what the president focused on last night was the lisbon summit, the whole issue of transition, the number of countries, heads of state and country who's are committed to this transition in 2014, which we think is about right. that's certainly the intent. and everything comes into this, as far as i know, mr. smith, i mean the allies were very much with us. they have specific decisions they have to make. i don't know what -- i don't know what those are. :

>> they are leading in some cases now part .

partnering throughout afghanistan throughout the course of the next year that will increase exponentially. i am not i leave to think they have challenges and have not done this before and we don't expect it to be magical but in terms of progress over the last 18 months, it really has been enormous. we will expect to continue on that pace and pick up and be better to be more and more in the lead. >> the improvement and trading over the last 18 months cannot be overstated. it was one thing to pick them up and said about the door but another to have a trained force. the surge was not just the troops of the totality of the effort including training and improving governance. when i was there last few months ago i have never seen so much activity usaid, justice

department, comprehensive effort if we put 128,000 more afghan security forces over the last 18 months i don't think it is fair to say drawing down troops or another 23,000 next year reduces the effort clearly we have used that appropriately under making progress and i appreciate your of leadership on that. with the improvement that we have all seen. it is truly remarkable and to be commended and with that i yield back. >> thank you very much for your service and testimony. 4.5 years ago i was talking about energy and mr. larsen was with me. we were stunned when the chinese began the discussion of energy talking about post whale. quayle is finite of course, there will be that

post oil world. without that focus of the next election which is never more than 10 years away the next report which is always less than three months away, i have heard none of the leadership mentioned there will be a post-oil world it is the dominant factor in chinese planning so people have a different perspective of time and agenda and we do. i am the afghan taliban. i am not constrained in my thinking about the next election which is less than two years away and what may seem to those americans as a long time as three years but to me with my planning it is so little more than the blink of the night.

in the three years, they will be out of their. for the next three years i will continue the fight as a diversion but i will really be recruiting and reconstituting so i will be ready they're working very hard to improve security forces and police and trying to make the mayor of kabul look like the president of afghanistan. but these are all very fragile and reversible. with the forces i will hold in reserve, it will be easily reversed when they are gone. do you think we have the ability? it depends on where one sits, do you think we have the ability to see the world of the prism of the taliban? >> we see that world a lot more clearly than we used to as i am sure you can

appreciate. because of the fights and sacrifices. we also see the world through the afghan people's eyes because we are in so many villages, some districts, districts with them. i just disagree that the gains will be easily reversed. in fact,, i see a stream of intelligence routinely of the taliban in significant disarray at the leadership level, and many live in pakistan as well as in the field. >> i was just repeating what i was told by general petraeus and others at and every testimony in the congressional record say the gains are fragile and reversible. >> i have said that as walt -- as well be you also said easily reversible i

just disagree that is the case. they only become irreversible if we get the afghan security forces in charge of their own destiny. that is the goal over the course of the next three years. four years ago they virtually have no afghan security forces. no effective force is certainly. that is the challenge and we know that. we see that through their eyes and through the taliban eyes. the taliban had a good year last year and they are having a really bad year this year and will have another bad year next year. it is for them to decide how long they want to sit on the side and i understand that. as far as i am concerned that is more than just a blink in the i even with their eyes of they were fighting this for many

years. they're all so tired so i come at a from a different position and by a understand what you are saying that we have seen great progress and there is an opportunity here to succeed against the objectives that we have which have been limited for afghanistan is in charge of their own destiny and we have a long-term relationship with that country to put them in a position to be a lot more people and stable than they have been the last three or four decades. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman and think you both for being here this morning. from my perspective and after having of conversation with the former ambassador

about the region in general and the challenges we may face given the decision the president made, we were there as part of the trip with the chairman. one of the anecdotes that stands out in my mind speaks to the comments made about the advance is we have made but we were told about one of the soldiers that had been trained and was intending on being deployed but what was significant is his idea was once we completed his term, was to go back to his village and work on the next generation in the context of literacy.

we know that is one of the big challenges we have faced with the rate of literacy within the general population. my question, given the decision that has now been made in terms of starting the drawdown, one of the expectations that we have was about civilian leadership to set the direction with the security forces would provide the securities so my question is for both of you. is the civilian leadership data point* to where they can provide that direction and oversight and where are we and how do we ensure also

with the amount of corruption that exist the lack of control exercised by the central government? those are questions out there those are the questions with the drawdown. we are being told even once this is accomplished, with the security forces come it will take somewhere between six and $8 billion per year to sustain the central government. it does not have at this point*, the expectation they will have that and come so where does the money come from? how long are we on the hook for either six or 8 billion or more if you take into account the civilian

government as well? >> we're certainly investing in developing afghan governments as well but the greatest progress we are seeing so far has been from the bottom up starting at the local and district levels and moving to the provinces but i would say something about 75% of the district and provincial officials in place are now merit based appointments. they are capable people qualified to do the job and you see a dramatic change at the local level where most afghans have the most direct experience with their government. that is the good news. when you move to the national level with ministries to provide basic services and accountable justice system, and dealing with corruption, this is a

work in progress. many challenges we have to work through but we have partnerships with each of the major afghan ministries working with them and to go after correction. with your question of sustainability, we share your concern, the president shares your concern. we're currently working with the afghans to scrubs of long-term model has the insurgency comes down and what is the needs of the force to be how can we bring down the cost to do things in a way that gets us into a more sustainable range in terms of what they afghans together can support over time? >> thank you mr. thornberry. >> admiral, you said in your statement there is the commander has inflexibility

inside the deadlines which tells me there is no flexibility to extend the deadline. and you also said in your statement that the president's decision was more aggressive and incurs more risk than i was originally prepared to accept. interesting choice of words, prepared to except. by your best military advice was something other than less aggressive of withdrawals of what the president announced. the first question that comes to my mind, is there a military reason to have a mandate to withdraw in september rather than november or december? >> [inaudible]

[inaudible] given to have the vast majority of the forces. [inaudible] and not one man on the ground that that is not my decision but for the president. i will reemphasize inside that deadline, the commander on the ground, has all the flexibility to move the force is where, when, . [inaudible] [inaudible] as you reference their people who are concerned about the military effects.

there is speculation politics plays a role in the timetable i am trying to focus on the military aspect. looking at "the new york times" today where talking about if the troops have to be in september they will be on the downsizing effort over the summer of been arguably where they should spend their time with the fighting season" end quote. the general who was the ground commander there in afghanistan and is now affiliated with the center for new american securities saying that 10,000 by december is more than the military wanted but doable but putting the september 2012 expiration tag on the rest of the surge raises concerns. that is in the middle of the fighting season. >> [inaudible] i know he commanded years

ago [inaudible] certainly we were focused on the military in increasing the risk. [inaudible] >> linney ask you one other thing. we have just recently been there to focus on the stability operations. looks like one of the great

successes that is spreading but the key determine it is manpower to all of my special forces with conventional forces and plans to expand into more villages if the people are there that cannot have been so does the decision but at risk what seems to be one of the most promising things going on in afghanistan to allow them to stand up to provide for their own security? >> the act of the local police has been enormously successful. [inaudible] >> ms. sanchez?

>> thank you, mr. chairman. i think you both for being before us. i have a question from three different aspects because i think all are very important for us to leave afghanistan and not have to return. as you know, i have been one of those people who have said let's get out of this because i cannot seem to understand and you have been before us many times so have secretary gates and cannot seem to find out what is the end game and what it looks like other than stability with the afghan people able to do this on their own? that is dependent on education of the population because we know they are under educated, said kent, the leadership of the

country. and third come at a strong afghan army/police force whatever you call it. my first question, when did we start training? what year i cannot recall now when did we start training the afghan army and police? second, how many have gone through training tornado training of our allies training program at this point*? >> i can speak to that certainly. the exact year would be hard for me to pin down but there has been a training effort almost as long as we have been there. my personal experience it was well under way although under resource 2006/2007. number of years been mckown many have retrained?

what about total? >> about 300,000. >> currently according to the information that we have in front of us, we have 305,000 total target for this year with the ansf we have nobody going away to walk away with arms or did not come to the fight lowered to go back to their villages? we have 100% retention? >> no, no, no. we have had retention problems. >> host: nicvax day macau, many have retrained during the total time? >> i would like to get that number when you get a chance. my second question comes to

the whole issue of a corrupt government from this standpoint that i first met the president karzai i was reading in "newsweek" article that was from the mayor of kabul and that was it in my last visit their his own parliamentarians said the type of election where he won a second term should never happen again in that country. some of his own party so they do not believe it was a good election. quarter redoing about leadership there? what have we done to cultivate leadership? who are we identifying or do we leave it up to the corrupt people to take advantage of their own country as they currently

are doing? >> i would say what i mentioned before we have worked bottom up to systematically work with the afghans to ensure first at the district level then at the provincial level and at the national level that we replace corrupt and incompetent leadership. i think we are 75% of the way there and at the district and provincial level. you are starting to see president karzai, who is our partner in the effort to make the connection between corruption and the need to fight corruption to gain and sustained legitimacy in the eyes of the people and what he has begun to do with our support is to make those replacements. for example,, dismissing a

number of officers from ansf he found to be corrupt and those that were found to be historically one of the most corrupt institutions in the country. the retraining, the fielding of the unit's with a totally different philosophy what the job is with those communities they protect that is dealing with the corruption problem. but we certainly have a long way to go and press our afghan partners everyday on the issue. >> i would like to add to the record when all is said and done about the affair we will find that is what brought the it efforts to bear. >> thank you, mr. chairman. admiral i would like to pick up on a line of questioning

mr. thornberry began where you said what i can tell you is the president's decision is more aggressive and incur more risk than i was an originally prepared to accept. risk to whom? >> the overall mission. certainly it is an increased risk across the board but it is manageable risk. >> but admiral i am taking the word it is more risk and that may ask the question i notice from your web site that you state your the principal military adviser to the president and as such you present a range of a vice from any other individual comments from the joint staff. what is your goal when you come before us? visit to support the decision of the administration?

>> i think the the website says joint chiefs it is certainly to provide both my assessment and vice if you will based on the questions that i get. >> do they give the same type of device? >> as you appeared before the senate and house during the administration's time, can you tell us one time in any of your testimony not supported the decision they have made? >> i work for two presidents and i have supported those presidents. >> we will basically have the support but the question you the ku have of better pitcher where to go toward the end of the year?

it is very difficult fighting season right now then in june to say should not let up that the gas my question to you what is the acceptable risk that it is not acceptable and today? had the reassessed your position in? for whatever has changed on the ground war militarily that makes it a more acceptable risk today? >> what i have said for many months, back up to what i said earlier, of very difficult year last year and it will be and continue to be a very difficult year

with respect to the taliban of the taliban goals this year and my recommendations that are out there is very focused on achieving those objectives and while there is those i don't find it significant or find it to put the military in a position where it cannot achieve its objective. >> were there any of good joint chiefs that recommended this particular action that the president is taking? >> i will not talk about individual recommendations. >> it just astounds me when we had "don't ask, don't tell" you are willing to come before the committee unsolicited to say i am

willing to stake my personal opinion and this is what i think it should be but when we talk about the rest of the troops of the decision we have to make you are not willing to say what those individual commanders were willing to say or your personal recommendations. with that, i yield back. >> mr. andrews? >> admiral mullen is an honor to be in the process was someone who's integrity is as impeachable as yours with the strength of your character and madame secretary thank you for your terrific contributions. madame secretary, i think you succinctly stated our purpose afghanistan may ultimately leave behind that will never again with the attacks of the allies. al qaeda was the parasite and the taliban was the post in afghanistan and the military mission essentially

has been focused on destroying the parasite and either weakening the post or making it unwilling to become the host for the parasite and i know admiral mullen says we need to support the process that includes reconciliation with the taliban who break with al qaeda which i think is a wise and understandable view. with that framework, it is my understanding with the administration took office we had 34,000 troops in afghanistan. the search build that up that 98,000. when the present withdrawal plan is completed we will be at 68,000. is that correct? >> it is correct. >> at present there are

47,000 troops from allied countries in the country. what do we know about the plan of the allies to withdraw all those 47,000? >> in the discussions we have had, we have in together out together principle with a strong sense of resolve and i think if we talk about bringing down our forces some of the allies think about bringing down their search contributions. >> in that context that a target number of ansf forces is 305,000 now we're at 286,000 and a public reports indicate by about three /1 ratio they were deemed to be effective as opposed to dependent. let me ask a question that

is not rhetorical. with the presence of allied troops if we don't expect a precipitous drop public is the mission of the 68,000 remaining americans be after september 30, 2012? why are they there? >> to continue the implementation of this strategy on the road to successful transition which will be completed at the end of 2014 expect the afghans fully in the lead across the country. we're in a slope toward that end goal and good drawdown is totally consistent with that. and the strategy and mission will keep aiming for the goal. >> >> in terms of constituents would understand what will the 68,000 troops be doing in the country after september 30th of 2012?

what will the mission be? >> first of all, to sustain the transition but specifically, from my perspective, rock-solid principle from a rack as the partnership of what we see in iraq today and what we have seen for this side is the enormity of the impact and that is where we are even now focused with the afghan security forces. in two or three years from now it will be much better so that will be a significant part of the effort but that doesn't mean we don't have forces still involved to continue the gains. >> when it comes with the afghan security force in is

our at the optimum point*, what is the appropriate troop levels than? >> that is in determinant right now it is dramatically reduced clearly the model is still iraq and that gets into what is right now with a strategic partnership approach with afghanistan and the united states and would visit me in long-term with any u.s. footprint? i don't have the answer. >> thank you for your answer and integrity. >> they do mr. wilson. thank you for being here today and admiral i appreciate your testimony to bring of the extraordinary progress of the american military is like 10 to winning afghanistan the american people and no progress is being made and i

appreciate you referencing how important we do i wish the american people knew the level of achievement and you provided the information today and we appreciate the reference that at the end of this year and then double the number up that 305,000 personnel, trained personnel and it has done extraordinary work and i have the privilege of visiting my former national guard unit 218 brigade as their training courses i don't think they get the credit. our military or there's so with that said, i am very concerned about conditions on the ground and for each of you the president did not reference any conditions on

the ground that would justify withdrawing 10,000 troops by december and an additional 23,000x summer. every witness before this committee has previously testified any withdrawal the first question was specific conditions on the ground withdrawing 10,000 troops by december? >> we're literally starting transition in seven districts next month with the overall transition process which is agreed to buy the lisbon agreement with nato and other countries. this is the beginning of that very specifically. the conditions on the ground with those provinces support that transition. that is the approach. the other transition in provinces if you will tied to the ability of the afghan security forces and we get

credit on the military side but there have been gains on the diplomatic side. we have surged diplomatically with extraordinarily with the civilians two of made a big difference but within the various provinces lowered districts, to transition-- as conditions allow and inside the numbers and the dates, any movement or changes to be associated with where the troops come from our condition based. there is no question about that that the president has given us the flexibility. >> looking at the level of violence and the establishment of the civil society within the districts, what are the conditions with the removal of 23,000 additional troops? >> the improvement of security conditions. the most representative example is than the south.

specifically. is actually, we have allies fighting in the north and west and in the north is turning. it has not turned but is turning and better than one year ago. there were grave predictions about losing the north because of what was going on there. we talked earlier today about the challenges in the east and there are but general petraeus has a strategy that i have seen and the the been in terms to create the conditions where we transition there as well. we are committed to not transitioning until it is ready and working our way through this with afghan security forces to have dramatically improved in size and in quality. that doesn't mean we don't have retention and attrition problems although they are much better on the attrition side, for the police force, we exceed our objective is that attrition is lower than it needs to be

to sustain the force. >> yes decisions are being made and terms of troop withdrawal, is it consider the effect of the morale on the taliban and the extremist, are not giving false hope format of secretary? >> not to give any comfort where will i be next year? i will control less territory and less support from the population and face more forces in the field and more afghans will be there for a long time. less access to finance and more to defections though any way you slice it things are getting worse and not better. >> we will not abandon our allies.

>> absolutely not. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman chairman and for both of you for being here. admiral mullen i know you will continue to give your extraordinary attention to the issues as you have and i appreciate your did a ship and service. we had a hearing yesterday and i think the comment was made the numbers are probably less important than how our troops are utilized and certainly which would be staying. could you break that down more in terms of support troops are combat troops and whether or not that decision has been made? a follow-up question is when we think of the afghan forces, how will they be

sustained financially in the future? how do we envision our help and support to those as we move forward? >> with respect to the afghan security forces and the bill associated with back, president karzai and his people recognize that certainly at the current level of six or $7 billion per year, it is not sustainable. there is a lot of work going on on both sides to figure out what is sustainable? and including the view you need 352,000 in 2014 or 15 every body recognized of the current level from a financial standpoint it was not sustainable but they have to be taken and what

was the first part? >> with some of large numbers with support troops. >> with those three categories i would be focused on that combat but i don't discount the need for the support and i include the first group, the enablers but they have to determine the specifics but on the 23,000 common knowing exactly where they will come from, it is far too soon to know that. that will be conditions based and conditions will change between now and when they really have to focus on

executing that. in the near-term general petraeus and general rodriguez have some expectation. obviously there would be a withdrawal over the course of the year and specifically what that might entail and they have done a lot of that work. i have not seen it although they will certainly come in the new -- near future how to do that. >> to follow up on reconciliation and integration issues broke but it is defined by the number of young women veterans come of girls in school, i had a chance to visit the schools as well as the number of trips we have taken from mother's day to visit with the troops but to ring gauge with women and villages as well as those in leadership. those that were here in the capital last week what role are be playing to make sure it -- it is in a lot of

rhetoric about the fact they are third with the civil society? tower removing for word to be sir 10 their voices are a meaningful voice? and at what point* would reconsider the reconciliation and send you been working or moving forward and what role would that play as we continue to look at troop withdrawal? >> with clinton and other members of the administration and consistently have raised the issue of female participation but with the reconciliation process with the interlocutors continue to press the point*. you see the gradual expansion of when been involved with the high peace council, a more community based oversight efforts that

are emerging. when we talk about the key criteria of those who reconcile and respecting the afghan constitution, as a key element is respect for minority and women's rights. that has been part of the policy from the get-go and something we continue to try to translate with our afghan into lockers. that is very important too. >> mr. turner? >> i want to thank you both and admiral mullen i want to go back to a topic that i think goes to the heart of what we see with the conflict of afghanistan which is the issue of opium production and the drugs that fuel and fund the taliban and the insurgent activities. frequently when i hold up

the congressional research service bar chart opium production and occurring during the time period we look at the chart to seek you can see opium production almost doubled up until 2009 that is when we saw we needed to go in with the surge but before that there was historical levels of opium production. i use the chart both with president karzai in general petraeus to show that we need to do more to lower the opium production and the narcotics trade and general jones says he believes these funds go directly to fund the taliban and also goes to find the issues of corruption. when general petraeus was here i held up the chart he

kindly told me there was no information as to what successes we have had and sent me a new bar chart. it shows in 2010 there was a 40% decrease as a result of the counter narcotics effort and disease with the crops but also 341% increase of the nationwide drug seizures showing this is a result of activities of increased focus. with the reduction of troops my concern is we go back to a period to take our eye off the ball and see a surge in narcotics. what assurances can you give us lowering the number of troops we can maintain the counter narcotics and strategy to reduce opium production and funding of the taliban? >> we will certainly press the issue. just showing the charts charts, look at the levels over the years and it is a

way of life that will not go away quickly. there have been considerable improvements and we continue to keep pressure on that. obviously it comes principally from helmand that the landscape and dynamics are changing but by no means is it on. the long term goal to produce a better way to provide for one's family van what has happened today. but with the security environment but not to drive it up overnight but a critical focus here on the taliban is where they get their finances from as with any terrorist organization and over the years i have

seen many estimates of how much money they get but it is substantial. we need to continue to focus on bad as well. there is an near-term piece but long term peace and from the overall strategy standpoint, my view would be to have the conditions in the south and helmand in particular they could not sustain production over the long term. >> i would like to yield the rest of my time to joe wilson. >> the question i want to conclude in regard to conditions based, the success of the surge, altmire production of violence, development of civil society. if violence increases and we're unable to promote a civil society, will the president change his course or is the time line of withdrawal more important than conditions? fam if that is for the

president to decide. what i said earlier and i go back from its 2009 in my view if this isn't working within 18 or 24 months we need to reassess the strategy. i think from the standpoint of the next 18 or 24 months given the transition it doesn't just include the military side, the issues of corruption or governance or pakistan, those are significant and inherent risks to the overall strategy. so for my point* of view after a period of time if it isn't working the reassessment is in order but not for me to decide. >> mr. cooper? >> we appreciate your extraordinary service. maybe the toughest part is the patience to demonstrate

from committees like this. i appreciate your forbearance. one of the most important factors you know, is the pakistan reaction and i assume the situation was taken into account when the decision was made. what is that reaction? >> all are pakistan its all. >> the decision to fight? >> i have not gotten it yet. i spoke with my pakistani counterparts yesterday as me made many contacts and we agreed to talk in the near future after he is able to absorber. from the standpoint of how pakistan views the future and is consistent with the government they see a stable peaceful afghanistan those

to be a result of the overall strategy. and overtime exactly how they view this is determined on how this works personally. their purse lay going through a very difficult time from the strategic standpoint and many others believe they have to sustain this relationship as difficult as it is this a terrorist problem whose economy is very weak and at a very dangerous and strategic part of the world. i think not just the united states but the regional countries need to focus on this so civility is something which is the output of all that what we

do. not just continued instability. the continued downward trend is dangerous for all of us with respect to pakistan and afghanistan and the region at large. >> it takes a great deal of patience and expertise. i find my constituents don't realize pakistan has more people than russia for example. >> they are projected to have over 200 million in the next 20 or 30 years to be the fourth or fifth largest nuclear power if you consider weapons. it is not a country or one that i think we have to continue to in gauge with an be frank with but at the same time i think we are paying the price in afghanistan and pakistan for walking away in 1989 and that is a model that runs in my head 20 years from now

whoever sits here versus in your seats to have the same conversation we walk away accepted as much more dangerous than it is right now. >> increasingly pakistan itself has been the victim of terrorist attacks and in karachi most recently and other instances of they have felt the wrath of the taliban and haqqani network and other groups. >> they have lost tens of thousands and specifically over 3,000 of their military with tens of thousands wounded and sacrificed greatly. sometimes that, if lost they have enormous, enormous challenges. they have face them and will continue and we need to help them, not hurt them. their reality to do with regardless we will not push

the problem to the side. a book recently called the wrong war called the ritchie's problem is jaime karzai unwillingness to lead as police the gaps in the mountains to terminate the flow of those along but iran aligned was the mistake and? is this something we need to demand? >> what they have done with general petraeus and general campbell who basically ran the campaign in the east to refocus and o layer from the border in pakistan to kabul and to pull forces out of those remote places which nine of us thought were strategically significant but the where'd approach to

ensure we could protect the capital to do with the economy makes it more difficult for the haqqani network that closed much of those in there is a better at -- a better strategy. >> my time has expired. >> thank you. admiral, you are here during an interesting line and thank you for both of your service we may not see eye-to-eye but you are out there doing what you believe is in the best interest of the nation. i haven't heard anybody talk about a strategy. i have no idea what the troop numbers are supposed to be but i know what they're capable of and higher numbers are better for the bigger insurgency we

could make afghanistan into a place to go fly fishing or she punting we don't have 300,000 people on the ground i have not heard of a change of strategy to a company troop numbers. how come? >> the short answer is the strategy has not changed. >> weir at the lowballed end that general mcchrystal ast four. i don't want to be wrapped up in the numbers game. >> he was talking about troops. this was two or three years ago. it has change dramatically on the ground since then. but i spend a lot of time looking who was there who makes a difference and who is and and we have the culture historical eight all of us with what we learn with respect to iraq we have

excess forces and iraq just because we were moving them so fast. we literally take those lessons into account and despite the pressure, that is also forcing us too not addressed the strategy but how we prioritize and to achieve success. is a capable military that we have. >> again, more risk and quicker than i originally anticipated but to get this done rorer has some point* in time but the strategy still is a counter insurgency focus without question properly resources to and get into a debate

about that given the mission and the objective right now if it is not working in a year or two my recommendation would be to be reassessed. >> it could be all encompassing zero or it could be village security operations working very well . .

>> if we move east at the same time with fewer troops -- >> the intent of the transition is to hold and transition to afghan security forces, and that's the challenge. i mean, i'm not here to say that's a done deal because it's not, but that's the strategy, and within the resources we have, we see it executable. not anybody has said that's not the case. is it going to be hard? you bet it's going to be hard. >> okay. madam foreman? >> if you go back to the six points from the speech, deny them access to population centers, disrupt them in areas outside of that, degrade them to levels manageable, build the nsaf capacity and build the capacity in selective areas of afghan government. as we do that -- >> we're successful now on all of those things. >> correct, but as we do that, that success enables a shift of

the effort more towards the afghans as they stand up. it allows us to thin out -- >> i understand how it works, yeah. >> we've always anticipated that with success, the strategy requires fewer resources on the coalition side and more on the afghan side, and that's the path we're on. >> thank you. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman, admiral, undersecretary, thank you very much for your service. i know you've worked long and hard on extraordinary difficult challenges, and it's much appreciated. i want to just confirm, i think i heard you say admiral mull len, that the mission remains a counterinsurgency mission; is that correct? >> that's correct. the mission is a counterinsurgency strategy. >> thank you.

that involves all that was said a moment ago, in other words, nation building is very much a part of this. >> it isn't -- from my perspective it's not very much a part of this. it is a counterinsurgency strategy focused on as the secretary just laid out limited objectives which is what it's been and it's what the president talked about in his speech in 2009. >> the notion of counterterrorism, that is to focus on the terrorists wherever they happen to be around the world is -- seems to be secondary to this mission in afghanistan. >> i think it's not secondary at all. it's integral, very much, it has been -- i've spoken about that before. that's also how it's being executed. and i just don't separate the two. it's part of it. >> if i could add -- >> yes. >> if i could just add, if you look at the region at large, afghanistan and pakistan, and you look at the progress that

we've made in terms of focusing pressure on al-qaeda senior leadership, the os psalm ma bin -- osama bin laden raid is one of them and it continues and there's only an intensification on counterterrorism alongside a complement to the counterinsurgency. >> is all the taliban the same? are they all the same and do they have the same goal? >> they are not all the same. this is a diverse network of groups that assists one another, rely on one another, but do have overlapping, but sometimes distinct goals. >> some would describe afghanistan as a five or six-sided civil war. do you agree or disagree with that? >> i would disagree with that. i think what's happening right now in afghanistan is really the

emergence of a nation from 30 years of war, and the rejection of the taliban by the population, and with that, the reduction of the threat to us because as the population rejects that movement and as they build their own national capacity, afghanistan is less and less likely to become a safe haven for al-qaeda and attacks against the united states and its alis. >> can i just had one thing to this? this border area we've focused on and al-qaeda receives the focus and i watch terrorist organizations over the last three or four years merge with each other, increase their horizon in terms of objectives, so let, a local outfit in eastern pakistan focused on india, is now in the west and

now has transnational aspirations, and we see -- so terrorist organizations are different generally in support of each other, and that in this place, this is the epicenter of terrorism in the world, and that's one of the reasons to focus on both afghanistan and pakistan is so important. >> what's the cost of the strategy that you've described to us today? the cost of 2011, 12, 13, 14? >> go ahead. >> the -- if you look at the cost over time, what we do see happening is those costs actually coming down. >> well, let's be very specific. surely, you have figured out what the cost of your strategy is and could you please share that with us. >> in 2011 the request for

afghanistan was $43 billion? >> i'm sorry? >> the request for afghanistan -- i'm sorry. >> we're running now at $10 billion a month. >> okay. >> the request -- >> i'm sorry. >> the 2011 request is for $117 billion. the bill of this -- we look at it coming down about $30-$40 billion a year based on the strategy. >> and 2011 -- >> 2012 will be how much? >> less than $120 billion. it was $160 billion in 11. it's about a $40 billion decline from 11-12. >> okay. could you please give us those numbers? >> certainly. >> thank you very much. >> sorry. >> thank you mr. coffman. >> thanks again for your service and dedication to this country. counterterrorism and

counterinsurgency, they are not absolutes. it's really more of a continuum, and how would you gauge the current strategy? are we then shifting a little bit more to add more counterterrorism elements as we draw down forces, or how would you state that admiral mullen? >> i, again, i think where we are a year from now is going to determine how it goes this year. it's -- it's heavily focused on both as we speak. i mean, the ct effort inside the counterinsurgency strategy is significant, and general petraeus asked for and got more forces to do that, so i -- will there be a difference balance a year from now? probably. how much? i think it's hard to say, and i think again what forces the commander on the ground recommends taking out next year

is going to be determined by what happens this year, and we're not even halfway through the fighting season so it's really difficult to say exactly how it's going to look a year from now. >> admiral mullen. i think you stated "in a counterinsurgency fire power's manpower." what does that mean? >> well, you have to have people out there engaged. the whole idea of counterinsurgency is to focus on and protect the people. in this case, the afghan people. what's important in this goes back to the success of the build of the afghan security forces. the army for sure, the police u absolutely, and not unlike iraq, the police lag the development here although it's going better and better. in the end, it's the protection of the people, security for the people, and there's going to be

in numbers, you know, a larger number of people focused on this in 2012 than focused in 2011 just because of the continued build of the forces, so it's not just u.s. manpower or coalition manpower, but the totality of manpower, and in fact, the tso's that have gone well, small now at 6400 as i indicate, that's a successful program. afghan local police, and we'll continue to build that. >> admiral mullen, in the lisbon conference that i believe the policy decision coming out of that was that we would transfer operational control to afghan security forces by the end of 2014. can you just be more specific as to what that really will look like? does that mean we'll still have some boots on the ground then in

support of afghan security forces? >> the model that certainly is very much in the front of our minds is iraq, and we will clearly continue to have forces there, and the lisbon commitment is to have afghans in the lead, and, you know, throughout the country, every single district by the end of 2014, and that's where we're heading. as much advise and assist and support as is necessary at that point, but i mean, what we've watched is in terms of both growth rate and learning rate that they are on a pretty good glide slope now in terms of asen dance to be able to do this, the afghan security forces. >> mr. chairman, i yield back. >> thank you. thank you. mr. critz. >> thank you, mr. chairman. my questions flow along the lines of what mr. wilson brought

up earlier, and ms. davis talking about the drawdown being determined by conditions on the ground, the movement towards the afghan security forces, the afghan national police being able to take over security. my concern comes from the future of this operation at an economic level. the afghan security forces are taking over more geography, but are we creating a situation where we created such a large army that the afghan economy will not be able to support that, and i think we have to if the crystal ball says we're drawing down to a condition like in iraq right now by 2014, what is the dollar amount that the afghan government, the afghan

economy is going to have to generate and how much of the u.s. support is still going to be there in a financial sense? >> that is something we are looking at in great detail right now. one question is once the insurgency is degraded, the level of threat is degraded, how big an army and police force do you need? it may well be smaller than we what we have planned. maybe they will settle at a lower level. secondly, we are working very hard with the afghan government whether it's increasing their border revenues, growing their economy, working with them on extracting industries to gain from their strategic mineral and mining resources, but ultimately, we have to get this on a more sustainable footing, and it has to cost less than what is currently anticipating. i think we are working through that now with lots of analysis

and the afghans. we believe we can get there. let me be clear, this will be a substantial assistance effort and not at the levels currently projected, but this will be afghanistan's going to require international development assistance for many, many years. it will remain one of the poorest countries in the world for quite sometime. >> obviously, you've heard from this committee. the support for this committee for what our military personnel are doing are second to none because they are doing -- beside being war fighters, they are educators, counselors. their parents and they are doing more than any other military ever had to do so the support is very sprung, but -- strong, but again, we've developed a model that's just not sustainable, and, of course, you look forward and if you say a shrinking of the security forces, well, you know, we know it in this country we tall them

layoffs, and that means there's people not working, and obviously with an economy, the delta is so large, you know, i just am very concerned about this as is a lot of people that we're setting ourselves up for either many decades of support just to maintain this or just something that's just not functional come down the road. i yield back. >> thank you. mr. young. >> thank you, madam secretary and admiral mullen for being here today. i really appreciate your testimony. you know, i want our troops to come home as soon as possible. everyone here does, but not withstanding your assurances, admiral mullen, i'm not yet comfortable the decisions related to in draw down or future decisions to our posture in afghanistan are, in fact, going to be primarily based upon conditions on the ground, and so i hope to get comfortable with

that. one of the conditions on the ground, as i see it that does very important as we consider our existing force posture and future posture is, of course, the conditions on the ground in pakistan where there's elements of various extremist elements including elements of the taliban that reside over there in a relatively safer haven than afghanistan. you acknowledged that you're, admiral, that the situation of pakistan is a significant inherit risk to our overall strategy. these elements, extremists, pakistan threaten to create the very conditions, destabilizing conditions that just our presence in afghanistan. regardless of our progress of the six components of the overall strategy articulated in

the president's west point speech. my first question laying that ground work is, admiral mullen, are you prepared to say the conditions on the ground in pakistan have improved to such an extempt that the threat -- extent that the threat to the government in afghanistan and to the people of afghanistan by these extremists in pakistan diminished to a significant degree? >> i think it's really important to remember that the, you know, the core goal of the president's strategy was to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-qaeda, and al-qaeda is very much on the ropes right now. i don't say that thinking it's over because they still would like to kill as many of us as they possibly could, and they had aspirational goals to do that. secondly is to make sure that afghanistan can't turn into fertile ground for al-qaeda or

another organization to threaten us long term. that's really what the afghanistan piece of this is. >> i'm going to very rudely interject which is euphemism for interrupt here on the hill. all right. we're trying to create conditions, of course, where afghanistan can't become a safe haven, but it seems that pakistan is a relatively safer haven already. >> and that's where, first of all, targeting significant leaders in those other organizations, the afghan taliban, the haqani network, which in many cases are pakistani partners, problematic, which is a part of this, and the strategy is intended to buy space so there can be political reconciliation across the board. that's not an insignificant -- >> all right, admiral, it seems we're approaching pakistan with

a very limited sort of counterterrorist strategy when we're implementing a counterinsurgency strategy over in afghanistan. we have our uav's, much reported that -- >> i think -- >> yes? >> i think our approach with pakistan has been to engage them to try to partner with them, support them in training so they can deal with the threats that are both internal to them as well as exterm. now, that's a very, very difficult strategy and execution just because of what -- because of both the history, the lack of trust, we left them before, and obviously -- >> okay, so, aired mirl, we can never send in enough american troops to afghanistan to create conditions where the extremists across the border in pakistan would not present a threat to the afghans, conceivably a

threat to the united states -- >> have to change in pakistan. >> right. all of this depends on the pakistanis playing ball if you will? >> there's great risk in the strategy tied to pakistan and there has been from the beginning. >> okay. is our presence in afghanistan in part a hedge against or a deterrent to future efforts by these militants in pakistan to use regions of that country as an unfettered training ground for their activities or even worse case scenario, to get control of pakistan's nuclear arsenal perhaps through violent means? >> i think through pakistani eyes, what you said, they are very concerned about a very unstable afghanistan that could threaten them with a much larger force. that's why getting to some level of stability and peaceful outcome here is so important. i believe if we can, pakistan will come to that. >> there are not -- we should in

no way factor in the fact that our troops are playing a productive role in perhaps detouring those extremists? >> gentlemen? >> taking control of a nuclear arsenal. >> i don't know how to answer that. >> admiral -- >> can he answer? >> if he can get that answer on the record, i'd appreciate it. mr. latchman? >> thank you, mr. chairman, secretary, i appreciate your service to our country and all that you're doing to keep america safe. admiral, let me just say that, you know, i'm concerned that we're reaching a point of diminishing returns in

afghanistan. clearly the war cost us billions of dollars and thousands of lives lost or wounded. mindful of that this past tuesday going out to waled -- walter reid to visit some of our soldiers there. with emerging threats here yesterday on evolving terrorist threats, dr. of the national defense university noted al-qaeda no longer exists in afghanistan and ultimately clearly we deployed to afghanistan to eliminate al-qaeda and deny the region as a source of terrorist activity there. our troops clearly performed the mission up credibly well. al-qaeda has gone from afghanistan, but obviously new terrorist threats are cultivated and other trouble spots like pakistan and yemen and north africa. the president in his strategy that he released last night is

going to bring home 33,000 troops by next summer. my question is, and i know that you've talked about that the reason to leave that number there and not bring others to ensure that we have enough troops to support another wave of heightened violence in afghanistan so that a clean victory is there won't be -- won't be lost. i have to say that i really remain unconvinced by a member of the armed services committee and house intelligence committee, i have transparency into both worlds, and i question that really the gains that really have been made that justify us keeping the additional 23,000 troops in there until next summer. can you further convince me? what is the real rationale for not bringing the 33,000 troops home by the end of this year.

i know that my constituents are looking for that answer, and i need to have it as well. >> [inaudible] from a military stand point, it is the focus on, you know, keeping the fire power if you will, the manpower there through the fighting season. through the end of the september, it does that next year, and then obviously putting the commander in a position to make decisions about where he may or may not take troops from first of all. secondly, i get the no al-qaeda or small number of them in afghanistan. that's not the case in pakistan. i never looked at this as a single country approach. you can't, from my perspective, you can't do that. it's the region. in part, you know, the other core objective, if you will, of this strategy has been making sure afghanistan is stable enough so it can't return to where it was when al-qaeda grew

up there and struck us in the first place or some other outfit that would seek to do the same thing, and there's growing numbers of of those, and that's not -- that's not where we are in pakistan. that's where we are in afghanistan. admittedly, al-qaeda is not in my significant numbers. al-qaeda, however, is tightly wound with the haqani network that comets to try to destabilize afghanistan and take over that government. the taliban's strategic goal is to still run the country, and i'm hard pressed to think if the taliban are still running the country or get back to that position, that they won't be the host, if you will, for organizations like al-qaeda in the past, so -- >> let me -- >> so the focus, again, i think, is to have as much combat power in there through this fighting season. we talked about that, and the importance of getting through vastly through next fighting season as well, and then move the troops. that, to me, is the time to

bring l troops, the serge troops out. >> so let me try this from another perspective. i hoped quite frankly to hear the president was withdrawing more troops than what he has planned over the next even the next year. why are we not cutting our forces in half by next summer? what is the utility of having extra 17,000 troops there between the 30,000 that the president wants to bring home by next summer and the number of 50%, an extra 17,000 troops by the summer? >> i think if we do what you described, we would undo all the gains that we just did putting the serge in simply. the strategy has no chance of succeeding were we to do that. >> thank you. >> i know that my time expired. i thank you both for your service. we obviously have still tough

questions and tough roads ahead, but i appreciate the work you're doing. thank you. >> thank you. admiral, a couple questions when i was done in front. i'll be brief to move on to the other members, but if you would, just my concern after being there a couple of weeks ago and talking to the soldiers, generals, intelligence community, you hit on this when congressman cooper was talking about pakistan, and that if we walked away now, we would be right back here in 20 years. i recognize that we were not talking about -- that we were talking about pakistan at the time if i'm not mistaken, is that -- >> i mean, i think, again, it goes to the regional approach. >> yes, sir. >> i wouldn't be so specific. we walk not just from pakistan in 1980, but also in 1989.

>> yes, sir. if you would speak to this as you sit as someone there we rely on to make important decisions and your statement was al-qaeda is on their heels and the taliban is in check. does that accurately reflect your statement? >> taliban is in check in the south. they are not in check in the east. >> and so our concern is we have them on the heels with one group and in check with certain reamings and others. why would we draw dune until we had them in check mate, the end game? >> accepting the risk associated with that draw down while still able to succeed in the overall strategy becaused on the gains of the serge over the course --

since the president announced it 18 months ago. >> okay. my understanding is that germany, france, and britain announced troop withdraws simultaneous with ours along a similar schedule as ours; is that correct? that's what's reported in the nudes. -- news. >> they are very, very modest and not uniform at all. i would say they are more modest in general than what we have proposed. for the most part, our allies, australians and others are committed, signed up to the lisbon plan, and that's what we're sticking with. i haven't heard anybody walk away from what we agreed on at lisbon. >> is it public what the total nato force will be, u.s. and coalition forces or is that classified information when the draw downs are anticipated. >> we don't have the particulars to calculate where that will be a year from now, but we, you

know, we certainly believe where the numbers are today, we have not heard enough details from our partners to know where we'll be next summer, but what we heard so far, there's not dramatic increases or people departing the coalition. there's a lot of commitment to the strategy in making it succeed. >> as we have that information, i would appreciate it if you would update me and the committee because it's important what the total force is as well as the u.s. force. i'm going to yield my time. >> happy to do that. >> -- >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you undersecretary and admiral for being here. my question, whichever one can answer it, is i think the public's a bit confused about what 2014 representsment i think when people think of 2014 given the announcement of the numbers that we are withdrawing, that

people are construing that as the date that by the end of 2014 we would have withdrawn our troops, but in reading both of your testimonies, 2014 is clearly being identified as the dana or the time that afghan or afghanistan takes over basically the whole military effort so given that, what are the numbers that is app tis pated, and i think undersecretary, you made a statement if peace is achieved and the numbers that are currently planned may then be reduced so i awe soup there's some understanding of where we're going to be in 2014, and what is that number in terms of troops? >> i think by the end of 2014, we expect afghans will be in the lead for security. we will be able to shift our mission focused more towards advise, assist, training, supporting them, continuing to partner with them on counterterrorism, intelligence, and so forth. this is a lot of what we're

pushing out in the discussions about an enduring strategic partnership. the expectation is that the numbers will be substantially lower, but i don't think until we know, you know, what the state of the taliban is, what the state of the threat, the state of the nasf, it's hard to predict the numbers, but we can tell you they will be smaller. the mission set will be increasingly more focused on supporting and enabling the the afghans in the lead across the country. >> i saw an interesting chart on the news. for example, the number -- what the troop strength was in 2008, and then after president obama came into office, and it looked like almost a doubling of the numbers if i remember it correctly. we were at like 30-something thousand, up to 60-something thousand and we're going to draw down 33,000 by the end of next

year, and then the question becomes from that 70,000 that we have left to what you considering to be not as large or whatever it is. i mean, what does it look like in terms of where we are in relationship to those numbers? >> again, i think that we will continue on the curve towards 2014. the thing that president obama has said from the beginning of this strategy is that this administration will commit to periodically reviewing where we are, is the strategy working, is it not? how do we adjust the resources to the strategy? i anticipate that regular process of review that we've demonstrated over the last two years will continue through this administration, certainly, and i hope on through 2014 and beyond. >> if just somebody who doesn't understand all of this wants to know in plain epg lish, are we going to have troops in afghanistan or are we not going to have troops in afghanistan at the end of 2014, the answer is

we're going to have troops in afghanistan. we just don't know how many they're going to be in >> i believe weevil have troops with -- we'll have troops with a different mission focus and reduced numbers supporting the afghans who are going to be able to leading their own security at that time. >> but -- ms. undersecretary, the bottom line is there's troops with guns who are going to be in some way in harm's way, and i think that's what the people are really concerned about, so the bottom line irrespective of what their mission or objective may be, we're going to have men and women in uniform who are going to be potentially in jeopardy after 2014? >> again, i don't want -- that is not -- the president has not decided on the character or numbers of our presence beyond 2014. i think it would be unwise for someone to try to do that at this point in time given that lots going to happen between now

and then. i'm just giving you my personal best judgment that there's still a mission for the united states that will be in our interest to support continued counterterrorism operations, intelligence, and supporting the afghans as they take the lead for security in their own country. >> i understand all of that. the bottom line question is very simple. if they're going to be in uniform and if they're in harm's way unless they are somewhat protected which i don't see that happening, those who are in afghanistan would be men and women in uniform and still have potential of being injured and potentially killed. is that a fair statement? >> you know, again, i think we anticipate a residual force, but i don't want to put words in the president's mouth. he has not made decisions on the nature or character of anything beyond what we've anowrnsed and beyond 2014.

>> thank you. my time is up. >> mr. platt? >> thank you. we are certainly grateful for both of you and your dedicated service and great leadership on a whole host of issues and especially our strategy? afghanistan and appreciate your patience here today. i'll try to be quick. it's been a long morning of questions. i'll first associate myself with mr. cooper and his concerns and about the impact of what we're doing on pakistan. i've had the privilege to visit troops in afghanistan eight times, back later this fall on my 9th, and as well as visits to pakistan and the importance of them partnering with us and we don't send the wrong message they focus on the insurgence they think is a threat to them versus more of a threat to afghanistan and us that they continue to partner with us, and so i think he raised the issues

well and i appreciate your answers on his questions. probably my overall map concern is -- main concern is i've always said in afghanistan and pakistan, on the ground guiding us, what the president said in december of 2009 laying out his plans for the serge which i commended him for doing, and his hope to begin withdrawing this summer, but an important caveat was facts on the ground, and so i understand where today the ability to say we're going to begin withdrawing up to 10,000 this year based on the facts on the ground today. i'm a little concerned though we'll get ahead of ourselves and say we already know what the facts on the ground are going to be next year so we can draw down another 23,000 rather than waiting to see what the facts actually are next year and not be premature. that's certainly a concern i have. specific area of questions i want to address is the importance of training up the

afghan national security force, and i've visited with general caldwell and he and his team are doing an jut standing job and transformed that training mission in the last year including the literacy aspect especially for police is a key aspect to what they're doing. madam secretary, you talked about the importance of them being trained up as part of the calculation in this draw down that we'll see. it's -- i guess first i assume you calculated that my understanding we're still seeing about a 30% attrition level, desertions, that that was factored into the numbers, but not just this many being trained, but we'll lose 30% of them. is that accurate assumption? >> yes. i think our expectations about both growth and quality are based on what we experienced to date, but also the progress we're making on bringing the attrition down, bringing the retention up and improving the quality, but importantly on

performance in the field particularly as more and more units are almost all the units and all of the units in the south and southwest and so forth are partnered with ours, and we're able to get a very good sense of how the units are performing in the field. >> and that relates to a follow-up question. i guess a concern i have is we're training them up through basics, and then for the need, we put them right out there without the additional opportunity to hope their skills, and i think that leads to the 30% desertion or attrition rate. to couldn't -- counter that, we have to continue to partner. the fact there's 30,000 fewer less forces to partner with, doesn't that create a challenge of how do we do that partnering with that many less u.s. forces for them to be partnered with? >> i think the details of how this effects partnering will

work through, but i don't anticipate a significant short fall in that regard. part of what we're getting as we grow the force is more time to pull units out for retraining, more time to send leaders to further development. admiral mullen mentioned the specialty schools that we're now developing the afghan national forces only enablers and specialists and so forth so i think this is all of a piece, but i don't think anyone's assessed the draw down to fundamentally put that effort at risk in any way. >> i certainly hope not because probably the best training we give them is when they are out in the field with the most professional, best qualified, best trained, most capable force in the world, that being an american soldier, marine, all of our personnel, and that's when we look at the numbers and not equate a newly trained afghan national security force individual to our military because obviously there's a huge

difference. i come back to, as i run out of time, just that my hope is that the administration as we get to next year with that 23,000 number that if the facts on the ground are not what we hope they will be today come next year, that we don't go forward then with that draw down if the facts don't justify it. a final comment, chairman, admiral mullen, what a record of service to this nation. we, as -- i personally, my family is indebted to you and your family for your heroic service and wish you great success and in all you do. i yield back. >> mr. johnson. >> thank you, mr. chairman. the president just can't win on this one. it's going to have one side saying that you are withdrawing too many troops at a time when we need to have them stay the

course, and then on the other side you're going to have folks saying, well, look, we're tired of war. bring the troops home. bin laden has been neutralized. let's close the door over there, bring the troops home and put the money into reducing our debt so the president just can want win. there is -- cannot win. there is another way, though, and first of all, admiral mullen and secretary, i appreciate you all being here today. i want everyone to remember that the president was clear in his 2008 campaign. he said that he would draw down u.s. forces from iraq, and he pledged to refocus on the neglected war in afghanistan.

he's made good on both of those commitments. in the spring of 2009, we had 138,000 troops on the ground in iraq. we now have 61,000 on the ground with more leaving every day, and by the end of this year we'll have less than 130 department of defense boots on the ground in iraq unless there is some change in the security agreement. with the addition of 30,000 troops and renewed focus on afghanistan, we've been successful by all accounts. we degraded insurgent groups, denied them territory while neutralizing and disrupting transnational terrorist who continue to threaten us and our allies.

the president has also made perfectly clear when he pledged additional forces to afghanistan, the 30,000 person serge, 30,000 troop serge, that he would begin to return those troops home in july of this year. last night, true to form, the president made good on that commitment. 10,000 troops by the end of this year, and over the next year, approximately 30,000 troops to return from afghanistan. now, what would it look like if we left right now? if we just decided to close the book on this painful era in our

history, close the book on it, get everybody out of there like we're doing in iraq, and just leave. what would the area look like, and what would the future look like for americans? could we be snug as a bug in the rug, and think that we don't have to worry about what's being fermented in these ungoverned areas? what about pakistan, a nuclear country right next door to india, a nuclear country? india having been the victim in the mumbai attacks of a terrorist plot hatched in pakistan, you know? what would we do if we left that

area just totally destabilized by withdrawing our troops from afghanistan? i submit it would not look pretty in the long term. we would end up having to recommit troops, probably a larger number, and at a greater except at a time when we would least be able to afford it, and so i regret that we are put into that kind of a situation that that's the situation we're in. i regret that, but that's where we are. what do we do from here? i think that the president has made the right decision, and i'd want to bring every soldier home if i could right now today, but it just would not be the responsible thing to do, and so

i want to encourage the people to support the president. thank you. >> mr. witman? >> thank you, mr. chairman, secretary, admiral mullen, thank you for your service to our nation and especially to that of your family. i know the sacrifice it takes to have a loved one serve the nation, and we deeply appreciate that service and sacrifice to the nation, and so we appreciate that. i want to ask this, we've heard a lot about numbers. we heard a lot about timelines. we heard a lot about the generalities of what we've talked about, the coin strategy and continuing along those same lines of effort while we're drawing down troops. it seems to me, though, there's another almost there that should be as concerning as the operations in afghanistan, and that is what's currently o ouring in pack --

occurring in pakistan, and my concern is that we can mount the greatest effort in afghanistan, but if we don't have an equal effort in pakistan, then we're going to not be successful, i think, in where we all want to be in the long run. i know that not long ago general rod rodriguez said if the pakistanis do more than what they are doing today, that we would be okay in afghanistan. let me ask this. in light of the current conditions in pakistan with the relationship between pakistan and the united states and with the current projection of force drawdown in afghanistan, do you believe that we will still be in as general rodriguez says, in good shape with our operations in afghanistan and efforts to defeat the taliban and ultimately displace al-qaeda with the current situation in pakistan and with the proposed draw down. >> i think that calculus depends on how things go in afghanistan,

not completely, but significantly, and -- well, at the same time, they're going through an incredible difficult time right now, not just -- not just in the relationship with the united states, but also internally, particularly their military because of what they've been through, and i said before, and i will just repeat the entire chape of the chand in the united states through the president thinks it's important to sustain the relationship even through its most difficult times, and it's actually heartened by the fact we are going through a very difficult time, and, in fact, the relationship is still there. i'm chasenned by the past when we said no, when the relationship was broken. i think we all just have to be moderate, frank, careful about how we proceed in this relationship particularly as they go through this interspection if you will about

what's happened to them. in the long run, i think it's the region; it's both countries. i think the pakistan piece of this is a very risky part of the overall strategy which is why we've been engaged song, but it's not just afghanistan-pakistan because there's nuclear armed countries, all of that that gets to the point should we walk away now? i worry a lot that we'll be back, and it will be much more challenging than it even is now and much more dangerous. >> secretary? >> i would agree wholeheartedly that we really have to look at this region in a very integrated mapper, and we have -- manner, and we have to up vest, reinvest in the relationship with pakistan to secure their cooperation we need from them on counterterrorism, but also in helping to reach the goals of

stability and in afghanistan. >> let me ask you this then. are either of you or both of you confident that we can get to the point where the relationship between pakistan, the united states, in relation to afghanistan will get us to the point where their efforts will be on the level of where we believe they need to be? i know traveling there, there's many concerns about their current level of effort, especially on many of the networks we're dealing with whether it's the haqani network or whatever it may be. the concern is we do our part on one side in afghanistan, and their safe harbor on the other side of the pakistan. do you see in the light of the difficult relationship we have right now, do you see us being able to get to a point to have an active pakistan government and army combating the taliban in their country in a way that helps us overall stray teemingically in the --

strategically in the region? >> i think as we succeed in afghanistan, i think pakistan will face some real strategic choices in terms of where do they want to end up when this comes to a successful cop collusion? i think the real question for them is what role will they play politically in helping to get to a political end game in afghanistan and with reconciliation and so forth. i think that's really where their key decisions will lie, and that will ultimately have a huge impact not only with the relationship with afghanistan, but also in their relationship with us long term. >> mr. larson. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thanks for sticking around and helping us out to understand the president's announcement last night. admiral mull p, in your statement you said we're going to continue to build a strategic

partnership with afghanistan, one based not on a military footprint, but on mutual friendshipment i think if there was something lacking in the president's speech last night was further defining what that relationship is going to look like. i wrote a letter to you secretary, a couple weeks back on this very question about what this transition from troops to trade as a shorthand does in fact look like. i think we need to map tan a substantial -- maintain a substantial commitment to afghanistan, and i think it's going to change, and it ought to change in nature, and i think most americans want it to change in nature. it's not just a matter of doing a drawdown, but what's it look like in the future? i'd be interested in hearing from you, secretary, and then you, admiral, about what that relationship does, in fact, look like. what does that strategic partnership with afghanistan look like to send a message to

afghanistan that we're not -- we're not leaving like we did in the 80s and to the american people that we're not staying any longer than militarily than we need to be. >> i think that the strategic partnership between the united states and afghanistan will have many, many dimensions. one is going to be a very sustained political and diplomatic engagement. i think there will be economic investment opportunities. some of those that really -- the early days # of that is already being seen in like the mining sector, the i.t. sector, telecommunications, agriculture, and so forth. i think there will be a security cooperation component that's very important to continuing to press our shared counterterrorism interests, and to continue to support the development of afghan national security forces over time so i think it will be

multidimensional, people to people elements and educational elements and so forth, but the key message here is that even as we achieve our military goals and the military draw down is made possible and afghans do stand up and take more responsibility for their security, we're not going away in a relationship sense. we recognize we have vital interests in this region. we have the objective of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-qaeda is one that's not going anywhere, and we're going to stick with this, and that means we're going to stay with the partnership in afghanistan even as the nature of the means by which we do that will change naturally over time. >> uh-huh. admiral, do you have anything to add? >> well, it is tied up into this whole idea of transition, and focused as secretary's pointed out as multisector. there are really ongoing negotiations right now about

each of what the strategic agreement would look like from my perspective, and i'm not involved in those. from my perspective, it's talking about the right things. the president of the united states and the president of afghanistan are both committed to this so that's going to, you know, that will be the framework for how this looks, and it's based on the assumption that we get to a point in 2014 with a successful transition, they are in charge of their security, our footprint is reduced, and there's a commitment to a sort of long term relationship. i summed that up in friendship, but a long term relationship that sustains a level of stability in that part of the world so that it can grow, so that its economy can improve, so people do have comfort in investing, and it has an impact not just in afghanistan, but next door in pakistan. >> yeah. i think that -- honestly, i think that the responsible and

deliberate draw down can be more deliberate and more responsible meaning i think it can happen faster with more folks, but i just don't want us to think that -- and i know you do not think this, been talking to folks at home saying get out of afghanistan. question to push back on is if we do that, what do we have left? it's not about that. their answer is, well, no, we don't think about that. well, we need to be thinking about that. what does that look like in the future? i just want to be sure that you are all talking about what this looks like in the future, you know? what model, you know, of which relationship that we have with a current country is the afghanistan-u.s. relationship going to look like? >> we are actively discussing that with the afghans, and as that matures, i'm sure we'll be coming back here to talk with you about that in more detail. >> thank you. thank you. >> we had a hard stop at 12:30.

we have two more members with questions. i understand our witnesses have agreed to stay. i would ask the members to keep it brief if possible and thank you for agreeing to continue with us another 10 minutes. >> thank you, very much, mr. chairman. madam secretary and admiral, thank you all for your service and thank you for being here. i know you've been here awhile. just quickly. i want to ask you looking at afghanistan and the history of afghanistan and it's difficulty in establishing central control and central, a strong central government ring what changes have you seen over the last few years if any in terms of the people of afghanistan willing to accept a strong central government and be a part of a

one-nation state, if you will. can you comment on that at all because i believe that the answer to that will -- is directly related to our chances of success long term in afghanistan. >> i do think that afghans increasingly do have a sense of common nationhood, but i think that the government that -- the level of government that matters to the most and where we see them investing greatly, participating greatly, holding people accountable is at the local district and then by extension levels. a lot of afghans don't worry too much what happening on kabul. they wonder if their governor is listening to my priorities in my community meeting my basic needs. are the instruments of government not preying upon me?

not being corrupt, ect.. i think the first place to help them get it right at at the local levelment i think working on the national government we're making progress in terms of capacity, couldn'terring corruption and -- countering corruption and so forth, but that project is going to take quite some time. in the meantime, the real stability is coming at the local level. >> i would mention that i was in afghanistan about three weeks ago, and was able to visit not only some of the larger areas, but some of the larger cities but was able to go and observe firsthand some of the village stablization operations with the special forces, and was struck by the success that they have had at the local level and particularly the progress that's been made in the last, i guess, 18 months, a couple years, and so i was able to see that firsthand. i was able to actually be flown around in