game hunting, and people are writing to him, you have got to come back. the republican party is coming apart at the seams. taft is doing thicks you won't -- things you won't like. he's backtracking on the environment. teddy roosevelt was a big environmentalist. so teddy roosevelt comes back, he decides to run against taft in the primaries. but the primaries then are not binding with in 19 -- not binding in 1912. so taft gets the nomination in 1912, and people approach teddy roosevelt about running on a third party ticket. and he says i'll do it, but if you can raise money. so two big money men come along, he raises several million dollars, and he kicks off his campaign, um, by using the expression, "my hat is in the ring." that was coined by teddy roosevelt. and he runs as a bull moose

progressive. now, he ends up with -- he gets a higher percent of the vote than any other third party candidate. he gets close to 28% of the vote. taft is 22%. and because of the split in the republican party, woodrow wilson becomes president with 43% of the vote. so one of the ironies of roosevelt is that one of the things he objects to about taft, he can't hold the party together of but at the same time by roosevelt running, he splits the party. so wilson wins the election, um, and that's it for roosevelt. he dies in 1919. but he's considered one of the -- if you look at polls that historianses take about great presidents, he's up there. he's in the top five. so he was a great president during his first two terms in office. and i think he runs in 1912

mainly for ego reasons. he can't stand to be out of the limelight. let me make another point about third parties. one of the things we find about third parties is that during the 19th century ideas tend to animate third parties. then they go out, and they get candidates. what happens in the 20th century probably because of the growth of the media, because of radio, television, the ease of transportation, personalities become dominant. you think of third party candidates, you think of nader, you think of wallace, you think of perot, you think of teddy roosevelt, these are all dynamic individuals. and third parties arise in the 20th century because of these individuals. and then the issue becomes a part of it, but they don't dominate. >> next, edmund hull, former ambassador to yemen, talks about

the u.s.' counterterrorism efforts in that country. this originally aired live on booktv.org. it's about an hour. >> ladies and gentlemen, good morning. welcome to the american foreign service association. my name is ian houston, i'm the executive director, and it's a real pleasure to have you here. we extend a warm welcome to all of you, and also to our c-span audience. and visitor watching this broadcast live and, also, likely taped on the c-span web site. we will also ask, we'll be putting a link on our web site to the broadcast at a later time. you can visit the program at afsa.org. afsa is approaching 16,000 dues-paying members.

the organization represents over 28,000 active and retired foreign service employees of the department of state, united states agency for international development as well as the foreign agricultural service, foreign commercial service and the international broadcasting bureau. our foreign service is a patriotic group of talented professionals making a difference for the united states and the american people every day. and we honor them with this particular discussion. again, for more about afsa and our programs, you may visit our web site at afsa.org. book notice programs and -- book notes programs and outreach events are sponsored by afsa's fund for american diplomacy. we appreciate the support that those in this room perhaps are providing and also our listeners

and viewers. if you have any questions about how to support the fund for american diplomacy, feel free to send me an e-mail at houston at afsa.org. finally, it's my pleasure to introduce the presiding officer and president of afsa, susan johnson. susan is a 31-year career diplomat, and i appreciate being able to turn the podium over to her, such an experienced and talented diplomat. thank you for being here. [applause] >> well, thank you very much, ian, and many thanks to all of you and a warm welcome to afsa this morning. ian has told you quite a bit about afsa, but i'd just like to say it's a particular pleasure to me to welcome someone like

ambassador hull who sort of in my perspective represent the master practitioner of diplomacy who's now moved into academia, who east putting forth books like this and who is part of that great national asset i think we have in our diplomats generally and our retired diplomat very much included. so i'd like to echo ian's warm welcome and welcome to you, ambassador hull. this morning we are going to be treated to a discussion on a very important topic, the emerging middle east and yemen as one of it many, unfortunately, hot spots. and in the context of the presence of al-qaeda there. so given the news and given development over the last several months, the program could haroldly be time -- could hardly be timelier, and that also applies, i guess, to the publication of ambassador hull's

book. i have not had a chance to read it myself, i look forward to doing so. but from those i know who have, they all tell me it's a great read. our guide through this discussion is very distinguished retired diplomat edmund hull, and his new book "high value target," will be sort of the basic road map for the discussion this morning. ambassador hull served as ambassador to yemen from 2001 to 2004 and has extensive experience working on counterterrorism issues at the state department. those of you who are at this event this morning will have seen a more extensive bio details and data in the announcements. so his extensive credentials both in terms of the middle east, a fluent arabic speaker, and in terms of counterterrorism speak for themselves. so without further ado, i'm

going to turn the podium over to ambassador hull, and he will be speaking for, i don't know, 20 minutes or so, and then there'll be plenty of time for question or answer. thank you very much. ambassador hull. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> testing, one, two. >> okay, that's the hard part. i want to thank susan johnson for that gracious introduction and afsa for hosting this event today, and i want to thank all of you for coming here. i know that in state there's not

a lot of spare time, and some of you are taking time away from important work. i hope i can make it worthwhile. um, what i'd like to do is to, um, really make three propositions and then turn to your questions and answers and talk about what you are interested in. the first proposition is that the state department is not, by and large, a learning institution. the state department has many, many strengths. it recruits some of the best and the bright e generally -- brightest generally, it takes care of them, and it challenges them. however, unlike the military, in my experience there is little systematic attention to lesson learned. and unlike u.s. business, again in my experience, there's little or no emphasis on best

practices. rather, the state department tends to recruit very smart individuals, provides them a modicum of training and asks them to improvise solutions. and a lot depends in the foreign service on who you work for. if you work for someone like henry kissinger, you're likely to get good lessons in geopolitical strategy and how to develop real options. if you work for somebody like jim baker, you're likely to learn a lot about deal making as he did in getting us all to the madrid conference. if you work for somebody like bill burns, you're likely to get lessons in creative humility and the significance of a initiative like the middle east partnership initiative. and, fortunately for state, we have so many exemplary

individuals, and we have such a small work force that it does fairly well with these personal examples. but not, i suggest, anywhere near optimal. as susan was suggesting, i think we should be more deliberate in tapping best practices so that even if you're not so fortunate as to work with one of these people, you can derive lessons from such practitioners. it's helpful, for example, to see how george kennan analyzes the sources of soviet conduct, or to learn how someone like dick holbrook strifes to end a war -- strives to end a war. or how colin powell leads. wouldn't it be great to have a

book from ryan crocker on expeditionary diplomacy, or a book from pat kennedy on management and diplomacy? or a book someday from mark grossman on afpac diplomacy. so i believe this is for state an area for improvement. and i assume that this is what the academy of diplomatic studies and training has in mind with this series on dip ro mats and -- diplomats and diplomacy. and it's an ambition for my particular book, "high value target." now, the second proposition i'd like to make to you this morning is that effective counterterrorism needs a strategy. i argue in this book thatdown terrorism could not -- that

counterterrorism should not be conceived narrowly as an intelligence matter or a military question, but rather it should be conceived as a broad strategy. in yemen we encapsulated our strategy as no development without security, and no security without development. it worked very well in arabic. [speaking in native tongue] and that strategy arose from extensive contacts with the yemenis themselves. high officials and low or average individuals. it linked what was important to us -- moving against al-qaeda in the an effective way -- to what was important to them, which was development. it was summarized in a very simple formula which yemenis

could remember, could make their own. and one of the gratifying phenomenons at the end of our effort, a yemeni would often come up to us and propose our strategy as their strategy. and we could agree with it. so one of the objectives of this book, "high value target," is to show how such a strategy is formulated. now, in the wake of the dramatic success in killing ocean ma bin laden -- osama bin laden, it is tempting to believe that there is a shortcut to victory, and that shortcut is jsoc, joint special operations command, or perhaps predators. in our experience in yemen, a kinetic operation -- the

predator strike -- was necessary. but it was far, far from sufficient. individuals, even bin laden, cub replaced. -- can be replaced. kinetic successes give us momentum, and they give us space to apply broad counterterrorism. and that broad counterterrorism must include diplomacy to motivate partner governments, public diplomacy to create support among their populations, political and economic development to address the underlying driver of extremism, law enforcement to promote an international rule of law, as well as military cooperation often in the guise of effective training and intelligence to protect ourselves and to expose

al-qaeda. .. >> it would be a mistake to rest on our laurels and go to it. we cannot. they cannot. now, my third proposition to you this morning is that the embassy country team is in an effective

mechanism for achieving. i think in washington today we're seeing a consensus that some problems are beyond the scope of any part of the u.s. government. humanitarian disasters, close conduits, stabilization and counterterrorism. what's less generally appreciated around town is that your country team in the field as an ideal way of achieving that whole of government. and the u.s. military is particularly challenged to understand that. and, therefore, they're inclined to set up ad hoc story interagency groups. now, an effective country team as i argue in the book starts

with the ambassador and it is critical that that ambassador not represent the state department, but rather be the personal representative of the president. and that formal letter from the president to each ambassador is a critical tool in his or her management of that country's views. but it certainly does not end with the ambassador. arriving as i did with no economic protection, no public section no development section, what i could do as an individual was extremely limited. and our priority in that first year was serving those critical gaps. the big obstacles to that were security restrictions and state

department's lack of resources. the success we had in yemen would not have been possible without dedicated foreign service nationals, people who with us today, it would not be possible with wae when actually employed retirees who came out to us on short notice and provided us critical support in public diplomacy, and in the economics section, in the counselor section. it would not have been possible without the entry-level officers that colin powell brought in as part of his diplomatic readiness initiative. people who came to us from the national democratic institute and played a key role in making

the -- in helping the yemenis making the parliamentary election in 2003 a success. and it wouldn't have been possible without spouses. people who came to us as a spouse of a foreign service officer but who brought with him critical development skills. and people like my wife anell who succeeded with the yemenis probably anybody else in the embassy. now, in a sense i'm preaching to the choir here. the state department did this and this quadrennial diplomacy and development review term arises disposition.

the secretary of defense, any of us who were listening to bob gates last night on "60 minutes" understands that he appreciates how critical this will be to success in afghanistan, in iraq, in yemen. but i would argue that by and large neither the congress nor the american people did it. the u.s. military has done a superb job of explaining to congress and the american people what their contribution is to u.s. security. the safety department by and large has not done an adequate job in the realm of diplomacy or in the leadership role which is essential for success. as we're here today, the state department is assuming any more responsibilities, in iraq, in afghanistan and elsewhere but we

do not see resources commensurate with those responsibilities. the qdr makes a request for those resources but i believe that congress and the american people need much more graphic examples of our value-added. yemen, in my case in point, and this book is my attempt to do so. thank you very much. [applause] >> any questions, please? go ahead, yes, ma'am, please. hang on just one second. can i have your name? >> judy, from ueam. thank you so much for your service in country. you talked about lessons learned as practices.

do you have some in particular that you'd like to discuss with the audience now? >> i have a host of them in the bo book. i think they are successful in reading our account of how we proceeded is and then also comparing to what happened in the intervening years between 2000 and now. and you can see in that comparison how great a job al-qaeda can do and reconstituting itself and how poor a job we do in learning lessons and sustaining an effort and thereby by default create

operating states. but specifically, i think proper lessons learned you have that strategy and you have to have an idea of how you're going to go about this is going to be more than just a collection of kind of ad hoc efforts. you need to get buy-in, not only from the government but from the people of the country. this is a lesson i first learned in egypt in the 1990s when they were beset by a very strong campaign of terrorism. and they staged a tipping point when a 12-year-old egyptian girl was killed in one of the terrorist operations. and she became a symbol of the harm that the egyptian were suffering. similarly, in yemen, when

al-qaeda attacked an oil tanker off of the coast and the resulting oil spill damaged the fish men livelihood, you could see in yemen you can see where it was costing their livelihood. it wasn't something that we could really sell and the embassy. it was something we could help the yemeni government and once motivated they did a very good job of it. i think the third lesson learned that i would suggest is it's better if they do it. now, that's a little bit counterintuitive and we're coming off this bin laden

mission and that's totally appropriate. as i said we had a similar case in yemen with the predator. but it's hard to imagine us sustaining those kind of operations as long as as it would be necessary or as broadly as would be necessary to actually defeat al-qaeda. so at some stage, and as soon as possible, i would argue, our role is indirect and our partners' role should become indirect. and in our book, what i try to explain how we start out eliminating abu ali in a space in time but then the real success at taking down the rest of the organization was a yemeni success supported by us.

and i think that is a much healthier model and a more sustainable model than some model that has the united states taking direct action all over the world. >> i was very pleased to welcome today cnn correspondent labbit. [laughter] >> thank you for that introduction. ambassador, thank you so much. and congratulations on the book. i was wondering if you could talk a little bit more broadly about the possibility of regime change in yemen and president sala and how could that affect the counterterrorism and the things that you discussed that are needed for a u.s. partnership. thank you. >> yes. well, a lot of the challenge in yemen, in my time, was getting a working relationship with president sala.

he is a very cunning fellow, -- kind fellow, but he is not particularly easy to work for. but it took more than my efforts, and the efforts of president bush at the time and others, john tenets, vice president cheney, a number of individuals. president sala has been important to our counterterrorism corporations. he is not essential to it. our partnership with the yemenis is much broader than the president. and would not have succeeded if it were resting fully on the president. i think the great risk we face currently is that the uncertainty and the political

turmoil is causing the government to withdraw forces from the periphery and that inevitable will create additional operating space for al-qaeda. and given the adaptability and the ambitions of al-qaeda in the arabian peninsula, we should assume that they will use that operating space not only to attack our interests but to attack the u.s. homeland. so we have a short-term vulnerability that needs to be addressed. i would argue in the long term, if there can be a successful transition from president sala to a more popular government, that's going to favor the united states and al-qaeda.

al-qaeda, as we all know has little to do with the kind of values and the kind of demand that the protesters in sana or elsewhere in yemen are making on the government. the recourse to shari'a law does not really answer it all, the kind of aspirations of the revolutionary in yemen or elsewhere in the middle east. rather, those values are very close to the values that the united states is comfortable with. so the challenge is getting through the period of vulnerability and then helping the yemenis build that kind of society and government that they aspire to have. >> other questions, please?

yes, sir. >> michael, i have to -- [inaudible] >> in the lessons learned so forth, are there any -- are there any -- [inaudible] >> of how you go how that -- lessons have been learned or you might learn of the foreign services of other countries in the middle east especially of the -- of that in the u.k.?

>> yes, i'd like to extend a little bit not only talk about the foreign service efforts of foreign countries, but other government efforts. in yemen, we found, for example, the british to be excellent partners in training the central security forces of yemen. in fact, we started backing them focusing on the yemen special operation forces who turned out to have this mission regime protection of counterterrorism. and as the british started out with the security forces and then we tag teamed to continue that training. and all along, i thought it was undesirable for the u.s. to take the entire burden on its

shoulder, therefore, we made an effort to share the load. the jordanians has played a very, very significant role in working with the yemeni security forces. we're often challenged -- yemen is an arab-seeking environment. it's not like cairo. it's not like tunis. to be effective in yemen, you need arabic. and what the jordanians brought to the effort were skilled -- arabic skills. there were other european efforts. the germans had a significant development effort. the dutch were doing significant development work. we were not alone by any -- in

any sense. and i think -- the sum is greater -- the whole is greater than the sum of its parts in that an effort restricted to the united states is less acceptable to the yemenis than an effort that is more broadly based and includes not only these european countries but in many instances, both countries or other arab countries. >> yes. mr. wilkins. >> thank you, ted wilkinson. criticisms have been made of the obama -- inevitable criticisms of the administration's response to the arab spring in different countries as being supportive of democracy where we believe we can tolerate it and not in countries like bahrain where our

interests appear to be more on the side of stability. how do you address that equation in yemen? >> i think that -- i agree that we don't have a one size fits all policy. i think anyone who's familiar with the middle east knows these countries have different dynamics, different possibilities, different risks. so i'm okay with a country by country approach. but i think in yemen, we're taking -- we're running a business because basically we're letting a situation grip. and given the forces at play, it's going to drift in a bad direction for us and a good direction for al-qaeda. there's going to be less government control out in the periphery. there's going to be greater chance of civil war. you only have to look at the face-off between different military forces in yemen to recognize that possibility.

now, i think it was all together reasonable for us to first hope the yemenis would sort it out themselves. second, both the cooperation council could reach an agreement. and i think the jcc efforts were highly laudable and they still have some potential. but i think we're at a stage now where we need to ramp up our efforts and the international community's efforts. and that may be by more attention in new york at the u.n. security council where some kind of concerted diplomatic effort that more activists. i think if we don't step up, we risk seeing a situation develop where the next demand, you know, becomes along the lines of responsibility to protect a

situation that we're seeing in libya -- i just don't see it being in our interest to allow these situations to deteriorate so that our options become narrower and narrower and more and more expensive. so i'm for more diplomacy, stronger diplomacy and a stronger u.s. lead. >> can you please come up to here. thank you. >> gentlemen, thank you for writing that book. i look forward to reading it. two things, number 1, do you think that in light of bin laden's death that aqap is going to continue to begin to focus more outwardly as well as, of course, inside. and second, what's your opinion of al-aulaqui.

a lot has been made of him and i have my serious doubts of his long-term leadership but i'm wondering what you think? >> aq al-qaeda in the arabian peninsula had been identified by intelligence experts and policymakers as the most active node in the al-qaeda network. if you look at john brennan's speech last december, you look at the testimony of the director of national intelligence or the director of the counterterrorism center, certainly this year it was clear that aqap in the past al-qaeda central, it's an organization that's pretty formidable in the sense it's very adaptive and it's very creative. and they have come up with uses

of the internet, for example, uses of media, english-language media entrapping al-qaeda central and they are not shy at all that their ambition is in the u.s. homeland and not contend themselves with either actions in yemen or in saudi arabia. so it's a threat. it needs to be addressed. and that is recognized. now, aulaqui is a significant asset to aqac. his outreach to english speakers, expanding the pool of mujahedeen far, far beyond arabic speakers and also appealing to individuals who can

more easily pass underneath our radar. but allacki is not thelary of aqap. there are yemenis and saudis and others who are the formal leaders and the operational leaders. and we have a tendency sometimes in kind of popular counterterrorism to latch onto one individual whom we can identify, we know -- we can know the name and it's a mistake for the individual to -- for the organization or for the real -- the real leadership. i don't doubt at all that, you know, the professionals across the street over at langley or over at the white house get this. but i think sometimes the media or journalists tend to be a

little bit careless in the way they report the roles of these individuals. thanks. >> i'm holly williamson. thank you for your presentation. we are now today in this town looking at a lot of important programs on the budgetary cutting block. i'd like your analysis of what projections you think are likely to surface from all quarters if people see that the united states is not able to pony up the necessary resources as we transition in some cases reducing footprint, military footprint, from the region, where are there opportunities, other coalitions, other like-minded folks as we hope

that yemeni protests sort themselves out and identify a pack for their own future? >> i think secretary gates said it very well last night when he said, it would be a mistake to penny wise and pound foolish as we go forward in the middle east in south asia. in other words, we're obviously pulling most of our troops in iraq. we're going to be pulling troops out of afghanistan. the military component is going to be on a downward slope. but if we do not ramp up the civilian side, if we do not give resources to those people out there working on civility, and i have a personal interest in this regard because my daughter is deployed to afghanistan on usaid

working on civil liberties, then it's going be a great shame and we're going to see the kind of mistakes that we made in afghanistan after our initial successes that we made in yemen after 2004 recur and that we are going to give al-qaeda breathing space, and they will take advantage. now, it doesn't mean this all has to be in the lap of the u.s. taxpayer. there are other parties with interests as large or larger than ours in this continuing effort. i'll speak particularly about yemen. in my mind, the wealthy states of the arabian peninsula, the gulf cooperation council states

have an even greater interest in helping yemen succeed as does the united states. al-qaeda and the arabian peninsula has made clear that they are within its right. i think there's been an evolution in the way the jcc relates to yemen. and it's been a positive evolution. and i think the initiative to resolve the political impasse is only the most dramatic evidence of that evolution. but what i would like to see, molly, is an attitude in the jcc similar to the attitude that we saw in the european union. when they came together and had initial success, and then they

would confront such development as the same as franko or lisbon after portugal, after its dictatorship, they recognized they had a long-term interest in establishing these countries and bringing them in one way or the other within the pool. but there was a common interest in that. and i do not think an arabian peninsula with extremely wealthy gulf states and an extremely impoverished yemen with its very large young population is a recipe for stability and, therefore, i think you can make an argument that there's a strategic fear that we made here in whatever way they're comfortable making it, but a strategic deal that needs to be made. >> i'm chuck cecil, retired

foreign service. for the last couple of years i've been involved in a lessons learned project in which we interview returning civilian members from provincial reconstruction teams in iraq and afghanistan. one of our questions is, what could have made you more effective in your work? and the very common answer is, if i had had more freedom of movement, i could have done a lot more. and by that they mean their movements were greatly curtailed by senior management, sometimes the embassy, sometimes washington, sometimes the combination of the two which had a very low tolerance for risk. in other words, not wanting to lose the lives of a civilian member of our government establishment abroad on those countries. my question is this, what is the implication of this for our

future activities in areas of high civil unrest? and does it mean -- how would you see the balance between the traditional activities of the foreign service and the role of our clandestine services in acquiring the information for our analysis and for implementing government policy decisions? how do you see the balance affected by this lack of tolerance for risk? >> the short answer is it's a recipe for failure. and to give you a short answer now because i give you a very long answer in the book. there's a chapter in the book that is entitled "an embassy, not a bunker." and the first time i met colin powell, he was secretary of state dez of an election year. and he asked for a briefing on

counterterrorism and we came in and we briefed him up. it was the whole counterterrorism security group. and it was an opener to him and it was made public in the commission because of the increasing threat of al-qaeda. he not only took and he also gave in that encounter because at the end of our long session, he said, thank you very much. i appreciate what you've told me today. one thing we must guard against, and that is hunkering down in our embassies, that will give the initiative to al-qaeda. he said he will protect our people but we will not hunker

down. and i took this, when i was in yemen, as kind of marching orders in the top and from my battle with some in the state department who wanted us to adopt a very, very cautious position. that's just unwise because in the long term it just increased our vulnerabilities and gave more space and more initiative to al-qaeda. so i really go into this at some length in the book because it is a very important question. >> i'll buy it. [laughter] >> i would say during my tenure, we had no official americans killed or injured in yemen

despite a very, very forward posture in terms of where we went and what we did. now your second question -- i mean, the intelligence people do brilliant work. and we've seen that recently. i saw it in yemen. absolutely essential. there's no way, you know, the state department competes in that area. it tends to be narrowly focused, though, and doesn't get into the questions of the will on the part of the president or his government to undertake what we need to undertake. those are kinds of assessments that the state department has a comparative advantage for doing. it doesn't necessarily get into

what's going on. and why al-qaeda has fertile ground there to insert itself. you need a much broader information collection and analysis about what the problem is and what can be done about it. so to me, it's not at all competitive. it's complimentary. and as an ambassador, i couldn't do without both. >> we'll take one more. >> thanks very much. my name is peter. i was with a.i.d. for about 25, mostly overseas, and i'm now with the secretary's office for the coordinate for reconstruction and stabilization, soon to become a bureau of -- >> congratulations. >> thanks very much.

we're all a little nervous. and i hastened to add to bring in we need some old a.i.d. guys who know a little bit about money over here. we don't know anything about money. but in that regard, the kinds of things you're talking about, as you probably appreciate, are sort of the warp and whoops of the water cooler discussions we have and something that we're looking at in the g12 budget of the contingency budget and was inspired by something called the pooled funds operation at the u.k. put together a few years whereby they're basically taking their security and civilian elements or monies, if you will and indeed pooling them in order to use them for these complex situations. complex crises overseas. would you think -- i mean,

there's a little bit of cynicism with respect to that coming about, but what it would mean a large amount of dod money and a little bit of state money. but with state prevailing in terms of the policy issues, indeed, where the usg needs to go in order to address the kinds of things we're seeing now, or have seen in the past 15 or 20 years in these difficult and undefinable times of crises. so having been involved in some of the budget work, i'm a little bit skeptical, but i was wondering, what your take might be on that? it's likely perhaps likely in vietnam the civilian operations and revolutionaries, developments, support efforts, thank you. >> in reading the book, when it comes to money, i am entirely

opportunistic. i have very few principles. and one of the great ironies in yemen is that most of the development that we were able to do and it was significant came from 416b proceeds. in other words, agricultural commodities made available in yemen sold and we took that money and we programmed it to build clinics. and where we came up short on almost all the other areas, yes, we were -- the department of agriculture, god bless them, allowed us to generate a certain amount of revenues so that we could proceed with the development program. so you're going to find me an

easy sell in anything that expands the money including this money that has been given to dod, and i think secretary gates and many others are very happy to have state department administer. but there's a bigger question here, isn't there? there's a fundamental question here. why is it that dod and the u.s. military has more money than they can spend? and the state department's historical resources and the resources given to usaid are sometimes at time are so constrained that we don't have the freedom to apply them effectively? that is a fundamental question that i think it would be healthy for us to address. and i think part of it is that there are stereotypes in this

town, there are myths and simple explanations and one of them is that the military is always effective. u.s. aid is always ineffective. and i think we need to address those kinds of myths and those kinds of stereotypes and provide the legislatures, the american public, the american media some very graphic examples of how these other agencies use resources exceptionally, efficiently and responsibly and serve the interest of the american people, not only effectively but

cost-effectively. and as i said in my opening remarks, one of the ambitions i have for this book is to show how a little bit of resources use properly and with the right strategy actually went a very, very long way. and at least during that period, preconcluded the massive investment in terms of american military presence. >> mr. ambassador, my name is bruce von horst, i'm a former foreign service officer and i must admit a correspondent. i get the impression from your presentation today very negative prospects for the future for yemen. on the other hand, you say yes, there will likely be domestic incivility. there's disorder among the

military and there will probably not be u.s. resources necessary to carry out of this sort of development operations you'd like to see. for 10 years we've tried to define when in afghanistan. can you tell us what your reasonable expectations are for what we can do in yemen? >> okay. first of all, let me correct a misperception. i'm a big fan of u.s. media and foreign correspondents, particularly, and we could not have done what we needed to do in yemen except for the fact that we have people from the "new york times" and the "los angeles times," "wall street journal" coming and paying attention to us and writing about the problems that we were addressing. so -- okay. well, i want -- i want the record to be clear on this. yeah. if you -- if you look -- if you

let the situation drip, if we don't dedicate attention and resources and look at execution of policy in yemen of the situation, it is grim. and let me just make clear that i do think the obama administration has paid attention to this problem. i do think that they have devised a rather impressive strategy and that they are dedicating resources to it. so the issue is being addressed by the administration. the question now, i think, is implementation of that strategy and to new factors. but is the situation like a

greek tragedy that's going to go forward and we can't do anything about it? no. an argument in the book is that we can affect these situations with the right strategy, with the right resources. what needs to be done in yemen is doable. it is doable without massive american presence. but it's going to take an active effort and an effort at a higher level in our government and other governments. and i think it's going to be -- or chances of success are greater if we act sooner than later.

that time is not on our side. risk is a risk for us. so i'm not by any means helpless. i'm not a doom sayer. and i think again in the book there is an optimistic underlying premise that even in very difficult situations, even when we had fewer resources than we were dedicating today, we found ways of impacting the situation, and i have no doubt that the current generation of diplomats and other development experts and intelligence people will also find ways of affecting the situation if we attend to it and given the resources.

>> i have one question myself before we close out this afternoon. you've spoken throughout your remarks of the fact that whereas the military gets it, the state department gets it, the u.s. congress and the american people doesn't get it. and we'll go back to the it and the american public and congress understand military. they don't understand diplomacy and development. they don't quite know what diplomacy is. and when you talk about development, large numbers of our public think that 25% of, i don't know, we give enormous amounts of foreign assistance when, in fact, you know, it's well under 1% of our gdp. so i'm wondering if your second proposition that we need an effective counterterrorism strategy -- in that context, do you think that the state department is playing -- has a lead role in developing that strategy and coordinating its

implementation? or not right now? is it other agencies that have that lead role? that's my question. >> i think it depends on the situation. i think for yemen, i think john brennan in the white house has the lead role in developing both strategy and resources. i think for a long while in iraq, the military had the lead. i think that's going to change with our drawdown there. so it is very much case-specific. but i think in terms of explaining -- oh, the other thing i wanted to say was. once you go out of washington and into the field, into baghdad, into kabul, into

riyadh, then i think the role of the ambassador becomes critical. and the essential role becomes that of the ambassador. and we know that the ambassador is not necessarily someone from the state department. again, the president decides how he is going to be represented. but oftentimes, it is a state department professional. and then if you're in a situation like yemen or where there's a terrorism threat, you better get pretty smart on the issue. you better get pretty smart about al-qaeda or the other terrorism organizations because one of the biggest mistakes you can make is to delegate this to your chief of station or to your

defense establishment. there's going to be no substitute for the ambassador herself or himself taking the lead on this broad effort that is going to be required. >> my follow-up question for that was, that i thought there might be an opportunity that if diplomacy was understood to be critical to effective counterterrori counterterrorism, that it might be the way to make diplomacy more relevant to the american people. and you mentioned that in the end, the importance of developing on better stories, i guess, of how it is that we actually use resources in development, in diplomacy to advance u.s. interests and do so in a way that's very cost-effective for the american taxpayer. and i mention this in closing because i'm very pleased this is an issue that you sort of address throughout, you know, in

your book and your experience in high value target. we are engaged in rethinking how we can better be an effective voice for the foreign service, voice for diplomacy and for development and for the work the foreign services of all our member agencies do. and both in terms of mobilizing more of our members, active duty and retirees, to be involved in it but also rethinking our outreach programs and how we do them and reach out and in what terms. we're embarking and building out on a lot of work in the past and collecting large amounts of information that we sense is already available in our member agencies, commerce, agriculture, state. you mentioned, sir, the lessons learned project there. i think there's a lot of information that we can just -- if we can find ways to use it

could really help us. i'm one who believes that it is possible to develop a constituency for diplomacy and development. but i have been told by, i think, many very experienced practitioners of diplomacy that it's a hopeless task. that it will not happen. that there is no natural constituency and in the end, it depends on the president. and the office of the presidency to see a diplomatic service and a development service as critical instruments of national power to have to go along with the sense. and it's been up to that office to try to defend and procure the resources needed to do job that you're talking about out there. anyway, that was my opportunity to say something and -- but in the context very much, we're truly welcoming this book and welcoming the fact that you've come here to share both the book and your insights. i think the audience has appreciated it so i'd like you all to join a round of applause

for ambassador hull and his book. [applause] >> booktv has over 100,000 twitter followers. be a part of the excitement. follow booktv on twitter to get publishing news, scheduling updates, author information and talk directly with authors during our live programming. twitter.com/booktv. >> this weekend booktv in partnership with brighthouse networks is taking viewers on the road to florida for a look at the literary scene of the tampa st. petersburg area. here's a video shot by our local content video crew. >> how do you think the industry has changed? >> i would have to say former book editor is one of the saddest words i know because there's so many of us.

there's so many of newspapers who have dropped their book pages. i'm very proud of what they do after i retired. but what is changing both the way people are reading in other words, the vehicle. and i think to some extent what they're reading. but mainly how they're reading i think is what's changing. we emphasize -- when book editors always covered the latest books and they were tied into the publishing industry in bookstores and so on and i think one thing that is happening is people are kind of disassociating themselves with the usual traditional vehicles. and so they're looking for -- people love books and i don't think that's ever changed but they're looking for other ways of reading in an easier way. people are very used to these

handheld devices and they see nothing, you know, wrong with reading on these devices. old foghies still want the books but the content is the same. they're still reading. so i'm happy about that. >> why do you think they've gotten rid of their book review section? >> i really don't know because i think it's a big mistake. they say it's because they have no advertising for the book pages which is true enough. the publishing industry is on the ropes. they don't advertising in the sports section either so i think their rationale is this place because that is their client. that is their customer readers so i've never understood why they didn't emphasize books and reading in their pages. again, i think the petersburg times has been ahead of the curve that way. >> you mentioned these changes largely. what do you think that means largely for smaller independent bookstores? how do they keep up?

>> well, i think some of them are incorporating this. the smarter ones. they are figuring out that they have to go with the flow. and i think there's going to be in the future books on demand in bookstores. people are going to come in and actually -- a book is going to be produced for them on the spot. it's already happened. people are -- the book industry is very old-fashioned. when the paperback came out, people said, that's it. no one is going to read anymore because the first paper books were these really dime novels, trashy novels. they said oh, this is the end of reading. paper books was the beginning of mass democratic distribution of books. so i think all this alarmism is understanding. someone once said that it's a 19th industry living in a 22nd century world. it's kind of schizophrenic.

and so some are adapting better than others. obviously, some are holding. some that i'm really happy to see this huge warehouse cavernous state are still coming. it's become a tourist destination and you talk to ink wood in tampa, that's the other kind of model which is a small very personal get to know your customers. you call them up when a book comes. you hand-sell them that's come back to some extent too but haslam is a book of books, ebooks that are revolutionizing the way they read. >> so some people i know that they've said that closing borders and barnes & noble is not doing very well. that this is kind of the end of bookstores. what they seem to me people -- >> well, here i find it funny

because when these mega stores came on the scene, they also predicted the end of reading. they said, oh, these mega stores will shut down reading. and independent stores will be driven out of business. now, the independent stores got together and they created the aba. they did a lot of very innovative things to try to stay alive. not all of them made it. you know, some people are cheering the end of the mega bookstores. i happen to like them because they did a lot of activities in towns. they have a lot of book-signings. they were really very active in the community and that's the key is getting involved with people and bringing them in for various other reasons, not just expecting them to wander by to read a book. because it's easier to sit at your computer and order a book on amazon. but if you have a reason to come to a bookstore because you're going to meet other readers, or you're a writer -- and these are communities that overlap, people who write and people who read, this is why the self-publishing

industry now is becoming so popular and flourishing and why amazon is getting involved in it and why barnes & noble is going to start trying to do it, they're starting to publish their own books because they're starting to understand there's a connection between people who want to read, people who want to write, and people who, obviously, want to publish in all its forms. so i think the successful ones have understood that they have to draw the community in. and you have to have the destination -- a bookstore has to be a destination, not just to buy a book 'cause they can do that easier online. it has to be for other reasons. >> can you tell me about the process and what will be successful? >> well, i think, you know -- here's what i thought about the book festival way back then is that i had gone to the miami book festival, and this is in the '90s, the early '90s and i just was amazed it was so much fun and, you know, theer