security regarding dealing with improved pipeline security and i raise the issue of the incident in montana, which was not a peripheral act. it was not an act by a terrorist, but our pipeline system is -- and what are you doing and what is happening with the security technology for pipelines? >> yes, maam. of course the overarching challenge with pipelines is they are so geographically diverse and there's so much asset to protect. what it necessitates from the beginning is prioritizing those for civility set are most critical to you. tsa does a pretty prescriptive process by which operators are to determine but ultimately the operator knows or should know what is most at risk and so forth so it against with prioritizing those things. their systems and the like can be applied effectively. across miles and miles of pipeline it is very difficult. there are-somethings working in our favor. for instance because of the d.o.t. and epa requirements

about monitoring we do have in our case at colonial we have aircraft that fly continuously. those folks are well aware of the security implications and they know to report abnormalities and so forth. we still consider our greatest risk to be a third party with a big piece of yellow iron digging a water well or some kind of trenching that is outside of our company. a sickly a third party is our greatest risk but it has the added effect of monitoring for surreptitious activity. if someone was out there to do us harm who is detecting it. beyond that it is a lot of emphasis being placed on the operators to understand what to look for and what to report, suspicious activities. be to reach out to her local law enforcement committees and invite them to our facilities and we get together and look at the facilities and we talk. so that those folks have it in their mind what we are, what we are worried about and what we are not worried about and are

able to respond. it is a grassroots knit together awareness campaign across the system and we have even involved the general public and landowners. >> i know your challenges best. i know pipelines are where we wouldn't even imagine that they are. i think in working with the chairman i would like to suggest this is an important issue for this committee and working with our stakeholders that we need to focus on ways that we can ensure the highest level of security for this infrastructure that is everywhere. let me do a final quick question to the chief. you made an interesting point and it was really unique that you do not get funding from the state of georgia so you are dependent on resources i assume that you might secure through the fee process, but very dependent on federal resources and i'm reminded even though it was a strange set of facts, of the olympics and the incident that occurred there. i know that you all were heavily

real initiated because of the olympics. so, tell me if dhs funding was zeroed out, we mention the transportation security grants but i know you have access to others. you mentioned grants. how devastating would that be on a large metropolitan area of like yours? >> yes, maam. thank you. we are in a unique situation as i stated. the state of georgia does not sound transit so every day is a challenge for operating budget and so you can imagine that when you start asking for target hardening, it extra sensitive tv cameras or intrusion detection for our rail lines, you have to get in line. so other things take priority so we isaf to be conscious of the fact that if we don't have grant funding for certain items we don't get them.

and so if we were not to receive any more grant funding. >> federal funding. >> federal funding, we would be in trouble. our system would be less vulnerable for attacks and of course we would do as much as we could but of course we could do so much more with the federal funding that we need to receive every day. >> thank you mr. chairman and thank you to the witnesses. >> just to follow-up on the ranking member's question. what percentage of your security funding does come from these federal sources? >> we have a 75% of our funding for target hardening comes from grant funding. and of course we talk about -- we get very little from them because we know -- they know we get a lot from department of homeland security so they go to other agencies first. >> the chair recognizes the chairman for minnesota. >> thank you. real quick after 9/11

unfortunately we have now been incorporated in front of her national security system. all of us have it due diligence to ensure the homeland security and with that said i was kind of wondering in regards to the different models here, see something say something campaign. have you seen that to be fruitful for us? could you start off mr. barton? >> yes, sir. that campaign has been effective in a number of modes of transportation in particular passenger rail, amtrak has a very proactive program. a of commuter promotes see something, say something. it has been widely used across the country in last year dhs adopted a nationwide program that has introduced many critical infrastructure sectors. so we see it as a very effective means by which the public, which is quite familiar with what goes on as they use it each day

because of the time they spend on it. for them to understand how to report security concerns. programs that entail reaching out to those who live near their operations or have interest in their operations can become initialized for security as well. >> thank you, sir. mr. rojas. >> i would describe -- everybody is much more alert now as we look out. we just had an incident back in february and they ranking member state in lubbock texas were student was a saudi student -- was arrested after trying to procure some material to develop a bomb, and the reason why the student was actually are arrested was because an employee of the carrier company noticed that the elements, the cargo, was suspect. we did some research on the person and decided to call and he called in his security team

and they called law-enforcement. at the same time the chemical company also called in the fbi so i think there's this level of alertness that is out there that is part of that information sharing component we are talking about. it goes both ways and it is important to ensure that critical information sharing and a component of how can we communicate with law enforcement to ensure that if we see something so this this issues we able to call it in so i think i would agree. i think it is better and everybody's psyche everybody psyche now. >> thank you. chief dumb and. >> see something say something is become a way of life. is not just a program. you have to embed it into your everyday operation and so see something, say something is valuable. one thing we did learn from 9/11 is that we can't do it alone. even the amount of officers we can't do it alone so we need our customers to be our eyes and ears and to help us. this is something we can ask them to help us and we have a very aggressive see something, say something program but not only that we have a knob on my

shift program for our employees so they help us as well because the employees are your first line of defense so they tell us what is going on. we are very pleased with our see something, say something campaign and tougaloo university came down last month to take a look at our program because it is one of the cutting edge programs for see something, say something. >> you kind of sparked a memory. when i was in a baby, not on my watch. mr. reese? >> most definitely applicable. pipeline plans are typically threat they so there's a baseline of security measures and then there is an additional measure that would be based on threat. however that threat information is obtained whether provided by the government or whether it is concerned citizen or an employee who is alert and aware that information is valuable and it ought to trigger and i was suggested as the cornerstone of

any effective plan. see something say something is an. >> mr. chairman do the time i will yield back, sir. >> i:the gentleman. >> i can't miss this opportunity. i want to thank chief dunham for now publicly announcing a new national effort not on my shift. mr. chairman and i have just made an agreement, not on our time on this committee. >> that's right. not on our ship. >> if anything is going to happen to the nation's transportation system, we just put a heavy burden on ourselves or with the how fast and furious. not in my shift. that is a great one. thank you and i yield back mr. chairman. >> i:the witnesses for your time and preparation. it has been very helpful. we have another panel otherwise i would keep asking questions. that i would remind all the witnesses that members may have additional questions. the whole purpose of this

hearing is to layout the congressional records and facts. i have additional questions and other members mike and i would ask when those are submitted to you within 10 days to try to get us back a written response to those.

[inaudible conversations] the chair recognizes the second panel. we are pleased to have with the several distinguished witnesses before us today on this important topic. let me remind the witnesses that their entire statements will be appearing in the record. our first witness is mr. nicholas calio. how did i pronounce that? i am sure it richard at. he is executive officer of the air transport association. the chair recognizes mr. calio for his opening testimony. you will have to get your microphone there mr. calio. >> thank you. chairman rogers, ranking member jackson-lee and members of the committee, thank you or the opportunity to testify here today.

as the committee undertakes reauthorizing tsa, think it might be helpful to set a little perspective. by recalling why tsa was created to begin with. to protect the united states, its systems, our economy and a way our way of life from terrorist attacks. the reason i mention this is because as i travel around in airports i often observe travelers are passengers who with the passage of time, don't seem to understand why the screening process is necessary. it is. can it be better? cs and ata is working with tsa to try to improve it. effective efficiency is vital to the airline industry and fulfilling our central role in propelling commerce and economic vitality and global competitiveness of the united states. terrorist attacks, either on or through airlines, underscore a simple fact. aviation security is a core homeland security function.

are airlines appreciate the collaborative relationship we have with tsa and their willingness to partner with us which is greatly improving the regulatory process, and we believe aviation security. ata supports the risk-based approach to security for passengers, cargo and crew that administrator pistole has endorsed. allowing tsa to focus its finite resources on that which creates the greatest risk is both good policy and good security. in conjunction with tsa's long-standing strategy and multilayered countermeasures and the incorporation of random measures, this approach allows the agency to further concentrate resources on high-risk passengers and cargo. targeted security includes differentiating individuals and shippers whose backgrounds are known. the air transport association along with the airline pilots association and tsa has

developed a crewmember program which will begin a 90-day pilot program next month at seven major airports. ata has advocated and discussed with tsa having flight attendants included in that program as soon as possible. moving crew out of the security line has a secondary benefit. it's the -- speeds up the process which is something we realize we need to do. passengers could also benefit from a known traveler program and ata strongly endorses tsa's intention of introducing such a program and in our view the sin of the better. finally we support similar programs for cargo. we are working with tsa and customs border protection for further risk-based screening of international inbound air cargo. the goal is for tsa and cpp to receive and process information about shippers earlier in the process of a can do it more

effectively and without stopping the flow of goods. everything we are discussing here today is about the safe and secure transportation of the people and goods that make america what it is today, connecting small and large communities and connecting america to the global economy. today u.s. airlines and their passengers continued to bear the burden of funding a system that and if can affect the entire nation. those who seek to harm our country like targeting commercial aircraft are attacking the entire u.s. populations in our way of life, not just the airlines. yet in 2010 passengers and airlines paid dhs $3.4 billion in taxes and fees, $2 billion of which went to tsa. this is a 50% increase of over what was collected in 2002. it is an enormous contribution from a single segment of the

private sector. no other industry or mode of transportation including anyone on the previous panel is required to fund their own security. only the airline industry and its passengers. this really has got to change. in conclusion, the air transport association will continue to work with tsa to evolve our practices to ensure that we have the best possible security so the u.s. airlines can continue to move goods and people to the benefit of our nations economy and our global competitiveness. we look forward to working with you, with tsa to reinforce these mutual goals. thank you very much. >> thank you to calio. it was very impressive. we appreciate you being here today. we now go to our second witness who is mark van tine who serves as chief executor -- officer and the manufactures association. the chair now recognizes mr. van

tine. >> thank you mr. chairman and good afternoon chair rogers, ranking member jackson-lee and numerous members of the subcommittee. i appreciate this opportunity sit before you and speak about the efforts to reauthorize the transportation and security administration. mr. chairman as you said my day job i am president and ceo. i do appear today on behalf of gamma and my role as a security chairman for the general aviation manufacturers association. gamma represents 72 world leading manufactures of fixed-wing aircraft engines, avionics and components. since the events of september 11, 2001, the generation committee has worked diligently to increase security measures and awareness of potential threats to the aviation system. numerous domestic and international initiatives have been put in place by both government and industry that substantially mitigate security

risks. there are however areas which we believe the committee should focus for improving security and obtaining operational efficiencies. the first is a large aircraft security program. the large aircraft security program has received significant attention from the general aviation community and numbers of congress sent a notice of proposed rulemaking was published in october of 2008. since the introduction the industry has raised concerns and actively engage with tsa to develop a program that appropriately balances legitimate security risks with the rights of citizens to fly their own airplanes. we have made good progress together. gamma asked the administration moved quickly to incorporate the industry's input and finalize its rulemaking as it would enhance security without creating negative consequences. the second is around repair

stations. must like -- much like the last rulemaking the industry awaits completion of an aircraft repair station security rulemaking by dhs. tsa is put forth rulemaking that would implement security requirements for repair station to november 2009. we believe it is imperative for tsa and dhs to move forward and complete this rulemaking which puts in place the type of risk-based repair for repair station security that is good for the industry and good for the country. the third is around temporary flight restrictions and access to airspace. temporary flight restrictions tfr passmark are you specifically to designate air space around selected sporting events and protect the travel of selected individuals. understand the desire for limitation of tfr but suggest that tsa needs to review their impact on the community to

and -- that have a security program in place. in conclusion mr. chairman and members of the subcommittee thank you for your leadership on these issues and for inviting all of us to testify. i believe it is essential for tsa industry and congress to continue to work together on general aviation security issues to ensure we have an effective security system that supports the business and private use of general aviation aircraft. thank you and i look forward to answering your question. >> the chair recognizes her third witness currently serving as president of the cargo airline association. the chair now recognizes mr. altman. >> good afternoon. mr. chairman, ranking member jackson-lee and members of the subcommittee i am delighted to be here today and we appreciate the opportunity to testify before you as you move to authorize the transportation security administration. the cargo airline association is a nationwide trade organization representing the interests of the nation's all cargo carriers,

specializing school -- soli and cargo are members of the primary drivers of worldwide economy that demands the efficient time definite transportation of a wide range of commodities. every member of the aviation community recognize as the highest level of safety and security must be a cornerstone of all of our operations. it is also important to understand that the aviation industry is composed of a diverse group of businesses with substantially different operational models. we have heard some from mr. calio and we have heard some from gamma. there a whole host of different aviation models and i believe mr. rojas stated earlier we expect the trucking agency and one size does not fit all. indeed even within the all cargo community there are substantially different operations. some of our members offer time definite service and are generally known for their express operations. other companies concentrate on traditional freight operations providing the transportation

function for the community and all of these different characteristics are currently taken into account by the transportation security at administration as we all operate under different security directives, different emergency amendments and different security programs. each of these different regulatory requirements is tailored to address the unique threats and vulnerabilities of the separate entity segments and this method of regulating the industry should continue. this multilayered risk-based approach to aviation security is clearly appropriate. as tsa ministry or john pistole 51 june 2, 2011 the tsa employees are risk-based intelligence driven operations to prevent terrorist attacks. we absolutely agree with the statement. we believe however this approach to aviation security should go at it for there. we actually think it should be codified in a tsa authorization bill to ensure that the theory and the practice of regulating

the aviation industry based on intelligence driven risk-based factors should in fact be a cornerstone of the agency itself and should be part of the authorization process. we also agree and appreciate the administrator pistole's to work collaboratively for the to develop programs necessary to enhance security. to his credit the administration has made good on his promise to engage the industry in formulating policy as we move forward. however, we also believe that the tsa industry communications interface should be strengthened and institutionalized by legislatively establishing the aviation security advisory committee. this is an advisory committee that was in effect until a couple of years ago and its charter has run out. it is now being reformed and they have parted been technically reconstituted but we can't gamble that this will happen again and we urge the committee to move forward in the

tsa authorization bill to institutionalize the existence of the aviation security advisory committee. i would like to talk just briefly about a couple of things so i don't repeat what mr. calio said. after the incident in yemen in 2010, a lot of activity took place. the result of that activity with tsa and the industry working collaboratively to put a whole host of new programs in place to secure international transportation. i would just like to talk about a couple of things that are ongoing. the department of homeland security established air cargo security working group's to deal with what we want to do is we go forward. we think one of the most promising areas of inquiry is the intelligent sharing aspect of it and get those working groups move forward we urge you to let them move forward and encouraged them to move forward. another one of those committees dealt with how to get that are technology and better -- so we can screen cargo better.

we are chewed to continue the funding that we absolutely recognized that funding problems we had in this country now so i would like to concentrate on low-tech rather than high-tech. a lot was said in the first panel about dogs and we absolutely agree that the k-9 program should be encouraged and expanded. we specifically urge that this committee consider forcing the tsa to expand the use of private k-9 the's in the screening process and that we don't just rely on tsa dogs because there aren't enough of them and there is a program we can put in place where tsa could actually started by the dogs and have private screeners do them. we are in strong support of that. mr. chairman icy my time is up. i would be happy to answer any questions as we move forward. thank you very much. >> thank you mr. alterman and we are working to that end to do just that. the chair now recognizes our

witness, mr. christopher witkowski. he is currently serving as director of air safety health and security for the association of flight attendants. the chair now recognizes mr. witkowski. >> thank you chairman rogers and ranking member jackson-lee for holding this hearing and allowing us to weigh in on the safety and security issues that are important to flight attendants and national security. and we thank mr.-- for being here as well. my name is christopher witkowski and i'm director of the health and security department of the association of flight attendants cwa who represent more than 60,000 flight attendants and 23 u.s. airlines. before i begin i would like to mention flight attendants and air an integral part of the crew in terms of safety and security and have been subjected to the same level of screening and background checks as pilots yet only pilots are being included in the test of the known crewmember screening process that allows expedited crewmember screening at security

checkpoints. we thank the committee for their support of flight attendants and we hope this committee will continue to exert pressure on tsa to include flight attendants in the program as it moves forward. i am here to talk about what has happened or in this case what has not happened to flight attendant security and self-defense training in the 10 years since the horrific attacks of 9/11. flight attendants are first responders on commercial airplanes responsible for the protection and preservation of the cabin environment as well as the lives of tens of millions of people every year. there are also the last line of defense in the aircraft cabin. recognizing their security role congress has on separate occasions pass bipartisan laws mandating flight attendants self-defense training but corporate pressure and agency prejudice have interfered with congressional intent. i am here to say the training for flight attendants remains elusive and leeds passenger airplanes unnecessarily vulnerable to attack.

prior to the 9/11 attacks flight attendants were instructed to slow down their actions to comply with hijackers. the sooner the hijacker wanted to go to a destination or wanted money or notoriety only. two months after 9/11, congress passed the aviation and transportation security act which mandated a change to the drinking curriculum and philosophy. the new hijack lee's aircraft as a weapon of mass destruction. heart of the request for updating the training included basic self-defense maneuvers to allow flight attendants to defend himself against a terrorist attack. we are not asking for flight attendants to be certified martial arts experts. afa worked with regulators and industry representatives to create a training program that would allow flight attendants to be provided with the appropriate training required to perform their duties. with the passage of apps to afa also urged congress to change the requirements for flight attendant security training to

include a provision that mandated a said a number of hours for the security training of these mandates would have to be in for so all carriers would be required to provide the same level of appropriate and effective security training for all flight attendants. the homeland security act of 2002 required the undersecretary of transportation for security to issue a rule mandating both classroom and effective hands-on situational training covering 10 elements. among them come appropriate and effective responses to defend oneself, including the use of force against an attacker. it was vision 100, the faa reauthorization act of 2003 that eliminated the department department of homeland security requirement for tsa to issue a rule requiring both classroom and effective hands-on situational security training. yet this was done without the homeland security committee review. does vision 100 letter to the individual air carriers to develop this security training originally to be done by tsa

including the element relating to appropriate responses to defend oneself. because vision 100 took away tsa's obligation to develop the basic security training rule for all carriers, it mandated that tsa develop and provide advanced voluntary self-defense training programs. when we talk about mandatory basic security training and our comments, we are generally talking about only a five to 30 minute self-defense training module developed and provided by the air carriers themselves. air carriers appear to be checking the boxes in relation to the required elements of training. without tsa establish standards, there is a wide variance in amount of security training being allocated to self-defense. the so-called advanced training a developed by tsa in the voluntary self-defense training. this program offered by tsa has not advanced but rather an introduction to basic self-defense. it is a one-day course conducted throughout the year at various

locations and focuses on hands-on self-defense training. unfortunately it is difficult for members to attend as it becomes harder for them to take time off from work on their flying days. flight attendants have been unwilling to attend training that may require them to pay for tail and meal expenses. the result has been depressed participation in the self-defense training program. flight attendants were paid or if the costs associated with attending were covered in participation could be hired -- higher. tsa is the authority to implement comprehensive and inclusive security and self-defense training for all flight attendants but has failed to do so. they should be a mandatory basic counterterrorism training that prepares flight attendants to deal with potential threat conditions as congress has required since the enactment of asset in 2001. despite the best intentions the ideas put forward by congress have been weakened and even ignored over time. conference of counterterrorism training must be enacted by congress in order to ensure implementation of what is required since 9/11. is the uniform crewmember test

by the tsa to defend the flight deck at all costs according to tsa, strategy the flight attendant as a is a target for terrorist to eliminate in order to successfully carry out an attack. the elements of which are stated that current law. basic counterterror some training for flight attendants if properly implemented by tsa would repair the flight attendants for potential threatening conditions. thank you for your attention i would be happy to answer any questions. >> i thank the gentleman and thank the panel for all the thoughtful statements in the time it took to prepare them as well as to deliver them. the hour clocks aren't working so we are going to try to wing it and stay at five minutes. we heard in the first panel some expressed frustration as we heard a couple of statements on this panel. the express frustration expressed frustration of a lack of communication of the thread or the risks that industry folks

need to be aware of that tsa has not been sharing as fully as folks would like and working on that. another thing that we have heard about though are summoned charisse stakeholders who have expressed frustration at technology development and procurement. not bringing the private sector and to help find solutions to the problems that folks are facing. i would ask and start with mr. calio, is your industry being given timely information from tsa is to the technology at needs and foresees needing and asking for feedback as to how we can get from where we are to where we need to be? >> mr. chairman you always think of a situation like this, the type of situation where the communication improves. i would say in our view communication with tsa has improved significantly over the last couple of years and they're

very collaborative with us. they act as a partner with us in many cases and share information. do we think we would like to have more input at times? sure, we do but we have been given a lot of opportunity to have that input. >> i know you mentioned in your opening statement your desire to see not only the pilots and the attendants being able to go through an expedited line but as you know the traveler. is my understanding within the next couple of weeks or so we are going to hear an announcement with regard to all those things but i think we all agree that it is going to be a partnership between tsa and the air force to make those things work effectively and it is going to benefit everybody. how about any of the other panelists? do you feel you are all being included by the tsa when you are doing thinking sessions about what kind of technology we need and how can we procure it and get it into the field? mr. van tine?

>> i think as we look at it i think one of the concerns that we have is the use of security directives and certainly we recognize the importance of using security directives and contingencies and emergencies but there is this tendency to use it to influence standing policy rather than working with industry to look at the operational impacts and the consequences of some of those directives. so we would ask that tsa and congress looked at how we can work closer with the industry and not use that as a mechanism for creating policy. >> mr. alterman? >> i think going back to your original question whether we are being counseled that in terms of the technology we need in our instance anyway, the answer is now yes and what may have been in the past i think you know, there may have been some

problems. that is not what we see concentrating on. the dhs cargo working groups we are formed within the past years, one of those working groups, subworking groups as specifically on the technology and how we get it and what needs to be done and what is the monetary research and the industry is intimately involved in that so i think the answer to your question is we are sometimes frustrated because we want to know everything and we want to know it yesterday but with respect to the technology.we have got to a point where we are involved with that process. >> excellent and mr. witkowski? >> thank you mr. chairman. the afa has talked about several other important aviation security issues that need to be addressed. one of them is the communication device, discrete communication device in emergency situations because every second you lose any of your response is going to

be putting you more at risk for a terrorist attack or could tsa be looking at this issue because it was required to be looked at it than the homeland security act almost 10 years ago and i understand that they have been looking at different types of devices that could be used for communication with the flight deck of the flight attendants. but we were never invited or included in those discussions directly affecting the flight attendant security aboard the aircraft. we did participate in a panel that looked at the federal air marshal communication system and we contributed to that quite extensively but as far as the flight attendant issue which we understood they were discussing we were not included and we felt we should have been. >> excellent. mr. calio, this will be my last question. we all have heard about the airline stowaway and while we are frustrated by that i like to remind people that we get millions of people and the fact

is we have human air because humans are running these filters that we use and i am aggravated like everybody else. when we hear about somebody getting through this system, we also are doing it right in a lot of ways. i want to talk about this particular guy for a minute. what type of technology do airlines use of the gate to verify the boarding pass presented matches that at the flight date and is the technology depend on the airline? >> yes, mr. chairman it does. i can't speak for virgin where the air occurred -- error occurred because they are not a member of ours but i can explain some of what happened. you had a dual error and tsa air and a gate error. what happened with the gate agent when he scanned the boarding pass showed but it showed in the error and virgin error shows a scanner where the red light goes on.

for the reason the gate agent did not check or they're what the what the problem was. when a gate agent scans the bar code, if it comes up red, there could be as many as a dozen or more error codes that come up which will then allow the gate agent to figure out what is wrong. i point out in this particular case the same individual who was traveling on virgin was stopped at the gate by a delta agent which is when he was arrested by the fbi. >> and this particular case this is very frustrating because there were several elements of human failure but thank you for that. with that, i will shut up and let the ranking member and -- ask her questions. >> thank you very much for what i thought was a very instructive question. let me thank all the witnesses for their very i think constructive remarks and i would like to thank the cargo association, mr. alterman, for

your support of the aviation security advisory committee and i believe that is an important issue both mr. thompson and myself in the ranking member requested tsa to establish that and we are hoping to codify that legislation in working with the chairman of this committee. the earlier questioning where we said not on our watch, at least i offer those words as we look at the transportation system throughout america. i think there a lot of points that have been made that help us move forward together. that is what i think is most important, the public-private partnership. earlier today i had the opportunity to speak to an industry group on the issue of cargo security and our commitment there along with the secretary of transportation, government and the private sector working together. want to thank them for their policy hearings.

i will always look to the rightness of some of the things that tsa does and in their pilot program, not sure if this is a lucky number. it seems like the state of alabama and the state of texas have been left out. the chairman did not ask me to mention that but i would wonder, wonder why that is the case and i would like to review. i don't see why we couldn't have more in the pilot program and maybe there would be someone here, not the panelist of course but we could get with the tsa on that choice. i think to include additional southern cities would be very helpful and busy cities as well. but as they move forward, let you try to focus in on some of the points that have been made, in particular about issues that

are of concern. the repair stations i think mr. van tine you spoke about and we have no life here so let me try to encourage her answer. is there an inconsistency in our oversight of the repair stations? would you want to or ticket like that again, please? >> again when we look at the industry we produce a large percentage of our product is going overseas to international locations and are operated on an international basis so what we are looking for is the consistency and application of those security requirements. the tsa has reviewed that and believes that there is consistency. i believe when the administrator of pistole testified here a couple of weeks ago that he noted that. we are looking for a dad that rulemaking to be implemented and that he put in place so there is that consistency.

>> and you believe you have sufficient input on the rulemaking, that it is one that is going to be constructive in oversight of those repair stations? >> yes, we do. >> and you were speaking about foreign repair stations because that has been a constant source of concern for this committee as you well realize and it is also a source of potential threat. i think we need very very strong oversight but when he consistency. is that your position? >> that is our position. >> i just heard the bell here. very quickly, first let me say personally to mr. witkowski that i have been consistently fighting for what i think is common sense. there are two aspects to that. one, i would encourage the flight attendants have the opportunity to have the same security access or ees of access that our pilots do. i have never seen a plane take

off without a pilot or sufficient flight attendants. i have been on planes when we are waiting for flight attendants. so, i know that they are not flying but they are part of the team. and i don't see why we cannot get a full understanding of that issue. so can you explain the devastation or the potential danger of an untrained flight attendant for some of the more serious incidents that might occur? >> i imagine that the flight attendants that were on the northwest airlines december 25 flight into detroit were using their basic instincts unless you are going to tell me that they had gone through the training that i've asked for them to go through. it if they did not, say they did not. if they did not go through a high level of training. >> they didn't go go to the higher level of training.

>> but they use their instincts and that training might have helped even more so tell me what would happen -- happens without that higher level of training? >> their reaction was a firefighting reaction in terms of trying to get the fire out that the tears had begun by using explosives but if there's a terrorist attack, which involves deadly force, the flight attendants will be the first to go as somewhere on 9/11. tsa had tried to make a rule saying that you could allow some items on board the aircraft like scissors that would have less than 4.5 inches or five inches of blade but the idea was when you punch that and you are not likely to kill someone. the problem is that what they do is they slice the arteries in the neck. someone can bleed out in a matter 15 or 20 seconds away flight attendant doesn't get that basic training to react

instinctively as train to block those areas where they can be killed and they can bleed out and then they will die. the terrorists will have control of the cabin because we never know what other passengers -- so you are not going to be able to control that. >> so what is your argument? was your bottom line about the enhanced training? the what is needed and enhanced training? >> what is your bottom line? how important is that? >> is critical to national security. >> how difficult do you think it is for airlines to do so? >> is not typical. the homeland security act language which that language was just reinstated in the law, that -- tsa was going forward with that in developing a program that was enacted in 2003 on young. >> how crosley from your own gas, would it be enormously costly? him think it would be enormously

costly in terms of having that kind of program and one of the recommendations we made was that we would make sure that the head of defense for the federal air marshals would ensure that was effective training perks. >> and it would be egg continuation. >> there could be recurrent training. once you get down you have to train and so that in the initial training so the flight attendants can react immediately so they have built memory from the training in order to react if they are attacked in a cab and. >> let me move quickly. let me say i am interested in the issue of the security act and hopefully we will work with tsa to find out how that can be expanded. i have two quick questions for mr. calio and mr. altman and i apologize if the name is not correct but after 9/11 and let me just say i have an appreciation for airlines. it brings graham us together and

if you go into the airports people generally are happy because they are going somewhere. and they are going to get there quickly. i don't believe any member of congress hesitated one moment after 9/11 to bailout the airlines. i understood the devastation and the crime from the airlines. they needed a large bailout from the federal government. so the idea of paying for security is what patriots do. patriot stand up for their country and there's absolutely no other way that we can provide for security without that assessment. whether we increase it i have an open mind are going interested in not seen -- i cannot in any way except the fact that it is not the responsibility of the airlines and those of us who are passengers and we do pay it. the passenger fee is passed through to us so it doesn't impact airlines at all.

but what i would like to find out is this issue of the recurrent basic training for flight attendants and the idea of this enhanced training. what would be the problem with that? >> you got it right the first time in calio. i've heard it many different ways. >> we shouldn't do that so calio. >> i would say first that the safety of our crews and passengers are always our highest priority and we won't compromise that. you know i believe we have a disagreement about whether the enhanced training is necessary. we provide basic training and defensive techniques as part of our conference a flight attendant training. we don't believe that training with more aggressive measures woods provide benefits based on a multilayered security for seizures and russ is already in place. >> and i respect that but why not have it to use it if

necessary? that is really the question that is not the answer. i think the complement of that of course is the appropriate use of it and i believe that you have a well-trained, well collected flight attendant that would have the right judgment. certainly we want to use it on a passenger that got up to the restroom at the wrong time if all they were doing was going to the restroom but i do think it is appropriate in a climate that they are living and to have that. i would like to keep an open mind and i'm going to convene a meeting of the airlines and i hope maybe the chairman will join with me on that issue. let me finish by just asking mr. alterman -- thank you for your answer. let me ask mr. alterman, we have packages that you know that were coming in from yemen on flights that were cargo. it open their eyes. some of us had our eyes open before but it opened our eyes to

the eye of the storm that cargo planes and your staff and your personnel are and. what should we do more on the cargo security side? >> thank you. i think that a lot of the answer to that question is what has been done. you are absolutely correct. it opened all of our eyes. terrorists are not dumb. terrorists are looking to exploit weaknesses and it is virtually impossible to figure out everything that they might do in the future. and so, this thread in yemen was an eye-opener for all of us. what it did immediately, it said into a motion -- motion a series of events whereby the transportation security administration in conjunction with the industry and i give them credit, and beginning to feel like an apologist for tsa and i don't want to do that. i will probably get fired. to their credit they worked with the industry after yemen incident to try to figure out where the vulnerabilities are, what went wrong and how do we

avoid them in the future? the results of that word, imagine some of them. some of them are ongoing projects through dhs and the working groups that are ongoing in the pilot programs that have been described by mr. calio to try to identify freight in advance of the game loaded on the plane. but let me go back to what was done immediately because i think that was very important and very unusual. tsa issues a security of -- number of security -- as it began to find out more information. what they learned clearly from that incident is that intelligence is the best way of thwarting terrorist. those packages, all of them were screened three times and guess what? they looked like renter cartridges. they were at actually thwarted by the intelligence efforts of people overseas. so one of the things we learned

and we try to implement and we talked about it before it is, we need to get better intelligence sharing. we need for the government to share with itself among itself and transmitted the industry as quickly as possible but over and above that what we learned is that we need a ken to employ the risk-based system to understand that they package from yemen may not do the same as a package from dubuque iowa and we need to take different measures based on the threat both in the location and the shipper. we need to get a better trusted shipper program overseas so that we know who we are dealing with and when we don't know who we are dealing with we need to take more intrusive and better care of our freight. >> i hate to cut you off but we have three and a half men -- minutes to get over to the floor. i would like mr. craddick to be able to answer a question before we leave. >> mr. calio, appreciate you

being here today. both of the airlines pilots and federal flight officers have gone through a lot of different training in this industry. and i really think it is imperative that what you brought out in your written testimony that the aircrew flight attendants and pilots know who is on their aircraft. it is imperative, and i just echo that and i complement you one that. i have got just a couple of quick questions for you because unfortunately it will be appreciated. i am a strong promote -- opponent and i strongly agree with that but with that said, you are proposing additional training and some of the words you use our flight attendants must know how to respond to deadly force. is imperative national security. -- this rule is written right now, sir, what i have a very big contention with its additional training is proposed which

prohibits any testing that allows any crewmember to opt out if they do not wish to physically participate, is that correct sir or am i reading this wrong? >> the homeland security act that i referred to to allow a crewmember who believed that they'd couldn't take a hands-on self-defense training was allowed to opt out. that was in the homeland security act language. >> i have a real big problem with that especially going through officer training and some of the training i have gone through. if they are going to be a vital member of the team as you have proposed and making sure that they know how to use deadly force and is imperative to national security, especially deadly force. you don't want to engage unless you know what you are doing. the big thing is and i've gone through enough physical training to understand this, as much as you need to know to give a punch or a clock, you have to know how to take one. so that was just my point and do

you have something to say? >> i was going to say the way tsa began to implement that before it was taken away by vision 100 was that they were going to ensure that all the crewmembers got the training or some level of self-defense training so they could protect themselves. >> we can talk about that. i apologize. i yield back. >> i've got so many more questions and obviously we'll do. we have 54 seconds to get across the street. having said that, we are leaving the record open for 10 days. i'm too going to supply questions to you all and i know other members will. i told the first panel all this is to support her writing of the authorizations are your answers are very important and your testimony and presence is really important. i want to thank the witnesses for their time and apologize for the delay in having to leave early. the members committee will get your questions and with that,

this committee stands adjourned. [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] chairman and ceo rupert murdoch testifies ..

>> news corp. chairman to ceo for curt murdock testifies before british parliament committee