so we really feel like this is a wonderful way to illustrate his life, the times that he was living in and to give some flavor to a biography of one of the most interesting and beloved presidents. so this is going to be a lot of fun for us. >> and we've been talking with marji ross who is the publisher of regnery, getting a preview of some of the upcoming books from regnery publishing. >> thank you very much. ..

this is another livingston lecture which is made possible through the generous support of the livingston foundation in atlanta and we are grateful to them for their continued support. our next livingston lecture will be held may 16th and will feature james b. stewart, author of tangled web of legal false statements undermining america from martha stewart to bernie madoff. seeing some of the previews of this book, you would be well advised to be here. it is fascinating. join us for a lecture featuring the best selling author of a double in the white city, erik larsen will be here discussing his new book in the garden of peace but a lovely girl terror

and hitler's berlin. please turn off your cellphone and pagers and electronic devices that might disrupt our program. as a delta airlines flight attendant said turn off everything that doesn't keep you alive. david nichols is an expert on the eisenhower presidency and he will discuss eisenhower 1956, the brink of war. which was called one of seven -- he is a matter of justice. and lincoln and the indians. he holds a ph.d. from william

and mary and resides in kansas. please join me in welcoming david nichols to our stage. [applause] >> thank you. it is an honor to be here and to be with people who love history. that is the best audience one could ever have an r m grateful. we need to shoot down the nasty rumor that has been going around that my publisher stirred up all the trouble in the middle east just to sell my book. that is not true. not true. this is also a day when the news is telling us again and author has been making up stuff and i want you to know that this book people except in some commentary in the conclusion, not a phrase

is in it that is not rooted in a document or compelling circumstantial evidence. eisenhower "eisenhower 1956" the new story in many respects because it is based on hundreds of top-secret documents that have been declassified since the last major work on the suez crisis was published 30 years ago and when i get done with the presentation those who have not read the book and i assume most of you have not will think you know the story but please read the book because the book is better than the speech i guarantee you. and it is above all a deeply personal story about the man we affectionately call hike. a word about this complex man. he was a military man but not militaristic. he did not think the war was often a solution to anything. he was slow to pick up the

sword. his public persona, the grandfatherly man with a big smile was largely his personal intervention. behind-the-scenes he was strategically rigorous and a tough minded commander-in-chief. people who worked for him never doubted who was in charge. eisenhower was a citizen of the world more than any other president yet he never forgot where he came from which is why his presidential library is in kansas close to where i live. he was not a professional politician yet he was one of the most successful politicians in our history and supremely protective of his image. he did not hesitate to use subordinates like secretary of john foote -- john foster dulles as lightning rods for conversion policies that were in fact ike's creation. he had a temper that exploded like a rocket but a tense moments requiring great decisions he was unfailingly cool, calm and deliberate.

this was a profoundly religious man who had prayer at the beginning of cabinet meetings yet when that famous temper erupted he could turn the air blue with profanity and did so frequently. above all eisenhower saw himself not as a warrior but as a peacemaker and that is what this book is about and tonight at a time of war and unrest in the middle east it is fitting we review the most dangerous international crisis of the eisenhower presidency, that crisis was also in the middle east. this is the tale of nail biting trauma which begins on september 23rd, 1955, in denver, colorado, on the golf course. dwight eisenhower had not destroyed a vacation so much in years. the president of the united states had himself quote a huge breakfast that morning for his

fishing buddies. the gulf was the president's priority for the day. after a briefing, eisenhower headed to the cherry hill country club and with this his secretary remembered she had never seen him look or act better. eisenhower's golf game was interrupted four times that day from phone calls from secretary of state john foster dulles. this was before cellphone so irritated and -- probably profane bike. only one phone call got through. that call was important. dallas confirmed to eisenhower the soviet union had made an arms deal with egypt. i knew this bold move would open a new chapter in the cold war and take and dulles agreed the president should send a message to the soviet premier but the president wanted to think about it overnight.

he told dulles he would call him the following morning. that phone call was never made. i went back to golf. his game deteriorated. as the day wore on the president experienced a growing discomfort. declined his usual evening drink. had little appetite for dinner and retired early. in the middle of the night he said i have a pain in the lower part of my chest. since he had complained earlier about in digestion, mimi gave her husband milk of magnesia. at 2:54 she called the president's physician who rushed into the white house. schneider put out the word that this was a digestion upset when he knew it was a massive heart attack. he waited until midafternoon that day before transporting the president's to the hospital and even then had a cakewalk to his

car instead of calling an ambulance. if you want more details on the mismanagement of this situation you have got to read the book. don't have time tonight. eisenhower was in the hospital for six weeks. in those days the gold standard for the treatment of heart attacks was total bed rest. ike's doctors would not permit him to read the newspaper, watch a movie, listened to a football game on a radio little and do much serious presidential business. he did not take a step across his room for months. this was an incredibly active man. he felt like a caged animal. so at the very moment the soviet union attempted to change the balance of power in the middle east eisenhower was out of commission and secretary of state john foster dulles was unable to conform with the president as he normally did. this dispels the myth that john

foster dulles rand american force in policy in the eisenhower years. everyone close to both men and i talk to a number of them knew that ike was in charge. dwight eisenhower -- he was out of the white house for three-1/2 months accepting two nights on his way to recuperating gettysburg. number 2 is the one that a heart patients are restricted in his other activities was upset about which is whether he should run for a second term in 1956. i am satisfied that he always intended to run. in the age of roosevelt you had to have a second term to be a great president and he wanted to be a great president but the heart attack raise the enormous question of whether physically he could run.

he repeatedly discussed possible successors none of whom have a snowball's chance of a love being nominated love alone elected. the only republican a sufficient stature to run was chief justice earl warren of the supreme court and if you want to know why ike for water and that cold love and you have to read my other books, eisenhower on civil-rights. chapter 5 will tell you about that. eventually ike shot down every argument against running and convinced himself he would be healthier serving and retiring. he also feared no one else could prevent a nuclear holocaust. in january 1956 eisenhower was informed that in a nuclear exchange with the soviet union 65% of american population would be casualties. years later chief of staff sherman adams said what surely applies to president obama today, the real reason a

president wants to run again is because he doesn't think anybody else can do as good a job as he is doing. after waiting so long that no one else put together he really did wait a long time, so long that no one else could put together a viable candidacy he announced his candidacy on feb. 20 ninth, 1956. drama and number 3 is about the aswan dam. it was the sea bed for the suez crisis. in the centerpiece, the plan for egyptian progress. historians often ignore the fact that eisenhower attempted to resolve the arab-israeli conflict that indoors to this day. on august 26, 1955, before his heart attack john foster dulles

publicly announce the administration's plan for resolving the arab-israeli conflict. that plan reads like it was written in 2011 discussing borders, palestinian refugees, places in jerusalem and so on. the plan would be in facing nasser to make peace with israel. like most middle east peace plan the alpha plan was dead on arrival. once he began to recover eisenhower revived the question of aid to the aswan dam and persuaded the national security council united states should make an offer that would head of soviet financing of the dam. in the following months negotiations with the egyptians broke down and i paid little attention to those negotiations. he was preoccupied with his health, his decision about

running for a second term and beginning to campaign. by june 7th, 1956, eisenhower appeared to have recovered. that morning he presided over a national security council meeting, had another 15 appointments and attended the white house news photographer until midnight as scheduled for doctors to veto a few weeks earlier. the president's car dropped garter schneider of his home and i retired to bed almost immediately. the doctor was removing his clothes when of phone rang. schneider reached for it with a shudder. only the first lady could be calling at such an hour. this was another a wishing medical drama your going to need to read the book if you want to know. turned out that unlike had an obstruction in his upper

intestine which the doctors called ileitis. 13 darters agonized for hours whether to stick a knife and a president who had suffered a heart attack eight month earlier. they were up until 2:00 a.m. on saturday to operate. the surgery would have taken place hours earlier if the patient -- once again eisenhower was out of commission for weeks. in the middle east the timing could not have been where is. by this time i returned to the white house in 1956 john foster dulles had decided to withdraw the american offers of aid to the aswan dam project largely because congress was opposed to it. on july 19th, 1956, dollars --

bolus --dulles obtained eisenhower's ascend. ike was not on top of the issue -- the next day dollars proudly told friend the united states had ulles proudly told friend the united states had made, quote, a big chess moving and esther was in the heller spot. he nationalized the suez canal. saying he would use his powers to build the aswan dam. the british and french had controlled that company for decades. two thirds of the oil from western europe came through the canal and now it was the united states and its allies that were

in a helluva spot. immediately the british and french prepared to go to war but eisenhower was adamant that war was not justified. egypt, he said, had a right to nationalize the canal because it was located in egyptian territory. to mike the only question was whether the egyptians would keep the canal open and functioning effectively. eisenhower shook off the lingering effect of his surgery. for three months he and dulles made frantic average to keep the french talking instead of fighting. you have to remember this is only 11 years after the end of world war ii. still shellshocked the british and french maid nasser into another hitler and by late september, 1956 eisenhower's allies gave up on him and any support for taking out nasser and implemented a program of blatant deception.

the failures of american intelligence, the cia did not foresee nasser's nationalization of the camaro and completely missed the plotting among the british, french and israelis. nor for the plot. on wednesday, october 24, 1856, in a villa outside carriage, the french foreign minister and the prime minister of israel and patrick been, deputy undersecretary of state for great britain signed a secret protocol providing that is really troops invaded the sinai peninsula on october 29th. this was the plan. once the israelis advanced for the suez canal zone britain and france would issue an ultimatum to israel and egypt to cease fighting and accept french occupation of the canal zone. if as expected egypt rejected the ultimatum britain and france would begin bombardments of egypt on october 31st followed

by planting but remember this was secret. it was not in the newspapers. what was in the newspapers was the soviet union had sent troops into budapest, hungry. killing dozens of protesters. eisenhower knew nothing of the secret meeting in paris. that day intelligence advisory committee chaired by cia director john foster dulles that war was not imminent and for the revision of intelligence. the committee ignored an fbi report that an unnamed country was considering military action against nasser. on monday, october 29th, eisenhower, campaigning in florida, boarded his plane for richmond, virginia. the note said the israeli army had attacked egypt and israel's

forces in 25 miles of the israeli canal. back in of the white house that night and a greek and profane eisenhower ordered secretary dulles to fire a message to the israelis saying we will apply sanctions, we're going to the united nations and we will do everything there is so that we can stop this thing. i knew that if the suez canal was disrupted the pipeline was destroyed, the british and french would attack. he didn't know they had already planned to do that. of the british intervened, i said, they might open israel between us. with the election eight days away, eisenhower announced he did not care in this latest whether he was reelected or not. on october 30th the british and french implemented to the letter the secret plan they endorsed. they delivered a 12 hour ultimatum to israel and egypt to

cease military operations. and accept occupation of the canal by anglo-french forces. the british and french mistakenly assumed that once they acted, their number 2 ally in the white house would bail them out with oil and military equipment. they were wrong. instead, eisenhower told an aide of those who began this operation should be left to boil in their own oil. that night in the un security council the british and french vetoed an american resolution calling for a ceasefire in egypt. less than half an hour later the deadline for the french and british ultimatum expired and the largest naval armada seen in the eastern mediterranean since world war ii went toward egypt. the next morning, october 31st,

eisenhower was heartened by news that soviet troops--the soviet government had declared its intention to practice non-interference in the internal affairs of the state. in egypt, british planes were bombing airfield and, ports and communications centers turning the lead part rows of aircraft into burning smoke and wreckage. nasser's troops sunk a 320 long ship loaded with rocks and cement in the suez canal, first of thirty-two ships. eisenhower concluded that he should address the nation that might, october 31st. foster dulles, sick and exhausted, wrote a draft of the address and ike read it, declared it an absolute disaster and late in the afternoon ordered that a new speech be

written. minutes before the broadcast in the oval office a speech writer fed the speech to the president across the table. the speech was short and terse. eisenhower revealed that given the veto in the security council he had taken the unprecedented step of appealing to the united nations general assembly. the united states was not consulted in any way about these actions, eisenhower said. nor were we informed of them in advance. and he pledged there would be no united states involvement in these present hostilities. and whitman describe november 1st, 1956, as another day of great crisis. chairman adams called this, quote, the worst week i have experience in all the years i worked with him at the white

house. that morning the president was besieged with rumors that the soviets were planning to deep for aircraft on syrian bases and a lake asked the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff if the russians might have slipped some atom bombs to the egyptians. eisenhower canceled all campaign events except the one scheduled for philadelphia that night, november 1st. and whitman recalled the typewriters had to go to the train to give the speech in time. in philadelphia, in convention hall, ike looked out at 18,000 partisans who came expecting a rousing campaign speech. instead he launched into what a columnist called a high level speech by a man who spoke not as a republican partisan as president of all the country. eisenhower stated that the nation had pursued a path of

honor by staying against the use of force in both hungry and egypt. the united states, he said, cannot and will not condone arms aggression no matter who the attacker and no matter who the victor. we cannot in the world anymore than our own nation subscribe to one law for the week and another law for the strong, one law for those opposing us and another for those allied with us. there can only be one law or there will be no peace. the president concluded, we believe that the power of modern weapons makes war not only perilous but preposterous. the only way to win world war iii is to prevent it. eisenhower was completely drained by four days of

unrelenting crisis. he drank two scotches before dinner on the train and three high bolts after word arriving at union station at 12:29 a.m. nov. second. on friday morning november 2nd eisenhower learned the general assembly had passed the americans cease-fire resolution by a vote of 64-5 with the soviet union voting in favor. democratic candidate adlai stevenson was harshly critical of the situation. we have alienated our ancient and strong as european allies, he said. we alienated israel. we have alienated egypt and the arab countries. in the united nations our main associate in middle eastern matters appears to be the soviet union. in the very week when the red army has been shooting down hungary and poland stevens and

concluded i doubt if ever before in our diplomatic history that any policy has been such an abysmal, such a complete and catastrophic failure. mike was not sleeping well. his doctor was concerned the president's blood pressure was bottled up. his heart skipped beats and he suffered constant abdominal discomfort and diarrhea. the records at the eisenhower library are so marvelously detailed. i told one of the library staff daily reports of the president's diarrhea was just a little more information than i really wanted or needed. lake in the night of nov. second, john foster dulles was

rushed to walter reed hospital. the next morning doctors removed a cancerous tumor from his colon. the news from the middle east was dismal. syrian saboteurs had blown up the oil pipeline going through the country. egyptian troops were pouring into cairo to defend the capital and the a glow french air strikes destroyed the egyptian air force on the ground. eisenhower's political opponents fiercely attacked his policies. , or roosevelt accused the administration of favoring the arabs over israel and asserted britain and france has been brought to the point of desperation by american policies. it leaves us in the strange position of supporting the kremlin and an egyptian dictator against our oldest and strongest ally. six of the eight democratic members of the senate foreign relations committee agreed with

stevenson and roosevelt that the president's middle east policies had failed. eisenhower had presided

>> and suddenly the leaders of the soviet group onpoured more fuel on the international fire. the premier sent messages to france and israel alluding to modern weapons of destruction and rocket weapons.

mobilized their naval fleets to stop aggression and terminate further bloodshed. he warned the president, if this war is not stopped, it is fraught with danger and can grow into a third world war. eisenhower interpreted the russian proposal as an ultimatum. he drew a line in the middle east sand calling it unthinkable. that was one of his favorite words, unthinkable, that the united states would join forces with the soviets when the general assembly had already ordered a cease fire. unilateral action by the soviet union, eisenhower stated, would be forcefully opposed by the united states, and he ordered the navy's sixth fleet stationed

in the mediterranean, ordered it placed on alert. this was election eve. the stresses were taking a toll on the president. after a tense meeting over the bull gannon message, ike's doctor found the president's heartbeat irregular. he laid down but developed a headache. after all, he'd only eaten a dish of carrots and a glass of yo gut since breakfast. the president's agitation, the doctor recorded, was due to what he termed an ultimatum that had been served upon hip. and ike growled to howard snyder, i'm confident, he growled that if he were a dictator, he would tell russia if they moved a finger, he would drop our entire stock of atomic weapons on them. tuesday, november 6th, was election day. ike arose to a middle east and even greater turmoil.

at a meeting that morning he was somber. our people should be alert, eisenhower said. the presence of russian planes in syria would inevitably trigger british and french attacks on those airfields. if that happened, as ike liked to say, the fact would be in the fire. he inquired of the chairman of the joint chiefs whether american naval units were equipped with atomic anti-submarine weapons. not long after the president and mamie left for gettysburg to vote, ann whitman recalled that the news from the middle east looked so bad at one point that the white house staff contemplated asking the president to turn around and come back to the white house. rumors were rampant that soviet intervention was imminent. some of the bad news came directly from moscow. chip bo lin, the american ambassador, cabled that the soviet mood had become more

ominous and that he feared soviet leaders were prepared to take action unless a cease fire was quickly achieved. the staff hastened the president's return by flying him back instead of having him drive from gettysburg. ike arrived at the white house at 12:38 p.m. following a short briefing, he strode into the cabinet room where 18 men were waiting. the vice president and the top leadership of both the state and defense departments including the joint chiefs. this was a could council of war. admiral ratford briefed the president regarding the steps of the joint chiefs. we're prepared to assure readiness for fighting a major war with the soviet union. eisenhower reviewed each step urging careful and deliberate implementation. then his son broke from behind,

and the president was informed in the middle of this meeting that british prime minister anthony was available by phone. eisenhower interrupted the meeting to take the call, and he confirmed in that conversation that eaton had ordered a cease fire in egypt. this was a tense conversation, it's much more detailed than i'm presenting here, a tense conversation with a clearly-resentful eden. ike asked if british compliance of the cease fire would be without condition, and eden growled, we cease firing tonight at midnight provided we are not attacked. eisenhower had foreseen what games eden would still try to play. he insisted that british technical troops not be used to clear the canal that would have constituted a de facto occupation and that no british or french troops or soviet or

american, for that matter, served in a proposed united nations peace-keeping force. when eden asked about foster dulles and the election, and ike replied, we have given our whole thought to hungary and the middle east. i don't give a damn how the election goes. eisenhower knew that the peace was still fragile and that soviet intentions were still unclear. he ordered implementations of most of the readiness steps discussed at his noon meeting. that night the joint chiefs put the sixth atlantic and pacific fleets on battle-ready alert and deploying additional ships, submarines and tactical resources, and they placed heavy troop carrier wings on a 12-hour alert. about 10 p.m. the eisenhower party travel today the sheraton park hotel in washington where a

suite had been reserved for watching the election returns. now, as you all know, the president won re-election by a huge marginment -- huge margin. but ike did not go downstairs until 1:45 because his reluctant opponent, adlai stevenson, waited until there to make a concession speech. meanwhile, hours earlier, approximately 2 a.m. cairo time, 7 p.m. in washington, d.c., the fighting ended in the middle east. permit me a much too brief epilogue. after november 6th eisenhower continued to be concerned about the possibility of soviet intervention because the british, french and israelis declined to withdraw their forces even though there had been a cease fire. they would not withdraw. eisenhower adamantly refused to provide oil and financial support to his bankrupt allies, and they were truly bankrupt.

there was a run on the pound, the british finances were in terrible shape. he refused to provide support. and the allies were facing a cold winter, but he would give them nothing until they publicly committed themselves to withdrawal. and it got so tense that in paris cab drivers often refused to pick up americans, and gas stations declined to sell them fuel. it took a month to get the commitment and another month for withdrawal. israeli withdrawal took even longer, it's a huge story that i don't have time to get into. the israelis evacuated the sinai but refused to, to leave the gaza strip and the mouth of the gulf. they continued to occupy those two spots. finally, after four months of presidential pressure, on march 1, 1957, the israeli government announced it intention to

withdraw. there's a big story about this because politically this was a hot potato too. then there's the eisenhower doctrine. in a four-hour meeting with congressional leaders on new year's day, 1957, who else but dwight eisenhower could hold a four-hour meeting with congressional leaders on new year's day? the eisenhower presented a resolution to those leaders endorsing military and economic aid to the middle east and, if necessary, military intervention by the united states. the house passed the resolution on january 30th, the same day that ike paraded the king of saudi arabia before the cameras in a state visit. now, the king insisted that the president come to the airport to greet him. that's something that ike had never done with any other former leader. but saudi oil had its clout in those days, too, and ike finally agreed to go. he grumbled to ann whitman that

now he supposed he'd have to greet everybody at the airport in the future. once israel agreed to withdraw from egypt, the eisenhower doctrine passed the senate on march 5th. in a breathtaking two months, 2008 eisenhower persuaded -- dwight eisenhower persuaded the congress to reorient american policy toward the middle east. the eisenhower doctrine committed the united states including oil resources in the middle east. and for good or ill, as president obama has experienced the past few weeks, for good or ill that obligation is still the cornerstone of american policy. thank you. [applause] >> if you have questions, if you'll come up to the

microphone, we're being recorded, and we want to be sure we're heard. >> so use the microphone, folks. come ahead. no such thing as a dumb question. come ahead. or a comment. contrary comment. it's all right. >> that was a great talk, thank you very much. um, i had a question. did the obama administration contact you about their involvement in libya, and if not, did you find similarity in how he dealt with libya in comparison with the suez canal incident? >> no, they have not, the obama administration hasn't talked with me. i'm meeting with former senator chuck hagel tomorrow in washington, d.c. who, i'm told, bought 27 copies of the book and gave one to the president, one to the vice president, one to the secretary of defense, and i

haven't talked with the senator yet about it, but my suspicion is he's a little uncertain that intervention in libya is a good thing. it always is tricky, we have to be very careful about taking a historic figure and applying him to a situation 50 or 60 years later. but there are principles in the way eisenhower approached things that are worthy of consideration. eisenhower, generally, did not like what we called brush fire wars. he ended the one in korea, he refused to go into indochina or egypt, he just didn't do it. and he disliked very much marginal military interventions. he believed that if you went in -- colin powell gets the credit for the doctrine of overwhelming force these days, and i often think that general powell ought to remind us that dwight eisenhower talked about that all the time. but, of course, eisenhower got it from the great german general. anyway, overwhelming force and

that marginal, the trouble -- ike understood very well the trouble with partial interventions is they spin out of control, that they are very hard to manage. and the libyan one appears to me to be that way, too, so i don't know whether the president would want to talk with me about that or not. [laughter] i'm a little concerned about that it's becoming a stalemate. and you can have not only a unilateral quagmire like we've had a couple of other places, you can have a multilateral quagmire too. yes, sir. >> what was richard nixon's role in if all this, if any? >> richard nixon's role, there's a lot of mythology about nixon and eisenhower. there's just, you know, i don't want to get too involved, but the eisenhower presidency has just been distorted by my profession shamefully. just because people didn't do the research. and one of them is the relationship with eisenhower and

nixon. eisenhower, and i'm satisfied would have never kept nixon for a second term as vice president if he didn't want him. you really have to know eisenhower to understand he just didn't abide people -- well, it's not true. he kept that doctrine. [laughter] but anyway, you know, dr. snyder was an old crony, but nixon was, basically, to answer your question, ike's political surrogate. and when eisenhower quit campaigning, once he did once this crisis broke out, nixon went out and substituted for him and took on adlai stevenson. nixon also provided much other support in the congress, and i haven't looked very carefully at what he did with the eisenhower doctrine passage, but i'm sure he played a major role. he was the vice president, so presided over the senate, and i'm sure he was deeply involved behind the scenes. but he was a political operative for eisenhower, and a very skilled one. nixon, the way nixon left the presidency always tars him, and people forget what else he did.

somebody else? yes. >> what was the effect of these events on nasser? >> well, eisenhower -- the effect on nasser, he asked. eisenhower saved nasser's heart. you know, if eisenhower decided to join with the allies, nasser would have been toast. now, what you would have done we egypt after that is an interesting thing to speculate, but there isn't any question. now, you've got to remember that in those days nasser and arab nationalists were considered pretty progressive. they were getting rid of, of royal thrones, and they were getting rid of the political powers, and so they were pretty progressive. so what happens is nasser stays in power who's followed by sedat who's followed by you know who? mubarak.

mubarak was a 28-year-old officer already on the rise at the time of the suez crisis. and so eisenhower's policy, we have to say, you know, i sound very pro-eisenhower. there are always the law of unintended consequences operates, eisenhower's policies opened the door for military strongmen to rule in the middle east. and at the same time it would not be fair to hang that around eisenhower's neck altogether 50, 60 years later, of course. but never the less, that was a factor. and personally, i have an op-ed i'm trying to get somebody to print at the moment. my prediction is that the military is not done in if egypt. -- in egypt. they've been in charge for 60 years, and i will be real surprised if we don't have either a military officer or somebody with very close ties to the military emerge as the next president of egypt. yes, sir. >> aside from the fact that they were in different parties, what was eisenhower's relationship with truman?

>> sir, i don't pretend to be expert on that. there is a, oh, i always fete this author's name -- forget this author's name, there is a book called "harry and ike." that's the correct title. i'm sorry i'm forgetting the author's name. i'm an old guy, and the part of my brain that remembers names has died. [laughter] and so i get caught with that sometimes. it was not an easy relationship. having said that, you know, truman chose eisenhower to head nato. we now know from truman's diary that he attempted to persuade i'm as early as 1948 to run for president on the democratic ticket. how serious that was with truman, i haven't studied in depth, but we now know that's in truman's diaries. and on the other hand, it was very tense in 1953 at the inauguration. eisenhower did not get out of the car and go into the white house to get the outgoing

president, and harry was very offended about that and talked about it later. it was not an easy relationship, although the book i mentioned said they kind of reconciled years later quite a bit. but it was a tense relationship partly because truman later in an oral history alleged that ike had wanted to come back, wanted to marry his driver, kay summersby, his driver in europe, and wanted to divorce mamie and had written george marshall about that and that truman had taken those letters from the state department and destroyed them. at least one scholar i know of who's pretty good thinks that truman made that up. i don't know, i'm not qualified, i'm not giving you a very good answer but a because i'm not an expert on that. i'm sorry. >> thank you. >> yeah. >> i had heard that sedat had made a statement years later that nasser told him that because we didn't back our

allies, that the united states couldn't be trusted, and then they became allies with the soviets. is that true? is. >> that sedat said that to nasser? >> no, no. nasser had said that to sedat. >> oh. i couldn't dispute that. there's another thing i tell folks i know a whole lot about a little, and i know a whole lot about what i just talked with you about. that i couldn't, i couldn't dispute that. um, i think there's still work to be done on the evolution of things after the eisenhower years. the tendency of the colonial, or the diplomatic historians has been to assume the eisenhower doctrine, policies were abject failures and that nasser ends up being allied with the soviets. i'm not sure nasser was ever really -- it's true the soviets helped build aswan dam, that's true. but nasser played both sides against the middle. and whether the united states

could not be trust thed, i don't know, you could take that kind of statement and look at it two or three different ways, couldn't you? certainly, the allies didn't think they could be trusted to do what they wanted. i'm sorry it's a poor answer, i'm just not qualified to answer any better. >> thank you. >> i think if i know my history fairly correctly that the role of israel after world war ii which was the implementation of the darfur treaty or agreement, what was eisenhower's view of the reluctance of israel to withdraw? um, from, you were saying from the gaza? >> yeah. that you're asking about that, you're not asking about the creation of israel? >> no, no. i'm asking about, you know, when he was president and, um, they were, you know, going through what, you know, how israel was taking over some of the territories that were not

involved in the agreement. um, what was his feeling about that? >> if you're talking about the balfour agreement, i only know about the suez situation in if gaza and the gulf in particular. i'm not qualified to speak about the rest of it. but he certainly put enormous pressure on israel to withdraw after the suez crisis. and he appealed to the congress on february 20th, 1957 for support for that, and the congress turned him down. and so he turned around that night and went to the people with a televised address. and behind the scenes, according to his memoirs, he threatened to the israelis to cut off private contributions from american jews to israel which at that time is still major, but at that time was really, really major. now, whether he could have done that, i don't know. but in terms of the politics of the united states, eisenhower

took extraordinary steps to oppose israel's policies at that time. now, the earlier stuff i'm not as good on in many terms of the creation of the state of israel generally, truman recognized the state of israel in may, i believe, in 1948 part of his presidential campaign. and that was really opposed by, by george marshall who was then his secretary of state. and you've got to remember george marshall, general george marshall had been eisenhower's mentor. and i think there's circumstantial reason to believe that eisenhower agreed with marshall, certainly key people in the state department believed, loy henderson is a graduate of my school, southwestern college, and what a great diplomat who really believed that the recognition and creation of the state of israel would lead to endless turmoil in the middle east. and he's not wrong. that doesn't mean you can't support that because there's a

dramatic and wonderful story for the state of israel. and i am moved and touched by it, too, that, my, the weeds are mixed with the flowers in that kind of situation. i wish i could answer you better. >> did the hungarians expect the americans to come to their aid in 1956? >> >> oh, significant evidence that a lot of hungarians did expect the americans to come to their aid, and there was great disillusionment among pro-hungarian groups and some of the refugees, now hundreds of thousands of refugees left. and all the united states did was make provision, and i forget the numbers now, for thousands of hungarian refugees to come to this country. but there was great disillusionment and criticism of eisenhower before that. he was very clear-headed that it could not be done, and this is eisenhower -- to get back to our earlier question -- who didn't believe on taking on military

tasks that could not be completed successfully. he, he, you know, he regretted it deeply, but he quickly made the decision. you have to go back to world war ii. we have a lot of mythology about what happened in world war ii. without the soviet union in world war ii, a case could be made that the war would have come out very differently. and the soviet union suffered 35 million casualties, estimated, on the eastern front. and the united states and the allied powers didn't land on the mainland until 1944. this was a totally different situation. the soviet union was, obviously, on the other side. britain and france were not available to help. he thought it was just not viable. but he was roundly criticized, much, much more so than -- my book doesn't do justice to that particular subject, i regret to say. >> would you address the eisenhower and vietnam?

>> yeah, i, i sound like a broken record because i -- [laughter] i tell you i know a lot about a little. i do know about that. he, clearly, made the decision not to intervene in indochina in 1954, particularly at the siege of dien bien phu, and he had a number of advisers who wanted him to do it. and he thought and thought about it, and he was surrounded by a number of people who thought he should do it. and he went overnight and came back the next day and said i'm not going to send one soldier to die this those rice paddies. and he did not. having said that, eisenhower left a bit of a mess in vietnam. um, the geneva conventions of 1954 -- i know something about this because i used to teach a course on it -- the geneva convention of '54 called for

unifying elections in vietnam, and those elections never took place because the united states supported, in effect, the creation of a separate country in south vietnam even though it really wasn't a separate country, never was. this is, you know, an outcome of this cold war. and so eisenhower's policies otherwise are open to a lot of question. i haven't done the detailed research on that like i have on this. but he, clearly, chose -- again, typical eisenhower -- not to intervene militarily in indochina. he believed that putting ground troops in the asia was a fool's errand. and i would submit that our american experience since then validates his judgment on that score. anybody else? how are we doing for time? good. i think last question. >> one more question, okay. really good questions, folks. terrific. >> so along the same lines,

eisenhower chose, was involved in the bay bay of pigs, and that crisis arose soon after his presidency ended under the kennedy administration. his decision to, to be involved with the freedom fighters in cuba, would he have -- that sounds inconsistent with all you've said about eisenhower's reluctance to engage in brush fire wars. >> that's a matter of -- yeah. the bay of pigs is a matter of some controversy among the historians, and i can't resolve it, though i know some historians who are working on it. and the historians who have tended to deify john f. kennedy, i will confuse the life out of you when i tell you i have a son named john kennedy. but anyway, you know, i really liked kennedy in so many ways. but the historians who are biased toward him have tried to argue that eisenhower really had set this up, and kennedy just

carried it out. i am convinced, and one scholar i know who's seen the documents that i haven't seen is convinced, that eisenhower would have never done it the way that kennedy did. he withdrew the air support, and even the plan with the air support just didn't look like an eisenhower kind of intervention. eisenhower would have done more what he did in lebanon in 1958 when he landed 14,000 troops. i mean, he really believed in overwhelming force, and you do it. now, he was open to covert action, and we know that in guatemala and iran. so he was not an angel when it came to covert action. but the cuban invasion is a strange phenomenon. you know, the cia, if you knew today what contingency plans the cia has, you'd be horrified. so these contingency plans were around. and so when the new president came in as every officer does,

alan dulles and all those people took in the new plans to president kennedy, and there were after eight years quite a few people who were upset with eisenhower and anxious to have a president who would do something differently. and one of the big arguments was about limited war, about whether we could have limited war. because eisenhower said massive retaliation, that limited wars were dangerous. he didn't like them. he felt they could lead to the holocaust whereas maxwell taylor who's head of the joint chiefs of staff for kennedy and headed the army when ike was there believed in limited war and wrote a book called "the uncertain trumpet." and their argument was in the nuclear age the only kind of war you could fight was a limited one. and so that's a great debate. but i do not, i cannot conceive of eisenhower having okayed that operation the way kennedy did. but that doesn't mean he had no fingerprints on it. it's probably, you know, as i like to say, the