that is unfortunately neither cheap or quick. to be frank limited funding and lack of coordination have hindered progress to date. the recently released natural planned for the fish and wildlife service address some of the shortcomings especially those to the communication between the various parties. however, as is often the case, funding has been and will remain the most limiting factor in the research on the white-nose syndrome. i believe the ecological and economic ramifications of collapsing communities are so severe as to the larger investment of personnel and funding to develop a better understanding of the devastating wildlife disease. with increased understanding will we be able to develop solutions to the problem in time to make a difference. thank you. i welcome the opportunity to answer any questions. >> thank you, dr. baliles. again, excellent information. again i want to thank all of our witnesses for the voluble contributions to the hearing and the national pollinators week.

this is an extremely deadly tsongas and i hope federal, state, local and non-governmental organizations will continue to work together to find a way to stop the spread of this disease. at this point, we will begin member questions of the witnesses to allow all members to participate and ensure that we hear from all witnesses today members are limited to five minutes for questions. however, if members of additional questions, we can have more than one round of questioning and often do. i now recognize myself for five minutes. some quick questions just so i can get a better understanding. the organism name is jeal am i sees destructive. is that correct? i'm not sure who is best trained to answer the question but i will take it from anyone to read the doctor seems to learn a lot

of the pathology on this. how does it actually kill the bat? >> this is something we don't know and if i can defer to the correct person to answer this question. >> thank you. that does represent an active area of research. when we initially discovered we described it as a as you know defines the fondness that in fact they did skin from the surface of the skin to read this on this turns out to be different. it's actively in phases and the dates due to invades living skin tissue. a recent publication put out by a hour group of researchers surmises this fungus causes, we know it causes devastating damage to bat wings they represent over 80% of the surface area of a bat so the skin of the wings performs more than a symbol barrier function. it's also critical for many functions raising from water balance, exchange of arab and

other gases, temperature regulation, blood pressure regulations so we believe that it's at the heart of this disruption in the numerous process these dependent on bat wings that are the mechanism of mortality. i and a stand that this organism has been endemic and many if not all species have been resistant to it in the past, yet we have eight or nine species here that are not resistant died at the rate of almost 100%. do we have an understanding of why certain species and certain locations, geographical locations species and organisms are resistant to the organism? >> i think it may come down too much more than just differences within the species themselves but since all disease involve

interaction between the pathogen and the batt post and the environment that they inhabit i think the research will ultimately support that bats didn't have -- a data that in habits a larger area may be less susceptible compared to a bat like a little brown bat that in habits a slightly warmer and very human portion of the case. additionally is the number of bats declined the number of the and dynamics change and there's your hosts available for the fungus and that allow the employees as it is reduced we are finding that our american bat population are quite numerous and becoming more like the european bat populations in which they are left fewer and fewer between. so, it may be that not all of the populations will go into the zero and the we will see a much

different typography with regard to how they persist with the function much as the year seeing today in europe. estimate is that to say the main host will be affected species? >> yes, so for example we look at the little brown bat which is numerous in the caves as perhaps an employee in species. the fungus grows to a certain degree in soil but it grows dramatically on backs of the presence of a lot of bats you can go from very few infective agents to literally trillions and then that agent remains infectious in the caves and associated with soil carcasses etc. as they aren't removed or further deteriorated and they will ultimately decrease over time. has there been any attempt from a research standpoint to actually spray or treat with and - goal treatments just to see if reducing spores can actually

make a difference? >> there has been more along those lines but it's difficult to transition the treatments from the laboratory to the caves. one of the very real concerns is a fungal disease on the rise among humans and is very few compounds suitable for treating fungal disease in humans, perhaps could be very dangerous of the widely broadcast compounds in the environment and risk breeding resistance to compounds among wild animals fun guy in the environment and perhaps creating a super bugs that would pose a risk to humans. >> is there any national credit her for the phone this itself? >> they're likely is it to make an am i with g there are some of our called microfiber systems of the virus can weaken the fungus

and it's sort of a constant battle between the fungus can recombine and change and the virus has to keep up, but that is mentioned by mr. pena is another area of research. >> okay. most interesting. next, i will recognize the ranking member for five minutes >> the gentlelady asked if we will have one round or more than one round, and we have three members here. >> what's your interest, would you like to have a second round? [laughter] >> [inaudible] >> as am i. we don't get them covered the first time we will come back. >> thank you mr. chairman.

my first question is for dr. speed. what is the scientific basis for using the closures to manage the white-nose syndrome and is it possible that they have limited the spread of the white knows -- white-nose syndrome and i know that a lot of them are private properties. how successful have you been closing the caves and what percentage of the caves are still open? if you could answer that? >> i would ask you to elaborate on the cave closure, but you heard the chair of the white-nose syndrome that have strong support from kentucky private owned to the close park service has allowed managers at the regional level to close or not close the caves if necessary. the service did close all.

>> most but not open to the public. they are just open for research and dedicated for protecting endangered bats. >> with regard to the scientific basis all infectious disease weather is cold in the children in the day care center or among bats in a case involving a triad of interactions between an environment that is a susceptible host and disease agent in the case of white-nose syndrome, the infectious agent and the increment of caves we've shown in the laboratory the fungus remains voluble in soil in the bottom of caves and so based on the basic epidemiological principles, restricting people to move in and out of the caves provide the means to prevent the persistent and environmentally resistant spores the fungus produces for

the purpose of reproducing itself both out and tested to the convicted ki of this or into the caves so it's a two-way street and we are producing it to the site, but mounting molecular forensic evidence and the collaborative with other groups and the likely source of the tsongas in north america is europe and likely means by which that happens was human transmission events. my first -- but just the closures dubious am i i might refer to the fish and wildlife service. >> anyone that can answer to that. >> that's a difficult thing to answer. the forclosures institute is a major jump and that is what we are trying to target with these actions is the creation of a new epicenter of the far removed from the current location of the

disease. so for a simple, or again, if they were to suddenly show up as a result of a human transmission so that is our measuring success. we know the facts themselves are going to be capable of transmitting the disease and moving it increasingly westward and south, but we haven't seen the major jump which has been potentially signs of the effectiveness of the policy. >> so your answer then is you really don't know if there's been a decline, is that what i'm getting at here? >> the decline in transmission of the disease? >> yeah recognizing there's more bats infected with the disease since the closure. >> we do know it has been spreading and there has been an increase. >> even with the closure of the case it's been increasing. >> yes, the bats themselves are able to move the disease.

>> how successful have you been with closing the public or private land? a lot of resistance from the private land owners and closing the cave because you know there is a group of people i guess out there for recreational activities and i wonder can you give me some new ideas, are you coming up with the resistance to closing the cave on private land? >> i would say there is resistance to that some people concerned about the loss of revenue and recreational opportunities to the closure of caves in the position has been that this is scientifically justifiable brought to take and the best thing to do to protect the species and that's why we recommended it. i will refer to dr. gassett. >> we have identified 80 private land owners that have what we

considered significant vernacular and we sent letters to all of them to asked to voluntarily closed the caves and only three refused, so 77 of those 80 complied with the voluntary closure request. >> that's in kentucky. what about the other states? >> i don't have any date on the others. >> i just want to get an idea of closing the caves and what resistance we are getting. >> each state has come up with their own response plan and not every state has one. in those response plans they treat the issue differently based on whatever the priorities are. so, some states like kentucky have seen a lot of success with outreach with public and private land owners. some states have not seen fit to close caves as response. so have chosen a medium ground where they opposed the partial closers but not all the sights and it depends on the state because that is how they address

this part of the land owners. >> are they cooperating with advising these recreational activists that visit the caves about the situation and the risks they're taking? >> each state has chosen a different approach and so some states have been in favor of the foreclosures to foreclose the kunin transmission. >> even if they are not closed, are there signs that you are entering this at your own risk? >> again, the states come it's of to their jurisdiction and that sort of thing, so everybody has handled it differently. >> i understand. >> if i might pick up on that question. this varies very widely. state agencies and federal agencies have varying authority over land they own or control but very little over private land ownership.

you tasted like tennessee which has over 14,000 known caves or missouri which has over 6,000 known caves the vast majority are on private land, therefore unless there's an endangered species present not subject to government authorities all that can be done is to suggest. there are many people who visit these caves and private land owners have private property rights and tend to be a little weary of governments, and the iteration all across the country. people who visit caves are not just members of the national society, but you have rock hounds, jeal captures, scout groups, college out in clubs and just locals who know the whole in the ground has been there a couple hundred years and every time and harry has their signature in the back and that's where you go to cool off in the summer heat. these are not closed in a

physical sense. these are closed by administrative borders and in most cases the government planned the bats are free to go and transmit this disease and that's why tom, who i quoted in my testimony basically says this is like putting a fire line up from 5%. it simply does not work in containing this disease. >> thank you very much. you made it very clear. >> thank you. mr. wittman from virginia. >> thank you mr. chairman. i want to thank the panel members for joining today. very interesting discussion, very timely topic. we have heard in the past of the population of blacks imus in an overall has been reduced by the population estimate of about a million. i was wondering if you could give us what today's estimate is with of reduction in bat

population by the tsongas, either some indication by which species might be most affected by this, and you had yielded to some of the species that are not affected but i would like to learn more about what species are and is the real likelihood in any species would become extinct by this? we talked about population dynamics come some homeostasis been reached by bat populations to the response to this particular fungus, but is there one particular species like the little brown bat that could go extinct and i will leave it up to which panel members are qualified to answer that question. >> which species are most affected? >> let's start with the question about what are the current numbers as far as dhaka total bat populations that are deceased based on exposure to

the disease current number your best estimate. estimate the number regenerated before over a million bats was based on approximation of an unknown number of bats and the number we had to show in the select known sites where the the that is before and after white-nose arrived so it's difficult to come up the total number of bats when we didn't know the population looked like prior to white-nose syndrome. we are looking for a way to come up with a new estimate for that. what we can report on are the known declines in sites we have white-nose syndrome data as many quote here we are looking at numbers that range from 60% to 100% decline in the bat population and on a statewide basis the numbers are consistently states that have been affected for multiple years exceeding 80% in the total populations by species.

so the number as i believe mentioned earlier is likely much higher than 1 million, but we don't know the answer to that. we are working on it. the extinction we have a modeling project the service from did a few years ago published in the general science that showed the likelihood of little brown bats in the northeast or the next 16 years based on the decline that we were seeing and actually they have been exceeding the values that they used for that 16 year estimate so we could be looking at something sooner than that for the little brown bats for example which were up until now the most common in the northeast. so it is a potential at least within the current range it could disappear. >> there are other species that are affected. they also shown very grave declines as a result of the

syndrome. >> let me ask you this. i know the smithsonian conservation research center has allocated some dollars to essentially establish a captive population in the virginia long your badge. can you tell us or does anybody know what the current state of that particular effort is and what may be the long term impact of that in relation to addressing this disease across all of the populations? >> sure. we did initiate a few years ago to look at the propagation needs for the brigadier that. they brought in 40 animals in 2010 to explore what it would take to house them and this gets to some of the things about the ways we can look at from the conservation standpoint how to care for bets after white knows syndrome goes through. so, insect bats are notorious to

maintain in captivity. there's only a few instances of species that have been successfully kept in captivity with propagation completely aside without very little success based on propagating or keeping them in captivity petraeus, we initiated a program to look at what it might take to house that in captivity, and the time it was basically on the doorstep of west virginia. we didn't know how the species was going to respond to the presence of the fondness. we made the worst and fought since there are very few sites that house major portions of the population if white-nose arises we anticipate it could wipe them out and there's only some 20,000 individuals alive as far as we know at this point. that program for most of the bats did dhaka over time it was a successful program and we learned a considerable amount through that exercise. there are still to bats remaining in captivity that were

successfully overlooked this past year that have come out of hibernation and they are eating very well and told and are actually doing quite well in captivity. the question we have now is what do we do with the last two and we are working on that issue. >> thank you. >> thank the gentleman. i have a couple more questions. are there questions from the -- okay. i will go ahead and ask a couple questions and then open the for the ranking member. when you have an epidemic such as this among human or animal population, you tend to find if there is a sub population that for whatever reason is resistant to that disease or they at least survived so some of the species

of bats would give encouragement in terms of the possibility of extinction and certainly over time they could reproduce a resistant population and involve themselves in to healthy and hearty and resistant which is kind of what i was touching on and some of the other species so i would love to hear when you have to say about that. >> i don't have access to all of the detailed specific data with regard to the population persistence and while there are reports the population is disappearing there are reports of others that decline and then maintain a smaller number of animals. so i believe there are a number of means by which that could happen by development of resistance were also selection for behavioral traits that provide certain bats with the ability to weather the disease in the absence of their immune

system which is known to become naturally suppressed during hibernation and may be a part of the problem that led to the emergence of the disease and is one of the major problems in managing it. rather than populations disappearing the bat population demographics become more akin to those we see today in europe from smaller populations persisting more in isolation as opposed to the massive caves full of millions of bats. >> is that to say that maybe this fungus or some of our lady the reason we see a little different behavior the trend populations in europe versus here that maybe what is happening there is the fact what is happening there in one first smaller more isolated groups and

that is what you're suggesting. >> it is very possible and one of the project is doing a molecular forensic analysis of reach of genetic change and on the license from north america and in europe. the work is being done by the laboratory who works of the fbi ferc sable tubercular forensics at the beginning with regard to in trucks letters we may be able to reconstruct history with regard to how long the fungus has been in europe and parts disbursed even to the point of pinpointing a source for how can the united states. stomachs of the will provide more information about that natural history? >> when you talk about humans being the potential factor of this i don't think you are really meaning that somehow they become temporary hosts but perhaps some of the year that sort of thing.

>> inadvertent mechanical transmission. >> so is there a treatment perhaps? >> we can educate our backpackers and cave explorers when you finish your work in one that you give a certain treatment process that may be very helpful. >> it is the case there are elements to the white-nose syndrome response beyond our control and others within our means and those within our means include regulatory measures like site closures, decontamination procedures and as close to the kid recommendations and these other senior procedures used to control the spread of a cultural and human diseases serve as the basis for you come back from another country the has defused you've visited a farm. >> is this a methodology we could pursue that would allow us

to begin opening up caves? >> very much and we have been involved in working with the fish and wildlife and development of protocols and one of our scientists leading a microbiologist at kentucky has been very much involved in testing materials and treatments and refining those particles was have existed for two and a half to three years. we promote those through training videos. there's an element of safety for people because you are involving chemicals in the treatment of the gear and equipment and this goes for biologists working directly in the handling of bats and some of the surveillance of monitoring as less people who visit caves. but i can tell you that is probably limited to the organized community within this loop of knowledge and network. it's very difficult to get it out to a lot of the other publics. as a vice president of the northeastern ks conservancy and we have a case with a kiosk

which has white knows syndrome protocols we educate literally thousands of youth group of visitors come camps that come and visit these caves and techniques they learn about white knows syndrome and the potential human transport. i think we all admit there's a potential for the human transport but there is little evidence that that has actually occurred. >> what is the nature of the treatment? >> for example, you need to remove wash typically with woolite to remove organic material because the bleach or lysol compound you use interacts with the organics and you need to make sure they are cleaned before they are treated and there's a range of treatments, available in the laboratory and some you can do in the field. some of them are boiling water for 15 minutes will kill the fungus and then you friends.

depending whether it is soft material or hard material there's different ways you can treat that. we have major regional caging defense and we do that at the national convention. we do it at regional events. that's something we've been doing for years and have developed in concert with u.s. fish and wildlife. >> with this open a way to a permiting process, therefore allowing only those people who have a permanent that perhaps pay for such permit have demonstrated knowledge and perhaps have been through recourse so we would only have people who are properly trained in the decontamination process these that would have access? >> in a number of the government-owned and managed sites that is the current practice that if you are doing a permit to on the case for national park cave that is

required as it is today. >> very good. >> may i ask -- >> sure. spearman gindin interior of the national park service, they have a lot of recreational caves visited by millions of people every year. so, through education, which is a big component of the national plan, you are already educating a lot of the people that are visiting these caves, and we have control of who comes in and out of the caves because they pay a particular. with education with not only the cave experts but the general public is a critical piece of the plan. ..

so in essence each species is different. in specifically regarding white-nose the important part is the species that is being affected which is the little brown pad. we are hearing huge collapses in a very common species. this species that were mentioned that are doing well are all endangered or have small populations anyway, so we are not even seeing a 1-to-1 replacement of individuals from the top species crashing and the not so common species doing well as of right now. >> of follow-up.

can you comment on the role that insect eating bats play in the erica system and if other animals would be able to fill this role? >> sure. so, bats are the primary and in many cases the only predator of nighttime predatory insects. if even the ones that are not a threat to humans are important. there really isn't any other natural alternative to bats. there are a few birds that are nocturnal insectivores, where per wills and things of that sort, but they tend to be rather uncommon. they are much more limited in forging and will not, most likely, be able to replace the bad. >> thank you. and are there examples of caves where bats are the main attraction? what might be the economic impact of these ads dying from the syndrome?

[inaudible] >> yes. there are many examples of caves that -- were bats are the main attraction. perhaps the best known example where millions of people have been educated and come to appreciate bats of the years. in these infected areas there are many case. small-business owners of families, some of these commercial caves that rely on the bat so bring in tourists. >> what is the percentage of caves that are problematic? you know, the syndrome is there versus the ones that are free of any of this fund is or disease? >> well, researchers are monitoring the spread of white meat throughout the united states.

it is being monitored county by county and is spreading. even though, for example, pennsylvania, white-nose syndrome nephew years ago. in maryland this year there were additional counties there were impacted. i don't know, and i don't know if anybody has a percentage. >> a percentage of all the case throughout the united states and canada that are affected. >> i can answer that question. we have over 190 sites that are known to be affected at this time, and there are thousands and thousands. >> a small percentage, but still spreading. >> yes, that's true. one of the other things that is important to know is many of these sites have never been visited. we don't know where i the hibernaculum are. we see and diagnose white-nose syndrome in a cave based on the bat populations that are there. it could serve as an enormous reservoir for the infection even though bats aren't there in the wintertime.

they only use the transition or people begin. >> well, mr. chairman, i don't have any further questions, but i think we have to proceed with finding a solution to this problem. >> i quite agree. that concludes our questions today. we have had a great panel. very informative, and we certainly thank you for that. members of the subcommittee may have additional questions for the witnesses. they may want to submit them in writing. the hearing record will be open for ten days to receive responses. finally, i want to thank members and staff for their contributions to the steering. if there is no further business without objection the subcommittee stands adjourned. thank you. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> tonight on c-span2, a house hearing looked into economic sanctions against men as well as for its ties to ron. a state department spokesman discusses the position of palestinians in gaza. a hearing examines the problem of declining bat populations caused by the spread of white-knows syndrome. tomorrow on washington journal financial times reporter examining the impact of the greek and european debt crises and u.s. financial markets and the economy as well as the state of u.s. market's overall and a discussion on the new labels for

tobacco products. washington channel live at 7:00 a.m. eastern on c-span. >> who would think you to breath video on economics of become popular? >> great recession. as you see things to me we are not in a depression. >> follow my lesson. >> this shovels. still kicking. it's time for a switch from that hair of the dog. it's time. >> this weekend we will talk with the creators of bite of the century, economics professor ross roberts and filmmaker john paul let. >> try to reach people who are interested in how the world works. everybody from a high-school student carries about economics to a person who is just trying to make up living in korea what is going on in the country. >> sunday night at 8:00 eastern and pacific on c-span q&a.

the house recently debated and voted on two measures related to u.s. military involvement in libya. continue debate in the house and senate at the congressional chronicle. a comprehensive rehearsed -- resource on congress. find video of every house and senate session, schedules, committee hearings, and information on all elected officials c-span.org / congress. >> in may the obama administration announced economic sanctions against venezuela state-owned oil company for its commercial dealings with iran. this hearing looks into the effectiveness of those hearings -- sanctions and the possibility of further punitive measures. three house committees members coasted this. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> good morning.

the committee will come to order. welcome to today's hearing. venezuela sanction will activity. this is a joint hearing between the oversight committees national committee foreign defense and homeland security, foreign affairs subcommittee on western hemisphere and the foreign affairs subcommittee on the middle east and south asia. we are joined by the chairman oc the subcommittee's, chairman connie mack and stevech chabot. i'al also like to welcome remember john tierney.ew j mr. albio sires have new jersey will be sitting in. thank you all for being here. today reexamining the administration'sx policies.stats the past decade the united siates has focused much of its attention on the middle eastame since the september 11thrs in attack. americans have invested over a trillion dollars. since 20,016,072 americans have died in operation enduringfrm, freedom, iraqi freedom and a new

dawn.n another 44,266 have beeninjure injured. in afghani tstan alone these numbers have risen dramatically since our current president took office in 2009.with wednesday mr. to represent obama as the intention to a trot 2012. 33,000 troops by the fall of 2012 which will leave approximately 67,000 troopss behind which is twice as many ae when president obama entered office. i support a withdrawal. because it is the right thing ts do based on the facts and not because it is convenient. while we combat terrorism in the middle east we must not neglect threats that we face in our own hemisphere. in recent yearsec venezuela hasr costs significantly closer to rc regimes that are openly hostilel to the united states and itsicty interest. venezuela has been a willing partner to countries such as enron, syria, north korea, andoa cuba. with the exception of dr. r ceis each of these countries has been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism by the united statessr government.rism by

senior officials within the venezuelan government have also provided material support to has block, a terrorist organization hezbollah. and have maintained ties that te the revolutionary armed forces of colombia. president hugo chavez accused the united states of being the first state sponsor of terrorism. president chavez was also callel sanctions against iran illegitimate and that then grn venezuelan government will back around under any circumstancescd without conditions. without -- there is a questione that venezuelas behavior is is questionable. the question is how is the u.s.s government going to respond to these activities in the a future what options are available. to should we continue to impose st cosmtions that are merely cosmetic or should we impose sanctions that truly impact venezuelas ability to threaten the united states of america?of? before we begin that analysis i want to express my deepminist frustration. time and again this

administration is frustrated at the work of the subcommittee by refusing to provide witnesses. instead it insult this body by sending only witnesses it believes are appropriate. not -i does not -- it doets so withouto regard to the judgment prerogative of the electede representatives.t an this congress and especially thn oversight and government reform committee has a constitutional obligation to oversee theerat management, efficiency, and is duty operations of the executive is branch.es this city is without question and exception.reonsibili at the samety time as a ministration has a responsibility to provide information the american people ise through their representatives. this critical check and balance is designed to ensurese that t federal government does not overstep its boundaries as yearn to the will of the people. the executive branch does not respond appropriately to congressional inquiries it reaches the duty of the american people. this is the tanhird time congres has attempted c to hold this th hearing. on the first two occasions theod administration refused to provide witnesses. is unacc it is unacceptable that the

administration requires more than two weeks to formulate a thought about a matter is studied and briefed executive branch leaders and policy makers on a regular basis and isaccept equally unacceptable the t administration did not submitor written testimony for today'se hearing until late yesterday. the administration had overmony three weeks to prepare testimonr and has known for this topic -- about this topic for nearlyis ua three months. it is unacceptable to the unabl, demonstration was so unable to r adhere to our sample 48 hour deadline by submitting testimony at the last possible minute. perhaps this committee should investigate the management and e efficient -- efficiency of the executive branch. alec for to hearing from our panel of witnesses about the successes and challenges they have faced. the subcommittee is ready to work with the department in anyo way possible to be we appreciatd you beinger here today but in understand the frustration of this committee in not being a ye will to do its work because you are unable to do your work in giving us the documents weo he deserve and need to have said that we can do our job. like

i would like to recognize theio distinguished ranking member ofm the national security -- nasa >> t security subcommittee, mr. john tierney. >> thank you for being here.ilir we are all familiar with thetio, 2020 -- 2010 comprehensived around sanctions act. we also understand that theng secretary has made a finding that gasoline sales have beentht made in contravention of that c law. the question really does come down, as the chairman said, to what are we going to do and what should we do. i think we have to have a cleart understanding of the current gtm sanctions regime -- regime, which i hope the gentleman will be able to share with us, a fuls appreciation of how much we have discussed these diplomaticis priorities, our goals, how is it exactly we will be able toleaccp accomplish them and what will the current sanctions due to usw drive us toward those goals andd what would any additional td mo sanctions to toward moving in that direction and how shouldtr. they be structured?

we have to understand the impact of any ramping above sanctions before we start moving in that r direction. a good time.hin i think that hopefully between the four of you will be able to give us all of that information in a form that can benefit us.fw with that i just ask consent that my formal remarks placed in the record. >> without objection so orderedo >> and now recognize the rni chairman from florida, mr. mack. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to associate myself witht your opening statement and alson the statement of the ranking member of. before i begin and to my formal opening statement i just want to say that the frustration runs kt deep. i know you guys know this.me we first asked for you to come c in front of the subcommittee in the western hemisphere and youd refused. you put up a roadblock after roadblock and just flat out refusal. i hope this serves as a warning that next time we ask you to

come in front of the subcommittee you will come because i the you're going to come t there, here, and if we he to use our subpoena power we will. it. let's not go through this circus another time.ate today in light of the u.s. state department's recent actions inur sanctioning the purpose of thisr hearing is to review and better understand the role of the state department and treasuryiz department annualizing sanctions as an instrument of u.s. foreign policy.he specifically i would like to concentrate on the sanctions available under u.s. law andplic discuss their potential application in cases where sine venezuela, individuals, and thee government's are able to be sanctioned. venezuela has become the wild west. this is true for the followingfi reasons. first, there is rampant drugptn. trafficking and corruption.

second, terrorist organizations like hezbollah are officially linked to government officials. third, venezuela is supporting iran and their desire from of au their weapons. under severe chavis venezuela has become a hub and our reason for money launder ing andmoney i transshipment of illicit goods.t in recent years the relationshir between drug trafficking and tes terrorist organizations has intertwined.y if you will notice, on the scre screen we have that definition from the state department of what a state sponsor of terrorism is, and i'll let you read that on your own.it it is widely acknowledged that terrorist groups have turned toc drug trafficking as a source of revenue. if we can put up the other slide.presents this slide represents in 2003 fi the drug trafficking flight patterns in latin american.xt s

then if you get to the next is what it looks like in 2007. unfortunately we can't show the slides from today because thoset are still protected and classified. the difference between 2003 and this map is in 2005 he go chavis kicked out our dna. as chavis has provided venezuels as a safe-haven for these markets terrorists, a drug trafficking and terrorist who organization who largelygely operates in remote sanctioned -- sections of columbia have long received assistance, relief, and material supportsu from venezue. authorities. pret i think this is pretty welltyia documented. when colombia took out rias and took the computers, and to paul was able to review those hard drives and found significant cooperation with officials from, venezuela, the venezuelan

government. so clearly if we go backac to te definition of state-sponsored ek terrorism you could check that box office. bween goere is a close relationship between terrorist organizations and the government and as well.k i also want to talk a little bit more about the drug traffickinge recently the arrest of a drug kingpin by the united states was arrested. he was then sent, extradited to colombia. he has said over andle over agan and talk about payments to government officials inso venezuela. so the drug trafficking a organization knows that they have a friend.ked we also, as i talked about, nowh that there is a relationship. the treasury has sanctionsthe

members of the the venezuelan government's for their relationship in venezuela. lastly i want to talk about venezuela and iran. after many discussions and not until a hearing when i was able to supply the state department with specific evidence of the shipments and sale of gasoline, we finally sanctioned venezuela. unfortunately those sanctions have no teeth. the things that the sanctions, i we currently aren't engaged int with venezuela in the first e place. on one hand i am thankful that we actually did put sanctions o, venezuela. it is a good start, but this is a guy who supports terrorist organizations, drug kingpins, judge parker trafficking, andld iran. hugo java's should be andeso be deserves to be labeled asr state-sponsored terror.on

our government, the system and in front of uins needs to explan to us us why he is not on the state-sponsored terrorism. with that i yield back. no >> thank you. the chair will now recognize th gentleman from new jersey. >> thank you, chairman chaff. since 1998 chavez has cast olig. revolution against a wealthyues oligarchs. he continues to impose populist political model and venezuelasie undermining democratic institutions and stifling thecr freedoms of the venezuelan ne people. however, the president wants approval ratings that have stum stumbled during the most recent legislative election.stage setting the stage for i'm eyed

ttention with impressive of emboldened opposition. the results show the bins will lead people desperately want chd change. he is losing his grip. an anti chavez sentiment continues to grow. he has further intensifiedon restriction on freedom of speech and press.s the government hasstemally systematically undermined the journalist freedom of expression, work is freedom of association and the ability of human rights groups to promote human rights, completely. [inaudible]nd official harassment and poli intimidation of the politicalwni opposition has grown, includingf the persecution of elected statd and local government officials and media outlets such as ours r see tv international that have internritical of the government's. internationally chavez continuei to cultivate relationships with countries that are a staterror sponsor of terrorism by cuba, iran, and syria. r i cannot emphasize enough how

troubling the relationship iraneen venezuela and iran is. but weekly flights that connectn to ron and syria collaboration between these two countries hasw hit a new height.ssed i have often discussed before me the western hemisphereout subcommittee my concerns aboutoe these fights, and i hope thathee representatives from the state department could elaborate on this topic as well as acknowledged the threat this poses both to the united states and the free nations. i commend the state department for its most recent sanctions oo two companies to have been's connected to a runs activities. thus far our strategy has beenin pragmatic. d a detrimental effect on progress that has been already made that further emboldened his populiste agenda. we must continue to make smarts decisions in regard to u.s. policy toward venezuela toz' further disable chavez control

in the storage citizens to support democratic institutions are principles. it seems to have peaked, but we must remain vigilant, for he isn likely to support like-mindedppe political allies in movements in li neighboring countries that seek to undermine moderate governments. he continues to uphold nearlyvey every u.s. policy in the region including the expansion of freed trade, tried to mend counter-terrorism cooperation and the regional securityes initiatives. venezuela continues to extend ao lifeline to colombian art of trafficking organizations providing significant support ha and safe haven along the border it remains one of the mostraffig preferred trafficking routes fon the transfer of cocaine out of south america. u.s. sanctions has successfullyi targeted mycotic traffickers and their organizations.rity ms. whalen has proven that itt cannot be trusted in the united states shoulund take the necesss measures to stifle the powers

and ensure regional security. we must do so in a tangibleo manner as not to further empowered chavez. national security threat posed by venezuela is complex. the we must implement theot appropriate measures to protect the people of venezuela andld lk promote u.s. interests. i would like to thank our witnesses and look forward to the testimony.now reco thank you. e f >> thank you.min th we now recognize the chairman of the foreign affairs subcommittee on the middle east -- asia. >> thank you.. chairman. i wanted thank my two fellowwo chairman for putting together this important hearing.nd i know the chairman back in thee ere staff hasph been trying to hold this hearine for some time and have met with considerable resistance from the administration.e fo i commend my colleagues for hist persistence. as chairman of the middle east a and south phases of community i and the other folks on theos committee frugally confront thel

threats posed by iran in global terrorist networks, more, peci globally especially in the middle east. the possibility of ans iranian-venezuelan alliance is particularly concerning when not a pressing its own people the tyrannicalal regime devotes a dt great deal of its energy to seca threatening american national ou security as well as the security of our allies in the region.an the threat posed by iran takes on a new and more ominousan geostrategic significance whenl coupled with a potential of an iranian base of operations in our own hemisphere.eas this prospect harkens back to the days of the cold war when a all of a sudden we were nod longer separated from ourns, enemies by actions but facingthu threats and our own backyard. h although the nature of the fed may have changed, such as

situation is just as unacceptable today as it was decades ago. i hope that the witnesses today can set light on the nature of this threat. i more importantly, however, i hope that they can outline agen clear and cogent policy toroof adjusted. one of the most fundamentalurit roles in government is to provide for the security of itst citizens. we are having enough troinublein combating iranian meddling and r dismantling of terrorist safe havens on the other side of the. globe.the la the last thing we need is for threats from bad actors, evenost closer to the american homeland. again, i want to thank my fellor chairman and also the ranking members for holding this hearing today in deal back. >> thank-you. we will now recognize the gentleman fromly virginia, mr. gerald connolly. >> the key, mr. chairman and the panelists for being here today.i great interest to my friend from florida. break you for not being hereve

previously. i serve on book the overset government reform committee. i must say i have not particularly been struck withisn the reluctance of the administration who acquiesced to hearing appearance requests. a perhaps on the subcommittee thae was a problem i don't know.here. in any event we are glad you're here. each sovereign nation has the right to t develop alliances system into its national interest, but not at the suspense of its neighbors. at te that is the point where weas breeze the relationship with iran. as a result mr. obama recently sanctioned pdvsa for its ac business. several illegal activities in latin america connected to the government ever run. as an example, iran backing of hezbollah has which isn the undertaken illicit activities in argentina, brazil, and per why. profiting from piracy and drug-trafficking in that area. the group is also suspected of

two bombings in buenos airesres that killed a total of 115 people, the 1992 bombing of the italian embassy and the 1994 bombing of the argentine israele mutual association.arrest eight of the nine originalhat arrest warrants were for iraniae government officials. foding links since the founding of a pack.tw the two countries recently strengthened that relationship.s especially troubling because a potentially harmful activityen a taken under the guise of diplomatic relationships.atic re one example isla the customs enforcement. on a weekly flights from caracas to tehran by the venezuelanho o airline it is unclear who or what is being transported.carry reports indicate the flights to carry weapons. these developments are troublin enough and the further complicated by the audacity ofa, iran in the nuclear arena.

the nuclear issues pressing and does not exist in the vacuum. 2009, venezuelan presidents hugr chavez expressed support for the nuclear development and have hae mixed reports signaling a hostile iranian assistance to venezuela and surging of deposits.venezu a diplomatic conduit. cultivating a relationshipulti between iran and latin american countries.ua a venezuelan involvement is ille because for concern and illegals activities in both hemispheres that have been directly linked to the iranian government. t i welcome today's hearing tond o explore that further with a looc at u.s. diplomatic options with regard to this troubling and a y growing relationship.man. with that i yield back. now thank you thought. >> we now recognize the gentleman from ohio.msith. >> thank you, mr. chairman, fort

holding this very importantbe ay hearing. i don't think there should be any surprise that there is a special link between venezuela e and iran. perhaps it should be no surprise that hugo chavez is aggressivela working to strengthen.n his country's ties with iran. ju if you look at just what isa occurred in the last seven years i think the document speaks for themselves. in 2006 venezuela integrated itself by aligning with cuba and syria as the only countries tost vote against the u.s. and atomiy energy agency resolutionrityounc supporting iran to the securityl council for its failures tonctio comply with u.n. sanctions toinl terminate its nuclear program i8 april of 2008.d a iran and venezuela signed a pacp to mutual military support. an in april 2009 the two countries into an agreement that wouldnt create a development bank coun whereby each country would

invest 100 million for bilateral economic development projects.un in october 2010 the two m countries signed 11 mutual cooperation agreements on such issues as trade energy shippinga finance, and public housing. are published in the newspaper in november 2010, one of the agreements signed between iran and vens whale la in october of 2010 would establish a military base on venezuelan soil to be jointly operated by both countries on which medium-range missiles would be placed. on may 13, 2011, it was further reported that chavez met with the commander of the iranian revolutionary guard's air force in february 2011 to discuss the final details of the construction of the missile base which is now being built only 75 miles from the venezuelan/colombian border. it is also believed that iran is

exploring the continued development of nuclear weapons. last year ria -- [inaudible] the russian international news agency, reported that russia which signed a keel with iran -- a deal with iran in 2007 to sell its five battalions of sophisticated air defense systems would abrogate the agreement due to the sanctions imposed against iran. it is believed that russia may now sell the systems to venezuela, how convenient, who in turn could sell them to iran. just recently, on may 24, 2011, the united states imposed sakss on the pdvsa for assisting iran in its production of petroleum production. they were sanctioned for selling 50 million worth of products to iran between december 2010 and march 2011 in violation of the 1996 sanctions act.

according to the state department's web site, the sanctions we've imposed on pvdsa prohibit the company from competing for u.s. government procurement contracts, from securing finance from export bank of the united states, and from obtaining u.s. import licenses. mr. chairman, i applaud the department of state for its decision to impose these sanctions. unfortunately, it is not enough. we need to do more. every venezuelan company doing business with iran should be investigated and a determination should be made as to whether it is in violations of the 1996 sanctions act. in those instances where venezuelan companies are in violation of the act, sanctions should be imposed immediately. we these to show chavez that we are serious and that there will be penalties to pay for assisting and accommodating the terrorist iranian regime of mahmoud ahmadinejad. thank you, and i yield back my time. >> we'll now recognize the

gentleman from american saw mow ya. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i do want to commend both of you gentlemen for calling this committee meeting this morning. i have listened in interest in be terms of providing sanctions to those countries that violate our laws as well as international laws. i think we've got sanctionitis. just about everything we do, we put sanctions, and i have my own serious questions about the consistency of how we apply our foreign policies when we apply sanctions against countries. i'm not suggesting that we don't put sanctions on venezuela, but there seems to be a whole bunch of contradictions here. we put sanctions, and yet i believe venezuela is one of our biggest suppliers of oil coming to our country, and i'm very curious from our witnesses if you can give us more information on citgo, i believe, currently one of the biggest oil distributers in the our country. as long as there are holes in if

between allowing these countries to do, to obtain whatever their needs are, the sanctions become somewhat useless. but i'm very, very curious and wanted to hear from our witnesses this morning in terms of how our whole fabric of applying sanctions have really been effective, or have they just been just another sanction and another thing? a classic contradiction, as you know, mr. chairman, as i indicated when something goes wrong we put sanctions against thailand, against fiji, all these, and at the same time we waive sanctions when musharraf by a military coun took over afghanistan. and that never happened. but i'm looking forward to our witnesses in terms of where exactly venezuela comes in as far as the whole host of sanctions that we've put against this country.

i will say, interestingly enough, the close ties of venezuela and iran has because of the nuclear issue, i believe what happened in japan recently has caused mr. chavez to have second thoughts about establishing a nuclear relationship with iran. but i do look forward to hearing from our witnesses this morning and thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. do any other members wish to make an opening statement? members may have seven days to submit opening statements for the record. we'll now recognize our panel. the honorable daniel benjamin is the coordinator for counterterror 'em at the state department. mr. thomas delare is the director for terrorism, finance and checks policy at the state department. mr. kevin whitaker is the acting deputy assistant secretary for western hemisphere affairs at the state department, and mr. adam szubin, i hope i said that properly, is the director of the office of foreign assets control at the treasury department. pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in

before they testify. please rise and raise your right hand. do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you're about give will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? let the record reflect that all witnesses answered in the affirmative. thank you. you may be seated. in order to allow time for discussion, please, limit your testimony to five minutes. your entire written statement will be made as part of the record. we'll now go ahead and recognize mr. benjamin. >> thank you very much, sir. distinguished members of the committees, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss venezuela's sanction bl activities. i'm pleased to be here with my treasury colleague, adam szubin, and state department colleagues tom delare and kevin whitaker. mr. chairman, let me be clear from the outset. with respect to global efforts

to counterterrorism, developments in venezuela over the last decade have been deeply troubling. instead of meeting his international obligations, hugo chavez has chosen to develop close relationships with iran and syria. senior members of his government are directly implicated in providing support to u.s.-designatessed foreign terrorist organizations, particularly the farc and eln. the administration has significant concerns about connections between members of the venezuelan government and eta as well. all of these issues have been reported on this press. and as we have report inside the past, hezbollah has a presence in venezuela, and the department of treasury has done much to reveal these connections. i do, however, want to emphasize that the information available to us indicates that hezbollah activity in venezuela is limited to fund raising. we remain alert to indicationings of other activities, particularly operational activity, but to date there's no information to support any such connection.

venezuela must fulfill its obligations under 1373 and 1540 which forms part of the legal basis of international counterterrorism efforts. these resolutions adopted under chapter 7 of the u.n. charter require all states, including venezuela, to take a series of measures to combat terrorism and prevent weapons of mass destructions and their means of delivery from getting into the hands of terrorists. it is our view that venezuela has not done enough in this regard. the obama administration's pursuing of policy to press venezuela la to change its behavior. we are ratcheting up the pressure in a way that our analysis suggests will be most effective. we are increasing the cost on the chavez government for its actions including by publicly exposing our conclusions about that government's activities. we are carefully avoiding falling into the trap of providing chavez with an opening to increase his demagoguery and exploit nationalist sentiments by falsely attempting to turn

this into a bilateral issue with the united states rather than what it is; venezuela's failure to live up to its international obligations with respect to counterterrorism. we believe this approach combined with regional efforts to moderate venezuela's behavior is slowly but surely bringing positive change. imaginative and effective colombian diplomacy has taken advantage of this environment. since president santos took office a year ago, we've seen a marginal but significant improvement by venezuela. venezuela has arrested and deported to colombia members of the farc headquarters section in the farc's key european fundraiser. most recently venezuela arrested a member of the farc, general conrado based on a colombian arrest warrant. they have developed a channel of communication to discuss border security. chavez has also publicly moved away from the farc by calling for that organization to join a political reconciliation process

and by disavowing his unauthorized any discussions between venezuelan government officials and the farc about establishing bases in venezuela. our actions have been targeted, well justified and well understood in venezuela. for the last five years, pursuant to section 40a of the arms export and control act, venezuela has been listed as not fully cooperating with the united states efforts country, antiterrorism efforts country. because of its inadequate response to our counterterrorism efforts, licensing for export to venezuela, articles or services. this sanction is a useful tool for signaling that we are not satisfied with venezuela's counterterrorism cooperation, and it is used when a state may not meet the high threshold for designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. we have also 'em employed an array of sanctions against the government. my colleagues from the

department of treasury will explain the work we have done to target elements of the venezuelan government via the drug kingpin act. via executive order 214 and the divestment act of 2010. much more work remains to be done, and we will continue to closely monitor venezuela's actions. as you know, secretaries of state have used the state sponsor of terrorism action sparingly since its creation in 1979. in fact, it has been more than 18 years since this power has been invehicled, but this does not -- invokes, but this does not mean we are unwilling to use this authority. all options are on the table if circumstances warrant. we look forward to working with congress and with our partners in the region to further encourage venezuela to behave as a responsible international actor. thank you very much. >> thank you. it's my understanding that given that there are three witnesses from the state department, that there was going to be just one

single statement, or are we doing individual statements as well? did i have that right? >> no. my colleagues also have brief statements. >> oh, yes. whether delare. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i appreciate the opportunity to appear here today with my colleagues. the bureau of economic and business affairs at the state department, we have responsibility for the implementation of sanctions targeting iran's energy sector. naturally, we also have very serious concerns about venezuela's relationship with iran and syria. venezuela is iran's closest political ally in the western hemisphere, as we have heard morning. president chavez continues to bond with iran as a strategic ally. the highly-publicized bond has led to declarations about broad economic, military and political cooperation although the ec tent of actual -- extent of actual cooperation is not clear. under the comprehensive iran

sanctions and divestment act, the agency is primarily responsible for energy, shipping, transportation sectors and telecommunications technology, non-proliferation and human rights issues. the department of treasury has primary responsibility for implementing the financial sanctions contained in the bill. i know my colleague, adam szubin, will discuss treasury's role in detail. let me just add that we -- not only at state do we work extensively and collaboratively with treasury, we do the same with many other agencies in the government. on may 24th the secretary of state imposed sanctions on venezuela along with six other companies for their activities in support of iran's energy sector. we sanctioned the company because on at least two occasions the company provided cargoeses of an additive used in

gasoline. these shipments were valued at over $50 million, well above sanction bl thresholds established in issa. under the iran sanctions act or isa, the secretary has the authority to sanction on a case by case basis, something that many of you have alluded to this morning. it can range from prohibitions on certain types of u.s. government assistance to a complete blocking of all property transactions subject to u.s. jurisdiction. the secretary chose three sanctions that limit the company's activities in the united states but do not impact their subsidiaries or the export of crude oil from venezuela. it's important to note that this calibrated approach was chosen because it is our goal to persuade the company to make the right choice and stop shipments of refined petroleum to iran.

if company does not stop and we have seen no evidence of any further actions since the imposition of these sanctions, we have made it very clear in our conversations with them that we reserve the right to impose additional and more severe sanctions. in the case of this company, we do not know what the ultimate result of these important actions will be. we are confident, however, that we have their attention based on comments and venezuelan government officials. the department of state has a very good record of convincing companies to stop supporting iran's energy sector. last fall we secured the formal withdrawal from iran of five large multi-national energy companies; royal dutch shell, impeck, staff oil and total. they've all removed themselves from projects in the iran. these firms have since been joined by scores of other companies both in the energy sector and in other sectors who

have simply recognized that the risks of doing business with iran are just the too high. we will continue our dialogue with venezuela about this subject, and we will continue a very vigorous outreach process that we've engaged in to talk to the business community worldwide about the risks of doing business with iran. i should note that also on may 24th -- may 23rd, pardon, the state department imposed sanctions pursuant to the iran, north korea and syria non-proliferation act. this was against the mill stair industries -- military industries company providing companies that provide or transfer from war technology controlled by one of the four multilateral regimes, that is the australian group, the missile technology control regime, the nuclear suppliers group and the vasanar convention. these agreements regulate the export of weapons of mass destruction and cruise and

ballistic missile technology. let me conclude by stressing that we pay constant attention to the activities of venezuela with regard to iran. we work with all the relevant agencies in the u.s. government to utilize the tools that the congress has given us, and we will, i can assure you, react to concrete possibles of -- examples of sanction bl behavior. thank you very much. >> thank you. i want to go back to this point, though, for a moment here. the three representatives from the state department issued one statement. we asked that, congress asked that you submit these statements 48 hours in advance. you couldn't do that. and now you each have three statements. we're going to hear from you, we want the hear from you, that's why you're here. why couldn't you submit your statements in accordance with our rules? what was the hindrance? >> mr. chairman, i apologize for the lateness of the submission. as you can you can see from

those who are present here, this is an issue that takes very intricate and complex coordination both within the department and across agencies. there was a great deal of work that needed to be done in preparation for this hearing. we wanted to have the best information available. we will certainly do our best to make sure that we meet your deadlines in the future. >> i would appreciate that. it is unacceptable to do this. you, obviously, prepared some opening remarks, yet you failed to submit them to this body, and we find that unacceptable. mr. whitaker, you're recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, chairman, ranking members, distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to appear here today. let me make two points. first, the department shares your concerns about venezuela's relations with iran, its support of the farc, its failure to cooperate on counterterrorism. we have taken a series of steps over time using tools provided by congress to address these

female yours. we are constantly reviewing all the information to determine if substantial, targeted and iterative steps we have taken are appropriate and sufficient in light of the information available to us. taken collectively, these steps demonstrate our commitment to act responsively and consistently with legislation and policy to confront specific activities by venezuela and venezuelan persons. second, let me draw your anticipation to colombia's -- attention to colombia's rah port with venezuela. it has resulted in unusually productive and effective counterterrorism cooperation. bilateral cooperation on terrorism and security matters is increasing and being systematized yielding notable results. while we still have serious concerns about venezuela's overall cooperation on

counterterrorism matters, these are steps in the right direction. and demonstrate that counterterrorism efforts work beth when nations collaborate. what we seek from venezuela is its collaboration in confronting narcotics trafficking and terrorism. in the absence of such cooperation and when possessing evidence that venezuela or venezuelan entities are not meeting their international obligations or failing to comply with applicable u.s. laws, we have demonstrated our willingness to act. the department has strongly urged venezuela's leaders to pursue a path of cooperation and responsibility rather than further isolation, and we'll continue to do so. we continue to monitor venezuela as well as other countries for activities that indicate a pattern of support for acts of international terrorism. no option is ever off the table, and the department will continue to assess what additional actions may be warranted in the future. i'm happy to be here, and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you. i will now recognize mr. szubin

for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. chairman chaffetz, chairman mack, chairman chabot, ranking member tierney, congressman sears and distinguished members, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss venezuela's activities. i'm pleased to be testifying alongside my colleagues from the state department of. we at treasury have been intently focused on venezuela over the past few years. we have uncovered and acted against a range of actors operating out of venezuela including terrorists and those who have facilitated iran's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. our concern regarding the activities of terrorist groups in venezuela is lock standing -- long standing, particularly links to the iranian-sponsored hezbollah. as but one example, i would draw the committee's attention to an action we took in 2008 targeting a hezbollah facilitator and venezuelan diplomat. he was an diplomat who served as

the charge of afares in da maas cat, syria, and he utilized his powers to provide financial support to hezbollah. among his activities were providing hezbollah doe donors with specific information on how to route their contributions such that they would go directly to hezbollah. he met with senior officials in lebanon to discuss operational issues and that be sill tate -- facilitated the travel of hezbollah members. at the same time we took action, we also exposed and sanctioned another hezbollah supporter and two travel agencies that he operated out of caracas. of course, venezuela has also been deepening its diplomatic ties with iran as the committee members have noted. the growing ties between venezuela and iran are very worrying, especially as they stand in such stark contrast to the global trend in which the world is trying to isolate iran because of its pursuit of

nuclear weapon and other destabilizing activities. in the 2008 the iranian government established the international development bank of caracas in venezuela. shortly after its opening, we moved to sanction this bank under our counterproliferation authorities due to the bank's relationship with the export development bank of iran. we will act firmly and quickly to deny a purchase to any attempted successor. we have also named under our sanctions authorities the iranian oil company and targeted its operations in venezuela in particular. finally, we have been extremely active in the field of combating narcotics trafficking and have sanctioned thousands of entities across latin america, including venezuela. among those, high-level foreign officials who are involved with the farc including the head of venezuela's military intelligence agency and their former interior minister. the threats posed by iran terrorism and narcotics

trafficking are complex, and we work closely with our interagency colleagues to bring all of our tools to bear against these threats, and our work can and must continue. i look forward to your questions. thank you. >> thank you. we appreciate that. we'll now, i'm now going to recognize the chairman of the foreign affairs subcommittee on the western hemisphere, mr. mack from florida, for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and i want to thank all of you for your testimony here today, and i don't think we need to continue to harp on this, but, you know, we look forward to more open dialogue and cooperation from be all of you. um, so it sounds to me that we're in agreement that chavez is sponsoring terror i feel. terrorism, whether through narco trafficking, through his cooperation with iran, through

hezbollah, support of hezbollah and the farc and other terrorist organizations. so it sounds to me that there's agreement. i think where the problem lies is what do we do about it. so i first want to make point. make this point, and i'll say it again. we're happy that there were sanctions placed on cha rez. chavez. what we're not happy about is that the three sanctions that were placed on pate vase saw, the denial of import/export bank loans, credits, denial of licenses for the u.s. export of military and militarily useful technology and prohibits on u.s. government's procurement from entities, these are things that are already not happening. so we can also agree that these are toothless, is that right?

>> chairman mack, i would respectfully disagree with that. final evaluation. i wouldn't say they're toothless because what we have done is warned the international business community that there is a danger of dealing with pate that vase saw. >> okay, just so i -- okay. so the designation of being sanctioned is important, but the actual sanctions that took place don't have any teeth? because these are things that we're currently not doing with venezuela. >> chairman, the fact is congress has given us a calibrated set of tools to use in instances like this. basically, implying that we have to make a very complicated calculation as to u.s. interests in each one of these incidences. now, we had to judge whether the sanctions would induce the company to stop it behavior -- >> i understand that. i'm sorry. i just -- but, so the fact that you made the sanctions is important here. what you sanctioned isn't important because these things

are currently not being done with venezuela in the first place. and that's my take, and i think that's most everybody else's take. we have other tools that are available -- >> we do. >> -- restriction of imports, um, also prohibiting the sanctioned entity from acquiring, holding and be trading any u.s.-based property, so there are other sanctions that we can use. but i want to get back, first of all, let me ask you this. who owns pay that vase saw? >> 100% owned by the venezuelan government, sir. >> so there's no mistake that this is, the actions of the company isn't by some company, it's by the government of venezuela? >> i think we can assume there's an intimate relationship there. >> i would assume that chavez has full control over the company. >> sir, we also make a calculation as to u.s. interests, and if 10% of u.s. oil imports are coming from venezuela with three u.s.

refineries dependent on citgo, 6,000 gas stations, 3,000 other employees, we have to weigh those factors as well. >> so i would suggest then -- sir, then i would suggest that the state department sign off on the keystone xl pipeline which will then be able to take over for any oil that we're getting from venezuela. it seems to me that if we're, if you or the state department or if you're going to continue to use, we have a strategic interest in their oil, and we have the ability to get oil from somewhere else, we ought to get it somewhere else, wouldn't you agree? >> >> i would say generally that's a fair point of view. >> so we can expect the state department to sign off on the keystone xl pipeline? >> i can only promise to take your views back, sir. >> i think they know my views. [laughter] so, again, the definition countries determined by the secretary of state to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. that is the state department's definition of a state sponsor of

terror, correct? >> that is the basis for the designation, yes. >> but that is the definition, that's what's posted on the web site, that is what the state department -- so how is, how can you not designate chavez as a state sponsor of terror when we know the narco trafficking, the support of hezbollah, even if it's just fund raising? by the way, i thought that was kind of interesting. i don't remember who said it, only in be fund raising. but fund raising is the mechanism that allows hezbollah to work. so we know drugs, terrorist organizations, support of iran, all three of these things would be a determined by the secretary of state to repeatedly provide support for terrorist organizations. >> well, the statute, sir, allows the secretary discretion to decide when repeatedly is sufficient enough to merit the imposition of this, of this

designation. and as i said in my oral statement, sir, our approach is very much predicated on effectiveness and what it is that's going to get venezuela to stop behavior that we believe is unacceptable. that is why we have, that is why we have instituted a calibrated, iterative process in which we are escalating pressure as appropriate. without having follow on or side effects that we believe harm our own national security and harm the interests of those who we cooperate with very closely including to contain venezuela's behavior. >> thank you. the gentleman's time has expired. given the number of members on this panel, i've asked members to keep within the five minutes, but we will allow our witnesses to answer past that moment. we'll now recognize the ranking member of the committee, mr. tierney. >> thank you. obviously, when you talk about the sanctions, congress passed a bill that allowed the secretary some discretion into how she

applied those sanctions. am i right, ambassador? is. >> absolutely correct. >> all right. so the task for the secretary at that point in time is to calibrate, as you say, or to make a determination as to which sanctioning to implement -- sanctions to implement at any given time and try to get the response she wants from that while at the same time taking other considerations of what might happen to impact our allies and our own interests, is that right? >> correct. >> so i don't want to get into negotiating here in public with venezuela or anything. can i ask you to give us a broad range of all of the competing interests that we have there. when the balancing is going on, give us a range of what types of things we're balancing, cooperation with colombia in terms of drugs and borders, you know, other things like that. just give us some idea of all the different interests. >> okay. well, i will defer in a moment to my colleagues from the regional bureau, from western

hemispheric affairs. but certainly thediplomacy with colombia is important. colombia would be very, very sharply affected by such a designation. since colombia is at this time making significant progress in dealing with venezuela and in curtailing those activities that we find objectionable, it would seem to be counterproductive to do that at this time. additionally, there are such second and third order effects as catching the business dealings of lots of closely-allied cups up in the state sponsorship net, if you will, that if other countries that were doing business with venezuela suddenly found themselves to be in danger of being sanctioned, that would be problematic. i believe mr. delare has spoken to the issue of our energy concerns in this regard, so there's a whole array of different interests that need to be taken into effect, and i think mr. whitaker may have more to add on that. >> if i could just add on with a

couple of points here. u.s. policy in venezuela as a number of folks want u.s. national security and counternarcotics and counterterrorism, all of those are very important to us. we would need to weigh, it seems to me, the effect of sanctions we take on issues like that. the ambassador mentioned the effect it would have of a sanction against venezuela when venezuela views colombia as a close ally of the united states, how would venezuela then react with respect to its dip diplomac efforts in colombia? that's unknown to me, but it's out there. again, that might be an avenue or a place where the venezuelan government would seek to identify that group and take some action in response to an action that we took. finally, we have many u.s. companies in venezuela, and it's our goal as the department of state to understand their interests, defend their

interests. and we would need to take into account as well any impact in that regard with respect to those companies that continue to do business in venezuela. >> thank you. if secretary's just decided to throw the book at venezuela and just take the more extreme sanctions on that, what would the anticipated, current anticipated response of the venezuelan government be? >> it's hard to say. i've worked on venezuela since 2005, and hugo chavez can be unpredictable. but one of the threats of his policy since taking office in 1999 is consistently to try to turn whatever problem or issue that arises into one of him versus the united states. whether that's accurate or not. i think that he would do this, he would seek to turn this into a matter of a u.s. attack on his government and seek to use it for internal political purposes. how that would manifest itself whether in diplomatic policy or with respect to democratic opposition in venezuela or with respect to u.s. companies is

difficult to predict. .. are you considering further sanctions? are you thinking things will move the way you want them to? are you just thinking we have to do something else just not sure yet? >> i would say that it's early to issue the report card given the recent activities and sanctions that have been imposed. we are, i would say somewhat optimistic because of the actions that chavez has taken i terms of extraditing far cooperatives from venezuela toca colombia, encouraged by hisfor apparent colombian demands and

encouragedd colombian demands ad encourages vote by the fact that there had been further shipments of the kinds of petroleum additives, gasoline additive that the kind that were recently sanctioned. at the moment we are cautiously up domestic. >> thank you. now recognize the gentleman from ohio, mr. chaffetz. scenic thank you, mr. chairman. obviously, our capacity as middle east and south asia where we devote most of our energy and time. having to be in the region there recently in saudi arabia is obviously very concerned at this time about iran exploiting the so-called arab sprig or whatever terminology one prefers that they see themselves as being

encircled, whether it's yemen, egypt, it has close relations with iran, bahrain and we saw the saudi reaction they are. there's certainly a man is flexing its muscle and they really do welcome and command my fellow chairs were talking publicly about this venezuelan connection with iran because it's a great concern. it shows the iranian threat is really global in nature. and obviously can't saudi arabia, a lot of oil there. the most resources in the world at this time, i ran this tech in her third depending on that she's deep. the point i take to get to at this point is oreo is a commodity on the world markets and what we pay in the united states is a set date by that

supply. and so, our interest here whereas we do import iranian oil and it affects the pricier, e-mail, depending how much we get from here and elsewhere, many of us believe we made a terrible mistake becoming so dependent upon foreign oil in many ways and some of that is by restricting access to read resources, whether it's in water, the arctic continental shelf and a whole range of other things here. relative to venezuela inhabited by this are many general, are we putting ourselves in a much more vulnerable position but essentially we are reliant upon the venezuelan oil. the money goes down there and they are clearly one of the bad art is in this hemisphere right now and what they are doing this against our best interests.

so that's continuing to be so dependent upon foreign sources of energy, our policies in the area have been counterproductive here. would you agree with that, mr. delare? i'll ask you if you'd like to take a -- >> well, there's little to argue with in your statement date because it is the fact that our sanctions policies are oil producers and we are dependent on the external source of energy. i think we all wish to retrieve that we had many alternate sources of energy to depend on, but at this historical point in time we have to move carefully as to how we apply some of the tools provided to us and we can maintain the flow of energy to our market while still demonstrating a strong political message to certain types of behaviors are and accept the bull. >> and they think it is clear that venezuela and chavez in

particular has been using american money in particular either to bribe or influence other nations in this hemisphere and the actions that they were encouraging them to take are often times diametrically opposed to what the united states best interest is. i think we basically have in venezuela now what we had in cuba over the last number of decades. the difference being cuba didn't really have a resource. they were dependent upon the soviet union -- former soviet union. venezuela has oil and is perhaps even more dangerous than cuba was over these last decades. i would at this time -- i didn't give him a lot of time. i might yield to the gentleman for any time i may have remaining. >> thank you. and to that point, i believe

that we are sending basically $117 million a day to venezuela through paid face. so we are funding someone who we've sanctioned. we are funding the fact to the deepest support terrorist organizations that is sending. once again, i think we covered the state department, needs to look at alternative ways instead of continuing to buy oil from chavez, we need to find alternative ways to get that oil. >> the gentleman's time has expired. i'd like to let members know, we have one vote on the floor. if the intention of the chair to recognize mr. delare and then to recognize that the hearing. >> thank you, mr. chairman.

i want to get back to the question every and then the flight in the end this cme activity in venezuela. i had dinner with a group of people and they tell me that the amount of people in the iranian embassy in venezuela is one of the largest in the world. i thought to other people. they tell me that's not true. in your best estimation, what is the embassy in venezuela from iran, the personnel. how many people today have their? how active are they? how many flights a week they have? does it conform -- i don't want to conform, but the amount you have in venezuela, can anybody respond to that? >> i can try, congressman. there was some months ago a direct flight initiated between

tehran, damascus and caracas. our information is that as at september 2010, flight in tehran had been shot and now it is caracas, to madrid in return. there are pointing out instead that the originals of venezuela are not subject to immigration controls. we've heard the stories, too. we don't have a way of verifying that. since 2006 it attempted to contact the statutory that required an inspection of the airports in venezuela because they are hitting .4 flights in the united states. because venezuela refused to permit the safety inspections, security inspections, in september 2008, dhs issued a public notice on the point informing passengers of our inability to do the inspections. in an example of, you know, i'm not going to call it progress, but there's a change in tsa was

able to make a visit to venezuela last week. they spoke to venezuelan security officials. you know, this is not the end of the process. for the first time since 2006 we had a meeting on this topic. in terms of the size of the arabian embassy in venezuela, according to the tip will not come at their many embassies in venezuela, and clicking around that are far larger than that. i didn't consider it to be particularly at his embassy in terms of diplomatic activities, showing the public diplomacy, et cetera appeared we can't see how active they were within the venezuela government. there is that same information on that and if appropriate -- >> how many flights do you have a week now? >> at the weekly fight and it doesn't go to tehran. >> all these rumors have two or three fight to be coming in and out of come you can't confirm

that? >> was a weekly flight. there is no more. >> currently chavez is in cuba. you have any information on that? be not what we now is that we can talk about it in early may he adequately defined as an indie operation. in june he cannot publicly and said he had a public abscessed strain. he has not appeared for some weeks now. >> he has not treated in his twitter account for some weeks. >> his sons jocular, but in fact he's the very act it tweeter and it's interesting he is, fine. >> i don't know if that's a good

atf. >> are we hope in the up decision? and of the opposition is growing in venezuela. are we assisting the process and venezuelan? >> thank you for the question. since 2002 dict is provided to court to encourage development to settle society and democratic practices. much of what was done in recent years has focused on getting out the vote, protect the vote in these kinds of activities to ensure the maximum number of people can vote in free and fair conditions. it is important to know we do this in an ecumenical way. it's not designed to approach any particular end, but support democracy. >> thank you very much. thank you, mr. chairman. >> we have roughly eight and a half minutes in the folk good who will stand in recess until

approximately 10:35 and then will resume the remainder of the hearing. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] i'm going to recognize my salter five minutes and we will go from there. >> according to the record of

the united states government provides $5 million to venezuela annually for democracy. what is happening with thatwe mn money? it why do we give it and how do we not matter where it goes? >> thank you for the question. fu the purpose for our democracy funding is to encourage the development of civil society in order to ensure the venezuelan democracy be as robust and inclusive as possible of differt tactics over time. this program has been in place since 2002 and has averaged about $5 million a year. it has gone up, and it has gone down. initially, the democracy program was intended to encourage reconciliation in the wake of the 2002 coup. over time government, government-affiliated, chavez-affiliated actors have refused to participate in these programs which we regret because

they are intended to be ecumenical in nature and demonstrate that it's open to all a, politically balanced and in support of the process rather than any particular -- >> the details of what's going on in that program and how that money is spent, is that something you can provide to the committee in, say, 30 days? would that be fair? >> absolutely. more than enough time. >> thank you. i'd like to yield now to the gentleman from florida, representative mack, for the remainder of my time. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and ask just for the committee's knowledge, by recommendation to the full committee is that that budget be zeroed out moving forward. i want to go back to kind of the sentiment that chavez will use this kind of struggle between the united states for his own benefit. and i've been pretty consistent and on the other side of this feeling. so what we have in hugo chavez is a classic bully. so he tries to get people to do things based upon fear of what

he might do. and i think this is an important point that we instead of looking at what it is that we're fearful that chavez might do, we ought to look at what is the right thing to do for national security, what's the right thing to do for the people of this country, and what's the right thing to do for our friends in latin america and around the world. not because of threats from a bully. so i hope that, yeah, i'd love to hear if you want to make comment on that, but let me just add one other piece to that. you also talked about that we have some great or beginnings of some strides where there's been some extraditions from venezuela to colombia of some drug kingpins. but the reality is that didn't, that's not due to the actions of the united states. that's due to the actions of the president of colombia, santos.

i'll remind you about the mackled case where we fell asleep at the switch, he was arrested on our warrant. when they arrested him, the colombians asked if we wanted him, and we said we're not interested, and then they sent him to venezuela. and that's why the extraditions are happening, not because of some great policy position or foreign policy by the u.s. government, if you care to react to those two statements, i'd love to hear it. >> thank you, mr. chairman. on the first point, i think that the reaction or potential reaction of chavez with respect to the united states and trying to demonize the united states with respect to colombia, the democratic composition in venezuela are all matters that one can make analysis about. they are factors. i wouldn't say that any one is necessarily the determining factor. what we're looking for is

results. in the case of the sakss, from -- sanctions, for example, there's a specific result we want. on the extraditions, actually, we're getting -- and i don't want to overplay this because there's much more that venezuela could do, but just in the last since july 2010 we've gotten on the order of ten senior narcos who were deported directly to the united states, removed from venezuela directly to the united states -- >> let me, because my time is, and -- i'm going to go through, because i just want to hammer this point home that hugo chavez, okay, i'm going to do this anyways. hugo chavez -- well, my time is running out. so thank you and i'll, apparently, we'll have another opportunity to speak with you again. thank you. >> thank you. now recognize the gentleman from america samoa. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and i do thank our witnesses for

their testimony this morning. i just want to follow up on a couple of issues or questions that were raised, at least i would like to raise at this point. we, we duly recognize, gentlemen, that you're just simply following the statute, at least what we did in the congress, passed laws into statute, you're just trying to enforce these sanctions, laws whether it be for economic reasons or whatever. i noticed earlier that chairman chabot had asked the question about venezuela's oil supply, and i'm just curious for the record what is the total dollar value of oil that we import from venezuela? say just last year or say over the period of the last five years. >> congressman, we -- the figure i used earlier in my testimony was -- or maybe i didn't -- was 900,000 to one million barrels

per day. i would have to get back to you with a formal response and cost it out for you. >> yeah. i would think it's important. we need to know. i mean, my next question for the record, exactly how many sanctions do we have against venezuela at this point in time? you know, i know there's sanctions against individuals, sanctions against companies, sanctions against officials of the government, sanctions for terrorism, sanctions on nuclear transfer, on non-proliferation, what is the total number of sanks that we currently -- sanctions that we currently have against venezuela? >> um, well, we can go through them. there's not fully cooperating on terrorism matters which was imposed in may 2006. every year since 2005 they've been found to have common availably failed in their counternarcotics -- >> as i listed to your statements, do i say maybe a

count of nine or ten different sanctions that we've put against venezuela? small sanctions? and then there are sanctions against individuals. so when you net it all out, there are a number of sanks -- >> yeah. at least how many. nine or ten? be more specific, i'd appreciate it. >> some of these are broader sanctions. for example, the not fully cooperating on terrorism implies other articles, so do you count that as a single sanction? then that would be one sanction. >> here's my whole point -- >> would the gentleman yield? >> i'd gladly yield -- >> thank you. it's approximately $117 million a day. >> and that includes citgo oil company? >> >> that is what we are sending the pedevesa -- >> the money that we're we're paying -- >> 117 million a day. >> do you gentleman agree to

that figure, $117 million a day that we're paying venezuela? >> well, sir, it obviously goes up and down depending on the production levels, the consumption levels in venezuela and the market. as i mentioned, i'd be happy to give you a more formal reaction in writing. >> so and i thank the chairman for that figure because the point i want to make is that we're putting all these sanctions into the fact that venezuela has this whole bunch of oil that it exports to our country, and it make it -- doesn't it make our sanctions look somewhat oblivious to the idea that, so what, you put sanctions, but we're still getting our money? does this make sanctions, our sanctions laws somewhat a little -- >> if i may -- >> defective? >> the sanctions we're talking about are the sanctions directed against the government in tehran. now, of course, they capture venezuelan activities in tehran, i'm sorry, in venezuela because

he was this active economic partnership. but that's the focus of this particular sanction. so, no, i don't think it looks silly. i mean, by the same token we've just sanctioned an israeli company, a u.k. company, a singaporean company. >> i'm not trying to say it makes it silly, my point is making it effective. have they been effective if we really want to use part of our foreign policy towards hugo chavez's regime and all that he's done, supposedly, contrary to our basic, fundamental principles of democracy and all of this? >> well, sir, i'll just speak to the iran side. >> no, i'm not talking about iran. i'm talking about venezuela. >> well, we continue to provide him, obviously, with a flow of revenue. is if a decision is made to somehow create another mechanism that we would want to restrict that, or if pedevesa continues to ship -- >> wouldn't you say it's

somewhat of a contradiction we have here? we're putting a whole bunch of sanctions against venezuela, and yet at the same time we're paying venezuela $117 million a day for its oil supply? and i'm sorry, my time's up, mr. chairman, thank you. >> thank you. the gentleman's time has expired. we now recognize the gentleman from florida for five minutes. >> thank you very much. congressman sires allude today the relationship between that nexus between venezuela and cuba. i want to try to drill down a little bit more, and i know we're going to have another round, so if we don't get through it all, i'll continue on the next round. for mr. benjamin, you were the coordinator for counterterrorism. how many countries are on the list, the u.s. state department list of sponsors of state terrorism? is. >> currently on the list, iran, syria, cuba and sudan.

>> so four countries. and with respect to cuba, why is cuba on that list? >> cuba was put on the list, i believe, in 1982 because of its support, principally, for its support of various terrorist and revolutionary movements within the hemisphere, and i think it's important to underscore that cuba has not met the standard for rescission which is to say that we need to be able to either certify that there's been a fundamental change in leadership and the country has ceased to support international terrorism, or that the administration can certify that cuba has gone six months without support to foreign terrorist organizations and has given assure,s that it will not -- assurances that it will not support any international

terrorism in the future. because of its continued relationship with the farc and the eln, cuba has failed to meet that standard. >> so cuba has a relationship with the farc, the eln, both terrorist organizations. what about eta? >> it's a good question, sir. i don't recall if there's any continued relationship with eta, but i can get back to you and confirm that. >> and what about any middle east-based terrorist organizations, hamas, hezbollah? >> i am unaware of any fund raising activity or operational activity from either of those groups in cuba, but i wil over d members of the farc and the eln. and i believe, also, eta, although i don't know if they're currently doing so. >> you don't know if they're currently harboring -- >> eta. >> eta. but currently they are harboring

farc and eln? >> yes, they have. >> how about members of the fbi most wanted list? how many of those do we have in cuba? >> frankly, sir, that's a -- in the law enforcement channel, and i would have to get back to you on. >> well, let me refresh your memory. does the name janet choosemard mean anything to you? would you consider her a terrorist? >> sir, i'd have to get back to you. i'm not familiar enough with the case. >> you're not familiar with the case? >> no, not sufficiently -- >> i'm going to yield for a moment to congressman sires to, perhaps, give us a little bit of the background since this occurred in his home state. >> thank you, congressman. there's currently a $1 million bounty on janet. she was accused of shooting a state police officer point-blank on the highways of new jersey. so that's the reason. the state police has put a reward of a million dollars.

she's been in cuba, now, for a number of years. thank you, congressman. >> thank you, congressman. and i believe that that was not just a random robbery, it was politically motivated, and i think most people would consider that a terrorist act. um, so i hope you'll become a little more familiar with that case in particular. what about narco traffickers in cuba? >> i think some of my colleagues may have more to say on narco trafficking issue. mr. whitaker? >> yes. as ambassador benjamin noted, there is evidence in the past eln and farc members having been present in cuba. there are continuing allegations of cuban government involvement in narco trafficking, but nothing that we've been able to act upon. again, as ambassador benjamin noted, must much of this is in w

enforcement channels. i would note that we have tried to reach out to the cuban government, and we have a coast guard attache who tries to work with the cuban government in order to identify and interdict -- >> before my last few seconds, just let me say in my next round i want to follow up with this because it seems as though we're placing sanctions on venezuela which is not on the terrorist list, but more recently we're lifting sanctions on cuba, and i'll get into that in the next round, which is on the terrorist list and, in fact, is harboring a cop killer from this country. so i'll go into that in the next round. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. i will now recognize the gentleman from florida for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i apologize, i was a little late getting back. v you spoken -- have you spoken about the venezuelan airline at this point? my question is as follows: the

u.s. announced it's going to sanction venezuela for it role in shipping weapons. can you speak to the possibility of sanctioning that airline, and wouldn't it be possible as well to sanction any airline that flies in and out of tehran if it can be linked to the shipping of sensitive technology and/or weapons? >> i'll give the preliminary answer and then my colleagues may want to follow up. as a practical matter, we do not discuss designations in public because of the possibility of tipping potential designees. regarding the hypothetical of whether others who are involved in the support of iranian efforts to advance their nuclear program, it is certainly within the scope of the legislation to do that, and we would certainly look hard at doing that. but, again, i'll let those who deal with sanctions and the

venezuelan case specifically -- >> and before they do, mr. benjamin, my point here is i would very much like to tip off, that's the purpose of the question, i would like to tip off any airline that is engaged in if transporting this sort of technology and/or weapons into or out of tehran that they would be summit to these sanks -- be subject to these sanctions. that's what i'm trying to confirm. >> i think that is a well known fact that airlines and other businesses in support of that effort can be sanctioned. >> then let me just move on to the sanctions regime. mr. delare, your office, your office commences and conducts all of the investigations of the companies that may be subject to sanctions? >> mr. deutsche, no. we primarily work on the energy side of things. >> right. and under -- >> we work closely, of course, with mr. szubin on a variety of

other things. >> but under, under ccsada the focus, those would be under your information? >> correct. >> how many people in your office do you have conducting those investigations? >> >> at the present time we have four plus support from our legal staff and the intelligence and research bureau. >> four full-time employees? >> three and a half. >> three and a half full-time employees. who are responsible for conducting the investigations to determine whether a company could be subject to sanctions under ccada? >> that's correct. >> can you, i won't ask you whether that's a sufficient number, but i will ask whether you think the process, whether it would be possible to -- how many, let me do it this way. how many more investigations could be conducted at one time, how many can be conducted by one person?

let me start with that. >> that's an interesting question. as it now stands, we have it divided by sectors, and i have, i think, everyone in the office doing a number of things simultaneously because various, let's face it a lot of media reports come in the door, they have to be evaluated. we then begin checking trade press embassies, businesses, the intelligence community, so it's a constant pushing things through a process with lots of things in different stages. so hard to answer that directly. >> well, let me be a little more direct. >> yeah. >> for those of us who have expressed frustration for the pace of investigation -- well, we're not sure of the status of some of these investigations because we're not informed until the end. but they don't seem to be moving quickly enough, could that be addressed if you had additional investigators, if you had more than the three and a half people who are responsible for all investigations? >> i think that's a fair

assessment. but let me also make two points in regard to that. the ccada is a relatively new piece of legislation even though it dates back to last july. in the intervening period since then, we have set up a procedure that never existed before. we have been exceedingly careful to do due diligence on everything we've done. hence, we probably have spent a little more time as we get used to this than would be necessary double checking facts -- >> i'm sorry, i only have ten seconds. let me just ask one more question. if companies were required to disclose in their filings made to the sec, those trades on american stock exchanges, whether they're doing business in iran, that would be considered credible evidence and should immediately subject them to the possibility of sanctions, correct? >> seems like that might be so. let me get back to you more

formally. >> be i appreciate it. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. we'll now start the second round by recognizing the gentleman from florida, mr. mack, for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. ambassador, could you tell us again why cuba was put on the state sponsor or -- of terrorism list in '82? >> cuba was put on the state sponsorship list for supporting foreign terrorist organizations engaged in activity primarily in this hemisphere but, again, for repeated acts of support of international terror. >> okay. and then in answering questions from my colleague, mr. rivera, you outlined some of those terrorist activities. can you tell me what the differences between cuba and vens rail what? -- venezuela?

>> i think it's important to underscore that the process of putting a state on the list and the process of taking another state off the list are two very different things. we have a very high bar for taking countries off the list. we want to make sure that when we put countries on the list, that we're not setting such a low threshold that we will both incur, create side effects that will undermine our efforts and our broader national security interests. as a result, um, the -- one secretary of state after another has looked very carefully at a number of different countries over the years for a possible listing -- >> yeah, but -- okay. what i want, you said you gave us the definition of why cuba was put on the state sponsor of terrorism list which is exactly what chavez is doing in venezuela.

so why is it that we have cuba as a state sponsor of terror and not venezuela? and it goes to this point, the inconsistencies that i think another member brought up. on one hand we have restricted visas to people in honduras who have fought for and defended their constitution, the rule of law, their freedom and their country. on the other hand, there are people in venezuela who are not restricted, and they are supporting terrorist organizations. so how can cuba under your definition be put on the state sponsor of terrorism list and then venezuela doing the same thing not be placed on the state sponsor of terrorism list? >> first of all, i'm not conversant with the honduran case, but let me just say -- >> take my word for it. >> as i said, this is about effectiveness. and about using the appropriate tools at the appropriate time to

elicit the correct response. >> when is the appropriate time? >> i think that's a matter that we have to evaluate on the basis of the activity going on. and i would say, sir, that as we noted earlier it's, the indicators are going in the right direction, it would seem not to be the right time. >> you mean the indicators that are being brought about because of another country's actions, not ours? is. >> we judge countries by the totality of their activity, and if other countries can elicit good behavior, we certainly view that as a positive development. >> well, let me -- i just want to, real quick, if you could put up the first slide. [background sounds] >> technical difficulties. you're familiar with that, right? if it walks like a duck, quacks

like a duck and looks like a duck, then it's a duck? right? next slide. if it walks like a terrorist, talks like a terrorist and acts like a terror itself, then it's a terrorist, and you recognize hugo chavez and fidel castro, reyes, raul reyes and ahmadinejad, we can agree with that? next slidement hugo chavez, quote, enough of the imperialist aggression. we must tell the world down with the u.s. empire. we have to bury imperialism this century. isn't hugo chavez a sponsor of terror? >> as i said before, sir, venezuela is engaged in the activities that we find unacceptable, and we are engaged in a sustained effort to get them to stop those activities. and i think that we are taking the appropriate measured

approach to get them to stop those activities in a way that will produce results. .. for 35 ministerial -- can you talk about the buildup? >> understand the had a considerable amount of weapons. >> that's correct. the principal approach that of venezuela made over the course of the last several years have been from russia, and the include high-performance which r have been delivered. the include the tanks which have not been delivered, air defense systemsbe and notably in excessf 100,000 ak-47 rifles. there's been a significant arms

purchase program by those venezuelan government. govern some of these purchases could t probably be defined defined as s to replace the super integrated, old antiquated equipment. you might, for example, say that with respect to sue greece. venezuela has long been a nation with purchased aircraft's. we sold f-16s to venezuela in the 1980s. those aircraft attended their service life in the venezuelan government showed to replace them. so that is an example of replacing superannuated equipment. many have examples of new capabilities as the t. 72 tanks of the new capability, which traditionally venezuela has not had. >> you said also a factory that was elton venezuela to make ak-47s or something like that. >> venezuela and russia have signed a contract to build such

a factory that would produce akm assault rifles. that's not a production. there is more we provide to a different setting. >> i had conversations with members of other's countries and one of them is tantamount. they have found that venezuela has tried to influence the people of the interior panama, so i am going to get a decent essay sounds will find a way to different countries in south america. to have any concerns about that? >> it would be a significant concern is venezuela were to start exporting weapons to other nations. i think what we've seen principally over the course of the last several years is rather than exporting munitions and weapons and things like that, it's more trying to buy influence with money. that's the tack tick the venezuelans have engaged in

principally in central america, caribbean, for example. there are limits to benefit a large. venezuela as a matter of policy has chosen to spread a lot of money into the population and this has been less money available to support these foreign activities they would engage in. >> talking about me, how michigan nsa listens to cuba currently? >> the truth is we don't know the answer to that question. publicly available information indicates 50,000 barrels a day go to -- go to cuba in addition. that would be free or virtually free. venezuela has agreed to reengineer can you rebuild a refinery in cuba. that activity has not been completed. finally, cuba apparently charges for the top areas and other

experts that provide to work in venezuela, the numbers which are estimates we don't have precise figures, but the estimates are 30, 40,000 individuals in there as they see that the cuban government charges per person to the venezuelan government. >> i just thought you wanted to know from chairman max's statement that we buy $117 million worth of oil a day from cuba. >> from venezuela you mean? from venezuela. the $32.7 billion worth of oil that we buy from venezuela each year. that's my limited knowledge of not nymex, but that not peanuts in my opinion. i thank the gentleman for yielding. >> i just want to add that following up on my friend, congressman barrera, it's not

just chesson. that goes to 100 at upstate the united states and cuba basically with sanction, with camino, living to come come in the and everything else. thank you. >> all i can tell you is actually in the past on key about this is a regular topic of conversation we had with respect to chest omar and other fugitives from u.s. justice. >> i can tell you the troopers are not going to ever give up the request to have chesson ma in cuba so he can report can trail again. >> and we join him and not. >> i recognized myself for five minutes. mr. whitaker, isn't the only reason we haven't a venezuela on the state sponsor terrorism list, isn't the only reason because we consume a lot of their oil?

is that fair to say? >> yeah, chairman, i would associate that we are trying to engage in substantial intruded statement designed to accomplish different ends. there's a number of that yours that go into this process, including the economic effects we talk about, the effects on democratic development. >> what other major economic effects are there other than oil? >> recited the number several times. that is the administration's concern. we assume a lot of their oil. it's the only thing holding us back, isn't it? >> i think it's broader than not. i think that is a factor. i think the economic relationship broadly stated there are dozens and dozens of u.s. companies that do business in venezuela today, some intimately involved in the oil industry, provide oil services, some of which are international

oil companies like chevron, some of which are like xerox, american airlines. so these kinds of factors need to be taken into account as well. in addition to the effect on democratic development within venezuela, the diplomatic outreach that our neighbors have engaged in. >> let's talk about all this money that does flow in. where does the money go once it gets -- do we have any idea or a sense of where the soil profits go take it to venezuela? distress srinath track that at all? we send them over $100 million a day. what's happening with that money? >> i can't speak to venezuelan reprimand. >> it does go to their government. i'm sorry, to someone else want to address that? >> this is a change from the past. the past database operated ever

been known, but operated as an independent entity with the financial structure. one of the changes was to insist on receipts going directly to the government. and so, if your assertion proceeds go directly to the government, i think that's accurate. >> in comparison to other parts of their economy, what portion of their oil proceeds -- other economic input, how big is that in their economy? >> if you're talking about government receipts, it's about half of government receipts. if you're talking about exploits, it's the lion share of exports. i can get you the precise number, but it's in excess of three quarters of total receipts from export. >> very good. feel to the gentleman from florida, mr. mack. >> so half of the receipts to the government come from the oil

that is sold here in the united states -- to the united states, is that what she said? >> half of government receipts come from proceeds. not all of pay to face the receipts come from the united states. the majority of export go to the united states. >> so i think what you are hearing from us as we want to see some sanctions that is not the oil industry in venezuela. and it's not an industry. it's chavez. right now all of that oil oil refunding ability to continue to sponsor terror. and i think it can apply to of us are wondering -- and this is obviously a bipartisan issue. i mean, everybody's talking about the same thing. why are we putting the sanctions

ip-based, especially when the state department, the secretary with the signature of her pen can allow the keystone xl pipeline to move forward, which then we wouldn't need to buy the oil from venezuela. and if we don't buy the oil from venezuela, he cannot continue to sponsor terror. so it seems pretty simple. maybe you can explain why it's not that simple. >> i would hesitate to ever tell the congressman that it wasn't that >> i would hesitate to ever tell the congressman that it wasn't that >> i would hesitate to ever tell the congressman that it wasn't that >> go for it. >> in fact, i fully appreciate your argument about energy prices. it'll probably take 10 years to come online. >> isn't it true that there's been study after study already, all the times the study comes back in a positive way, but then the environmentalists with it all up again?

will continue to buy the soil from chavez and the need for american in canada. >> that's very true. we have to look at the market as it stands today and during a difficult economic past as you well know. >> you can't look at the market yesterday? >> all look at it for the next five years and say we've got to make adjustments. in the meantime, we need the energy from somewhere. >> as i wrap up him and there is a concerted effort to say we're okay with tears in the fun is to keep the price of gas go down here and that's the concern a lot of us have that the administration is making a concerted effort to make have come at three quarters of revenue to hugo chavez. it's okay even though they're participating in terrorism as long as we keep the price of gas down at 711. yield five minutes to mr. rivera. >> thankthank you very much. foreign minister szubin, your director of the foreign assets

control and you're in charge of regulating the trading with the enemies act, is that correct? >> yes. >> cuba is regulated under that act? >> there are sanctions pursuant to trading with the enemy. >> cuba is an enemy of the united states. to >> the title of the statute that congress passed is the trading with the enemy act and that is the authority which you mentioned. >> i would present cuba is an enemy of the united states? >> not for me to characterize. you're correct for the sale. >> how many flight were there between iran and venezuela? i heard one flight a week no longer exists. is that correct? >> what mr. whitaker mentioned earlier is there was one flight a week and i believe has now stopped.

>> how many flights are there between united states and the other countries who are on the terrorist list direct flights, north korea, sudan and iran. hominy direct flights a day? >> i know now, but i'd be happy to look into that. >> do not regulate trading with the enemy? would that not fall under your purview? >> there are none. >> how many flights are there between the united states and our enemy, cuba a day? >> if you're talking about direct flight, private charter flights? >> airplanes that fly between the united states and cuba daily. >> i don't know the answer to that. >> do not regulate? >> yes we do. at happy to get the answer, but i don't know what a fan. >> you're the director of opec.

you regulate the trading with the enemies act, flights between the united states and cuba enemy are regulated by you. the only flights that exist according to the enemies list or korea, sudan, iran zero comic cuba -- you don't know how many flight? >> that's right. >> faq to give me that information. >> i'd be happy to, congressman. >> i'd like to know not only how many flights, but he's charter flight, what company is on the airplanes that are chartering misplace. are you familiar with that? >> what i can tell you is that too operated charter service with respect to cuba, you need to be like our office. there is an elaborate process which travels service providers

are charter service providers need to come in. their ownership and you should be intimate with these fights. if i had a better memory, i could recite the names about these charter companies that stand. >> would you say the number is more than 10? >> i don't know the number of flights a day. >> mr. whitaker. i understand ther was .. a summary produced of a conversation you had with the affairs in venezuela. are you familiar with this? >> i've spoken to them on the phone. >> i received information of it being published.

he did a few things. he congratulated him on the excellent diplomatic work on the honduran crisis. you're invited to meet with secretary of state for venezuela, reassured him that venezuelwellrese >> that is not a conversation that i had. >> not to emu the. >> i have spoken with him on the fun. >> recently? >> i would have to check but that conversation is not you what i had. >> what was it? >> release speak with him i did have a recent conversation that was highly operational in nature and it would be happy to discuss that with you but the factors that you just mentioned were not part of that conversation and notion things i would say. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> and no further questions thank you for appearing

today. i would implore you in the future and asked of the administration to work with us to provide witnesses in a timely manner and provide testimony and other written statements 48 hours in advance so we can do our job as well. we appreciate your patriotism and sacrifice and service to the country. i hope you find it wasn't too painful to come before the committee and perhaps we'll haveis you here but we do appreciate your time. we are adjourned. [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> what to expect should happen after these hearings from the state department? >> it is very clear the actions of hugo chavez is in support of terrorism whether through supporting the

far, hezbollah, arco trafficking not things that we think happened but we know what has happened but now selling gasoline two ahmadinejad this is another link some chavez should be be put on the state-sponsored terrorism list and should be done at immediate leave. >> one reason is pete pez of the oil coming through their? >> they had a hard time to answer the question and i do think that is the answer for some reason the state department does not see the value to finding other sources of oil like canada but instead wants to continue to send $117 million per day to venezuela. i would say the people in the state department and the administration failed to act on this the american people need to stand up to stop buying oil or gas from citgo

because people in america do not want to continue to support a terror organization-- we have a lot of support we have seen a broadening support now have republicans and democrats working together recognizing hugo chavez supports terrorizing organizations and named this a sponsor of terror. [inaudible] >> i think the label, we have labels chavez to sanction him is good. the problem is the sanctions do nothing. there is absolutely no. >>host: any sanctions place by the state department.

but those that we're not doing and venezuela already it is more in name only they have been sanctioned but the problem the state department has is it shows again, there is the chavez supporting terrorist organizations. buydown definition they should be on the state-sponsored terrorism list like cuba. thank you very much

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[inaudible conversations] >> the chairman notes the presence of a quorum. good morning we have a follow-up hearing on when we first exam in june 2009. this was the first discovering case west of albany new york the white-nose syndrome has killed more than 1 million bats. spread to 18 states from maine to kentucky. under committee rule 4f opening statements are limited to the chairman and ranking member of the subcommittee's we can hear from witnesses more quickly. i ask unanimous consent to include any other members opening statements in the hearing record if submitted to the clerk by end of business today.

objection? so ordered. despite considerable amount of effort by six federal agencies and other states which have spent more than $60 million we're no closer to stopping this disease which it is devastating more than half of the 47 species of bats native to north america. why is this hearing important? bats consume vast amounts of insects and according to the april edition of science magazine, the value to the u.s. agriculture is between 3.7 353 i'm sorry, but that 53 billion each year in the united states they pollinate more than 360 plants and so effective to disperse the seeds they have been called the farmers of the tropics. also certain species can capture between 500 and 1,000 escudos and one-hour. a single colony of 150 brown

bats in indiana has been estimated to axd newly eat nearly one point* 3 million pest insects. we also know 1 million bats that have already died from the fungus would have consumed more than between 660 and 1300 metric tons of insects each year. by losing the bats, farmers and timber harvesters have to spend millions of additional dollars to buy pesticides to protect crops and trees. was a doctor was interested in learning 80 different medicines come from plants that need bats to survive. while it is reassuring to know vigneault jimenez all this has been associated with exposure to the infected bats it is important to try to find out why the fungus is killing bats in the united states. apparently the same disease has not caused mass mortality in europe. although it has spread

through back-to-back contact , fish and wildlife service and u.s. forest service have close to thousands of caves and abandoned mines to stop the spread of the disease. i am interested to find out the results of the efforts if prohibiting cuban caving activities have saved hibernating bats. i look forward to hearing cardis english witnesses how we can address what many experts are calling the most precipitous wildlife declined in the past century and north america. now, before recognize that a gentlelady from guam, i will mention will probably have a vote in about 10 minutes we will try to get through as much as possible but i understand maybe only two boats at the most we will come right back immediately after and pick up where we left off but i am