similarly, in yemen in 2002, the elimination of abu all the prey

predator provided an opportunity with no inevitabilities. it would be a mistake for us to rest on our laurels, let jsoc do it. i carry preposition this morning is that the embassy team is in effect a mechanism for achieving a whole of government effort would be adequate resources. i think of washing today we are seeing a consent is that some problems are beyond the scope of any part of the u.s. government. humanitarian disaster conflict, stabilization and counterterrorism. what is not generally appreciated around town is that your country team in the field is an ideal way of achieving a whole of government effort.

the u.s. military is particularly challenged to understand that and therefore they are on client to set up ad hoc interagency coordination groups. now an effective country team argue in the book starts with the ambassador and it is critical that ambassador now represents the state department, but rather as a personal representative of the president in that form a letter from the president to each ambassador is a critical tool in his or her management. but it certainly does not end with the ambassador. arriving as i did with no economic sections, no public

diplomacy sections, no development sections, but i could do as an individual was extremely limited and our priority in that first year was filling those critical gap. the big obstacle for that were security restrictions and state departments lack of resources. the success we had in yemen would not have been possible without dedicated foreign service nationals, people like hawkman hotkey who is with us today. it would not have been possible without the dvd when actually employed retirees who came out to us on short notice and provided critical support in

public diplomacy in the economic sections, it would not have been possible without the entry-level officers that colin powell rod and as part of its romantic readiness initiative. people came to us from the national democratic institute and played a key role in making in helping yemenis think parliamentary election of 2003 for success. and it would not have been possible without equally curious theory who came to us as a spouse of a foreign service officer, who brought with them developed and. and people like my wife ml has succeeded in relating to the yemenis probably better than anyone else. now, in a sense i am preaching

to the choir here. the state department gets this and the quadrennial diplomacy and development review formalizes this position. the secretary of defense, any of us were listening to bob casey last night on 60 minutes understand that he appreciates how critical this is and will be to success in a tennis fan, and iraq, in yemen. but i would argue that by and large neither the congress nor the american people get it. the u.s. military have done a superb job of explaining to congress and the american people what their contribution is to u.s. security.

but the state department by and large has not done an adequate job in the realm of diplomacy or in this leadership role, which is essential for success. as we are here today, the state department is assuming even more responsibility in iraq, and afghanistan and elsewhere. but we do not see resources commiserate with those responsibilities. the cute ddr mix of bureaucratic for those resources, but i believe congress and the american people need much more graphic examples of our value-added. yemen is my case in point in this book aims to do so. thank you very much. [applause]

>> any questions, please? >> judy carson on the w. 80. he taught him lessons learned and best part is. do you have some in particular you'd like to discuss with the audience now? >> have a host of them in the book and they think they're accessible in reading our account of how we proceeded and also comparing it to what happened in the intervening years between 2004 and now and you can see in that comparison

how great a job al qaeda doesn't in adjusting to it in reconstituting itself and how poor a job we actually do in learning lessons and sustaining an effort and there by default create operating business. specifically, i think primary lessons learned, you have to have an idea of how you're going to go about this. this can't be more than just a collection of kind of ad hoc efforts. you need to did not only from the government, but from the people of the country. this was a less than i first in egypt in the 1990s when they were the saddest by a very

strong terrorism. in the cage to the tipping point out one day when a 12-year-old egyptian girl was killed to run a precarious operations. and she became a symbol of the harm that the egyptians are suffering. similarly in yemen, when al qaeda attacks an oil tanker off of the coast and the resulting oil spilled the mid-to fishy and livelihood, you could see in yemen a popular reaction against this violence which was costing people their livelihood. it wasn't something we could really sell to the embassy. it was something we had to help the yemenis fell to the yemeni government itself.

but once motivated, they did a very good job of it. i think the third lesson learned that i would suggest that's a little bit counterintuitive because were all coming up with this bin laden and we feel this private account to schmidt and in this instance it's totally appropriate. we had a similar case in yemen. it's hard to imagine us as long as it's necessary for the lot to think it's necessary to see people updated. so at some stage and as soon as possible, i would argue, i role should become indirect and our

partners will should become to write. and in the book, when i tried to explain is how yes, we started out eliminating abu ali, that then the real success at taking down the rest of the organization with the yemenis success supported by us. and i think that is a much healthier model any more sustainable model in some model that has the united states taking direct action all over the world. >> i am very pleased to welcome today's cnn correspondent elliott ave. it. >> thank you for that introduction. ambassador, thank you so much congratulations on the book had us wondering if you could type

more broadly about the possibility of regime change in yemen with president saleh and how that could affect the counterterrorism effort in some of the things he discussed that are needed for a u.s. partnership. >> well, a lot of the challenge inherent in them is getting a working relationship with president halle. he is a very cunning fellow, but he is not particularly easy to work with. and it took far more than my effort at the time and others, vice president cheney. president saw has been important to her counterterrorism

population. he is not essential to it. our partnership with the engine is much fatter than the president and would not have succeeded if we were resting solely on the president. i think the great risk we face currently is that the uncertainty and the political turmoil is causing the government to withdraw forces from the periphery and that inevitably will create additional operations to for al qaeda. and given the attack ability and ambition of al qaeda in the arabian and pens for, we should assume they will use the common not only to attack or an choice, but to attack the homeland.

so we have a short-term vulnerability that needs to be addressed. i would argue in the long-term if there can be a successful transition from president saleh to a more popular government, that transceivers to the united states and al qaeda. al qaeda is subject to although has little to do with the kind of value for the kind of demand that the protests elsewhere in yemen are making. al qaeda solution, the recourse to sharia is not really the answer at all to the kind of aspirations of the revolutionaries in yemen or elsewhere in the middle east.

rather, those values are very close to the values the united states is comfortable with. so the challenge is getting through. a vulnerability in helping the yemenis build a kind of society and government they acquire to have. >> and answer questions please? >> michael kozicki at george washington university. in the area of lessons learned and so forth, are there any --

would she say there's a very valuable lesson that has been learned or might be learned from the foreign services of other countries in the middle east, especially of the u.k.? >> adverts or expanded a little bit and not only talk about the foreign service after, but other government efforts. in yemen, we found for ample the british excellent part airs in training the central security forces of yemen. in fact, we started out talking the wrong horse, focused on the yemen special operation forces who turned out to have is their mission regime protection, not

counterterrorism. and so come it was ideal of the british started out the central security forces and then we tag teamed to continue that training. and all along i thought it was undesirable for the u.s. to take the entire burden on its shoulder in an effort to share the tragedians also played a very important role in working with the yemeni security forces. we are often challenged. kidman is an arabic speaking environment, not like cairo. to be effective in yemen, unique arabic. with the jordanians after what

arabic skills in helping us interpret between ourselves in the yemeni security forces. there were other development efforts. the dutch were doing significant settlement work. we were not alone in any sense and i think this sum is greater -- the parts is greater than the sum of its parts. and that the effort be stretched to the united states is less accessible than an effort which is more broadly based and includes not only the european countries, but both countries of the arab countries. >> yes, mr. wilkinson.

>> thank you. ted wilkinson. criticisms have been made -- inevitable criticisms of the administration respond as being supportive of democracy where we can tolerate it and not in countries like bahrain where our interests appear to be more than stability. have how do you address that equation in yemen? >> i agree that you don't have a one-sided fits all policy. i think anyone who is really with the middle east knows the countries have different dynamics, different possibilities so i'm okay with it country by country approach. i think in yemen were running a big risk because basically we

are letting the situation grow. and given the force has its plate, it's going to drift a bad direction perez and a good direction for al qaeda. there's going to be less government control out in the periphery. there's going to be greater chance of civil war. you only have to lift the face-off between different military force is in yemen to recognize that possibility. i think it's altogether reasonable for us to first see the yemenis are sorted among the thousands that can help the operations council could reach an agreement. i think the gcc efforts are highly laudable. but i think with his stage now where we need to ramp up our efforts in the international community efforts in that baby more attention in new york at the u.n. security council was

some kind of concerted diplomatic effort that more at this encapsulate. to think if we don't step up, then we risk being in a situation developed for the next demand becomes along the lines of responsibility to protect, a situation like what we've seen in libya. i just don't see it's in our interest to allow the situation to deteriorate so the obstacles become narrower and narrower and more and more expensive. so i am far more diplomacy, stronger diplomacy and a stronger u.s. lead. >> if you would please.

mr. bill pope. >> train to come attainment for writing that the pair to look forward to reading it. two things. number one coming to take in light of bin laden's death were just anyway that aqap is going to continue to begin to focus more outwardly as well as the horse inside? and second, what is your opinion of how a lucky? i have a serious doubts about his long-term leadership in wondering what you think. >> even before bin laden's, al qaeda in the arabian peninsula have been identified by intelligence experts and policymakers is the most out of note in the al qaeda network. if you look at john brennan speech last december, if you look at the testimony of the

director of national intelligence, direct or of the counterterrorism center, early this year it was clear that aqap had msb surpassed al qaeda. it is an organization that is quite formidable in the sense that it's very adaptable and very creative and they have come up with uses of the internet example, uses those media language surpassing al qaeda in stating that their ambition is described the u.s. homeland and not with their actions in yemen or in saudi arabia. so it is a threat that needs to be addressed. now, and where a lucky is a

significant asset. particularly his outreach is expanding the pool of mujahedin fire, fire beyond arabic speakers and also appealing to individuals who can more easily pass underneath our radar. but a lucky is not the leader of aqap. there are homegrown yemenis who are the former leaders in the up durational leaders. we have a tendency sometimes in the popular counterterrorism to latch on one individual who we can identify and know the name

and mistake that individual for the organizations or for the real -- the real leadership. i don't doubt at all that the professionals lamely were afraid the white house get this, but i think sometimes the media or journalist tend to be a little bit careless in the way they report the rules of these. thanks, bill. >> molly williamson. thank you for your presentation. we are now today in this town looking at a lot of important programs on the budgetary cutting block. i like your analysis of what projections you think are likely

to surface from all quarters if people see the united states is not able to pony up the necessary resources as we transition in some cases reducing footprints, military for prints from the region. where are there opportunities? other coalitions, other like minded folks as we hope that the yemeni protests sort themselves out and identify a path for their own future? >> well, i think secretary gates said it very well last night when he said it would be a great steak to be penny wise and pound foolish as we go forward in the middle east and south asia. in other words, where a recent poll in most of our troops out of iraq. were going to be pulling troops

out of afghanistan. the military component is going to be on a downward slope. but if we do not ramp up the civilian side, if we do not give resources to those people that they are working on stability and i have a personal interest because my daughter is deployed to afghanistan with usaid working capability, that is going to be a great shame and we're going to see the kind of mistakes that we made in afghanistan after initial successes, that we meet in yemen after 2004 we occur and we are going to give al qaeda breathing space and they will take advantage. now, that doesn't mean that this is all in the lap of the u.s.

taxpayer. there are other parties with interest as large or larger than ours in this continuing effort. do not speak about yemen. in my mind, the wealthy states of the arabian peninsula have an even greater interest in helping yemen succeed in the united states. al qaeda and the arabian permit to have made it clear that they are within its sights. i think there has been an evolution in the way the gcc together and has been a positive evolution. and i think the initiative, the result of political impasse is only the most romantic evidence

of that evolution. but i would like to see, molly, is an attitude similar to the attitude in the european union, when they came together and had initial success and then they would confront such developed since it is after franco or portugal after his state readership. they recognize they have a long-term interest in stabilizing these countries in bringing them one way or the other, that there is a common interest in that. i do not think an arabian peninsula, where extremely wealthy coal states and extremely impoverished yemen with this very large and young

population is a recipe for stability and therefore i think you can make an argument there is a strategic deal that needs to be made here in whatever way they are comfortable making that, the strategic deal needs to be made. >> ad, i am chuck cecil, retired foreign service. in the last couple years i've been involved in a lessons learned project in which we interview returning servicemembers of potential and reconstruction teams in and afghanistan. one of our questions is what could've made you more for getting your work? is a very common answer is if it had more freedom of movement i could have done a lot more. and by that they mean their movements were greatly curtailed by senior management, sometimes

the embassy, sometimes washington, sometimes a combination of the two, which had a very low tolerance for risk. in other words, not wanting to lose the life of a civilian member of our government establishment in those countries. the question is this. what is the implication of this for our feature set to be in the areas of high civil unrest? and does that mean -- how would you say the balance between the traditional activities of the foreign service and the will of our clandestine services in acquiring the information we need for analysis and implementing government policy decisions? how do you see the balance affect it by this lack of tolerance for risk? >> the short answer now is to

give you one answer in the book. there is a chapter in a book entitled an embassy, not a bunker. in the first time i met colin powell, he was secretary of state deputy in december of that election year and he asked for a briefing on counterterrorism. we all came in and we briefed him with the whole counterterrorism security group. it was a real eye-opener for him, which he later stated in his testimony at the 9/11 commission because we laid out the threats of al qaeda. and he not only took. he also gave in that encounter because at the end of our long session, he said thank you very much. i appreciate what you've told me

today. one thing we must guard against the madness hunkering down in our embassies that will give the initiative to al qaeda. he said we will protect our people, but we will not bunker down. and i took this when i was yemen is kind of turkey burgers to stuff them in my battles, some in the safety department who wanted to adopt a very, very cautious position, that this was unwise because of the long-term it just just increased our vulnerability and gave more space and more initiative to al

qaeda. so i really go to this at some length in the book because it is a very important question. >> i'll buy it. [laughter] >> i would say during my tenure we had no official american in yemen despite a very, very forward posher in terms of where we went. now, your second question -- i mean, the intelligence people do brilliant work. we've seen that recently. i thought, it's absolutely essential. there's no way that the state department competes in that area. it tends to be narrowly focused,

though and doesn't get into such questions as the will of the part of the president or his government to undertake what we need him to undertake. those are kinds of assessments that the state department is comparing with the spanish were doing. it doesn't necessarily get into what's going on and why al qaeda had fertile ground there. you need a much brighter information collection and analysis about what the problem is and what can be done about it. so to me, it's not as though competitive. it's complementary. and as an ambassador, i couldn't do without a quote.

>> will take one more. >> my name is peter cranston over at a idea for about 25 years, mostly overseas and i know what the secretary's office for the coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization, soon to become a barrel. >> congratulations. >> thinks very much. for a little nervous. so i was brought in that we need some old guys who know a little bit about money over here. we don't know anything about me. but in that regard, the kinds of things you're talking about are the water to school.

a contingency fund which aspired as you may know by something called the pulled funds operation that the u.k. put together whereby they are basically taking security and civilian elements are many and pooling in order to use them for these complex situations -- complex crises overseas. what do you think -- i mean, there's a little bit of cynicism with respect for that coming about. but what it would mean with the other large amount of dod money, but a little bit of state money. to restate prevailing in terms of the policy issues. indeed, where the u.s. aid needs to go in order to address the kinds of things we're seeing now in sight of the indefinable crises. so having been involved in some of the budget wars, i am a

little bit skeptical, bose was wondering what your take might llama. reflective perhaps a little bit to the accords in vietnam, the civilian operations in revolutionary developments. thank you. >> what you'll find in reading the book when it comes to money, i am entirely opportunistic. i have very few principles. and one of the great ironies in yemen is that most of the developments we were able to do with significant came from 416 b. in other words, surplus agricultural commodities made available in yemen sold and we took that money we programmed it to build clinics.

we came up short on all the other areas, ess. we were at the department of agriculture, god bless them, allowed us to generate a certain amount of revenues so you could see the development program. including the money that has been given and i think secretary gates and many others are very happy to administer. there is a fundamental question here. why is it that dod and u.s. military has more money than they can spend and the state department is stark for

resources and the resources given to usaid are oftentimes so constrained that we don't have the freedom to apply them effectively? that is a fundamental question that i tank would be healthy for us to address. and i think part of it is that there are stereotypes. they are meant and simple explanations. and one of them is that military is always effective. usaid is always in effect to. and i think we need to address those kind of stereotypes and provided the legislature, the american public, the american media some very graphic examples

of how these other agencies use resources excessively and efficiently and respond to the end for the interest of the american people, not only effectively a cost effect really. nsa said a nato made remarks, one of the ambitions i have for this book is to show how a little bit of resources used properly and with the right strategy actually went a very, very long way and during that period precluded the massive investment in terms of american military presence.

>> mr. ambassador, my name is bruce, former foreign service officer and i must admit corresponding. i get the impression from your presentation today very negative prospects for the future. i'm the one hand you say yes but there will likely be domestic instability, this discord among the military and civilian authorities. secondly, you agree they will probably not be u.s. government resources necessary to carry out this operations you'd like to see. for 10 years we've tried to define when in afghanistan. can you tell us which are reasonable expect patients are for what we can do quite >> first of all, let me correct the misperception. i am a big fan of u.s. media and foreign correspondence particularly and we could not

done what we needed to do in yemen come except for the fact we had people from "the new york times" and los angeles times, "wall street journal" come in and paying to us in writing about the problems. well, i want the record to be clear. yeah, if you let the situation lift, if we don't dedicate attention to resources and execution of policy in yemen -- and let me just make clear that i do think the obama administration has paid attention to this problem. i do think they have devised a

rather impressive strategy and they are dedicating resources. so the issues being addressed addressed by the admin is reassuring. the question now think is implementation of the strategy. but, it's a situation he strategy that's going to go forward and we can't do anything about? no. an argument in the focus we can affect these situations with the right strategy, with the rate resources. what needs to be done in yemen is doable. it is doable without massive american presence, but it's going to take an active effort

and an effort at a relatively high level in our government. and i think it's going to be -- our chances of success are greater if we act soon or then later, that time is not on our side. risk is a risk for us. so i am not by any means -- i am not a doomsayer and i think again in the book there is an opportunistic underlying premise that even in very difficult situations, even when we have fewer resources than we were

dedicating today, we found ways of impact in the situation and i have no doubt the current generation diplomats and other development exploits will also find ways if we attend to its situation. >> i have one question myself. you've spoken throughout your remarks of the fact that whereas the military gets it, the state department can't say. the u.s. congress and the american public doesn't get it and we'll go back to it. the american public and congress understand military. they don't understand diplomacy and development. they don't quite know what diplomacy is. when you talk about development, large numbers of our public and get 25% of enormous amounts of

foreign assistance when in fact under 1% of our gdp. so i am wondering if your second proposition that we need an effective counterterrorism strategy, in that context, do you think the state department is playing -- has the lead role in developing that strategy and coordinating his implementation or not right now? is that other agencies without pedro? that's my question. >> i think it depends on the situation. i think for yemen, john brennan in the white house has the lead role in developing the strategy and resources. they think for a long while in iraq, military have delete. i think that is going to change with our drive down there. so it is