and out educate the world. the president set a goal of boosting our efforts in r&d for folks who don't remember, that was the amount of research we were doing at the height of the space race and we haven't come back to that level yet so he set this broad goal and made historic investment in that area to back it up. and he laid out plans for us to move from the middle of the pack to the top of the world in terms of education. people forget that a paul 11 in mission control the average age was 26 years old and yet today the average age at nasa is around 50. we knew we needed to take a look at this new generation of space leaders and scientists to get involved and unfortunately today the average middle school kid would rather take out the trash,

go to the dentist instead of their math homework. we launched a couple initiative the early on and brought the space community and others to change the equation. 100 ceos >> the way teachers teach and students learn to create more makers, dewars and dreamers. the president hosted astronomy night on the south lawn of the white house to get kids focused but our biggest challenge was on the civilian side of space. in addition kind of building the building blocks. congressional budget office, general accounting office have both highlighted a growing number of challenges with nasa's constellation program but we didn't know the bread or the scope of what our challenges would be facing up ahead. brad alluded to the challenges.

we took a page out of the clinton administration and out of the bush won. the clinton administration had the challenges with space station freedom and what mark referred to, the clinton administration set up a commission about 5 experts to get under the hood and take a look at it and we borrowed norm augustine who mark also referred to and put him in service and put together astronauts and engineers and space experts to really take a look at the program. they held meetings across the country, got in put all over the place. they came back to us and kind of sad we have a problem. we were really surprised at the scope of what they found. we were billions over budget. bill years behind schedule, unable to get back to the manhattan and any reasonable time frame and the program had

become fundamentally not executable. we were surprised but we knew it was our job to do better. it as a result of the augustine committee we embarked on a new effort to explore new worlds, create new jobs, foster new industry, strengthen international partnerships and increase our understanding of the universe. their recommendations drew lessons from the decisions of many of these administrations that passed before. so first and foremost was the shuttle. as brett mentioned the bush and administration made a decision to retire the shuttle at the end of 2010. that was a tough decision on their part. as mark points out it is very difficult to fund and operational program when you can't refund the replacement program on top of it. it is the challenge.

sometimes they have to be done sequentially and that was part of the challenge that led to the set of challengess we faced when we came into office. but the bush administration made the decision to retire the shuttle. we said instead of just putting a time stamp on one of the things we saw on safety is if you just drive shall plungees bar arbitrary time table you can run in to safety problems so we decided to add more money to -- added a couple flights but we are nearing the end of that incredible program sunni and. $100 billion space station, we drew upon the lessons from previous administrations. ron reagan initially kicked off this effort when this thing started. the clinton administration pulled it out of the fire and saved it by one vote. the challenges we saw was this program would have to be dumped into the ocean to pay for a

follow-on program and we were concerned after early investment in putting it together before we actually turned it into a scientific web which was part of the original design that we would have to d or but it and we decided to give it on a new lease on life while enhancing its utilization. beyond low earth orbit, this is always one of the holy grails in space. we set out to go places men had never gone before on a more flexible path which is what the augustine committee had talked about. also mentioning importantly means with mission. augustine found one of the things we had done is underestimated over the decades in the new technology that we invested -- needed to go beyond the earth/moon cradle.

we found the exact kind of technologies we need today. we haven't invested in these new technologies to take us further, faster and farther into space. someone during the process developed this chart that showed if we wanted to go to mars for example, it was going to take the lifting weights of 12 international space stations. the combined weight was what amounted to. won international space station had required all of the space shuttle flights to get there, 12 time that was massive. but with new technologies you could dramatically reduce that weight that you would need to live from 12 down to two international space stations.

things like in orbit refueling and other new technologies that we haven't yet focused on or pushed for. so we sought to push the frontiers of innovation within the space program and develop these technologies before making a decision in terms of what type of heavy lift architecture we would pursue and the president went to kennedy space center to lay out some new goals for publishing a new firsts in human space flight including visiting an asteroid and eventually going to mars. with this looming gap and the time between the shuttle retired and between the new successor's system which the augustine committee found wasn't going to be ready to launch until 2017, two years after the space station would have had to have been dumped into the ocean, it had nowhere to go. we had to extend the space station and find a way to accelerate that time that we

could get access to low earth orbit so the augustine committee recommended a path for safely transporting astronauts on american made spacecraft and ending the outsourcing of this work to foreign governments and recommended a new commercial crew effort to harness american entrepreneurship and competitively fund the fastest development of a safe and affordable american made vehicle creating thousands of jobs and enabling full use of the space station. this amounted to a new acquisition strategy making payments based on milestones rather than contracts which is how things went before. this commercial concept got a lot of attention in the press. where did you come up with this idea? how did it come forward? this genesis of this program is -- was long in the making.

it began in the carter administration when they embraced commercial international space policy and the reagan administration when they created the f ao office of commercial space the one in the bush administration when they signed a large service and purchase act and in 1998 when president clinton signed the commercial space act and contract about operations to private companies. as brett alexander mentioned in 2004, lease second bush administration in the aldrich commission and elsewhere recommended using commercial enterprise for access for crew and cargo to low earth orbit and by 2008 actually congress had weighed in and actually pushed nasa to develop a program for cargo and crew access to the international space station so

we built on that history of harnessing our entrepreneur real energies so that nasa could focus on the hard things. overall our plan that we put together included more money for nasa, more jobs for the country, more competition in space, more investment in innovation. by extending the space station there were 3500 additional astronaut days in space over the next decade with more rockets launching suitor, more destinations for an ambitious space program allowing nasa to focus on the hard things, and new technological development and getting beyond low earth orbit and the technologies we need here. although this was seen as big change there's a lot of continuity with what folks have put together before. there have been critics.

as there have been at every major turning point in space policy. within six months we saw a bipartisan legislation in the works to move much of the administration's plan into law. congress passed it. dms it -- administration decided. was a critical step in our strategy for achieving the president's goal. it happen sooner than we ever fought possible. it is thanks to the leadership of senators nelson and hutcheso. it is thanks to the leadership of senators nelson and hutcheson and others in the senate. much work lies ahead that history is being written but there is some exciting stuff happening today because of the work these gentlemen have done and what nasa is doing today. is really exciting progress in space. in the coming months nasa is poised to announce more details

on the heavy lift rocket that will eventually take man further and faster into space to places we have gone before including asteroids and beyond the earth/moon drill. yesterday there is an alpha magnetic back from a we docked with the space station to unlock the biggest questions in science's search for dark matter and finally fulfilling the space station's goal as having a science component and turning it into a research lab orbiting 250 miles above us. that was 15 years in the making. nasa taking us further into the solar system. the messenger face graft went into orbit around mercury. in a few weeks don --dawn will begin orbiting vest the, vote second most massive object in the asteroid belt.

juneau will take us to jupiter this fall, the largest mars rover is the size of a small car and can be lower on a stock crane onto the surface of mars. nasa is working on it -- hubble replacement. it will be several years off but it will allow us to see ten times farther than the hubble telescope and further back in time than ever before. this new commercial space race has been going gangbusters and we see more results faster than we expected and it is amazing progress and last month nasa announced we for new contracts for competitors ranging from boeing in nevada, spacex, these of the spaces of the new frontier where the commercial sector is stepping up. in this case there are four different capsule vehicles. some are lifting bodies and some

are capsules all competing. two rocket systems, spacex's falcon and united lunch alliance with three of their four potential capsules and their atlas v just made the 26 consecutive save white. likely to be a work force in this new area. commercial cargo, something the bush administration launched for access to the space station is moving along like gangbusters too. a new rocket is likely to have its first launch this summer, beat boris ii. they're planning and getting cargo all thethe boris ii. they're planning and getting cargo all the way to the space

station and in suborbital space surge in galactic just had another breakthrough test. as early as next year we will see human space flight in the suborbital -- these are big and dramatic things happening quickly and swiftly. it is a dynamic time, an exciting time to be in space. it is only the beginning. i want to come back to this panel 20 years from now and see where we are. this week marks the 50th anniversary of when jfk went to a joint session of congress and said we want to go to the mission. we are still reaching for new heights 50 years later. we are at the beginning of

unlocking what space can bring and a boundless opportunities that lie ahead. dodd-frank please still think the best is yet ahead. want to go to peter marquez who was instrumental within the obama white house on helping us draft our national space strategy. peter? [applause] >> thanks to david and jeff for putting this panel together. for me it has been great to sit here in the audience and listen to what happened and how we got to where we are. fascinating for me, appreciate

the opportunity. one thing i want to talk about doesn't have to do with the content of policy but why we have a policy. at the white house views the dark -- joke with my colleagues that we don't have a policy about this or that. there is no land policy or air policy. why do we need at space policy? the answer in my opinion is fairly clear. space isn't a place. it is a lot more than that. is everything. everywhere we go and everything we do. if you go to the atm that is space. check your e-mail that is space. check the weather, space. ever driven in ireland or italy? definitely space helps you get around. even the most arcane use of space. i went skiing with my father-in-law and my brother with an air one on my phone that track where i was make sure it wasn't ski trails.

by speed, velocity, elevation gained and lost and was able to put it on google earth and see all the trails. i am sure the air force had no idea that was how gps would be abused but it was fun to watch. still look at the way we do trade, warfare, completely modern warfare, intelligence programs and science efforts. space is in everything we do. someone says why have a space policy? pull out their phone, it is everywhere. that is why we need space policy. jim did a great job capturing as activities so i want to focus on how to develop the obama space policy aside from the scientific and nasa activities. part of it was framed by my experience in the latter years of the bush white house. there were a few activities that shaped my opinions on how we

should do the next administration's space policy. one of those came -- i wouldn't really call it a test. you blow something up on or but you really didn't test it. you did something. that changed the whole dynamic. here was another country willing to exhibit that they were going to pull another asset at risk and we continued to be strategic not just for -- any type of warfare intelligence activity we conducted so it really was a shot across the ball. what we thought with a peaceful environment was the dangerous environment. that framed part of it. the other part was the bush policy was put out in 2006. i came in shortly after to implement the policy. we can all trace back failures in policy not because of what was written but the failure to implement policy. when i got there everyone said great to have you here. the clock is running out.

we have other stuff to do. good luck implementing policy. putting the interagency together to do this, difficult if not impossible to do. the guys who wrote the policy, it is a fantastic policy but just a matter of timing. it shipped might desire to get an obama policy out early. other things brett alexander touched on was the change in environment. the war on terror, space was a strategic and tactical capability used at the same time and coalition warfare. we had done coalition warfare since before world war i but things are different. people on the ground waiting different flags on their shoulders or the same data and the same communication and precision targeting to accomplish emissions. one thing that shaped it and jim touched on that was the constellation program and where to go beyond that. that with the concept that

looked great and the augustine guys say it looks great on paper but the way you are funding it has not been executable so we had to start over. the other was burned frost. the usa 193 satellite engagement. that was a defining moment for me. i had done the job a few months and and got a phone call that said the military wants to shoot down a satellite. you think someone is joking with you. that one to me, everyone mentioned the obama white house has openness and transparency. the seeds for openness and transparency were so out of the usa 193 activity. as soon as the president made the decision we were going to take down a satellite there was not a question in the room there was going to be an open activity. we were going to share everything we were doing and why we were doing it and engage in profile. we could tell we would show everybody what we were doing it and that came out of the bush white house and the obama white

house did a faithful dog continuing that idea of openness and transparency. those were the things that shaped where we went on the national space policy. one of the things that jeff and david talked-about what changes were in the national space policy of the previous administration. one thing we did at was a chapeau. i am not floury emotional guy. when they said that it was like -- i just want to write a policy. let me do my job. instead they wanted poetry and it blew my mind. but really in the end it was a helpful exercise. policy surge two purposes. what guidance is it giving the government or industry or what guidance is it giving to the department of agencies? the other thing we lose sight of is policy is an external communication device that tells other nations what the u.s.'s intent is and what our goals

are. i believe the chapeau set that tone. this is what we're doing it. it was a nice addition to the document. the principals and goals at all my colleagues have mentioned have stayed pretty much the same since the eisenhower administration. one thing that was interested in the obama administration policy was maybe arrogance on my part. my friends tell you i have it in spades. those are just my friends. and went in and briefed the senior leadership and said here are the goals and principles. is fine that you think that but why? we have been doing it since eisenhower. one senior person said i don't care that eisenhower said it. it was more questioning why you are doing these things. why are these goals and

principles? all the policies may have a lot of continuity but this administration did a lot of soul-searching as to why these principles are in here. do they still apply and need to be updated? the core values remain. we went through a clean sheet approach that these principles are nearly universal and stood the test of time so we took a hard look at the goals and principles. some other dramatic changes in policy would be the ascendancy of the state department's role in policy. this is the realization that space is an international activity now. the u. s is not the only player. is not just u.s. and soviet union anymore. there are many players. commercial and not state actors and many people coming to play who believe the state department has a strong role working through that. one of them that is near and dear to my heart with an explicit role of gps.

acknowledges that gps is a foundational piece of international infrastructure. and they are starting to grow this interrelationship between cyber and space and both industries -- the tie is very tight and gps is -- the fact that we were able to include that language was important. so one thing i will go through is the process. how we got to the policy. this white house, most of you are familiar with the interagency process. talking about the frustration of developing two space transportation policies. having 50 people with 50 opinions, the department and agencies they represent and sometimes they represent their own opinions. and i was referred to as a

traffic cop. i refer to it as road kill. people came with a lot of opinions. once we figured out the president was serious and we had to write a policy the mood changed. was one of the most exciting experiences in my life to sit with a bunch of people who had a similar goal in mind. the motion at the door save for a few folks that really worked together. it was the most enlightening experience, i wish everybody here could spend several years and the white house -- i wouldn't wish that on a lot of people but spend one day to see the camaraderie and unity of vision. the process using obama white house reflect a lot of processes used in previous white houses to get principles committee and deputy committee to get issues on the table as senior leadership, there was a campaign discussion, the obama campaign about reestablishment of the space council. we had that discussion at the

white house, do we need to reestablish the space council and was like this. who is going to be on the space council? departments and agencies. let me set the scene. we are sitting in the city room with department said agencies sitting around a table. okay. what are we going to talk about? space issues. okay. what are we doing here right now? the discussion was the process is we were already sitting about talking about space things. why do we need a space cal on top of it? as long as the system worked there wasn't a strong need for space counsel when the system did work. we put out a space policy in 18 months. one of my personal goals was to get a space policy out before the reagan administration. we beat the reagan administration by a couple

weeks. my gold standard was the reagan administration policy. it took all the things the carter administration put together. they did a great job taking disparate parts and putting them together but the reagan administration's that we know what the parts are but how do we get in front? i will tell you that the reagan administration policies that on my desk, scratch through everything. any failure in the obama policy -- [laughter] -- it is a great policy. and ask folks to look at the reagan policy and the obama policy. it is not one for one. there's a lot of textural similarity but you will see some tone similarity. hope and change. the actual writing of the policy took place in the matter of five

months. an exciting time, painful at times. the policy writing phase was preceded by a presidential study director. the president said study these areas and get back to me and tell me whether we need a space policy. we kind of already know what that means. that was finished at the end of december and agreed to by the end of december. senior leadership took a month to chew on it and in february put the crew together and work on. at the beginning of june we wrote the national space policy. there were those who had written national space policy is that in order to write a policy in five months is hard and there's only one way it gets done if everyone in the room works together and had the greatest group of guys riding this national space policy. the other thing we benefited from with extraordinary top down guidance. i don't mean it was micromanagement but senior leadership with britt was

secretaries or vice president it is clear what they wanted out of space. lot of time was wasted at the working level trying to divine -- you can waste weeks. the interpretation began, what did that line really mean? to have senior leadership involved would shorten the time line for getting this policy out and that was a critical role. i want to leave some time for questions. that was to run down how we wrote the obama policy. the rest is still being written. implementation still going on right now. still a lot -- we will come back to figure out whether it was a success or failure. i will have my successor at the white house come back and say why it was a miserable failure. i do think we have to capture a lot of issues that are good successes and wins. we tried a concerted effort to get the message out about the policy that a lot of engagements

to make sure we did that. we will see. the rest is written on the obama space policy but we are on good footing because the gentlemen all came before me. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you, peter. not bad. 40 years of space policy in 2 hours and 40 minutes. i am sure there is enormous amount of questions for the panelists and i will use the host's prerogative to ask the first concerning implementation. peter and the others mentioned it. the forum has gone on. the policies themselves are interesting exercises and the processes and procedures put in place to draft them are fascinating to study but the reality of the implementation of those policies the translation of an idea into thought and action, influencing budget and programs is where the rubber hits the road.

i would ask the panel to think for a moment and comment on the implementation observation they had from their various administrations. how did you see this policy get implemented and where were the failure points if there were any, and if it did happen, did subsequent administrations improve upon or not recognize them? i invite anyone to jump in on that. you need to press a button? >> i am steve moran from the clinton administration. sorry i had to step out for a phone call. i missed the entire clinton administration. from an implementation perspective i can talk about a good one and a bad one. gps clearly is a good implementation of a good policy.

we started that policy from scratch. there was nothing that preceded it. i didn't really take credit for -- gil rye did not take credit for reagan offering gps to the world as follow-up to loss of k l 007. we put the policy in place and then spent an inordinate amount of time on vice president gore's adding to that and making sure that policy was going to stick and get implemented. we add the second or third civil signals and put in place the financing package to make sure that was going to happen. we set in place turning off selective availability put in place, the program with the military that would allow that to be turned off.

we started all the international consultations on gps starting out with european commission and japanese. we had a joint -- at boat -- president clinton and prime minister obuchi, cooperation between the u.s. and japan. that was a very good implementation of what i still think was a very strong and forward leaning policy. speaking of the policy process if you look at one of the top goals in the first gps policy, it says -- i am paraphrasing--it talks about enhancing economic competitiveness and productivity while protecting national security and foreign policy interests. i can tell you every word of every space policy that ever comes out has been debated at infiniti mm-hmm --ad infinitum.

phil want to enhance national policy, protect economic security and productivity and it came out way it did because it was a reflection of the clinton administration's focus on the economy, stupid. we knew the impact that policy was going to have on jobs, growth, productivity, technology, competitiveness and all that. i think that is reflected in the fact that the international astronautical federation is going to present a special 60th anniversary award for the single space program that has had the greatest impact on human life. that is coming from the international community and that will be gps. it will be awarded to the gps program. that is a pretty important deal. i will use one word to talk about bad implementation of what may be was a good policy and maybe not, to be determined in

the future. [laughter] >> questions from the floor? [inaudible question] >> looking for communication and all these things, my question is by not steering cyber and space together are we missing something get the policy level? we talked about space competition, exactly -- to cyber also? we know these things have far reaching and you do a lot of things -- should we have a more consolidated approach at the policy level? >> if i can jump in on that. won a thing we did in national space policy was integrated our

innovation strategy. we integrated our manufacturing strategy and education strategy into our open government strategy into the national strategy and we talk a lot -- there are so many parallels between cyberspace and our space in terms of thing that's than borders. but i do think it is tough because at least in the cybersecurity space which i also spent a lot of time on, the challenges are hugely different and i would hate to move cybersecurity which is a fast-paced type of operation into space policy which by nature is very slow changing dynamic. the cyberspace thing takes a more dynamic 85% of critical infrastructure is owned and

operated by the private sector. it requires interesting partnerships between the government and the private sector to solve in outer space even though there's a lot of linkages. if you combine the two structures and had it run by one it would slow both efforts. >> if i could follow on but there's also a maturity level. you have folks here, also missing the eisenhower -- we have been doing this for 50 plus years. we have a good idea what the space world looks like. it will still involved dynamics but to try to get those two to mary up, the national security portion of the national space policy, it was informed by the guys on the cyberside. they were going through these steps to have some cohesion, we

would have cohesion but the cyber side just isn't there yet. from a personal standpoint it was tough being the space guy at the white house. at least i am not a cyber guy. >> i don't think anybody in this room would be superimpress the fis said we were relying exclusively on the russians for space. i don't think anybody would be particularly impressed with how costs have gone up, not down even with things like lift. industry has continued to struggle. might be going in a good direction but hasn't been a good two decades. i don't mean this as a partisan question because it is 20 years of republican and democratic administrations. but what went wrong? we can all agree that money has been scarce and interest has gone down since the time of

apollo but it hasn't been a good two decades. what did we do wrong and what choices did we not make or what wrong choices -- i hope everybody can answer that. >> it is complicated. part of it is everything has been said here in different administrations. it is hard to stop something and start something new. the bargains you have to make in starting something new to get in -- not to overcome the inertia of doing nothing are so substantial the interests -- stakeholders have become so powerful land and grained to start something new is an overwhelming objective. you have to say i have to fund everything we are doing and now i need to add more. in a time of constrained budgets as you go down the aisle here there wasn't anybody other than

our friend with president reagan and seemed to have cash. that is part of it. institutions have gotten old and bureaucratic. so that the wax buildup on implementation, as you roll down this, i can remember who said it. the guys that ran apollo were in their 20s. those running the international space station are in their 50s. that is true when you look at the aerospace industry's doing this and building this. we will be able to see whether -- country before country was cool. spacex there are a lot of young people around. but the guys doing in our 60. they are retirees and they are going back and reliving old hits. it is a complicated problem.

i think it is a huge problem in the space program. it is a huge problem for the united states space program moving forward. can we become nimble? can we become affordable? can we become inefficient and fast or is space going to become the auto industry of the twenty-first century? good question. complicated. i am not sure how we get out of it. >> highlight dependence of implementing the space program on the economy. in one sense it is a miracle that any major program survives through this many administrations with the ups and downs of the economy. i think that really highlights one of the contributions the commercial private-sector space program is offering to help the

space program. wasn't too many years ago that dave thompson and i formed the company called orbital engine corp and we pioneered the commercialization of high-resolution image reform space that you see now and peter and others referred to as google earth and other things. that is where policy can be important in marshaling the resources of the government to helping the private sector capitalized on the on for burn orship and technology that is sitting out there. because the government cannot do it all in itself. we have to rely more and more on creativity and capturing the genius this country has in meeting these goals for the

future. >> i would certainly echoed that. the fundamental problem has been trying to do the same thing for too long. because space programs are hard and expensive and we had such success early on, in ten years we went from nothing to landing on the moon and coming back. 12 years. we have by contrast operated the space shuttle since the mid 70s. first launch in 81. it is a remarkable achievement but it doesn't allow for dynamic growth or change or a learning curve where new folks come in and design systems and move on to design other systems. you come in now even on the national security side if you work one program for 20 years instead of being in your late 20s in mission control for

apollo 11 and worked mercury, gemini and apollo and go on to the shifting of skylab, shuttle, station. if we don't have a dynamic cycle that is more akin to the business cycle of innovation, new products, three to five years instead of 35 years that is a problem. one thing in the implementation of the vision for exploration that i did not like was one of the drivers was if we are going to go to mars in 30 years we have to design the vehicle now. if we are using the same vehicle 30 years from now to go to mars we are fundamentally doing it wrong in my view. that is part of the lack of innovation, whack of dynamic activity.

we have got to get out of that. commercial crew, commercial cargo started under administrator gretchen, the commercial group program under this administration, those can change that and allow nasa to do the bigger things that take longer because that dynamic part of the sector will be there to inform it. >> let me add one point to that. started on this end of the table, one of the things that has emerged over the decades we are talking about in the space procurement arena has been incredibly large and cumbersome bureaucratic procurement process. when you try to offer a solution from the commercial provider, industrial provider of the

oversight and procurement requirements overlaid, incredible cost burden to these procurements where there is a small instrument in space or major procurement activities such as space launch vehicles or space station. the infrastructure we overlaid and required has been a significant contributor to that and something that can be cut back. it is not a need to requirement as are overlaid over the process. >> one last thing we try to is steadily and not so subtly is reflection of what art just mentioned, when we did a presidential study we looked at the acquisition system to find out why it was broken. a report came back that the acquisition system is not broken. the acquisition system serves as a computer. of garbage goes into the system

garnett comes out of the system. program management was seriously flawed. that is on the civil side and national security side. the only place there seemed to be a glimmer of hope was on the commercial side. they were doing things because they were driven on a short time line with high-technology refresh rates driven by profit which i don't have a problem with profit. things were being done on the commercial side that should be harnessed by the government side and that is what you saw the full embrace of commercial crew and cargo which started in previous administrations and why you see the national security side looking to service rather than platforms. the thing that suppresses programs is budget. there is nothing that suppresses the appetite of policy and requirements and we are trying to put appetite suppression into the system. >> i would be remiss if we didn't follow up on mark's comment that our human space

exploration program was dying a slow death. the inference i took from that was the end of the cold war lifted the rationale for human space flight. we have been struggling thereafter to find a new reason to do it and animates support and initiatives and budgets behind it. i would ask in particular, to comment on the thinking of president carter and president reagan about the human space flight program. did they see reasons to do it aside from the space race with the soviet union and perhaps some of the others might want to chime in about what they see as the ongoing rationale for human space exploration? >> that was the driving force. clearly the aspirations of the nation could be a manned orbiting -- orbital capability, was underwriting force for being first to do that.

but there was not also -- even earlier, high expectation that there would be a bigger role on return of having man space with the space station with industrial manufacturing and things of that nature which unfortunately have not matured. >> i think the president saw the man space program as being the face of the space program. it is what gave visibility to the program and what kept money on the hill for the space program. it was hard, always has been hard to rationalize the man space program on the basis of its cost-effectiveness because it isn't. the military came to that conclusion back in the late 60s. they had a man orbiting laboratory that was eventually canceled in 1969. the military concluded there was

no mission in space that was needed to support the battlefield commanders that couldn't be done by an unmanned satellite system. so when it came time for president reagan to make the decision on the space station, the department of defense said that we really don't have a vote here. we think you, mr. president, ought to make the decision what is in the best u.s. interest for other reasons, not for the military. so it is hard to argue with what mark says. it is a shame. it is a real shame. that we can't do more. but the problem is putting man in space is a very costly

enterprise, in a time when we have got people on the hill arguing about how much we cut, not whether we cut. i wouldn't want to be a policy guide today in the white house. i think it would be kind of depressing, really. because i think it is a real heartbreak for those who have been involved in the space program going all the way back to mercury, gemini, to see where we are now, in a couple months ending a string of programs that have been so important to our country. it is something to lament. >> can i take an alternative view? i believe we are at an exciting time, we are still at the beginning of a bright new age of humans in space. i don't disagree with the

precepts of the budget challenges that we face. the augustine committee looked at why we do this and found for example on the scientific basis it is not there. we can send robots further into space more affordably and accomplish a lot more. there's something about u.s. leadership in space that is important. there's something about driving new technologies that lead to economic opportunity but one of the things i find that is incredibly exciting and the reason there's a bright new future is our look at 1969. two incredible governmental accomplishments in 1969. we landed on the moon but we invented the internet. one of the things -- they took two different fundamental paths. now the internet is a huge -- bigger part of our economy than is space. every day there's a dynamic new thing happening in the internet that is being discovered. there is an ipo, billions of

dollars for linkedin. the difference is in space we kept it entirely as a governmental program. in the internet around 90s we moved it. we created dot.com. it is no logger just -- we created a new commercial space that could grow and thrive. i do see exciting things around the corner. it may not be government programs directly but maybe spurred on by new things that are enabled by this broader eco system. the fact we have companies like bigelow working on a private space station. we don't know if they will work but we have something up above right now. if they can lift one of the commercial crew people have access to that, that is their primary problem and it could be something new and different. in suborbital space we have a lot of new things, new

technologies that weren't possible before. we also did a big move to prizes happening now that people are doing amazing things if we can think outside the box rather than a governmental program thinking of what we should do. we are trying to harness the experience of a broader set of americans to figure out how to accomplish goals and other things. the inherently governmental peace is hard, in our case we are trying to focus nasa not on low earth orbit but the harder stuff, it is really exciting. there's one other rationale for why we do some of these things and i look separately at the space station. a different rationale. one of the things -- when i was serving in the clinton administration we went through hard choices on bringing the russians to the table and other

things. when communications shutdown, when there was a coup in moscow and the communications channels broke down. what was amazing was the communication channels that had been built around a space station actually rose up and help us create a back channel for communications to move things forward. the international cooperation was extraordinarily valuable land underappreciate it. >> i would like to make one point to echo jim's point about how this is an exciting time and this goes back to what happened in the last 20 years and to me the last 40 years. when we landed on the moon, those of us who grew up in those days we were told when you grow up you get to fly in space. you are going to go to the men and mars and the fact is when we grew up thatoon and mars and the fact is when we

grew up that didn't get to happen. the 0.1% who can fly as an astronaut. the commercial human space flight activity this administration has pushed that was part of the vision for space exploration and part of the aldrich commission is the first thing that will change that equation. that is the first time people can say maybe i get to go sunday. first it will be very rich people. those are people that didn't dedicate their lives to being astronauts. that is how aviation's started. as the price comes down maybe i get to go sunday so i finally have some the view that i might actually get to fly in space some time. >> i hope we have come to answer is for all the questions that dog space policy over the last four decades but we failed to achieve that goal. nevertheless we had a

fascinating and stimulating discussion. i invite all of you to visit the web site of techamerica for updates on the very good work they are doing for our part at marshall.org. you can find copies of the declassified versions of all the national space policies we have been talking about on our web site called making national space policy. we will continue to update that archive as additional materials come out. i would ask you join me in thanking the panelists. they did a fantastic job. thank you all for coming. [applause] [inaudible conversations]

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