eastern booktv airs a program from our archives that coincides with a significant occasion that happened that week in history. for more history programming, check out american history television on c-span3 or visit c-span.org/history. ah tv features 48 hours of people and events that help document the american story. >> coming up next, another program from be our archives. august 13, 2011, marks the 50th anniversary of the building of the berlin wall. w.r. smyser discusses the berlin crisis of 1961 to 1963. he recounts the meetings between president kennedy andny key the that -- nikita khrushchev and the political fallout from the construction of the berlin wall. this is about an hour and a half. >> well, welcome, everybody, to

the woodrow wilson center for the book launch of "kennedy and the berlin wall: a hell of a lot better than a war" by william smyser. it's one of the, certainly, readable books ever written on the history of the berlin wall and this major confrontation between kennedy and khrushchev, between the united states and the soviet union during the late '50s and the early '60s, and i'm sure we will have 90 highly-interesting minutes of talk and discussion together. my name is bernd schafer, i'm a senior psychologicaller here -- scholar here, and i'm very pleased to have an outstanding panel here today. we will start with mr. smyser who will talk about his book and major points of his book for about 30 minutes followed by comments. i will introduce our commentator when it's their turn, and then

mr. smyser will have a chance to respond briefly to the comments, and then we will open it up to all of you, to the audience, and we'll hope we have a lively question and answer session afterwards. so mr. smyser is currently the henry alfred kissinger scholar in the john w. lucas center at the library of congress, and he's also teaching at the bmw center for german and european studies here at georgetown university. he has a long and outstanding career in public service, and you can find in his book a lot of details about his career. but he was doing the berlin crisis, he was in berlin, in west berlin on the ground, and he got a lot of insights which he really introduced into this book. um, he also served later in the white house with henry kissinger on the national security council and became a specialist on vietnam and other parts of the

world. and he has an outstanding career in biography, but today he will talk about the book which, actually, also has a very close connection to the wilson center because he wrote major parts of this book when he was a public policy scholar here at the wilson center. so in some ways it's a wilson center book, and we are very proud to have him here with the final product, and it's very worth the read, i can tell all of you. we'll now looking toward to have him talk about his book for about 30 minutes, and later i will introduce the two commentators. welcome and, please, step to the podium. >> thank you mr. chairman, mr. schafer. on january 19, 1961, it was a snowy day in washington. president-elect john f. kennedy and some members of his cabinet went to the white house to meet with outgoing president dwight eisenhower. eisenhower was to brief them on

foreign affairs as was the secretary of state. they did that, and eisenhower said privately to kennedy, berlin is a place that worries me. i think we're going to have a crisis there. we've managed to postpone it, but it's going to come up probably pretty quickly. christian hooder, the secretary of state, briefed them on how khrushchev in 1958 had issued an ultimatum that they were all to agree to sign a peace treaty for germany within six months. if they did not do that, he would sign a private treaty just with east german party boss and dictator, and then after that the allies would have to get their rights from walter. at that point they would no longer be able to fly in the corridors the way they had been flying, they would no longer be able to go back and forth to berlin on a special privilege which only the soviets checked, and they would no longer be able to take their special trains.

so khrushchev had a menace right there, and eisenhower warned kennedy that there were many signs that khrushchev would, in fact, act on it. i will not go into the details of the whole story because it's in the book, and i urge you, of course, to read it. but i will talk here about four things; the vienna summit june 3rd and 4th, 1961; the start of the wall; checkpoint charlie tank confrontation, october 1961; and the connection between the cuban missile crisis and berlin in october 1962. when kennedy became president on january 20th, the day after he'd met with eisenhower, he staffed his white house with the people whom everybody called the best and the brightest. george bundy who had been dean of faculty at harvard

university, a scholar of a everything at harvard university and a number of other people. he also brought onboard the best possible experts on the soviet union, george cannon who he had known personally for quite some time, chip boland, ambassador who had serve inside moscow, and he also brought onboard several other people whom he consulted from time to time like tommy thompson who was ambassador to moscow and floyd cruller who was assistant secretary for european affairs, but also a soviet hand. there was only one european hand who was in the senior levels of the white house, and that was henry kissinger who was there only on a part-time basis. he couldn't leave harvard, so he spent 25% of his time at the white house. he found it rather frustrates because whereas kennedy looked at berlin through a lens focused on moscow, kissinger believed that one should look at berlin through a lens focused on

western europe, on west germany, that the important thing to do was to protect berlin so as to maintain the allied position in germany. but he found himself consistently frustrated even though he had some good meetings with kennedy. he could not get kennedy to agree with him, and he finally left at the end of 1961. he resigned, and he left with a memo to schlesinger in which he said, quote, i am in the position of a man sitting next to a driver who is heading for a precipice, and the driver is asking him to make sure that the tires are properly inflated and that the oil pressure is adequate. that was not what kissinger wanted as a role. he thought that kennedy was heading for disaster, and he wanted to make sure that he could not make a contribution, so he might as well leave. khrushchev made nice to kennedy. he was delighted that kennedy became president, he hated nixon, he was so glad that

kennedy won. and within a few weeks of kennedy's victory even before kennedy had become president, khrushchev sent word through some american journalists and also through some soviets that he wanted to have a good relationship with kennedy and that he looked forward to it. kennedy, in response, had a meeting with his soviet experts, and in february sent a memo -- excuse me, a letter to khrushchev indicating that he hoped that they would have an early meeting. khrushchev sat on the invitation. he had had intelligence reports that the united states was going to attack cuba. he alerted castro, told him what to expect, and then he decided to sit and wait. well, as you know, the american invasion took place, it was the bay of pigs, it was not an american invasion. actually, it was a group of cuban exiles who the americans landed, and as you also know

castro was ready, and the cubans had to surrender, and the whole thing was a disaster. but what fascinated khrushchev was that kennedy let it be a disaster. he thought that kennedy would use some of those planes that were flying overhead or that he would use some of those ships that were cruising off the coast of cuba in order to land troops and in order really to take over the island, but kennedy didn't do it. khrushchev said to his son, sergei, he said, you know, i don't understand kennedy. perhaps he lacks determination. and at that moment he changed his mind about kennedy. he decided that there was no sense talking to this man on an even basis because this man was weak. he called him a boy in short pants. khrushchev respected age, and he did not respect people who were too young, and he certainly did not respect people who did not act the way he would have acted.

he was a fighter. if his friends were losing, he would do everything he could to make them win. kennedy did not do that, and khrushchev decided that he was facing a weak american president. he was reinforced in his opinion by men, cover who was the soviet ambassador to washington and who said, excuse me, who wrote to khrushchev that, quote, when there is a real crisis, kennedy will drop a load in the his pants. that's not a nice thing to say about the head of state to whom you're accredited, but that's what he believed, and that's what khrushchev was beginning to believe. cruise chef was, had a chance -- khrushchev had a chance to test this theory in june 1961 when he and kennedy met in vienna. but the kennedy preparation for the summit was a disaster. in fact, as a foreign service

officer i can tell you that i was shocked by some of the things i read in the kennedy library, what people had sent to kennedy. ambassador tommy thompson, who had been personally warned by khrushchev that he wanted to settle berlin in vienna and that he was going to be hard on that subject, sent a cable to washington saying that khrushchev would glide over berlin in sweetness and light. the state department sent a memo to kennedy, a pre-meeting memo in which they said they were expecting a positive meeting and that khrushchev would be prepared to delay on the berlin issue. only a soviet agent whom robert kennedy had befriended told the americans the truth. he told bobby that there would be a tough meeting, that khrushchev was going to be hard on berlin. kennedy replied, bobby replied, you know, on this one the president is hard set. he's not going to pull out the troops. and so bobby said to jack, we're

going to have trouble. but nobody else did. well, as it turned out, he was right. when the summit began, kennedy began with two proposals, two ideas. the first idea was to divide the world and, particularly, to divide europe. he said to kruschev -- and this is in the record -- as far as i'm concerned, you can maintain your position in east berlin, and you can maintain your position in eastern europe. we want to maintain our position in western europe, and we want to maintain our position in west berlin. khrushchev absolutely and totally rejected that. he said, you cannot prevent the people from acting as they want to act. then kennedy, basing on his briefings in washington, said to khrushchev, you know, we all have nuclear weapons now, we have to make sure that we avoid miscalculation that we avoid getting into a war as them a got into a war in world war i. khrushchev blew up.

he jumped up, he said, i do not want to hear the word "miscalculation" again. what you are trying to do is to tell the soviet people to sit on their hands like schoolboys. we will not do that. kennedy retreated and made a quiet promise he would never use the word "miscalculation" again, but he had met the real khrushchev who was absolutely determined. he was a believer in the future of communism, he was not going to sit down and let anybody talk him out of it. khrushchev warned at the end of the first day during which they talked mainly about laws and about arms control that he wanted to settle berlin, and he said, we have only a half a day left, we've got to talk about berlin in the porn morning. well, it didn't work out that way. kennedy talked a little more about laos, arms control, everything, and it was only when they were within about an hour

and a half -- and, mind you, this was with translation, so not more than 45 minutes really -- not until then did they get on to the subject of berlin. khrushchev was beside himself. he said, i have tom co-- come to settle berlin, you have got to sign a peace treaty. if you don't, i will sign a peace trity with the east germans, and at that point your rights will evaporate, and you must setting with the gdr. kennedy reacted firmly. he said, you know, here we're not talking about laos. they were talking about something else. we're talking about something that we take much more seriously. kruschev said he was going to sign his treaty within sick months, and he said there might be war, and if there is war, the burdens would be shared equally on all sides. kennedy was unhappy and so after lunch he said, let's have another final meeting even though we're not scheduled to have one, and he tried again to say to kruschev, look, berlin is

a budget that is really very difficult for us. we cannot just do what you want, we cannot pull out. khrushchev got even worse and more impatient, and he said, i'm going to sign that treaty within six months, nothing will stop me, there will be war. kennedy was totally intimidated, all he could say was, it will be a cold winter. a friend of mine spoke with a journalist who had seen kennedy right after the meeting and who said kennedy looked green, like a man who had all the blood drained from his face. ..

>> he said finally we're going to do something with berlin. one thing i want immediately is to stop the refugee flow and a

peace treaty. he said look, these are very important decisions. they're going to shape the future of europe. i cannot do it without discussing it with the warsaw pact. and he called a meeting of the top people, the top leaders of the warsaw pact in moscow and he said you make your proposal and he made his proposal for the two things. the warsaw pact leaders said, look, we agree, you have to stop the refugees. but you cannot have a peace treaty because the administrator of west germany will impose a economic embargo and we cannot bros it unless you mr. crushe have unless you support our economy and he said no, i can't do that. and so crushe have gave instructions to stop the refugee flow by building a wall and he said to him not one millimeter

more. and then he sent the marshal to berlin and to control him as well as watching the situation. on august 13, 1961, at 2:30 am i had a phone call at my apartment. and somebody said this is a security officer and there's something going in east berlin. would you go take a look. i got in my car which was a 9100% sl convertible to look at what's going on. and i drove into the area. i didn't get duty reimbursement i should add. i drove in the area and i was stopped because there was some east german soldiers who were pulling barbed wire across the square. i said you cannot stop me, you cannot block me. you have to let me through.

i'm a member of the allied forces and you can tell by looking at me. out.

i went up to the train tracks, as close as i could get, and it was clear that all the trains that came from east berlin to west were being stopped and turned around. so i went back to the u.s. mission and i said they're closing down the refugee flow. they reported to washington and met with the french -- excuse me, french and british missions and they drafted a little protest to the soviets because this was a violation of allied rights. i had a report where president kennedy was spending the weekend and he got a report from his man

who said to him, we have a report from berlin which says they're closing down the refugee flow and kennedy said, ah, well, a wall is not very nice but it's a hell of a lot better than war. this was kennedy's attitude. she was terribly afraid that berlin would lead to a war. if and he thought maybe there wouldn't be a war. this is not how we they saw it in berlin but maybe in the white house. but this is not the way the american people saw it. the american people were upset. kennedy began getting little black umbrellas in the white house mail room, meaning, that they thought that he was an appeaser like chamberlain. he began getting angry phone calls. newspaper editorials said we

cannot let this happen without a reaction and he realized he had to do something. he called in a number of people including a representative who had been the military governor of germany for four years, who had been the hero of the airlift. and he asked him what he should do. clay said what you should do is send a brigade-up the ought ban up to berlin to show that you take this seriously and that your rights will not be trampled out. kennedy decided to call a meeting about this and about other things. and at that meeting, they prefaced his proposal. he was totally opposed by all the soviet hands including chip bulland who was at the meeting. kennedy had to make a decision. and the decision he made was to send the brigade. this was an incredibly difficult

decision. it was the first time he had gone against the advice of his soviet experts. it was for him a real coming out, a real shift in his attitude about a number of things. he also, of course, lbj who made some nice speeches and the brigade got through. the defense minister of the soviet union told khrushchev that we should block that brigade and he said no, but khrushchev and his son, it was a weekend not in his office, he watched not on television -- he didn't have television but he watched reports, everything that was happening with that brigade. kennedy himself asked for a report from ted clifton every 20 minutes. both khrushchev and kennedy were

worried what happened. they were very relieved when the brigade got through. it was the kind of thing that was a risk for kennedy but it worked. then kennedy decided that he wanted to send a personal representative to berlin and i was appointed as his personal representative and if we had more time i will talk about it. the west and the united states in particular would not abandon them. he ran patrols up and down the autobahn, he ran patrols around the border. he took a flight to an area and i accompanied him to pull out a refugee, which is a small berlin enclave. when we left, in a helicopter with the refugee, some of the locals trained their guns on us but we were fine because they

did not have authorization to shoot and maybe they didn't have any ammunition. we don't know. clay was doing the things that had an effect. but he had his opposition. in washington, it was obviously at soviet hands. it was mack bundy himself who had many, many doubts about what clay was proposing. the military, especially nato commander norstad was very, very worried about it including the british including prime minister mcmillan who once called clay an senile and embittered ass. you pardon the redundancy about what he felt about somebody who was against the way he wanted. alan lightner, chief mission of the u.s. mission of berlin wanted to go to the opera in east berlin. he was stopped at the

checkpoint, which was known as checkpoint charlie in the american army system which i won't explain to you. you seeplasty and ourplasty is the u.s. mission license plate. i have the right to go through. they would not let him go through. general watson who was the commander for the u.s. forces in berlin went to the operation center and they sent a squad of soldiers who with the rifles in front of them and walked up and down several timing in order to make the point that we were going to oppose it. nonetheless, he kept it up. and a couple of times in the next few days, did the same thing. at the end of the week he decided he would try a test. he put a few military into civilian clothes and had them try to get through.

they did. the same thing happened. the first day of the week, there was a great recognition that this was something that the east germans would try to keep up. clay had already sent a cable to kennedy about 10 days earlier saying that kennedy should look out because the soviets were letting the east germans intimidate us and harass us while they themselves fade in the background. and he said i don't think we should let this happen. what i'm going to to try to is have the soviets out of hiding and once, of course, they come out of hiding, i will come back. i think it's important for us to get them to show themselves. so after american power was turned back, he not only walked at the walk-through at the checkpoint once again but then he sent 10 tanks through an empty lot. there are lots of he want lots in berlin in those days about two or three blocks from the

checkpoint. the soviet political officer from the soviet mission walked around the tank and said we have lots of tanks too, which i think we all knew. and lo and behold a couple hours later, 10 tanks appeared at the checkpoint. but then we knew the soviets had taken over the checkpoint. he had not let east german handle this. they wanted to bring the soviet tanks out. so he does instructed the tanks, our tanks, to go up to the line dividing east and west berlin which is a white line painted across it. when they did that, the soviet tanks rumbled out of their parking lot and faced the american tanks, about 10 or 12 feet away with their guns pointed at each other. at that point, we relaxed in the american operations center. we knew that the soviets were

not going to start anything and we knew that we were okay. clay had gotten what he wanted. and it spoke of impending war. they said here's the americans and the soviets are facing each other. they are shooting each other and they're going to shoot each other and this is a very dangerous moment. and several of the other white house advisors said to kennedy, look, you got to tell them to pull back our tanks. we can't afford aesque are of war over this. kennedy put his feet up on his desk in order to show that he was totally calm and he called berlin. when clay said, hello, mr. president, the operation center fell dead silent. you ought to know what's happening. kennedy says, what's going on. everything is fine. the soviets have hundreds of tanks in the area and they only

brought up 10. it's a sign. it's perfectly relaxed and everything is under control. he said good, i'm glad to see that. and i hope you don't lose your nerves. mr. president, we're not worried about our nerves. we're worry about the nerves of those in washington. kennedy said some people here lost their nerves but i haven't. those are the most important words that kennedy had spoken in his presidency. because it showed that he had last understood how you had to deal with certain situations and sometimes you had to bring up the tanks if the other people were going to. i've always believed that berlin was the best preparation that kennedy could possibly have had with the cuban crisis because of that. in any case, the next morning the soviet tanks pull back and

he explains to his son overnight in berlin, you know, our soldiers can't take that kind of stuff. but we pulled them back and, of course, within 20 minutes clay pulled his tanks back. the checkpoint charlie moments was the most important in berlin and it showed berliners that the americans were ready to act if necessary. berliners didn't want a war either but they wanted the americans to show that they would not always yield and that was clear. then for the next few months, crises came and crises went. clay wanted to send aircraft to show them they were doing something that they shouldn't do

and kennedy said no. but he would backtrack on certain things. it was a mixed relationship. sometimes kennedy supported clay and supported him more than others in washington but sometimes he didn't. but strangely enough, everything calmed down. the reservations in the air corps itself and everything was quiet. we know now that there was a conversation about that time. and it was said we don't simply have the power to make the americans to do what we want them to do. clay left berlin. before he left, he got a cable from kennedy saying, i think we are in a pause but we're not at the end of this. we don't know what it will be but something will happen and we

must be ready for it. what happened next was cuba. in berlin we knew this was going to be a crisis because the soviets began building pipelines, oil pipelines, from the polish border to the west german border and also to the surrounding the berlin. something they did not do when they had limited maneuvers. they knew they were going to try to make a major force in berlin and that they want us to know it. a major show of force at the border. khrushchev sent a cable to kennedy saying, you know, we should settle this with the united nations. we should substitute united nations forces for allied forces maybe 25% a year until at the end of four years allies are reportedly out. kennedy replied, i'm not going to do that. but gramiko went to the white house, you know, khrushchev is

going to come to november with the united nations. he's going to make a speech there and he wants to settle the berlin problem. khrushchev was clearly up to something. berlin knew it but we didn't know what it was but it was to put the missiles in cuba. and all of you know what happened and the story and a little bit about that. kennedy forced them to pull the missiles out. khrushchev says to his son who has written an excellent book that he expected kennedy to protest, protest a little more and then to accept the soviet missiles. what khrushchev had not realized was that kennedy was a different man in october 1962 as he had been in june 1961. i'm just about to finish. with that, with the end of the cuban crisis, the berlin crisis

was over. every berliner, you know, said to me, this is it? you're not going to do anything more. the next day after kennedy made his speech announcing that we would insist on the cuban missiles to be withdrawn, the soviet forces began pulling back on the west german border. but we always saw a connection. in any case, in november 1962, after the cuban missile crisis, i happened to be in new york. aide drink with the general at the links club and he said, you know, if kennedy had acted more toughly in berlin, there never would have been a cuban missile crisis. khrushchev expected that kennedy would accept the missiles and that kennedy would do it. on june 26th, 1963, he goes to

berlin. he said i am not a jelly donut and i'll be happy to talk about that if you like but i don't think it's worth it. and he's done work if necessary to save their freedom. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you very much. and now we will have two comments. first mary beth stein and then charlie livingston in 10 minutes. mary beth stein is the associate professor of journalism international affairs at the george washington university in washington, d.c. and she received her ph.d. and has received several fellowships and scholarships with her various studies of germany. she's really an expert on

current east german affairs and german affairs and german literature and also on the berlin wall and all that's around it so i'm very pleased to have her today. i just remembered about 11 years ago we had our first panel in atlanta, georgia. i'm happy to be with you again and we look forward to your comments and then i will introduce mr. livingston, thank yo you. >> thank you. >> one of the great paradox of history that the berlin wall was built and torn down for the very same reason, to keep east germans from escaping the gdr or the german democratic republic. the former event was carefully planned for on an early sunday morning in august with prior approval of soviet premier khrushchev and the warsaw pact

countries. the latter was literally the chaotic unraveling of the tottering regime that had been told by mikhail gorbachev at the 40-year anniversary at the gdr a mere four weeks of-it collapsed that the soviets would not come to the aid and assistance to the east germans in trying to deal with their problem of the mass refugees to eastern europe and the growing numbers of dissidents and demonstrators in the east german cities. political circumstances between 1961 and 1989 could not have been more different. there had been gradual yet very visible improvements over the years that only between the superpowers but between the two german states. thanks to a number of important milestones. a critique which i'll talk about in a moment the four power agreement between the four allies of berlin and the basic treaty between the two german

states and yet between 1961 and 1989, one crucial aspect remained the same. the lack of support among the east german population for the socialist unity party. this ultimately is what drove the gdr government to build the wall and to tear it down. professor smyser's book is the second berlin crisis. the first was the berlin blockade and airlift. the second crisis was precipitated by the 1958 ultimatum that berlin be a free and neutral city. that meant the western allies should evacuate the city and the soviets and the gdr would move in. the crisis reached its climax with the closing of the border but it did not end there. the book begins with kennedy's triumphant's visit to west berlin to june, 1963, nearly two

years after the building of the berlin wall. and the book ends with a spectacular fall of the wall. the closing and opening of the border are the dramatic book ends. the intervening chapters recount with fascinating detail the moves and counter-moves of the western and soviet allies, their wartime alliance fractured beyond repair into escalating cold war. equally fascinating are the divergent interests of the british and european, french and american leaders with the www.de gaulle and mcmillan pursuing their own national interests and european policies often at the cross-purposes of the u.s. government. darrell mcmillan had no love for gomer and was an appeaser to soviet demand. de gaulle encouraged kennedy to adopt a strong position with soviet threats but was undermining kennedy at every minute as being a sole supporter

and keeping the british out of the european community. the berlin wall effectively lowered the temperature on a highly charged situation. the professor's account recounts the drama of the times and what turns on what the key players knew or thought they new and what subsequently had been discovered through archival material and research. before addressing some of the political implications of the berlin law i'd first like to don my cap as a professor of german not to talk about the jelly roll and whether he actually says that, that i think has been answered by professor smyser and other historians. professor smyser writes from the narrator whose narrative is culled from all available sources and with the advantage of hindsight and there's an immediacy of narrative

perspective and in the moment feeling when the author steps forward as the participant in and eyewitness to many of these very dramatic events and speaks from personal experience as he guides robert kennedy around west berlin and even more intrigui intriguingly sneaks robert nixon incognito into west berlin and i loved that episode and i hope there's a chance to talk about that and i assume there would have been many more such episodes that could have been included in the book. the immediacy and drama of the time is what is referred to as the book's readability and it's captured in chapter titles, quote, from published accounts archival material and personal interviews between the author and these key players. the author's admiration for general clay is clear. it's an admiration i share but his opinion on or perspective about other key players in developments remains largely guarded. if i were to critique this book, which i find very admirable i

would have to say that i would have liked even more of his unique insider perspective. perhaps a single chapter devoted to his role or the activities of the u.s. mission throughout this crisis. this is the unique perspective that the author brings to a widely researched project. let me turn now to two of those key players to whom professor smyser had special access working for one and with the other. lucius clay represented both american and west berlin interests as professor smyser has made clear. clay was the american world war ii general and the hero of the first berlin crisis where he masterminded the berlin lift. he played a critical role in preserving west berlin a second time as kennedy's personal representative he gave the president a radically different viewpoint from the state department and white house advisors. clay understood both the strategic and symbolic importance of berlin for germany

and europe and he believed berlin was an important -- was important for american influence in europe. he not only knew berlin and the berliners well, he had learned from past experience how to deal with the soviet threats. he understood what was needed, to withstand of east germany and soviet pressures which was essentially a tit for tat response to every east german provocation along the border or the transit highway, a similar response by the americans. much to kennedy's distress, clay was behind this showdown of checks at checkpoint charlie, the hottest moment in the cold war history of berlin. finally, and for the west berliners probably most importantly, he also encouraged u.s. investment in west berlin at a time when many west berlin companies were picking up and moving to west germany. most importantly, however, was his advice to kennedy that reflected both american and west berlin interests based on a deep personal understanding of the

will and testament of the west berliners. west berlins turned out to hundreds of thousands in 1963 to hear kennedy famously say. [speaking german] >> but in this exclave, it was clay who was the berliner by choice. clay's advice helped kennedy regain the hearts and minds of west berliners after two long years of frustration and resentment over american inaction. in the late 1980s, when i was living in west berlin and doing research for my dissertation i interviewed many people who had known clay and they said with bitterness well, kennedy was off sailing during our crisis clay was standing by us. and they recounted with very vivid and personal memories how clay had done so much to promote german american friendship with, quote, such as he was an elegant man or he saved west berlin a

second time. professor smyser's unique perspective on the importance of berlin is that kennedy wouldn't have had a west berlin to visit if it had not been for clay's influence and impact on kennedy's decision-making. what i hadn't known and learned from professor smyser's book was the timing of kennedy's visit. i never knew that date. it turns out it was to preempt charles de gaulle's visit to germany and undermine much of what de gaulle was doing in his european strategy based on a close franco german relationship. the phrase -- [german] >> has gone down as of the great presidential quotations of all time. kennedy's text was rewritten at the last moment and in doing so, he pitched it perfectly, expressing the right sentiment

at the right moment in time. and like lincoln's, kennedy speech has acquired an iconic status. second, i would like to talk about billy brunt the acting mayor of berlin at that time and when he became the federal chancellor of west goirm. when brown became the chancellor of republic of west germany he embarked on a new course, he went from the a framework based on a western alliance, the atlantic alliance, to off politic, maintaining that western alliance while improving relationships with the east particularly with the soviet union and the european states. through renunciation of force agreements. for brunt, it was rooted in two key factors. the first was the lesson that he took away from 1961. he recounts in many of the memoirs that he's written. the one i looked at again in

preparation for this talk was his autobiography "my life in politics" where he describes his frustrations in dealing in the lack of response by the western and particularly the u.s. commandant's when the border was closed. he also describes the mixture of fury and ineffectual protest that his government was forced to deal with on its own. he writes that we should not expect others to find the answers we had to find for ourselves. and so he began working on a framework that would improve and remake the status between the two east german states. the second factor in the politic was an indisputable belief that germans belonged together. brunt believed east and west german leaders must rid themselves of illusions, intractable politics and instead work toward practical solutions that could ease tension and human suffering.

the salient feature of his work was really the humanitarian dimension. the policy of small steps formulated by his advisor was the rapprochement, continued confrontation, he felt, would only deepen the division. brunt dropped language that had aggravated relations with the gdr. in his inaugural address, he omitted the word "reunification" and he rereversed west germany recognition policy vis-a-vis the gdr. he became the first west german chancellor to refer to two german states and initiate the first meeting face-to-face of west and east german heads of state since 1945. while the meeting with billy shroll in east germany and later in west germany did not produce immediate results, it did lay the groundwork for the later basic treaty between the two germanys. ironically and i found this quite interesting the meeting

reprised some of the basic dynamics between khrushchev and kennedy and on the offensive demanding the de facto recognition of the dgr and presenting brunt with a harsh ultimatum, brunt like kennedy at his first meeting with khrushchev in vienna opted with a softer approach and with a base of agreement. the soviet unity party was skeptical and fearful because they did not want to change the status quo. they fully recognized that the change in relations would, in fact, lessen the gdr's control over its citizens. and that indeed is what happened over time. to my knowledge, billy brunt was the only key player from 1961 still alive in 1989 when the berlin wall fell. when interviewed, he said with

great and understandable emotion -- [speaking german] >> what belongs together will grow together. he began to see one of his fondest hopes realized. the jury is still out on how much the two halves of germany have grown together in the last 20 years. but brunt's statement certainly captured the mood of the moment in those first heady days of the open border when germany did come together to celebrate the unexpected and an almost forgotten hope of unity. [applause] >> thank you very much, professor stein. and now we will turn to jerry livingston, also had a distinguished career in the u.s. foreign service and here in washington. he's currently a senior visiting fellow with the german historical institute where we

were so many panels together and he had been the founding director of the american institute for contemporary studies at johns hopkins and former president and in the '60s he was in the foreign service and he also was based in west germany in berlin germany after the construction of the wall and he's over here in washington so he has a lot to say about the book and the times. i'm very pleased to have you here and looking forward to your comments. >> thank you very much. i'd really like to begin with a personal note that i was in berlin with the u.s. mission there. and, in fact, i can remember some of the editing of my cables -- but editing of some of my cables by dick smyser. even back in those those he was a real stylist. and let me go to a personal it seems as mary beth has already

suggested one of the main strengths is counter-point where the personal and the summit meetings of khrushchev and kennedy and attenhour and de gaulle and it shows almost in every chapter how diplomats like himself looked on the ground. so this -- this counter-point is one of the great strengths of the book. he's drawn from a wide variety of sources as beth has already mentioned. and i think probably dick was planning to write this book for 48 years because some of the end notes refer to author's notes from 1961. so clearly -- here he was planning something 48 years ago and we have it today right here. i don't want to repeat some of the things beth said so i'm going to skip over certain points i would have otherwise made. the other strength as mary beth

has already suggested is that the book is tightly focused. it's focused on the period 1961/1963 and the core of it is focused on dick's time with lucius clay from august, 1961 to may, 1962. and one last personal word, the book shows that dick's loyalty to his former bosses, both of whom are republicans by the way, henry kissinger and he has a lot of sections on kissinger's advice and kennedy through most of which wasn't taken and, of course, the core of the book as i mention his boss was gung ho as some historians referred to him his realist to lucius clay. some historians have accused clay as brinksmanship in his redness to confront the russians and to show that -- not let them high behind the east germans.

and mcmillan at one point referred to in horrific terms this childish nonsense that clay was showing in berlin. but, of course, dick will have none of that as we all know, as he said himself. the other -- the other parts of the book as mary beth has also mentioned he shows in detail in fascinating detail, how kennedy developed the learning process of jfk as a following policy practitioner and his unwillingness in the beginning to confront the russians eventually developed into his willingness to confront the russians at the time of the cuban missile crisis. the entire pattern of kennedy's behavior, foreign policy behavior changed. i think we get -- we get how great that change was and we get as dick has alluded to this the

series of defeats in his first weeks of administration was terrible. the bay of pigs in april, 1961. and then a disastrous summit that dick was referring to in july, 1961 where he was verbally browbeated with the soviet successor and then the building of the berlin wall in august 1961, all of which was a series of defeats for kennedy and we should not forget and dick didn't mention it but it was important in the end he got what he really wanted. he wanted the peace treaty and he wanted to stop the flow of emgrays because it was a real threat to the east german economy which after all was the most important economy in the -- in the eastern . now, let me, before the positive remarks in the book let me have four points that could have

emphasized or should have emphasized more. he should not forget in 1961 khrushchev was at the apex of his power. there was castro coming in, in '59. it was the first time communism in the western hemisphere, sputnik, soviet men in space, and at the time of the berlin confrontation, a large celebratory, much like that has been going on in beijing in the last few days, celebratory congress of the communist party of the soviet union was taking place. and so, you know, it's not too difficult to understand why crushe have in his meeting at the vienna summit really was convinced that communism would triumph. with the perspective of 2009 or as mary beth said 1989 seems ridiculous. but one can understand why khrushchev could believe it because he was at the apex of his power and i think that could have been stretched more.

secondly, dick does not stress the berlin context in the influence of the spring of press which was on the americans all the time for not acting more strongly. and i can remember on the eastern section affairs division which dick and i were part of and we were responsible for reporting on the gdr and we did not have any german firms and if we were caught talking to an east german official it would be in the papers the next day. thirdly, dick does not stress efficiently that there was a war -- between attenhour and brunt and kennedy's first reaction to the letter he received from the governing mayor, the one, what is this bastard brown doing? he's trying to capitalize on this situation, for electoral

purposes so one should not forget that there was a contest between brunt and athenhour and i don't think dick mentions that sufficiently and lastly, i think dick should have mentioned a little more strongly that brunt -- kennedy in 1963, did not just give one big speech, he gave a second speech at the free university which reiterated, reiterated his readiness to meet and negotiate with the russians, a theme which he sounded in his speech at the american university as well and that speech always gets neglected because of the confrontation as the belligerent speech. and the strengths of dick's book. first let me recall one point that i think we should not forget when we criticize kennedy on his readiness and compromise and negotiate with the russians and indeed in the end to accept -- accept the division of berlin and accept the division

of germany. you should recall that all american presidents, whether democrat and republican have avoided confronting rush on security issues which russia has signaled it's important to it. in 1953 we did nothing to support the uprising of the gdr workers. 1956 we did not support the uprising of the hungarians and poles. in 1968, we did nothing when the soviets invaded czechoslovakia and in 2008, we didn't -- we did not confront with the russians on georgia. so this is -- it's kennedy's practices or reluctance to confront the russians was in many ways to be expected 'cause it fit in with presidential politics over five decades. and the second aspect of dick's book that is so stimulating has already been referred to by himself and his myth assessments

and the bad advice given to him by experts and maybe mr. obama might think a little bit about this when he's gathering his experts to think about afghanistan, because the experts barely prepared him for the vienna summit as dick has mentioned. they gave him bad advice generally mostly bowle, bundy to my surprise because he had been so highly rated on the poise. what did kennedy do? he claim to rely on his instincts and that's something to be learned. secondly, dick shows how -- i think it's fascinating different in ages influenced political positions. all those in this crisis period with whom kennedy was dealing was older. but also some were much older and they were influenced, mcmillan had first in the world war had memories of the second

world war and it's quite understandable to the pressure we're not very anxious to get into another war. and de gaulle was -- i guess in the first world war too, i think and athenhour was a hell of a lot older and -- oldest of all so it was not unusual when, you know, khrushchev may be the only one who said it but he was dealing with a teenager in short pants but the rest of them sometimes felt that. and thirdly and lastly and maybe most importantly, dick shows the success in berlin both in 1948, you know, and in 1961, '63 it's s-based on one very important factor that dick, i think, mentions and should stress more, i think, and that is the courage of the berliners themselves. and clay had come to know that in the blockade in 1948 and it's

somewhat ironic and berlin is not bravaria. it's a leftist city. they vote for the sbd and the right -- or the eastern part of the city they voted for the sed so this was a leftist city but it was still very pro-american. and -- but clay pointed on the berliners and he made berlin the central aspect of our relationship with germany as dick has pointed out. and clay linked berlin, united states and west germany and the berliners were our first allies in 1948. before the west germans and that remained -- i won't say it's true anymore but it remains certainly an element in the berlin crisis in 1961, '63 so i was going to say rush out and buy dick's book but i'm not sure it can be bought but go to the brother and buy it. it's a very good book. >> thank you very much for your stimulating comments. i will give professor smyser a

chance to respond and then we'll get back to you but let me only one brief thing. there are so many very salient points made. but there's really not much to add maybe if he decides the east germans played a mainly roll in that particularly those east germans who fled. the refugees as the professor stein reported which forced the hands of the east germans and this was not a collective action. it was just an individual decision, very selfish to be said by people who wanted to flee because they wanted to have a better career, a better life and those refugees reinforced the hand of the soviets. and this was also sort of defeat for the communists because they did not want to build a wall around berlin as the first choice. the first choice was to take over west berlin and take over the axis route and west berlin and it failed and it failed thanks to those people who forced them basically to fail

them. and east germans just let the com any of the germany play a major role. >> don't forget this is a long-term trend. germans had been moving from east to west ever since 1944 and they're moving today, east germany continues -- >> yeah. >> it's not losing population because they have a dictator. but it's for economic reasons. >> they flee. they don't move. you don't flee from ohio to new york and you move. >> if that's what you think of ohio. [laughter] >> >> if you lived in cleveland, you might think differently. whatever. >> 2 minutes for professor smyser to respond to the comments. >> i'd prefer to take questions but i want to just say one thing about kennedy's speech which was i saw at the kennedy library about half a dozen of the

drafts. and all i can say kennedy was so damn smart to throw those things away because they were absolutely god all of including including sooner or later the war will come down. sooner or later he understood he couldn't say. and he made it up as he went along. as he drove through the city and as he was inspired by the crowds. and, of course, it was the kind of speech which the crowd loved. jackie kennedy was heard to say many times, perhapsest that she was sorry the famous speech of her husband's -- the most famous remark by her husband was in a foreign language. i should tell you something about the book and i hope sam, who represents the publisher here doesn't mind because i've heard this from the publisher himself. don't go to the bookstore unless you can get it stay discount.

it's overpriced. [laughter] >> buy it from amazon. i heard this from an editor that the publisher people. send people to amazon and that's where i'm going to send you if you don't mind and i'm happy to sign any copies that you get and i have to say one final thing about clay when i was first told that i was going to be working for him, i asked a few people who knew him still from the days he had been in berlin before, have you got any advice for me and they said, well, a different one told me three things. one was, he's the smartest man i've ever known and that was certainly true. he also a steel trap mine. he can make decisions immediately. and the third was, he's the worst chain smoker you'll ever see and all three of those turned out. i have no more remarks. i mean, i appreciate what everybody has said. and i wonder whether we just can't have questions and comments from the audience. it's so nice for you to come

here and listen to all this. >> if you can't think of a question. >> yes. >> state your name first. >> my name is tom hughes. during the berlin crisis i was the bureau intelligence in the state department as deputy director and then director under kennedy. i think it's a terrific book as dick knows. stimulating on a really rewarding read and i could say a lot more positive things about it, but i won't take the time. as jerry mentioned a couple of things that i was surprised in the book when i did read it. one was that it's hard for me to see how you could write about the kennedys and berlin without mentioning the dulles. certainly the dulles-attenhour

relationship. and in the late 1950s when dulles meant neutralism was immoral when he made -- even the european-oriented democrats like atchison and others were against dulles for his policies. and then there was alan who play as role in this and then there is of all things eleanor who was miss berlin in washington. she was the representative of berlin's effect in the state department. i remember at the beginning of the kennedy administration alan dulles called, tom, i know my sister is working over in your bureau if you have any kind of embarrassment about this, let me know and i'll move her somewhere else and i thought well i didn't realize you moved her year had the first place. she was miss berlin wherever she was. and so she was a constant public thorn as far as the kennedys

were concerned. they wanted together rid of the whole dulles particularly after the firing of alan dulles after the bay of pigs and it didn't take loaning to get rid of eleanor and after the wall went up eleanor was talking all of washington, i mean, she was very direct and personal against the president and so forth and he resented all and this wondering why she was still serving on the administration. anyway, i think they should have been have been mentioned. second, you refer so often to the washington advisors as though they are a group of like-minded people. my impression of washington is that all people that you refer to will certainly say that you say they were saying that there was a lot of inputs at a more junior level perhaps but when you look at the list of who you're talking about in the white house, it's not only bundy

but lee white, david klein, mike feldman, arthur goldberg, jerry wheezener, dick goodwin and fred wholeburn and there was quite a rich pool of people there. and while they may have been arguing more or less along similar lines i doubt that they were just echoing what bundy and others were saying. the same thing is true in the state department. eleanor dullets was still upset about martin hellenbrand that she kept accosting him on berlin constantly and followed him into the men's room once and continued lecturing him. [laughter] >> there were a lot of stories about this great lady. a more serious one, i don't quite go along with you on the kennedy transformation. i think kennedy is much more complicated both at the

beginning and at the end than you indicate. i don't think that he suddenly was influenced -- well, he certainly was influenced by berlin and clay. clay was appointed, of course, originally just the same reason that henry cabot lange was send to vietnam that he was going to share responsibility for what happened. he was very nervous about checkpoint charlie, kennedy was. he didn't suddenly decide it was a way to move to the russians. it's very hard to square with the speech in berlin as is the second speech in berlin. kennedy had many personalities and he was able to rise to many different occasions. a lot of them contradictory. and make contradictory statements. ultimately, it seems to me he would have thought that his success in the cuban missile crisis is because he followed a soft line. he followed thompson he followed others. he was very upset about military advice right straight through

the bay of pigs through the cuban missile crisis, admiral anderson, general may and all these people and he didn't want to trust the military men on the spot, which clay sort of stands for. it was very clear that through all the cuban missile crisis he tied the hands of all those in the military both here and abroad so there wouldn't be any checkpoint charlies that he didn't authorize from the white house so i come away pleased that you reached the analysis you have but i think it's probably overstated whether it comes to the final john f. kennedy what he was actually. >> you've made so many comment i don't want to take time to comment to all of them except on the -- i should perhaps say that you're absolutely right. kennedy was an incredibly complicated person.

and you could say different things in the morning and in the afternoon. i'm not sure that he ever heard so much from other white house advisors. you know, i went through the kennedy library very carefully through the berlin files. it's astonishing to me how few documents there are in those files from people who were competent on german affairs. every document seems to be from somebody who's an expert on the soviet union. and those are the people whom kennedy was responding to. so where are all these other people were and whom they wrote to except thorough i frankly don't know. that's just a comment that i have to make because i couldn't deal with people whose record i could not see. as for kennedy's growth, a very complicated man but a very different man in '63 from what he had been in '61. and i think you're right, one can possibly trace this, as one

does, a series of hills ascending to a mountaintop. not a smooth ride and not necessarily meaning he had become very fond of the military which i think you're absolutely right. during the cuban missile crisis i think there was several times he would have liked to take general curtis lame and throw him out the window. [laughter] >> but the point is he did things in '61 and in '62 at checkpoint charlie and also later on. and also he did things, for example, sending the brigade up the autobahn which he would not have done earlier. now, he may have done them only because a republican had given that given and he didn't want to get in trouble and he didn't want to have any arguments and he didn't want to make berlin political, well, he may have suggested this let's just do it.

he sent johnson to berlin because he didn't want johnson there as a democrat. but nonetheless i see a development in kennedy. and whatever it may be, i think this is where khrushchev made his big mistake. kennedy, by 1962, was wearing long pants. and who had put them on and how he'd put them on, i frankly don't know but that's how they are. other questions and comments, please. sorry to take so long but this was a good intervention. ..

>> this swift procedures used. it's hard to say unrest respect because they didn't try it. i would say that it was perhaps impossible to treat it as the early german problem because the soviet troops are there comes a kircher thursday when he was pushing hard. what kissinger was suggesting -- he was suggesting a tape made of negotiation. one of his wonderful phrases that he sent to kennedy -- i think it just got deep-sixed.

but he says were always coming up with ideas because it would be acceptable to the soviets. he said it would make acceptability the test of every diplomatic opposition were going to offer, we always lose because we always say nothing is acceptable except deposition. so he said we have to ask our things. we have to do things that have a positive impact on german and european opinion. he was as much concerned about the tactics of negotiation and how you maneuver through this complicated thing. seriously you enough i worked for kissinger in the white house, as was mentioned, and i thought the same thing. there is a man who had a strategic object days, but all around the strategic object to there were so loose that when all directions and many people accuse him, done entirely for

domestic reasons or bureaucratic reasons. we don't know that. i spent many, many times to kissinger. but nonetheless, it was quite clear that on berlin in germany, we should not just play the soviet game. epic to say one other thing about kissinger which is interesting. kennedy after kissinger last admissions come he sent them to places. one of the most important missions for which to use them was cheap refund dimeric atomic policy. and now as you know, frenchy's shouse, especially russia and kennedy felt that offering a atomic weapons to the chairman says a red flag in the inky was

probably right. but he had to find some way to assure a hot now. you say what will happen is they will invade germany. no one will do anything about it. the wonder that the french border and say thank you very much, we'll just take us. and then the only way to get rid of them is to bomb west germany with atomic weapons and that obviously was impossible and germany have been largely destroyed already. so kennedy sent kissinger, who had known him for years of course to adenauer in order to brief him on the american atomic policy. they had a meeting which was to last half hour. that lasted almost two hours. he postponed everything else. and i'm not meaning, kennedy -- excuse me, kissinger told kennedy this is ever going to

first or using nuclear weapons. this is when we'll start using them. you can be sure the soviets will never cross west germany without being attacked outside west germany. and he went through quite a bit of astonishing details. it was such astonishing detail they decide they want these notes two-story. and so did the american embassy. they had the notes two-story. and no stony faced and that. he's just so kennedy had done it. but that's the kind of thing he could do. and that's the kind of thing he could do brilliantly. and that's the kind of thing for which kennedy once again. he had to stop the west german drive. and after that conversation, adenauer understood he didn't need to worry. >> what kissinger said it's okay, we're not going to the nukes on frankfurt.

>> i'm not even sure that he said that. they were destroyed because i know we corrected the missed dose and the days, with so many questions about the deployment of new candidate use of nukes that he would not want that record. >> e. widows drop them in east germany. >> i frankly don't know that he really would. i don't think i'm now with the soviet favor of dropping them. >> other questions, please? >> michael binder from the air force. he said koosh of respect datastream. what do you think of eisenhower after the minimal u.s. response to the appraising and if opera can i get her help with the refugees in 1960, with them will have gone up during eisenhower's administration?

>> a funny moment with khrushchev. i frankly don't know what he said about eisenhower. so i can't answer that question directly. but i do know that in the context that there was this moment when they had been negotiating a little bit in geneva i think an attack turned out to nothing. nothing useful. eisenhower decided at the gates of medicine in man a little better. he invited khrushchev, had escorted all around the country. this is the famous strip on which cruise will because he couldn't get into disneyland. and then, essentially eisenhower did what he always did, which is talk in such a vapid way that nobody quite knew what he was

saying, but it might be okay but they weren't sure. and you know how this went. there's a famous moment when everybody in eisenhower's cabinet was confused because the press is after them. he said don't worry i'll just going to confuse everybody. the point was khrushchev was honored and delighted hit and inviting invitee captives. he went back to moscow and said now we are somebody. this is the first visit that any soviet leader had ever made to the united states. he said now we recognize are the greatest power on earth. we are somebody. this is very important for us. i think it was more than that. i've read many years working in refugee affairs and traveled all around the road was 50 or 60 different countries. one of the things i learned as i

traveled is how so many countries and the rest of the world always think that the americans of the english are the french or the chairman act superior. and they appreciated. people would love it when a talk to them like a normal human being. it was one of those moments that i began to realize that there isn't much of the world a sense that somehow or another we westerners think we are on a higher plane. not that may not be true. it certainly isn't the way the most of the people i know feel. but for khrushchev this is incredibly important. russia was a communist country, said a communist society was still making its way up in the world. it had a lot of missiles, but needed recognition. they need people to say you are somebody. now i'm not going to -- i can't

tell you in detail the khrushchev thought about hungry about those things. i don't recall that in his memoirs, but i didn't read that part of his memoirs. that's not a terribly good answer, but it's kind of the khrushchev for date. and he then gave up on berlin and so kennedy came. he didn't push it in paris. >> any further questions, comments from the audience? >> while, we've got five minutes. let me just raise a couple more points that i think deserve a little more stress and in your book, although they do come out. the first is that the readiness -- the readiness of the united states negotiate a about berlin in germany behind their back and their refusal or their reluctance to bring the germans into consultations about germany itself.

this would of course be something in 10 years later that would impossible. the letter was received by kennedy. johnson's refusal to take adenauer along with him to berlin when he made his trip there and does the right he felt powerless in the summer 61. so just like khrushchev wanted to keep under control and described quite well its effort to do so, there's some tendency we want to be sure that we keep our germans under control as well. the second point which of us are mentioned, which is very important because it's an abiding feature is the power of the west german economy. as he said it caused the checksum upholster recess as he said it caused the checksum upholster recess wish for a peace treaty as early upholster recess wish for a peace treaty as early as the 1980s. adenauer offered to make a deal with the soviet union that would die of the gdr, which in effect you could argue almost as would

have been at the very end. and the strength of the german economy is not only important to these countries, but of course booming economy of the 1950s and 60s attractive later not only from east germany, but from all over europe. and some trickery that continues to be the case. on the last point seems to be this business of willingness to negotiate with the russians, which led to the fascinating part of your book i hadn't really thought about before and pay much attention. the way the code was able to exploit that to develop his relationship with adenauer, which ended in the treaty of 1963 and part of it was the goals firmness. how firm the french really were on berlin could they didn't say much, but they are absolutely

distant on the right. so the contrast between the americans and the french and berlin then went site in the radius -- by the late come in the british had no idea showing their identity cards a minute to check point charlie, if they went to the checkout where they'd make a big issue out of it. so there are these ironies. >> when he met with kennedy is kennedy was going to vietnam, he said holdfast. he said that is the best service you can do for the russians as well as for everybody else. those are the last words that kennedy. they may have influenced him a bit of good. we don't really know. you know, it's nice that sam is here from the publisher because he can tell that they should've let me write about twice as long and order to cover up these points. but i didn't know that because i wanted to