granddaughter to me. >> host: if you were to recommend one book to people to read of yours what would it be? >> guest: i suppose a spiritual history of the living world". >> host: y? >> guest: because the essays are a small. they are about topics people really care about. they are short stories in part. it seems like it has more meaning to it in a short space than the novel. .. with linda hogan, author and poet and chickasaw nation writer in redense. residence. here, very quickly, are some of her major works beginning with dwellings, then the woman who

watches over the world, her native memoir. mean spirit, pulitzer finalist. solar storms, power and "people of the whale" came out in 2008. linda hogan, thank you for being on booktv. >> guest: thank you. >> host: coming up in the next couple months on booktv, ann coulter, michael moore, david brooks. thanks for being with us, here's more booktv.

>> are new but, the best of battles and leaders of the civil war. abraham lincoln was, as he told the council of generals that he convened at the white house, greatly disturbed by the state of affairs. the treasury was nearly exhausted. public credit was operating. congress was full of jack depends, as he said. foreign relations were perilous. spending more time fighting each other than the confederates in missouri and these.

the general was sick in bed with typhoid fever, incommunicado. the army still make is inspiring his famous comment. if general mcclellan did not want to use the army may be can bar for a while. if something was not done send he confided the bottom would be out of the whole affair. 1862 may have been in no way the most dizzying year of the war. before it was over the in that better than worse than better than worse. within its roller-coaster of triumph and disaster abraham lincoln did nothing less then transformed the war for union into a war for union freedom. that was a pretty breathtaking turn of events. we wanted to exploit that here today with an emphasis on the extraordinary battle of antietam

that did so much to transform america in many ways. let's go back a couple of days before the battle. september 15, 1862, destroy the rebel army if possible. a few days later after a battle widely reported in the press in a major union victory the commander in chief issued a congratulations. a few days later the emancipation proclamation suspended. the writ of habeas corpus began nagging to go into action. he wrote this amazing letter to a quaker leader in citing his belief that america was going through a fiery trial. permitted to continue, as he put it, for some wise purpose of his own mysterious and unknown

device. well, among the landmark books on the civil war crossroads and freedom, antietam, the battle that's changed america in which she wrote in a war with several crucial turning points above antietam was the pivotal moment for the most crucial of the mall. and in his unsurpassed by aircraft -- biography, george mcclellan described antietam as the opportunity of a lifetime for the general and for the union alike which mcclellan squandered by losing, and i quote, his inner composure and with it the courage to command under the press of combats. strong words about an extraordinary moment. tonight we would like to drill down to the still unresolved questions of what was lost and what was gained in 1862. let's back up first a little bit. things are looking up for the union in the spring.

shiloh in the west, the monster driving off. nor liz april. disaster at manassas. above all, before antietam there was a campaign. hairbrained or really brilliant plan that had a reasonable chance of conquering richmond and ending the war. >> mcclellan thought of is going to be very much -- feed of the war would be over. his famous letter after the failure, he had actually drafted before the seven days started, and he was planning to reassume the role of commander-in-chief -- general in chief, i should say. he was expected to be writing this letter from richmond. he was very optimistic until the seven days, until we attack him. jim will be embraced during this

campaign. almost overnight it seems granny lee became a successful defender of the confederacy. a sleeping giant that was a lot to slumber too long by jefferson davis? >> what, i don't think so. lee's experience had been the succession of players. after he helped immobilize the reason its troops and then joined the confederacy when virginia finally did join the confederacy he had been sent out to deal with the problem in the western part of virginia which became west virginia where mcclellan actually had overseen successful union occupation of much of that area. then mcclellan was called to washington in july. lee was sent off to west virginia to try to recover that area. august of 1861. every effort he made turned out

to be of failure. he came into the -- came under all kinds of criticism from the richmonds newspapers. was call the granny lee, as you suggest. then in november of 1861 jefferson davis sent him to the coast of charleston just-in-time for lee to witness the capture of port well by the union navy and the occupation of the south carolina and georgia sea islands by union forces, another reversal of the confederacy. lee had to check to deal with what was going to be the consequence of that. he gave orders to pull back range of the navy which was seen as another major retreat by the confederacy. it is not that lee was some kind of a sleeping giant his talents were not recognized. he actually had not really

succeeded in doing anything. he was called back to richmond in march in 1862, became a military adviser to jefferson davis and then began fashioning the confederate strategy of a counter-offensive first with stonewall jackson in the shenandoah valley and then joe johnston was wounded at the battle of southern pines. lee was given direct command of what he named the army of northern virginia, and that is when the great news release starts. up until that time. >> that me ask you both the question. a successful counter-offensive general and defender of the capital. as we march toward the fall of 1862y did robert e. lee chains the winning formula and decide to go on the offensive and march

into maryland. >> she really didn't have much choice. he to go further directions of the compass. if he wins toward washington he had not the heavy artillery to besieged washington. if you went back south he was admitting that his plan, his offensive plan failed. west into the shenandoah valley he could supply his men, but you would just be marching time. he ended up going north. there was a lot of food. they thought they would raise merrill others to join the confederate boss this is not turn out to be true. he really could not stay still. this is best action. >> i think lee was always an avid reader of northern

newspapers and a follower of more than politics. he was well aware that the congressional elections were scheduled for october and november of '86 to and even wrote to jefferson davis saying that by invading maryland's and as he hoped inflicting another defeat of the army of the potomac may be on the scale of the second manassas that he can actually influence that election. maybe the democrats would gain control of the house and forced the weakened administration to negotiate for peace. also at the same time we need to remember that the war is taking place that only in virginia but across a front of 1,000 miles. the confederates were on the offensive in the western theater where general brag and smith were invading kentucky. also with the idea of winning that state for the confederacy. when we went across the river

into maryland and the first trick of september, 1862, confederate soldiers were on the march elsewhere. the hope of, in effect, conquering piece by forcing the lincoln administration to negotiate with them. also, please personality, his character was never satisfied with remaining static, remaining on the defensive. he always wanted to seize and hold the initiative. that meant always going on the offensive. we will see that happening over and over again. his career as long as is armies are physically capable of doing that. >> the moves come as you both pointed out, into a state that has very divided loyalties. would have seceded had lincoln left the legislature and secession convention steer its

own devices. how did the northern press and the population along these routes react to the arrival of the army of northern virginia? >> well, one back to you have to remember, he had a press. reporters were not supposed to go beyond the potomac. he was very unhappy with the press coverage. there was nothing passed out by the government about what was going on. and so everybody, they tag after every soldier the confined to see what was going on and what he thought about the situation and so on and so on. i'm sure there was a great deal of panic in philadelphia. harrisburg and governor curtain was all set. he was sure that pennsylvania

was a target. >> well, if lee had been able to invade maryland in the county's south of washington, he would have met a very capable welcome. that was a confederate part of maryland. the topography, geography, and logistics' were such that he could only cross the river from washington and invade the western part of maryland which was strongly unionist. and so the reception there in frederick and the other western part of maryland was really quite cool to the confederates. especially in contrast to the tumultuous welcome for general mcclellan and the army of the potomac when they marched on september 13th. mcclellan rights to his wife and said, he is being showered with praise and flowers and so on by the local population.

clearly while maryland was a divided state this was an invasion in the union is part of the state. the hope that by invading maryland they would liberated from the iron heel of yankee despotism which turned out to be a hollow hope and expectation that did not happen. >> we will get back to mcclellan later because if you read his letters which steven has so ably edited for his volume of correspondence, mcclellan was forever being showered with flowers. in the wake of his administration. let's talk for a moment as we did backstage. this issue out into the open and talk for men about the background of the famous lost or if and how the size of a role they played in the battle.

>> will, the last order was general lease plan to capture harpers ferry, the garrison at harpers ferry which was 12,000 men in the good deal of our abundance. and so this was in frederick. and on september 9th he writes out orders to divide up his army into four segments. stonewall jackson was going to go to the west. he sent these out what carriers to all the generals involved. copy that went to stonewall jackson, jackson read it in a county that yet again d.h. hill. one of the carriers was also taking the same messes to dhl and, of course, it never arrived. it was dropped in a clover field south of fredericksburg.

and we don't know why this happened or how it could have been presented or at least discovered because the curtain was superb -- courier was supposed to deliver the envelope in which the message came with the signature. when back to the headquarters my own theory is that it was a careless career and he discovered he had lost it. it went to the headquarters and asked around. yes, we have the orders. he felt much relieved. went back to headquarters, no one seems to have pursued the case of getting the proof of delivery. in any case on the 13th of september 8 corporal from an indiana regiments, a bit lax in this plover field and he found a symbol of cockpit to the power of the message. still had three cigars in the envelope along with it.

he was smart enough to realize, you recognize these names and places, that this was pretty important. he ticket of stairs and i think it went to brigade. they skipped a few levels because each person sought and realized how important it was. it went up to help -- headquarters. from there general williams was in charge of the court. he sent a note along with this to general mcclellan saying it looks important and we believe it is authentic. he describes how it was found. so by noon on the 13th -- is that right track system of the 13th. mcclellan has this order. to take the next step, if i may, while he was head of several people from the city of frederick discussing the up patience. he was handed this dispatch.

he liked it. supposedly he threw up its hands and said now i know what to do. in any case he was obviously very much excited biologists and dismissed all of this. one of them turned out to be a confederate sympathizer. i think he was a confederate spy. paid to be on this meeting. stir ran off. it finally made its way to the general lee. announcement. but the question is, how much did generally know and when he knew it. and as far as i can determine the only thing he learned from this was the something was going

on. general mcclellan was excited about something rather. i'll leave the story there. maybe jim can pick it up. >> the big question, i suppose, and the great debate that continues is whether this was, as he put his command at think you're pretty decisive on the subject, whether it was coming back to my sloppy career in the state or whether it was the most bread the -- brilliant counterespionage action of the war which was supposed to throw off mcclellan into falsely comprehending please intentions. but all that the permission you would think that mcclellan would have been more aggressive and successful. jim, what do you think? counter espionage or mistakes that was taken advantage of? >> * convinced it was a sloppy courier and that the orders virginia when holy orders. they had been lost by the career

two other dimensions of it, one of them serious, and one of the not so serious. the series one is why did mcclellan way so long before giving orders to different generals, especially to the general franklyn to force crane. those orders went out to franklin at 6:00 that evening. mcclellan did actually express a certain amount of urgency in his orders to franklin because it was fractus task to rescue the garrison at harpers ferry which was under siege by 25,000 confederates under the overall command of jackson. franklin was to force his way through the gap and come to the ag of the garrison at harpers ferry by driving away at least some of the confederate procedures. he didn't actually get started until 6:00 in the morning which was 18 hours after mcclellan had disinformation and hand and.

some mcclellan right away or maybe it was franklin who was one of mcclellan's closest confidants and supporters, did not really take advantage as they could have of this lost order, this intelligence windfall that they had. the other question i have is why was -- for these orders wrapped around three cigars? to get the cigars? nobody knows. >> they were at headquarters. i think one of the generals probably smoked them. >> it is interesting. >> why would you have these orders initially? i never understood that. why were there wrapped around three cigars? that makes no sense at all. >> but if there were in an envelope marked secret orders. it's an extra step.

>> well, where this information in hand with the sense that the cat is out of the back, his plan has been exposed. the knowledge has been gained by the union commander. the forces me. the bloodiest single day of the work. it is portrayed in different ways at the time and certainly lincoln needs to declare it a triumph. but tiddly lose some or did mcclellan barely win? what is your sense of how you conclude who gets responsibility and who gets blamed for what happened to on september 17th? >> mcclellan was convinced that he -- he was afraid to win. that was the essential part of this thing. can i read something about this? there is a letter that mcclellan wrote, and i made a copy of it. this is to his wife.

this is one day after the battle, september 18th. at 8:00 a.m. they had this terrible battle. at dawn lee is still there. he has not left the battlefield. everyone of you inside and the confederate side, expecting it to be renewed. for he writes his wife, a terrible battle against the entire rebel army. the battle continued 14 hours and was terrific. fighting on both sides was superb. the general result was in our favor. that is to say we gained a great deal. it was a success, but it decided victory depends on what occurs today. i hope that god has given us a great success. it is all in his hands where i am content to leave it. and then he adds this interesting sentence. those in whose judgment i rely tell me that i fought the battle

splendidly, it was a masterpiece. this is the most revealing letter that i think he ever wrote. he obviously is not telling to follow what he had accomplished the day before. he thinks he has done a wonderful thing largely because he has prevented this superior force. they have even gained ground against a superior force. and as it happened he was counting three soldiers for every one that existed in lee's army, which was his habit. his habit, and deed. >> at the same time that we said that mcclellan was sending this letter to his wife he was also sending a telegram in which she said, and of the phrasing, i expect the battle to be renewed today. not i expect to renew the

attack. >> we will renew the attack, as he put it. >> yes. it is quite true that he says over and over again in members of his staff and some of his generals liked this some border think that the confederate 7,110,000 men at antietam. he fought that battle with 37,000 men. mcclellan had 80,000, up from about 65,000 anxious got involved in the fight which is almost a two to one a advantage over the confederates. mcclellan never took advantage of the superiority. he said ten attacks, one corporation, one division, sometimes only one brigade at a time. piecemeal attacks. and on two separate occasions there was a real opportunity to break through the confederate line. mcclellan had only uses reserves , 20,000 of whom never shot a fire in the anchor during the battle of all. but because he feared that lee

had these tens of thousands in reserves he never committed his own for fear that there would be ambushed by those phantom reserves. so there was an extraordinary number of mr. a virginities on the union side because of mcclellan's psychology, i think, that could have made this a really decisive victory rather than a qualified victory. >> and get most of these teeseven think we're at the stage now when we should address this. in many ways this was the most important battle of the civil war. i'm not going that add anything. tell me why you each think that. >> at the time they did not know. the confederates did not think that antietam was a defeat by any means. they captured the harpers ferry garrison of 12,000 men. the campaign as a whole, they

inflicted twice as many casualties as the union suffered. so it only became -- we only know now, i guess, we only know now how are important it was. once the emancipation proclamation can now this had a ripple effect including overseas with simpson talk about better than i can. there is all kinds of police, i think, that mcclellan really needed to follow this up. even when he got his man, his sources rashad and his new shoes for his men and all this other stuff and he was waiting. all he had to do is cross the potomac. of course he was exceedingly reluctant. he had to be ordered again and again and again. >> would you have written what

makes antietam important and fascinating, the point that antietam may be more important looking back from now than it was on september 18th, 1862. but as you have written, antietam is a chance formative because it changes the rationale for the war. >> not only that, but i think it was recognized at the time by a lot of people in the north as a transformative victory. northern newspapers had a huge headlines saying great victory and so on. even the new york times said it was one of the greatest victories in the history of warfare. i think that is because up until the battle of antietam the confederates were on a roll. union morale was at rock bottom, both among the northern people and in the army of the potomac. one thing that mcclellan should be given credit for is reviving the morale of the army so

quickly and reorganizing its committing it off of its that and putting it in shape to win at least this qualified victory at antietam. but because expectations in this house, even in the north and abroad were that we would win -- the third time would be the charm. he had won the initial campaign. he had won the second battle of bull run, and now he was invading the north, and this was going to be there crushing blow. when that didn't happen i think there was a great sigh of relief in the north. if it had happened, if the comparison with one another victory at think that the chances are quite strong that the democrats would have won control over the house of

representatives. >> and european recognition. >> and european recognition because we know that the french and british were seriously considering intervening by offering their good offices to be a piece on the basis of confederate independent spirit of the lincoln administration refused to except that offer, which they probably would have done, the french of the british would have recognized the confederacy. most other european nations would have followed suit, and that would have made a huge difference in the course of the war. when the news reached london that lee had retreated back to virginia in particular prevent his power was decisive for backed off. napoleon and france wanted to go ahead. some members of the british cabinet wanted to go ahead. but some key members of the british cabinet said, no, let's back off and see what develops next. if lee's invasion had been

successful and he had won some kind of victory at antietam and not been forced to retreat, which by the way, he hated the idea of retreating back over the potomac and even gave thought after he recrossed into virginia of crossing again and continuing the campaign. his army was in no shape to do it, and he finally recognize that. but if he had won the kind of victory he expected when he moved into marilyn i think there would have been some kind of european intervention. so you have got a revival of northern morale. you have got the republicans retain control of congress and the congressional alexian's, the british backing off from intervention, and abraham lincoln seizing upon this battle, and happy as he was with mcclellan's fell year to make it even more decisive to fall without vigorously by moving

into the virginia. lincoln does take it as the sign he had been waiting for, the victory he had been waiting for to issue the emancipation proclamation which does transform the nature of this war and make it now will war for freedom as well as union. so for all of these reasons i think antietam stands as the most important turning point of the war. >> i'm going to take issue with one thing you said, but i don't want to get too far ahead of the story. that is how well lincoln did in the election. obviously a huge losses for the republicans. probably more attributable to emancipation as a game changer. >> yes. the democrats gained 33 seats. >> thirty-four. >> thirty-four. all right. [laughter] >> however, in the last 20 years before 1862 every midterm congressional election had

resulted in the victory by the opposition party. this was the first midterm election in 20 years in which the opposition party did not gain control of the house. >> remember, southern democrats were not participating. >> even so. >> you went on a technicality on that one. [laughter] >> but the other point on the election, lincoln did not fire mcclellan until the day after the last midterm elections were held. if he had fired him before that, and i think you're absolutely right, there would have been a democratic, perhaps. let's talk about emancipation as a result. lincoln, of course, that services is one thing. it is a little bit open to question in another. seizing the moment. he actually waits quite a bit. he waits five days for a fellow

who said that god decided this question in favor of the slaves, he tells his cabinet when he calls them into session to say he's going to use antietam as a believer to pull the trigger on emancipation. i'm mixing metaphors, but you get the idea. he takes his time. let's talk eroticism. he's got the emancipation written and is waiting for the moment. i have always been curious about why he waits? is it because he expects at mcclellan will be marching? >> we know that the battle was over on the 17th. they did know whether it might not be renewed. lee was still in position on the 18th. he does not retreat and tell the height of the 18th and 19th. mcclellan says that people pursued. they get involved in a battle on the 19th and 20th. the rear guard action. so there is still fighting going on until the 20th. probably more accurate to say that lincoln, that he isn't

really sure that this campaign is over until the 20th. only two days. >> but he also waits for his dismal cabinet meeting, does he not? >> he does. he waits for weekend to pass as well. >> she has been waiting since july 22nd stacey this. >> and of course i have recently done some work on the notion of how many people in washington knew that a proclamation was imminent. i think that my conclusion is plenty. the newspapers were full of it. he has shown that are shared the story with enough blabbermouth politicians and white house office aids. i think, you know, after years of wondering why we had, his novel concluded it was the worst kept secret in washington. i came to the conclusion he was probably right. lincoln needed that trigger. antietam provided it.

you made a great point, the both of you, but lincoln keeping mcclellan on with an election looming and political landscape changing enormously with the proclamation which is as much as we look back retrospectively on it and say what took them so long and why didn't chief remorseless and the other things we hear from modern commentators, it, of course, agitated huge numbers of people and disturbs huge numbers of people. at the same time link loses patients with mcclellan, and he began acting him, making fun of him, what have your forces done since the battle of antietam. he was running out of patience. he was furious. taking what he justified. >> out on the battlefield. the first of october, i think. three or four days. and the two men seem to have come up with that, we only had

-- we don't have anyone -- no one was there listening to what they were discussing. but the two of them came off totally different views of what was even discussed. and lincoln goes back to washington and he expects baton to start the next day across the potomac. two or three days pass. he tells him to avoid the cross. nothing happens. and mcclellan is writing. he thinks that the administration is mad me. i'm afraid i'm going to be sent off to the west or something like some other place. he has no conception. i can't believe that lincoln was somewhat unclear as to what he wanted done. apparently lincoln could talk to mcclellan and so he is blue in the face. nothing seems to register. never would. mcclellan also is rather preemptory about what he is willing to fight for and his new

landscape that involved fighting for emancipation. >> well, mcclellan, when he reads the emancipation proclamation, is really upset. two days later comes the suspension of habeas corpus and the declaration of martial law. mcclellan actually toys with the idea of expressing opposition to this. his advisers tell him, some of his political friends tell him that he should remain silent about this. civilian supremacy over the military, government of mixed policy. the army carries it out. he backs off. privately he makes it clear that he is very unhappy with the emancipation proclamation. he had earlier written a famous weather that was referred to a while ago saying that the declaration about slavery will dissolve our present army.

there should not be a war for conquest or for the overthrow of seven institutions but merely a war for the restoration of the union. the union as it was before 1861. i don't think mcclellan never really chases mind about that. when he runs for president in 1864 he runs on the platform that avoids any commitment at all to the abolition of slavery and runs on the platform of a party it that pledges the constitution as it is and the union as it was. so mcclellan clearly did not like the direction that the war was beginning to take. yet he does not openly protest against it in september in october of '86 to. >> does write a letter. issues and address to his troops explaining all of this. superiors in the military.

but he makes the one remark that for any general, something to the effect that if there is any objection to this the polls are always open. this society can solve the problem. the midterm elections were coming up. a rather thinly veiled. >> as we contemplate the enormous sacrifice of that date, still bloody. we want to open the room up to questions from you with a reminder that we have staff with microphones and we need you to raise your hand and then wait for a microphone. we have the first question right here. >> as you probably know to release words before he died or as he was dying words, tell held

to come up. you must tell hill to come up. >> well, that does actually probably referred to the battle of antietam. hills division had been left behind at harpers ferry after the confederates had captured it on september 14th to arrange for the paroling of the soldiers and the union captured union soldiers and the securing of all the armaments and uniforms and shoes and ammunition and all that that the confederates had captured, a real boon to them. and on the morning of september september 17th we had actually said orders that on the evening of september 16th, send orders down to harper's ferry to hill to get up to sharpsburg as early as he could on the 17th. lee knew that the battle was impending. so hills division makes the

forced march of about 17 miles and get to the battlefield about 4:00 in the afternoon. the ones who aren't, you know, scattered along the way. i think only half of his division gets there. the crash and to the flank of the attack after burnside crossed the street and was actually threatening to cave in the confederates refined, very thin flank when have crashes and to burnside. anhui express a great sigh of relief when the word reached and that hill had arrived. save the date for the and that hurts. when his last words were can he come up, that is what he is referring to? >> here in the back. all right. >> i think he successfully address the weaknesses, but i

think we deserve some blame. he does after seven days. he had taken enormous losses. his army was in a trade condition. understand that causes of man crossed the potomac into maryland because they wanted to fly south to virginia. he went with about 40,000 men. is that true? >> again, i don't think -- his soul determination was to get this over with as soon as possible. he recognized, i think, that the south could not maintain itself that long against the industrial might. so right from the time he takes command on june 1st of 1862 he takes the offensive in order to try to end this war as soon as he could. and that think this carries over during the peninsular campaign when he comes very close to defeating mcclellan.

he immediately goes north. again, he has no choice. he has to do something. general pope is to the north of them. in a moment to -- general mcclellan is to the south. he has to do one or the other. he goes after pope's first. as i said before, at that point he is faced with the decision to either keep going or to retreat and give up all that he has gained. so i don't think -- i don't see him to be blamed for this. >> it is quite true that his army was in terrible shape. many of the men did not have sues. the supply system for the army of northern virginia was in shambles. we probably had about 50,000 men when he began this campaign. he has only 37,000. there have been about 3,000 casualties on september 14th. something like 10,000 of his men

just didn't make it to the battlefield because there were exhausted, sick, i didn't have shoes and so on. we actually, he is quite condemnatory toward these men, the stragglers. he said that they lacked conviction, courage, their goal breaking, the slackers to use a little language. but in bats, i think that they were just physically incapable of keeping up with the army. i think that probably we was not as cognizant of that as he should have been. >> it is interesting. you had one general who is so aggressive with so little and another who is so timid with some much. where is the next question?

>> i believe you said that the trigger for the emancipation proclamation was the victory at antietam. mcclellan had lost how many men the first day? >> well, the using -- union casualties were just under 13,000 at antietam. >> black men could not be expected to serve and the union army as long as slavery existed in the south. it had been suggested that one of lincoln's mother vases was to pave the way for the enlistment of black troops. what would you say to that? >> well, lincoln was quite hesitance, even at this stage, still quite has and to enlist blacks, especially former slaves in union armies. in august of 1862, just a month before the battle he had actually rejected the offer of a couple of regiments, troops from indiana. if they were enlisted, 50,000 bayonets from the border states.

what he meant is 50,000 union soldiers from states like kentucky and missouri and maryland. 15,000 bayonets from the border states would be turned against us that are now for us. still very much worried about the response to emancipation, but even more volatile aisle, i think, was the issue of putting arms in the hands of black men. so basically lankan is heading towards emancipation. the couple three months after that he is edging toward a lesson and a black soldiers. there is no public commitment by the president's until the final emancipation proclamation of january 1863. it is emancipation first and then black troops. >> i agree with him on that. i think he is extremely nervous about black recruitment and almost has to be. kicking and screaming on january 1st. the big motivation is the home front in the south and depriving

them of france and the political advantage. but i don't think it is recorded by any means. >> right here in front. >> my name is alice. >> any women in the battlefield? >> out that there were obvious. >> i haven't run across that. >> a number of years ago, a woman named lauren kirk verges who was very much interested in reenacting from north carolina. she was at a re-enactment of the battle of antietam back in the late 1980's.

she was caught dressed as a union soldier coming out of the ladies' room. and she was dishonorably discharged. and she sees upon this and did a lot of research and found evidence for several hundred women who passed as men, some of them wives or lovers of soldiers and so they were protected. and if she found evidence of four women who actually fought at antietam, so she plans, one of foam was killed. so if she is right. there were some. she actually sued the park service on the grounds of gender discrimination and won the suit after she had been not allowed to participate in this living

history demonstration. >> speaking of women, there is a woman here who i think you would all enjoy meeting, a surprise guests to me. she is an historian in her own right. also on both times and her family, a defendant of interesting people. her family, i'd german jewish photographer took two photographs of abraham lincoln, one is the first of him wearing a beard 1960 in chicago. also defended on the other side of the family from one of the highest-ranking officers. i just thought you would enjoy meeting here. stand-up please. [applause] [applause] she is not a veteran as far as i know. we have time for one more

question, i think. offhand. >> one of the frustrations is that he is so darn hard to like. what is your interpretation of the ferris evening where president lincoln was waiting for him to come home. the general came home and the straight to bed. people have suggested he was embarrassed and drunk. do think that was it or was it just rudeness? >> i think there was no love lost between abraham lincoln and george mcclellan. they just despise each other in many ways. mcclellan was contentedly read that night. i don't think it was a matter of as being drunk. he had been -- was it at a winning? >> the wedding of one of his officers. >> came home to find the president of the edison is lounging in his parlor, and he did not want to talk to him.

it was not business hours. the fact that abraham lincoln did not have been dismissed that evening as a secretary tell some of the way back, egging him on. this is outrageous. lincoln says kamal listen, whatever it takes to get in to win victories coming to you have a different view of that? was he drunk? >> i don't think he drank it all. it was not the first time he had done that. lincoln would stop by his headquarters. he wouldn't wake him up. he is much more direct. it did have an effect on him, i think. >> gettysburg might have inspired lincoln's good speech when he got to maryland and

october all the did say was at first if i were as i have been most of my life i might talk amusing see you for half an hour and it wouldn't hurt anybody. hardly gym like words. his greatest act. the central act of my administration and the great act of the 19th century. antietam in the fall of 1862 liberated lincoln as much as it liberated enslaved people. as jim and steve have argued so eloquently and convincingly in their work, and as we both agree tonight, it transformed the war for the union as it was too low war for the union, and it could be a union that embraced freedom. thank you all very much. [applause] [applause]

>> this event was hosted by the new york historical society in new york city. for more information visit ny history got a court. >> let me get right into it, and i will begin by telling you a story. it sounds melodramatic. it sounds kind of purple prose. it is this story. the story of a would-be suicide bomber who lies in wait outside the home of the man about to leave the church. the assailants in his car ignored by the security employed to protect this man. the man's wife comes to the door with a child to see the man off. the bomber does not want to strike in front of the family, so he stays his hand. four days later he is captured. now let me make the story completely over the top. the man in question, the target is the president-elect of the net states. the only reason why that story

is not ridiculously implausible is that it happened. the would-be suicide bombers name was richard paton, 73 years old, a retired postal worker with a deep-seated hatred of the catholic church in the kennedy family. his target was john kennedy, the casing of the family home. he stalked across the country and was parked on the morning of december 11th 1916 holding the switch loaded with seven sticks of dynamite, enough in the words of the secret service to level a small mountain. were it not for jacqueline kennedy's appearance at the door that sunday morning john kennedy almost surely would have been killed. there never would have been a president kennedy. the secret service chief at the time said in his memoirs, we were seconds away from that disaster. then what? some of you here look like? remember, some of you may have read it in history. we're talking about a month after the election, a transformation of generational change from the oldest president

to the youngest elected. how would we have dealt with that and a time when violence against public officials was virtually unheard of. how lyndon johnson felt it, where robert kennedy would have gone, and how johnson with assumptions and a mind-set so different would have dealt with civil-rights or with the cuban missile crisis? that is one of the questions i have tried to answer in this book called then everything changed. what this is is a trio of alternative histories the center on contemporary american politics or at least contemporary for some of us. they are all rooted in one common notion, and that is that the smallest twist and turn of fate can produce radical consequences. they are written as a fictional narratives with dialogue and a message of scenes, but they are all histories. i try to ground the men plausibility. based on opossum believes an insult to of the impulses of the

players as john from history's tomorrow histories, biographies, and several interviews. and the common thread is that history does not turn on a dime. it turns on a plugged nickel. there were theories of history that focus on geography, climate, natural resources, theology, radiology, mass movements, great leaders. but the smallest random access is the one that we like to see patterns. there two examples i don't deal with in the book. there arrived a few minutes later than planned, which meant he had to climb up on a chair to see the speaker stand which meant that when he pulled out a weapon of bystander noticed and jostled him which meant that he shot, head trauma and killed the

visiting mayor of chicago, rather than his presumed target president elect franklin delano roosevelt. that was a matter of a few minutes' delay of his arrival. so that five minutes may have meant that we would have had as president during the great depression john hance corner, the speaker of the house, a crusty texan with little charm, less charisma, and the capacity to move a shaken nation that was minimal. indeed, there was a book by philip k. dick. some of you may know it. man in the high castle, that presents a nazi victory in world war two because there is no roosevelt to mobilize the nation. or you think about 1931 when a visiting british politician in new york but the wrong way are crossing the street into revenue. you know, birds look this way. we look that way. hit by taxi. developed pleurisy and almost died. a slightly different injury, slightly worse alice.