thank you. >> we are just about out of time here, i'm afraid. first of all want to thank you all. we could be here all day with this great band, great expertise. you can see that it's very interesting, a lot of folks that were formally at dhs, or the private sector and how this rotates around that i think that croscross-pollination of ideas d thoughts and theories is very helpful to protecting the homeland. so i just want to personally thank you all for taking the time to be with us today and share your thoughts. thank you very much. and we -- [applause] >> and i would just ask you to just keep your seats year and will have a wrapup from governor ridge at this moment. thank you. >> often times during my tenure as it assistant to the president for homeland security or

secretary, people ask me how do you sleep at night? and my usual response is i sleep very well, i just don't sleep very much. one of the reasons i slept very well is because i knew that people represented the quality and commitment and the passion, the vision represented by the panel going to work every day to make america more secure. and i knew because i was on the inside how committed these individuals were, and their teams and their coworkers were from september 12 on. so i do want to pay recognition to the panelists for the public service and a group of men and women they represent and homeland security family. i want to thank our sponsors, con-way and csc. we thank you very much. it's been a very, very important dialogue and conversation. i just want to show you with you a couple final foster

information sharing is at the heart of how you combat terrorist. and we've made a lot of progress, doing pretty good job, it's not good enough in my judgment. we move from a culture of need to know, to a culture of need to share. we are part way there. the only way i believe we get there is to understand a couple of things at the panelists have lived to either to directly or indirectly their information is only valuable if it is shared. keep it to yourself, then you yourself are limited in using it. but if it is shared there might be other folks out there that can use it and add to die, it enhances your capability make herself more secure, your communities more secure. the other thing i would say that is absolutely essential is trust. there's still this incredible notion that i better not share it because this wikileaks all over again. i'm going to tell you, that is a potential. and if it occurs to him to throw the book at them.

but if you can't trust americans to secure america, then who else can you trust? if you can't trust the big city mayor, the big city police chief, you can't trust the vice president of security and discovered or that company, then we have a real problem. so i think one of the challenges going forward is recognizing we change the culture from need to know, the need to share. but we need to share more and we need to do more trusting. i love the conversation about private sector engagement. we talked a lot about partnerships. the only thing i can say from my perspective is that it can be ad hoc. you can't just knock on the private sector's door right before an incident occurs or right after it occurs. you've got to be there long before. they've got to be involved in the planning. they've got to be involved in a policy develop and. involved in a training, involved in execution. now, the best example i think right now is the whole cybersecurity legislation. the departments credit, randy's

credit, up here talking to the chamber before, the resources available and the infrastructure necessary to protect, and, frankly, the governments infrastructure is owned by the private sector, so if you want to secure the countries cyber and digital assets, you better involve the private sector at the front end rather than at the other in but not in the ad hoc way. i appreciate fema's and secretary napolitano's continued message of outreach. you need the private sector in fall. the other thing i thought was important, the employees. i think, al, you talked about the impact of some of these, the psychology, a lot of folks talk about the psychology of getting people in the mindset. "see something, say something." it's more than that. i am reminded we wanted people to have a ready kit. remember that duct tape? i remember those stories well.

[laughter] i wanted color-coded duct tape but i just couldn't get it in. i mean, there's certain response those that are but has to share. i think the panel certainly, certainly projects that notion very well. and going forward i think everyone has eluded their concerns, but if you what they said, they are all manageable. i had a budget secretary that said, when i walked into his office, nothing seemed to the imagination like a budget cut. think about it. do you think there's an agency in government today but couldn't get along with one or two or three, whatever, that couldn't get along with a little as? maybe not. but now is the time given the economic restraint in this country where we need thoughtful leadership to set priorities and find ways to fund them. find ways to go partnership with the private sector to deal with those priorities. it can be done. and again, i think this been a very enlightening panel. i hope you enjoyed the discussion. on behalf of a broader homeland

security community, i want to thank you for participating. but i thought your panelists deserve an extra round of applause because i think they did an acceptable job. thanks, ann. [applause] >> [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

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>> we believe the u.s. chamber of commerce now come and tell you about what's coming up this afternoon here on c-span2. the head of the transportation security administration, john pistole, will participate in a panel discussion on aviation security. the event is part of the airline pilots associations 57th air safety forum. that's coming up live at 1:30 p.m. eastern here on c-span2. and all this month watch booktv in primetime on c-span2.

>> congressional leaders recently appointed members to serve on the deficit reduction committee created as part of the compromise to raise the debt ceiling. this afternoon live at 1:30 p.m. eastern on c-span, the brookings institution host a discussion looking at the committee's prospects for success. i law, the 12 member group is required to improve -- approve a plan to cut $1.5 billion in federal deficits over 10 years. also live on c-span later today, the johns hopkins school of advanced international studies hosts a discussion examining the dynamics that lead to nonviolent movements. that's at 6 p.m. eastern.

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they continue to write on issues regarding pakistan and south asia and the larger international situation. the ambassador is a senior fellow here and teaches a course on pakistan, and he's been an invaluable asset to us here at. there is a faculty member on the floor who said that it's great that we have him here because there is so much swirling about in the public domain that it's only partly right, it's good to have someone who knows what is right and can put it in a larger context. my own a typical day starts out with an hour-long at least an hour-long conversation every morning with the ambassador. we talk about events in south asia, and we have a lot to talk about because there always seems

to be something that is coming up in the news of significance regarding the region. ambassador usian will introduce the announcer who until a few years ago as the foreign secretary's pakistan, the highest bureaucratic position in the pakistani foreign ministry. and i understand that both of the ambassadors were close friends during their foreign service careers and remains so today and i am pleased i could help arrange to bring them together here on the same stage. >> thank you, walter, for the kind and affectionate introduction. i am fortunate to be here and contributing in my own way to the great work of this university and the program. really fortunate to have among

us one of the ablest and most distinguished former pakistani diplomats who held high ambassador positions as well as to the head of the professional foreign affairs secretary. apart from that, equally importantly, he is a scholar, internationally renowned and has written a highly acclaimed books on how pakistan and afghanistan, he combines the academic experience with his professional ability to talk about an issue which is very complex and hard to understand especially as there is much confusion and this

understanding surrounding it since it touches some of the fundamental issues of the national interest to both pakistan and the united states at this time. in the media interest in these issues and in the public interest, both in pakistan and the united states and they are not always in sync, conflict of interest, conflict of policies the policies converge to some extent and it's not really any malevolence. the interests are so white for both sides that it's hard to sort of find a policy for both of them. so often we see the trust deficit defined in a narrow term but the relationship itself as long standing and a very vital,

and my sort of understanding is it was a main vital for a long time to come. right now we are a number of things adding to the complexity but when it settles down, we will arrive at a mutually sort of acceptable form so both sides can be happy nobody is more competent to explain these complexities than the ambassador riaz mohammed khan, who was walter said, as has been a friend of mine for many decades and has learned from his counsel and ideas and did in my own way to have a mutual understanding. so here is ambassador riaz mohammed khan. >> thank you very much. thank you, touqir and walter for

inviting me to to this very prestigious institution and thank you very much, touqir, for your generous introduction. you have been a very respected and admired colleague in the foreign office, and i'm so happy that now you are here to help understanding of our very complex challenges that we face in pakistan. i was asked that i may speak about the u.s.-pakistan relations, whether these relations are transaction or strategic. now this is a vast subject, so i'm going to speak and come up with some observations, but i

will largely depend on many questions which i'm sure you must be having to try to offer clarifications and try to offer other perspectives on some of these important questions which relate to these vital relations. now, the u.s.-pakistan relations is commonly viewed as transactional episode, dependent upon expedience the, the high points during the cold war and 50's and particular. during the 1980's, the days of jihad, and after 9/11. but there have been long periods when this relationship has been

somewhat estranged coming into can call them a low point and therefore because of this people argue that they are transactional. recently there has been again what appears to be the beginning of a down turn in their relations, and it seems to suggest that it this view of these relations being a transactional is violent, but in my view this doesn't have to be the fate of this very important relationship. all i will, back to this point suffice it to say that pakistan is an important country in the region where the united states

has very important interests at stake, and therefore, this relationship need not necessarily to remain in the kind of transactional mode that we associated with, but it should based on a more long-term and stronger foundation. i will very briefly touch upon the pre-9/11 phase of the relations. i will touch upon the milestones of that, almost 50 years, five decades period. then i will discuss cooperation and the nature of problems, expectations, disconnect during

the post 9/11 period until now, and then i will examine this question on whether these are transactional or strategic and how they can be managed. so first, the milestones. briefly, i would say that in the 60's or the 50's during the cold war, there was the cooperation as the relationship of alliance. at that time the united states needed bases around the soviet union. pakistan needed assistance because it felt a security threat from its neighbor in the east. so there was a convergence of. but by the 60's, we find that

this relationship has started eroding. one of the american need for bases was no longer as acute for the development of the missile technologies and icbm, etc. putative second, because of these issues between china and india, the u.s. relations with india started getting closer. the u.s. offered military sales and assistance to india, and pakistan felt let down. at the same time pakistan started opening its relations to china, something which rendered

with washington as that time. pakistan had during this period tried to level its relationship with the united states to get a solution of kashmir issue something that would be favorable to its position pakistanis, if you read those accounts of those days, you will find that they reflected a desire that the united states should appreciate. their perspectives on south asia and india on the regional politics -- but i think it was probably a wrong approach in the sense that pakistan should have, even at that time, tried to look at the interests of the global power or super power in the

region instead of having this expectation that united states would pay heed to other perspectives in the region. when we come to the mid-60s by 65 all of the u.s. assistance and military sales to pakistan the entered here pakistan fell at a disadvantage because for its military requirements, pakistan depended on the united states, where as india on the other hand after 65 actually the military sales stopped for both countries but in the was depending more on the soviets and the soviet union.

so, had that time, pakistan felt that feeling of letdown. 70-71 was a brief period where there was this tilt towards pakistan. but the judge period also coincided, if you will recall, with pakistan facilitating the united states opening to china. it is ironic something early in 62-63 and in 1970-71 that became quite useful for united states to open up towards china.

one of those as an intermediary would be not only intermediary but it was a critical role as a post office i would say but a critical role because a certain understandings have to be reached between china and the united states. but that impacted on our relations with moscow, and it was i think amoco who said we're going to teach to the progress in pakistan to read than we come to the post 71 situation and the important milestone i would say is post-1974 situation. in 74, india tested a nuclear device. pakistan wanted to rectify this

imbalance which had developed between the two countries. the u.s. put a great deal of pressure at that time that pakistan should not resort to nuclear options. in fact i remember, and this is something i have seen and there are a number of things which it supported by can't vouch for them that this is something that i have myself seen in the papers that dr. kissinger had met mr. bhutto and have the case that pakistan must not pursue the nuclear option. mr. bhutto argued why are you putting pressure on us when it is india which has tested a

nuclear device, it is not pakistan. pakistan is nowhere near. dr. kissinger made the remark. he said that horse has border the bomb. we are going to make sure that this is not again. and so mentioning some of these things because these are historical memories and sometimes there is a disconnect between the historical memories of the one nation or the other nation. so when one talks about u.s. relations leading some of these things do need to be pointed out the next milestone is 1979 when the soviets invaded afghanistan, the relationship catapulted, and there was a new convergence now. the assistance have resumed, pakistan received its aid

package after a long time under president reagan, it was $3.2 billion between 1983 to 1988. we also the military supplies or the military sales were resumed during this period. the next milestone is 1989, 1990. 1989 is the year when the soviets left. now there's a whole history. i don't want to go into those details. in fact as my first book which was written in 1989 was published by duke university press was untimely and basically it focuses on the part 89.

the soviets' lead. 1990 pakistan doesn't get the certification of the nuclear question and the question is stopped. what more than the assistance, the issue of the f-16s, that created a great deal of ill will in pakistan because pakistan has paid about $700 million for the f-16s. the money was not returned until the year 2000 when a part of it was returned in the shade of exports. but over these years between 89

to the year 2000, this was a question which many pakistani military some of which was sent here for retrofitting that was also confiscated. but because under the sanctions under the certification was withdrawn because we were pursuing the nuclear option you will recall off if president clinton had visited the region in the year 2000 and he had spent about five days in india, and at that time the relations with india were growing strong he, and he touched in pakistan became for about four hours and

refuse to have a session with president musharraf who was at that time and thus serve the country for the military coup of 99 to pakistan literally was shunned at that time because it was a low point in our relationship. but before 2000, let me make one of the reference and that is 1998. when india conducted nuclear tests, pakistan can under pressure not to follow suit, not to conduct nuclear tests at that time, and president clinton offered a say about $10 billion

of assistance if pakistan were not to do that naturally the lifting of sanctions and the opening of the military sales etc., all of that. but it was a very difficult question for pakistan because having conducted a nuclear test soon after the indian peoples and many others the started questioning pakistan's capability. they said that by testing we've called pakistan's's bluff. there was an ambiguity about the question of whether pakistan was capable or not because pakistan had pursued an untested part towards the what position in the centrifuge technology.

it was extremely important at that time that pakistan should make its capability over. i haven't to be at that time the ambassador in brussels, and i had meetings with some of the militant parliamentarians including the chair of brussels for the relations committee, etc.. and some of them at that time commented because we were saying look the indians have done a really nasty thing and it is a big problem for pakistan, what should we do, and all that, and like the ambassador is supposed to do, we were asking that there would be some kind of test. but what i found was that a couple of them set look, we know

if you have to devotee you will test, if you don't have it, you will not test. again, a question on pakistan's capability. now, this ambiguity could have been very dangerous, and this ambiguity have to be removed, and i'm happy at that time many of us had recommended that pakistan did test so that there was a clarity, strategic balance established. but nonetheless, because of that, we can under sanctions which hurt pakistan because pattison's economy was not in good shape and the indian economy was doing far better as compared with. now, when i give you this paulson area of these milestones , it is suggested that yes, when there was expediency consequent convergence of

interest, then the two countries to cooperate and work in the relationship of alliance with at times false expectations that some word of the relationships the violence continued. but when there would be a chain of circumstances, then the distance were put distance between the two countries. and during those periods, there was the recognition i would say short of hostilities and those periods also is all sanctions especially on the military sales on which pakistan has come to depend. and all of these things k-fed and anti-american sentiment in the public, which is an

important point to know because now you see a lot in the press about the anti-american. this is not a new phenomenon. it has a certain memory behind it. now, coming to the posted-9/11 period catapulted against the relationship, pakistan's policies and the term on taliban the united states needed certain facilities from pakistan. pakistan agreed to that but they must serve on demand about the trends that basis and the air route. musharraf's readiness response has come to pakistan but that is the subject one can discuss and in fact my recent book talks about some of these things because that book covers the period from 89 and on words --

onwards. during this period that his post-9/11, there's a recognition that the u.s. pakistan relationship should not be based on one point and the like, previously the cold war, jihad, but that it should be -- it should have a long-term strategic basis, it should have a stronger foundation. and this was reflected in an offer in 2006 when president bush can to pakistan in march, 2006, and it was the american side, which offered a strategic dialogue and five areas of the cooperation were identified, which were extended to the ten areas, etc.. but, even during this period, there were problems, there were

misgivings, and they started surfacing more and more as the taliban started regrouping inside afghanistan. and pakistan started getting more and more deeply embroiled in the conflict in the area. partly for the reason that all shares of militants who had found shelter inside of afghanistan they were ousted by the american intervention, and they found refuge in the underground spaces of the pakistan tribal areas. al qaeda, militants from central asia, militants from chechnya, militants from the arab world, all kinds of people. if you would recall there were

arabs who are brought to fight upon the war in 1980's they were in their own countries ready to go. they stayed behind in afghanistan, and that is the genesis of al qaeda. many of them were collis to al qaeda triet said pakistan got sucked into this conflict. then of course the pakistani religious militance within pakistan many groups, the jihad which were linked to the struggling kashmir etc they also became active because they were highly resentful of the

government's u-turn in the policy to abandon the taliban because after all, these were strips so to say come and they were violently opposed to the privacies that musharraf followed. but those policies had a rationale and generally people did understand that pakistan did not have any other choice but 9/11 was such a cataclysmic event that there was also at that time sympathy for the united states and pakistan. but while the taliban started regrouping, one of the reasons -- in fact i would say i would

mention faugh the main reason in my view however was that the u.s. attention was diverted to iraq in 2003. that is soon after. you may recall that until 2007, there were less than 19,000 u.s. troops committed to afghanistan. and for most of the time was than 15,000 whereas more than 150,000 troops were committed to the iraqi situation. now with this kind of presence and this kind of commitment, it was difficult, it was not possible to militarize taliban, that itself needed complete focus, but the attention was diverted to iraq.

the other point that i would mention is that even in 2002, 2001 you can say december, to those one and in 2002 at the time of the process of pakistan was suggesting that an effort should be made point to bring those taliban leaders and elements who are pluggable and may be ready to join the process. but the taliban with a lump together with al qaeda so in pakistan during the process which is in the year 2001, 2002 had lost its voice, and so far

as the areas were concerned. now, i would say that pakistan's position was and a way validated with the evolution of the united states position on the taliban because there are two things which are almost a cliche for the stabilization of afghanistan. one is the reconciliation and the other is reconstruction. not a reconciliation with whom? the first time a direction came was four the pakistani pasterns themselves in august, 2007, when there was a grand juror invited by president karzai and president musharraf who was our prime minister and also in kabul, and the important decision which cannot of this about 500, 600 largely passed

june to the tomb -- pashtun from the afghan side is that we should reach out to the opponent's and who were the opponent's? the opponent for taliban. now here, let me say that there has been this disconnect between pakistan and the u.s.. which persisted. pakistan could not have treated the taliban leaders or the taliban themselves in the same manner as it treated the al qaeda leadership. al qaeda we have captured, eliminated, and most of the al qaeda who you find in guantanamo bay there are those who were basically captured by the pakistanis. in 2002 alone, 148 were

captured, so then if you look into the fact is, most of the important al qaeda leaders, they were neutralized with cooperation between pakistani intelligence and the american intelligence. the americans intelligence -- i have all the figures but i don't want to give the names, etc.. now, let me come to the other aspects of these misgivings and i would say false expectations. there was a disconnect on the taliban. second, there was also the distressed operational levels.

this distrust could mean genuine for example there was this repeated reported throughout from 2004 and on words that the pakistanis are not cooperating and intelligence is provided to them the target's run away, assuming that this intelligence is a link to the targets. if you were to hear the pakistani side of the stories, the pakistani side of the story is that we do not have rapid deployment, quick action capability, for which you need helicopters and others. and here the targets are not sitting somewhere or the battalion's sitting somewhere. the targets would be a group of

people with one person or two persons, and naturally, if pakistanis were to take action sending a company or platoon of soldiers to capture the target was not going to come and our own military was operating in the area, which as i said, these are the undergone spaces of a tribal areas of pakistan to the traditionally they were uncovered. traditionally, pakistan had not captured its military over there. and the whole with the afghan jihad of the 80's, the whole political system had basically been in disarray, and there were these militants and others who what become influential, replacing the influence of tribal elders. then on top of that came these

very violent al qaeda and other militant activists who in fact were up to 2007 the figures were about 600 tribal elders murder by these people to read any way, these are the complexities of the problem that i am mentioning now, when we would ask about helicopters or night goggles or to enhance the capacity to expand the frontier call, then there would be questions should the helicopters be used pakistan on the eastern front? not against, so the fact is that until 2007, only half a dozen

helicopters were provided of which only one was operational because the others do not have these spare parts. so with this kind of situation in which i am saying that these are the operational level you can call misgivings or distressed, which had become operated, then there was the demand that pakistan should move its troops from the eastern borders and deploy them on the western border in these troubled areas. now, pakistan kept on increasing the numbers, 50,000 until 2004, 05, and today it is almost close to 146,000 troops in this area. but if you look at the areas of the pakistani army situation, it

is half a million strong. and in that, it is not possible to deploy more than this number that has been deployed today because there is a formula for the call one-third, one-third, one-third. one-third is on the eastern front, now why on the eastern front? first, of course the pakistani traditional security threat is from the eastern front. but, more than not, there were two incidents. one was in 2002, december of 2002, the attack on parliament. what happens? the indians mobilized about a million troops. pakistan had to also mobilize. in fact, that was a proposed we

should have been more focused on the western front but we have to focus on the eastern front. and he would recall that it was in 2003 that the tensions finally started reducing the rate if you come to the recent times, there were threats that if something similar happens again, then some action will have to be taken. now, in this kind of situation it is jury difficult. then there are also other aspects like goldstar which the deployments of the detection of the deployments with the indian army. given all of these factors, it was not possible to expect pakistan to remove all from the eastern border and put on the northern border.

and so this was again one of those things deutsch wish to leave the was a source of misgivings. a lot can be said about this, but this certainly creates a lot of resentment within the public and the government is always on the defensive on this issue. one way which was suggested and continues to be suggested is there should be coordination between the two sides. there is a whole history of the attacks, but again, if i go into the history probably we would not have much time left for the question and answer sessions. so, then and there is the question of the u.s. demand to do more. how does it impact in pakistan?

this basically plays into the hands of those people who work detractors of pakistan who questioned pakistan, what policy association led to this whole war on the tender etc and who would oppose to the u-turn taken by president musharraf? they argued that this is not pakistan's war, this is not pakistan's fight. pakistan has been set into what is the american war. or america's fight. and whenever there are these demands whether they are through the media or through some officials' statements, what ever levels, they designate in pakistan and say look, this is the proof, this is the

indication of what we are saying. this is not our war. it is coming from somewhere else. i am trying to explain the sources of these misgivings and distrust and the ill feeling that you find. so, this question of the public opinion, again, it is extremely important because for the military to take action, and for the government to take action, public support is extremely important. and this was proven when we took action in swat. before it was not possible to take action in swat. and here i must say one other thing which is the so-called

peace agreement. we had peace agreements and north waziristan and in swat. there was a lot of international criticism of those. but with and pakistan, the argument was the are your own people, we cannot deploy the military means to address this issue if there is a possibility of offering peace through these kind of agreements which are tried, so regardless of the matters of these agreements, the politics of the situation demanded that we must also try that approach. in swat when this peace agreement was made with the local taliban in swat and overreached and swat be not one of the tribal areas, that turned

the public opinion in pakistan against the swat local taliban. and allowed the government to take from the action the army to take from action which led to almost 2 million people who were out of their homes or almost about six months to one year but everybody tolerated it and understood this. had the army taken this action before this agreement and before the skeleton had overreached themselves, then there would have been a lot of criticisms that the government is only trying to pacify their own people tilling and trying to achieve political means. so the public opinion as i said. the question of aid also is on

both sides in the united states and also in pakistan for different reasons. in the united states you see almost every fortnight is almost every week somewhere or the other we have given $20 billion. they are not delivered. they are playing a double dealers and those kinds of things. the pakistan army, pakistan intelligence, etc.. the taliban are considered an asset and i must say again, these are long arguments. pakistan does not consider taliban to be an asset because the taliban has no chance whatsoever to return to the position of the pre-9/11 situation. they would not be able to return to kabul. but taliban and the pashtuns

were part of the political landscape. they simply cannot be washed away. and there are many of them coming to our areas we have still more than 3 million, some of them more than 4 million refugees and they reach the population in the bordering regions. anyway, so i will mention about the aid and assistance. there are these accusations and the part of the u.s.. there is dealing pakistan is not delivering. but, on the pakistan side, even those who favor and who are convinced that there has to be a close relationship and cooperation between pakistan and the united states, they feel that the united states or the americans generally are not

appreciated the complexities of the problems pakistan faces and the sacrifices that is made. in this fight we get lost close to 500, 5,000 military troops. we have lost more than a 35,000 civilians we have also allows i said we have deployed troops etc. in that area and the economy suffers because of the whole situation. now the latest problems, the latest problems start with this episode of rain in status and which anybody who has followed in those even scans he that it was the cooperation between the cia that finally led to the gentleman. she was no diplomat.

she killed two persons. he was a cia contractor. but what happens that as soon as he is released and leaves pakistan the next day there was a drone attack for people in the tribal areas. now, this was not reported here but in the pakistan papers there was every papered the the paper carried an editorial comment, so the kind of insensitivity here i would say there was this question of the osama bin laden episode that he was living -- there happens to be an academy

over there for. these are struggling populations and many of them are undocumented. in islamabad there are sectors. enough qatar to there are sectors so we don't have any restrictions, and it has happened that this man approach to accomplices, his companions got a place which was a complex situation but a very honest due date to -- modest place if you look at the pictures. and he never left that place.

if there were any complicity is on the pakistan side that complicity would have now come to light because there is a lot of material which was taken over by the fields from that. anyway, in pakistan, the debate is not on the question of whether osama was there. there are some questions that are raised about this and it is a part of the commission which has been set up, but the public comment was more focused, the media comment was more focused on how come the americans were able to come to the area of the operation and everybody was sleeping? so you can see this disconnect also in the media perceptions of the data come and the media

somehow -- i will try to sort out grab this up. there are a number of weapons and one thing i would say that assistance itself is the package which was about $5 million between 2003 to 2008. the next package, 2009, became very controversial. it is still in the works. the other part, which is about 14 billion, this is what is called collision support funds. a very poorly negotiated on the part of pakistan. a very poorly negotiated an arrangement, which is for the compensation for all of the deployments which are made and all of the equipment which is used in pakistan for counterterrorism and counterterrorism activities in the area. on the other hand, if you look

at the situation, pakistan provided freebases, and pakistan as providing the transit which accounts for 70% of the supplies to nato at present. earlier, it was more. and pakistan will not charge anything for that. in my view i think it was a mistake we should charge for this and not for the deployment. it would have been a much needed arrangement from my point of view, but today this 14 million was seen as the need which is to pakistan and pakistan has not delivered on this. pakistan basically i always maintain that pakistan can do without the aid, but pakistan needs is a good and positive relationship with the united states. and here we have tried to have market access etc, the

construction opportunities, but nothing came out of those. now finally, the question of whether this is a strategic for transactional i would say if you look at the size of pakistan and if you look at these conventional and unconventional military to devotees in the region where the united states stays it basically this relationship has a strategic quality to itself. but, given all these problems that i have mentioned, there is the question of how it should be managed, and if one can discuss in greater detail, but what i feel this that this relationship has to be managed and developed on the basis of realism and frankness. it is an important relationship for pakistan, and i think it is

also important for united states for all of the reasons that i have mentioned. it isn't just a question of the afghanistan civilization. there is an opportunity because the stabilization, as i said, depends on the reconciliation. and for the reconciliation, there are only three players apart from the taliban because the taliban are the ones who have to be basically pacified and brought into the process. one must lead the process, the united states because the united states is there, you can cut occupation power or the power which is present, and pakistan, not because of any special claim or special right, but because of the demographics of the situation, the demographics, why? because pashtuns are half the population of afghanistan, and there are more than three times

as many pashtuns in pakistan as in afghanistan. so the demographics, they dictate that pakistan -- pakistan has to put pressure on the taliban and the pashtun leaders to be cooperative and realistic in their demands when some accommodations are offered to them and for which -- the fear is that because of this downturn this opportunity may be lost but then there are many other areas, other regional issues i would not go into that. the most important point where i would like to end is that the two countries must develop and continue a regular dialogue in the political, diplomatic and military levels and be open about the concerns,

sensitivities and limitations, and clearly delineate the areas of cooperation to avoid the issue and maintain this important relationship. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you for the excellent talk and for presenting pakistan's caisse very forcefully in the very clear manner. i will briefly to some of your points and had perhaps a couple of my own comments on this and then to sort of use my privilege to ask the first question. the problem is as you rightly said we do have grounds for having the strategic relationship and the need for

that also and the potential for it. but, the background of the historical baggage is becoming very difficult not only the historical baggage but the issue that the two countries are facing are also meeting complications. the simple fact is how can one have a strategic relationship when every day there are some transactions to be done which have a lot of potential on which the operations side of and the policy side is another. most of the operations are being handed over to pakistan, but the strategy and the policies are being dictated from here so you can't have good coordination win you are sort of expecting this strategy should be operationalize in pakistan. you have to have a greater sort

of coordination, consultation and understanding of each other's point of view to have a unified strategy and operation. that's one issue, and i think that as you also said that strategic relationship needs a kind of broad convergence of the perceptions, interest and policies on the major issues and that is not happening. what happened in the future? my own sort of hope in the guess is that yes, it will. but it will continue the difficulties during the current times when so many other issues are surrounding. there is an overhang of all going on in afghanistan. there is the anti-americanism in pakistan, there are islamists and pakistan who are building of also into the americanism. you have a very serious concerns about pakistan about the security. i mean, nobody calls pakistan the most dangerous country in the world before 9/11 commesso

pakistan is also looked at the situation and feels that what has happened, who has caused all of this? of course it is very hard for them to sort of look deep inside to see the response of a, but to perhaps look for outside explanations. so there are a lot of things going on, which you have referred to, but that relationship between pakistan and india is also a relationship between the civilian government and the army in pakistan is a big factor. so, a number of issues are surrounding this relationship. some are not entirely, but our national issues, so it's not easy to manage the relationship as you rightly said. but thanks once again for an excellent source of help to us to understand this. my question is a bit sore left in the sense that you have an

ambassador [inaudible] of your ambassador ship and secretary. when the government put to much pressure from american they feel that perhaps they should get closer to china. if that is the kind of naive view because the relationship between the small power and big power cannot be dictated by a small country, so especially china, itself, would not like to sort of take over charge of pakistan. the relationship with pakistan and the united states also to have a relationship with pakistan. i think that china can do the things china cannot do and would like the united states to do for a sample both in terms of and the united states would also like china to do something which it cannot do and would not like to do. in many ways the chinese are very concerned about their own

image in pakistan, and they have benefited from the american is also because that by contrast the looks quite good and they would not like to do anything that makes them on the to -- swat. so what are the prospects of pakistan getting closer to china them to come in to pressure in america? >> well, let me first make one other comment because the u.s. pakistan relationship as i said i may say that it also lacks a certain that because whenever there has been these periods of closeness, the closeness had been at the official level, the military levels, the civilian bureaucracy levels, but somehow or the other the kind of

interaction which should develop which developed between the in for all institutions of democracy among the countries these days india comes to mind between academia, the media, the financial institutions, the market's etc that has not developed and then in the case of the united states one other thing which is important is the role of the communities how strong they are in the united states. so that has not in the case of pakistan that has not really developed. here i would place the blame on the leadership which probably lost many opportunities. on the question of china, yes with china and pakistan has had this relationship of i would say closeness and trust but

naturally as you have mentioned there are certain limitations to what extent china can help pakistan or so in today's world which is the post cold war situation, it is not a question of that you have choices, that here you have a bad relationship, therefore you move to another like it used to be between the two that if you get the trouble on the one side and you have the option of coming to the other block. of course the post cold war situation as far more complex. we have to develop our relationship independently. there are a very strong interests which are common between pakistan and china. there are also certain limitations as well for example

the people to people contacted cetera. the economics relationship that this not as strong as the political relationship and partly it is because of the situation in pakistan. we could have attracted a great deal of many times more investment into pakistan from china because china has all the sort of losses if our security situation were better. but because of the data security situation, which all of you know because of the conflict, etc., that opportunity or that possibility has not materialized. so these are the kinds of things. but yes, publicly, one can expect china to stand by pakistan. pakistan is also very sensitive to many of the chinese concerns. for example, there is a lot

appears related for the incident episode that there may some return on that count but this is on the media speculation. pakistan has been cooperating with china on a question of etim and was killed by the pakistani forces and other are other people some of the leaders of the etim of east turkistan which are people who basically shifted from the soviet union to afghanistan and when afghanistan was completely isolated and insular and ostracized and after the american intervention began to our own areas.

but the point i want to make is that we are really sensitive of all these questions when it comes to china. >> thank you. i will now open the discussion to questions and kindly just ask questions and not make any comments because we don't have much time. we have our views and i would like only to ask questions. please come again. >> and if you could please identify yourself. >> i am amar and am a freelance journalist from baluchistan. i would like to ask mr. riaz kahn this pakistan feel ashamed, the world's worst terrorist found just outside of text and's west point is not just the pakistan military. member to, why was the pakistan

military, why did they hand over the state to the chinese for inspection? st, y uzbeckistan conducting a genocide in baluchistan? >> well, the first thing i have tried to explain that this man osama bin laden was hiding abbottabad i would say one thing about pakistan that pakistan although went from outside made that the armies of the intelligence and if you go to pakistan, pakistan is probably one of the most undocumented societies in the area. i remember attending one similar event.

when somebody made this comment that after all he must have relied for getting the land to the house and this and that but in these kind of things do not come and then the question of the high wall for bullishness on, therefore you know it is the same culture that these high walls are there and households, every household is surrounded by high walls, etc.. so it was -- and the pashtu culture so it was possible for the man to be able to hide. yes, it is embarrassing, and there are so many things that happened that can cause embarrassment, but why should we feel ashamed of anything? we did try and we have given i would say on al qaeda the policy was very clear, and that is why if you look at the list of the al qaeda leaders who've been

captured or neutralized by pakistan then you will realize that it simply doesn't make sense that we should be protecting the top man while capturing and killing every other leader of al qaeda. and second, as i said, the seals have taken all of his computer's etc., all of that, and knowing the little bit on of the american society, if there was a shred of evidence buy now it would have come and if it comes i would be surprised to read these things you cannot be 100% sure of anything, but so far nothing has come out. there was a complicity on the part of the pakistani establishment. so, that is one part of your

relations. the of the part, the material of the helicopter. i do not know whether the material has been given to the chinese, because i think there would have been quite a protest. the charge is that we provide access to the chinese. but let me be also say one thing. what we do with the chinese or don't do with the chinese is a different thing. if a helicopter has crashed, i would be very surprised. i am a free tie your person there for i would be very surprised if we did not take a piece of it for our own sake to see, to analyze what it is. we would be fools if we don't do

that. are we kidding? we are living in this world where the technology is one of the most important things to get access to, so if pakistan has everything and has given it to the americans without even taking a speck of anything i did say as a former whatever that is -- to pakistan should have taken so that we won they don't have those kinds of technological capabilities. but we do have a few here and there. so we might be able to take use of that. i will say that much. baluchistan, baluchistan is a very sad issue with all of us pakistanis. we hope this -- basically it has

to be a political approach, which will somehow assuage the concerns of our brothers from there. and i think that the present government is trying to do that. hopefully we will succeed. this is the effort. >> please, go ahead. >> my name is matthew, and during the talk you referred where there has been the same agent into a different perspective to the americans having one perspective and the pakistanis having another perspective, and my question to you is as a former pakistani diplomat do you think that there is enough understanding between the american diplomacy and the pakistani diplomacy and american diplomats you spend some time here in the united states do you think there is enough exchange

to promote that type of mutual understanding so that we are able to solve and address some of these issues and ways the pakistani diplomats should collaborate more, should we have more exchanges, but in your opinion should be done? >> as i said towards the end, they're has to be exchanges, regular exchanges, and frank and candid sort of -- candid discussions between the two sides on what are the concerns and sensitivities where we can cooperate, but there is one basic problem also at times i feel united states is a superpower has its own interests, etc. the way that it looks at things.

pakistan is also a medium-size country but is large country, 180 million population with all that. so, while on a number of issues i think the two sides are on the same page say for example the question of terrorists, extremism, countering extremism is and pakistan's interest. and it happened we did that, took strong extreme and i mentioned about swat. so, we are on the same page as strategic view of terrorism and extremism is concerned emote violence is concerned. we have to counter it for our own sake. for our development. but, the tactics which need to be deployed, how we do it, pakistan would want to do it in

its own way. ..

and the cost of the war itself within pakistan. and the second question was

about the anti-american sentiment in pakistan. part of it i feel partly because of the lack of transparency between the governed and the governed in pakistan itself. and there seems to be some kind of vested interest in pakistan that for whatever reason wants to keep its dealings opaque and, therefore, doesn't allow the person-to-person or academic to academic contact that you were talking about. and that also goes back to the '50s and '60s when there was that kind of contact when we had kind of like guys like duke ellington playing in karachi. >> the second more if you could clarify a little more. >> yes, sir. what i mean is that anti-americanism in pakistan seems to be propagated by the lack of transparency what the

sunni government is doing and how the public perceives it? thank you. >> the first question how does -- i'm basically talking about the effect that there is this feeling that there is lack of appreciation. i'm not going into this whether this feeling is right other wrong. but there is this feeling. this is a fact. how it sort of gets reflected, it gets reflected in the comments when there is an accusation that pakistan is playing a double game. that pakistan is not delivering. pakistan has basically turned away $13 million or whatever and that -- the u.s. taxpayers money

and there is no return for that. these are -- if you look at it from the other side, with the simplistic statements which will show to the other side that, look, the kind of problems, the kind of mess that we are in and some people can argue that this mess was not there before 9/11. it got worse after -- >> and we're going to leave what's left of this program now to go live to an event that's part of the airlines pilots association's air safety forum. it's a panel on aviation security. it is just beginning. you're watching live coverage here on c-span2. >> i promised not to mention any names if you save me the sudoko puzzle right there. thanks. congratulations to all the members who received awards during their individual breakout sessions monday and tuesday this week. would you please stand to be

recognized. we're proud to have you on our team. mra[applause] >> we now begin the afternoon session by focusing on the very important task of keeping our aviation system safe. like safety, security is all about eliminating or mitigating risk. the question is, how do you continually improve a system when the threat is often difficult to identify and resources are getting scarce? discussing that now will be an all-star panel including captain moke and our moderator captain shaun cassidy of alaska airlines. shau shaun? >> good afternoon and welcome. i'm captain shaun cass by alpa's

first president. we're pleased to be joined by the chief executive by the transportation airport transport association, and vice president security and facilitation airports council international north america who will discuss the current status of aviation security and many of its aspects to include the use of intelligence and identifying potential risks, risk analysis and implementing effective risk mitigation strategies. the subject is of great interest because after the events of 9/11 showed us, it is imperative that we continually stay one step ahead of our adversaries in order to protect not only aviation but our entire national economy. alpa for years has called for the government to switch to a risk based system and we could not be happy that has now being done i would like to offer some historical perspective on the subject of aviation security. civil aviation security exists to prevent terrorists or

criminal activity directed against aircraft, airports and the people who occupy them and addresses acts such as highjacking damaging and destroying aircraft and assaulting passengers and aviation employees. in view of the terrorist attacks perpetuated by al-qaeda on 9/11, the failed shoe bomb attack by richard railed and by mutalljab on christmas day in 2009 and why aviation continues to be a target and why aviation security is high on the list of governments the traveling public and the international aviation community let's briefly review a pre-9/11 aviation security benchmarks. 1968 through 1973 marked the peak of highjackings. in that time the u.s. department of transportation estimated 365 highjackings occurred worldwide. most highjacking demands were

political or financial in nature. consequently our response strategy was one of accommodation more than confrontation. at alpa's strong urging they wanted security of passengers that no unlawful or dangerous weapons or explosives or destructive substance were carried on board our aircraft. from 1973 to 2001, the security system was predicated of preventing acts of unlawful intervention by nonsuicidal individuals and worked quite well for its intended purpose but its limitations were clearly demonstrated on 9/11. that brings us to the post-9/11 era. in congressional testimony, given two weeks the 9/11 attacks, the then acting faa deputy administrator monty bellinger said and i, quote, the nature of the fete facing america has changed. what we faced on september 11 was a new phenomenon.

highjackers taking over commercial flights for the sole purpose of turning them into human guided terrorist bombs of massive explosive power. assumptions underlying aviation security have fundamentally changed. in november of 2001, congress passed the aviation and transportation security act commonly referred to as atsa which established transportation security administration and charts the agency with the responsibility for the security of all modes of transportation. government's response that a new category of threat was understandable as it attempted to counter the repeat attack of 9/11 attack. initially checkpoint screening procedures were allowed on pre-9/11 securitifullities. all passengers were subject to the same airport techniques. an elderly grandparent, a 5-year-old child or a congressman with the highest security clearance possible were all screened the same as a foreign national adult with a questionable or unconfirmed identification. the process was rigid and

inflexible. in an effort to better harness intelligence in order to separate known from unknown individuals, u.s. government proposed a more tosophisticated provision a of passenger prescreening system otherwise known by caps 1 which is changed to caps 2 to establish a traveller's credentials and their trust worthiness. it met with stiff resistance from privacy advocates and was abandoned ultimately to be replaced by the secured flights system. regarding the use of intelligence in response to the northwest airlines 253 incident the senate select committee on intelligence offer some conclusions on its may 18th, 2010 report. notably, the individuals not placed on the government's terrorist screening database or no-fly list the state department should have but did not revoke abdulmutallab's visa.

i'm sorry intelligence reports were not disseminated. subsequently, in december 2010, dhs announced that all passengers on flights with or bound for the united states are now being checked on a government watch-list under the implementation of tsa's secure flight program. previously airlines were responsible for checking passenger names against watch-lists. spoof of seemingly applicable screening techniques, foreign nationals were allowed to board aircraft while wearing clothing which made positive identification virtually impossible. in october 2010, a young man donned an intricate mask that made him appear to be much older and was able to board a flight from hong kong to dc and you remember the old mission impossible series will probably know what i'm talking about and the potential for defeating a system that relied heavily on a

physical screening technology but didn't pay enough attention to the individual being screened. with advancements of screening technology, we have seen the x-ray machine replaced with a more sophisticated ct scanner. advanced video systems monitor airport perimeters and doors and use softwares anomalies identification systems. trace detection equipment can identify small amounts of explosive residue sophisticated scanners analyze the material inside shoes. back scanner and wave advanced imagery technology otherwise known as a.i.t. have become prevalent at airports and they've generated much public concern due to health and privacy concerns. in addition to the significant reliance on technology, and airport screening we are witnessing an increased use of human intervention through behavioral pattern recognition programs such as the screening of passengers by observation techniques commonly referred to as the spot program which is in use right now at boston's logan international airport. and the wide deployment of tsa's behavioral detection officers known as b.d.o.s.

just as alpa was at the forefront of the '70s for the passenger screening at the forefront for collaborative ways for government and industry. alpa a white paper calling for a risk based approach to aviation security rather than one which treats all passengers the same and primarily seeks to identify prohibited items through reliance on technology. since that time, public awareness and support for this concept has been raised globally as evidenced by an overwhelming number of subject matter experts now calling for the implementation of a risk-based or threat-based security system. a group of industry representatives undertook efforts to implement the concept for a threat-based system for airline pilots. this program was ultimately approved and implemented by tsa

at three domestic airports. it has evolved into a jointly response program between alpa and ata and a test began at o'hare international airport which i was proud to be there when the system first rolled out. tsa has characterized the known crew member program as an example of alternative screening which allows us better utilization of tsa resources in acertaining, confirming valid terrorist threats to aviation. a crew member is part of the risk based screening system. in summary aviation security screening measures implemented by many governments have seen limited success in differentiating between those who pose a legitimate threat to aviation and those who do not. with that, i believe i've offered enough food for thought on this complicated but critically important topic and i would like to introduce the members of this distinguished panel. to my right we have a representative from the airlines

pilot association. to his right john pistole administrator, transportation security administration, to my left mr. nick callio president of the airport transportation and we have the vice president facilitation from north america and on a side note chris bid well is filling in for principato who was unable to join us due to a family emergency. chris joined as vice president and security and facilitation in october 2008 and is responsible for leading the association's efforts on airport security, facilitation and regulatory activities. in that compassion he monitors domestic and international aviation security developments, regulatory actions and programs impacting security and facilitation at north american airports and we're very pleased to have chris here with us today. so that concludes my opening comments. as far as what the rules of engagement are for today, what we're going to do i'm going to start to my left.

i'm going to give each of the panelists a few minutes to offer some opening comments and observations. then i have some prepared questions that we've been working on in collaboration with many of our security professionals and then probably about the last 15 minutes or so we're going to have audience participation in which questions are submitted ahead of time to some of our staff members in the back and then they'll be submitted to me to pose to the panelists and with that, i invite chris bidwell to start off. >> i would like to take my opportunity to express my sincere appreciation for alpa to invite me to speak today at this event. over the years i've had the privilege to work very closely with the captain, jim andersacs and i can't list everybody because there are many other alpa representatives and i can say that alpa continues to be a great partner to airports and to

tsa to support you on aviation security initiatives. i also appreciate the opportunity to speak on such a distinguished panel. unfortunately, as the captain mentioned acni greg principato could not be here today as he had a family emergency but being an avid sports fan i'm sure he would have likely opened with a baseball witticism and so as the pinch-hitter i will tell you that i will do at least as well as my home team the kansas city royals. so today i want to provide you with an overview of post-9/11 aviation security enhancements including a discussion of the policies, procedures, programs and technologies that have significantly shaped and contributed to the security enhancement of the system that we have today. security happens at airports and

it is essential for dhs and tsa to collaborate on airport security initiatives. just this morning secretary napolitano speaking on the topic of homeland security since 9/11 looking back, looking forward commented that the role the public sector is important and that security is a shared responsibility. and airports council international north america agrees and we recently met with the secretary to discuss ways in which airports and other industry representatives can work together with dhs and tsa collaboratively to further enhance airport security. one of the key aspects of that that we're going to touch on by leveraging available intelligence information and data. so along those lines, the timely sharing of intelligence information is critical. and this is evidenced by the yemen plot. significant amounts of data and

intelligence information that is available can and should be used to effectively harness and really focus our limited aviation security resources. and, you know, through collaborative relationships potentially working in the classified setting, there's the potential for tsa airports, airlines, alpa to identify strategies that enhance security while keeping in mind the need to balance that with customer service and efficiency. in addition, we believe that there should be an ongoing government industry initiative to review processes and procedures out there. to that end, there's been a lot of discussion over the years about an orange-level review. and acina took the initiative building upon our strategic partnership with tsa to launch what we call an end-up security review. and through that process, what we do is collaboratively work with our members, tsa and other

industry associations to take a look at security measures. and identify that are outmoded, duplicative, need clarification or just need to be thrown out completely. and although security measures through the idsr have been completely rescinded, they were no longer necessary. and this really allowed limited resources to be redirected to bolster other areas. in short, this is the essence of the risk-based program or initiative. it's worth saying that many airports go above and beyond tsa's security requirements. for access control patrols they've installed various intrusion detection systems, closed circuit television systems and provided security awareness training to employees. many of these airport security enhancements were implemented

absent a mandate to do so. and had the additional benefit of not only enhancing security but also improving efficiency. so to the core of the discussion today, tsa's risk-based security initiatives are in accordance with a key acnia recommendation for focusing on people rather than things. and this helps to preserve our limited resources. from a practical perspective, risk-based security harnessing available data and intelligence information to serve as an indicator to guide the application of screening resources. the most invasive screening technology and procedures should be and will be under these programs reserved, individual items and cargo about which the least is known. aci supports tsa's risk-based security initiatives and looks forward with working with the industry and our agency partners

to develop and rule out the known crew member program and the nontraveler program. these risk-based security programs have the potential to increase security and efficiency of the current system while also ensuring that it is sustainable over the next 10 years when passenger volumes are expected to top 1 billion annually. every part of the aviation industry play as critical role in contributing to security, aci recognizes the many security initiatives advanced by alpa. the airlines and tsa and we look forward continuing to work with our industry and government colleagues in support of our shared goal of providing efficient and effective security. thank you and i look forward to the questions. >> thank you, chris. one note, too, while we're going through this panel and seeing the questions addressed and answered, if you have any questions that you would like asked, please feel free to jot

them down and once we have a pause from the prepared questions, we'll have an opportunity to collect those questions. mr. callio? >> thank you, sean. and thank you, lee, and alpa for the opportunity to be here. ata appreciates it. this is a critical issue. on september 11, 2001, the terrorists were not attacking the airlines. they were looking for the most potent way to disrupt the u.s. economy and the worldwide economy and our way of life. they thought it out pretty well. airlines is really the physical internet and aviation drives the worldwide economy as well as the u.s. economy. ata's priorities here are pretty simple. we want a risk-based intelligence driven approach to security that enhances overall safety and security. makes the screening process better and quicker for passengers and also helps to facilitate the movement of goods worldwide. that's why we were pleased to

partner with alpa on the known crew member program, it is off to a good start. we're looking forward to see that program expanded to others. we also think that it's the exact right kind of approach and i commend tsa for working with us on it. it takes available information and people who have less risk or no risk and move them in the system which will move everybody along in the process that's why we too look forward and approve the known travelers program and look forward to a known cargo program. i'd just like to take the opportunity before saying i'm willing to move on to questions after the others, administrator pistole, he's leading just exactly the right kind of approach to security. it's a professional law enforcement approach and it's based on solid intelligence and data-sharing with both government and industry stakeholders, something that's very much needed and can very much help the process.

thank you. >> all right, thanks to the panel. thanks for everybody showing up. it's kind of a unique rule for me to be on a panel with captain cassidy monitoring it. usually it might be the other way around. but as we approach the 10-year anniversary of 9/11, if you go back just a couple years ago, i think we were all shocked a little bit and we were fortunate. and the event that occurred on christmas day 2009 with the underwear bomber was his attack on northwest airlines 253. and then following on what occurred in october, 2010, with the printer cartridge attacks on the federal express and ups all cargo aircraft provided a reminder that there is a determined, adaptive adversary that remains focused on attacking civil aviation and

that we must be vigilant. that we must continue to work together. that we must not let our guard down. now, it goes without saying and i agree with everyone on the panel that civil aviation is a critical component of the nation's infrastructure and the global economy. you know, pilots have a vested interest in security. and the ultimate command of the aircraft and the responsibility for the lives of everyone on board. once we're airborne, problems are sealed in. you know, we just can't we're h

direction to a risk identification, a risk mitigation strategy in order to stay ahead. the general security culture needs to change. advanced screening technologies, while important, are not a panacea. they're not a silver bullet. you can't treat all passengers as an equal threat and search for harmful objects only. we must look for evil intent.

now, doing so will enhance, i believe -- will enhance passenger privacy, facilitate passenger flow and better focus our limited screening resources. pilots, leos, flight attendants, other aviation employees whose identity, employment status and background are known should be accommodated in a fashion consistent with their known status. we're pleased that the administrator has announced his intentions to build on the known crew member program with the known traveller program and that's going to incorporate risk-based philosophy and drive toward a better system and a more efficient passenger screening model.

on other missed -- on other risk mitigation opportunities that are before us, one, all cargo airline operations, they continue to be conducted we believe under reduced security requirements. when compared to passenger operations. there's a lack of parity insider requirements, back room investigate of individuals and unescorted access to cargo aircraft, lack of hardened aircraft doors, no mandated training for all cargo common strategy and all that contributes. we need to work on that. the dffo program in this era of financial austerity is i believe an underutilized resource. there are pilots who are volunteering their services to the government to provide this line of defense on the flight. yet the program's budget -- and we understand that -- the budget has not been increased in many

years. we want to work harder on that. threatened air space management, pilots in command of airborne aircraft are those about to take off should be notified real time of events that are going on. in such circumstances, improved ground air communications will better enable pilot and commands to protect their passengers, their crew, their cargo, their aircraft. also allow them to be more vigilant when they know that there's another event taking place. secondary barriers, now we're pleased that the rtca special committee 221 will soon issue its final report on the value of these permanently installed secondary flight deck barriers. and alpa urges the government and industry to carefully consider the security benefit that's provided by these

devices. you know this is a long time coming and we've gone through a process and it's time we solve this issue. we should have the secondary barrier. security training for aviation workers and individuals who make the aviation industry go should be viewed as a part of the solution rather than as a part of a problem. in summary, pilots are ultimately in charge of the safety and security of the airplanes, passengers, crew and cargo. and we're working diligently to protect those resources. our lives literally depend on our successes and our failures in this effort. the airline pilot association commends tsa administrator pistole for the courage and the wisdom and partner with us on approving the known crew member program. and we commend the ata for taking the step with us to jointly sponsor the known crew

member program. the program now is rolled out and we're confident that it will pass the test over the next few months and rapidly move through some 80 u.s. airports in the coming year. we'd also like to commend our other industry partners, aci who share our vision on security. in order to achieve success, we encourage the tsa to reach out to the industry subject matter experts in a truly meaningful dialog while policies are being shaped not after the fact and i thank these recent successes are a great example of that. we have -- we all have much in common on risk-based security, in making it a reality. and alpa stands ready to partner with anyone. we're trusted, capable partners

and we'll bring solutions to the table. thank you. >> well, thank you, sean, for the moderation here, and captain moak for the opportunity to speak and for the opportunity to be on this panel. it seems like a lot of the issues that i would discuss have already been touched upon and so i appreciate that. and thank you for your support and chris thank you for being here for acina and i have three points i would make today. the threats are real and evolving. second that risk-based security makes sense. and third, that partnerships are critical. so on the first point the threats are real and evolving. we know that al-qaeda in particularly has focused on aviation going back years and years. and that they continue to have an interest as we've seen going from 9/11 using the aircraft as

a weapon to the ied attempts with the shoe bomber, richard reid and then, of course, abdulmutallab with the christmas day and then the attempts involving the liquids from the u.k. in august of '06 and then, of course, the cargo plot from yemen that was previously mentioned. aviation both passenger and cargo remain a target and that's why the threats are real and evolving. we face an enemy that is determined and is focused on the design, construction and concealment of ieds that will defeat our security apparatus and because it's a global supply chain we know we're only as strong as our weakest things and that's why the partnerships are critical. second, the risk based security makes sense. we want to try to provide to provide the most effective security in the most efficient way and risk based security addresses that, i believe, in several facets.

getting back to the first issue of the threats being real, we can't try to do the same type of security screening for each and every of the 1.8 million plus passengers every day to provide the most effective security in the most efficient way. the same thing on the cargo fronts. in the first three months of the year over 700 million pounds of cargo coming in the u.s., we have to make sure that we're working in close partnership to address how we can focus on the high risk cargo in a way that focuses on known shippers and known shipments and we've got great industry cooperation in moving forward in that area. i want to applaud alpa particularly along with ata in terms of the risk-based security initiatives. a lot of work has been done prior to my time to tsa last july but i applaud the work that has did not done in that realm. acina has also been a vocal supporter of what we're doing. the key from my perspective is that we have a number of different tools.

intelligence is the most effective tool. intelligence comes from any number of sources. very likely it could be from industry rather than from a government source. and so that's why those partnerships come back into play. one size fits all dimension and that is one of approach but i think we can do better and that's why we're working in such close collaboration with our partnerships that you see up here. the crew members is something that we're very supportive and very pleased to see that the initial proof of kept is working well at o'hare and we also look forward to expanding that in the near future as both technology and checkpoints allow that. but clearly, the policy is there to move forward with that. same thing with trusted traveller known traveller and a lot of different names. very much interested in how we do the concept that we'll see this fall, early october when we'll see at least four airports

piloting those concepts. and so that's all part of that partnership and collaboration that we come down to. the other part of that is global entry, nexus and century, a very supportive of what customs and border protection has already existing. and as an additional entry point for those who want to have the possibility of expedited physical screening because we're doing an additional intelligence screening on the front end. which brings me to the third point the partnerships critical not only especially for what we've been talking about with alpa, ata and acina but all associations and really the traveling public. i think it was president lincoln who said the best defense of democracy is an informed electorate and with passenger security an informed traveling public is one of our most effective tools in terms of being aware of surroundings, see something, say something but being prepared to go through a

checkpoint so we can then focus on those that we know the least about. another program which captain moak and i discussed earlier when he took office is something that we believe is another recognition of pilots as being the most trusted persons in the air so if we can't trust pilots, then who can we trust? clearly the whole known crew member and the jump seat program are aimed at facilitating pilots in that regard. very broadly we are undertaking initiatives in other areas with automatic targeted recognition which gives the generic outline of the person. the assessor program that was mentioned at boston logan airport which we are doing a proof of concept under. the screening of children 12 and under that we are working through, different options there. recognizing that in the very great likelihood the child is not being used as a terrorist

but, unfortunately, we are aware of adults using children in that regard elsewhere. and then, of course, the honor flights, the world war ii veterans that if they're on a charter we do risk-based security with them using the intelligence-driven approach. the bottom line there's no 100% guarantees in this business. risk management and risk mitigation are the watch words, not risk elimination. and to conclude i would note from my last job of almost 27 years at the fbi there's a saying in the fbi headquarters courtyard of pennsylvania avenue that i'll paraphrase is cooperation of the american people. i would say as we look at the tenth he anniversary of 9/11 to update that it would be the most effective tool in the fight against terrorism is cooperation of freedom-loving people worldwide. thank you. [applause] >> thank you, mr. pistole.

one introductory comments and a perfect segue to get into the questions of our panel here. i could not think of a better way to launch into the rest of the forum today. so what i'm going to do i'm just going to pose the questions to the group here. there's no specific need for one or all or any to answer because i think all these questions addressed issues which we certainly all have in common from all the stakeholders up here on the podium with me. so since the christmas day attack on northwest airlines flight 253, it has become more clear that there's a global trend towards a more risk-based approach to airline passenger screening so the first question i'd like to pose is i'd like to ask -- i'd like to start up by asking each of you about the evolving threats to aviation security and how we best manage that ever changing threat and what is needed from your perspectives? you want to lead off, chris? >> sure, happy to do it.

>> thank you. >> from acina's perspective, we think that as mentioned previously that leveraging available intelligence information and data to really focus the application of technology and screening resources on the individuals and items and cargo for that matter which we know the least about is the right approach. and, you know, clearly that's the one that's being taken under the administrator's leadership right now and we're fully supportive. >> i'm going to take a pass because i think what i've said already and what chris just said and what others just said pretty much covered it. we need to continue what we're doing now. >> the only thing i would add, sean, is the solution is what we're doing here today. we're all working together partnering, sharing information and having a system set up that when you see something that's not quite right, you have a way

of communicating that and that information is of communicated throughout the system so that we can adapt and make adjustments real time if necessary. >> the only thing i would add to that is that the more we can know about either individuals or cargo, the better judgments we can make in terms of what type of physical screening would be appropriate. we recognize given the latest intelligence that terrorists are talking doing surgically implanted explosives as an individual as a suicide bomber present additional damages but that's why i say intelligence is the most important tool that we have because but for intelligence, for example, at the yemen cargo plot, we did not know about those traditional physical screening had not detected those and so that's why it's critical and some of the best intelligence comes from industry. >> great. >> looking ahead what obstacles and issues could arise as we try

to evolve our processes to deal with the devolving risk and how do we stay one step ahead on the terrorist and this is an open question for the panel? >> the way we stay one step ahead. and a day-to-day challenge that i deal with is to make sure that the intelligence is flowing freely. i start the day with an intelligence briefing and what's going on in the world. what the terrorists are thinking, what they're contemplating and how they're going about it. that's being said because tsa is almost exclusively domestic. we have to make sure that our international partners are informed and also able to take steps that not only to detect but deter those punitive terrorists so that's the challenge is obtaining actual intelligence that's timely, it's credible and it gives us is basis for doing something most

oftentimes it's through industry partners that that actually would take place such as with fedex and ups with the yemen cargo plot. >> all i would add is from the pilot and command perspective, the sharing of intelligence and the briefs prior to flights are what you need in order to combat and ensure that everyone stays vigilant. vigilance is key because, you know, the underwear bomber -- i mean, who would have thought what -- you know, who would thought it would be an underwear bomber that should hbe wakeup c end they'll go. bottom line, multiple events, sharing of information, real time, updates, routine and real time updates will come -- will combat, you know, the problem that we have by something not

happening every day in order for the pilots to remain vigilant. >> thank you. >> the only thing i would add to that is i think public acceptance in the sense that the public needs to be aware and educated about the threats so that there's greater acceptance of what needs to be done on a day-to-day basis by both the government and the partners sitting up here to make -- the right word more precisely to make sure that things don't happen. >> so with regard to the challenges that lay ahead, i think that -- is this mic working? can you hear me now. all right. with regard to the challenges that lie ahead, i think that in the face of pressure to do 100% which we know there is no true 100% -- i mean, you know, we face it in our every day lives. i mean, the decision to come

here, get in a cab, walk across the street, whatever, we need to -- so in the face of that pressure, we need to maintain that delicate balance between the appropriate level of security and the efficiency that is inherent and essential to the aviation system. and, you know, back to a comment that captain moak made, you know, the way we get there is through these partnerships and working together. >> great. i think what we'll do we'll just keep going back and forth just to keep the flow going so i apologize. i'm going to double up on you, chris. >> great, the intelligence in the leo community has done a key role in risk-based security. we think they've done a good job of including the intelligence in the law enforcement community and the risk-based process. so i'm kind of curious what you think about this and what additional next steps are needed to improve this collaboration. >> clearly, we've come a long

way with regard to intelligence-sharing and leveraging boots on the ground. you know, there's really a two-way information flow. tsa provides intelligence information to airports and airport law enforcement officers. and that information is utilized to make adjustments to the security baseline at airports. and at the same time, airport law enforcement officers -- those boots on the ground and airports -- they collect information about events, situations and provide it to tsa. and that can be incredibly useful as the situation unfolds. >> airlines are currently providing classified briefings on emerging and existing threats. we think the partnership is good with our government partners. we'd like to see it expanded so that there's more -- i think captain moak said this, more of an operational perspective put in at an earlier time on some of

these things but overall we think the intelligence-sharing is going very well. >> on a real time event that's going on, we want to continue to do the things we've been doing to this point and we want to enhance that as we go forward with all the air crews that are airborne during that event. planning, going through flight planning when an event is ongoing or host-flying so more constant coordination. >> i would just add two points. first is the whole risk-based security initiative that we are working with our partners. it's designed to focus on those unknowns recognizing that the more we know the better informed judgments we can make as i said. the second point is right now, there are probably 20 to 22, 23 heads of security for passenger

and cargo carriers at tsa headquarters receiving a classified briefing on the intelligence. i met with them this morning for a brief time to outline where we are with the risk-based security initiative and that gets back to our initiative we can be informed by industry as to what we're seeing and what what the u.s. government is collecting internationally as to the latest trends, tactics and techniques terrorists are using. >> great, thank you. public perception is key and it's important how we get the buy-in from the traveling public as these processes change. the next question will be more directed to mr. pistole and the gentleman to my left. the no travel program should help obtain public buy-in for risk-based security. what will it provide to the traveling public from the tsa and industry perspectives? >> well, from tsa's perspective, it allows us to do more intelligence screening on the front end before somebody ever gets to the checkpoints so the idea is that as people

voluntarily share information with us and whether that's through global industry, nexus century, those existing travel programs or through the prototypes, the proof of concepts that we're doing with elite frequent fliers initially because there's a rich set of data there if they're willing to share we can again make those informed judgments so that's -- that's the first part of it, to allow us to spend time on those that we know nothing more than about other than name, date of birth and gender that is under a secured flight so that's, i think, one of the keys. i'm just leave it at that. >> mr. kelly? >> for the customer i think it will be an improved experience getting through the airport. i think that will improve the customers' moods. for the tsa it's expect what the administrator said a better allocation of resources where the greater threats lie. i think over the long hall it's also got to be a matter of we've got to educate the public.

i just read an article in the "washington post" over the weekend. i don't know if you saw in the travel section complaining somewhat about the known traveller program, what it would cost you giving up your privacy. i think the key here is that the public has to know that there are people who travel more. there are people who are willing to, quote, give up some of their privacy to get that preapproval at the airport screening that will allow them to be expedited through the process and also thereby allowing the general public who is not willing to do so to get through the airport quicker. >> there's really three benefits in my view. and the first of which has been touched upon by the panelists and that is in terms of security with the additional data that tsa would get under this type of program, that allows them to target resources on individuals about which less is known. the second is efficiency. and this will be in terms of, you know, efficiency processing

at security checkpoints. and it will, i think, make the whole process more efficient and then the third is predictability for participants who would as a benefit receive expedited processing through passenger security checkpoints and with the pong that has been discussed of relieving some of the items that i have been identified as hassle factors, shoes, coats, laptops removal of those items so i think, you know, this program has the potential to benefit industry government and the traveling public. >> thank you. this next question is for the whole panel. do you think that the need for a more risk-based paradigm in aviation security should include more information about travelers so that we know exactly who's boarding the aircraft? >> currently there's a lot of

data that is available about to tsa, to the airlines about passengers right now. i mean, if you look there's what's in the passenger name record or the reservation. there's the data that the passengers provide under secure flight. tsa can utilize that information to, you know, do the watch-list investigate right now. provided that passengers agree to voluntarily provide additional information that opens the door to leveraging additional data that is also available whether it's cbp, the automated passenger information system, it's the information that comes in the machine readable zone on the passport, the global industry information that the administrator mentioned earlier and other data. but i think one of the keys to that and that is the beauty of this program is that it will be voluntaril

voluntarily. >> yes. >> as captain moak would say, i like that. next. effective aviation security has a blending of human technology and human intervention. are the privacy considerations that need to be addressed in connection with the risk based security. i'll start with mr. pistole. >> absolutely. and that's why we're doing this risk-based security initiative as a voluntary which has been mentioned several times. so what i don't want to do is data mine information that the entire u.s. government has on people who are not willing to share that information. that would affect and go to the core of privacy and civil liberty issues that we hold dear in this country. i want to use all available information that people care to share but that's got to be voluntary. >> well, by definition, the pilots are sharing all that information about themselves and as you can see the known crew member programs is moving forward and it's going to be very effective so we're more

than happy to share. >> i'd just say sure, there are privacy considerations and back to the previous comment about these being voluntary programs, those individuals that don't wish to provide additional data don't have to do so. but they do so -- they withhold that information with the full recognition that they may not receive the benefits of providing the data which would be increased efficiency. >> actually, i would. it is a choice. and it has to be stressed as a choice. it's a choice, frankly, i made with global industry. it's a choice i would make in the known traveller program because i want that efficiency and i want that expedited screening process. what i also don't want is somebody telling all passengers that they can't have that because they don't want it. >> great. with approximately 628 million passengers traveling through u.s. airports each year,

tremendous assets are devoted to screening, for potential threats and the most effective and efficient manner possible. the question of the group is the ship to a risk-based security system will it truly enhance the secure process as well as the customer experience of our travelers and what are the cost implications of this change? chris? >> sure, absolutely. i think there's potential for some upfront costs to support the networking of databases and whatnot. but when you look at the ability of what will be provided through that networking to provide additional data on a voluntary basis to tsa to assist in the risk assessment, that really allows the focusing of resources and screening technologies on those that we know the least about and in the long run, that's going to serve to reduce

costs because you may not need to have the whole suite of technologies available at every single screening lane. you can have certain lanes that are dedicated for those about which the least is known. >> i couldn't have said it better myself. >> again, the whole goal of this is to provide the most effective security in the most efficient way so any efficiencies that we can achieve through this process, such as spending less time physically screening pilots who are in that most trusted position, that allows us to achieve some efficiencies at the checkpoints. that's exactly what we're trying to do here. >> shaun, the only thing i'd like to add that these millions of passengers going through these checkpoints it's an incredible job the tsa has done every day and, you know, they don't get a lot of thank you's. they don't get a lot of credit and i guess there's a lot of late night comedy routines on that but i got to tell you the

pilots -- we thank them for the great job they do every day. and if you look at the trend, the trend is more people flying especially over the next several years. so the shift to risk-based is the way to go. >> thank you. >> as a reminder if you have any questions that you'd like to present to the panel, what i'd ask you to do is write them down on one of the pieces of paper in front of you. you can pass them towards the middle of them if you hold them up one of our staff members will come and grab them from you. and along those lines, let me proceed this by saying i hope you're enjoying the forum. i was able to go out and chat with the folks who build the laser proof glasses and i've been told they are great for green liner as well as very tough questions. and with that i'm going to get to my first audience question. what role can airport and airline employees play in being the eyes and ears of security? and is training for this purpose

needed. >> as part of the see something say something comes home to the airport employees, vendors of those who are on the premises and we've talked about doing training that goes beyond what they would normally have from their employers to give them a baseline of not necessarily behavior detection but simply greater awareness of what may be suspicious activity. obviously, there's a cost of doing that. and do the government or the taxpayers pay that? is that a fee-based issue? is that something that the employers pay? so it's a number of issues there but clearly anybody who can be a force multiplier or enhancer for aviation security is welcome. >> i agree. i agree. >> thanks. every employee plays a role in

security. and, you know, what we've seen has been identified from some of our members as a real innovative security enhance is that some airports have provided security awareness training to all employees, including janitors, and that results in a feed of information that goes to the airport. obviously, some of that information that is pertinent can be provided on to tsa. that, you know, helps guide the application of resources. so every employee plays a role. >> next question, should the government increase emphasis on risk assessment as pertains to passengers reduce its plans to acquire greater quantities of advanced screening equipment, to the panel? >> i would in a sense defer to the administrator. but one would hope that the greater allocation of resources to real threats over time would allow them to make the

evaluation that they don't need some of the machinery i think as chris said earlier at every checkpoint, you don't need the full array of equipment at every different checkpoint. >> we're obviously watching this closely to see how the risk-based security initiative rolls out and how many people are impacted. and the demands that are placed on our technology so i see security as both the human-enabled but the technology-enabled part of it also. and a.i.t. -- the advancement of technology gives us that best opportunity to detect the nonmetallic devices that we saw on christmas day. one of the things we have to be careful of recognizing there are no guarantees that anybody even in a trusted status could be somebody who could do something bad. i've worked with fbi agents who turned out to be soviet and then russian spies.

aware of major hasan in the military an officer and doctor that has done bad thing and has been documented as allegations anyway at this point. the we have technology that we can use to enhance the screening experience for security purposes for those that we don't know. so the total rollout, for example, of the a.i.t. does not cover all 2200 checkpoints that we have at the 450 airports around the country. but it is to be deployed in a risk-based scenario looking at where the highest risk may be. ..

toward the development of mutually recognized standards for the development of screening technologies. the manufacturers are open to this. it will result in lower cost and more highly effective units, and then back to the question, the risk-based security process, the results from that will help guide the application and investment in security screening technologies. thank you. >> another audience question. how can a risk-based security program be used to protect all areas of the airport and not just passenger screening? >> i'd be glad to take that.

obviously if tsa has a shared responsibility particularly with airport police, at least with a larger airports and then along with the airline security personnel, airport security, so it is a shared responsibility. that being said, we are very much aware of what's happened infil glasco or what happened in moscow that checked baggage area. there are vulnerabilities that the terrorists will always try to exploit and the question is getting back to the most effective tool being intelligence, hopefully there is a tripwire in place somewhere across the u.s. law enforcement or intelligence and security community that would identify this person or persons especially if it is an active shooter scenarios such as we saw in mumbai going on three years ago now that we have intelligence about that before it happened.

if it doesn't, then it becomes a question of what are the airports moves to preparedness plans, what have they done to train and rehearse scenarios such as active shooter or something else like that because of that really becomes a part of the training opportunities that imports along with tsa and airport police have. >> we spend a lot of time talking about passengers, screening passenger security, but you know, at u.s. airports we have cargo operations also, and the cbp after 9/11, the amount of cargo coming in in the u.s. through non-aviation modes of transportation, you know, really forced upon them a risk-based security model right out of the get-go.

with a cargo carriers we were shocked to beckon to reality in october, 2010, with a cartridge, in cartridge bombs and then recently, still not known, we have had a couple of cargo accidents, one in dubai and one off the coast of korea, still not knowing the cause of those accidents but, you know, taking a good hard look at everything that could have happened. so the bottom line is the risk based models in the cargo security is keep coming and we need to be focusing on what's going on on the cargo and of the equation at airports as much as the passenger and and. in doing so looking at the progress on this we need to move the risk assessment further and the information gathering supply chain if you can. so you get the information earlier and better information at the same time. >> so there's also a need to as the administrator said, rely on

the partnerships and leverage the intelligence information that you can glean from those partnerships. also, i want to mention that airports do exercises to test and evaluate and learn from various scenarios some of which have been mentioned today, and these are done in coordination with the airlines, but tsa, with local fbi, and local law enforcement as well. and then the lessons learned are built back in or applied to the security programs to make further enhancements. and then airports have also done a number of things that are separate and apart from regulation to enhance security, and this is in terms of the implementation of the different process these, procedures and technology is to enhance security, and one of the efficiencies that those have

served to benefit is for passengers being able to get through airports more expeditiously. thank you. >> this next audience question is directed to mr. pistole. but reaction is tsa getting from the governments and airlines to a risk-based approach? >> there has been a great deal of interest. one of the things we are doing is working through iko to work on the security regimens post christmas day and post the cargo plot so there has been a series of conferences to ensure that the baseline that all countries and the civil aviation securities regimen have meet those standards. there is again the great interest from the standpoint of how does this impact what they do for passengers coming to the u.s.. we are limiting this initially

just to domestic flights because of the impact on international standards and protocols. we want to make sure we get it right here in the u.s., assuming that that does work then we will look at expanding either bilaterally or multilaterally, for example with the e.u. in terms of reciprocity. so a lot of interest there, looking to us to see how that is going to work. >> thank you to read a question for the panel and also from the audience, and i know that it is probably a little bit premature since we just stood up chicago last week, but how well are the airports and freezing of the known crewmember program? >> in terms of initial set up and cooperation and collaboration towards getting the program started. >> the airports have worked in close collaboration and coordination with tsa and the

airlines to facilitate the rollout of the known crewmember program and it's something airports have identified as the security enhancement and at the same time and the efficiency so those partnerships have streamlined the rollout of the program. >> there's been very good cooperation. obviously each airport or different airports may present unique challenges to set up the program and we've been working through that with tsa, with alpa and the airports. >> i've been getting good reports from the reports from the pirates to the copilots utilizing the sources from tsa is providing an dillinger brimmed the screaming. >> the next question i may have to pass around so we will see.

what safeguards are being used to ensure background data or data base information of an individual's, such as passengers will not be able to be exported? and here it says the same question pertains to the known crewmember program. so the question is about the safeguarding of the personal and duration -- information to the estimate i will address on the end of that. from the point we are not interested in naturally obtaining the information and to a government database. we are interested in the working with the office of alpa and the working in nta for example of freedom flyers or the trust trial programs that exist right now. we are not interested in pulling out that information we are simply interested in pending against it to make a judgment that is if this person is part of this program, at least an initial iteration then we can get determination basically by mary, either they are in or out,

and so on the bar code is the fact that that person is a known and trusted traveler. as the program ensures and we are able to use more intelligence information and technology to refine and great believe could get a greater granularity again, is something we don't want to be the holders of that information, which could be exploded in some other way, somebody hacking into the government systems or anything like that. so the focus is on simply accessing the passenger who has made a reservation. are they part of this known trusted traveler said, and if so, then there is a likelihood that they would receive the screening. islamic and we are confident in the database of the known crewmember accessing in the security. >> next question also an audience question. actually let me change that.

i'm going to go to one of the ones i had a ahead of time. in regard as a partnership it between the fbi and the private sector and association of business, academic institutions, state and local law enforcement agencies and other participants dedicated to sharing information, and intelligence to prevent hostile acts against the u.s. aviation infrastructure. to the panel, now that you have given us some feedback, can you give us a little bit more of an assessment of how well the current system of sharing information and intelligence is actually working? >> i can start with my fbi background started in 1995, and the clinton office in the fbi in terms of the public and private partnership where companies, not just aviation sector but across the board can share information and a trusted client type of setting online where if for example there had been a cyberattack on xyz company, they

could share what the method of attack was if there is an attribution for where the attack came from and things like that. without identifying who xyz company is. others can learn from that and take precautionary steps. so that's the model this question is referring to with regard to it worked very well from my perspective and when i get the feedback i think there are many models like that in the public and private realm, and the question becomes from the tsa perspective is their information that can be used collaborative flee that helps to inform the decisions as to the best possible securities provided the most efficiently to come back to. >> sharing of intelligence information is something that is improved significantly over the

years, and tsa sponsors, as nick mentioned, industry representatives to get approved for secret clearances and then provides classified briefings to those individuals. one of the new initiatives is to have what is called one of the officers are local and regional in nature and can provide that connectivity with the airline to increase the information in both directions, which is a significant enhancement. >> thank you. >> 9/11 caused a total shutdown of the u.s. aviation system, and the question is how much progress has been made in defining a paradise plan to control our airspace if we witness significant attacks, and

if all along on this question is the are the agency spurring with other agencies within the government security world for a harmonized solution. let me start off with dan first. >> there's been a number of exercises that has been conducted at the senior levels within the government. some that have involved industry representatives to address this very topic. and, i think that there has been a lot of progress made, and you know, depending on the scenario, that is going to drive what is a localized shut down or broad shutdown. >> i think it is pretty well known there has been good progress made, and also i think there's a lot of things that are going on that are not public and

have to remain on public. depending on what the threat is. >> also there has been significant progress since 9/11. i think the 9/11 commission referred to the act as being imagination by the government to anticipate that and given the lessons learned from that there has been a huge investment made in the resiliency issue this frankly goes to by the department of homeland security was related to do everything possible with partners throughout the intelligence community and the private sector to prevent another terrorist attack but in the east and that something bad happens a terrorist attack or natural disaster to ensure their resiliency of the industry and the american people, the livelihood, the survival of people who have been affected by that attack or by that national disaster. tsa's reason for existence is to make sure that another attack

does not happen in the even something does happen, we have a very robust plan through the interagency to address that resiliency issue. >> next question. and it is a two-part question again from the audience. john and jane doe walk into, i'm not going to put a brand out, but the book and a cargo shipping office. the shipping cost is shortly afterwards. the package is airborne. how does the flight crew be assured that there's no explosives on board the aircraft, and is there a mold for a trusted shipper program to act in the same manner as a known crewmember program? >> i will take the first part of that. so, 100% of the high risk cargo, we don't define that publicly for obvious reasons we don't want to provide a road map for

the terrorists, but 100% of the high risk cargo coming into the country from foreign destinations on a departure is screened. now, there are various methods of screening as we all know, but that's the starting point. the whole focus of a known shipper, known shipment program and national cargo security programs that we are working with other countries to recognize our key steps in implementing that along with the advanced cargo information that the cbp under the national targeting center utilizes the reason there are a number of avenues. the reassurance that the pilot and the flight crew, anybody on that flight has is that there are robust procedures in place now, but recognizing that just as we saw with the cargo plot, we were facing a determined enemy who was always looking for scenes that they could get in

between, and just because it is a cargo bomb i would not anticipate it necessarily coming out of yemen next time i would anticipate that they would try to get it to a low risk area that would be seen as a good opportunity to inject in the global supply chain. >> thank you. >> the only thing i would add is we focus a lot on how risk mitigation to the space management. now cargo, and the tsa, through its coordination with the air carriers and its coordination with and training for pilots, that coordination comes into play because our operations are around the globe. not only do passenger flights originate in the u.s., a lot of the flights originating overseas where the air carrier has a

country, a responsibility for certain security, but the air carrier will have an increased responsibility for the security, and in some places, the pilots' responsibility is increased, and that's why it's key that we are coordinating and intelligence is being gathered. it's being communicated. we have training programs and we ensure that there is vigilant crews and company personnel on the ground in those locations. >> great. >> i think this is part and parcel of everything we've been talking about to become increased use of intelligence, data, data sharing, partnership to try to figure out a problem, how to solve the problem to the best degree possible. and there's been a lot of work that has gone on between tsa, dhs, the industry, pilots, all parties involved on the cargo issue. >> earlier this year, the

department of homeland security constituted working groups and charged with government and industry representatives with looking at different aspects of the cargo system with the specific task to identify recommendations in these various areas. those recommendations came back and not surprisingly, one was for and in support of the development of a trusted shipper program. currently tsa, customs and border protection, the department and industry are working together to really flesh that out, and there are some targeting initiatives that are under way in support of that right now. >> thank you. >> i tell you what i'm going to do one more question before i thank the panel. and the question is also from the audience. what is being asked is perhaps we could get an update on the status of the secure flight system as well as any other initiative out there that we haven't specifically addressed in this panel.

secure flight is up since the last fall when we can fairly operational so all individuals fleeing either in or through the u.s. over flight issues are vetted through the secure flights and we know that whether they are on a terrorist watch list the they are a no-fly zone if they are selectees and every morning as i mentioned start with intelligence briefing we would have a look ahead for all those passengers we are wanting to fly or scheduled to fly so we can actually make decisions for external affairs to on a flight and we don't of the air marshal coverage on we can adjust the schedules to make sure we do have the coverage on that flight. so that is another example of intelligence being used and what we found is that even the was working somewhat prior to tsa

taking over we did see an increase in the number of the no-fly zone that has been identified particularly from the certain airlines that were not identified for whatever reason. so it just gets back to the whole intelligence cycle where we are then able to take that information, and flexible, notify my former colleagues at the fbi that while those individuals are traveling, the fbi may have been under investigation but you may not know they are traveling and so we have had several examples where we share that information to inform the ongoing investigation so it is part of that intelligence cycles of the secure flight is a significant advance in terms of intelligence and technology. ski >> i'm just going to wrap things up. just a couple parting comments from myself. regardless of your piatt, a crew member, mechanic, if you were a consumer walking to their

friend, at one point we are all consumers, passengers from coming to air force and leaving airports, and so, this stuff is just incredibly important for us to discuss, and i think it's been an incredible privilege, and i hope he would agree that we have the leadership here, the exchange, the folks who really are at the tip of this year sharing these insights and answering your questions, and as i said it has been a privilege to stand with this group of here and i hope you would agree with me. on behalf of the airline pilots association, i would like to express my sincere thanks for your part of this panel today and i hope that you enjoy the rest of the event. thank you. [applause]

>> [inaudible conversations] >> thank you, sean and to the administrator pistole, to discuss this topic it's time for another break and we will be having 30 minutes so you should have ample time to visit the exhibits. the next session starts and half an hour at 3:city. see you then. in all conversations [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations]

now a discussion on the potential threats from an electromagnetic pulse emp which is capable of disabling the progress by detonating a nuclear bomb at a high altitude or from an unusually powerful solar activity. this is hosted by the heritage foundation. it is one hour and 35 months. >> good morning. thank you all for joining us here at the heritage foundation. as the director of lectures and seminars it is my privilege to welcome you to the louis lerman auditorium and of course those of us to join us on the heritage website. we would ask of everyone here in house to make that last courtesy check that your cellphone have been turned off as we prepare to begin the program. we of course will post this on the web site within 24 hours for

everyone's future reference as well. our internet viewers are always free to e-mail with questions during the program or comet at any time simply addressing those to speaker@heritage.org. he serves as director of the douglass and server ellison center for foreign policy studies and is the deputy director of our kathryn and shelby cullom davis institute for international studies. he's a member of the national academies more on army science and technology and the department of the army historical advisory committee as well as being a senior fellow with the george washington university homeland security policy institute. she has lectured and then a professor of several university campuses, his army career, he was a lieutenant colonel serving in europe, curry and the united states, and was leading executive editor of the joint force quarterly. he's offered back several books including the one that he co-authored for us here at the heritage, winning the long war, lessons from the cold war for

defeating terrorism and preserving freedom. please try me in welcoming my colleague, jim? [applause] >> in the course of action i'm going to introduce congressman berman, who believed it is a few words and question-and-answer. we will do that about half an hour and then but i will do is introduce the panel, and then the panel will speak to each of the panelists will speak about ten minutes and then we will do a question-and-answer and the congressman is going to graciously agreed to attend status long as we can and participate in the q&a as well and we will wrap up in about an hour and a half. we always start lead at heritage but we end on time. [laughter] so come and so i will be recognizing questioners, so if you have a question either for the congressman or for the panel if you would raise your hand and wait for the microphone to come around, and if you would wait for the hikers and state your name and affiliation and then ask your question would be terrific. some think you all for coming.

i have the honor of introducing the congressman today. releasing a paper today before the lights about come a survey of the emp preparedness reveals a significant shortfall. the congressman's article was instrumental in the stalls in a national commission which issued two very important reports on the emp danger, and what we did is conducted a survey of what efforts the federal government and the congress have made in implementing the findings of the report. i believe it is certainly the most comprehensive and certainly the first survey that has been done evaluating what our government has done in response to this in the last few years and i think it's very enlightening and an important reading, and it's all today, and for those of you that interested you have a copy online you can find it on our website at seattle. she is the definition of citizen

legislator, chairman of the tactical air and land committee and one of the few actual scientists in the house of representatives. he worked more than 20 years as a scientist and engineer the research and different programs for the military and nasa. he has an undergraduate degree from maryland and studied autonomy, physiology and cellucci and mur earned his master's degree in to see ology and talk on the maryland faculty we're here in a ph.d. in physiology. so he's a scientist, he is a scholar, he is one of our nation's most respected legislators, and a champion for taking on tough issues regardless of how popular they are or the politics of them. if it is important for the security of this nation than he cares of them and speaks for them, so i couldn't be more honored to start with him. please join me in welcoming the

congressman. [applause] >> thank you very much. i think that we are nine members of congress and three russians and a personal representative slobodan milosevic, we were sitting in a hotel room in vienna austria in 99. from the kosovo conflict just as jackson was in belgrade the secretary of state was aghast when there was a photograph of jesse jackson standing in a circle holding hands with slobodan milosevic in prayer. we were there developing a framework agreement, which the g8 of the week later to end the kosovo conflict.

the senior russian there was vladimir who was the ambassador here at the end of bush and the beginning of clinton, the end of boesh i and beginning of clinton, and he was at that time the chair of the international relations committee, and she was very angry. he sat with his arms folded over looking at the ceiling for today's, and he said you spit on us, now why should we help you? the only country that had the real confidence of yugoslavia was russia, and what we told them was the soviet union had

collapsed and the big guys will take care of this now, thank you. and that was his reference to use it on us now why should we help you because we had come to the russians to help negotiate a settlement to the kosovo conflict. finally after two days, vladimir spoke up and said if we really wanted to hurt you with no fear of retaliation we would launch an slbm, shut down your grid commodore communications and the grid for six months or so. as a former ranking communist was there, alexandre, a tall handsome blond russian command he smiled and said if no one within won't do it we have some spares. i think at that time they had something like 10,000 stairs. what was he talking about?

by the way curt was there and spoke russian. he said did you hear what he said? of course i heard it but i didn't understand it unless it was translated. >> what was he talking about? something that would shut down our who were critical of our communications for six months or so and no fear of retaliation slbm is launched from the sea, who would know where it came from if it was launched from the sea? he was talking of course about emp, electromagnetic pulse. it is an inevitable accompaniment of any nuclear detonation above the atmosphere, any nuclear weapon doubled produce a emp pulse. our only experience was in 62 johnston island. hawaii, 800 miles away. not much microelectronics back

then in 62. hawaii, 800 miles away had some pretty serious consequences of this of the atmosphere detonation there was a lot more experience than we realized which it. we had a number of simulations but it's very difficult to simulate the longline effects. what is this electronic pulse? it has three phases. the first one is different than anything that we have experienced. it goes through your surge protector and nanosecond's and it is through the surge protector before the surge protector sees it and then there is a two, three and the three is something that we have very little experience with. it's very long wavelengths that will couple with wires buried under the ground. it lasts for several minutes.

i came into my office a couple of years ago i guess now it was and it was a big signal fall on my desk and have a hand written note. dr. lowery was lying in his hospital room recovering from a heart operation and was surfing the television and happened to be on c-span and i was doing about one of a half-dozen presentations on the house on emp, and she turned in at the beginning of that hour and stayed with me during the whole hour he was retired and was a ph.d. in electrical engineering and he really got fascinated by emp and he did a lot of work and he wrote a novel. the legacy was the title of unlawful. i don't know how many others have read the book.

new gingrich came by my office a couple of years before that, and i don't read novels, so i wouldn't know him, but bill was with him and apparently as a very well-known novelist bill had written a story about a emp attached we would like them to

be knowledgeable about emp is. my wife listens to my presentations at emp and said why would you want to talk about that because all you are doing is giving our potential enemies some ideas about our vulnerability because emp is certainly the most tv to asymmetric warfare that you can imagine, and i told her not one in 50 americans may know about emp but 1% of our potential enemies know about emp commit to convince the audience is that true, i have a charge which i use and it's in russian and it shows a nuclear detonation in the emp and power lines sparking and everything going out. so obviously, they know about

it. it is in all of the open literature in any of our potential enemies. it is in all of the war games. it's the very early evin and all of the of war games because it is so asymmetrical. i guess it has been a couple of years or so ago now that dr. mcclellan was in my office. he's the head of the office of reliability in ferc. and he said when we have the next carrington yvette -- carrington event is a super solar storm -- the last one occurred in 1859. there was not much electronics of any kind then. this was a really big solar storm to a british scientist by the name of dr. carrington described the event so it is known by his name. it's not -- if and when there is

another carrington event and dr. mcclellan said the group would come down and we would destroy or damage 300 of the transformers. we don't make them. you order them and they will make them for you and it takes about a year or year and a half and said the grid would be down for years for a major solar storm. that is not an if, that is a win because there will be another major solar storm. the next cycle was, 12 and 13, starting next year there's going to be another solar maximum, so we will see what happens. there is a general understanding that if it is too good to be true that may not be true probably not and it seems to that to be true, so therefore it

is relegated to the fringes and why would we want to talk about that because it is so improbable we had this to get there by using the comments of vladimir if we really wanted to hurt you with no possibility of any revenge so you wouldn't know who did it we would launch an slbm. it doesn't take a state actor to do this. it could be a non-state actor. a single weapon detonated a 300 miles high over iowa or nebraska with a blanket our whole country. the russian generals told the commission that of the soviets had developed and they had enhanced weapons that produced 200 kilowatts per meter. that's 100 per meter the margins of the country, northwest

washington and miami. we have never made or tested anything anywhere near 100 kilovolts per meter. it takes all of our microelectronics. all of the units that control the distribution of power. i don't know how if you have been to a manufacturing plant where they manufacture these microelectronics i was kind of fascinated when i visited there it was mostly women doing the work by the way and men and women are different on the military as a little trouble understanding that sometimes but they are different and the women are superior in some things and manufacturing microelectronics they must be because they are almost all when men. but i looked on and they have a steel include on and it's tied to the floor and the reason is these microelectronics are so sensitive that the static

electricity that you did what when you moved your clothing produces enough electricity that you can damage these electronics we hard and made it said it can bounce around and drop yourself a bit and so forth, but they are exquisitely sensitive to these waves to i don't know how i first heard about that emp, but when i became aware of it there was such a phenomenon i called my friend, tom clancy, who has done a couple of fund-raisers and tomei new degree of research and had a scenario in one of his books and so i asked if he would talk to me about the emp and he said if you read my book you know that i know about that and this did not refer you to the smartest man hired by the u.s. government. that is a pretty big order that we hire a lot of people. and from his perspective, this

modest and hundred by the u.s. government was dr. law will would. and so i got his cellphone and i paged him and i thought that he was in california for the satellite and down it came down the page in washington, d.c. so within an hour she was sitting in my office and his assessment of the problem that we face in preparing against the emp is that it's just too hard, where we are not going to worry about that. scarlett o'hara, we will worry about that tomorrow. and that is where we generally are. we just passed the bill. we have a good bill come out of the house, and it had hardening of the grid against a cyber and

that could bring down the grid, three things could come a cyberattack with cascading affects the transformers could bring down the grid. the chair intends to leave to care in geneva and will bring on the grid and a and emp can bring down bugger it. -- down the grid. i mention it doesn't need to be a state actor to a transformer a scud launcher which you can buy for $100,000 in the open market and any nuclear weapon. it's what about 180 miles? that's not high enough or it can go far enough to shut down the whole country but it certainly could take out all of new england, couldn't it? that would be katrina, what, ten times over at least ten times over. by the way, both of these novels, and i would recommend that you get them and read them,

one second after and the legacy was sa18, the big soviet missile that had ten warheads on it and in the story one of those disappears when in they are moving them from ukraine to russia after the soviet union collapsed, and three of those are used in this attack and they are launched in the caribbean and where are they going to land? one as land and out a plan to get one in the pacific and suffered one as landing in northern canada. that apogee they are right across the united states. this is an emp attack. i hope that the story that the doctor tells in of legacy is not a screen to happen because it is just the other side of all full. it is one second after. but all of this can be prevented. none of this has to happen.

all we have to do is use a technology that is readily available to us through the grid. and to prepare for this what i think is inevitable one of these three things will happen, there will be a cyberattack. there will be a caring and the event, there will be an emp, nuclear emp, one of those and the of the same effect, they bring down the grade. just think about your life. if you do not have electricity, if there would be no electricity for the next year, but will you do? by the way if it is a emp attack, your car is full of computers and they will probably be fried. but we can prepare so you might do without your cards going to be tough to do without the grant, isn't it? the house passed a good bill that has emp in it and when i got to the senate the senate decided it would be too expensive to - emp, so they took

it out. if in this life as you know it, it can't be too expensive to hard and to avoid coming khanna? i just a mine in trouble understanding that logic. and what -- it would end life as you know it. i know there are many out there who have never heard about emp and what is this stuff, and are you really being a radical and are you a member of the lunatic fringe? i would assure you that this is very high real. it can happen and we need to prepare so that when it does happen we will not be devastated by it. i am very pleased to be here. thank you for your attention. [applause] >> we are going to take a few minutes for questions from the congressman commesso, peter? refer the microphone. okay. >> one of the prospects of the

shield act passing the house, and do you know it's in the bill to protect the grid what are the prospects of getting that through the house and what recommendations do you have for us to work in the senate? >> just, you know, call your congressman, call your senator, urged them to get on the bill. i hope that we can get through the house. week of course this is the only problem we face, but when kuran deficit is a half trillion dollars more than all of the money that you vote to spend it is easy to see how we are focused on our deficit and what we are going to do about it. and by the way, nothing we have yet proposed even comes close to solving the problem. the budget doesn't balance for 25 years. and then only balances -- and during that time, our debt about doubles. and only balances if you make unrealistic assumptions about economic growth with of the world being against the ceiling of 84 million barrels of oil now for five years. look at the iea projections for

the future. i love challenges, and accelerated by this because this is a huge, huge challenge, preparing for emp is a big challenge but there are others that are in equally big challenge. we need to get that bill out and we need to -- we are not going to have a lot of money, you know? first things first. making sure that you have electricity has to be first because you think about your life, if you don't have electricity, things just stop, don't they? and so this has to be -- i think that it should be our highest priority. they won't pay for much of the house to be money for this. >> general, is the director of the command and control during a the sdi formation. many stories about what we can afford and what we can't afford, but we had a very limited amount

for the hardened communications, and there were big gaps between the hardened communications which was the command and control for the nuclear forces and the tactical forces. so, it's a matter of expense, where you go with hardening. my two predecessors, one was a nuclear physicist and he had put into the program everything on the nuclear warning. the one that followed him as a trained as an astronaut, and i came in as assistant engineer, so where we have a fallback position emergency that will be tried we have many of those particular things and it's been written about by clancy and every novelist going, scared the hell out of everybody. here it comes. but i faced this for three years in the pentagon and a trip he

was talking about hair trigger this and that but i believe you when you say at this guy said we meant to hurt you we could have and as far as i am concerned that you have any fallback positions that might fall within the affordable area of? >> the commission had some great recommendations and isn't all that costly to harden the grid. i've been to the cheyenne mountain were, and it's more a matter of attention as it is cost to harden and if you're hardening as you build the system by the way, it costs no more than five to 10% or sometimes 2% more. he tried to harden it after it is built it becomes enormously expensive. i don't know whether it is true or not i'm told that hardening airports against emp cost as much as the air force one. i don't know if it is true or not but it's very expensive to try to protect.

if you design at we've been waiting the heartening for the military for the weapons platforms. ever since the founding of the clinton years we've been waiting that and my question is then the only time we are ever going to need this you don't need it in iraq and afghanistan and it's nice and you went a little quicker but you don't need it, the only time you are really going to need this equipment is when it is near appeared and one of the first things you will do as a robust this to 90 feet to deny all of the equipment which today is essentially all of our equipment we would have great difficulty fighting after the emp but it's a matter of attention. it's so easy to violate this. one little antenna outside and it just spreads everywhere as a cancer that's inside. it's not so much a cost after you hard in the system but it's the vigilance to make sure you retain the hardening.

estimate about what you are aware but today's national emp awareness day. it is so because we have declared it. [laughter] we actually started this a couple years ago and wouldn't it be great if the congress celebrated the national emp awareness day by pretending there was a emp attack and they could turn off their blackberrys and show off the lights and the air conditioning, plus the cafeteria and just see what it's like for a day and maybe they would appreciate it. of course congress couldn't do anything for a day maybe we would be better off. we did a couple years and quite honestly nobody paid attention, so the problem is actually the congress paying attention, so we moved the national awareness day and we can do that because we declared it to begin with. to august 15th, and august 15th, 2003, was the second largest blackout in human history. it was 55 million people on the east coast of the united states and canada lost power for 24

hours. so i would ask the american people what do they think it would be like if they have to live like that for a year or two and the congressman bartlett said by some of the estimates it is pretty horrific. it's one of the truly generous sides you can't see and sustained 300 or 400 million. when the carrington affect occurred we all had horses and such will gardens, and so august 15th is national emp awareness a so when they say why aren't people paying attention to this issue there's three things you do understand. you have to understand the science to understand the policy and understand the program and i naturally couldn't think of three better musketeers to do that than the panel had assembled today so i'm going to do is introduce them very quickly. and then we are just going to go down the road here and ask them each to make about ten minutes worth of remarks and then we would just like to open it up to the floor and to get as much question and answer as we can in the time we have allotted.

very quickly and abbreviated introductions dr. peter is the president of impact, which is a citizens' group dedicated to educating the public on the threat of nuclear and natural emp affects and to advance the policy and programs to address them to reduce also the director of the united states nuclear strategy forum, which is an advisory body for the congress on policies to counter weapons of mass destruction. ..

verbivore asian that the secret of the weapon might have leaked to north korea and they protected at that time within a few years after meeting with the commission within a few years north korea might be capable of building such weapons and the theory that is complex and the technology is not and the north koreans can build the sand in a couple of years after that within a few weeks after being told by that 2006 the north koreans conducted the first nuclear test in a widely

declared a failure because it had a very low yield, but the seismic signals looked so much like the super, very well yielded that it puts of the seismic signals which would be the gamma rays coming out. there are 2,009 tests with the same, the north koreans declared this to be a success, and presumably is a success because the defense intelligence agency testified to the senate last month that north korea is knocking warheads on missiles, nuclear warheads on missiles why would they put a field within that needs further development of missiles. so whenever that thing is, it apparently works. so the super and the nuclear weapons conventional design and then of course there's mother nature that can cause a emp even to buy a geomagnetic storm which are commonplace. they happen every year. 1989 there was a commonplace geomagnetic storm that caused a

blackout in the province of quebec, there's this thing we are concerned about that the commission warned about as did the national academy of science and subsequently called a great jeal mattocks form which is a once in a century phenomenon, the last storm was 89. we now lease things happened, they are inevitable and when they do happen they will collapse. power grids across the entire planet not just in the country. and we are very concerned about what will happen during the solar maximum which begins in december, 2012 and passes through 2013. and because we are completely unprotected and getting increased incidence of solar flares and to end of the solar maximum this basically is a roulette game and a lot of scientists are concerned the possibility of the great geomagnetic storm will increase during the solar maximum which happens every 11 years and last, which we haven't mentioned, is there are the mononuclear emp weapons. these are not sufficiently

powerful to take out the whole country. but, you know, you could, but they are available to anybody. you know, a mad man or a criminal can purchase and in industrial emp signal which can be used as a weapon and in fact there is one advertised that usually show in my briefing that is called a emp suitcase. it is used just by one person, puts out a very high localized, localized emp field but if you know what you're doing good for this in the trunk of a car, parked near a transformer, you know, these things are not protected. you've probably seen them when you drive down the highway there are chain-link fences near the highway and there are large devices those are basically what powers the cities. you know, these transformers are located and or not guarded, only protected by a chain-link fence. if somebody put one of these emp simulators in the trunk of a car and no the woodring building the park near you could black out a city so those are the threats. jerry real threats.

it doesn't cost a lot. the emp commission came up with recommendations, you know, we have known for 50 years the technology we don't need new technology. and to protect -- to protect at minimum a minimum of which you to protect the 300 transformers' associated with the range of the metropolitan areas. you know, if we did that it would -- we could do that for 100 to $200 million, and since the commission estimated that in the absence of the emp protection given the current status on preparedness, a year after an emp event, two-thirds of the american population will die from starvation, disease, societal breakdown. at least two-thirds. the commission is criticized for actually underestimating the threat by fritz who used to be the chair of the council who says some good arguments as to why more people would die like that because americans are not

come and the we just degeneration i know my parents, for example, having lived through the great depression of world war ii they didn't trust the system through a prepared -- it never heard of emp but they were never prepared for anything. my mother was constantly canning said, we had a few years' worth of food. my father knew how to hunt and fish, most americans don't know how to do that anymore he and the commission assumption is that most people did. so, if you subtract those skills, you know, you probably would end up with a higher casualty. 100 to 200 million for every life that would be saved is the bear minimum. that wouldn't solve the whole problem but it gives us a fighting chance to save those two-thirds of the american population. that is the bear minimum that should be done. it's estimated that for an increase of 60 cents in the bill of every ratepayer in the united states for a period of three years, 60 cents per year for

three years for each ratepayer we could protect the whole grid robustly. to protect all the critical infrastructure is the commission came up with ten to 20 billion over three or five-year period. so that is for the cost and one would argue as mr. bartlett said there are things you must afford that one must afford and must do something about. and i guess i would like to wrap up my remarks with this observation, and we appear to be now in a national security free-fall looking at the large picture where the american people have been demoralized by the foreign war that don't seem to have much in relationship to their own security. and the defense department budget is being looked at, you know, as something that is probably going to be deeply cut because the financial problems that we have. and i am hoping that people --

that the dod and the dhs look to this threat which the congress has been trying to get them to pay attention to for years now. something not just that the need to do, but they will see that it's in their bureaucratic interest in this political environment to do it. we need to make -- we need to do things with the defense dollars that make sense to the average american, and i mean -- and to those americans who hold the independence tea party people who have a libertarian attitude, many of them, you know, we are moving towards a period politically where the force between isolationism, fortress america, the attitude is probably more potent than it has ever been since before world war ii where people don't want the support for a military that is focused on fighting for an war, the war overseas to read how was that related to their personal security? we obviously need to do that. but i -- one of the things we

can do is buy preparing for an emp at the department of defense and homeland security, you know, by which can involved and in utilizing many military bases to work cooperatively for example with the local governments and state governments trained to exercise with them so that instead of these military bases and the investment and the department of defense as being seen to support the overseas contingencies that include not just the foreign war i would add, but that enable us to give better homeland security capabilities, indonesia and japan. the department of defense is always the first on the spot and does a great job there but the next time you look at for example of a tornado that went for tulsa, it struck me that there was not one uniformed person there. and there are lawyers who argue there's constitutional reasons for that. i think the average american will understand why the current policy gives high priority to the security of indonesians' and

a japanese when it comes to americans and not for americans, so i think we need to reinvent ourselves in a way that makes the dod much more relevant to the lives of the americans and emp is something that we must do and it can be the answer in a way that even the libertarians, and say we need to do that and it will preserve the military capabilities that america's number four has relied upon to maintain peace in the world for peace through a policy which unfortunately is of such a risk right now because of the politics. >> thanks. it's a pleasure to be with people who have been aware of the emp for a very long time, and as much as anybody in the nation i think to try to raise levels consciousness and the rest of us about this particular

threat and as jim mentioned at the center for the city policy which i run, we worry about it lot of threats and our focus on the dangers of fishery a law, we are worrying about what china is up to, the russians. we are concerned about threats for our sovereignty including what is as the obama administration apparently has a mind of testing of the old law we get to see a tree one more time and trying to jam it through the senate as they do the s.t.a.r.t. treaty. bar none, even as those curious problems are real and are being exacerbated by some of the things peter just talked about in terms of both the actual effect on our defensive capabilities and the perceived weakness in the resolution that

will be seen by others associated with those cuts. the thing i worry the most about is a parallel to this country to its people, to its way of life, to its system of government is that associated with an electromagnetic pulse with our electrical grid and all of the related infrastructures. a problem that has been mentioned can be accomplished in a couple of different ways. the department of homeland security is fond of calling these things man caused disasters. well, this would be over man caused a disaster. but has it been said we are looking at this train hurtling

down the track whether the north koreans actually had failed with their chests or not and therefore, we are unable to do what they're in the position to do and for the business of doing which is to sell a super emp weapon to somebody else. and as the congressman bartlett and i, i just cannot see how appreciative i am for your work on this space. but as you have pointed out both here and elsewhere, there are lots of missiles in the world today. in fact one of peter's slides briefing that he give some there are even cruise missiles that might be of value in this area of an optimized attack, but the russians are now producing

missiles concealed and containers, cruise missiles it is entirely possible that would be the launch the cover of choice for the ballistic missile for example. the problem is you put one of those things on a ship, you bring it close to the short, you don't need an intercontinental range missile to achieve the kind of effects that we are talking out here. so that is decidedly in prospect even if it is not, even if the north koreans, the russians, the chinese and others are in tenterhook on exploiting the vulnerability we all know we have, we know mother nature is going to do a emp laid down in

due course. peter mentioned these things happen every hundred years. .. >> and congressman bartlett not only got, initiated once but had to keep going, repeatedly, despite efforts from several quarters to shut it down. but the chairman, bill graham,

one of the eminent nuclear physicist in our country today actually estimates, i believe in congressional testimony, that nine out of 10 of us will be dead within a year of the emp effect. so it is real. it's a grave danger. and we know that it's coming. and despite roscoe bartlett warnings, and others like him, despite the commission's reports, despite confirmation by other distinguished scientific and other bodies, and despite even nasa and noaa confirmed that is possible assist 2012 or 2013 we're going to get some of those geomagnetic storms, intense, devastating geomagnetic storms. we are still not doing anything

to fix this problem. what do we do about it? well, the first thing is to stop denying that it's a problem. what we are here, i hope will contribute to, is a raising of awareness that causes people across this country to insist that their elected representatives give this the kind of priority that congressman bartlett and others have rightly said it needs. obviously, enacting a very modest piece of legislation, the s.h.i.e.l.d. act, focus principally on these key transformers. it's the bare minimum that we can do. now, peter estimates the cost of trying to harden these transformers out about

$250 million. we spend more than that on coffee for the united states government personnel. and if we fail to make that investment, the costs not only in human lives but in terms of every other aspect of this country are incalculable. truly incalculable. the commission use the term catastrophic. and i think, roscoe, you mentioned katrina. think about that. katrina was a trivial example of what could happen, if not coast-to-coast, certainly over large parts of the country, depending on how this plays out. so enacting the s.h.i.e.l.d. act and making, as i think the act would help too, it a priority for industry, not just for the government, to address this

vulnerability is critical. i've talked to people in the electrical industry, and most of them don't know what you're talking about. at least on the management side. what they know is this is not going to show up well on their quarterly reports to their stockholders. and unless somebody says, well, the stockholders might not survive if you don't do something about this, in conjunction with this being given the sort of priority that it requires from the government, made we can then enlist their help. they do have a vested interest, after all. we've got to provide the resources for this. it's been said repeatedly now, but i second it, what higher priority is there than in showing fundamentally the survival of our country? and again, to repeat, you cannot

sustain the population of a 21st century superpower with the agricultural capacity this country has without electricity. not only to grow the foods and harvest it, but to distribute it and to do all the other things that we require electricity to do, from communications to finance, to water and sanitation, health care, to transportation. you don't have any of those in those places where most people live without electricity. and, unfortunately, every bad guy on the planet knows that. and some have said, well, we just do it back to them. well, in north korea that

probably isn't a deterrent. because most of the people in north korea don't have food as it is. let alone this kind of infrastructure. i want to just emphasize two of the things that were said that might not get sufficient attention here, but i think they are really critically important. one is, for years now we have both waved the requirement for hardening of our militaries capabilities to ensure that their systems will function in an ambient environment. that's been compounded i believe, maybe the waivers have implied implicitly but endlessly by this, in order to save money the military has increasingly relied him as congressman bartlett nose with his responsibility, on commercial off-the-shelf technology, c.o.t.s. technology.

virtually none of which has been hardened against emp. for the same reason that the electrical industry is not concerned about this. why? why add the additional cost? even if the additional cost, as you said, roscoe, is trivial when you're building it into begin with, but it is hugely expensive now to fix if we built an entire military for two decades basically without attention to this problem. and related point, there's much talk now about whether it's part of the stimulus bill or otherwise, building a smart gr grid. nothing could be stupider than building a smart grid that isn't smart enough to deal with this problem. and doing it, doing it from the

beginning, as has been said, will make it both possible, and certainly vastly less expensive than trying to contend with building it in later on. so i just want to conclude by thanking heritage for, as always, using its bully pulpit to good effect. there are a couple of other days that i would like you to declare while you're at it, but i'm certainly glad -- [laughter] >> one day out of time. [applause] >> drew. >> thank you. i served as an intelligence officer in the air force. i work in plans and programs stratcom. i'm very for money with the emp threat another national security threats. i've written just like joint force quarterly but i find when you're writing and your preaching to the choir, that's why wrote yet another novel

about emp, and other threats called roe on nation. i did that because i wanted to make people aware of the threats, trying to do here today and also get out that the government is not protecting you against these threats and you need to be prepared not just for devastating attacks but for the collapse of our society. so my book pro high nation takes place three years after this collapse caused by e&p and by a worker or viral pandemic. and for those of you are not for my with of the rings, the roll-on is a horse faced nation. horses will be our primary source of horsepower. the emp attack in my book is launched an airliner that takes to scud missiles in the air and watches them over the trendy, one to the east, went to the west, effectively covering the united states. as the card is reported want to get the umpire to launch from aircraft helps you do that. i just read last week in defense news that the israelis are now planning to start launching satellites and 747s over the indian ocean. again, emp and all these

measures were talking about, these are not new threats. they are all technologies, very feasible. so it ain't be launched resilient airline would be hard to detect may be impossible to stop and difficult to trade who launched it is the intelligence community figures out this came from china or north korea or wherever, high noon, some civilian airliner. we would be so weakened by an effective emp attack, i'm actually be a good position to retaliate. i'm surprise when i read studies that everyone seems to assume we're trying to stop nuclear proliferation doby note advances in nuclear technology. using technology that comes basically from world war ii era. we should not assume that advances in technology won't lead to new methods to create nuclear weapons grade material. so projections of how me nations will become nuclear i think are very, very far off because the are going to be new technology enabling more people to develop nuclear weapons material and create weapons. it does not take very much.

so the proposal to work for a complete u.s. nuclear disarmament i think is a very bad and very dangerous idea. while this is an emp panel i like to point out what may be an even more devastating threat is bioengineered viral pandemics. that's what happens in my book as well as the emp attack. iran is very likely using the same manipulation in bioengineering technology that we're using to develop new medicines to bioengineered deadly viruses. in the past we assume bioweapons would not be used because a nation like rush was going to be deterred from using them because they would be worried about the virus spreading back to russia and hurting them as well. but if you're developing and bioengineering viruses you have the ability to develop not just a new virus but a vaccine for the virus that only you have. so at that point if iran does something like that they've got the ideal weapon to wipe out the

united states and israel edges give the vaccine to those they care about. to retaliate against or preempt a bioweapons attack we must maintain a very capable nuclear force. ideally with a strategic policy and administration that will clearly use nuclear weapons to punish, distrust and deter such attacks. unfortunately, we have no such policy or result in the current administration, the latest nuclear posture review lead to grab some of the worst decisions this administration has made. a declaration that you can attack the nuclear -- the united states with biological weapons and we promise not to reply with nuclear weapons attack on you. we have to look at the nuclear posture instead of -- that would change in this latest review. when you consider the threat of e&p and viruses and policies that proclaimed that the u.s. will not use nuclear weapons against our enemies, you realize the securities threat we face are probably much worse now than he worked during the cold war. our federal government seems to be too busy and and with social

programs to address these problems. the heritage foundation and other conservative libertarian groups have argued about these unconstitutional programs that we can our economy and distract the federal government from its primary job of national securi security. but, unfortunately, continues. so i wrote "rohan nation" part as an "atlas shrugged"-like call to stop these unconstitutional federal social programs that pull directly and indirectly weaken our national security both by taking funds from defense, from some e&p preparation and recovery needs, and also shifting the focus of the national government from socialism and economic political pro grams back to its overriding main mission which is simply national security. americans need to prepare themselves to deal with the consequences of e&p, nuclear war and viral pandemics. you should not put faith in the ability of the federal government to protect you against these threats. i put an arbitrary date in the book of 2020 for the collapse of

the disaster described that would take place in time. it gets worse every year. worse every year because of every lives on electronics and computer chips that increases every year. most of these chips are not made in the united states. moser made in china, taiwan and korea, so good luck getting replacement post-emp event. it gets worse because there are more people to the, fewer farmers and more dependence. and it's also worse every year because our military with his tremendous conventional superiority is dependent on high-tech weapons and computer chips. that's as clear as the congressmen and others pointed out. it is a clear obvious achilles' heel for our military. if you want to defeat the united states military, you start to attack with a high altitude emp attack and any fool can figure that out. someone smart and ruthless enough to attack us with a clandestine high altitude emp will be smart and ruthless enough to combine that attack with the release of a highly

contagious, highly lethal virus, probably a bioengineered virus that they have a vaccine for and we don't. the u.s. commission on the prevention of weapons of mass destruction warned a terrorist attack a bioweapons was likely by the end of 2013. this one was issued years ago by very few americans know about it and almost no one in congress or the administration has focused on this thread for survival. the brookings institution, johns hopkins center for bio defense strategy, interpol, many scientists are britain and warned these advances in manipulation and bioengineering, even an individual could choose very cheap and available equipment and today's technology to do with the soviets did back during the cold war which they combined ebola virus which is 90% legal, with smallpox which is highly contagious. if they create a brand-new deadly virus, they can also add in the gene that makes the virus vulnerable to a vaccine that

they create. so if they want to protect their children from the vaccine they can do that. we have got cases i should point out, used we've had these cases were scientists try to use dna manipulation to create good have asked you a great lethal viruses for chile just in the lab so for. so the bottom line for americans, number one, don't count on the federal government to protect you from emp or viral pandemic threats. they are too busy penning with social programs and unconstitutional programs to be bothered it seems with vital national defense measures. it would be great if the heritage foundation and the cato institute, ron paul, the tea party could convince most, the constitutional limits focus on security, but that's probably an unlikely thing to happen. so my second conclusion, recommendation, as individuals and families you need to prepare for these disasters. had their own means of being able to survive. the prepper movement is big in the united states but it's getting bigger all the time. there's a sales of bumpers have been growing in the united states as you read in the paper this year.

their survival communities in the united states. and you two should prepare for surviving the kind of post-collapse environment described in "rohan nation," reinventing america after the collapse. thank you. [applause] >> so we're going to open it up to our panel for questions, if you just wish and and/or recognize you. and then if you would wait for the mic phone and announced your name and affiliation, that would be great but i just want to add to put points. this is a dynamic problem, right, because her infrastructure and technology is changing all the time. so part of the evolution of technology is to create processes that require less and less power. so we need small and smaller batteries. and so we can be more and more efficient with electricity. of course, that actually makes

those systems even more vulnerable to emp surge. so as we are racing forward to making very efficient electronic systems, we are making incredibly vulnerable electronic systems. on the flipside, one thing we didn't talk about is, we talked about some of the protective measures and others. many of these are fall into group of all-hazards or multi-use respond to even if you never express the emp attack or if we're al-awlaki enough to outlive, before the next solar flare, that's not to say that a lot of these measures would go to waste. when you look at our paper about reviewing what the department of homeland security hasn't done in terms of planning and preparedness and coordination, and some of the measures that the defense part under departmental done, these things would be useful and helpful for whole range of things. for conventional attacks in some instances to natural disasters. it's not like you're saying we are just buying something that

is for a once in a maybe million year event. these are actually measures for lots of kind of dangerous we might be concerned about. so the young lady in the back was very patient. >> yes, hello. my name is lauren gilbert. my question i suppose would be, there's a very brief mention about getting private industry involved in the meantime until the government can do something but my question is, what are the sorts of things that could be done at the level of utility such as excellent or do, what are the loves of things that can be done at regulatory authorities such as pjm or miso, and what would be beyond any thing that could be handled by the government? >> i'm going to ask congressman bartlett, he's talked to a lot of them and also peter, if they would start it and i would ask our panelists to really refrain

from using acronyms because probably most of the world doesn't know what they are. >> as the power industry can do this without some education and authorization, is asking an awful lot. the cost of electricity is going up in have. it will simply add to that cause. not exorbitant late lay by the way, but it was 60 cents to each bill for each person, would provide the kind of, we pay for the kind of heartening that we need. it's primarily a matter of education. once we know that you need to do this, and americans understand that 60 cents is very well spent, isn't it, then i think that will do it. but the answer of that will be offered for these people to justify increasing their costs and increasingly the billing to

their subscribers. so i think it's education. i really want to thank heritage for doing this because we need to do this a thousand times over so that people understand how important this is. and it isn't just for emp. i like the second one about what was said, the personal preparedness. i'm old enough to live through the cold war. remember those old cd emblems of their, the food was stored as you couldn't go to any public holding without having a bunch of brochures there that told you what you want to do and how you ought to do it. and except for the duct tape that impair soma security, they tell me that they have this information but nobody knows it. i know is doing what everybody out to be doing, and that is prepared to speak because we're only to be a strong as a nation as we are individually in a catastrophic situation like this. there's a reason that you can't be independent of the system,

for whatever period of time your financial permit you to be independent of the system. just a matter of education, and i am really quite distressed that we are not doing that. because you think about it, if you go out and you buy supplies and food ahead of time, you're now a picture because the farmer has to grow it into helping the economy. if you do when hurricane is at your door and now you're a order come you're doing exactly the same thing when you do it, determine whether you're a patriot or a sinner, doesn't it? >> theoretically industry could do it on its own. currently the north american electric operation in fact is rejecting the passage of the s.h.i.e.l.d. act insisting that they don't need federal regulation. that they can do this on their own. and we'll do it on their own. that's the argument they're making. i do not believe that. because what we've known about emp and the commission made its

recommendations, oh, the beginning back in 2004 and they haven't done anything. you know, they are also frankly, i mean, as they should be, driven by the profit motive. i small government conservative as his mr. bartlett. there are probably no other member of congress as small a government conservative as he is. but liberal democrats and conservative republicans alike are united that this is a legitimate role where udp government, you do need to give authorities to ferc as we can require industry, to move forward. it doesn't have a legal authority yet so that's why the s.h.i.e.l.d. act is so necessary. they will have an opportunity and got an opportunity now to actually move forward on their own. they should be encouraged to do so. that doesn't abyei the need for the government to exercise its responsibility since people's lives depend on industry. on industry doing the right thing. >> explain what ferc is.

>> right. you know, that would be the chief agency that we would be looking to, you know, to implement implementation of the s.h.i.e.l.d. act. >> federal agent -- federal energy regulatory commission. thank you. >> i'm dan pohl from the sinus organization of america. for those of you have the expense of intelligence and government, special dash especially the congressman, something is missing a rather large infrastructure professional intelligence people who make a living studying our adversaries and what they intend to do to us. and how are they not communicating leadership of our military and to the congress that this is something that needs to be defended against, i'm a little bit unclear about why our professional intelligence establishment is not advising congress to take

action. >> may be true and frank can start. >> is a cardinal rule you did not make policy, provide information, whatever decisions maker, it's up to them. he will not find intelligence folks advocating policy. they will make the information available and that's it. >> the question occurs, and peter may be in a position to answer this, or roscoe, better than i, whether the information is being provided. i certainly have heard from peter about this super emp weapon. i'm not sure that policymakers have been hearing about the north koreans having successfully developed a super emp weapon. as to the policy piece of this, i think that -- i bet some of these conversations, i know others here have well, with people in previous administrations as well as this

one, and you get sort of this, this blank look from most of them, with the sort of -- [inaudible] >> more than usual. with sort of a sense that it's got to be somebody else's problem, not theirs. or it's not a serious as pop as you're making it out to be. and i think the combination of maybe not getting actionable intelligence and belief at a time when there's so many other things to worry about, this is an be too hard or not absolutely high priority category, seems to be contributing to. inaction we're talking about. >> well, having served a decade in the intelligence community, cia, as a senior analyst, i know that at least when i was there, this was during the cold war and after the cold war up until 1995, we were informing, you

know, policymakers that there was a serious emp threat. frank is right when it comes to policy issues in terms of recommendations about what you do about it. that is crossing the line. you can talk about the threat, you can make recommendations. that's up to the policymakers which is one of the reasons i left the intelligence committee by the wayside to get to fixing the problem, side of it. now, this is a mixed to me how even in washington, d.c., it doesn't seem to be widely understood what the purpose of the commission, presidential commissions are. i mean, the reason these things exist, the reason a commission was established is precisely so you can have authoritative statement that includes the collective use of defense and intelligence and scientific community. so the intelligence community have spoken loud and clear already in terms of the threat anyway in the emp commission report. because they were part of that process and a consensus emerged from that report. second, there was a strategic

posture commission report after the emp commission, you know, which re-examined this threat. could rogue states and terrorists do that? this was the commission that was headed up by the president clinton secretary defense, came to the exact same conclusion, okay, it's been through the process twice. with a national sciences academy study after that that confirm independently the threat from magnetic storms. and it was a june 2010 stay by the department of energy and ferc, federal energy regulatory commission, that went back and said yes, indeed, there are great magnetic storms, this is true. and rogue states, there is, they can do this. and last on september 2010, the ferc sponsored a big interagency stay that gave again voiced to the department of defense, intelligence committee, nuclear weapons lab. they all came to the same conclusion. one official study, they all support each other.

so we said basically the equivalent of two congressional commissions, plus three major authoritative studies that all said the same thing. now, why do people still not know about it? i don't know. maybe it's because you say db and people's eyes glaze over. and easily care, even among nuclear weapons experts, whereas working in the field i think it's the case today. there is a narrow subset of the scientist to really understand this, it's kind of a small piece of group of people who understand it. and it has been classified for many years. was really into the commission came out with its first reports, mr. bartlett conducted the first congressional hearings, you know, that we actually kind of came out of classified closet to the public. and innocent even though it is an old threat to be known about, known about for a long time for the public is concerned, this is actually new information.

and it's a steep learning curve we've got. it doesn't help it such an esoteric difficult thing to understand. >> d. want to add to it? >> the primary deterrent is, it always sweeps the important author table. you change the baby's diaper. the college education, saving for the is really more important but it's not urgent. and that's true in our government, too. is a tyranny of the urgent. the urgent always sweeps the important author table. i don't i get around that but we clearly need to. >> i'm really appreciative, we'll get to as many as we can. just wait for the microphone, please. >> thank you. none of you has mentioned the possible power of public opinion. and in my town, which is bethesda, in my circle, i'm not aware that people have any idea

of the possible dangers that face us, very eminently. why hasn't public opinion been hardest in some way? visit before of material, you told us that, that somehow could be, i'm an external us. that somehow could be told in a way that ordinary people like me could understand and perhaps, am i being -- put pressure on these government entities that are doing anything, even though they know of the danger. >> could i add one plug your for peter probably and the work they are doing at empact and the books that are being written on the subject and a movie that i think is coming out of bill forstchen's book. and i think some work is being done in a very serious way on this, and what you just said is a call to intensify that effort. and, of course, there's the great oceans 11.

[laughter] >> sadly, the lights come back on in the mood which is some sort of . no, you want to jump in? >> i want to answer the question of why, what could be done has not been done. when they produced a problem and they said there's no solution. right now there is a number of companies that are working with some very large microsoft type companies that are going to build systems that can protect the transformers. they will build them and demonstrate them. the problem is we needed three and half million dollars to pay that national labs to go do this. sadistic company has come up with a money. that's number one pick second issue is a look like you going to shoot down a missile. that's missile defense. a lot of people don't like missile defense. they deny there's a prime. the presence national security adviser wrote a piece in "the new york times" this is not going to come from a rogue state, it will come from the sun.

so geomagnetic storm but then they stopped there. okay, the third thing which i think is very important is not just utilities that didn't believe there was a solution, to costly and it was only geomagnetic storm, is that the solution becomes so big that they deny there's a problem. and until you translate the solution into something very doable, which peter has done a great deal about, then people i think will come onboard in terms of -- a lot of people like intelligence committee said to me, oh, we will know what looks like up in the clouds, we will sample it like we did over north korea. we'll find out whose body was. that's only if you a sample of all their bomb a true. the iranians, north koreans are not about to give that to a. that was the reaction of some people in the intelligence community that deterrence works, or we can't know where it comes, you deny the problem so you don't have to face a solution. now we have actually utilities now know there's a solution. what peter said, it's no more

than a dollar a year per person to kill the bill and they can charge it to the rate. so i would say that that is the second part of the solution that we haven't got to. the solution is affordable and durable specs a new technology. yes, sir, right there. >> congressman bartlett come all the work you did on the committee, a concern about right now we seem to export technologies so that hezbollah was able to launch a missile against the state-of-the-art israeli patrol boat, the u.s. navy sitting out there with support groups, what's your comfort level if they're going to the defense capabilities to protect themselves against an emp attack? >> unfortunately as i mentioned ever since the clinton years when we had a big decrease in military funding, we have been

waiting tv hardening on all of our new weapons systems. they just aren't hardened. as i mentioned, i had huge problem with that and it's on the congressional record you can pull it out. i question over and over, why would we build the weapons at all if we were not hardening them? because the only time we ever really need those weapons is against a peer or near-peer, and one of the first things they would do, it's in all of the open literature is, is a robust emp lay down to deny us the use of all of our weapons which are not be the hardened, which today are essentially all of our weapons. i don't understand why we don't do this. the discretionary wars we're fighting, world war ii stuff would've been just fine. we did it quicker and with less fatalities, with a new weapons that we didn't have to have to windows worst it will have to have these weapons, emp hardened, and they're not emp hardened. at least not as result of the

commission, they have a standing task force in the pentagon looking at tv hardening across the services. i'm not confident that they are looking at a serious enough threat. i think the level of bnp are looking at is, is classified that it is too low. i think if with the russian generals told the emp commission is true, what we are praying for is a fraction of what our enemy is capable of. and that doesn't make much sense. >> just a few bits will try to catch both of these two questions here in the middle. >> my name is jeff mcgee. i'm interested in some the comments you. a couple -- dr. miller's book sounds a great blockbuster for hollywood, to make into a movie. oceans 11 didn't portray the threat. young people are a little more aware of it because a lot of the

few games they play have bnp devices as the ultimate weapon. if you get the emp you can take out your enemy. [laughter] but my real question is as far as comparing this analogy to the arms race preparation, are there any other nations that are on the ball of preparing their grades for emp attack? >> peter, maybe you could talk about what's going on? >> sure. russia and china, russia -- [inaudible] china also has its great prepared. some countries that are much less developed, like north korea, because of their backwardness would be virtually vulnerable to this. they don't depend upon the electric grid and microelectronic systems the way we do. iran is more dependent on them. but even they are not nearly as advanced as we. we know in terms of offensive capabilities they are prepared

to use emp weapons. we actually at open source, north korea and writing iranian military doctrine they openly write about attacking the united states. in the case of iran we have seen them i think mr. bartlett mentioned, doing several tests, launched the high altitude. they even launched a missile in the caspian sea. frank gaffney mention there was a freighter or scud in the bucket i think people call it. where you some primitive missile, get it close to our shores, due in the gulf of mexico. and peter is also correct, you know, that you would not be able to identify the attacker not on because the missile would not come from enemy territory but you can't get nuclear forensics on an emp attack. it's not in the atmosphere. it's out in space.

there's nothing to collect. >> this is the last question. >> there's been a lot of talk about the big one, in 2012, 2013 from the sun. but if you look at the history of geomagnetic storms and see it doesn't reach back to the maximum, and it could come this year. they could come next week. we had one last week that was so big it just wasn't directed at us. the sun is throwing these off regularly. but we do have a partial hit. it's something i think it needs to be addressed is it could be a scud in a bucket or could be a partial geomagnetic storm that puts us out for a month or two. and we need to be prepared for the. it's one thing to think of the big one, and it's another, how are you going to get through the next month, or two months, and it's not just the people who are involved and their families to think about, but it's corporate america. are we going to our corporations

and saying to them, can you survive one month or two months without electricity? what will you do? because we want our corporate america to be strong coming out of this in one or two months. would you address that, please? >> i want to finish up with, maybe peter will be best for this, talk for a minute, explaining whether infrastructure deny states has and what we would need. >> let me add to that also, in terms of the solution, some of the solutions here. the space whether infrastructure is basically once satellite. it is old, wasn't originally designed for detecting flares, was added on as an afterthought. and has some false warning because it's at the end of its life. there's some debate about whether to replace it. there's two competing satellite for placing this. one of them is called the

sentinel. it's much better designed, dedicated for this purpose. but even if you get that space satellite up, one of the myths that is out there that is perpetrated by industry, say, well we can use the satellites to give early warning of a great geomagnetic storm, and close the grid down, shut the great down so it won't collapse. all right? first of all, while we can see solar flares coming a few days before they reach the earth, they travel a million miles an hour. the senate 6 million miles away. we don't know if they will hit the earth until about 10 or 20 minutes after they detected by the satellite. you have 10 or 20 minutes of warning where you are for sure it's going to hit the earth. will it cost a geomagnetic storm over the united states? we don't know that. so you will shut the whole grid down in the united states, you're not sure.

shutting the grid down over the united states solution would be catastrophic in itself. if you can imagine that. there's no plan to do it despite misrepresentations by some in industry. there's no plan to do. we've never practiced it, and so basically we are not prepared even against that phenomena. however, i do want people to despair because all the talk you has been about how catastrophic a nuclear, natural emp is to ultimately the commission's work and the other studies is a good news story. there's no excuse for society to be vulnerable to this. we know how to fix the problem. it doesn't cost a lot to fix the problem. some of the solutions are while it sounds complicated, let me just you an example of one of the things we could do. if you put a metal shed over these big transformers, you know, i shed with no windows, the kind of thing you could get from lowe's, for example, around a big transformer, now it's the

size of a cage. that's what you could do to protect it against the e3 partner that big metal shed, if you use thick metal. it can also protect it against a sniper, for example, if he cares were tried using high-powered rifle to shoot a hole in the transformer. for your are taking against that when you do that. and also the most common failure mode in hurricanes, and tornadoes, for transformers is a tree falls on a. these things are out there completely unprotected. a metal shed will protect against that, too. you don't have to be a physicist to understand how some of this stuff works. it's very common sense type things. if you add to that metal shed a surge protector going into the transformer, all right, with a sensor that will pick up something like a polls, something that is come into the line that will protect you against the ep coming down the line. it will also protect you against cyber warfare. the way cyberattacks destroy these transformers is to get in

and because, the wave energy comes in to come in in a different way so that the energy that is searching through the power grid instead destroying itself. but the surge protector will protect against everything. if you do those two things, but they transformed are protected and that be done cheaply. we know how to do. it's inexpensive. why aren't we doing it? >> let me just close with this. it was remarked by mr. bartlett, i mean, we don't make among the many things we don't make in this country anymore, we don't make the big transformers anymore. they were invented in this country. the electric grid was invented in this country by tesla. new york was the first electric grid in the world. we have exported the technology for electric grids all over the world. but we don't make it here anymore. the big transformers are for export purposes, made into countries. south korea and germany. we have to buy our big transformers from the. it takes 18 months to build one

because each of them has to be custom made, custom-made. i would like to see that change. as a matter of national street policy in my view. if something as important as a big transformer, american lives depend on it, they should be made in america again. .. >> they wouldn't know what to do with their leisure time oriented

towards these things. those values of our pioneer roots have been lost and we used to pride ourselves of not being dependent on the system, and these values are lost. if you get a garbage can with a tight fitting lid and you have communication electronics or medical qiement or spare parts to run your car, put them in a plastic bag, a garbage can with a tight fitting lid, and that will survive the threat. there's many things to do against emp and preparedness in general so we are not vulnerable and dependent on washington. we can lead from the bottom up, and if people prepare as individuals, bureaucrats in washington will notice and take action. they don't like to follow the parade, but lead the parade.

>> i want to say a couple things quickly. if you found this program informative and helpful and you want to share it with folks tomorrow, it's archived on our website and you can send the link to anyone, and it will be there forever -- until the next emp involve. [laughter] they can catch that program. there are paper on what the government has done so far. that'll be up on the web site and the paper talking about emp awareness website. go to heritage.org, there's a documentary that in six minutes explains which bill grahm, the chair of the emp commission, how emp works, and you can watch that or you can go to the documentary website which is 33minutes.org, and you can watch the entire film online for free. with that, thank you all for coming today, and please join me

in thanking our panelists. [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

>> nasa administer, charles bolden, said last week, the

agency is only months away from returning americans to outer space. this following the completion of the space shuttle's final mission last month. after bolden's remarks a speech from donna edwards of maryland. the remarks run about 35 minutes. >> good morning, and welcome to the university of maryland college park, the alumni center here in college park, maryland, for today's nasa future forum. it's the first of 2011 for nasa, and we're excited to have you here in the audience and the audience live on nasa television. we're streaming on nasa tv at www.nasa.gov/ntv. for those of you on the social media, we'll take questions from twitter followers today. you can follow today's program on hash tag pound nasa future or ask questions on our technology

account @nasa technologies. we'll discuss our role in nasa in the role of the economy of the nation. our first panel is starting off with leaders from nasa followed by panels on innovation, technology, education, and the future. i want to welcome our host today, dr. pat o'shea, vice president of research here at the university of maryland. pat? [applause] >> friends, colleagues, distinguished guests, i am delighted to welcome you on behalf of the university of maryland to the nasa future forum. nasa is the modern embodiment of our primal desire to understand

the heavens. in its 5 # year history, the technologies developed far and by nasa have been brought -- they have brought the heavens to earth and enabled critical advances in how we deal with water, health care, energy, the environment, food, information, infrastructure, transportation, and security. as you can probably tell from my accent, i grew up in ireland, and one of my earliest memories in the 1960s is of a drawing i made of a big rocket, a sat turn five. i drew usa and nasa on the side, and that was the apollo 11 rocket, and later, a few years later, i remember after apollo 13, the astronauts visited my hometown and had a forum in the park opera house, and i snuck in. i didn't have a ticket, i was a young kid, and i remember

standing in the book looking at the brave astronauts and thinking of all the things they'd done and all the scientists and engineers that had supported them before the launch and during the critical stages of their return to earth, and that inspired me to become a scientist and a technologist like it has several generations of children worldwide, so here i am now at the university of maryland which is a globally preimminent institution renowned for its powers in innovation and education. as vice president and senior research officer, i oversee an enterprise that closely couplings creativity, entrepreneurship, and education to create a brave new world and to educate the leaders of that brave new world. as befits the nasa mission, we are in the business of educating explorers here at maryland, not simply training tourists. at maryland, we have been very

active over many years, and nasa projects ranging from commit hunting to climate monitoring. in today's nasa forum, we will actively discuss the role of technology, innovation, business, science, and education in our future space exploration plans and in sustaining economic development and competitiveness. we have gathered together nasa leadership, technology gists, scientists, engineers, as well as leaders from local business, science, technology, and education to discuss and help guide the future role of nasa in advancing innovation, technology, science, engineering, and education in a way that benefits our community and the nation. nasa today stands at a critical juncture. will it adapt to new

requirements placed on it by its own successes over the past half century? also by the changing economy? will it continue to contribute to our nation's progress in new ways? will it continue to inspire budding scientists and engineers like it did many those many years ago? nasa, to date, seeks to fortify its crucial relationships with academia and business which now more than ever will be vital partners as nasa ventures into the future. our forum today will explore major areas of interest and help attendees understand the issues, the opportunities, and the ways they can help ensure nasa's continued leadership. thank you. i would now like to introduce our most distinguished guess, nasa administrator charles

bolden. he's a highly decorated garage rat of the u.s. naval academy in annapolis, in the marine corp., and astronaut. in 2009, he was named nasa administer by president obama. please join me in welcoming charles bolden. [applause] >> thank you, all, very much, and especially thank you, dr. o'shea. i was trying to applaud for him, and nobody helped me. i liked everything he said. i am -- since i'm the nasa administrator, i'm going to try something here today. i brought my ipad, so if you see me stumble, several things may have happened. the battery may have died, i may have hit the wrong button, or i

may be scrambling to get my paper back up, so bear with me. it's really special to be here today. i see a lot of friends and former colleagues, and that's great. what i don't see are a lot of faces -- except in the back -- i would really like to see a lot more faces of people like several of those in the back who look like they have not been around for the last 10 or 20 years, so i'm disappointed in that regard; however, i hope as the day goes by, i hope they look at the agenda and see they're going to get all of this bureaucratic hoopla out of the way, and they are just waiting for the panels, and then they'll show up, come streaming in. i see the first panel members over there going, yeah, we're not starting on time, so come about nine, and you can catch

the first panel. i am hoping we'll see more then. this is an incredible opportunity for us, and congresswoman edwards is on her way and will be here, and if i don't, i'm going to say something now that hopefully someone will pass to her because i do want to thank the congress for the bipartisan support they continue to give to nasa. i know for those of you who don't see what we go through every day, you don't believe that. we continue to get bipartisan support on the hill. nasa and space exploration and aeronautics and things like that still remain something that tends to be bipartisan, and, you know, we have strong advocates no matter what party, no matter what segment of what party since even the parties today have parties. i do want to thank her for the leadership that she continues to exhibility in the --

exhibit in the congress as a advocate for nasa. the maryland congress has been enormously helpful to us in ensuring the management of the hubbell space telescope and other assets in maryland have been fully supported. i thank the entire delegation for their support of the agency and the aerospace sector. i want to thank you, dr. o'shea, and the university of maryland for hosting us today. i'm not sure this is the first ever -- everybody says no. first of 2011? okay, i can say it's the first? this year? okay. for hosting the first this year of our future forums, and when bobby brawn and i talked about it the other day, we hope there will be other universities around the nation that will follow the example that

university of maryland is setting today so that we can take this show on the road and have an opportunity to listen to the american public as much as we talk with them because that's really important. the future forums are wonderful gatherings, and mainly nasa has been and always will be in the future business. it's been our job to conceive what might be possible, even though it might seem out of reach, and then in resources to make it a reality. you know, i cannot help -- my wife hates to see me come into the house and turn on the television because she knows i'm going to switch to the talking heads, and i just have to do it because they have such wisdom. yeah, you got it. it's still interesting to listen to them and to listen to people who supposedly are leaders today who speak with such pessimism.

you know, we can't do that. we won't do that. we are very optimistic about the future. we're very optimistic about what can be done, and i think we're that way. any of you who are nasa hands or used to be nasa employees or are nasa employees know what i mean, when i say we take science fiction and turn it into science fact, and that's the way we live every day, and it's fun. we think it's important, and we hope that today you'll help us to, at least advance the efforts that we have. right now, the agency has completed one enormously effective chapter in our history with the retirement of the space shuttle, and we're writing the next one as we gather here today. the shuttle was an experimental vehicle throughout its lifetime. you know, a lot of people don't want to admit that. the shuttle was never operational. it was always an experimental vehicle. i don't know any of us at nasa

ever thought that nasa would be something that we could truly consider operational. you know, it's just -- when you have something on the cutting edge of technology in many respects, it's -- it's sort of a -- i don't know, it's a strange vehicle because when you're in the cockpit, you're in the 1970s, and when you look at things like the main engines and the systems, alphamagnetic magnetic spectrometer, it's the cutting edge technology, and it represents dreams to be quite honest, thicks that have not been fulfilled yet, so it does show that while we want to advance technology and science, in some cases, you have to use, you know, modern day, current day assets to help you do that. i say that only because we have

a big battle going on right now both within nasa and without, between moving into the future and preserving some of the past, and i contend that you can't -- if you forget your past and just kind of shake it off, you don't have anything on which to stand. when you're trying to reach high points or trying to reach a top shelf, you got to have something to stand on, and, you know, when you kick the things that you stand on away and think you're going to jump, make big leaps, i think we're maybe missing the boat. for starters, as i said, you know, shuttle was critical to the assembly of the international space station. it's the size of a football field with human beings on it 24/7 for more than ten years now which will produce breakthroughs for the next generation of exploration until at least 2020 and we have just about completed the certification of the international space station through 2028.

we'll continue to study what the shuttle taught us as we work with industry partners to develop the next generation of transportation systems to lower earth orbit and beyond. nasa is now handing off the transport to the space station to the american industry to focus on a new series of firsts like sending humans to an asteroid and eventually to mars. we have the opportunity to raise the bar, to demonstrate what human beings can do if we are challenged and inspired to reach for something just out of our grasps, but not out of our sights. let me take a break here. just a show of hands. how many of you think you know what the gap is going to be between american capability to take things to lower earth orbit between the end of shuttle and the onset of the next american capability to do that. who thinks they know that? who thinks it's in terms of years? whether you know or not. who thinks it's in terms of

months? it's in terms of months. we will be flying american vehicles to the international space station in less time than it took us to recover from challenger or columbia. that is a message that i have failed to get out. that is a message that we at nasa, that is a message that the american administration, that the administration has failed to get out. you know, orbital sciences and space ex are two companies that are industry bidders to take over the responsibility for access to lower earth orbit. last december, space ex demonstrated their disability to get a vehicle to lower earth orbit, to orbit it, safely deouter and recover it in tact. they demonstrated that capability. that's never been done by a private company in my knowledge. orbital sciences from here in

dulles, virginia, is on the verge of flying their first demonstration, and in the cases of both companies, they will have flown two demonstration flights for us in what we call the cots program, sort of a very short development program, and next year, 2012, they will be -- we will be paying them fee-for-service to take cargo to the international space station, to depending on how well things go for space ex in their now scheduled november/december final demonstration flight, they could be flying their first cargo mission for pay as early as next february, so we're months away, not years from an american capability to deliver cargo to the international space station. don't let anybody tell you otherwise. we're not dependent on the russians, the japanese, the europeans. we are developing an american

capability that will be available very soon. that does not mean you throw away your international partners because we still need them to fill out the gap for being able to take the amount of cargo that we want to take to the international space station. president obama has given us a mission with a capital " m" to focus on the crucial research and technological capabilities required for us to move beyond lower earth orbit. the president asked us to harness that american spirit of innovation, the drive to solve problems, create capabilities that are so embedded in our story and led us to the moon, to great observatives, and to miewms living and working in space, possibly indefinitely. that american ingenuity is alive and well. it will fire up our economy and help us create and win the future, but only if we put aside our differences and come together to work hard, dream big, and imagine endless

possibilities. working together, nasa, academia, and industry will create new technologies, develop new capabilities, and increase the knowledge in understanding of the fragile world on which we live, and that, i think, is the essence of what you will be doing here today, and that's what's happening right now across the board in nasa's work. just last week, we sent juno soaring to jupiter where unprecedented images of the gas science data of its surface and core will be made possible by efficiency advances in our solar cell technology pursued by nasa over the past few years. juno will operate further from the sun than any other solar powered spacecraft we've ever flown. that's no small feat. this is applicable to that stay's future robotic and human

exploration and may make a difference in our energy future here on earth. last month, dawn arrived in orbit around the asteroid, vesta. tomorrow, reporters in florida will be getting a last look at the mars science laboratory appropriately named curiosity before it's mated be a decent stage and move closer to the november launch. curiosity will have more high-powered science instruments on mars than we've ever had before, and it's a step along the path to human missions to the red planet. next month sees our return to the moon to understand the gravity field with grail, a set of twin satellites. the improsed preparatory project or npp, launches tomorrow to help us understand our planet.

that's just a sampling of the huge array of missions coming up. to reach the destinations of tomorrow, we're working on a new crew kit capsule and studying the path we want to take for a heavy lift rocket to take humans into deep space beyond lower earth orbit where we worked for the last 30 years. communications, radiation protection, and life support technologies that complement these two deep space systems are being prioritized and worked into the pipeline even as i speak. looking further into the space future are the 30 visionary concepts that our chief technologist, bobby braun's office, selected under the advanced concept program. they were chosen based on their potential to transform our future space missions, enable new capabilities, or significantly alter current approaches to launching, building, and operating space

systems. matched with the 80 graduate fellowships recently awarded for basic and applied research in technology areas aligned with nasa's future space missions, the agency is beginning to create its future and invest in its future innovators today. nasa's role has historically been crucial in seating the technology and innovations that brought our nation's capabilities to the cutting edge, made us the leader in space exploration, and made a difference in our lives every day. nasa's impack on the nation's technological future, the work force and economy are based on investments and innovations that we had the courage to make. these investments have helped us create, galvanize, and strengthen the expertise that has made nasa's achievements possible. similarly, today's investments in education, science, innovation, and space technology

will maintain nasa's position on the cutting edge while stimulating our economy and global competitiveness and inspiring future generations. that concept of transformative work to give future generations more capability than we have today is at the core of our work right now. nasa is at the heart of a national strategy to invest in research and development and take these con cements from the -- concepts from the drawing board to the launch pad. we candidate do this a-- we can't do this alone. we need your help, your ideas, your energy, and your passion. what you're doing here today is very important, and i look forward to hearing more from you. i thank you all for working with nasa and the entire aerospace field as we move forward into a bright future of science, aeronautics, and exploration. our future is bright, and we're ready for the challenges of

tomorrow. we hope that you will join us on this journey. thank you all very much for coming today, and thanks for letting me help kick it off. thank you. [applause] [applause] >> hello, good morning, and i apologize i was running late this morning, and administrator bolden was here and said we're friends, and he's right. it's exciting to be here. a nation is only as strong as its investmentses in technology in the future, and i believe that, and i think that nasa is at the core of that investment. i've had a couple experiences