[inaudible conversations]

>> the u.s. representative to libya's transitional council has just returned from four months in benghazi, a stay that included talks with the rebel governing body. chris stevens was at the state department to brief reporters on the libyan political unrest and violence. this is a half hour. >> hey, good afternoon, everyone. welcome to the state department. it's our good fortune today to have with us chris stevens, a man you've heard a lot about over the past several months, as he has been the u.s. representative to the transitional national council and had been working with them on the ground in benghazi. so we thought it would be

helpful and important to have chris come and talk about his experiences and answer some of your questions. without further ado, chris, thanks. >> hello, good afternoon. i'm chris stevens. i got in from benghazi a couple days ago. i'm in town for consternation at the state department. just briefly i'll say a few words at the top. i've been in benghazi for about four months now. we got there april 5th. it was difficult to get in there at the time. there weren't any flights so we came in by a greek cargo ship and unloaded our gear and our cars and set up our office there. so we've been on the ground since then. my mandate was to go out and meet as many of the leadership as i could in the tnc. they've got their council which is sort of their legislature and they've got sort of a cabinet so i've met just about everybody in those two institutions and then

i've gone around and -- with our small team and tried to get to know other people in the society there. of course, we operate in eastern libya, not the part that gadhafi controls. and the immediate concern when we got there was that gadhafi forces almost infiltrated and taken over benghazi but were pushed out by nato and since then the situation has improved quite a bit. real briefly, i'll say that in the last four months, my strong impression is that the tnc are making progress, and i sort of break it down into three areas. diplomatically they've made tremendous progress since april gaining international recognition now from about 30 countries including significantly our own. this helps them in the eyes of

the world and the eyes of the libyian people and it also helps them in the sense that it increases pressure on gadhafi. financially, they made progress. and when we got there, they were really in a precarious situation because they didn't have funds to pay for food, medicine, fuel to keep the power generators going to keep the lights on. and since then, a number of countries have come forth and offered loans most recently, turkey, qatar, the uae, kuwait and, of course, with political recognition they're hopeful they'll be able to gain access to the frozen assets around the world. and then lastly i would say militarily although it's been slow, they're also making progress, gaining territory from gadhafi. and the way i sort of break it down is, you know, there are three battlefronts. there's the western mountains

where they've got fighters, you know, inching their way toward tripoli. the misrata front on the coast where they've not only fought off gadhafi's forces successfully but they're also pushing west up the coast towards tripoli. i understand they're getting close to sliton which is a significant town. and closer to where i am there's brega where they're now encountering difficulty with land mines, unfortunately. hopefully, they can get through those. now, i don't want to paint an overly rosy picture because there's challenges inside the tnc-controlled area and one of them is security. there was a security vacuum when the regime fell and they had to stand up very quickly this organization called the tnc. the police for the most part just left their posts because

they were afraid the reaction against them because they committed abuses in the early days against the people. so there's hardly any police around. and because of that vacuum militias started to form and step in. and so, you know, looking after the security of benghazi and eastern libya. you got a lot of militias and a few police and this has led to some security challenges that you've already read about and know about, i'm sure. and the tnc is working to address these problems. we flagged the problems with them. the british, the french, other diplomatic missions, they are sort of keeping the pressure on the tnc to get their arms around the militia problem so that, you know, they can provide better security as they try to move forward to tripoli and hopefully to gadhafi's departure. thank you very much. i'm happy to take questions.

>> i had a question for you about the numerous reports of fracturing within the tnc and some factions against the tnc and what the u.s. is doing to help unify them? >> yeah. my impression is really a little bit different. the tnc really is a reflection of libyan society. libyan society is not monolithic. it's made up of lots of different people. lots of groups, different points of view. so, you know, this was never a monolithic group that we were dealing with. and i realize that from the start from our mission. so it's not surprising to me there are differences of opinion. the problem, of course, arises when they express their differences of opinion in a

violent way. and with respect to the general's killing we don't know who did it but the tnc has set up a committee to look into his killing and to, you know, ascertain what the truth is. i'm really hezzant to talk about if it's a gadhafi until we really know. on your last point, we have gone in to the tnc leadership with our partners on the ground there. and -- and communicated the view that they really need to be careful about maintaining their unity and keep the focus on gadhafi's ouster. and they understand that message very well. and they've told that you say they are going to work hard to bring the militias under the

control of the security ministry which they set up and under the army as well and hopefully that will work. >> do you have any concerns that the fractions within the tnc could affect it and enact a unified way and impede their progress or their ability to provide services on both fronts? no, because the militias that are troublesome are really quite small. the main militias are working in coordination with the tnc leadership and under the -- and under the leadership of the defense ministry there. that's the first point. the second point is militias -- any number of them they sprout up anytime and when you identify a name to attach to their group and oftentimes they work only in a neighborhood context. so i don't see them as pose ago huge security challenge right

now. >> sorry, that wasn't the militias i meant. in the tnc any fractionization within the tnc leadership that would impede their ability to make decisions in the group or advance against gadhafi. >> no, i don't see that as an issue. as i said, the main ones are with the tnc and they are on the front lines not only in brega but they are sending fighters out to the western areas and misrata so they're with the cause. >> taking a larger picture, it does seem in the last few weeks that despite their nice plans and papers and proposals and, you know, meetings that they're having, that there does seem to be kind of some disarray on the ground and i think it probably stems from the fact that there's been so little of institutions of any type of government in libya for so many years that, you know, these people are not really used to kind of all working together towards a

common goal. so are you concerned that despite the façade that they really have their act together that perhaps they don't. and how can the u.s. help in terms of helping them professionalize themselves and what specific things are you going to do on the ground to help them maintain their unity and, you know, on that note, what is the status of your office? how many staff, if you can talk, you know, given security concerns, what kind of presence do you have on the ground and do you expect to have a more robust presence as you increase your or formalize your presence? >> okay. first it's -- i mean, it's really important to remember the tnc sort of emerged out of, you know, emergency circumstances back in february. and they tried to set up, you know, government institutions in very difficult circumstances. while they're fighting a revolution, while they're fighting off gadhafi and trying

to gain international support so i actually think they have done well considering the challenges. but your point is correct in the sense that gadhafi never encouraged, you know, institutional development. he did the opposite. he really demolished his government as you know from your visit there a few years ago. so they are struggling with that. we and other international partners are trying to help them in various ways. the main vehicle for that is the international contact group which means once a month. and there are discussion about, you know, what kinds of technical assistance could be provided to help them, sort of buttress their institutions, which by the way are meant to be temporary because they weren't elected. they're not considered, you know, the elected government. they're meant to be, you know, transitional. so there's a sensitivity there. and then on your last question about how big is our group. we're 8 people now. we're quite small.

but we hope to get a little bit bigger. >> just a quick follow -- i mean, in terms of you working with these people and helping them kind of maintain their unity -- i mean, even though they're the biggest game in town, i mean, how much support do they really have throughout the country? i mean, although they're certainly the most well-known, i mean, would you say this is an adequate reflection of representation of the libyan people? >> yes, i would. first of all, there's no alternative except for gadhafi. and he is extremely unpopular throughout the country. second, the tnc has representatives from gadhafi-controlled libya, you know, on his council. and in its government. and they've actually recently increased the size and the representation of the tnc among the western provinces. and they're very conscious of this sensitivity of not being

sort of overly dominated by eastern libyans so they are well represented. >> can you tell us what you do know about killing of the general. the circumstances are very murky, as you know. and what affect have you seen so far in the week or so since that's happened on the military leadership on the tnc? >> well, i don't want to speculate. all i've seen are a couple of reports. one by the tnc leadership that a gadhafi affiliate military that killed them and the other that said it might be one of the military militias and i don't know what the truth is and we have to wait and find out. in terms of his death on the military leadership among the rebel ranks, i understand that they have selected or are

looking at a general who is in charge of the region in the eastern part of the country. but i don't know if he's been confirmed so to speak. >> hi, mary beth sheraton from the "washington post." can you give us is sense at this point of how much longer it will -- the sort of conflict is likely to go on before gadhafi leaves? i mean, three months, six months, a year? >> i wouldn't want to put a date on it. but i can tell you what the tnc hopes to be the sort of endgame. what they envision is increasing pressure on the gadhafi regime such that more and more of the leadership flee. and such that gadhafi will give up. and the pressure is political,

you know, he has increasing isolation and it's isolation and as the rebels come from tripoli from the mountains up to the coast. >> if i could follow up also, it's been reported that the u.s. had suggested in its talks with the gadhafi government the possibility of gadhafi staying in the country. is that something that you're still willing to offer to them? >> well, our position is that it's a decision for the libyan people and their future government where gadhafi resides. >> in your talks with the tnc, have you gotten a sense that they would accept gadhafi to stay? also i have another but i'll start with that one. >> that's a highly controversial issue within the tnc right now.

and as you've seen, they flip flopped a little bit on that and that's because there's activity views and the tnc is trying to be responsive to the street and i'm not sure they've reached a final decision. you know, the two basic arguments, one, he should go because if he's allowed to stay in libya he'll just cause more problems and we'll just have to deal with him forever. the other argument is, no, i should be allowed to stay in libya 'cause it will end the conflict later and then we can prosecute him ourselves. and then there's the other where the libyan government turned to the icc. >> have you been able to travel outside of benghazi and meet with civil society leaders in other places? and these are the people who are telling you that they support the tnc? >> absolutely. we try to get out and about as much as possible. and meet with all sorts of people. tribal leaders, islamists, ngos,

women, men all around. so benghazi but also we've headed out to the east. where we don't go for security reasons into the war zone. >> have they told you what type of government they want post-benghazi. >> democratic where they have a say in their lives which they didn't have for the last 42 years. >> a few more questions, and then we'll stop. >> sir, how do you and the other diplomatic missions with the tnc? do you coordinate your efforts. do you talk with them on a daily basis and would you recommend to the administration, to the united states administration, to epion up the embassy as soon as possible in washington so you can have better coordination? >> well, we talk to them on a daily basis. >> are you coordinated with other missions and so on? >> we talk to the other missions as well. >> as priorities.

>> yeah, yeah. of course, in the contact group there's other nations and those other nations are represented in benghazi. and we do work among ourselves and how do we work with the tnc with the goals that everybody talked about in the contact meeting. so, yes, a lot of talk among a lot of us. as for their mission here, i understand they're going to be opening up their office pretty soon. >> paul richter, is the u.s. doing any systemic planning for what happens after gadhafi leaves? >> yes. first, i really want to see the tnc is also doing planning for the future and that's probably more important. they have done extensive planning about how to handle the situation in libya in the immediate aftermath after his fall. they have done a political roadmap to how they're going to

get there and then they've done very specific sector by sector of planning. we and our international partners are helping them and to give ideas based on our experiences. they're very open to that kind of cooperation and, of course, the u.n. is very involved and will be very involved in the post-gadhafi area. >> and how much of a role is the u.s. willing to play? are you leaving it to the europeans or is the u.s. willing to do a substantial role in helping maintain security in the immediate aftermath? >> well, i think we have a lot to offer based on our own experiences. and my understanding is that we're going to be doing this, you know, as part of a joint effort with other international partners. as i said, the contact group is kind of the venue where these discussions take place. and the teamwork is formed. >> two more questions. >> i'm just wondering this touches on some of the other questions that were asked.

we keep hearing that the nato militarily -- the mission is in a bit of a stalemate and gadhafi's forces and the opposition forces. and more people are saying it will have to be a political situation. i'm just wondering what the tnc say about that. do they feel that they're also in a stalemate? and if they are looking at a political solution, what specific are they thinking of. >> well, they are of the view they're actually making progress towards ousting gadhafi they and everyone's pressure is working on the economic pressure so they don't see a stagnant position. they see movement, you know, in the right direction. they're very glad that nato is part of this. and they see nato's continued involvement as essential to protecting their people. and they hope it continues.

>> did they expect it to last this long, the military involvement by nato? >> well, you know, they hoped gadhafi would have been gone a long time ago but their patient and committed. >> the second part of my question is politically what are they willing to do to bring this to a conclusion? >> well, they're trying to do all they can with -- they are fighting on the various fronts. and they're trying to -- continue to show the international, you know, community that they're worthy of our support. >> what percentage of the tnc, this reflection of libyan society is now composed of women? secondly, have they told you how they want to use the billions of dollars they're hoping to get access to? and thirdly, how do you draw the assessment -- how do you reach the assessment that gadhafi's demise is an inevitablity at

this point beyond you want this to happen? >> well, the percentage of women in the tnc is very small. i can tell you that. i'd have to look -- look carefully at the list of who's in and the different structures but it's very small. i know one tnc woman who play as prominent role as head of the legal affairs committee and she's very involved in the discussions about, you know, political planning for the future. women are more representative in civil society groups there. so that's that. and can you remind me of your other questions? >> the money, the billions in assets. >> oh, yeah, right right. they have specific plans and priorities for how they would spend the money. generally speaking they would spend it on the urgent priorities which are fuel so

they can keep the electricity going and the water pumping. by the way, they get their water mostly from the great manmade water from the desert aquefurs of the south and that takes a lot of money. and on food subsidies and supporting internationally displac displaced libyans to the west and that's how they would spend the money. on the inevitablity of, you know, gadhafi's departure, i don't -- all i can say is that, you know, the world is lined up against him. and his base is shrinking. and the tnc forces are closing in around him. and so are sanctions and everything. i think everybody agrees it's a matter of time.

>> the senate foreign relations committee tuesday heard testimony from nominees to be ambassadors to syria, turkey and the czech republic. all of nominees who have served in those positions in a temporary role in november are still waiting for a vote of

confirmation in the senate. this hearing runs two hours ten minutes. >> this hearing will come to order. good afternoon, everyone. today we have two panels of nominees. but we're doing this a little differently today. so we're actually going to hear from all three nominees in the first panel and then we'll do questioning of mr. ford in the second panel. we're fortunate to have senator lugar here with us and we want to try and accommodate his schedule as well as senator lieberman's schedule. so on our first panel we will consider the nominations of norman eyesan to be ambassador to the czech republic and francis richard olney to the

republic of turkey. and on our second panel we will be considering the nomination of robert ford to be ambassador to syria. senator casey from pennsylvania will be here. he chairs the subcommittee on near eastern affairs and he will chair ambassador ford's questioning portion of the second panel. all of the posts being considered today are critical in strengthening u.s. influence and safeguarding person interests around the globe. i look forward to discussing the challenges and opportunities the united states faces in these three important countries. now, as i said, we're doing this a little bit differently today. and one of the differences is that both of our nominees on the first panel were nominated last year to serve in these same positions. i think i chaired one of those

nomination hearings last year. but both nominations were thoroughly considered and approved by the senate foreign relations committee and both were held up on the senate floor and were not ultimately confirmed by the full senate. seeing the importance of having an ambassador in these critical countries, the president chose to recess-appoint both ambassador richard owny and ambassador eisen to their positions. they have been serving as ambassadors in prague and ankara. an appointment only lasts for one calendar men so these two men have been renominated and the committee will reconsider their nominations. as the subcommittee chair on european affairs, i was supportive of those nominations last year, and i intend to support their nominations once again. since both men have already been serving in these roles we'll have an excellent chance to hear

from them directly about the challenges they've already seen and their plans for the future. so welcome back to the committee, gentlemen. thank you both for being willing to go through the nomination process again and to continue to take on these difficult responsibilities at a very important time for our country. so first today we will consider the u.s. relationship with the czech republic. as an important ally of the united states in central europe, the czech republic has demonstrated exceptional leadership in europe, particularly in engaging the region's eastern neighborhood and pressing for further european integration. the czech republic has made some impressive contributions to international peacekeeping efforts in afghanistan, iraq and kosovo. in addition, the country's unique experience with democratic transitions should provide some lessons for the united states as we navigate the ongoing transitions in the middle east and north africa.