residence, it needs to demonstrate the person that it's after is an employee or spottyba or other was working for or onet behalf of another country or terrorist group. lone wolf provision which wasn sent to shlaes site in 2004 recognizes that there may be g casesov where the recover metf suspects in the individual inside the united states of plotting a terrorist attack, buk it hasn't been able to link that individual to al qaeda or another group.or al the lone wolf already allows the engaging in terrorist activity and get a warrant to begin surveillance. this is not done without a warrant from the court.

it also allows for court-ordered collection against a non-united states target who may have broken with a terrorist organization while continuing to prepare for an act of international terrorism. the justice department has advised congress that although to date it has not used this authority, lone wolf authority nevertheless fills an important gap in united states collection capabilities, and we have it if we need it. the recent case of khalid wasiri, a saudi national arrested in texas this past february, shows why the lone wolf authority is necessary. aldo wasiri was arrested after the f.b.i. learned that he had purchased chemicals and conducted research needed to

make improvised explosive devices. he had also researched bomb targets including dams in california and the dallas residence of former president george w. bush. unlike other recent terrorists, like najibula asiri, wasiri was not identified. he is better described as one of the most recent cases of individuals already inside the united states who becomes radicalized and committed to carrying out terrorist attacks. so it's for this kind of threat that the lone wolf authority is important. and for why we should extend this mechanism. it is also this kind of threat

that the intelligence community is now especially worried about, as people inside the united states may be spurred to action in retaliation for the strike against bin laden. if the f.b.i. or department of homeland security or a state or local police officer identifies someone building bombs, it is necessary to move quickly and not take time to research a possible connection to al qaeda before we use fisa authorities to learn what they're up to and when and how they might strike. business records. the third authority covered by this legislation is known as the business records provision and provides the government the same authority and national security investigations to obtain physical records that exists in an ordinary criminal case,

through a grand jury subpoena. business records authority has been used since 2001 in fisa to obtain business -- excuse me -- drivers license records, hotel records, car rental records, apartment leasing records, credit card records, among other business records. this is the way in which you track a target. let me note that while the debate over this provision has often focused on library circulation records, the justice department has advised the congress that this authority has never -- and let me stress -- never been used to obtain library circulation records. we had a big debate on this when this came up before, and in fact it's never been used for library

circulation records. the department has informed congress that it submitted 96 applications to the fisa court for business record orders last year alone. the justice department has further stated that some business records orders have been used to support critically important and highly sensitive intelligence collection activities. the house and senate intelligence committees have been fully briefed on that collection. information about this sensitive collection has also been provided to the house and senate judiciary committees and information has been available for months to all senators for their review. the details on how the government uses all three of these authorities are classified and discussion of them here would harm our ability to

identify and stop terrorist attacks and espionage, but if any senators would like further detail, i encourage them to contact the intelligence committee or to request a briefing from the intelligence community or the department of justice. now, i've mentioned several times the role of the foreign intelligence surveillance corps. let me describe what it is and how it operates. this court is a special court. it is a set of 11 federal judges, each of whom is appointed by the chief justice to specifically serve in this role. at least one of these judges is available at all times, 24/7, 365 days a year, seven days a week, for the purpose of reviewing government

applications to use fisa authorities, and if those applications are sufficient, approving them by issuing an order or what we call in the criminal law a warrant. the fisa court judges meet in closed session to review classified declarations, and they provide very careful judicial review of the government's applications. they are expert in this specialized area of the law, as is their expert staff. this department of -- the department of justice officials that come before them take all care in making their case and presenting their facts as they do in public court. so the american people should understand that these fisa authorities that we are discussing now, the ability to conduct electronic surveillance and obtain records are subject

to strict oversight. a senate confirmed official in the department of justice, the attorney general, the deputy attorney general or the assistant attorney general for national security, one of these three must -- and i stress must -- sign off on every application before it goes to the foreign intelligence surveillance court. federal judges also confirmed by the senate must improve the applications. inspector generals conduct regular audits and oversight as well. and the senate house intelligence and judiciary committees receive regular reports from the department of justice on the use of all fisa authorities, as well as receiving briefings from the f.b.i. and n.s.a. on the implementation of the fisa statute.

the three authorities reauthorized by this legislation have been debated extensively on this floor and in this congress since they came up for reauthorization in 2009. every single national security official to come before the congress in the past two years has testified that these provisions are vital to protect america and has urged their reauthorization. it's very hard, i think, to vote no in face of what we have been told in classified intelligence, in hearings, by officials from the attorney general's office and the f.b.i. in fact, the attorney general and the director of national intelligence wrote a letter to leaders reid and mcconnell today, may 23, expressing their

strong support for the immediate enactment of the legislation we're now considering, and i ask unanimous consent, mr. president, that this letter be inserted into the record. the presiding officer: without objection. mrs. feinstein: let me point out there are no recent cases of abuse of these authorities. no recent cases of abuse of these authorities, and the oversight system in place is working well, i believe, to ensure they will not be misused in the future. now, other senators may come to this floor and talk about abuses of these authorities, but i ask listen carefully. chances are they're talking about a section not involved here, and that's the section on national security letters. again, national security letters are not touched by these three sections that we are renewing

today. and i would say yes, they were abused or misused in years past, according to the inspector general of the department of justice. but corrections have been made since then, but more importantly for today's debate, there's nothing we're taking up today that affects or mentions national security letters at all. i've referred to this now four times. i hope i get it across because it's -- that's what happened last time. people came to the floor, and what they were talking about wasn't really in the legislation we were considering. earlier this year, i was pleased to support legislation authored by senator leahy that would have made several improvements in the foreign intelligence surveillance act in order to better protect privacy rights and civil liberties, but the point i made during the debate

in the judiciary committee, which i will repeat again today, is that many of these changes were, in fact, codifying practices the department of justice and the f.b.i. have already implemented. for example, minimization. that was one of the things that was discussed. it's been implemented. so the departments are listening, and they have taken action where there have been problems. so i would like to say to my colleagues that the executive branch has heard and has acted to address concerns about intrusions into american civil liberties. the office of the inspector general and the department of justice has indicated that it intends to conduct audits and inspections to ensure that the implementation of fisa is in full compliance with the law and its reports will be carefully

reviewed by this congress and by the concerned committees. a major priority of the intelligence committee in this house is to conduct regular oversight on the use of fisa authorities, and we will continue to do so after passage of this legislation. now, just about every administration official to testify on the use of fisa authorities has also noted the importance of having the stability that comes with a long-term extension. since december of 2009 when we reauthorized it, the congress has passed three short-term extensions, one for two months, one for one year and one for three months. so by lurching from one sunset to another, we run the risk that these intelligence authorities are going to expire, and here we

are once again because they expire this friday. and i hope members will think about that. i hope members will think if they want to produce an amendment, look, this thing goes out of place. what if n.s.a. and other agencies have to stop? what if they miss something? what if something happens? that's a responsibility that rests on the heads of nrch these two -- of everyone in these two bodies, both the house of representatives and the senate of the united states. even short of that, by providing one short-term extension after another, two months here or a year there, we create significant uncertainty in the intelligence community as investigators aren't sure whether these tools will continue to be available to

them. i can tell you, as one who tries to read the intelligence rather assiduously, we are not out of harm's way and no one should believe that. people are plotting every day as to how they can send someone in the -- into the united states or convince someone in the united states to attack this country, and the only thing we have to prevent this from happening is intelligence and an f.b.i. that is now able to institute surveillance and tracking on possible targets in this country. mr. president, we have come, in my judgment, a long way since 9/11, but we cannot leave this country vulnerable. we must keep our guard up, and we must see that the intelligence mechanisms that are

available to this country are able to be utilized. so this legislation now extends the use of these sunsetting authorities for four years, to june 1, 2015, and in view of the time that we're living in, i believe this is appropriate, it's keeping with past practice and it's vital to the protection of the united states of america. the patriot act was enacted in october, 2001, and several provisions were up for review and reauthorization four years later, in december of 2005. after some significant debate, some of the original patriot act provisions were made permanent, and some were reauthorized for another four years until the end of 2009.

the lone wolf authority that expires later this week was first enacted in the intelligence reform act of 2004 and placed in the same sunset cycle as the roving wiretap and business records authorities. under the model established in the patriot act and a subsequent reauthorization, a four-year extension from the end of may, 2011, to june 1, 2015, is based on sound congressional practice. so these issues have been debated and redebated and should be very familiar to members, especially those on the intelligence and judiciary committees. so i hope we're now going to act in the best interests of protecting the people of this country from another terrorist

attack by passing this legislation so that our intelligence professionals can continue to keep this nation secure. thank you, a senator: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from montana. mr. tester: thank you, mr. president. today, mr. president, we have an opportunity to do away with a law that tramples on our constitutional rights, a law that invades the privacy of law-abiding montanans and americans, a law that deprives america of some of our most basic constitutional protections. this week, we're voting on whether to extend the u.s.a. patriot act four more years as is, and there's a chance that we may not have an opportunity to change it, even though we know that our freedoms have been compromised. and that is a shame, because without that possibility, we're not having the debate the american people deserve. if our only choice is to vote "yes" or "no," i'm going to vote "no." long before i ever got to the senate, the patriot act was sold

to us as a toolbox of sorts to give u.s. agents the tools they need to find and fight and kill terrorists. what we got from the patriot act was a law that is killing the rights guaranteed by our constitution. it gives our government full authority to dig through your private records or tap your phones or make a case against you without even having a judge'judge's warrant, even if e doing nothing wrong. we give up our rights, mr. president, we give away -- we give way to exactly what the terrorists wanted for us -- fewer freedoms and invasion of privacy. it's not acceptable in montana and i'm sure it's not acceptable anywhere else. more than 200 years ago, one of our founders of this country warned us, and here's what he said. "those who give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." words of wisdom from benjamin franklin. our nation was founded on the principles of freedom and

privacy and a government that we control. we got exactly the opposite with the patriot act. mr. president, here's a copy of the constitution. it's a reminder of our rights as americans guaranteed by the fourth amendment. and i quote -- "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated." the folks who wrote the patriot act were here in washington long before i even thought about running for the u.s. senate. but you do not have to be a lawyer to know that the patriot act flies in the face of the fourth amendment. it allows the government to conduct secret proceedings even when those proceedings don't need to be held in secret. and if we allow that to happen, we toss government transparency and accountability out the window. as we've seen over the past few weeks, our military forces and intelligence agents are the most effective in the world. they are the best because they have the most powerful tools in

the world to do their jobs. they are better trained than anyone else, they're stronger, they're smarter and they do what they do without needing to snoop around in the private lives of law-abiding americans and montanans. without having to dig up your medical records or your gun records or your library records or your internet records, mr. president, the patriot act is bad policy that has put us on a very slippery slope. our constitutional freedoms are too valuable to give even an inch of them away, especially when we don't need to. and without the opportunity to make real changes to this bill, our only option is to a ohie" or "no" to extending this law four more years f. we do, an entire -- more years. if we do, an entire decade will have passed without making any adjustments. not having any opportunity to amend the patriot act, i'm going to vote against it in the name of freedom and privacy. and i'm going to encourage all senators to do the same because it's the the

quorum be suspended. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. grassley: mr. president, we find ourselves again in the situation of extending key provisions of the patriot act. these three provisions are roving wiretaps, section 215 impis record orders, and the lone wolf provisions. these are all very important tools used to investigate and prevent terrorists attacks. they have been reauthorized a number of times, but it seems that in recent years we've been discussing only very short-term extensions of these critical tools. that is why i will support the cloture petition on moving to s. 1038 today. this legislation provides a four-year extension of the three expiring provisions without any substantive changes to the existing authorities, and i believe there does not need to

be changes to existing authorities. regardless of my support for today's cloture vote and support for the four-year extension, i want my colleagues to know that i support a permanent extension of the three expiring provisions. having this debate year after year offers little certainty to agents utilizing these provisions to combat terrorism. it also leads to operational uncertainty, jeopardizes collection of critical intelligence, and could lead to compliance and reporting problems if the reauthorization occurs too close to the expiration of the law and we're getting very close to that. if we believe that these tools are necessary -- and i clearly state i believe they are necessary -- we need to provide some certainty as opposed to simply revisiting the law year

after year. given the indefinite threat that we face from acts of terrorism, it is my view that we should permanently reauthorize these three expiring provisions. this position is supported by agents on the ground using these tools every day. i have letters of support from the federal bureau of investigation agents association supporting a permanent reauthorization of the three expiring provisions. the federal law enforcement officers association also supports a permanent extension of the provisions. in fact, a very important passage of that letter states -- quote -- "crimes and terrorism will not sunset and are still targeting our nation and american citizens. just like handcuffs, the patriot

act should be a permanent part of law enforcement arsenal." then we have another letter from the society of former special agents to the f.b.i., and that letter -- quote -- "we urge congress to reauthorize the expiring provisions of the patriot act permanently and without restrictions as the three expiring provisions are essential to the security of our country." end of quote. mr. president, i ask unanimous consent that these letters be a part of the record. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. grassley: in addition to agents on the ground, we've heard strong support for extending the expiring provisions of the patriot act from members of the bush and obama administrations. we've heard testimony from the director of the f.b.i., the attorney general and the director of national intelligence about the strong need to reauthorize these

provisions. these same offices have recommended extending the provisions regardless of political ideology, as both republican and democrat administrations have backed the extensions. the four-year extension we're voting on today is a step in the right direction. extending the three expiring provisions without any substantive amendment that would restrict or curtail the use of these tools is very important given the recent actions that led to the death of osama bin laden. now is not the time to place new restrictions and heighten evidentiary standards on critical national security tools. a lot has been said about these provisions, and unfortunately most of what has been said is incorrect. congress enacted these provisions and reauthorized them

in 2005 following the 9/11 commission report which criticized the way our agents failed to piece together clues. in other words, to connect the dots. since that time the three expiring provisions have provided a great deal of information to agents that have helped thwart terrorist attacks. and let's be very basic, what is terrorism about? it's about killing people living in western europe and north america. they don't like us. they want to kill us. and we've got to prevent that. they can make continuing mistakes and not get their job done, but once the f.b.i. makes a mistake and lets one of them get away, it's a victory for the opposition. we can't afford a failure. now, examples along the lines that we can't have these

failures, in testimony before the house judiciary committee, subcommittee on crime, terrorism and homeland security, robert litt, the general counsel of the office of the director of national intelligence, testified that a section 215 order was used as part of the investigation by the f.b.i. in the khalid aldawasa r*eu who was arrested in texas recently. mr. litt also testified the 215 orders were utilized to obtain hotel records in the case where a suspected spy had arranged lodging for intelligence officers. he also discussed the roving wiretap provisions and how it is used to help agents track

foreign agents operating inside the united states who switch cellular phones frequently to avoid being caught. these examples are limited not because the authorities aren't valuable, but because of how sensitive the investigations are that utilize these authorities. while the need for keeping personal national security matters classified may prevent the open discussion of further examples in this setting here on the floor of the senate, it is important to note that these provisions are constantly under strict scrutiny by the inspector general at the department of justice and by congressional oversight. in fact, in a march 2008 report, the justice department inspector general examined the f.b.i.'s use of section 215 orders and found -- quote -- "we did not identify any illegal use of section 15 authority."

end of quote. further, there are no reported abuses of the roving surveillance authority and the lone wolf provision has not yet been utilized, so it is without abuse as well. while i tkpwhrae these three provisions -- while i agree these three provisions should be subject to strict scrutiny, oversight authority already exists in the law and does not provide authority for these tools to achieve the goal of oversight. as such, it is important that congress reauthorize these provisions quickly and without amendment. i urge my colleagues to vote in support of the cloture petition on the motion to proceed to s. 1038 because it provides a clean reauthorization of these very vital tools for four years without substantive changes. in other words, if it ain't broke, don't fix it.

while four years is a far cry from the permanence that i feel is necessary on these provisions, it does provide more certainty and predictability than continuing to pass short-term extension after extension. i yield the floor. a senator: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from kentucky. mr. paul: there's been a lot of discussion of the patriot act, and we're told basically we wouldn't be able to capture these terrorists if we didn't give up some of our liberties, if we didn't give up some of the fourth amendment and allow it to be easier for the police to come into our homes. we were so frightened after 9/11 that we readily gave up these freedoms. we said, well, the fourth amendment is not that important. we'll just let the government look at all of our records and we'll make it easier for the government to look at our records. the question you have to ask, though, is whether or not we

would still be able to catch terrorists by using the fourth amendment as it was intended and having the protections of the fourth amendment. what you have to ask yourself is think about the worst person in your community. think about someone accused of murder or rape or a pedophile. you think of these people; do you know what happens if someone is accused of that? even if it's 3:00 in the morning and they want to get their records or they want to go into their house, they call a judge. this is something very important. they get the warrants almost all the time. but it's one step of protection. what you have is the protection where you don't have police officers writing warrants to come into your house. you have to have it reviewed by a judge. what we've done to the patriot act is taken away some of the protections of the fourth amendment. the fourth amendment says you need to name the person and the place to be searched. we've taken away those protections. the fourth amendment says you

need to have probable cause. we've taken away those and made it to where it, if it's relevant or they think they might be related to it. originally the fisa court lowered the standard somewhat on the fourth amendment, but it recognized that it was lowering the standard and was careful. we had secret courts set up and the fisa court was the court that dealt with things that had that to* do with national security or terrorism or intelligence. the information was kept secret so we didn't let everybody in the world know the name but the name had to be die srulged to the judges. those who argue you have to have the patriot act, tough do this or we will not be able to stop terrorism, they need to explain why the fisa court did tens of thousands of search warrants and never turned any down. in fact, the history before the patriot act was no search warrant had ever been turned down. do we really want to give up our liberties in exchange for miles-per-hour security? franklin -- in exchange for more

security. franklin said those who give up liberty in exchange for security may end up with neither. right now if you have a visa bill that's over $5,000 and you choose to pay for it over the phone which is a wire transfer, the government is probably looking at your visa bill. they don't have to show probable cause and they don't have to have a judge's warrant. and this does apply to u.s. citizens. often they'll tell you it's only foreign terrorists we're looking at. they want you to feel good about allowing the spying, but this spying is going on by the tens of thousands and even by the millions. with regard to these suspicious activity reports, we've done over 4 million of them in the last ten years. we're now doing over a million a year. these suspicious activity reports, all the trigger is you don't have to have anything to do with terrorism. the trigger is you have over $5,000 that you transfer by bank account. you say, well, the courts have decided that your bank records aren't private.

well, the hell they aren't. they should be private. my visa records, if you look at my visa records, you can tell whether i go to the doctor, what kind of doctor i go to. you can conceivably tell what kind of medication i'm on. you can tell what kind of magazines i read. you can tell what kind of books i order from amazon. do we want a government that looks at our visa bill? do we want a government that looks at our records and is finding out what our reading habits are. one of the provisions apply to library records. do you want the government to find out what you're reading at the library? we now have a president that wants to know where you contributed before you do work for the government. do we want that kind of all-encompassing government that is looking at every record from top to bottom and invading our privacy? there is another aspect of this called national security letters. these are basically warrants that are written by f.b.i. agents. no judge reviews them. this is specifically what james otis was worried about when he

talked about general warrants that weren't specifying the person or the place and that were written by police officers. and this is a problem because really this is -- we depend on the checks and balances in our society. we never want to give all the authority to either one group of congress or to the president or to police or judges. we have checks and balances to approve -- to try to prevent abuse. now, some have said, well, if you have nothing to hide, why do you care? well, the thing is that it will not always be angels that are in charge of government. you have rules because you want to prevent the day that may occur when you get someone who takes over your government through elected office or otherwise who really is intent on using the tools of government to pry into your affairs, to snoop on what you're doing, to punish you for your political or religious beliefs. that's why we don't ever want to let the law become so expansive. but the thing is you have to

realize that you can still get terrorists. we get rapists and murderers every day by calling a judge. that's what i'm asking for. i'm asking that we go through and obey the fourth amendment. many conservatives argue that well they love the second amendment. some liberals say they love to be able to protect the first amendment. if you don't protect the entire bill of rights, you're not going to have any of it. if you want to protect your right to own a gun, you need to protect your gun records from the government looking at your gun records and finding out whether you've been buying a gun at a gun show. you need to protect your privacy. if you want to protect the first amendment, you've got to have the fourth amendment. in fact, we specifically had to go back there. the original patriot act said that you couldn't even consult with your attorney. you couldn't even tell your attorney -- you were gagged from telling your attorney. even know, though, you say i don't know if they've investigated me. you know why? because they tell your phone

company if they're looking at your phone records right now or your visa records, it's against the law for visa or the phone company to tell you that. it's hundreds of thousands of dollars of fines and jail time. it's five years in jail if your phone company tells you they have been spying on you. now, some of this doesn't even require a letter from government. some of it is done by the banks. the suspicious activity reports, we have simply told the bank here, anybody that deals in cash, anybody that has over a a $5,000 transfer, wire transfer or who deals in large amounts of money, the bank -- it's incumbent upon the bank to spy on their customers now. this is a real problem, and i think that we need to have some argument and debate in our country over these things. some want to have these things permanently. they want to permanently give up their fourth amendment protections, and i disagree strongly. not only would i let these expire, but i think we really

should sunset the entire patriot act and protect our liberties the way it was intended by our founding fathers. james otis was an attorney in boston, and he wrote about these things they called in those days writs of assistance. these were general warrants. the king would write them, or actually they were written by soldiers here. they didn't name the person to be searched or the place, and they were used as a way to have the king have his way with the people and to bully the people. the idea of general warrants is what really sorely offended our founding fathers. that's why we got the fourth amendment. the fourth amendment was the product of a decade or more of james otis arguing cases against the british government. but the question you have to ask yourself when thinking about these issues is it's not so simple that you can just say well, i'm either against terrorism or i'm going to let terrorists run wild and take over the country. you can be opposed to terrorists. we can go after terrorists. we can go after murderers and

rapists and people who commit crimes, but we can do it with a process that protects the innocent. you know, we -- we looked at -- i think so far they say we have looked at 28 million electronic records. we have looked at 1,600,000 text messages, and we have 800,000 hours of audio. we have so much audio that they can't even listen to it all. 25% of what they have recorded of your phone conversations is not listened to because they don't even have time to listen to it. my point would be that we're eavesdropping on so many people that it could be that we are missing out and not targeting. it's just like the airports. every one of you is being searched in the airport and you're not terrorists and you're no threat to our country. why are we not looking for the people who would attack us and spending time on those people? why do we not go to a judge and say this person we suspect of dealing with this terrorist group, will you give us a warrant? why don't we have those steps?

instead, we're mining and going through millions of records, and i think we're overwhelmed so much with the records that we may well be doing less of a good job with terrorism because we're looking at everyone's records. but the bottom line is i don't want to live in a country where we give up our freedoms, our privacy. i don't want to live in a country that loses its constitutional protections that protect us as individuals. we do have a right to privacy. you have a right not to have the government reading your visa bill every month. we do have rights and we should protect these, but we shouldn't be so fearful that we say well, i'm a good person, i don't care, just look at my records. if you do, you're setting yourself up for a day when there will be a tyranny, when there will be a despot who comes into power in the united states and who uses those rules that you said oh, i don't have anything to hide. what happens when someone takes over who believes that your religion is -- is to be combated, who believes that your

political beliefs and your literature should be combated? what happens when that day comes? we cannot give up -- our liberty. if we do, if we trade it for security, we'll have neither. so i rise in opposition to the vote on cloture. i will be introducing amendments to the patriot act this week, and we will be having a real debate about how we can stop terrorism but also preserve free mr. grassley: i yield the floor. a senator: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from georgia. mr. chambliss: mr. president, i rise in support of invoking cloture on the motion to proceed to s. 1038, the patriot sunset extension act of 2011. in four days on may 27, three fisa provisions, the lone wolf, roving wiretap and two section 315 authorities will expire unless congress acts to reauthorize them. the house has been working on a bill, h.r. 1800, that would make

the lone wolf provision permanent and extend the other two provisions until december, 2017. senator feinstein and leahy have sponsored bills that would, among other things, extend all three provisions until december, 2013. it seems to me that 1038 with its extension of the three sunsets until june 1, 2015, is a reasonable compromise. although i believe that each one of these two should be made permanent, this bill will ensure that our intelligence professionals have the tools they need to keep our nation safe. there is little disagreement that these provisions should and must be reauthorized. f.b.i. director robert mueller has testified repeatedly that each one of these provisions is important to both national security as well as criminal investigations, but the importance does not end there. because of enhanced information-sharing rules and procedures, other parts of the

intelligence community like the national counterterrorism center and the national counterproliferation center, often depend on the information collected under these provisions. losing or changing these authorities could adversely impact the intelligence community's ability to analyze and share important national intelligence information. according to director mueller, with all the new technology, it is easy for a terrorist target to buy four or five cell phones, use them in quick succession, and then dump them to avoid being intercepted. he has testified that the ability to track terrorists when they do this is tremendously important. i couldn't agree more because it's pretty obvious those guys are up to something and it's not good. our enemies often know our own laws better than we do. they understand the hoops and hurdles the government must clear to catch up to or stay ahead of them. keep in mind that the f.b.i.

cannot use a roving wiretap until a court finds probable cause to believe that the target is an agent of a foreign power. some critics claim the provision allows the f.b.i. to avoid meeting probable cause as surveillance moves from phone to phone. this claim is simply not accurate. as every roving wiretap must be approved by a fisa court judge. if a target changes a cell phone and the f.b.i. moves to surveil a new phone, the court is notified of that change. all of the prebz -- protections for u.s. person information that apply to any other fisa wiretap also applies to roving wiretaps. in short, while this authority is a tremendous asset for the f.b.i. and has been used 140 times over the past five years, it poses no additional civil liberties concerns and it should be renewed without delay.

with regard to section 215, the business records act, over the past several years, the rallying cry against the patriot act has centered on section 215, fisa business records authority. section 215 allows the f.b.i. to seek fisa court authority to obtain business records such as hotel information or travel records. as with each one of the expiring provisions, the f.b.i. must meet the statutory standard of proof. the inspector general from the department of justice conducted several audits of the f.b.i.'s use of section 215 orders and found no abuses of the authority. director mueller testified that the business records sought by the f.b.i. and terrorism investigations are absolutely essential to identifying other persons who may be involved in terrorist activities. the lone wolf provision, the sole expiring provision under the patriot act that has not been used by the f.b.i.

prompting some critics to demand its repeal is the lone wolf definition of an agent of a foreign power. recent events have demonstrated that self-radicalizing individuals with no clear affiliation to existing terrorist groups are a growing threat to national security. the lone wolf provision provides a counter to that threat, at least in the cases of a non-u.s. person who is readily identifiable with a particular foreign power. the lone wolf provision is a necessary tool that will only need to be used in limited circumstances. it's kind of like those in case of emergency break glass boxes that cover certain fire alarms and equipment. while we may not use it too much, we will certainly wish we had it when the right situation comes up. in conclusion, i am grateful for the leadership of senators reid and mcconnell on this crucial piece of legislation.

this bill will ensure that our intelligence and law enforcement professionals can continue doing what they do best, without any additional restrictions. our nation has been fortunate to have not suffered a sequel to the 9/11 attacks, and much of the credit goes to the dedicated work of our intelligence and law enforcement professionals. we owe them not only our thanks but the recognition that their jobs are as difficult as it is, and we should not be taking any steps that will make their responsibility to protect this country any more difficult. mr. president, i urge the vote in support of invoking cloture on the motion to proceed, and i yield the floor and

mrs. feinstein: i thank the clerk very much. mr. president, as chairman of the senate intelligence committee, i want to point out that as of friday, there are three provisions of the foreign intelligence surveillance act which are going to expire. those three provisions are something called the roving

wiretaps, the lone wolf provision and the business records authority. because of prior discussions, let me point out up front that this does not include national security letters. just these three provisions -- roving wiretaps, lone wolf and the business records authority. i very much appreciate that the majority leader and the republican leader have come together in agreement to bring this legislation to the senate floor. and because of its importance, particularly at this point in time, i hope we will be able to conclude this business and see that these provisions are extended for four years before friday. many of us strongly believe when it comes to national security, there should be no partisan divide, only strong bipartisan support. and so this measure should

receive a substantial vote this afternoon, and the senate will pass it quickly this week before these key authorities expire. but before talking about the substance of the legislation, let me describe the context in which this debate occurs. three weeks ago, on may 1, the united states carried out a risky, complicated but ultimately successful strike against osama bin laden in abbottabad, pakistan. the strike was the culmination of nearly a decade-long investigation to locate bin laden. finding bin laden was the product of multiple intelligence sources and collection methods. it was a seamless effort led by the c.i.a. with important contributions from the national security agency, known as the

n.s.a., and the national geospatial intelligence agency as well. the intelligence mechanisms, their kpwhraoed and counter-- ememployed and counterterrorism operations are regularly reviewed by the senate intelligence committee. some are also overseen by the judiciary committee, on which i also have the pleasure to serve. these intelligence tools include the provisions of the foreign intelligence surveillance act, or fisa, and in particular the three provisions that will, if not reauthorize, expire on may 27. again they are the roving wiretap, the lone wolf and the business records sections. the point is we as a nation rely on certain secret sources and methods to protect our national security, and most other nations do the same thing as well.

it is also important to note that the strike against bin laden, while a critical strategic blow to al qaeda, is also very likely to lead to reprisal attempts. there have been calls for attacks against the united states after the bin laden strike from al qaeda in pakistan, from al qaeda affiliates in yemen and north africa. and there is very real concern that radicalized americans here at home may contemplate violence in response to extremist calls for retribution. so this is a time of heightened threat. maybe no specific threats, but certainly heightened threats. and we see attacks in pakistan carried out by the taliban in reprisal for this attack as well. therefore, this is a time when our vigilance must be heightened as well. key officials from the national counterterrorism center, the

f.b.i., and the department of homeland security recently described to us in closed session how the respective agencies have heightened their defensive posture over just these very concerns. so clearly this is a time where every legal counterterrorism and intelligence gathering mechanism should be available. it is also a time to seize the opportunity to further disrupt al qaeda. the assault on the bin laden compound netted a cache of valuable information: papers, videos, computer drives and other materials about al qaeda's vision and al qaeda plans. the intelligence community established an interagency task force to go through that material as quickly as possible. and i am hopeful that previously unknown terror plots will be

identified and information leading to the location of terrorists found. authorities like the three provisions set to expire this friday may well prove critical to thwarting new plots and finding terrorists. they must be renewed. let me describe the three provisions in more detail. first, the roving wiretap provisions. roving wiretap authority was first authorized for intelligence purposes in the patriot act in 2001. but, as you know, mr. president, it has been used for years in the criminal law. this provision codified in the foreign intelligence surveillance act provides the government with flexibility needed to conduct electronic surveillance against illusive targets. now let me explain. in most cases, under fisa the

government can go to the foreign intelligence surveillance court, which i will describe in detail later, and present an application to tap the telephone of a suspected terrorist or spy. the fisa court reviews the application and can issue an order, basically a warrant, to allow the government to tap a phone belonging to that target. now we all know in this day and age, there are disposable or throw-away cell phones that allow foreign intelligence agents and terrorists not only to switch numbers, but also to throw away their cell phone to dispose of the cell phone and replace it with another. this roving wiretap authority allows the government to make a specific showing to the fisa

court that the actions of a terrorist or spy may have the effect of thwarting intelligence. they make -- in other words, they make one appearance. the government can thus seek, and the fisa court can authorize, a roving wiretap so that the f.b.i., for example, can follow the target without having to go back to the court for each cell phone change. instead, the f.b.i. reports to the fisa court normally within ten days of following the target to a new cell phone with information on the facts justifying the belief that the new phone was or is being used by the target. the justice department has advised congress that the authority to conduct roving electronic surveillance under fisa has proven to be operationally useful in some 20

national security investigations annually. so this provision is both used and very necessary in this day of throwaway cell phones. lone wolf authority allows the government to request, and the fisa court to approve, intelligence collection against non-united states persons who engage in international terrorism but for whom an association with a specific international terrorist organization may not yet be known. so let me explain that for clearly. all other foreign intelligence surveillance searches and surveillances must be focused on a target who the government can prove is tied to a foreign power. so before the government can tap

a phone or search a residence, it needs to demonstrate that the person it is after is an employee or spy or otherwise working for or on behalf of another country or terrorist group. the lone wolf provision which was added to fisa in 2004 recognizes that there may be cases where the government suspects an individual inside the united states of plotting a terrorist attack, but it hasn't been able to link that individual to al qaeda or aolz or al shabob or another group. lone wolf authority allows the government to show why it believes another person is engaging in terrorist activity and get a warrant to begin

surveillance. this is not done without a warrant from the court. it also allows for court-ordered collection against a non-united states target who may have broken with a terrorist organization while continuing to prepare for an act of international terrorism. the justice department has advised congress that although to date it has not used this authority, lone wolf authority nevertheless fills an important gap in united states collection capabilities, and we have it if we need it. the recent case of khalid wasiri, a saudi national arrested in texas this past february, shows why the lone wolf authority is necessary. aldo wasiri was arrested after the f.b.i. learned that he had

purchased chemicals and conducted research needed to make improvised explosive devices. he had also researched bomb targets including dams in california and the dallas residence of former president george w. bush. unlike other recent terrorists, like najibula asiri, wasiri was not identified. he is better described as one of the most recent cases of individuals already inside the united states who becomes radicalized and committed to carrying out terrorist attacks. so it's for this kind of threat that the lone wolf authority is important. and for why we should extend this mechanism.

it is also this kind of threat that the intelligence community is now especially worried about, as people inside the united states may be spurred to action in retaliation for the strike against bin laden. if the f.b.i. or department of homeland security or a state or local police officer identifies someone building bombs, it is necessary to move quickly and not take time to research a possible connection to al qaeda before we use fisa authorities to learn what they're up to and when and how they might strike. business records. the third authority covered by this legislation is known as the business records provision and provides the government the same authority and national security investigations to obtain physical records that exists in

an ordinary criminal case, through a grand jury subpoena. business records authority has been used since 2001 in fisa to obtain business -- excuse me -- drivers license records, hotel records, car rental records, apartment leasing records, credit card records, among other business records. this is the way in which you track a target. let me note that while the debate over this provision has often focused on library circulation records, the justice department has advised the congress that this authority has never -- and let me stress -- never been used to obtain library circulation records. we had a big debate on this when this came up before, and in fact

it's never been used for library circulation records. the department has informed congress that it submitted 96 applications to the fisa court for business record orders last year alone. the justice department has further stated that some business records orders have been used to support critically important and highly sensitive intelligence collection activities. the house and senate intelligence committees have been fully briefed on that collection. information about this sensitive collection has also been provided to the house and senate judiciary committees and information has been available for months to all senators for their review. the details on how the government uses all three of these authorities are classified and discussion of them here

would harm our ability to identify and stop terrorist attacks and espionage, but if any senators would like further detail, i encourage them to contact the intelligence committee or to request a briefing from the intelligence community or the department of justice. now, i've mentioned several times the role of the foreign intelligence surveillance corps. let me describe what it is and how it operates. this court is a special court. it is a set of 11 federal judges, each of whom is appointed by the chief justice to specifically serve in this role. at least one of these judges is available at all times, 24/7, 365 days a year, seven days a week, for the purpose of

reviewing government applications to use fisa authorities, and if those applications are sufficient, approving them by issuing an order or what we call in the criminal law a warrant. the fisa court judges meet in closed session to review classified declarations, and they provide very careful judicial review of the government's applications. they are expert in this specialized area of the law, as is their expert staff. this department of -- the department of justice officials that come before them take all care in making their case and presenting their facts as they do in public court. so the american people should understand that these fisa authorities that we are discussing now, the ability to conduct electronic surveillance

and obtain records are subject to strict oversight. a senate confirmed official in the department of justice, the attorney general, the deputy attorney general or the assistant attorney general for national security, one of these three must -- and i stress must -- sign off on every application before it goes to the foreign intelligence surveillance court. federal judges also confirmed by the senate must improve the applications. inspector generals conduct regular audits and oversight as well. and the senate house intelligence and judiciary committees receive regular reports from the department of justice on the use of all fisa authorities, as well as receiving briefings from the f.b.i. and n.s.a. on the

implementation of the fisa statute. the three authorities reauthorized by this legislation have been debated extensively on this floor and in this congress since they came up for reauthorization in 2009. every single national security official to come before the congress in the past two years has testified that these provisions are vital to protect america and has urged their reauthorization. it's very hard, i think, to vote no in face of what we have been told in classified intelligence, in hearings, by officials from the attorney general's office and the f.b.i. in fact, the attorney general and the director of national intelligence wrote a letter to leaders reid and mcconnell

today, may 23, expressing their strong support for the immediate enactment of the legislation we're now considering, and i ask unanimous consent, mr. president, that this letter be inserted into the record. the presiding officer: without objection. mrs. feinstein: let me point out there are no recent cases of abuse of these authorities. no recent cases of abuse of these authorities, and the oversight system in place is working well, i believe, to ensure they will not be misused in the future. now, other senators may come to this floor and talk about abuses of these authorities, but i ask listen carefully. chances are they're talking about a section not involved here, and that's the section on national security letters. again, national security letters are not touched by these three

sections that we are renewing today. and i would say yes, they were abused or misused in years past, according to the inspector general of the department of justice. but corrections have been made since then, but more importantly for today's debate, there's nothing we're taking up today that affects or mentions national security letters at all. i've referred to this now four times. i hope i get it across because it's -- that's what happened last time. people came to the floor, and what they were talking about wasn't really in the legislation we were considering. earlier this year, i was pleased to support legislation authored by senator leahy that would have made several improvements in the foreign intelligence surveillance act in order to better protect privacy rights and civil liberties, but the

point i made during the debate in the judiciary committee, which i will repeat again today, is that many of these changes were, in fact, codifying practices the department of justice and the f.b.i. have already implemented. for example, minimization. that was one of the things that was discussed. it's been implemented. so the departments are listening, and they have taken action where there have been problems. so i would like to say to my colleagues that the executive branch has heard and has acted to address concerns about intrusions into american civil liberties. the office of the inspector general and the department of justice has indicated that it intends to conduct audits and inspections to ensure that the implementation of fisa is in full compliance with the law and

its reports will be carefully reviewed by this congress and by the concerned committees. a major priority of the intelligence committee in this house is to conduct regular oversight on the use of fisa authorities, and we will continue to do so after passage of this legislation. now, just about every administration official to testify on the use of fisa authorities has also noted the importance of having the stability that comes with a long-term extension. since december of 2009 when we reauthorized it, the congress has passed three short-term extensions, one for two months, one for one year and one for three months. so by lurching from one sunset to another, we run the risk that

these intelligence authorities are going to expire, and here we are once again because they expire this friday. and i hope members will think about that. i hope members will think if they want to produce an amendment, look, this thing goes out of place. what if n.s.a. and other agencies have to stop? what if they miss something? what if something happens? that's a responsibility that rests on the heads of nrch these two -- of everyone in these two bodies, both the house of representatives and the senate of the united states. even short of that, by providing one short-term extension after another, two months here or a year there, we create significant uncertainty in the intelligence community as investigators aren't sure whether these tools will

continue to be available to them. i can tell you, as one who tries to read the intelligence rather assiduously, we are not out of harm's way and no one should believe that. people are plotting every day as to how they can send someone in the -- into the united states or convince someone in the united states to attack this country, and the only thing we have to prevent this from happening is intelligence and an f.b.i. that is now able to institute surveillance and tracking on possible targets in this country. mr. president, we have come, in my judgment, a long way since 9/11, but we cannot leave this country vulnerable. we must keep our guard up, and we must see that the

intelligence mechanisms that are available to this country are able to be utilized. so this legislation now extends the use of these sunsetting authorities for four years, to june 1, 2015, and in view of the time that we're living in, i believe this is appropriate, it's keeping with past practice and it's vital to the protection of the united states of america. the patriot act was enacted in october, 2001, and several provisions were up for review and reauthorization four years later, in december of 2005. after some significant debate, some of the original patriot act provisions were made permanent, and some were reauthorized for another four years until the end of 2009.

the lone wolf authority that expires later this week was first enacted in the intelligence reform act of 2004 and placed in the same sunset cycle as the roving wiretap and business records authorities. under the model established in the patriot act and a subsequent reauthorization, a four-year extension from the end of may, 2011, to june 1, 2015, is based on sound congressional practice. so these issues have been debated and redebated and should be very familiar to members, especially those on the intelligence and judiciary committees. so i hope we're now going to act in the best interests of protecting the people of this

country from another terrorist attack by passing this legislation so that our intelligence professionals can continue to keep this nation secure. thank you,t the quorum be suspended. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. grassley: mr. president, we find ourselves again in the situation of extending key provisions of the patriot act. these three provisions are roving wiretaps, section 215 impis record orders, and the lone wolf provisions. these are all very important tools used to investigate and prevent terrorists attacks. they have been reauthorized a number of times, but it seems that in recent years we've been discussing only very short-term extensions of these critical tools. that is why i will support the cloture petition on moving to s. 1038 today.