economies. by the same token it seems americans feel better about castro than they did before. >> you can watch this and other programs online at booktv.org. >> next, david nichols presents a history of the suez canal crisis that occurred nine days prior to the 1956 presidential election. and resulted in president dwight eisenhower's decision to place american military forces on high alert, and condemned the attacks on egypt at the united nations, and ultimately led to a cease-fire announced on election day, november 6, 1956. it's about an hour. >> good evening. welcome to the atlanta history center. i am the president and ceo of the history center. this is another livingston lecture which is made possible through the generous support of

the livingston foundation atlanta. we are ever so grateful to them for their continued support. our next living lecture we held may 16 and will feature james stewart, author of tangled webs, false statements are undermining america from martha stewart to bernie madoff. i've seen some of the previous of this book, and you would be well advised to be here. it's fascinating. also in may choice for a lecture featuring the best selling author of devil in the white city, erik larsen, who will be here. he would be discussing his new book in the garden of beef, love, care and american family and hitler's berlin. tonight's lecture is being recorded by c-span, and check your local listings for the broadcast date you can see it again. at this time out like to ask you to please turn off all your cell phones or pagers, any other electronic devices that might disrupt our program.

or as a delta air lines flight attendant said, turn off everything that doesn't keep you alive. [laughter] delta airlines stewardesses are cheeky. our author this evening is david nichols will speak for about 40 minutes and we'll take your questions. david nichols is a leading expert on the eisenhower presidency. this evening he will discuss his new book, "eisenhower 1956: the president's year of crisis- suez and the brink of war." which the "christian science monitor" called one of seven history books worth checking out in 2011. he is the author of the matter of justice, eisenhower and the beginning of the civil rights revolution, and lincoln and indians. he holds a ph.d from william and mary, and he currently resides in kansas. please join me in welcoming david nichols to our state. -- to our stage. [applause]

>> thanks, sal. and it is an honor to be here. and to be with people who love history. that's always the best audience one can ever have. i'm grateful for being here. first, we need to shoot down the nasty rumor that's been going around that my publisher simon & schuster stirred up all the trouble in the middle east just to sell my book. that's not true. not true. this is also a day when the news is telling us that once again and author, at least alleging, has been making up stuff. and i want you to know that this book, excepting some commentaries and a conclusion, that in this book not a phrase is in it that is not rooted in a document or in compelling circumstantial evidence. "eisenhower 1956" is a new story. in so many respects because it is based on hundreds of top

secret documents that have been declassified, the last major book on the suez crisis was published 30 years ago. when i get done with the presentation, those of you have not read the book, and i do most of you have not, what kind of think you know the story, but please read the book because of the book is better than the speed. i guarantee that. i know the book. above all it is a deep personal story about the man we call affectionately ike. a word about this complex man. eisenhower was a military man but he was not military listed. he did not think that war was often a solution to anything. he was one, slow to pick up the sword. ike's public persona, that grandfatherly man was largely ike's personal invention. behind the scenes he was strategically vigorous, a tough-minded commander-in-chief. the people who worked for him never doubted who was in charge.

eisenhower was a citizen of the world more than any other president. yet he never forgot where he came from, that's why his presidential library is in abilene kansas close to where i live. ike was not a professional politician is one of the most successful politicians in our history. ike didn't hesitate used supporters like secretary of state john foster dulles as lighting rod for controversial policy that were in fact ike's creation. eisenhower had a temper. a temper that exploded like a rocket. at tense moments required great decisions he was unfailingly cool, and delivering. this is a religious man but prayers at the beginning of his cabinet meetings. yet when the famous temper erupted, he could turn the air blue with profanity. and did so for equally. above all eisenhower saw himself

not as a warrior, but as a peacemaker, and that's what this book is about. and tonight at a time when war and unrest in the middle east, it's fitting we reviewed together the most dangerous international price of the eisenhower presidency, that crisis was also in the middle east. this is a tale of nailbiting dramas. no, number one because of september 23, 1955, in denver, colorado, on the golf course. dwight eisenhower had not enjoyed a vacation so much in years. believe it or not the president of the united states had himself cooked a huge breakfast that morning for his fishing buddies. golf was the party for the day. after briefing and his air force base office, eisenhower headed for the cherry hills country club. his secretary remembered that she had never seen him luck or

act better. eisenhower's golf game was interrupted four times that day for phone calls from the secretary of state, john foster dulles. this was before cell phones so it irritated and probably a propane ike, had to return to the clubhouse for each call, only one of which actually got through. that call was important to. build is concerned -- confronted the soviet union had made an arms deal with each appeared ike knew this would open a new chapter in the cold war and they agreed the president should send a message to the soviet premier nikolai boudin. at the present want to think about it overnight. he told dulles you would call him the following morning. that phone call was never made. ike went back to golf, his game history. as the day wore on the present experience discomfort.

he declined issues with evening drink, had little appetite for dinner and retired early. and in the middle of the night, ike appeared by train to spitzer. i've got a pain across the lower part of my chest, he said. since a complaint early about indigestion, mamie gave her husband milk of magnesia. at 2:54 a.m. mamie called the presence physician who rushed to the white house. he initially put out the word that this was a digestive upset when he knew it was a massive heart attack. he waited until midafternoon that day before transporting the president to the army hospital. even then had ike walked to his car instead of calling an ambulance. if you want more details on the mismanagement of this situation, you've got to read the book. don't have time tonight. eisenhower was in hospital for six weeks.

in those days the gold standard for treatment of heart attack patients was total bed rest. ike's doctors would not permit him to read a newspaper, watch a movie, listen to a football game on the radio, let alone do much serious presidential business. he did not take a step across his room. for a month. in this incredibly active man felt like a caged animal. so at the very moment the soviet union attempted to change the balance of power in the middle east, eisenhower was out of commission. and secretary of state john foster dulles was on his own unable to consult with the president as he normally do. and let us bury once and for all the myth that john foster dulles john foster dulles rent american foreign policy in the eisenhower years. everyone close to both men, and i talk with a number of them, knew that ike was in charge. dwight eisenhower was out of the white house, people hardly believe this, light eyes i was

out of the white house for three and half months. accepting tonight on his way to recuperating at gettysburg. drama number two is the one at the heart patient so restricted in his other activities upset about, that is, what he should run for a second term in 1956. i'm satisfied ike always intended to run. in the age of roosevelt you had to have a second term to be a great president. and ike wanted to be a great president. but the heart attack rates the enormous question of whether physically he could run. ike repeatedly discussed possible successors with aids. none of whom had a snowball's chance in hell of getting nominated, let alone elected. the only republican with sufficient stature to run was chief justice earl warren of the supreme court, and if you want to know why ike threw cold water

on that option, you have to read my other book, chapter five will tell you all about it. eventually ike shut down every argument against running and convinced himself he would be healthier serving retiring. no one else could prevent the nuclear holocaust. in january 1956 eisenhower was informed that in a nuclear exchange with the soviet union, 65% of the american population would be casualties. years later, chief of staff chairman adam said which applies the president obama today, the real reason a president wants to run again, adams said, is because he doesn't think anybody else can do as good a job as he is doing. after waiting so long that no one else could put together, he really did wait a long time, so long that no one else could put

together a viable candidacy, ike announced his tennessee on february 29, 1956. -- announced his candidacy on february 29, 1956. number three is about aswan dam on the nile river. and the centerpiece of the president's plan for egyptian progress, historians often ignore the fact that eisenhower attempted to resolve the arab-israeli conflict that endures to this day. on august 26, 1955 before ike's heart attack, john foster dulles, have publicly announce the administration's plan, codenamed alpha, for resolving the arab-israeli conflict. that plan reads like it was written in 2011. discussing borders, palestinian refugees, holy places in

jerusalem, et cetera. in the alpha plan, aid to the aswan dam would be the carrot to entice them to make peace with issue. like most mideast peace plan, that awful plan was dead on arrival. once he began to recover, eisenhower revise the question that they'd do the aswan dam, and in december 1955 he persuade the national security council that in a make an offer that would head off soviet financing of the damn. however, in the following months of negotiations with the egyptians broke down. ike paid little attention to those negotiations. he was back in fight with his health, his decision about running for a second term in any the campaign. by june 7, 1956, eisenhower appear to have recovered from his heart attack. that morning he presided over a national security council meeting, had another 15

appointments, and practiced gulf. that evening he attended the white house news photographers dinner and stayed up until midnight as scheduled that his doctors would have vetoed a few weeks early. the president's guard dropped off schneider and his home and ike retired to his bed almost any of the. the doctor was removing his clothes when the phone rang. snyder reached for it with the shutter, only the first lady would be calling at such an hour. this is another anguishing medical drama that i'm sorry to say it again, you will need to read in the book if you want to know. it turned out that ike had an obstruction in his upper intestine, which the doctors called billy-itis. 13 doctors agonize for hours over whether to stick a knife in a president who suffered a heart attack eight months earlier. they waited until 2 a.m. on saturday june 9 to operate.

dr. snyder later opined the surge would've taken place hours earlier if the patient had been someone else. once again, eisenhower was out of commission for weeks. but the middle east, the timing could not have been worse. by the time ike return to the white house on july 15, 1956, john foster dulles had decided to withdraw the american offer of aid to the aswan dam projects, largely because congress was opposed to it. ..

>> a week later in retaliate nasr nationalize the suez canal company, saying he would use its profits to build the s1 dam. now, the british and french had controlled that company for decades. two-thirds of the oil for western europe came from the canal and now it was the united states and its allies that were in a hell of a spot. immediately the british and french prepared to go to war. but eisenhower felt it wasn't neff. egypt felt it was nationally located because it was in

egyptian territory. to ike it would whether the egyptian would also keep the canal open and operate effectively. he and dulles kept the british talking instead of fighting. still shell shocked from world war ii you have to remember from this context it was only 11 years after world war ii. still shell shocked. the british and french made nasr into another hitler. and until late september 1956, eisenhower's allies gave up on him and any support for taking out nasr and they implemented a program for it. the cia did not force nasr's nationalization in the canal and completely missed the plotting among the british, french and israelis. now, for the plot. on wednesday, october 24th,

1956, in a villa outside of paris. the french foreign minister, prime minister of israel and patrick dean the deputy undersecretary of state for great britain had a secret protocol providing that israeli troops would invade the sinai peninsula on october 29th. this was the plan. once the israelis advanced towards the suez canal zone britain and france would issue an ultimatum to egypt and israel to accept the canal zone. if as expected israel rejected the ultimatum. followed by troop landing. but remember this was secret. it was not in the newspapers. what was in the newspapers that day was that the soviet union had sent troops into budapest, hungary, killing dozens of

protesters. eisenhower knew nothing of the secret meeting in paris. that day the intelligence advisory committee chaired by cia director allen dulles, that's the brother of john forceder dulles and postponed further revision of the intelligence. the committee ignored an fbi report that an unnamed country was considering military action against nasr. on monday october 29th, eisenhower campaigning in florida was handed a note as he boarded his plane for richmond, virginia. the note said that the israeli army had attacked egypt and that israel's forces had driven been 25 miles of the suez canal. back in the white house that night, an angry and profane eisenhower ordered secretary dulles to fire a message to the israelis telling them that we're going to apply sanctions.

we're going to the united nations. we're going to do everything there is so that we can stop this thing. ike knew that if the suez canal was disrupted or pipelines were destroyed, the british and french would attack. he didn't know, of course, they'd already planned to do that. if the british intervened, ike said, they may open a deep rift between us. with the election eight days away, eisenhower declared that he did not care in the slightest whether he was re-elected or not. on october 30th, the british and french implemented to the letter the secret plan they endorsed on october 24th. they delivered a 12-hour ultimatum to israel and egypt to cease operations and accept occupation of the canal zone by anglo french forces. the british and french mistakenly assumed that once

they acted, their world war ii ally in the house would bail them out with funds, oil and military equipment. boy, were they wrong. instead, an angry eisenhower told an aide those who began this operation should be left to boil in their own oil. that night in the u.n. security council, the british and the french vetoed an american resolution calling for a cease-fire in egypt. less than a half hour later the deadline for the french/british ultimatum expired and the largest armaida seen in the mediterranean since world war ii beamed toward egypt. the next morning, wednesday october 3 warm-upst, eisenhower was heartened by news that soviet troops had pulled back from budapest, hungary and that the soviet government had declared its intention to practice noninterference in the internal affairs of the satellite state.

in egypt, u2 flights confirmed that british planes were not bombing air fields, ports, railways and communication centers turning neatly parked rows of aircraft into burning smoking wreckage. nasr's troops had sunk a 320-foot ship loaded with rocks and cement in the suez canal. the first of 32 ships there. eisenhower concluded that he should address the nation that night, october 31st. and foster dulles sick and exhausted wrote a draft of the address and ike read it, declared it an absolute disaster. and late in the afternoon ordered that a new speech be written. minutes before the broadcast in the oval office, the speechwriter fed the speech to the president a page at a time across a table. the speech was short and terse. eisenhower revealed given the

veto in the security council he had taken the unprecedented step in appealing to the united nations general assembly. united states was not consulted in any way about any phase of these actions, eisenhower said. nor were we informed of them in advanced. and he pledged there will be no united states involvement in these present hostilities. ann whitman described november -- thursday november 1st, 1956 as another day of great crises. terman adams called this, quote, the worst week that eisenhower experienced in all the years i worked with him at the white house. the this morning the president was besieged with rumors that the soviets were planning to deploy aircraft on syrian bases. and ike asked the chairman joint chiefs of staffs whether the

russians might have flipped some atom bombs to the egyptians. eisenhower cancelled all campaign events except the one scheduled for philadelphia that night, november 1st. ann whitman recalled that the typewriters had to go to the train to complete the speech in time. in philadelphia, in convention hall, ike looked out at 18,000 partisans who came fully expecting arousing campaign speech. instead, he launched to what a columnist called a high level speech by a man who spoke not as a republican partisan but as president of all the country. l.

or there will be no peace. the president concluded, we believe that the power of modern weapons makes war not only perilous but preposterous. and the only way to win world war iii is to prevent it. eisenhower was completely drained by four days of unrelenting crisis. he drank two scotches before dinner on the train and three high balls afterwards. arriving at union station's 12:29 november 2nd. on friday morning, november 2nd

eisenhower learned at 4:00 in the morning the general assembly had patched the american cease-fire vote from 6-5 with surprisingly the soviet union voting in favor. democratic candidate add lay stevenson was harshly critical of this situation. we have alienated our chief, our ancient and is to thinkest allies. we have alienated israel, egypt and the arab countries and the -- and our main associate and middle eastern matters now appears to be the soviet union in the very week when the red army has been shooting down the brave people of hungary and poland. stevenson concluded, i doubt if ever before in our diplomatic history has any policy been such an abysmal, such a complete and such a catastrophic failure.

ike was not sleeping well. his doctor was concerned. the president's blood pressure was volatile. his heart skipped beats. and he suffered constant abdominal discomfort and diarrhea. the records at the museum are marvelous detailed. [laughter] >> one day, i said to the president's diarrhea was really more information than i wanted or needed. [laughter] >> then late in the night on november 2nd john foster dulles was rushed to the walter reed hospital where the next morning where doctors removed a cancerous tumor from his colon. the news from the middle east was dismal. syrian saboteurs had blown up

their oil pipelines running through their country, egyptian troops were pouring into kaiser and the anglo french strikes had ground the egyptian on the ground. eleanor roosevelt accused the administration of favoring the arabs over israel and asserted britain and france had been brought to the point of desperation by american policy. it leaves us in the very strange position, she said, of supporting the kremlin and an egyptian dictator against our own strongest ally. 6 of the 8 democratic members of the senate foreign relations committee publicly agreed with stevenson and roosevelt that the president's middle east policies had failed. eisenhower, they declared was over four years of indecision,

tacklessness, amity and bluster. stevenson asserted, quote, the president's age, his health, and the fact that he cannot succeed himself make it inevitable that the dominant figure in the republican party under a second eisenhower term would be richard nixon, steven asked the crowd, do you want to place the hydrogen bomb in his hands? on sunday, november 4th, dwight eisenhower confronted a perfect storm. at 4:00 am the soviet union ordered 200,000 troops into hungary. tens of thousands of hungarians died or were wounded that day. eisenhower quickly concluded that the united states was no position to intervene in hungary. his allies were died down with the war in egypt. hungary was not accessible by sea. and the american forces could not respond by land without violating the territories of

neutral or communist states. meanwhile, in the middle east, israel now controlled both the sinai and the gaza strip and held 5,000 egyptians prisoner. on monday, november 5th, election eve, british and the french paratroopers landed in egypt. and suddenly, the leaders of the soviet union poured more fuel on the international fire. the premier sent messages, alluding to modern weapons of destruction and rocket weapons. we are full of determination he wrote to crush the aggressor, and to re-establish peace in the middle east by using force. simultaneously, he proposed to eisenhower that the united states and the soviet union jointly mobilized their naval

fleets to stop aggression and terminate further bloodshed. he warned the president, if this war is not stopped, it is fraught with danger and can grow into a third world war. eisenhower interpreted the russian proposal as an ultimatum. he drew a line in the middle east sand calling it unthinkable. that was one of his favorite words, unthinkable that the united states would join forces with the soviets when the generalized assembly had already ordered a cease-fire. unilateral action by the soviet union, eisenhower stated, would be forcefully opposed by the united states and he ordered the navy sixth fleet in the mediterranean ordered placed on alert. this was election eve. the stresses were taking a toll on the president. after a tense meeting over the

bulgarian meeting, the doctor found eisenhower's blood pressure elevated and his heart rate irregular. he laid down but developed a headache after all he ada dish of carrots and a glass of yogutters. the president's agitation was due to what he determined an ultimatum that had been served upon him by bulgaria and he wrote i'm confident with soldier profanity. he growled if he were a dictator he would tell russia if they moved a finger, he would drop our entire stock of atomic weapons. tuesday was the election day. ike rose to the middle east and even greater turmoil. that morning he was somber. our people should be alert, eisenhower said, the presence of russian planes in syria would ultimately trigger french and air attacks on those air fields.

if that happens, as ike would like to say, the fat would be in the fire. he inquired of the joint chiefs whether american naval units were equipped with atomic antisubmarine weapons. after he and mamie left to vote that the middle east looked so bad at one point that the white house staff contemplated asking the president to turn around and come back to the white house. rumors were rampant that the soviet intervention was imminent. some of the bad news came directly from moscow. chip boland the american ambassador cabled that the soviet mood had become more ominous and that he feared that soviet leaders were prepared to take military action against a ceasefire was quickly achieved. the staff hastened the

president's returned by applying him back instead of having him drive from gettysburg. ike arrived at the white house at 12:38 pm. following a short briefing, he stowed into the cabinet room were 18 men were waiting. the vice president and the top leadership of both the state and defense departments including the joint chiefs. this was a council of war. admiral ratford briefed the president on the joint chiefs. we're prepared to take readiness for fighting a major war with the soviet union. eisenhower reviewed each step, urging careful and deliberate implementation. then his son broke behind the war clouds and the president was informed in the middle of this meeting that british prime minister anthony was available

by phone. eisenhower interrupted the meeting to take the call and he confirmed in the call that eaton had ordered a ceasefire in egypt. this is the tenth conversation. it's much more detailed than i'm presenting here. a tenth conversation with a clearly resentful eden. ike asked if british compliance with the ceasefire would be without condition. and eaton ground we're ceasefiring tonight at midnight provided we're not attacked. eisenhower had foresee what games eaton would try to play. he insisted that british technical troops not be used to clear the canal. that would have constituted a de facto occupation. and that no british or french troops or soviet or american for that matter served and opposed a united nations peacekeeping force. the first hint of warmth in the conversation when eaton asked about foster dulles and the election. and ike replied, we have given

our whole thought to hungary and the middle east. i don't give a damn how the election goes. eisenhower knew that the peace was still fragile and that soviet intentions were still unclear. he ordered implementation of most of the readiness steps that were discussed at his new meeting. and that night the joint chiefs put the sixth atlantic and pacific fleets on battle-ready alert and deploying additional ships, submarines and technical resources and they placed heavy troop carrier wings on a 12-hour alert. about 10:00 pm the eisenhower party attended the sheraton hotel to watch election returns. now, as you all know the president ron re-election by huge margin. but ike did not go downstairs to address his supporters until

1:45 am because his reluctant opponent adlai stevenson waited that long to make a concession speech. meanwhile, hours earlier, approximately, 2:00 am cairo time in washington, d.c., the fighting ended in the middle east. after november 6th, eisenhower continued to be concerned about the possibility of soviet intervention because the british, french and israelis declined to remove their allies. even though there had been a ceasefire they would not withdraw. adlie refused to provide oil to his allies. they were interrupt. there was a run on the pound and the british finances were bad shape. the allies were facing a cold winter but he would give them

nothing until they publicly committed themselves to withdraw. and it got so tense that in paris, cab drivers often refused to pick up americans. gas stations declined to sell fuel. it took a month to get commitment. and another month for withdrawal. israeli withdrawal took even longer. it's a huge story that i don't have time to get into. the israelis evacuated the sinai but refused to leave the gaza strip and the mouth of the gulf. they continued to occupy those two spots. finally, after four months of presidential pressure objects march 1st, 1951, the israeli government announced its intention to withdraw. there's a big story about this because politically this was a hot potato, too. then there's the eisenhower doctrine. in a four-hour meeting with congressional leaders on new

year's day 1957, who else but dwight eisenhower would hold a four-hour meeting with congressional leaders on new year's day? eisenhower presented a resolution to those leaders endorsing military and economic aid to the middle east. and if necessary, military intervention by the united states. the house passed the resolution on january 30th, the same day that ike paraded the king from saudi arabia before cameras on a state visit. he insisted that the president come to the airport to greet him. that's something that ike had never done with any other foreign leader. but saudi oil had its cloud in those days too and ike agreed to do. and he grumbled to ann whitman now he'd suppose he would have to greet everybody in the future. once israel agreed to withdraw from egypt, the eisenhower doctrine passed the senate on march 5th.

in a breast taking 2 months, dwight eisenhower persuaded the congress of the united states to dramatically reorient american policy towards the middle east. the eisenhower doctrine permitted the united states to replace the british as the civility and security including resources in the middle east. and for good or ill, as president obama has experienced the past few weeks, for good or ill, that obligation is still the cornerstone of american policy. thank you. [applause] >> we have time to open up the microphone. [inaudible] >> use the microphone, folks. no such thing as a dumb question.

or comment, contrary comment? [laughter] >> all right. >> great talk. thank you very much. i had a question. did the obama administration contact you about their involvement in libya? and if not, did you find similarity in how he dealt with libya in comparison with the suez canal incident? >> no. they have not -- the administration hasn't talked with me. i'm meeting with former senator chuck hagel tomorrow in washington, d.c. who i'm told bought 27 copies of the book. and gave one to the president and one to the vice president, one to the secretary of defense. i haven't talked with the senator yet about it but my suspicion is he's a little uncertain that intervention in libya is a good thing.

it always is tricky -- we have to be very careful about taking a historic figure and applying them to a situation 50 or 60 years later. but there are principles in the way eisenhower approached things that are worthy of consideration. and eisenhower generally did not like brushfire wars, what he called brushfire wars. he ended the one in korea. he refused to go into indochina or egypt. he just didn't do it. and he disliked very much marginal military invention. he believed -- colin powell gets the credit for the doctrine of overwhelming force these days. and often think that general powell ought to remind us dwight eisenhower talked about it all the time but he got it from the great pyramid general but overwhelming force. and that marginal -- the trouble ike understood very well the trouble with partial interventions is they spin out of control. that they are very hard to

manage. and the libyan ones appears to me to be the way so i don't know whether the president would want to talk with me about that or not. i'm a little concerned that it's becoming a stalemate. and you can have not only a unilateral quagmire like we've had in a couple places and you could have a multilateral quagmire too. yes, sir. >> what was richard nixon's role in this, if any? >> richard nixon's role -- there's a lot of mythology about nixon and eisenhower. i don't want to get too involved but the eisenhower presidency has just been distorted by my profession. shamefully. just because people didn't do the research. and one of the relationship with eisenhower, nixon i'm satisfied would never have kept as second term as vice president if he didn't want him. you have to know eisenhower he didn't abide people -- well, it's not true he kept that

doctor. i don't know. [laughter] >> you know, dr. snyder, an old crony but nixon was basically to answer your question ike's political surrogate and when eisenhower quit campaigning which he did when this crisis broke out, nixon went out and substituted for him and took on adlai stevenson. i haven't looked very carefully what he did with the eisenhower doctrine passage but i'm sure he played a major role. he was vice president so he presided over the senate and i'm sure he was deeply involved behind the scenes but he was a political operative for eisenhower and a very skilled one. nixon -- the way nixon left the presidency always tars him and people forget what else he did. somebody else? yes. >> what was the effect of these events on nasr?

>> well, eisenhower -- the effect on nasr, he asked. eisenhower saved nasr's hide. if they joined with the allies, nixon would have been toast. but there isn't any question -- now, you got to remember in those days nasr and arab nationalists were considered pretty progressive. they were getting rid of royal thrones and the colonial power but what happens is nasr stays in power who's followed by sadat, who's followed by you know who? mubarak, right. mubarak was a 28-year-old officer on the rise already he at the time of the crisis. eisenhower's policy we have to say -- i sound very

proeisenhower. there's always a law of unintended consequences. and eisenhower's policies opened the door for military strong men to operate in the middle east. and at the same time it would not be fair -- to hang that around eisenhower's neck all together, 50, 60 years later, of course, and nevertheless that was -- that was a factor. and personally, i have an op-ed i'm trying to get somebody to print at the moment. my prediction is that the military is not done in egypt. they've been in charge for 60 years. and i will be real surprised if we don't have either a military officer or somebody with very close ties to the military where they're the next president of the egypt. yes, sir. >> what was eisenhower's relationship with truman? >> sir, i don't pretend to be an expert on that. there is -- oh, i always forget this author's name. there is a book called "harry and ike."

that's the correct title. i'm sorry i'm forgetting the author's name. i'm an old guy and the part of my brain that remembers name has died. [laughter] >> having said that, truman chose eisenhower to head nato. we now know from truman's diary that he attempted to persuade ike as early as 1948 to run for president on the -- on the democratic ticket. how serious that was with truman, i haven't studied in depth but we now know that's in truman's diaries. and on the other hand, it was very tense in 1953 at the inauguration. eisenhower did not get out of the car and go into the white house to get the outgoing president. harry was offended about it and talked about it later. it was not an easy relationship, although in the book is that they kind of reconciled years

later quite a bit but it was a fairly tense relationship partly because truman later in an oral history alleged that ike had wanted to come back -- wanted to marry his driver kay sommersby his driver in europe and wanted to divorce mamie and that truman had taken those letters in the state department and destroyed them. at least one scholar i know who is pretty good thinks that truman made that up. i don't know. i'm not qualified. i'm not giving you a very good answer because i'm not very good on that. >> thank you. >> i had heard sadat had made a statement years later that nasr told them that because we didn't back our allies that the united states couldn't be trusted and then they became allies with the soviets. is that true? >> sadat said that to nasr? >> no, nasr said that to sadat.

>> i know a whole lot about little and i know a whole lot what i just talked to you about. i couldn't dispute that. i think there's still work to be done on the evolution of things after the eisenhower years. the tendency -- or the diplomatic historians has been to assume the eisenhower doctrine and the eisenhower policies for abject failures and nasr ends up being allied with the soviets. i'm not sure egypt ever became what you could really call a satellite of the soviet union. nasr played both sides against the middle and whether the united states can't be trusted, i don't know, you could take that kind of statement and look at it two or three different ways couldn't you? certainly the allies didn't think he could be trusted to do what they wanted.

i'm sorry. it's a poor answer and i'm not qualified to answer it any better. >> thank you. >> i think if i know my history fairly correctly, that the role of israel after world war ii, which was the implementation of the dao4 treaty or agreement. what was eisenhower's view or reluctance of israel to withdraw you were saying from the gaza? >> that you're asking about that, you're not asking about the creation of israel? >> no, no. i'm asking about, you know, when he was president and they were, you know, going through what, you know, the -- you know, how israel was taking over some of the territories that were not involved in the agreement, what was his feeling about that? >> if you're talking about the -- i only know about the suez situation in gaza.

i'm not very qualified to speak about the rest of it. that he certainly put enormous pressure on israel to withdraw after the suez crisis and he appealed to the congress on february 20th, 1957, for support for that and the congress turned him down. and so he turned around that night and went to the people with a televised address and behind the scenes according to his memoirs, he threaten to the israelis to cut off private contributions from american jews to israel which at that time is still major but at that time was really, really major. now, whether he could have done that, i don't know. but in terms of the politics of the united states, eisenhower took extraordinary steps to oppose israel's policies at that time. now, the earlier stuff, i'm -- i'm not as good on. in terms of the creation of the state of israel, generally,

truman recognized the state of israel in may, i believe, 1948. part of his presidential campaign. and that was really opposed by george marshall who was then his secretary of state. you got to remember george marshall, general george marshall, of eisenhower's midterm and i think there's circumstancetial evidence to believe that people in the state department believed roy henderson is the graduate of my school in southwestern school and a great diplomat who really believed that creation -- the recognition and creation of the state of israel would lead to endless turmoil in the middle east, and he was not wrong. that doesn't mean you can't support that because there's a dramatic and wonderful story for the state of israel. and i'm moved and touched by it. i wish i could answer you

bette better. >> did the hungarians expect the americans to come to their aid in 1956? >> there's significant evidence that a lot of hungarians did expect the americans to come to their aid and there was great disillusionment among pro-hungarians and the refugees, there's hundreds of thousands of refugees left and all the united states did was make provision and i forget the numbers now for thousands of hungarian refugees to come to this country. there's great disillusionment and great criticism of eisenhower for that. he was very clearheaded that it could not be done and this is eisenhower who made it back to your earlier question who didn't believe on taking on military tasks that could not be completed successfully. you know, he regretted it deeply but he quickly made the decision -- you have to go back to world war ii. we have a lot of mythology about

what happened in world war ii. but without the soviet union, in world war ii, a case could be made that the war would have come out very differently. and the soviet union suffered 35 million casualties estimated on the eastern front. and the united states and the allied powers didn't land until 1944. well, this is a totally different situation. the soviet union was on the other side. britain and france were not available to help. he thought it was just not viable but he was roundly criticized much, much so -- my book doesn't do justice to that particular subject, i regret to say. >> would you address the eisenhower and vietnam? >> yeah. i sound like a broken record because i tell you i know a lot about a little. i do know about that and clearly

made the decision not to intervene in indochina in 1954, particularly to save the prince. and he had a number of advisors who wanted him to do it. and he thought and thought about it and he was surrounded by a number of people who thought he should do it. and he went over overnight and came back the next day and said i'm not going to send one soldier to die in those rice patties, and he did not. having said that, eisenhower left it in a bit of a mess in vietnam. the geneva conventions in 1955 because i used to teach a course on it, it was called for unified elections in vietnam. and those elections never took place because the united states supported in effect the creation of a separate country in south vietnam even though it really wasn't a separate country and never was.

this is an outcome in this cold war and so eisenhower's policies; otherwise, are open to a lot of question. i haven't done the detailed research on it like i have on this but he clearly chose, typical eisenhower not to intervene militarily in indochina. he believed that putting ground troops in asia was a fool's errand. and i would submit our american experience since then invalidates his judgment on that score. anybody else? how are we doing for time? one more question. okay. these are good questions, folks. terrific. >> so along the same lines, eisenhower chose -- was involved in the bay of pigs, and that crisis arose soon after his presidency ended under the kennedy administration.

his decision to be involved with the freedom fighters in cuba -- it sounds inconsistent with all you've said about eisenhower's reluctance to engage in brushfire wars. >> yeah, the bay of pigs is a matter of some controversy among some historians right now. i can't resolve it although i know some historians who are working on it. and the historians who have tended to defy john f. kennedy i will confuse the life out of you that i have a son named for john f. kennedy. you know, i really liked kennedy in so many ways. but the historians who are biased toward him have tried to argue that eisenhower really had set this up and kennedy just carried it out. i am convinced -- and one scholar i know who has seen the documents that i haven't seen is convinced that eisenhower would have never done it the way kennedy did.

he withdrew the airport and even the plan with the air support just didn't look like an eisenhower kind of intervention. eisenhower would have done in what he did in lebanon in 1958 when he landed 14,000 troops. i mean, he really believed in overwhelming force and you do it. now, he was open to covert action and we know in that guatemala and iran so he was not an angel when it came to covert action but the cuban invasion is a strange phenomenon. you know, the cia -- if you knew today what contingency plans the cia has, you would be horrified. and so these contingency plans were around and so when the new president came in, as the -- every officer does, alan dulles and other people took the plans in to president kennedy and there were after eight years quite a few people who were upset with eisenhower and were

anxious to have a president who would do things differently. and it was about limited war. and eisenhower said massive retaliation, limited wars were dangerous. he didn't like them. he felt they could lead to the holocaust; whereas, maxwell taylor, who's head of the joint chiefs of staff, eventually for kennedy and head of the army when ike was there believed in limited war and wrote a book called "the uncertain trumpet" and felt the nuclear age -- their argument was the only war you could fight is a limited one and so that's a great debate. i do not -- i cannot conceive of eisenhower having okayed that operation the way kennedy did it. but that doesn't mean he didn't have no fingerprints and i like to say the weeds are mixed with the flowers in that situation. >> thank you very much. >> and thank you folks for excellent questions. [applause]