give bigger gifts but it indicated the nature of chinese society some of its chinese relations lowered based on mutual respect then the concept of the quality but the chinese, as we do believe the values are unique and it makes them even more sensitive to the outside pressures telling them how to deal with the society. . .

>> guest: they became themselves, so china expanded sometimes by the opposite of western ways, not by conquest, but by being conquered and then signifying the conquers. there's one occasion, and the man choose from the north. >> host: it's a much more

efficient way, isn't it? >> guest: a thankful way. >> host: you said because china was never forced to engage with larger civilizations in the world, it remained basically -- but because of that, it considered itself the center of the world, does that still hold true? >> guest: in a way it still held true with china with the revolutionary leaders in china. they were influenced by the chinese. for example, you never had an appointment. you were summoned, and that was also the same of any foreign enjoy that came from the

previous my millennium. at the end of the 18th century, the british sent an envoy, and he was supposed to offer them trade and diplomatic relations and everything that europeans were familiar with. he was received, but he couldn't get an audience with the emperor, and took him three months before he was summoned, and then said you have nothing we want, and you have nothing we shouldment, the trade is not possible, and we don't receive them because anybody who lives in beijing has to live in a chinese house, wear chinese clothes, and can never leave china. the question is do they still think this way? >> host: uh-huh.

>> guest: of course, that's not exactly this way, but -- and with globalization of the economy and with daily contact, there's still intent to sink into the new kingdom in terms though it's in the modern period. >> host: you mentioned the father of the chinese come mewist revolution. you knew him, worked with him? >> guest: i met him five times. >> host: what were your impressions of him both as a strategic leader and as a movement heard? >> guest: first as a movement leader, one has to understand, and the intent of millions of people were killed under his rule, and the reason for that was in part because he wanted to

complete the communist revolution in his lifetime. he knew that in chinese history the leader he respected most was an emperor who unified china, and then 20 years after his death, all vees tajes of his rule had disappeared except the unification so he, for example, organized what's called the great leap forward in which china was supposed to move from total underdevelopment to a steel production at the level of great britain in three years and in order to do that, they had to get resources from the countryside, and they melted down steel, and the result was a father and famine in which as

many as 40 million people may have been killed and ten years later he started a counterrevolution that started another quandary and on the moral ground and of the movement leader ground, he was enormous cruelties and disasters were afflicted. at the same time, as ruler of china, he had to ma never china -- maneuver china among a whole host of countries, and the china that was poor, underdeveloped, not very strong militarily and had just emerged from a century and a half of colonial dead dead agree gages so on that level, he was a great level, e enormous

skill in strategic only sis, and he maneuvered china, the only major country that survived the collapse of k., and he csh communism, and he managed to switch to the winning side in the cold war without missing a beat. they unified a huge society and fought a decade-long civil war, but one could not forget the suffering he caused. >> host: you mentioned that you met with him a total of five times, three times alone, one-on-one. what were your impressions of

him as a man? >> guest: it was never totally one, but i was principal, but in those contacts, and i didn't have to deal with him on that level. i think it's best how these meetings came about. as i said, he was summoned so you're chinese escorts would take off always in chinese cars to where he lived. he undoubtedly had many places where he lived. they showed foreigners and soviet-style guest house. it was none of the majesty of the european palaces. it had -- the first time i saw him, the room had a ping-pong

table in it, and he received one in a study in which folks were scattered -- books were scattered all over the place, and he sat in the middle of the circle. he had a very manner. as every leader i know and met over the years would say i have five points to make, and here's my five points. he would begin his conversation what is your consideration of, and then he'd pose an issue and then you'd say whatever you wanted to say, and then he'd say but have you considered the following?

every once in awhile, he'd make an objection. at one point, we were discussing the contribution europe could make to the common defense, and he said they remind me of swallows who fly up into the air at an approaching storm and flap their wings, but you, professor, and i will know that the flapping of the wings does not effect the coming of the storm, so he achieved in that sentence two things. one, he gave he equal status with him says you, professor, and i, and then he had his

metaphor of the impotent, and that's how he would conduct a conversation, and sometimes he'd get pointed, but it was usually in an indirect way, but forceful. when he spoke, you knee. he vibrated physical, almost dominance. now, the last two times i saw him, he had had a stroke and had great difficulty speaking, and he had to croak out his sounds and try to say the language, and the interpreters had to understand what he had to say before they could interpret it, but even then he conducted a meeting over two hours with all

of his physical disabilities, so he was obviously a formidable person. >> host: let's talk about 1972 in that dramatic diplomatic breakthrough conducted by you and president nixon of course. it's interesting because president nixon told me in the 1990s the thing that brought the two of you together, china and the united states, was the concern of the growing soviet power. they saw a growing soviet assertiveness, a nuclear buildup, very concerned, and so they approached the united states, you approached china; and you came together for strategic reasons. can you describe the die namics at the time that allowed the diplomacy that you and president nixon were trying to develop? >> guest: well, as you say, we saw the growth of soviet power, and the soviet union had in this

space of 10 years occupied hungry and subjected poland a second time and occupied chex la vok ya. they were beginning to build up on the chinese border and there was clashes along the yusari river between the two sides, and we were sort of watching this, and then the soviets made a mistake that accelerated our considerations. the mistake was they sent in their ambassador to broaf us periodically about clashes with the chinese. they did that probably because they considered attacks china, and they wanted to prove that they had a good reason for doing it. it had to practice --

they had to practiceically create of map for us to look at of the location of the incidence, and then we called in an expert and said if there are incidence in these and these places, what would that suggest to you? sh who is the attacker? that expert said, well, this is all close soviet supply points and pretty far from chinese supply points, and therefore, it's unlikely that the chinese if they wanted to attack would did it from such a posture, and then we picked up a few other signals, and then nixon made one of the renowned and most important decisions. we discussed, aseeming there's a

war, what position does the united states take? we concluded that it was against the american interest of china defeated even though we had no contact with them, and so we decided that in case of a war ring we would be technically neutral, but towards china, and try to give it as much ability to survive as we could. now, we didn't communicate that to the chinese because we had no way of communicating with them, but what we did do was step up statements that we would not be indifferent to such a war, and

we had directer of cia speak to two political sides, associated with something we knew would leak, and in a low key way, he made that point, and the deputy secretary of state, and then we began looking for channels into china at the same time, and we did a number of little things. for example, in retrospect, it looks minuscule. chinese, nobody -- no american could buy chinese goods anywhere, and there were -- we lifted that restriction so that as a tourist you could buy 100,000 chinese goods, the chinese in turn relieved some people that was straying into

chinese waters, and there it was anyway, captured, and they were relieved. we had signals, but we found it hard to establish contact because for example, we sent messages to romania or rather told the romanians what they might tell the chinese. we chose the romanian channel because nixon had been in romania, and the romanians had been the most independent of the east communism countries, so we thought they might have most credibility in beijing. the problem was that the chinese communists didn't trust any communists, so they were

reluctant to be specific to romania, but finally again on a trip around the world, nixon talked to the pakistan president, and that established the contact that we then used. >> host: let me ask you about the immediate backdrop to what you were doing with the opening to china which was the vietnam war. we talked about the dynamics between the united states, the soviet union which was growing at least in strategic terms and china. talk a little bit if you would about how you expected the opening of china to affect the war in vietnam. >> guest: one has to remember that nixon didn't start the war in vietnam. nixon inherited the war in vietnam. when they ended office, there were 565,000 -- 545,000 americans in vietnam, and we had just gone through the

on offensive, a major attack by the vietnamese, and there were riots in the streets in this country against the war in vietnam. at the same time, we were the country on which the security of almost every region in the world and nixon felt he had not made the original commitment, he would not abandoned the people who with reliance on american promises had staked their future on cooperating with us so nixon decided to withdraw from vietnam, but to do it in a way by which the people of south vietnam would be given the opportunity to develop -- to

choose their own fate. the one condition he would not meet is turn over the vietnamese population, to the come communists. he wanted a free political process, and when people say he could have ended the war more quickly, they never tell you how because if you look at the record of negotiations, you will see that every other condition we were willing to make except now the vietnamese approached the negotiation with us was to try to break our spirit. i went periodically on weekends to paris to negotiate on behalf of nixon and the united states, and they -- their strategy was to outwait us.

we had the following benefits. this will change the debate. they were opposed to peace, and vietnam had large conceptions of peace which included the whole world, and so at the same time it isolated the vietnamese because it meant that the closest, at least the most nearby ally was willing to deal with the united states without informing them and to some mistake to their disadvantage because it ended up they thought they established. it was an important aspect. >> host: in any national security in foreign policy

calculus, there's always american domestic opinion which any great leader nows how to change, how to purr suede, how to move. >> guest: sometimes he can, and sometimes he can't. >> host: exactly. when you think about the opening of china and the talks with the soviet union as well, was that part of the strategy to signal to the american people while fighting a hot war in vietnam, we were seeking longer term peaces? >> guest: it was not done as a political maneuver, but it was done because he believed it to be right, and we believed it to be right. it had the effect of telling the american people not to be obsessed with events in one part of the world that we had, in fact, inherited, and were trying to liquiduate, and look at the overall design that put china,

soviet soviet union, europe, into a pattern that could be grasped by in time by public opinion. >> host: taiwan, the united states and china had, still have, wildly different views about taiwan. how did president nixon move past that? >> guest: for 20 years, the negotiation between china and the united states took the floridaing course. the chinese negotiated if he spoke first would say we won't do anything else until you turn taiwan over to us. when we turnedded that down, that ended it. the american negotiator would say we won't do anything else until you give us a pledge of peaceful attitudes towards taiwan so there was an absolute

deadlock so even before i got to beijing, and in their first communication to us, the chinese invited us in order to discuss taiwan to china. we implied that we were willing to talk about the issue of taiwan, but only in relation to all of the issues of asia and in the world, and i chinese accepted that, and so that was already a huge concession before we ever got there. then one has to remember the united states with president roosevelt in the declaration of 1943 had declared that the united states considered taiwan

to be a part of china so the fact that taiwan belonged to china had never been revoked by any american president. the only condition subsequent american presidents made was the takeover or the union should be peaceful. we got around this -- this problem by signing a communique in which each side stated its own views. we stated in our view that the chinese people on both sides of the taiwan straits assume there's only one china. the united states, we said, that's not -- let's not challenge that proposition so that was a way of

accepting one china, but we still did not recognize beijing as the government of china, so nixon was in a capitol of a country that he did not recognize as the capitol of that country, so if you look at the 40 years that have happened since then, both sides in a way have finessed the taiwan problem on the pages really of three principles -- that the united states accepts the principle of one china, that the united states strongly up cysts or affirms the need for a peaceful solution, and that the united states warrants each side not to

take precipitous action and to consider this has been carried out for 40 years is quite remarkable. now today there's many heros of retrospective diplomacy who say what nixon might have done and what nixon might have extracted. we didn't hear from any of them at that -- >> host: of course not. no, the framework you put in place in 1972 has been remarkably durable to this very day. >> guest: through eight american administrations of both parties, so it's one of the most continuism american policies. >> host: please stand by, we'll take a short break. i want to move into more current affairs with u.s. with human rights and other issues with the former secretary of state, henry kissinger and his new book when

we come back. >> host: rejoined by former secretary of state, drft henry kissinger with a masterful new book called "on china." let's talk about more current events particularly as it relates to the united states relationship with china. it's very complicated now. i remember when i was working for president nixon in the early 1990s, he said, you know, monica, it's interesting because when we opened relations with china in the early 70s, it was

all about strategic issues which we talked about before the break. he said now in the early 90s, it's now almost all about economics. i think now in the # 1st century, it's a combination of both, strategic and economic. >> guest: right. >> host: when you look at china's incredibly rapid economic rise, are you stunned, surprised, or not at all? >> guest: no, no, i'm surprised, and so would nixon be, any of us who was in the group that opened to china. when nixon -- when i had been to china, but before nixon went, nixon invited the french novelist andre who had been in china, and to see what we could learn from it and he said china is a desperately poor country

and the most important thing you can do for them is give them economic aid, but he didn't want economic aid, and he didn't want china connected with the rest of the world at all. china was so poor at the time that when nixon we want there, they did not have equipment to connect us with washington in a way appropriate to the president, so we brought in a ground station so they could not undo it. at any rate, we would have been amazed at the rapid progress that has taken place and which really couldn't take place until the reforming group came in. >> host: he was succeeded by who in the late 1970s

revolutionizeed the chinese economy through agriculture reforms that laid the framework for what we see today; right? >> guest: right. he, for him, everything was ideology. i don't know whether a cow is black or gray as long as it catches mice. anything that worked was acceptable, and he liberated the energy to the chinese people. one has to remember that over the last 2,000 years, in 1800 of the last 2,000 years, china had the largest growth, domestic product in the world. it was just in the 19th century that they fell apart because of the impact of colonialism, but chinese economic growth didn't

really take place until just about 30 years ago. >> host: how would you describe chinese capitalism? would you describe it as managed capitalism? >> guest: i would describe it -- they call it -- what do they call it? a market economy with -- >> host: with chinese characteristics? >> guest: with chinese contacts. what it is is market economics, but guided by stray teemingic decisions -- strategic decisions from the center which helped establish priorities, and so far it has worked amazingly. they have a growth rate of 8%-10% over a 30 year period is an extraordinary achievement. >> host: even during times of

global recession. >> guest: even in times of global recession. of course, they can do things that we can't even think of. i was in china in 2008. i talked to the mayor of a city, and he said they have about 5 million unemployed people in that city so i asked what he was going to do about that, and he said, well, they all go home chinese new year's, and we omelet about a quarter -- only let about a quarter of them to come back so they use the chinese tradition of taking care of their family as a social security network, but on the purely economic level, it is a combination of market principles and central management.

it's not a planned economy in the soviet sense. >> host: there's a point of concession between the united states and bay gipping over the chinese manipulation of its currency. how is this straining our relationship, and how should the administration be dealing with it? >> guest: well, the argument that is made is the chinese are manipulating their currency at an artificially low level giving them an advantage in exports, and therefore, improves their payments and that in turn gives them greater economic financial feat. my view is this -- some of the deficit is caused by our own actions. some of it is caused by chinese a,. it's caused by our actions because as long as we are

financially there and run huge deficits, deficits in our current economy are inevitable because we have to were row from abroad to meet our differences. we need to work at our own problems. where the chinese take unfair advantage, we have to raise the issue and defend our interest, but the way it's usually done is to arrange for it, balance penalties and rewards that achieves this. >> host: it is striking to me that just about every time the chinese leadership meet with the american leadership, whether it's president obama's secretary

of state clinton, treasury secretary geithner, they never miss an opportunity to meekture us -- lecture us on the critical issues of spending levels, deficits, and our debt. it's ironic we have chinese communists lecturing the american capitalists. >> guest: it's ironic. for the greatest part after the opening of the relationship, the chinese's basic attitude was this that our political enthusiasms were -- well, they had various add adjectives for it, some were immature and so forth, but they had huge respect for our economic capacities, and they thought we were on a management of the world financial system from which they could learn a great deal so they sent students over here, but they sent practicing capitalists

over here to learn how to run banks systems and -- banking systems and american up vestment -- investment banks and so forth, and then in late 2007 and 2008 they learned, or they think they learned, that the americans didn't know how to run their economy very well either, and that caused a tremendous loss of prestige both for us, but also for those chinese who had been associated with the reform program, and some of the difficulties that followed afterward that was claimed and correct in some respect that were assertive talk back to the period that shock occurred. >> host: the chinese are the biggest foreign creditors. how much of a threat to us is that? >> guest: it's very

complicated issue because on the one hand you can say if they exploit their position, they could make life very difficult for us. at the same time, it's been said if you owe $100,000 to a bank, it's your problem. if you owe $100 million to a bank, it's their problem so the creditor suffers enormously also if the several trillion dollars they hold over america suddenly was worthless as a result of inflation or is a result of their lending us, that would be a huge blow to them. we have a mutual suicide pact. >> host: there was a high level of the chinese military who said last year in talking about the united states in economic warfare, not military warfare, but economic warfare. how big a concern should that be

for the united states? >> guest: well, what i think the focus is, we are the two most powerful countries in the world today. there's a whole series of issues that are new, the environment, proliferation, fair institute of energy, these are unique problems only to be solved on a global basis. secondly, we ought to learn from the european experience when a rising germany and an established britain had to dole with each other -- deal with each other and didn't manage to do it and the result was world war i, and i often ask myself if the leaders that went to war in 1914 had known what the world would look like four years later when the war ends, would they have done it? would one or the other make an accommodation? i say in the book we ought to approach foreign policy

vis-a-vis china with that in mind. we ought to look for opportunities of cooperative relationship. at the same time, we will strenuously defend our interests, and if the chinese approach the problem in the same way, then i'm hopeful that the ingenuity on both sides find a way through, but both sides have to have this attitude. the united states cannot do it by itself, and i think this is the greatest challenge to peace, and the greatest test of progress as possible. >> host: let's talk for a moment about the strategic challenges facing the american relationship. there's a lot of concern in the united states about a chinese military buildup. i'd like for you to comment on that. how worried should we be about that? about growing chinese assertiveness in asia in the region and globally as well?

its ability to project power, and should we do anything to shore up our allies in the region, south korea, japan, and others who are increasingly worried about china? >> guest: the -- as china grows economically, their military capacity is bound to grow so that's inherent in what is going on. what we have to -- what we have to watch is at what point does the chinese military capacity go from beyond defending its country to a capacity to intervene all over the world and challenge existing institutions? at that point, we are in a period of potential confrontation, and if that is not attended to, then it could

slide into a con froppation. that -- confrontation. they haven't yet reached that point, but they are certainly increasing their military capability, and we certainly have to be sure that we maintain the edge of the balance that is characterized in the situation before that. now, if they conduct these policies, we have the clear notion of our national interest and when our national interest is challenged by assertive on nonassertive powers, we'll take measures to protect it, and when the chinese conducted institution in foreign policy with all my commitment to cooperation, i would have to say

then american interests converge. if the chinese conduct an open-minded policy, then we should have a discussion of our positions and see where progress can be made, but it is always necessary that any foreign country dealing with us should understand that we protect our interests. now, could we strengthen our relations with korea, india, and japan? it is absolutely essential that america remain an asian power, and that america main tapes its relationship -- maintains its relationship in the asian world. we can want do it the -- cannot do it the same way it was done in europe because in europe there was an existential threat so that the relationship with europe took on a heavily

military character in the relationships between japan, korea, united states, india, the economic and the social factors play a huge role. the consequence is very similar namely to show that america is committed to the up dependence of key countries, but i wouldn't object on some of these projects the chinese participated so long as they are not the power of asia. >> host: talk, if you would, about china's role in nuclear proliferation. there's talk they are participating with rogue powers like north korea and pakistan to share technology with syria and perhaps venezuela. what can we do to rain china in

on the proliferation area? >> guest: well, on all issues except north korea, i think the chinese national interest is very parallel to ours. neither of us can be interested in the proliferation of nuclear weapons because if nuclear weapons spread to countries that cannot have the same technology safeguards, and they do not understand the nature of modern technology adequately, the danger of a catastrophic conflict or even just of an outburst of terrorism are overwhelming so i'm quite hopeful that with respect to this, we can get gradual chinese support. the major hesitation the chinese have is they are always reluctant to agree that outside

forces can tell a country what to do internally, but i think within increasing globalization, china will come to that point on the complicated issue and that's north korea. on the one hand, it's not in the chinese interest for north korea to have nuclear weapons. on the other hand, the chinese believe it's also not in their national interests to have north korea collapse and then face the pros pelgt of a large -- prospect of a large country on its border that can gain the nuclear capability. i think they are going back and forth on the nuclear issue and have not really meads a decisive move. i think they'd be delighted if the weapons would go away, but they don't want to do what is required to make them go away,

so they bear responsibility for the consequences. now, they, themselves, have not been active in nuclear proliferation because it would hurt them more than, but north korea has because north korea has -- it's broke, and it's just about the most repressive country in the world, and sooner or later, the other countries have to face the issue when a rogue nuclear country continues to operate, and that's an issue before us with iran and also an issue even of more -- in a more complex way with north korea, and it can't really be solved as

an isolated problem. there needs to be a scwiewrt concept developed for all of asia that all countries can join, and maybe under that system north korea should be denuclearized. >> host: human rights. they dictate we should not be all that concerned with what goes on interimly within a country, that we should only be concerned with their external believer, and that got in american foreign policy for quite a while, but for the last two decades, united states concerned itself with what goes on inside of china. there's a lot of talk and worry now that the chinese are now retrenching and that there's been an escalation of the attention of disdense, those arguing for liberalization, journalists detained, religious minorities, and so on.

what do you say to the chinese when you talk to them about their human rights record? >> guest: let me say a word about this, a term i never use. it's a term my critics use if they want to be able to say what it means really in german, and this is not an american concept even though i lived in germany as a child as part of a persecuted minority so that in the school to which, a jewish school which i had to go, they were not exactly studying prussian politics, but putting that issue aside, the fundamental necessity of a peaceful world is two elements. i've been preaching it all my life. on the one hand, you need e

quill equilibrium, a balance of power. why? so the strong cannot simply dominate the weak. tame, you need -- at the same time, you need justice, legitimacy, whatever you want to call it so that the existing arrangements appear just to most of the members and to most of the people so that they don't want to challenge it. first thing deals with capability, the second one deals with attitudes so it's that balance that has to be achieved. now, there, again, two aspects of the human rights issue. what are our convictions with respect to human rights? secondly, what do we do about them? america has been founded on the principles of human dignity, human liberty, and human

equality. we can never not only not renounce these principles. we need to affirm them, and other countries should know that it makes a difference to us how they conduct themselves on the human rights issue. the more -- the next question is what do you do beyond this? how many sanctions do you put on and to what degree do you assert that you can tell other countries what domestic institutions they should have, and at that point, there is a difference of opinion. some people whom i belong, and i would be sure nixon, and for that matter i say almost every american president i have seen in action believes that through a policy of engagement, one is move the chinese better than

through a policy of con froppation which evoked all the memories of their history, and which they have always resisted and when clinton was president in its first years, he adopted a policy of con froppation, and after -- confrontation, and after three years of failure, he gave it up. whenever i'm in china, when sixon was in china, and every president i've known, we are # aware of individual cases in which human rights are violated. we talk to the chinese on a private basis often, and so about it so there's no disgrement about the importance of human rights or the role of america. there is a disagreement on whether they should be done

based by a public demonstration or by diplomacy. >> host: we just have a few minutes left, dr. kissinger, and when you look at the geopolitical land scape today, when you survey the world, what worries you the most? what are the threats looming out that there concern you the most? >> guest: what worries me is that you have upheavals in every part of the world happening all of the time continuously without any really clear guiding principles of where they're going to go. it's one thing to say to be very enthusiastic and like the arab spring, but no one knows the heat of revolutions is not the day on which they occur, but in the period in which they are being sorted out. on the technical level what

worries me is the spread of nuclear weapons, and in a way of nuclear technology because as weapons spread and if any of them ever get used, the casualties would be so up believable that -- unbelievable that it would affect the human sense of security and the political system that cannot prevent this. those are the key issues that worry me. >> host: dr. kissinger, such a joy to talk to you, and on a personal note, you're my personal hero, and i've known you for, oh, my goodness? 18 years now? i think i'm dating myself, but it's been an honor to get to know you, sir, and such a pleasure to talk to you today, and it's a real privilege to call you a friend swealings a men -- as well as a mentor. >> guest: you worked over the years and impressed and amazed at the tremendous achievements

of you. >> host: thank you. former secretary of state, henry kissinger, his new book called "on china." i'm monica crowley, thank you so much for joining us today. >> that was "afterwords" booktv's signature problem with authors are interviewed by journalists, public policymakers, legislatures, and others familiar with their material. it airs every weekend on booktv at 10 p.m. on saturday, 12 and 9 p.m. on sunday, and 12 a.m. on monday. you can watch it online at booktv.org and click on afterwords on the upper right side of the page. up next, gretchen morganson talks about the 2008 financial collapse and the role bs played

by -- roles played by fannie and freddy. this lasts about an hour. [applause] >> thank you so much, david. we are really thrilled to be here tonight at politics and prose, and this is an iconic institution in washington, and it's just a thrill to be here with you and engage customers as well. that's really fantastic, and it's wonderful to meet david and see in person this incredible institution that everyone loves so much in washington. now, josh and i have been a little bit on the book tour. the book came out may 24th, and among the questions that we always get or often get from interviewers, buyers of the book, e-mails, what surprised you the most about your reporting and the investigation

that you both did to come out with this book? we all know that there's been a lot of books about the financial crisis. many of them recount the events during the crisis in the heat of the panic of 2008. some of them go back a little further in time to describe some of the ground work that was laid to create the crisis, but josh and i decided to go back much further into the early 1990s to really tell the tale because a debacle this large really didn't happen overnight, and unlike some of the books' conclusions, other books' conclusions that it was nobody's fault, sort of a con tat nation of events that could not be helped. we really believe there were actual parties involved laying the ground work, but as far as

what has been most surprising to me in this exercise is the number of paradoxes that emerge from this story. the paradox of powerful participants in the events leading up to the crisis who continue to this day to be in positions of power or are even in positions of greater power than they were. a second paradox that trillions of dollars of losses being een dured by -- endured # by investors and borrowers, yet no one involved in the mess is held accountable, but for me the most perplexing paradox at all is this -- how did it happen that the drive to expand the rate of home ownership to first time home buyers, many of them minorities, immigrants,