certainly the standar today, he did not make a lot of money. >> and the trial was one of the reasons he was in the headlines too. that had concluded, was it a few months, i think, before the scopes trial started. so, he was well known. that trial was about the two chicago teenagers murdered a school made. it was just a thrill killing, to see if they could do it and get away with it. what he managed to do was to keep them from the death penalty. and it didn't -- what was nove .. >> i think it would be interesting, we have a minute or two, if you could tell us where the pictures came from, who took them -- >> they're from the robinson collection at the arches at the university of tennessee. and i'd looked, but couldn't find photographers that were associated with them.

they have -- some of them were published, have been published before, i mentioned, and you'll find them scattered around some of them in newspapers. so, this tells me probably some old wire service photos, maybe the services are defunct now, like united press international. but other than that -- and it's not one photographer, either. it's -- it has to be different photographers. and i say that with a bit of reservation because i'm not a historian of things visual or photographic. but as far as even my ill-trained eye can tell in these kinds of things, very different techniques, very different framing and some of them posed, some f them action photos, if you will. a monkey playing a iano, that's an action photo. that sort of stuff. >> have there been any other books like this published before, to your knowledge? >> no. that's what made it novel, was as much as has been written

about the scopes trial, we don't have these phoos appear before. and they've been laying around in the archives, obviously, for all of these years. so, one of those oddities that we think that ground is pretty well plowed historically on any given top ibbling, and guess what? it isn't. and i think larson's book, his "summer for the gods" had illustrated that well. if you told me 10 years ago someone would write a pulitzer-prize winning book on the scopes trial, i would slap my head. are you kidding? with all that's been written about that? it's not going to happen. but clearly he covered ground that hadn't been covered and covered the same ground than what had been covered before. so, a lesson for historians there, i guess. >> i want to thank you all of you and i want to invite you to come to the signing session and to purchase mr. caud irks ll's

book. and, of course, it's not his book alone, it's the other authors he mentioned and it makes good reading and good looking. i'm interested. >> thank you. [applause]

>> this is a little over an hour. >> good evening, everyone. welcome. when the year 1862 began, as stephen sears writes, in the our new "the best of the civil war" abraham lincoln told the council he was greatly disturbed by the state of the affairs. treasury nearly exhausted, public credit was evaporating, congress was full of jack up ins he said, congress was perilless, they spent more time fighting each other than the confederates. in the missouri, than in the east, george mcclellen was sick in bed with typhoid fever.

his army stall mated, inspiring the comment, if general mcclellen did not want to use the army, maybe he could borrow it. for a while. if something was not done soon, lincoln con fided the billion would be out. 1862 could have been the worse year. before it was over, they got better than worse than better, than worse. before the disasters, abraham lincoln did nothing less than transfer the war for union into the union for freedom. that was a pretty breathtaking turn of events. we wanted to explore that year today with an emphasis on the extraordinary battle of antedum that did so much to transform

america in many ways. let's go back a couple of days before the battle. september 15th, 1862. lincoln to mcclellen, destroy the rebel army if possible. two days later, in a -- after a battle widely reported in the press as a major union victory, the commander in chief issued no congratulations that i've ever seen in the army, but a few days later, he issued the emancipation proclamation, suspended the writ of habeas corpus, started nagging mcclellen to go into action. he wrote the amazing letter to a quaker leader that america was going through a fiery trial. which god permitted to continue for some wise purpose of his own mysterious and unknown tonight. well, among james mcpherson's

landmark books in which he wrote in a war with civil crucial turning points, the battle of antedum was the most crucial of them all. in his unsurpassed biography, he described as the opportunity of a lifetime for the general and for the union alike which mcclellen squandered by losing and i quote his inner composure and with it the courage to command under the press of combat. strong words, about an extraordinary moment. and tonight we'd like to drill down to the still unresolved questions of what was lost and what was gained in 1862. let's back up first a little bit. things were looking up for the union in the spring. shiloh in the west. the monitor driving off of the

marrmac, new orleans april, disaster, and above up, before antedum, there was a really brilliant plan that had a reasonable chance of conquering richmond and ending the war. >> mcclellen thought it was going to be very much -- he thought the war would be over. his famous letter to lincoln, he had actually drafted before the seven days started. he was planning to resume the role of commander in chief, gentleman in chief, i should say, and he expected to be writing this letter from richmond. he was very optimistic until the seven days. until lee attacked him. jim, lee emerged almost overnight. lee became the successful defender of the confederacy.

was he a sleeping giant that was allowed to slumber too long by jefferson davis? >> well, i don't think so. because lee's experience in the first year of the war had been a succession of failures. after he had helped immobilize the virginia troops and then had joined the confederacy, when virginia finally did join the confederacy, he had been sent out to deal with the problem in the western part of virginia, which became west virginia, where mcclellen actually had overseen successful union occupation in many of that area. lee was sent out to western virginia to try to recover that area in august of 1861. and every effort he made turned out to be a failure. he came into -- came under all kinds of criticism from the

richmond newspapers. it was called granny lee as you suggest. then in november of 1861, jefferson davis sent him to the south atlantic coast to charleston. just in time for lee to witness the capture of fort royal by the union navy and the occupation of the south carolina and the georgia sea island by union forces. and other major reverse for the confederacy. lee had to try to deal with what was going to be the consequence of that. and he gave orders to pull back out of range of the union navy, all along the coastline. which was seen as another major retreat from the confederacy. so it's not that lee was sometime a sleeping giant who's talents were not recognized, he actually had not really succeeded in doing anything. he was called back to richmond in march of 1862, became

military advisor to jefferson davis, and then began fashioning the confederate strategy of a counteroffensive. first with stone wall jackson in the valley, then after joe johnston was mounded in the battle of seven pines, lee was given direct command of what he remained the army of northern virginia. that's when the lee greatness really starts. and the lee legend really starts. up until that time, no, robert e. lee was also rad. >> let me ask you a question. he's a successful counteroffensive your for the defender of the capitol. as we march towards the fall of 1862, why did robert e. lee change a winning formula and decide to go on the offensive and march into maryland? steve, let's start with you? >> well, he really didn't have

much choice. after second bull run, he could go directions, literally four directions. if he went towards washington, he had not the arms or the heavy artillery to besiege washington. and if he went back south, he was admitted that his plan -- his offensive plan had failed. if he went west into the shenandoah valley, he could supply his men, but he was marking time and lose the advantage of the initiative. so he ended up going north where there was a lot of food and a lot of -- they thought they would raise marylanders to join the confederate cause. which didn't turn out to be true. he couldn't stay still. this was his best option. jim? >> well, i think lincoln -- lee was always an avid leader and followers of northern politics. he was well aware the

congressional elections were scheduled for october and november of 1862. and even wrote to jefferson davis saying by invading maryland and as he hoped, inflicting another defeat on the army, maybe on the scale of second manassas, that he could influence that election and maybe the democrats would gain control of the house and force the lincoln administration to negotiate for peace. also at the same time, we need to remember that the war is taking place not only in virginia, but across the front. the confederates were on the offensive in the western theater too. where jackson bragg and mr. smith were invading kentucky. with the idea of winning that state. when lee went into maryland,

confederate soldiers were on the march elsewhere with the hope in effect i think conquering the peace by forcing the lincoln administration to negotiate with them. also lee's personality, his character was never satisfied with remaining static. remaining on the defensive. he always wanted to seize and hold the initiative. and that meant all was going on the offensive. and we'll see that happens over and over again. in lee's career, as long as his armies are physically capable of doing that. >> he moved as you both pointed out into a state that has very divided loyalties. nearly -- well, probably would have succeeded had lincoln left the legislature and secession to it's own devices. how does the northern press and the population acongress lee's route react to the arrival of

the army of northern virginia? >> one thing you have to remember, the general halek, the general and chief had a ban on the press. and reporters were not supposed to go to the army of potomac, he was unhappy with the press coverage at second bull run. who was going on was just all based on rumor. and there was -- nothing passed out by the government about what was going on. everybody tag after every soldier they could find to see what was going on and what he thought about the situation and so on and so on. i'm sure there was a great deal of panic in philadelphia, in harrisburg, governor was all upset, because they were sure that pennsylvania was going to be the target. >> well, if lee had been able to

invade maryland in the counties, he would have met a very favorable welcome. that was a pro confederate part. but the topography, lo -- logistics he could only cross up and invade the western part which was strongly unionist. so the reception there in frederick in the other western part of maryland was really quite cool to the confederates. especially in contrast to the welcome for general mcclellen and the army when they marched in on september 13th. mcclellen writes to his wife and said he's being showered with praise and flowers and so on by the local population. so clearly maryland was a divided state, this was an

invasion in the unionist part of the state and the hope that by invading maryland, they would liberate it from the iron heal of yankee desperatism, it didn't happen. >> we'll get back later. if you read the letters that was edited, it was forever being showered with flowers. unless it was the lincoln administration under cutting him and preventing him from getting the credit he deserved. let's talk for a moment as we did backstage. we might get the issue out into the open and talk for a minute about the background of the famous lost orders and how decisive they played in the run up to the battle. stephen whereby why -- stephen,

why don't you start? >> they were trying to catch the ferry. 12,000 men and a good deal of armor men. this was in frederick. he writes out ordered on september 9 to divide his army into four. jackson was going to go out to the west and completely surrounding harper's ferry. he went it out courier to all of the generals involved. the copy that went to stonewall jackson, he read it and copied it again for dh hill, that had been under his ordered. one of the couriers was also taking the same message to dhl. and, of course, it never arrived. and it was dropped in a clover field south of frederick. and when we don't know why it

happened or how it could have been prevented. because the curious was supposed to deliver the envelope with the significant and went back to the headquarters. but it did not go. my own theory is that it was careless courier and he discovered he lost it, went to dh headquarters and said, oh yes. he felt relieved. and went back to headquarters. nobody seems to have pursued the case of getting the proof of delivery. in any case, on the 14th, the indiana regimen were in the field and they found the envelope, picked it up, read the message, and it also had three cigars with it. he was smart enough to realize, since he recognized all of the names and places, that this was

pretty important. he kicked it upstairs. went to the regiment, and went up to, i think it went to brigade. then it skipped a few. each person that saw it realized how important it was. and from there, general was in charge of the corps. he sent a covering note along with this to general mcclellen, saying it looks important and we believe it is authentic. and he describes very briefly how it was found. by noon on the 13th, is that right -- yes, 13th. mcclellen had this order. and to take the next step, if i may, while he was -- he was head of several people from the city of frederick discussing the occupation and so on. and he was handed this dispatch. he looked at it and supposedly

he threw up his hands and said now i know what to do. we are not. it maybe a pocketful. any case, he was very much excited by all of this. he dismissed all of his guests and off they went. one of them turned out to be a confederate sympathizer. as we were discussing. he was a confederate spy that he had paid to be on the meeting. stewart ran off, they ran off and found stewart and gave him this. it finally made it's way to general lee. stewart's announcement of a lot of this. but the question is how much did general lee know and when he knew it? as far as i can determine, the only thing that he learned from this marylander was that something of the going on. the general lee -- general mcclellen was excited about

something or other. and that's -- i'll leave the story there and maybe jim can pick it up. >> the big question, that i suppose, the great debate that continues is whether this was as you put it, and i think you are decisive on this subject, whether it was, in fact, a sloppy courier mistake, or whether it was the most brilliant counterespionage action of the war which was going to throw out mcclellen. with all of that information, you would think that mcclellen would have been more aggressive and successful. jim, what do you think? counterespionage or mistake that wasn't taken advantage of. >> i'm convinced it was sloppy and that the orders were genuine lee orders. they had been lost by the courier. there were two other dimensions of it. one of them serious and one not so serious. and serious one is why did

mcclellen delay so long before giving orders to different generals, especially to general william f. franklin to force him. those orders went out to franklin at 6:00 that evening. then mcclellen did actually express the certain amount of urgency in his orders to franklin. because it was franklin's task to rescue at harper's ferry, which was under siege by 25,000 confederates on to the overall command of jackson. franling was to force his way through the gap and come to the aid of the gerrisson harper's ferry by driving away some of them. he didn't get started until 6:00 the next morning, which was 18 hours after mcclellen had the information.

mcclellen right away or maybe it was franklin, who was one of mcclellen's closest confidant and supporters, did not take advantage of the lost order of the intelligence windfall that they had. the other question that i have is: why was the -- were these ordered wrapped around three cigars and who got the cigars? [laughter] >> nobody knows. >> last they were headquarters. one the generals smoked them. >> nowhere to be scene is the cigars from the story. >> i've never understand that. why they were wrapped around three cigars. >> not if they were in an envelope marked secret ordered. it's an extra step. with the information in hand with the sense that the cat is out of the bag, that lee's plan

has been exposed and it's knowledge has been gained by the union commander, forces meet, it's the bloodiest single day of the war, and it's portrayed in different ways at the time. certainly lincoln needs to declare it a triumph. but did lee lose or did mcclellen barely win? what's your sense of how you conclude who gets responsibility and who gets blamed for what happened on november 17th? >> mcclellen was convinced. he was afraid to win. which was the essential thing. can i read something about this? because there's a letter that mcclellen wrote to his wife. this is one day after the battle. september 18th. 8 a.m.

they had this terrible battle. they had the union side and both on the confederate side too, they were expecting the battle to be renewed. they went to the wife and they fought yesterday a terrible battle against the entire rebel army. the battle continued 14 hours and was terrific. fighting on both sides was superb. the general result was our favor. that is to say we gained a great deal of ground and held it. it was a success from other decided victory depends on what occurs today. i hope that god has given us a great success. it is all in his hands where i am excellent to leave it. then he adds, this is interesting sentence. those in who's judgment i rely tell me i fought the battle splendidly and it was a masterpiece of art.

this is the most revealing letter that he wrote. he is obviously not going to follow up what he had accomplished and what is meant at accomplished the day before. he thinks he has done a wonderful thing. largely because he has prevented the superior force that they have gain gained ground. as it happened, he was counting three. for every one of lee's army. >> which was his habit? >> habit indeed. >> at the same time that mcclellen was sending the letter to his wife, he was also sending a telegram to general halek, he said i expect the battle to be renewed today. not i expect to review the attack. >> the guard knew the attack. as he put it. >> yes. yes it's quite true that

mcclellen says over and over again and members of his staff and some of his generals like fits john porter think the confederates has 110,000. lee fought that battle with 37,000. mcclellen had 80,000 there of whom about 65,000 actually got involved in the fight. which is almost a 2-1 advantage over the confederates. yet mcclellen never took advantage of that superiority. he sent in the tax one corps, one division, sometimes only one brigade at a time. peace meal the tax, and on two separate occasions, there was a real opportunity to breakthrough the confederate line. he had only used his reserves. 20,000 who had never fired a shot during the bat at all. because he feared that lao had the tens of thousands of reserves, he never commit the

his own. for fear they, ambushed by the phantom reserves of lee. there was an extraordinary number of missed opportunities on the union's side because of mcclellen's psychology, i think, that could have made this a really decisive victory, rather than a very qualified union victory. >> and yet both of you have written, and i think we are at the stage now when we should address this, that in many ways, this was the most important battle of the civil war. i'm not going to add any hints. tell me why you each think that. steve? go ahead. >> at the time, they didn't know that. the confederates did not think that antietam was a defeat. they captured harper ferry, and campaign on the whole, they had inflicted twice as many as the union had suffered.

so it only became -- we only know now, i guess is my point, we only know now how important it was. once these emancipation proclamation came out, it had ripple effects overseas. jim can talk about that. there's all kinds of beliefs that mcclellen really needed to follow this up. even when he got his men or his horses reshod and his new shoes for his men and all of the other stuff that he was waiting for. all he had to do was to cross the potomac and pursue. he was reluctant. he had to be ordered again and again and again to do it. >> jim, you've written clearly that what makes antietam

important and fascinating, stephen the point that antietam maybe more important looking back than now in september 18th, 1862. it's transfortive because it changes the rational for the war. >> not only that, i think it was recognized at the time by a lot of people in the north as a transformative victory. they had huge headlines says great victory. even in the "new york times" it says it was one the greatest in the history of warfare. i think that's because up until the battle of antietam, the confederates were on a role. and union mor real -- morale was at rock bottom. one thing that mcclellen should be given credit, is reviving and reorganizing it, getting it all -- getting the army off of it -- off of the mat

of the count nine. and putting it in shape to win at least this qualified victory at antietam. but because expectations in the south even in the northern and the extraordinary were that lee would win -- third time would be the charm. he had won the peninsula campaign. he had won the second battle of bull run, now he was invading the north. this is going to be the good craw. the questioning blow. when that didn't happen, i think there was a great sigh of relief in the north. if it had happened, if the confederates would have won another victory, i think the chances are quite strong that they would have won control of the house of representatives. >> and european regular in --

regular in addition. >> because we know they were considering intervening by offering the offices on the bases of con federal independence. they could have followed soot, -- suit, and that would have made a huge different in the war. when they retreated back, prime minister palmerson in particular, who's power here was decisive, backed off. napoleon of france wanted to go ahead. some members of british cabinets wanted to go ahead. he and some other members said, no, let's back off and see what develops next. if that invasion -- if lee's invasion has been successful, if he had won some kind of a victory at antietam and not been

forced to retreat, which by the way, lee hated the idea of treating back over the potomac and even gave thought after he had recrossed into virginia of crossing again and continuing the campaign. but his army was in no shape to do it. he finally recognized that. but if he had won the kind of victory expected when he moved into maryland, i think there would have been some kind of european intervention. you've got a revival of northern morale, you've got the republicans retaining control of congress, you've got the british backing off from intervention, and you've got abraham lincoln seizing upon this battle. unhappy as he was with mcclellen's failure to make it even more decisive and to follow it up vigorously by moving into -- moving again into virginia. lincoln does take it as the sign

he had been waiting for to issue the emancipation proclamation. which does transfer the nature of the war and make it now a war for freedom as well union. for all of these reasons, i think antietam stands as the most important turning point of the war. >> i'm going to -- i'm going to take issue with one thing you said. i don't want to get too far ahead of the story. that is how well lincoln did in the election, control, yes, but obviously a huge loss for the republicans. probably more attributable to emancipation. >> well ab morale -- as a game changer. >> yes, the democrats gained 33 seats -- >> 34. >> 34. all right. [laughter] >> however, in the last 20 years, before 1862, every midterm congressional election had resulted in the victory by the opposition party. this was the first midterm

election in 20 years in which the opposition party did not control. >> remember, democrats were not participating. yeah. >> the other thing is you win on a technicality. >> but the other thing is that mcclellen -- lincoln didn't fire mcclellen until the day after the midterm elections. if he had fired him before that, i think there would have been a democratic, perhaps sweep. >> yup. >> let's talk about emancipation as a result. lincoln, of course, jim is right. the verb is acting one way. it's open to question in another. seizing the moment. he actually waits quite a bit. he waits five days. for a fellow who says that god decided this question in favor of the slaves, as he tells his

cabinet when he calls them into session, to say he's going to use antietam as a reliever to pull on the emancipation. but he takes his time. let's talk about his decision. he's got the emancipation written, he's waiting for the moment. i've always been curious about why he waits? because he expects that mcclellen is still going to be marching? >> we know the battle was over on the 17th. they didn't know whether it might in the be reviewed. lee still in position on the 18th. he doesn't retreat until the night of the 18th and 19th. mcclellen sends the feeble pursuit. they get involved in the battle on the 19th and 20th. there's still fighting until the 20th. it's more accurate to say that lincoln -- he hadn't sure the campaign is over until the 20th.

it's only two days. >> he also waits for a scheduled cabinet meeting, does he not? >> he does. and for the weekend. yeah, sort of business as usual. >> but he had been waiting since july 22nd to issue this. >> yes, of course, i've recently done some work on the notion of how many people in washington knew that a proclamation was eminent? i think my conclusion is plenty. the newspapers were full of it, he had shown it or shared the story with enough blabber mouthed politician in the white house office that i think, you know, after years of wondering why william sapphire and his novel concluded it was the worse kept secret in washington, i've come to the conclusion that he was right. boy, lincoln needed that. let's talk about he made a great point both of you about lincoln's keeping mcclellen's

on with that election looming and now the political landscape changed enormously by the proclamation. which is as much as we look back on it and say what took him so long and why didn't he free more slaves and the other things we hear from modern commentators. itage -- it agitated huge numbers of people and distinguished huge numbers of people. at the same time, lincoln loses patient with mcclellen. he began heckling him. his famous telegram, he was running out of pair. mcclellen was furious at the tone that lincoln was taking. was it justified? >> on the battlefield, on the first of october, i think, three or four days. the two men seem to have come up with the -- we don't have anyone's -- no one was there listen to what they were

discussing, unfortunately. but the two of them came off with totally different views of what was even discussed. and lincoln goes back to washington and he expects mcclellen to start across the potomac. and two or three days past and then he tells general to order him across. still nothing happens. and mcclellen who is riding home and he thinks the administration -- lincoln is mad at me. i'm going to sent off to the west. he had no conception of -- i can't believe that lincoln was so unclear as to what he wanted done. apparently, lincoln could talk to mcclellen and nothing seems to register. it hadn't. >> mcclellen was preemptory with the commander in chief in what's he's willing to fight to.

when he reached the emancipation proclamation is upset. then comes the suspicious of habeas corpus and marshal law. it toys with expressing this. his advisors tell him, his political friends tell him that he should remain silent about this over the military and policy and army carries it out. so he backs off. privately, he makes it clear he's unhappy with the emancipation proclamation. and earlier, he had written the famous letter that steve referred to a while ago. saying this a declaration about the slavery will dissolve the present armies. this should not be a war for the

conquest or the over throw of southern institutions but merely a war and the union as it was. i don't think mcclellen ever really changed his mind. when he runs for president in 1864, he runs on the platform that avoids any commitment at all to the abolition of slavery. and runs on the platform of a party that pledges the constitution as it is and the union as it was. so mcclellen clearly did not like the direction that the war was beginning to take. yet he does not openly protest against it in september and october of 1862. >> he does write a letter to -- he really issues kind of a little address to his troops expressing all of this. the civilian is superior to the military and so on. he takes the one remark that for any -- i can't remember the exact quote.

something to the effect if there's any objection to this, the polls are always open. this is how to solve the problem. the midterm elections were coming up. it's rather thinly vailed. >> yes. >> as we contemplate the bloodiest day in american warfare, we want to open the room up to questions from you with a reminder that we have staff with microphones and we need you to raise your hand and then wait for a microphone. all right. first question right here. >> as you probably know, general lee's word -- last words before he died or as he was dying were tell hill to come up. you must tell hill to come up. would you please comment?

>> well, that does actually probably refer to the battle of antietam. a.p. hill had been left behind at harper's ferry after the confederates captured him for the soldiers and apptured union soldiers and the securing of all of the armaments and uniforms and shoes and am -- ammunition and it's a boom. on the morning of september 17th, lee had sent ordered in the evening of september 16th, actually, sent orders down to hill to get up to sharpsburg as early as he could on the 17th. lee knew that the battle was impending. so hill's division makes a force march of about 17 miles and gets

to the battlefield about 4:00 in the afternoon, the ones who aren't -- you know, scattered along his way. half of his division gets there in the forced march and crashes into the flank of the attack on burnside's attack after he had crossed the stream. he was actually threatening to cave in the confederates right flag, a thin flag when hill crashes into burnside's left plank. and lee expressed a great sigh of relief when the word reaches him that hill had arrived. it saved the day for the confederates. i think when lee's last words were tell a.p. hill to come up, that's what he's referring to. >> here in the back. >> all right. >> you know, i think he was successfully addressing mcclellen's weaknesses. i think lee deserves some blame. after the seven days, and

manassas, thousands of the men wouldn't cross the potomac because they wanted to fight in the south. he went without 40,000 men. is that true? >> blame for lee? well, again, i don't think -- lee's whole determination was to get this over with as soon as possible. i mean he recognized, i think, that the south could not maintain itself very long against the industrial make of the north and so on. right from the time he takes command on june 1 of 1862, he takes the offensive in order to try to end this war as soon as he could. and i think this carries over, it happens certainly on -- during the peninsula campaign when he very, very -- comes very close to defeating mcclellen. and he immediately goes north, again, he has no choice.

he has to do something. because general pope is to the north of him. general mcclellen is to the south of him. he's got to do one or the other. he goes after pope first. then as i said before, at that point, he is faced with the decision either to keep going on to retreat and give up all that he's gained. so i don't think he's really -- i don't see him to be blamed for this. >> it is quite true though, that his army was in terrible shape. many of the men did not have shoes. the supply system for the army of northern virginia was shamble s. lee probably had about 50,000 men when he began this campaign. and he has only 37,000. of course, there had been about 3,000 casualties at the battle of south mountain on september 14th. but something like 10,000 of his men had straggled. they aren't made it. because they were exhausted, they were sick, they didn't have

shoes, and so on. and lee actually -- he's quite condemnatory towards the straggers. they lack conviction, courage, slackers to use the later language. in fact, i think they were just physically incapable of keeping up with the army. i think that probably lee was not as cognizant of that as he should have been. >> it's interesting. you have one general who is so aggressive with so little, and another who is to timid with so much. where is the next question? >> hi, professor mcpherson, i

believe you said the trigger was the victory at antietam. they had lost how many the first day? >> union casualties were just under 13,000. >> i believe douglass had write to lincoln black men couldn't serve in the army as long as slavery existed in the south. it's been suggested that one the pais way was to pay for the way of the existence of black troops. what would you say to that? >> lincoln was quite hesitant to enlist blacks, especially former slaves, in the union army. in august of 1862, just a month before the battle, he had actually rejected the offer of a couple of regimens of brack -- blacks troops in indiana said if they were enlisted 50,000 from the border state. what he meant is 50,000 union soldiers from states like

kentucky and missouri and maryland. 50,000 would be turned against us that are now for us. he was worried about the response both to emancipation, but even more volatile was the issue of putting arms in the hands of black men. so basically lincoln is edging towards emancipation and towards enlisting of black soldiers. there's no final comment about the emancipation on july 1st. emancipation, then black troops. >> i agree with jim on that. i think he's extremely nervous about black recruitment. he has to be -- he's kicking and screaming on january 1st. the big motivation is the home front in the south and the political advantage. i don't think he's there yet on

recruitment by any means. >> right here in the front. >> my name is alice. i wanted to know, where there any women on the battlefield? >> any women in the battle to do? -- battlefield? >> on that battlefield. >> not that they were obvious. there were a good many of those who dressed as women -- women who dressed as men. i don't know anything -- i hadn't run that across that at antietam. >> well, a number of years ago, there was a woman named lauren cook burgess who was interested in reenacting. she's from north carolina. she was at a re-enactment of the a battle of antietam in the late 1980s. she was caught dressed as a union soldier.

she was caught coming out of the ladies room. and dishonorably discharged, i should say. and she seized upon this and did a lot of research and sound evidence for several hundred women who passed as men dressed up as soldiers. some of them wives or lovers of soldiers. so they were protected. she found evidence of four women who actually fought at antietam. one of which was killed. so if she's right, there were some. she actually sued the park service on the grounds of gender discrimination and won her suit. after she had been not allowed to the participate in the living history demonstration.

>> speaking of women, there's a woman that i think you would enjoy meeting, a surprised guest to me. she's an historian in her own right. she's also the defendant on both sides of her family, descendant, on one side, a german photographer who took two photographs. one the first of him wearing a beard in 1860 in chicago. she's also defended on the other side is one the highest ranking jewish officers. she's hear from florida. i thought you would encourage meeting her. stand up please. [applause] proximate cause plays she's not a veteran as far as i know. we have time for one more

question. >> everybody has a point of view. seems one the frustrations is that mcclellen is so hard to like. what's your interpretation of the famous evening where president lincoln was waiting in general mcclellen's parlor for him to come home. he went straight home without acknowledges him. people have suggested it was embarrassed because he was drunk. that it or rudeness? >> i think there is no love lost between abraham lincoln and george mcclellen. they are -- they just despise each other in many ways. mcclellen was rude that night. i don't think it was a matter of him being drunk 37 -- drunk. i think he had been at a wedding. he came home and found the president of the united states lounging. he didn't want to tuck to him. it wasn't business hours. the fact that abraham lincoln

didn't not have him dismissed as the secretary tells. he says, listen, i'll -- whatever it takes to get him to win victories. coyou have a different view of that? was he drunk? that would add something. >> i don't think he drank at all. that was not the first time. lincoln could stop by and he was told the general had gone to bed. he couldn't -- he wouldn't wake him up and call on him. lincoln after that episode does change in his treatment -- he's much more direct, he calls him to him from now on. so it did have an effect on him, i think. >> you know, gettysburg may have inspired lincoln's greatest speech. when he got to maryland in object, all lincoln can say was at first, if i were as i have

been most of my life, i might talking amusing to you for an half an hour and it wouldn't hurt anybody. hardly gemlike words. antietam did inspire or at least made possible lincoln's greatest act. what lincoln himself called the central act of my administration and the great act of the 19th century. antietam and the fall of 1862 liberated lincoln as much as it liberated enslaved people. as jim and stephen have argued so eloquently and convincingly in their work. as we all agree, it transformed the war for the union as it was into the war for the union as it would be. the union that embraced freedom. thank you all very much. [applause] [applause]

>> what's your answer to common sense? >> we refer to common sense all the time. it's not something that get defined. common sense is supposed to be the kind of thing you don't have to talk about. it's the wisdom that everybody has. it's the obvious. the self-evident. and it's something that politicians refer to a lot. if you ever notice that democrats or republicans, they love to talk about a common sense solution to health care or common sense solution to the problems of the environment. but nobody ever actually sits down. what is common sense? what would it be? it's every day. everyday ordinary wisdom, reasoning, about everyday ordinary matters that we're supposed to agree upon without

discussion. >> when did it enter -- the term enter the political discourse? >> well, it's a very old term. the term goes all the way back to aristotle in political form. it's not political, but starting in the early 18th century in england. it starts to become a political term. and it starts to suggest a kind of politics that everyone can participate in potentially. a sense that politics isn't something so complicated that ordinary people can't participate in it, and that ordinary people have a collective wisdom that lends itself to thinking about political issues. that happens after the glorious resolution in england first. >> how did aristotle use common sense the term? >> it's completely different. it's some residue of the term. for aristotle, there was some notion that humans had five basic senses. we still think that. that's right out of greek phil

-- philosophy. we tried to coordinate it. how do you figure out that sugar and salt were different? they looked the same. tasted different. he suggested there was a common sense that combined the five, unless you distinguish, but also put together who was sweet and white was the sugar, and what was a little bit bitter and white was the salt. if that makes any sense. we have different explanations for that now. it's really fallen entirely out of psychology and brain science. it lasted through the middle ages. :

>> we wouldn't fight about religion, politics, ironical ly of course, as soon as it was introduced everybody said fighting but that was the story ever since. >> host: and the american political discourse was it thomas paine? >> it was known before then

but he really brings the term into american politics. and now it is to the democracy. common sense is already in circulation fostering democratic notions but it comes up for the idea. >> host: what was the impact of the book? >> it is hard to imagine. >> it is the thrift addition it is very short and meant to be highly accessible did it cost a lot 18th century terms and nobody has read anything 25 editions in the first year every major city additions came out london

and dublin and it was the right set of ideas it is rare to have that kind of immediate impact. >> host: did he make a lot of money? >> he did not. he was not a very successful businessman died in total poverty was a lot of schemes along the way but did not make much of that as of the sellers did not guarantee and pirated by all kinds of people pain is obviously incredibly difficult man and a lot of those things but also brilliant one great track during the american revolution in the french revolution and changed opinion internationally he may call him the first revolutionary.

>> host: where do you come up with the idea of riding about common-sense? >> i was intrigued by two things. could you write a history of something? it isn't supposed to have a history and is what we always agree upon. that does not sound very historical but i was intrigued by the idea where do we get the idea there for the eighth idea is outside history? the second reason i came to the topic is we live through a moment every surgeons of populism and we probably all agree on that and common-sense is that idea and it is a pre-history of populism economy ever get that notion that ordinary people together with kitchen table solutions might know better than expert policy wonks in washington?

of those two routes of historical writing combined. >> host: what do you think of glenn beck and the tea party movement have thought of thomas paine? >> i find it fascinating. during the reagan years, thomas paine was the patron saint of the left the founding father of radicals and much hated early century america for the suppose it atheist views and the radical political economy and most people associated themselves with his ideas and then on the ferry left that he is the only founding father we don't recognize and quite the same way as hamilton madison and jefferson and monroe.

but with reagan something interested happen he quoted paid quite often also the notion of common sense and spoke of his own ideas stemming not from the political wisdom but from the peoples' common sense. and he opened the way as opposed to the left-wing populism adoption and idea of common sense and now last in a long line but the book was a best seller with the incredible numbers of copies >> host: professor rosenfeld, in your view, who was ronald reagan adaptation of thomas paine purposeful? >> guest: i think you recognized very clearly

scenes that continue to have a good american residents. tomorrow will be sunny outlook that we can do this and with pain, a folksy quality that didn't have to necessarily be applied to the set of ideas that painted but could be adopted for different purposes. the interesting thing about populism as whole as it doesn't have to stand for any set of ideas for any ideology that matches. it is away and a style of talking fat can resume in two different and so has the quality of having revolutionary implications and deeply conservative funds and found a temperament he could use.

>> host: you teach history here. >> i am an expert in french revolution and the am i in mint budget i am interested in this point* teaching courses about stage of revolution the american french and haitian revolution and they teach more general courses about history of europe in the world and the relationship and the history of human rights. where do we get those modern ideas? i am interested in the modern vocabulary and the concept that we bandied about. >> host: go to your expertise. what is a term or a concept used during the revolution? 1789? >> what i find interesting

is the french revolution does adopt a resolution of the common sense of a very similar notion but to a different end and if you see those revolutionary democratic populism, what you see in the french revolution is common-sense feud exactly the opposite way as a counter revolutionary way meaning the ada that could be leveled against the radical reason of robespierre and a way to defend traditional ways of doing things with the wisdom of the countryside and the modern anti-democratic populism but in the french context.

>> host: that have been just a couple of years after word. >> incredible number of influences. jefferson was there for the beginning of the french revolution help retain the rights of man and a great documents and off i at becomes the head of the national guard because he is the hero of the american revolution. and the real reason the french have such a financial crisis to begin with this it costs so much to begin in the american revolution 15 years earlier. sometimes it is inconceivable without the american revolution. not that it went the same direction. there are plenty of differences between the two, one of the fascinating things of thinking of them together is figuring out how deeply interwoven the finance is the ad is an military aspects how these were. >> host: do you have any

examples of nonsensical? >> i do. there is a final section on the politics that seemed to be quite far afield but the artistic movement of the first half of the 20th century between the two world wars took the approach that common-sense has gotten us nowhere with mass destruction and it was time may consider the possibilities of fun doing common sense. i am a fascinated by the adr that much of the artistic of vanguard whittier a painting and movies of the 20th century is focused on challenging common sense and figuring out the nonsensical and absurd and a response to

the politics of common sense ended in the 20th century with deeply destructive events. >> host: your book common sense of political history is published by harper? why? >> harvard does wonderful books that i think straddle realm of the academic and of the trade. and really trying to reach a broader audience with serious books and marketing as such and it is hoped many publications will fill this particular airspace in which they could re-read by university audiences tata but also ideally make a dent to reach a leadership.

>> host: what is your background and where were you raise? >> guest: i was born in new york city europe and northern new jersey and draw up with parents who were in the arts. my father was a cellist and my mother was an editor. i went university of princeton and graduate school at harvard and ended up 15 years ago in charlottesville teaching european history of of first sense. >> what is life like? >> it is wonderful to teach about the 18th century the students are excellent. says you have probably seen and it is an interesting

place and it is the big public marseille university with a liberal arts school with the ivy league school at an interesting about them in state comment on a state and enhanced with a law school filled with interesting people i am very happy being here. >> host: as a tenured professor and are you encouraged to write and publish it? >> absolutely. there is not a sense if you do not write a book you will lose your job tomorrow we have enormous privilege of job security but there is a strong sense it is a research university that they go together the way to

provide students with interesting courses is buy simultaneously and gazed with a research and writing project. almost all of my colleagues are always somewhere in the process of writing books and articles. pressure may not be the right word after a while but it becomes what you do. >> host:. >> host: what about naming the but common-sense. [laughter] >> guest: i have not thought about that there is legalities of publishing the images as is always the case. but common sense is not a copyrighted term but a part of our folk -- vocabulary and then has been appropriated to every possible end if you go to amazon you'll see coon