next, david nichols presents a history of the suez canal crisis that occurred nine days prior to the 1956 presidential election and resulted in president dwight eisenhower's decision to place american military forces on high alert, condemned the attacks on egypt at the united nations and ultimately led to a ceasefire announced on election day november 6, 1956. it's out and our.

>> design. welcome to the atlanta history center. i'm the president and ceo of the history center. this is another livingston letcher which is made possible through the generous support of the livingston foundation, and we are ever so grateful to them for their continued support. our next lecture will be held may 16th and will feature james b. stewart come author of tangled webs, how false statements are undermining america from martha stewart to bernie madoff. i've seen some of the previews of this book, and you would be well edify is to be here. it's fascinating. also joining us for the featuring best-selling author of deval in the white city eric larsen who will be here. who will be discussing his new book in the garden of peace, love, terror and american family in hitler's berlin. tonight's lecture is being

recorded by c-span and check your local listings for the broadcast state you can see it again. at this time i would like to ask you to please turn off all of yourself phones or pagers, any other electronic devices that might disrupt our program whereas the delta air lines flight attendant said turn off everything that doesn't keep you alive. [laughter] delta airline stewardesses are geeky. our author this evening is david nichols who will speak about 40 minutes and then take your questions. david is a leading expert on the eisenhower presidency. this evening he will discuss his new book eisenhower, 1956, the president's ear of crisis in the break of the war which the christian science monitor called one of seven history books worth checking out in 2011. he is the author of the matter of justice eisenhower and the beginning of the civil rights revolution, and lincoln and the indians. he holds a ph.d. from william

and mary and currently resides in kansas. please join me in welcoming david nichols to the stage. [applause] >> it's an honor to be here and to be with people who love history. that's always the best audience one can ever have come and i'm grateful. first we need to shoot down the nasty rumor that's been going around by publisher simon and schuster stirred up all the trouble in the middle east just too self my book. it's not true. not true. this is also a day when the news is telling us once again and author at least allegedly has been making up stuff, and i want you to know that this book, accepting some commentary in the conclusion, that in this book not a phrase is in it that is

not rooted in the document or in compelling circumstantial evidence. eisenhower, 1956 is a new story. in so many respects because it's based on hundreds of top-secret documents that have been declassified since the last major book on the suez crisis that was published 30 years ago. and when i get done with the presentation, those of you that haven't read the book, and i assume most of you have not, will kind of think you know the story but please, read the book because the book is better than the speech. i guarantee that. i know the book. and it is above all a deeply personal story about the man we call affectionately ike and a word about this complex man. eisenhower was a military man that he was not militaristic. that is he did not think the war was a solution to anything. she was what one would call slow to pick up the sword.

his public purse, the grandfatherly man with a big smile and the love of golf was largely his personal intervention. behind the scenes he was strategically rigorous and a tough-minded commander in chief. the people who work for him never doubted who was in charge. eisenhower was a citizen of the world more than any other president. yet he never forgot where he came from and that's why his presidential library is an abilene kansas, close to where i live. he was not a professional politician yet he was one of the most successful politicians in history and supremely protective of his hero's image. he did not hesitate to use subordinates like secretary of state john foster dulles as lightning rods for controversial policies that were in fact his creation. eisenhower had a wild temper. a timber that exploded like a rocket, but at a tense moment requiring great decisions he was unfailingly cool, koln and deliver it.

this was a profoundly religious man who had prayer at the beginning of cabinet meetings. yet when the famous temporary rot income he could turn the air blue with soldierly profanity and he did so frequently. above all, eisenhower saw himself not as a warrior, but as a peacemaker, and that's what this book is about. and tonight at a time of war and unrest in the middle east, it's fitting that we would review the most dangerous international crisis of the eisenhower presidency. that crisis is also in the middle east. this is a tale of the abiding trauma. number one begins september 23rd, 1955 in denver, colorado, on the golf course. the white eisenhower had not enjoyed a vacation so much in years. believe it or not, the president of the united states had himself cooked a huge breakfast that morning for his fishing buddies

that golf was the president's priorities for the day. after a briefing at his lowry air force base office, eisenhower headed for the hills country club and the secretary remembered that she had never seen him look or act better. eisenhower's golf game was interrupted four times that day for phone calls from the secretary of state john foster dulles read now this is before cell phones, so irritated and probably profane ike have to return to the clubhouse for each call, only one of which actually got through. that call was an important. she confirmed to eisenhower that the soviet union had made an arms deal with egypt. he knew that this move would offer a new chapter in the cold war and they agreed that the president should send a message to the soviet premier nikolai bulganin. but the president wanted to think about it overnight. he told him he would call him

the following morning. that phone call was never made. ike went back to golf, but his game deteriorated. as the day wore on the president experienced growing discomfort and declined his usual evening drink, have little appetite for dinner and retired early and in the middle of the night, ike appeared by mimi's bedside. i have a team across the lower part of my chest, he said. since he complained earlier about in digestion, mimi gave her husband milk of magnesia. at 2:54 a.m., she called dr. howard snyder, the president's physician who rushed to the white house. slider initially put out the word that this was a digestive upset when he knew it was a massive heart attack. he waited until midafternoon that day before transporting the president to the fitzsimmons are and he had walked to his car

instead of calling an ambulance. now if you want more detail on the mismanagement of the situation, you've got to read the book. don't have time, tonight. eisenhower was in the hospital for six weeks. in those days the gold standard for the treatment of the heart attack patients was total bed rest. the doctors wouldn't permit him to read a newspaper, watch movies, listen to a football game on the radio, let alone do much serious presidential business. he did not take a step across his room for a month in this incredibly active man felt like a caged animal. so at the very moment the soviet union intended to change the balance of power in the middle east, eisenhower was out of commission and the secretary of state john foster was on his own unable to consult with the president as he normally did. and let us bury once and for all the myth john foster ran

american foreign policy in the eisenhower years. everyone close to both men, and i've talked with a number of them, knew that ike was in charge. dwight eisenhower out of the white house people hardly believe this, dwight eisenhower was out of the white house for three and a half months, exit to light on his way to recuperate in gettysburg. drongen number two is the one that the patient is restrictive in his effort activities obsess about. that is whether he should run for a second term in 1956. i'm satisfied that ike always intended to run. the jurors felt you had to have a second term to be a great president, and ike wanted to be a great president but the heart attack raised the enormous question of whether physically she could run. ike repeatedly discussed possible successors with aids.

none of whom had a snowball's chance in hell of getting nominated, little one likely. the only republican with sufficient stature to front was the chief justice earl warren of the supreme court, and if you want to know why he threw cold water and that option, you have to read my of your book on eisenhower and civil rights chapter will tell you all about it. eventually, ike shot down every argument against running and convinced himself that it would be healthier surfing and retiring. ike also feared that no one else could prevent a nuclear holocaust. january, 1956, eisenhower was informed that a nuclear exchange with the soviet union, 65% of the american population would be casualties. years later the chief of staff sherman adams said what surely applies to president obama today the real reason the president

wants to run again, he said, is because she doesn't think anybody else can do as good a job as he is doing. after waiting so long that no one else could put together she really did wait a long time, so long that no one else could put together a viable candidacy ike announced his candidacy february 29, 1956. and, number three is about aswan. but project on the nile river was exceeded for the suez crisis and the centerpiece of the president's plan for the egyptian progress. historians often ignored the fact eisenhower attempted to resolve the arab-israel conflict that endures to this day. on august 26, 1955 before his heart attack, john foster had

publicly announced the administration's plan code-named alpha for resolving the arab-israeli conflict. the plan reads like a was written in 2011. discussing borders, palestinian refugees, holy places in jerusalem, etc.. in this plan to the sal cilella team would be a carrot to entice nasser to make peace with israel. like most middle east peace plans, the alpha plan was dead on arrival. but once he began to recover, eisenhower revived the question of aid to the aswan and in december, 1955, he persuaded the national security council of the united states should make an offer that would peddle soviet financing of the dam. however, in the following months, the negotiations with the each actions broke down. and ike paid little attention to those negotiations. he was preoccupied with his health, his decision of running

for a second term and beginning of the campaign. by june 7th, 1956, eisenhower appeared to have recovered from his heart attack. that morning he presided over a national security council meeting, had another 15 the plant meant in practice golf. that evening he attended the white house news photographers' dinner and stayed up until midnight, a schedule that his doctors would have vetoed a few weeks earlier. the president's car dropped off dr. snyder at his home and he retired to bed almost immediately. the doctor was removing his close when the phone rang. snyder reached for it with a shudder. only the first lady can be calling at such an hour. this is another anguishing medical drama that i'm sorry to say it again but you're going to need the book if you want to know. [laughter] it turned out ike had an obstruction in his upper

intestine which the doctors called ileitis. 13 doctors at the highest for hours over whether to stick a knife in the president who suffered a heart attack eight minutes earlier. they waited until 2 a.m. on saturday, june 9th to operate and dr. snyder later opined the surgery would have taken place hours earlier if the patient had been planned mrs. murphy. once again, eisenhower's out of commission for weeks. for the middle east, the timing could not have been worse. by the time ike returned to the white house on july 15th, 1956, john foster dulles decided to withdraw the american offer of 80 to the aswan project largely because congress was opposed to it. on july 19th, 1956, an important date, dulles in a 12 minute

meeting, 12 minutes, obtained eisenhower's jacinta the decision to withdraw the offer of aid to aswan. ike was not on top of the issue. his recovery had been difficult. he had been plagued with doubts of depression. that afternoon, dulles informed of the egyptian investors the decision and the next day he proudly told some friends that the united states had made, quote, a big chess move and that nasser was now, quote, in a hell of a spot. a week later in retaliation, he nationalized the suez canal company saying he would use its profits to build the aswan. the british and french had controlled the company for decades. two-thirds of the wheel for western europe came through the canal, and now it was a united states and its allies that were in a hell of a spot.

immediately the british and french prepared to go to war. but eisenhower was adamant that the war wasn't justified to be egypt, he said, had a right to nationalize the canal because it was located in the egyptian territory. the only question was whether that the egyptians would keep the canal opened and functioning effectively. eisenhower shook the lingering effect of the surgery. for three months and they made efforts to keep the british and french talking instead of fighting. still shellshocked from world war ii, you have to remember from this context this is only 11 years after the end of world war ii, still shellshocked, the british and the french-made nasser into another hitler. by late september, 1956, eisenhower's allies gave up on him and any support for taking out nasser and implemented a program of blatant deception. the failure of american

intelligence or momentous in this crisis. the cia did not foresee the nationalization of the canal and completely missed the plotting among the british, french and the israelis. it now for the plot triet on wednesday october 24, 1956, in a villa outside paris, christian tunnell, the french foreign minister, prime minister david bin garrey of israel and patrick team, the deputy undersecretary of state for great britain signed a secret protocol providing that the israeli troops invaded the sinai peninsula on october 29th. this was the plan. once the israelis advanced toward the suez canal britain and france would alter an ultimatum to cease fighting and accept the french occupation of the canal. if as expected egypt rejected the ultimatum, britain and france would begin bombarding egypt on october 31st followed

by the troop landings but remember this was a secret. it was not in the newspapers. what was in the newspapers that day was that the soviet union had sent troops into budapest laundry killing dozens of protesters. eisenhower knew nothing of the secret meeting in paris. that day the intelligence advisory committee chaired by the cia director, the brother of john foster dulles is a myth of the war wasn't eminent in postponed to further revision of the estimates. the committee ignored an fbi report that an unnamed country was considering military action against nasser. monday october 29th eisenhower campaigning in florida was handed a note as he boarded his plan for richmond virginia. the note said that the israeli army had attacked egypt and

israel's forces had driven to 25 miles of the suez canal. back in the white house that might come in pingree and profane eisenhower ordered the secretary to find a message to the israelis telling them we are going to apply sanctions. we are going to the united nations. we are going to do everything there is so that we can stop this thing. ike knew that if this was canal was disrupted or pipelines were destroyed, the british and french would attack. he didn't know of course they had already planned to do that. if the british intervened, ike said, they may open a deep rift between us. with election eight days a week, eisenhower declared he did not care in this latest whether he was reelected or not. on october 30 of the british and french implemented to the letter the secret plan they had endorsed on october 24th. they delivered a 12 hour ultimatum to israel and egypt to

cease military operations to 10 miles from the suez canal and execution of the canal anglo-french forces the a assume once enacted the world war ii ally in the white house would bail them out with funds, oil and military equipment. bully with a long. instead, an angry eisenhower told an aide those who began this operation should be left to baliles in their own oil. that night in the u.n. security council, the british and french vetoed an american resolution calling for a cease-fire in egypt. less than half hour later, the deadline for the french and british ultimatum expired and the largest naval armada seen in the eastern mediterranean since world war ii steamed towards egypt. so next morning wednesday,

october 2,021st, eisenhower was heartened by news the soviet troops pulled back in budapest hungary and the soviet government had declared its intention to practice non-interference in the internal affairs of the satellite states. in egypt, the flights confirmed the british planes were now bombing airfields, ports, railways and communications centers, turning the neatly parked rhodes of aircraft into burning smoking wreckage. nasser's troops had sunk in a 320 feet long ship loaded with rocks and cement in the suez canal, the first of 32 ships scuttled their. eisenhower concluded that he should address the nation that might october 31st and foster dulles sick and exhausted rutka draft in the address and declared it an absolute disaster. late in the afternoon he ordered a new speech be written.

minutes before the broadcast, the oval office the speechwriter said the speech to the president a page at a time across the table. the speech was short. eisenhower revealed given the veto in the security council, he had taken the unprecedented step of appealing to the united nations general assembly. the united states was not consulted in any way about any phase of these actions come eisenhower said. nor were we informed of them in advance. and he pledged there will be no united states involvement in these present cost of the peace. wittman described november, thursday november 1st, 1956 as another day of a great crisis. sherman adams called this, quote, the worst week that eisenhower experienced in all of the years of the white house.

that morning, the president was besieged with rumors that the soviets are planning to deploy aircraft on the syrian basis. mike asked the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff whether the russians might have slipped some atom bombs to the egyptians eisenhower were canceled all campaigned even six of the one scheduled for philadelphia that night, november 1st. and whitman recalled that the typewriters have to go to the train to complete the speech in time. in philadelphia in convention hall, ike looked out at 18,000 partisans who came expecting a rousing campaign speech. instead, he launched into what columnist called a high level speech by a man who spoke not as a republican partisan, but as president of all the country. eisenhower stated that the nation had pursued a pass of

honor by staging against the use of the force in and egypt. the united states, he said, cannot and will not condone armed aggression no matter who the attackers and no matter who the victim. we cannot in the world any more than in our own nation subscribe to one for the become another law for this long, one law for those opposing us and another for those alive with us. there can be only one law or there will be no peace. the president concluded we believe that the power of modern weapons in the war model literalists but preposterous and the only way to win world war war iii is to prevent it. eisenhower and completely drained by four days of

unrelenting crisis. he drank too scotches before dinner on the train and three highballs afterwards a riding of the union station 12:29 november november 2nd. on friday morning, november 2nd, eisenhower learned of 4 o'clock in the morning, the general assembly had passed the american cease-fire resolution by a vote of 64-5 with, surprisingly, the soviet union. the voting in favor. democratic candidate adlai stevenson was harshly critical of the situation. we as alienated our chief contingent in the strongest european allies, he said. we have alienated israel, alienated egypt, and the arab countries. and in front united nations demand as a seat in the middle eastern matters now appears to be the soviet union. in the very week when the red army has been shooting down the brave people of hungary and poland stevenson concluded, i

doubt if ever before in our diplomatic history has any policy event such an invisible, such a complete and such a catastrophic failure. ike was not sleeping well. his doctor was concerned, the president's blood pressure was volatile, his heart skip beats, and he suffered constant adamle discomfort and diarrhea. the records of the eisenhower library are so marvelously detailed. [laughter] one day i really did come idled one of the library staff that daily reports on the president's diarrhea was just a little more information than i really wanted or needed. [laughter] then late in the night november 2nd, john foster dulles

was rushed to the walter reed hospital where the next morning the doctors removed a cancerous tumor from his colon. saturday morning, november 3rd, the news from the middle east was the small. syrian senator said blown up oil pipelines running through their country. egyptian troops reporting into cairo to defend the capitol, and the anglo-french airstrikes destroyed the egyptian air force on the ground. eisenhower's opponents continue to fiercely attacked his policies. eleanor roosevelt accused the administration of favoring the arabs over israel and asserted britain and france had been brought to the point of desperation by american policy. it leaves us in a very strange position, she said, of supporting and an egyptian dictator against our oldest and strongest allies. six of the eight democratic members on the senate foreign relations committee publicly agreed with stevenson and

roosevelt that the president's middle east policies have failed. eisenhower committee declared, had presided over, quote, four years of an decision, talked lawlessness, timidity and bluster, and us quote. that might november 3rd, stevens and asserted, quote, the president's age, his health, and the fact he cannot succeed himself make it inevitable that the dominant figure in the republican party under second eisenhower term would be richard nixon. stevenson asked the crowd do you want to place the hydrogen bomb in his hands? [laughter] sunday, november 4th, dwight eisenhower were confronted a perfect storm. at 4 a.m. the soviet union ordered 200,000 troops, tens of thousands of hungarian stock or were wounded that day.

eisenhower quickly concluded that the united states was in no position to intervene in hungary and the allies were tied down in the war and egypt, hungary was not accessible but seen in the american forces could not respond by land without violating the trade of the mutual or communist states. meanwhile, in the middle east, israel now control both the sinai and the gaza strip and held 5,000 egyptians prisoner. on monday, november 5th, election eve, the british and french paratroopers landed in egypt and suddenly the leaders of the soviet union poured more fuel on the international fire. ..

eisenhower interpreted the russian proposal as an ultimatum. he drove in the middle east, calling unthinkable. that was set at this favorite words, i'm in for both the united states would join forces with the soviet in the general assembly saturday ordered a cease-fire. unilateral action by the soviet union, eisenhower stated, would be forcefully opposed by the united states and ordered the sixth fleet stationed in the

mediterranean order to place on alert. this was election eve. distresses retake and it's on the president. after a tense meeting over the message, eisenhower found the president heartbeat irregular. he laid down and developed a headache. after all, he'd only eat eaten a dish of carrot and a glass of yogurt since breakfast. the president agitation recorded was due to what he termed an ultimatum that had been served upon him. he crowd i'm concert was soldierly profamily. he crowd that if he were a dictator, he would tell russia if they moved a finger he would drop our entire stock of the public weapons on him. tuesday, november 6 was election day. i cruised to an even greater turmoil. in a meeting that morning, he

was somber. our people should be alert, eisenhower said. the presidents of russian plane and syria were inevitably trigger taxonomist airfields. if that didn't come, as i'd like to say, that would be in the fire. in a crowd of ryde, chairman of the joint chiefs, where american naval units were equipped with atomic antisubmarine weapons. not long after the president had left for gettysburg though, in whitman recalled the news from the middle east look so bad. at one point the white house staff, contemplated asking the president to turn around and come back to the white house. rumors were rampant that soviet intervention was imminent. some of the bad news came directly from moscow, chip boeing co. american ambassador people the soviet mood had become more ominous and he feared the soviet leaders were

prepared to take military action unless speier was quickly achieved. the staff hastened the presidents returned by flying him back instead of having him drive from gettys heard. i corrected the white house at 12:38 p.m. only a short reefing he stood in the cabinet room where 18 men were waiting. the vice president, the top leadership of both the state and defense departments, including the joint chiefs. this is a council of war. admiral radford breached the president regarding the steps of the joint chiefs. we're prepared to take a short readiness providing a major war with the soviet union. eisenhower reviewed each step, urging careful and deliberate implementation. then, the son spoke from behind

the word clouds and the president was informed in the middle of this meeting of british prime minister was available by phone paired eisenhower interrupted the meeting to take the call and he confirmed in the conversation they even had ordered a cease-fire in egypt. this was the 10th conversation inasmuch murray detailed then i'm providing here, clearly resentful evening. a cast of british compliance with the cease-fire would be without condition and eaten growled, cease-fire tonight at midnight provided we are not attacked. eisenhower had first seen what he would still try to play. he insisted that british technical troops not be used to clear the canal that would've constituted a de facto occupation and no british or french troops or soviet or american for that matter served

in a united nations peacekeeping force. the first uniform in a conversation came when he denounced about foster dulles and the election. ike replied, we have given a horrified to hungary in the middle east. i don't give a how the election goes. eisenhower knew the piece is still present in the soviet intentions were still unclear. he ordered implementation of most of the readiness that were discussed at his new meeting. that night, joint chiefs put the six atlantic and pacific fleets on battle ready alert and deploying additional ships, submarines and type of resources placed heavy troop carrier wing on the 12 hour alert. about 10:00 p.m., the eisenhower party traveled to the sheraton park hotel in washington, were fleet had been reserved for

watching election returns. now as you all know, the president won reelection by huge margins. but i did not go down to address supporters until 1:45 a.m. he kisses reluctant opponent waited until then to make a concession speech meanwhile, hours earlier, approximately 2:00 a.m. cairo time, 7:00 p.m. in washington d.c., the fighting ended in the middle east. prevent me and much to read a blog. after november 6, eisenhower continued to be concerned about the possibility of soviet intervention because the british, french and israelis declined to withdraw forces even though they been a cease-fire they would not withdraw. eisenhower adamantly refuse to provide oil and financial support to bankrupt allies and they are truly bankrupt.

there was of him in the town, british finances are in terrible shape. he refused to provide support in the allies are facing a cold winter, but he would give them nothing and today publicly committed themselves to a job. in paris, cabdrivers often reduced to pick up americans, gas stations declined to sell fuel. it took a month to get the commitment in another month for withdrawal. israeli withdraw it took even longer, which is a huge store it on a time to get into. the israelis evacuated the sinai, but refused to leave the gaza strip in the mouth of the gulf of aqaba. they continue to occupy those two spots. finally, after for months the presidential pressure on march 1 to 197, the israeli government announced its intention to

withdraw because politically this was it, too. then there is an eisenhower doctrine. in a four-hour meeting with congressional leaders on new year's day, 1957, who else but dwight eisenhower could hold a four-hour meeting with congressional leaders on new year's day. eisenhower presented a resolution to does new year's commodores in military and economic aid to the middle east and if necessary, military intervention by the united states. the house passed a resolution at january 30, the same day that take predicting the salute of saudi arabia before the cameras in a state visit. now, can salute insisted that the president come to the airport to greet him as something that i could have never done with any other foreign leader, that saudi oil had its time in those days too and i finally agreed to go.

he crumbled to an whitman and now he supposed he had to beat everybody at the airport in the future. once is really great to withdraw, the eisenhower doctrine passed the senate on march 5. in a breathtaking two months, dwight eisenhower persuaded to do dramatically reorient policy toward female abilities. the eisenhower doctrine committed the united states to the british ability of security including oil resources in the middle east. and for good or ill, as president obama has experienced the past few weeks, for good or ill, that obligation is still the cornerstone of american policy. thank you. [applause] >> if you have questions, comments the microphone.

>> use the microphone, folks. no such thing as a question. or a comment. >> i was a great talk. thank you very much. i had a question. if the obama administration contacted you about their involvement in libya and if not, did you find similarity in how he dealt with libya in comparison with the suez canal incident? >> now, the obama administration hasn't talked with me. i meeting with former senator chuck hagel tomorrow in washington d.c., who i'm told what 27 copies of the book and gave unto the president president and went to the vice

president and secretary of defense and i haven't talked with the senator yet about it, but my suspicion is he is a little uncertain that the intervention libya is a good thing. it always is tricky. we have to be careful about taking an historic figure in taking it 50 or 60 years later. their principles in the way approach things. and eisenhower generally do not like brushfire wars. he handed the one in korea have refused to go into egypt. he just didn't do it. and he dislikes very much marginal military interventions. he believed if he went in -- clonmel hits the credit for the doctrine of overwhelming force these days and i often think that general powell like to remind us that dwight eisenhower talked about that all the time. but of course eisenhower -- anyway, overwhelming force.

the trouble with partial interventions as they spin out of control, that they are very hard to manage in the libya and what appears to be that way, too. so i don't know whether the president would want to talk with me about that or not. i'm a little concerned that it is becoming a stalemate. and you can have not only a unilateral quagmire like it had a couple other places. you can have a multilateral quagmire, too. yes, sir. >> what was richard nixon's will of all this if any? >> there's a lot of mythology that nixon and eisenhower -- i don't want to get too involved, but the eisenhower president he has just been distorted by my profession shamefully, just because people didn't do the research. and one of them is a relationship with the eisenhower nixon.

eisenhower didn't want him. you really have to know eisenhower to understand he just didn't invite people -- that's not true. he kept a doctor. i don't know. but anyway -- last night dr. snyder was an old crony, but nixon was basically to is your question, ask political survey. among the quick campaigning, once the crisis broke out, he went out and substitute it for him and took on at least you didn't. nixon also provided a bunch of other support in the congress. i haven't looked very carefully at what he did for the eisenhower talked to in passage, but i'm sure he played a major role and presided over the senate and i'm sure he was deeply involved behind the scenes, but he was a political operative for eisenhower and a very skilled one. the waynick some of the presidency always tars him and people forget what else he did. somebody else?

yes. >> what are the events on nasser? >> well, eisenhower -- eisenhower eisenhower decided to join with the alleys, nasser would've been toast. which would've done with egypt after that -- you have to remember, nasa master and arab nationalists are pretty progressive, getting rid of -- a oil drones and getting rid of the colonial powers. and that they were pretty progressive. what happened was nasser stays in power has followed by sadat was flawed but you know who? mubarak the 28-year-old air

force officer already on the rise of the time of the suez crisis. as though, eisenhower -- we have to say. i sound very pro-life. eisenhower's policies open the door for military strongman to rule in the middle east. at the same time, it would not be fair to hang out around eisenhower's neck already 50, 60 years later. but nevertheless, that was the doctor. and personally have an op-ed in trade to get somebody to print in my prediction is the military is not done in egypt. they been in charge for 60 years and i'll be real surprised if we don't have either a military officer for somebody with very close ties in the military be the next president in egypt. guess commissary. >> what was eisenhower's relationship with truman?

>> sera, i don't pertain to be an expert on that. i always forget the south remained. there's a book called harry and i ache. that the correct title. i'm sorry i'm forgetting the author's name. i tell people i'm an old guy. and the part of my brain that remembers names has died, psychic cop was that sometimes. it was not an easy relationship. having said that, truman had chose eisenhower to have nato. we now know through truman's diary that he attempted to display a fake as early as 1948 to run for president on the democratic ticket. how serious that was inside her know that that's in truman's diaries. and on the other hand, it was very tense in 1963. eisenhower did not get out of the car and go to the white house and get the outgoing

president and harry was very offended and talked about it later. it was not an easy relationship, although the book i mentioned this the kind of reconciled years it are quite a bit. but it was a fairly tense relationship, partly because truman later, in an oral history alleged that i had wanted to come back -- wanted to marry keith summers v., his driver in europe and wanted to divorce mimi and had written george marshall about that in truman had taken those letters in the state department had destroyed them. at least one scholar and know of was pretty good, things that truman me about a. i don't know. i'm not qualified. i'm not giving you a very good answer because i'm not an expert. thank you. >> i had heard that sadat had made a statement years later that nasser told him that

because we didn't back our allies that the united states couldn't be trusted when they became allies that the soviets. is that true? >> that sadat said that to nasser? >> now, nasser had said that sadat. >> i couldn't dispute that. i know a whole lot about a little and i know a whole lot about what i just talked to you about. i couldn't dispute that. i think there is still work to be done on the evolution of things after the eisenhower years with the diplomatic historians has been to assume the eisenhower doctrine and the eisenhower policies for abject failures and nasser and have been allied with the soviets. i'm not sure nonservice ever really -- it's to this soviets help told. that's true, but i'm not sure each of ever became what you could really call the satellite of the soviet union. nasser played both sides and whether the united states became

trusted company could take that statement and look at it two or three different ways. certainly the allies didn't think he could be trusted to do what they wanted. i'm sorry it's a poor answer. i'm just not qualified to answer it even better. >> i think if i know my history fairly correctly, that the role of israel after world war ii, which was the implementation of the doubt for treaty or agreement. what was eisenhower's view of the terms of israel to withdraw you are saying the gaza? >> you're asking about that. you're not asking about creation of israel? >> now, i'm asking about when he was president and they were coming in now, going through, you know, how israel was taking over some of the territory governed not involved in the

agreement. what was his feeling about that? >> if you talk about the pro-feminism, i only know about the suez situation in gaza. i am not very qualified to speak about the rest of it. he certainly put enormous pressure on israel to withdraw after the suez crisis any appeal to the congress in february 20, 1957 for support for that and the congress turned him down. and so, he turned around that i and went to the people with a televised address. and behind the scenes, according to news mars company threatened to the israelis to cut off private contributions from american to israel, which at that time was really, really major. whether you could've done that, i don't know. by the entrance, the politics of the united states, eisenhower

took appropriate steps to impose israel's policy at that time. now, the earlier steps i'm not as good in terms of the creation of the state of israel generally, truman recognized the state of israel in 1948 as part of his presidential campaign. and that was really opposed by george marshall who was then his secretary of state. you have to remember george marshall and eisenhower broke up midterm. i think it is circumstantial reasonably that he agreed with marshall. certainly key people in the state department to leave what henderson is the gratitude of my school at southwestern college and a great diplomat who really believed that the recognition and creation the state of israel held unless turmoil in the middle east. now, that doesn't mean you can't support that because there is a

dramatic, wonderful story for the state of israel and the leaves are mixed with the flowers in that situation. >> to the hungarians expect the americans to come to their aid in 1956? >> there is significant evidence that they didn't expect them to come to their aid and there's great disillusionment about groups among some of the refugees of hundreds of thousands of refugees left in awe of the united states did was make provisions and i forget the numbers now for thousands of hungarian refugees to come to this country. there's great disillusionment in criticism of eisenhower for that. but he was very clearheaded that it could not be done. and this is eisenhower who made it to her earlier question who did believe in taking on military paths that could not be completed successful.

you know, he regretted it deeply and quickly made the decision. you have to go back to world war ii. we had a lot of mythology about what happened in world war ii. a case could be made that the war was come out very differently. and the soviet union soccer 35 million casualties estimated on the eastern crime. and the united states and allied powers abandon the mainland until 1944. this is a totally different situation. they said written in france are not to help. he thought he was just not viable. he was criticized much more so. might look doesn't do justice to that particular subject i regret to say. >> would you address the eisenhower and vietnam?

>> yeah, i sound like a broken record because i tell you i know a lot about a little. i do know about that. he clearly made the decision not to intervene in china in 1954, particularly for the siege the enemy approved any other number of advisers who wanted to do it. any thought about it and is surrounded by a number of people who thought he should do it and went over overnighting came back the next and said i'm not going to send one soldier and he did not. having said that, eisenhower left a bit of a mess in vietnam. geneva conventions of 1954, i have no doubt about the scsi should each to teach a course. the geneva convention called for unified elections in vietnam. those elections never to place

because the united states supported in effect, the creation of a separate country in south vietnam, even though it really was in a separate country. this is the outcome of the cold war. and so, eisenhower's policies otherwise are open to a lot of question. i haven't done a detailed research on not like i have on this, but he clearly chose -- typical eisenhower, not to intervene militarily. he believed that putting ground troops in asia was a fools errand and i would submit that the american experience since then validates that course. anybody else? how are we doing for times? one more question. okay. really good questions, folks. two red tape. >> so along the same lines, eisenhower shows -- was involved

in the bay of pigs and that prices rose soon after its president he ended under kennedy administration. his decision to be involved with the freedom fighters in cuba -- it sounds inconsistent with all you said about eisenhower's reluctance to engage in brushfire wars. >> the bay of pigs was a matter of controversy among historians right now and i can't resolve but i know historians are working on it. and they historians who have tended to deify johnette kennedy , i'll tell you i was sending john kennedy, but anyway, i really lay kennedy in many ways. but historians were biased toward senate try to argue that eisenhower really had set aside at kennedy carried it out.

i am convinced in one scholar i know who he seen the documents i haven't seen is convinced that eisenhower would've never done it the way kennedy did. he would tear the air support and even planned with the air support and look like an eisenhower kind of intervention. eisenhower would've done more or less what he did in lebanon in 1958 when he landed 14,000 troops. and he really believed in overwhelming force and you do it. now, he was open to covert action that we know that in guatemala and iran. so he was not a nature when it came to covert action. the cuban invasion is a strange phenomenon did you know, the cia -- if you need today what contingency plan the cia has come to he be horrified. and so, these contingency plans are around so when the new president came in, as every officer does, they took in the

plans to president kennedy and after eight years, quite a few people were upset with eisenhower to have a president. it was about whether you could have limited war because eisenhower said massive retaliation. he had liked them. they thought they could leap through the holocaust to maurice maxwell taylor, who is head of the joint chiefs of staff were eventually for kennedy and headed the army when i i quizzed they are believed in limited were in a book called the uncertain trumpet in a nuclear age, their argument is the only kind of war you could type is a limited one. and so that is great debate. but i cannot conceive of eisenhower having okayed that operation. but that doesn't mean he had no fingerprints on it. the weeds are mixed with the