>> until the very next second but the prime minister, you could see it coming away prepare you learn to something to shut him up. [laughter] >> an interesting moment. another slavery question is it in 1862 before the mets' application and proclamation signed a treaty with break-in to suppress the effort 10 slave train. they agreed and this was taken as a straw in the wind that emancipation was coming. although the slave train was illegal in britain and the united states we were forced

>> the first time that had happen to then he signed a treaty with the precious and diaz day and a at. >> how did that swimsuit dominate? >> i don't think it was that capitalizing but if the nasdaq four smb gives a day wage and they deserve with one of my favorite move months is coats to the iraq us a a anna. . .

in his book, "1861: the civil war awakening" adam goodheart writes about what led to the war that began 150 years ago this past april. he was at the national

constitution center in philadelphia for little more than an hour. [applause] >> thank you very much, steve. i'm a great lover of this wonderful institution, the national constitution center and i also wanted to remind you that we have an exhibit upstairs in posterity hauled between the signers hall and the main exhibit area on lincoln that i hope you will get to take a look at some time in the coming weeks. it is obligatory for a person sitting in this chair to praise the author and to praise his luck, and ethically i think anyone who agrees to perform my role as interlocutor has to genuinely believe that and the

other occasions in which i have done this, i have done this. but this really is in a cage and in which i want to go a little little bit over the top because i do think adam is a very special historian and this is a very very special book. as steve described adam's career he really has been at a remarkably early age a very important public intellectual. speaking to a wide audience about a wide variety of subjects i think since he graduated from harvard, not that long ago. and now he has undertaken -- it is hard to believe and by the way i haven't really read the book in my hand because this is the publishers bound galley proof. >> that is what an author likes to see, really ragged copy. >> but it is dogeared, so i think i read it. [laughter] >> i hope you read it.

>> but this is a very, very important book and it is a first book. he has done a lot of writing before at this time but this is the kind of book that you would expect from a scholar who had written five or six or seven such books. it really does give a remarkable picture of this first year leading up to and finally coming about in the civil war. adam has this style in which he makes a very important general points about the american nature -- meg nash in and about the coming of the civil war but he does it by telling absolutely compelling anecdotes about individuals many of whom you will be familiar with that many of whom you will be not until after you have read adam's look. so i must say buy this book.

okay, down to business. adam has been a very busy man in the past couple of days with all sorts of public appearances. maybe some of you saw the interview with him in philadelphia inquirer. he was on fresh air with terry gross yesterday. he was on radio times this morning and as steve mentioned, yesterday was the 150th anniversary of the firing on fort sumter in the anniversary of the surrender at fort sumter. we will eventually get to those moments because i know adam wants to get to those moments that i want to begin sort of the beginning of adam's book by asking about december of 1860 -- 1816. at abraham lincoln has been elected president. i think it is fair to say that a few southern politicians are grumpy about this outcome.

i would say a few south carolinians are more than grumpy about the outcome. they are enraged about the outcome. you introduced us to a relatively unknown, at least to me, an unheralded man, major robert anderson who is just been given command of fort moultrie. also in charleston harbor. i wonder if you could talk a little bit about those events in december of 1860 and in particular help us understand what is going on in anderson and's mind as he is given the command of what might be a hopeless task? >> one thing i do want to thank you rick for your introduction and also especially the part about being young. i've gotten a couple of -- and i sort of thought, only in the context of civil war historians to someone who is three years old get to be called the sort of kid all the time. anyway, i like it.

but, anyhow, i am glad you brought up the character of robert anderson because he is one of my favorite characters in the book. and he is the first hero of the union cause. largely forgotten today i think the most people except for the real sort of civil war nuts. and he is fascinating to me because he is a very reluctant hero. a sort of an accidental hero, which to me is the most interesting kind. he is a seven or. he is from kentucky. he comes from a slaveholding background and in fact his wife was the daughter of a wealthy plant -- plantation and made money by selling off the slaves that she had inherited. and he is a career officer in the u.s. army who finds himself stationed at the sort of sleepy little post in charleston harbor. it is really a kind of cushy army post before the civil war

where they send officers who were season to while away their time going to barbecues with charles doney and and very quickly however, he is at the center of a non-bolding national crisis. in fact it is already and folding when he arrives. the southern states began to secede off course in december of 1860 a month or so after lincoln's election as president, and this little island, fort sumter, the center of charleston harbor becomes an isolated union outpost. i think you wanted me to talk about before they get twos fort sumter however, so anderson is originally stationed with his men at a place called fort moultrie which is an old ford, ford that goes back to the american revolution. anderson's father was a soldier in the roof rove bush and awarded in stationed at this ford and the 1770s and 1780s

during the revolution and he has got this little harrison there, literally 60 men 16 men and a brass band. that is the sort of military force that ends up being the bane of the confederacy, 60 guys in a brass band. and some workmen. and they quickly realize that they are at the center of this unfolding secession crisis. south carolina sort of the center of this secession fever and charleston is the center of that. and the southern militia begins encircling this little fort. anderson and his men realize that this sport is about as dispensable should it come to that as a public park, and they are looking out at these troops that are massing all around them. they feel as anderson writes in a letter, he feels like a sheep

tied up, watching the butcher sharpen his knife. not a very pleasant image. and, so he does something buried old. he ignores his orders from the war department or more his lack of definitive orders, and under cover of darkness he and his men cross in their boats to fort sumter in the center of charleston harbor. and this is seen throughout the south as an act of war. it is interesting when we talk about the beginning of the civil war today the story tends to begin with this southern shot being fired at fort sumter. it is a very dramatic moment in a very important moment in american history but for many people in 1860, 1861, this conflict began more plan robert anderson and his men cross charleston harbor and raised their flags above fort sumter,

the south carolina newspaper headline scream out major anderson has inaugurated and has inaugurated a war, civil war in our country. so that is where you start the book, this sort of night escape. we are right there at the fourth as the boats are slipping away from the beach and crossing over and and major anderson has the american flag tucked under his arm that he will raise on the new fort. >> thank you and it is just one example of adam's techniques. he takes a person who we don't know much about, who was not a conscious they row in this struggle, but committed some quite extraordinary acts. >> yeah. he was very ambivalent and i like that about him. he was seen in the army as being the sort of gray bureaucrat. he was literally this great-looking man, very serious

and he was mostly known in the army for having translated certain french artillery textbooks into english. and being sort of everybody's instructor and artillery at west point. he was that guy whose course you had to pass in order to graduate but nobody really looked forward to it. and so here is this guy, major professor anderson in the middle of a crisis. also he was really a southern sympathizer in and is hard and he even said that. he sympathized with the sense of ravens over the way the institution of slavery was coming under attack and under threat. so the entire time that he is there in charleston harbor and it is becoming increasingly clear that this is the spot where war is most likely to begin, he is already fighting a war within himself. so i see this character in major anderson in some ways as being sort of a distillation of the war that is being fought and heart of the americas being

fought within his heart. >> adam also adds one of the post scripts in his book an extraordinary fact that major anderson and now general anderson is brought back at the end of the civil war to raise the union flag once again on fort sumter and on the evening of that day that he did so abraham lincoln was assassinated. one of these coming together of events in american history. i want to ask you another. this is bordering on trivia but i think my loyalty to the state of pennsylvania requires that i ask a question. the only president distinguished james buchanan. adam also had the wonderful theme it is new year's day in 1861 at the buchanan whitehouse. what was that they like, both in the white house and maybe you could give us a brief assessment

of president buchanan? >> well, you know buchanan of course has been vilified by many generations starting with his own generation. he was seen as sort of a loser and a misfit and disastrous president before he had ever led -- left the white house. not that this resonates with anything in our own time of course. [laughter] >> democrats you can take that as you will and republicans you can take that as you will and insert face here. but buchanan, actually i love these characters from history who have been sort of push to the margins because for me in many ways they end up being more interesting than the heroes. it is so it easy to celebrate the people who were on the right side of history but in my book i also try to sort of get into the hearts and minds of people who ended up being on but we think of is the wrong side of history.

so there is this scene of new year's day. buchanan was a total contrast to abraham lincoln and many many respects. where lincoln was sort of the worst qualified man ever to become america's president. when he looked at his resume he had been a one term from illinois. buchanan had a long glittering resume. incident lay like lincoln buchanan was born in a log cabin. not a lot of people remember that. so, he loved to host parties. he would sort of host receptions for everyone from visiting japanese ambassadors to sue indian chiefs and he would open the door to the white house and people would come in and partake of the free federally subsidized cake and punch and whiskey at these events. he drank a lot of whiskey in the antebellum years, a whole lot of whiskey. there is -- is seen in my book

of this last dismal reception at the buchanan white house, january 1, 1861. there was a tradition that some of you may know of in america in washington of the president throwing open the doors of the white house quite literally to sort of any decently washed and moderately sober citizen who wanted to say hello to the president of the united states on new year's day. this lasted until herbert hoover amazingly enough. you could just walk in and wish the president happy new year. here is this reception and it is a miserable affair. the marine band is there sawing out "hail to the chief" as best they can. on one side of the room are all of the pro-southern glowering across the room at the pro-northern washingtonians and it is sort of that last sputtering amber of this ill-fated buchanan administration. >> so now i'm going to turn to a

big question but it is a big question that i have been struggling to figure out how to ask. there is a tangle of conflicting thoughts in my mind relating to the specific moments of april 12 and april 13, 1861 and they are tangled by some more general thoughts about the causes of the civil war and tangled further by my recollection of my own inadequacies as a teacher of the americans in history survey course and the university of pennsylvania for most of my career there. i should confess that unlike most in the first half of the survey course i actually in the course with the firing on fort sumter and i do this because my memory about the civil war battles and alignments is so terrible that i know that i can't get through them.

so i never make it through the whole civil war and i'd never make it through reconstruction. fort sumter is the dramatic moment on which i conclude that half of the course. and i described at that moment a somewhat hyperbolic the war of southern bolshevism, that radical militant southerners lead many more moderate of their section into civil war and that the north were very reluctantly responding, halfheartedly respond to that challenge. it is not a conflict that they wish to have. your interpretation is not wholly at odds with that, but you do see northerners even at the moment of fort sumter as not merely occupying a defensive posture, but standing up in an

affirmative way for things in which they sincerely believe. i wonder if you could talk a little bit about your sense of what northerners thought they were about to fight for at that moment? >> first of all i just want to say when you talk about having a hard time keeping track of the battles, i in the same way. nobody asked me whose calvary wend charging over which he'll against whose infantry. i can remember that stuff at all. that is not the part of history that interest me. i'm interested in what is going on in the hearts and minds of the people living through this experience. the hearts and minds of northerners and actually southerners were much more divided i think them we are often told to think. i do believe that the union cause was ultimately not just a movement to keep the nation together, but it was an

anti-slavery cause in a very significant way. and, i know that is a very rare thing to hear because we are told that it is completely true that there were very few abolitionists in the north in 1860 and 1861. abolitionism was seen as this dangerous sort of weird sect. abolitionists were sort of like people who refused to burn fossil fuels at all in the course of their lives, because they believed that this would harm the environment and people accepted a general philosophical theoretical way that this was a correct position but who is going to be crazy enough to actually espouse and live this view that ultimately would do so much undermined the foundations of our society and economy? that is how a lot of people felt about abolitionism but it wasn't an anti-slavery cause in the sense that if millions of northerners had not, especially

with the election of abraham lincoln in 1860, drawn a line in the sand and said, slavery shall go no further than this. if they had not done that, the south would have had no reason to leave the union, and northerners, while deeply ambivalent about this union, also in a sense i found surprisingly when you read their words, welcomed it to some degree because there had been a great -- throughout the north you find people who in their heart of hearts hated slavery and felt like they couldn't say it because it was going to risk splitting the nation apart. as soon as the nation is already split apart, suddenly it is like a great on stifling for people in the north. suddenly they are able to espouse these thoughts that they weren't able to speak before. and not to say by any means that suddenly as everybody as an

abolitionist. quite far from it let alone racism evaporate overnight him even further than the truth but there is a sort of a collective sigh of relief almost on the part of many northerners. >> adam phrases it you to fully. one person at a time, millions of americans decided in 1861 that their grandparents had in 1776 that it was worth risking everything, their lives and virtues on their country, not just on its present reality either. not on something so solid that on a vision of what its future could be and what its past had meant. 1861, like 1776, was not just a year, but an idea of. so this is all part of the theme of minds and hearts. speaking of a person with a great mind and i think a huge heart, abraham lincoln.

a not so obscure figure who plays an important part in your narrative. as i am sure many of you know, the historiography on lincoln is nearly as massive as the historiography on the civil war itself and the different portrayals of lincoln are so varied. defender of the union when slavery is decidedly a secondary issue for him on the one hand. the great emancipator on the other hand. i guess if you are living in charleston south carolina, the chief villain and the war of northern aggression. tell us a little about your sense of the evolution of lincoln's thought, particularly in 1861 as he confronts this crisis? >> well i feel like in the course of writing this book i discovered a very different lincoln than the one i felt i knew and a link in the release

surprised and startled me. so much of our understanding of lincoln and our mental image of lincoln is informed by the sword sort of arc of his greatness throughout the civil war and of course his martyrdom at the very end of the war. in 1861, it is quite -- he is quite a different man. linking comes to washington as they said, on paper at least, very and prepared for this high office and he mumbles and stumbles his way through the early weeks and months of this secession crisis. this is something where historians disagree. i was on a panel at lincoln historical. you have to hope they are not caring a calvary saber or it cobalt revolver or something. but anyway my interpretation of lincoln is that he did not really fully understand the gravity of the secession crisis.

in fact as he makes his way slowly to washington d.c. in february of 1861 on his way to his first inauguration, he gives a series of speeches that he is just pilloried through the north and the south. he stands up in plymouth ohio and he says well, you know we have this crisis that we are facing, but at least no one is really suffering yet. at least no one is really hurt. and when we look around us, everything seems fine and it is all going to be all right. people are saying, wait a minute. the country is split in half and everything is all right? we are about to plunge into a war and quite likely it can economic depression and no one is suffering? so he makes a the sort of ham-handed remarks and he gets to washington. again is sort of paralyzed throughout the first weeks he is confronting the sumpter crisis,

but then has a bit of an epiphany and in response to the problem of what to do at fort sumter and set make you sort of the -- his first great masterstroke an american leader when he decides basically that the war is going to start one way or another anyway and it is in his best interest to make sure that the south is going to fire their first shot rather than the north. this is again something that has been debated, you know. southerners sometimes it said it is a little bit like you hear these conspiracy theorists saying that fdr invited to jeb needs attack on pearl harbor or someone was secretly behind the attacks on 9/11. but i really do think that lincoln was sort of thinking several chess moves ahead of jefferson davis' situation and may even with that masterstroke have ended up -- i won't say

winning the war but keeping the confederacy from winning the war at the crucial moment. my lincoln is a lincoln he goes from the sort of uncertain and in some ways bumbling guy to a think by the end of my book a few months into his presidency, becoming well on his way to the great leader and a great president we think of today. >> and, was it an unfair question? was at union or slavery? >> for lincoln? i think for lincoln union and slavery were sort of inseparable causes. because, the reason that the south was seceding was because of slavery and it was because of this stand that northerners were taking where they were willing to yield no further to what they called the slave power. and this result had been decreed

by the outcome of the national election, the election of lincoln in november of 1860, and so lincoln recognize that if he were to orchestrate some sort of a compromise and he played his hand very interestingly in some ways a bit ambivalently during this crisis, but he ultimately realize that if the south were allowed to blackmail the north, this wouldn't be any kind of a union really worth preserving. i do believe also that lincoln's personal sentiments were very much anti-slavery. there are some documents when lincoln was writing so, really revealing his heart of hearts rather than standing up in front of an audience speaking politically and saying what needed to be said. there was one remarkable letter he wrote in 1855 to his friend joshua speed being lincoln's

friend who was really one of the few people that lincoln became close to in the course of his life. it is remarkable that someone like lincoln who was such a rich inner emotional life had very few people he could really become close to end can fight in but joshua speed is the man with whom lincoln shared a bed for four years when they were young man. so lincoln roads to speed and this is as they know nothing group the anti-immigrant movement, is really catching fire in america. and he says, you know, our country was founded on the principle that all men are created equal. and then, that became all men except are created equal. now it seems to be all men except, catholics and immigrants are created equal. and if this is what our country is going to be, i might as well move to russia where i can take

my despotism unadulterated with the alloy of hypocrisy. [laughter] so you know i think lincoln did believe in freedom and slavery were incompatible. whatever you may have founded as expedient as a politician. >> adam in your interview with terry gross yesterday, you said and i am sure i am paraphrasing. you may not even a remember saying this, so i hope this question resonates. you said something to the effect of, lincoln did not free the slaves, the slaves freed themselves. if indeed you said that. what did you mean? ..

there are these to sort of flight time crossings by the both sort of bookends. my story and this one happens when three young african american slaves in virginia who have been conscripted by the confederacy to work on the confederate fortifications, they sit in this war we will be the cavaliers with the shining sword, and the negro's will be the man with the picks and shovels doing the dirty work that we don't have to do. so they construct these slaves and the decide they don't really feel like being considered it's

very much. can't imagine why. and a pickup in the middle of night, they steal a boat and across the james river and present themselves at the gate of the fort of fort monroe and isolated lonely little union outpost in the middle of the confederate territory at the start of the war. the next morning they are brought in to see the commanding general benjamin butler, and butler is forced to decide what to do with these men. this is weeks after the attack on fort sumter. this is a moment when lincoln said this is not going to be a war about slavery this is about union but this says can i take these three people and send them back to work on the confederate fortifications? can i take these three people and send them back into slavery? and he has very little time to decide this before a confederate officer comes writing up his

horse and demands this property, this human property, and butler almost in the spirit of the moment thinks of something brilliant. he's a general that in private life he's a lawyer, very clever massachusetts attorney, and he realizes by bill law of the war he's a lot to confiscate any property that is being used to aid the enemy cost. so he says you know what, to the confederate officer, if you and your people insist that these men are property i'm going to say they are property, too and i'm going to confiscate them from you just like a shipment of muskett source words. so he declares them conference of the war as the legal term, and very quickly, not surprisingly, word spreads mysteriously to the enslaved population and the next day another half-dozen sleeves appear at the fort and the day

after that some 40 or 50 at year and this time and is not only men who have been conscripted to work on the fortifications. it also women and children and old people, and soon because hundreds and then eventually thousands and the force this issue of slavery into the agenda of the war, the lincoln administration to make a decision of what to do with these people and the administration decides not to send them back and also very quickly with the end of supporting the union calls in important ways fighting for the union cause sometimes literally become laborers in the union camps. they become scouts and spies. as the union armies penetrated the territories they are only the friendly faces, the only people who come out and welcome them and help them, show them the way. and even weeks into the civil war as the general benjamin

butler what is sending of his force into what becomes the first significant land battle of the war. he sends out the force and right at the head of the force, along side of the commanding officers, is writing one of these escapes leaves sleeve and he has been ordering that this man be given a gun to use when they go into the battle. an extraordinary moment. this is about two years before what we think of as the beginning of black americans serving in the union army and of course the famous glory regiment and so, to me it's this momentum that the emancipation really begins. it's not something that lincoln sat down and decreed with a sheet of paper, and i close that chapter with a story that i love that hasn't been told very much and it's of the day that the emancipation proclamation is

finally issued and william seward, many of you have red team of rivals, you know that william seward was in many ways the sort of canny and crafty member of the lincoln administration walking across the lafayette square in washington and this was the emancipation has been proclaimed he runs into a union army officer and a man stops him and says secretary seward, congratulations on this great historical act that the administration has proclaimed today, and he says the great historic act, what are you talking about and he says well, secretary seward, the emancipation proclamation, you freed the slaves and he says emancipation was proclaimed in the first gun fired at fort sumter and we have been the last to hear about it and we simply let of a puff of wind about the established fact. >> very interesting.

>> of ha with -- -- this seems to me the south has tried very hard particularly in the political debate leading up to the secession and then beyond to appropriate america's founding documents, the declaration of independence, and the constitution. a little bit of discomfort with the declaration of independence because there's that all court mention of the quality, but nevertheless it is truly convincing themselves they were fighting a second american revolution against an overbearing government, and certainly they were also fighting for their own particular interpretation of the constitution. if i read your book in particular a very powerful concluding chapter you don't

want the southerners get away with that political argument. 1861 in fact not december very first its -- anp event i will confess i knew nothing about that and they deliver to congress on july 4th. and it is a shrunken congress obviously because they are missing the southern delegates. could you talk a little bit about what he found important about that message, i think a message that most historians have tended to overlook? >> lincoln, again, something that surprised me he and many people left the time fort sumter in spite of, lincoln called 75,000 militiamen to defend the

nation's capital and to be ready for this war is going to begin. and then he very quickly seems to sort of disappear from sight during this crisis, and in the white house, writing a draft after draft of the message that he's preparing to deliver is actually a special message to congress when the congress can be in the special session that lincoln is beginning on independence day, 1861 and people were sort of asking where is a bit in the middle of this, where is the president in the middle of this crisis? at one point with two or three weeks left until he has to present this document he literally tells his secretary no more calls to the white house i'm sort of locked up with my rough draft, and even ralph waldo emerson, a great writer himself, great introspective

thinker says this president of ours seems to be introspecting himself from this country to the point of disaster. to me lincoln in writing this document, which is not dealt as much attention as what we think of as the great lincoln documents, he was fighting a the war intellectually within himself. he was deciding and he was articulating what it was that was wrong about the secession, what was that the secession was and an existential threat to the united states and how this threat needed to be countered. the whole legacy of the american revolution was contested at this moment i love discovering the moment when in virginia at this for a i was speaking about deep in the confederate territory the union to strike on july 4th and plan to celebrate the holiday by firing off a bunch of artillery

solutions and then get wildly drawn to. then they start firing off their artilleries and very quickly disappearing from the other side of the james river confederate artillery firing and the santoli held and they are opening fire on us. and then they realize frequently the confederacy is also celebrating july 4th. who does this holiday belong to? of course july 4th was about the establishment of the united states of america and was also as a summer saw about the separation from a tyrannical mother country, a tyrannical powers from and what lincoln freely expresses in his address is that this july 4th idea belongs to us in the union and the reason that it belongs to us in the union rather than to the confederacy is that secession is

something different from our revolution. the american revolution, the revolutionary country significantly we are not represented directly within the british political system. that is what the revolution was about. taxation without representation. they were not given a voice. they were not participants in the system of majority rule and the southerners were and thus of ours simply decided to take their cookies and go home when something came up from the election that they were not ready to acquiesce to and so lincoln realized that this was not a revolution for liberty in fact is this the session was quite the opposite, succession is a rebellion for anarchy. and the minority holding the majority hostage so lincoln sends this message to congress, he reviews the history of what's

happened up to that moment in the crisis and he talks about how this is a people's context that is the great phrase that comes out as the people's contest, this is about old heavily democratic principles that involve. he uses the phrase that is about allowing the government to give its citizens and unfettered start in the race of life. something extraordinary and it's telling when you look at the rough draft lincoln originally said it's about giving the citizens and even start in the race of life which is a sort of much cleaner metaphor than the unfettered start when you were talking about the race but he struck out the word and he wrote in an unfettered which many southerners of the time said he's talking about slavery and you know what, i think they were right. >> if people want to start making their way down, i'm going

to ask why all you do that i'm going to ask adam one more question, which i warned him about and this might be a nonsensical question but it's something that is on my mind. ken burns was here at the constitution center a couple of weeks ago for a wonderful civility and democracy conference, and because of the anniversary they have been rerunning the civil war series and i think there's so many americans, probably many of you out there who understanding of the civil war has been shaped by that extraordinary documentary series. i also know that you are on a panel with ken burns just a few nights ago. do you see any sense is and which your book has a different emphasis from the civil war? >> i think that ken burns' civil war i do love and i hope my book does the same thing of the way

can uses individual stories to talk about history. he has those wonderful readings of letters, and he makes you hear those people's voices and live their experiences. i love that, there's a sort of sense of overarching poignancy and tragedy and suffering that so many have but that can sort of color our understanding of the war to the point that obscures' so much else. it did in that being an awful tragedy that people wouldn't know at that time that it is howard was going to turn out. and i think, you know, walt whitman famously said the real war will never make it into the history books. and he was saying the real war that he had seen in the union hospitals in washington was the war of human suffering and the

wounded and dying men. but i think if anything, we tend to date to focus more on that war of squalor, that sort of shared experience of north and south and of living to the horrors of the battle. that's true in the civil war series and i think that can sort of be it's so powerful, it's so compelling and it's so simple that it can sometimes ask complexities. >> the other photographers of the war, it's harder to capture in a photograph in a sense the glory and the idealism that -- >> and there was idealism but one of the great pleasures of studying and writing about the civil war era is that you do have just these incredible

letters, incredible photographs and music that when people talk about the fascination of the civil war era for us today i think we have to give a certain amount of credit just to that incredible legacy that we have and the way they can write letters and even the ordinary civil war private coming up with these incredible phrase is that the moment in history when the literacy was very wide spread but people's brains haven't been sort of the styrofoam of the mass culture jet. so they were capable of this kind of individual expression >> we are glad they wrote letters on tweaking helm. now the fun starts. i think i will turn in this direction because i can tell you are ready to ask your question. >> thanks, mr. good heart. you were just deluding to the tragedy of the civil war. and after not long ago i watched

of the martin scorsese movie, gangs of new york, and the horrible tragedy of the draft riots when possibly the know nothing party went after black people in new york and lynch to them in the streets and i was wondering if that happened in any other cities in the u.s.. >> know where was it as terrible as it was during those days in new york in the summer of 1863. but in fact, there were other terribly episodes of that sort of urban violence, that just sort of close quarters slaughter that wasn't that we think of the sort of ranks of blue and gray soldiers marching against each other. that is often what is portrayed at the gettysburg they used to have that sort of list of maps

you remember i saw it in fourth grade and you see it progressing as the winds are coming to 1960's thing. but, you know, in many places the civil war was much more like the civil war that we think of today and the place like the nazi defeat cubs bengazi, a very personal pleas of violence. one thing i dhaka that in my book is set louis missouri, where before any of the sort of noble blue and gray battles were fought at all, there was a street fighting who going on with civilians being mowed down in the streets of st. louis. it involved when you mentioned the know nothings of actively involved immigrants with significant extent. i won't tell the whole story now but i tried in my book to include these people coming to

america played a very significant roles and in the martin scorsese movie many people remember the image of the irish immigrant stepping off of the boat and being handed guns before they know where they are you remember this in the movie, and i think this sort of tarnished the irish immigrants reputation unfairly for a lot of people, and in fact a lot of irish immigrants are very idealistic for the union cause they had an experiment themselves of knowing what it was like to live under a sort of oligarchic a tyrannical regime, and there were irishman who marched in a regimen of the beginning of the civil war down broadway and all the regimens with a banner over their heads with the shamrocks and is said remember front and wild which was a battle on the 1740's sought by the irish against the

english, so there were so many complexities to the relationships. >> one of the most controversial aspects of 1861 was lincoln's suspicion of the writ of habeas corpus especially in the state of maryland. can you comment how buyer the situation in that state prior to his rather momentous action >> and lived in maryland halftimes of this is close to home for me and one of those places people are still fighting the civil war by offices up the street from the towns of war on the mend and from the north face inside is a list of the name of the men killed fighting for the union from our town on the south seas in sight and the fighting for the confederacy and last names are the same of of an old

house in eastern maryland but i wouldn't say that i'm restoring at holding up pieces before they crumble off and it's the house of a maryland confederate sympathizer with a judge who was literally dragged off the bench in the courtroom, beaten bloody and unconscious by lincoln's kunes for expressing his pro southern sentiments come from and to fort mchenry, one of these people without habeas corpus writing letters to lyndon begging at least to know the charges are against him and he gets no reply at all. so yes, the suppression did happen with some very brutal ways, and it happened because lincoln was very aware that the capitol, the city of washington couldn't be cut off. if that happened it might really sort of be the game over for the north and the very beginning of the of war in those first weeks pro confederate maryland made a

very concerted and jerry nearly successful effort to cut off washington and exactly in that way. i do think that lincoln -- i don't hold him up as a demagogue. i think that his suspension of habeas corpus can be argued about today but he certainly felt he had good reasons for doing what he did. >> i'm going to stay on this side because people have been lined up and then i will come back over here. >> thank you. >> if you look into the hearts and minds of the average american, not a study the historian, the average guy or gal at the lincoln memorial lab miring lincoln. do you think the average american admirers, loves lincoln because he played a significant role in ending slavery? because he played a significant role keeping the union together or because of this magnificent he has in terms of his political

sphere intellectual gifts and power. >> you feel that when you stand at the lincoln memorial and part of it is also because of daniel's extraordinary statute with such a presence in that temple. for one thing i don't think that every american does revere lincoln. in fact some of the best-selling books on the lincoln the past ten or 20 years are by thomas dilorenzo if any of you know this historian whose whole schtick is what an evil fascist pig abraham lincoln was. laughter, and it's something i felt also writing this series for "the new york times" there's a lot of commentators who want to paint abraham lincoln as well as a sort of pro obama, the guy that stands for arbitrary authoritarian use of the federal power to quash the states' rights and individual rights and

so lincoln is still a controversial figure. i think that it's hard to say why the average american does love lincoln if we do love lincoln but part of it is that he freed the slaves and that his story is such a magnificent story. his words are such magnificent words and those are things we can't discount and i believe as a historian the job of the historian is to be a storyteller and not somebody who believes as many historians do in sort of sitting of these people into these neat categories of the blacks, whites, the northerners, the southerners. that individually the house to be respected for them just as we understand how complex the individuals are in our own time. i think lincoln was such an extraordinarily complex individual that he speaks to our own humanity as individuals, too.

>> hello, adam, how are you? >> historians believe the civil war did not actually start in fort sumter. but in 1856 in lawrence kansas. what is your take on that? >> good question. you know, it's a great because my cousin is here. i'm looking out. [laughter] where are my cousins and the people from the class of '88. [laughter] looking for some of them. when the folks told me the event lead be fully booked i said 99% of the people are related to me. [laughter] any way, to get back to kansas, yes, bleeding kansas as it was known was this sort of place where america learned to kill other americans. as far this bloodshed began, and i do think it's fair to say in some way that the civil war

began there. that battle literally a battle over slavery began. i think in our country one of the reasons i believe we are so fascinated with the civil war is that in our space system we are always doing battles against each other. we even use the sort of metaphor is the bottles to the politics triet pravachol campaigns. you know, and so it feels like we are on the verge of the warfare but the civil war was the one time that that actually turned into real shoot them up warfare. something happened at that moment that guns start to fire to read a line is crossed from and especially as we've seen in our own times when people start to turn guns on their own fellow citizens. i do believe that kansas and 1856 was where the became a sort of credible reality, and without that moment the work wouldn't have eventually happened.

>> as a constitutional historian -- 1857 deride space. >> dred scott is important but that moment when as it were the ballots become bullets, that's a pretty big turning point. >> yes, sir. >> my question is about britain's response to the beginning of the civil war. i understand in the early stages of the conflict in britain was sympathetic and not supportive to the confederacy. and i would imagine because of the importance, the vital the importance of the cotton trade to the british economy in the middle of the 19th century. can you tell me when that attitude changed and how and why britain changed later on? >> i think when we talk about the british, again, it was a place and there were people complicated and is divided of course as americans are. and so, there were many

individual britain's the -- individual but since you were in favor of the confederacy. i think particularly within the ruling elites in england people felt challenged by the sort of upstart republican across the waters were challenged philosophically challenged economically in some ways and then they also did hear what would happen if these cotton exports from the southern states were interrupted. but they were a great many britons who were strongly antislavery. of course as we know britain had had its own strong abolitionist movement for many decades to really got off the ground before the american movement did, and it inspired the american movement to some degree. and i really think that it would have been very politically difficult for the british government to step in on the side of the government tested for slavery. i mean, plan victoria and prince albert themselves were strongly

antislavery, and i think especially as soon as that moment happened when the south fired the first shot better than the north firing the first shot i think from that moment on it would have been very difficult for the english, for great britain to come in on the side of the south. thank you. >> yes, sir. >> from walter reed. a general pierre, new orleans, was in command of the troops at fort sumter for the confederacy. i've also read as a rabid summer he was a gentleman of the first order. but i have never read that he personally tried to make the demand of major anderson to surrender the four honorably have lead under the rules of the war, seóul honor, the whole bit.

i was wondering if you could shed some light on that. >> this is good. this is the point to all of my courses in american history, and all of my readings i've never found anything to this effect that they tried to settle. stomach well, pierre gustave was a sort of marvel character and in the year of a great facial hair and a great facial hair even by the standards of the times and a wonderful much better than mine. but anyway, he is major anderson, the confederate man who becomes the confederate commander of the provisional confederate forces in charleston is a close friend and former student of major anderson to

consider garrison and he arrives to take command of these forces and the first thing he does is send a case of brandy and box of cigars across the charleston harbor to his old professor to express his continued esteemed and affection and was a different era and a different kind of warfare anderson being an officer promptly sends them back as much as he needed some brandy and cigars at that moment, but in fact she does sort of offer anderson these terms of surrender, and anderson and years of the terms of surrender but in fact he doesn't and the language that is used is wonderful. it's all my dear general, leader, have the honor to inform you that our batteries shall

opened fire within one hours of time. >> there were still open in five years. it didn't matter all that much. >> but there was no quarreling of any kind. estimate the general sent the aids across to the fort to attempt to negotiate terms with anderson by which he would withdraw peacefully, but anderson couldn't come to terms. >> said he fired his old teacher. you better watch yourself. [laughter] >> i'm expecting to answers. >> which of us is which? [laughter] >> the professors agreed that in the 1960's will the american

people started reinterpreting the civil war and it just happens in the 1960's where x essential threat like fire in the united states i wonder if we would ever come to the conclusion about history >> can we take that first that sounds like a heavy duty notte -- >> do you think we start of the disagreement of the test group because we are existential, we became existentialist. >> i would disagree with that. the arguments about history have existed a long as the history has existed. this agreement has existed as long as history hasn't. i don't think that is a bad thing. we sort of grow toward the

understanding of the agreement and we always see the past through the preoccupation of our times every right the past according to the preoccupation and it is right for us to do that. we are never going to arise as an incredibly complicated past as the present we are never going to arrive at one understanding of that so in may be some ways it is the history that teaches us to be good post modernists, good existential lists perhaps. >> i think we have one more question. is that a union army? >> good evening, sir. just a question, please. in regards to the writ of habeas corpus, i know that this has been brought up, but the chief justice declared that it was unconstitutional. my question, sir, is how did the

legislative overrule the judicial. in my readings it said that the justice said it was, you know, illegal, the highest court in the land says you didn't have a right to do it and i want to know how lincoln got away with it. >> lincoln got away with it simply by ignoring them. >> that's what they're reading said. that he had borrowed them. >> our constitutional system, and dr. demon can address this far better than on a. there was the process of working out in many respects in 1861. it was not entirely clear where the jurisdiction of the supreme court began, and lincoln simply decided to ignore the ruling. >> in the same vein and slightly earlier in the chief justice john marshall render the

decision to the cherokee indian land and andrew jackson said justice marshall rendered his decision now let's see him and force it. >> should we take one more question over here? >> one more. >> one more quick question. >> it almost seemed casual just before you opened the floor to questions. i'm just kind of curious. something to the effect of the majority being held hostage by the minority and i wonder if you could elaborate on that. >> sure. i think that, you know, within our space system, the very foundation of our space system is that there is a vote of one sort or another that of them at least a majority wins, even if it is just by one vote even as we've seen in our own time as the presidential election it can be extremely, extremely close. and ultimately, the entire foundation of our space system

is on the fact that when that happens, the minorities acquiesce to be as difficult and as painful as that may be coming and they say the remedy for this is that we are going to come back and fight another day within the system. as soon as that minority decides that they are going to pull out, the entire concept of democracy is no longer sustainable. when lincoln said in the gettysburg address it was for the government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth, he wasn't exaggerating. it wasn't rhetoric. the world was looking at this american space experiment, and that if it dissolved a very quickly within the sort of two or three generations into anarchy, that would be it. democracy would show that it was not viable. so i do think this was an anarchy and even a kind of terrorism against the

foundations of our space system, and lincoln's great genius was to hold to that understanding and not flinch from fighting and winning that war. [applause] >> it is a wonderful book. there will be a book signing immediately following this. i think out in the hallway. thank you all so much for continuing to support these wonderful programs of the constitution center. [applause] [inaudible conversations]>x?x?/

several war historian jeffry wert on of robert e. lee command of the army from janet 1862 to the battle of gettysburg. from the lehigh heritage museum in allentown pennsylvania this is a little more than an hour. >> good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. i'm the exit of director of the lehigh heritage museum in allentown pennsylvania. welcome to today's program. i'm delighted to have all of you here. we have one of the most esteemed civil war authors and historians in the country jeffry wert will

be speaking about a glorious army robert e. lee's triumph 1862 to 1863. this book we are delighted to say is a main selection of the history book club and of the military book club. this book is one of the most sought after several more books in the country right now today. he's the author of nine books and he's been writing about the civil war for 40 years. it took a one of to get that out. about 40 years, and he really is well known from pennsylvania to california. his most notable achievements, one of them is a biography on general james wall street of the confederacy's most controversial soldier. we are delighted to have jeffry wert with us. at the conclusion he will take your questions. let's get jeffry wert a round of applause. [applause]

>> thank you. good afternoon. [inaudible] many of you were so kind to ask questions. i'm in the timeframe but if you have questions i certainly would like to hear them or if you disagree with what i have to say. in fact i was thinking about coming down on the drive this morning this is the first full talk i've given on the book. so if parts of it don't make sense, forgive me. i haven't gone through this all together at this time so please, when i'm done i would like as many questions as you have. when robert e. lee rode out nine mile road on sunday june 1st, 1862, to the assumed command of the army of northern virginia, there were i will tell you very few people who were quite

optimistic about prospects. there were a few in the regiment but there were not many. he had that great virginia family name of west point, a model soldier in many ways, but he commanded in western virginia in the fall of 61 and between lousy weather and even worse subordinates there was a failed campaign so that kind of hung over his reputation. actually, he was temporarily exiled if you will to south carolina and georgia to build coastal defenses until march of 1862 when jefferson davis need a military advisers and she chose lee and joined davis. what was critical for the next march, april and may was these two men developed mutual respect and trust for each other, whereas davis had so many problems with johnston, if you

ask johnston he would have problems with jefferson davis, johnston withheld information from davis and the relationship was very icy and getting more difficult and then of course he written on may 31st in the seven times faeroe picks and as davis roadway that reasoning on may 31st, leave was with him, and you can make the argument was going to command the army and davis had little choice. there was no support and later to give it to so he turned to lee incident bring to a point you to every command. they expect it may be johnson with returns of that is how he got the job as being the commander of the army of northern virginia. when he joined the army, she realized very quickly that johnson was a bad administrator, so there was the organization of the army was weak, discipline in

the camps was miserable in many ways. they wrote to the wife at the time hundreds if not thousands of men would sneak away from the camp and enjoy the saloons and brothels of richmond when the cost basis you can't run an army that way. so lehane turned in her to them army that was not quite ready for what he was going to expect of them. i thought about this when i was doing it i was thinking you know, you can't write in a book that all of the stars aligned. people will think -- a historian, you can't prove also stars aligned. but in a sense, all the stars aligned for the confederacy on that june day. you have robert e. lee who was of an unknown quality and quantity but there is nobody really in the army potomac which

for the gates of richmond, and i know the names, some of jackson, james longstreet, jeff stuart, a.p. hill, dhs hill comer richard duals, lafayette, there simply was not in the union army those kind of subordinates. so, what they needed if you will was somebody who could take them somewhere and that was lee who rode out that morning on the sunday of june 1st. but did he do immediately? what he would do for the next three years, he went to work, he issued an order immediately saying that all commanders will have their brigades and decisions ready to move at a moment's notice. today's leaders. two days later lee decided he was going to attack the union army of the potomac.

what is critical to understand about this, and i think it is what becomes a hallmark of his general should certainly for the next 13 months but arguably as long as he could do it, lee at sesto if you will rationally some argued he had that in eight combativeness and maybe he had come it's hard to imagine that if you remember there is a famous conversation between one of david's aid and the what future great our tourist and the army, and this happened after he was taking command. ha alexander asked is general the audacious enough? we need audacity. and i said alexander, you're shortly going to see all of the audacity that you need, and in

richmond, and the attitude in the north was if you recall the shutdown the recruiting offices. they felt the war was going to be over shortly and there was every reason to believe it may be over very shortly. so winter of 62 was a winter where the confederacy had eight defensive, and the union army swallowed up the swaths of land and the largest city had been captured in new orleans. lee saw that the only chance they had against an opponent whose material might and manpower may not be unlimited, but it was certainly unlimited

compared to the confederacy. and he felt that you had to take the war to them. you had to assume the offensive. you had to take risks, because if you don't take risks, you are in a possibly for a slow death, and you had to prevent that lee calculated that the only thing that the confederacy needed to do if you will want to be on audacious and bold. some argue lee was too bold, but what i will tell you if lee was doing with the general's expected them to do. the line was any good ret could with ten yankees. they probably exaggerated the numbers, but they believed their boys could with a fair number of the yankees. they had a marshall attitude in the south prior to the war and the davidson administration, he

wanted oppressiveness but the southern people, so when ackley assumes the aggressor to -- aggressiveness he is doing what the people expected him to do, and by doing so if you are a general you can dictate within your theater how the campaigns are the operations are going to unfold as you well know it is a strategic or operational a sunset swithin today's he had conferred june 2nd and june 3rd if you of his commanders jackson still in the shenandoah valley completing his 62 campaign conferred with some but we have made the decision within two days to strike the enemy klaxon charles marshall who was the military secretary would say later in her writings and certainly mostly in conversations with lee and is reflected in lee's strategy he

believes the best way to defend richmond was to be as far away as possible from richmond. in other words, you have to take the war away from richmond. welcome what george mcclellan and the army of the potomac city on the doorstep, somehow you have to get them away from that. and if you jump ahead to 64, what happens? brandt takes the war to richmond, doesn't he? and enrichment to petersburg and the army is going to believe a slow death. so to lee yet decided away. the other factor in his calculation and this is critical to understand he will write about this time and again, and he paid close attention to what was going on in the north as a trivia his favorite newspaper was this philadelphia inquirer. he felt they had the most reliable correspondence with the army of the potomac. she would read other newspapers but his favorite was the sole

belfield inquirer. but anyhow, he knew that the conspiracy to win this war had to achieve a es on the battlefield but ultimately what they had to do was to break the will of the northern people. the will of the northern people to sustain a war effort in the face of defeat and sacrifice and losses of husbands and brothers and so forth that was some the center of gravity. the crucial thing that has to be broken, and to do that in lee's mind, you have to fashion together a series of battlefield victories that might break the will of the northern people and force, force the lincoln administration to negotiate a political settlement. the confederacy could never conquered the north, so they had to bring the north to the table.

and in lee's calculation as part of his strategy. so as many of you know, at the end of june, 1862, the confederate army struck, and the army struck and what is known as the seven days campaign. and we liked turning points in the war. and in any war. the civil war is famous for the diplomatic turning point, gettysburg and vicksburg is aimed turning point. well, in some ways a critical turning point was the seven days. the war changed. it took a new course because of the seven days. lee and his army are going to change everything in the east and for the next year. with george mcclellan's held in the sense he wanted to retreat and get away from them, but when they achieved that, the war is

going to change, and that is because of lee willing to do this. now, this is an army that will be not the army that he think about later. it's just a couple things that struck me as i was doing this, one of the standard things of course and there was a terrible miscommunication, jackson had a bad campaign that had been given over to fatigue and illness we are not sure what he doesn't do very well. in fact he had serious questions about stonewall jackson's conduct in that campaign. but one other thing that struck me was the amount of struckman. my goodness there was a lot of good southern boys that were not interested in fighting. when they can close to the battlefield they were not around and this would be a problem through a 62 getting into antietam but this is clearly a problem of that time. just for an example of how they were not a machine buy any means

and that a small baron hill. the question has been argued still remains argued and i just saw a recent article i think the civil war illustrate for america's speefestival war comparing lee and grant and i think the press in part is wrong in the sense that if you look at the western campaigns there are a lot more movements maneuvered. after a string of bloody battles in the west. it should be engaged in bloody battles you are going to lose more men than when you are marching. but my point is now baron hill. it is a line there and dhl said it wasn't war it was murder. the confederate troops were slaughtered. so they never had a chance against the union canyon. they were slaughtered. the important thing to remember, that is an example of the aggressiveness and the combativeness he was on the left

wing of the army late that afternoon with james and they were discussing this and she had decided to cancel the attack if they were going to make an attack. they were preparing possibly for an attack but lee decided he's going to cancel licht and then two things happened. two messages came. army from gettysburg he made in advance of these messages can to lee and see that we have an opportunity here and the federal sargen scurrying away, and as lee would say he wants to destroy their army. unfortunately, those pieces of information were wrong. instead of him ordering the map he was drawn into it by false

information and the result was murdered as he said. i say in my book because james longstreet said it ended up second manassas in fact second if you go to the park is manassas battlefield and in the march around john pope once they got in the battlefield the second of the assumed the tactical offensives until august 30 at and then with a counter attack and can close to destroying the the union army of virginia and to go to the house bill and it down below is the stone house and that intersection as they were to capture that they would have been scattered all over, many of

them would have been forced to surrender but they came close but they never did. from those seven days of the beginning of july until the end of august, somehow this army, parts of it came together. this was a different army than the seven days communication was much better. jackson got out of what ever bothered him more caused him to have a subpar performance during the 70's. he was the one that executed the flag of around it. longstreet is clearly becoming a solid wing commander to time both he and jackson, and in that sense it is in many ways the masterpiece even the chancellorsville was considered the greatest battle but if you want to look at lee -- essey, we have this image of lee and a lot

of minds, and i know why we have it because i'd imagine all of you have been to gettysburg? you walk out there from the virginia monument and you stand there where the alexander's guns are and look across that line and there is a clump of trees and you say how could he do this? ..

and he feels he has to take the war across the tarmac into maryland. the difficulty with that if he is looking at an army that is physically just worn out. they have gotten many miles, but they are going to follow. what is interesting we know from research of others is probably his army at that time is the neighborhood of 70 to 75,000 as it sat there just south of the potomac river, beginning in september. what is also interesting is he had to inform david at this. he wrote to davis and asked him if he was okay. but he wrote to davis to ask permission when he entered he started to hear me forward. you know, davis is going to grant it because davis, even in that year, earlier, there were discussions within the administration, how can we take

the word not into maryland, but into pennsylvania? you know, they wanted to expand the borders of the confederacy. when we crossed the river are companies going to risk a great deal. the straggling becomes epidemic. they probably last editor to estimate again. we know thousands of that number could not cross the river because they were just physically exhausted or ill. but more than likely, anywhere from 25,000 to 35,000 confederates during a campaign that's going to last two weeks are going to abandon the rings. they are going ahead back into virginia. i knit the second virginia, which is the stonewall brigade will go with jackson's commanding capture harpers ferry. and then they were ordered back across the potomac to go to sharpsburg -- well, they decided they'd been to maryland, seen

enough of maryland and they're not going back. and they don't go that. and they are basically doing duty south of the river. when you look at numbers, we ought to have this fierce and yet we study desks, how many confederates going to the field on september the seventh 1862. the consensus is probably about 40,000. i've gone through some of the records and other fellows have to spirit everything confederate regiments, folks, before the battle, not after the battles. before the battle 15 min, 25 men. these are regiments that are thousands in the rank of 61. so when you look at 50 men -- i remember the battalion if i think that a full regiment, but a battalion of eight. i believe it was south carolina if you look at these numbers.

what happens of course is lee is going to be criticized. why did you fight their? police explanation was it was better to fight a battle in maryland and to leave without a battle. but if you go to sharpsburg admitted that battlefield, it's a wonderful place in the sense that it is not -- i think gettysburg is a great place to go to, but sharpsburg, you know there is not a motel in town. these none of it. these none of it. it's hardly changed. if you want to stay overnight, you have to go back into. it's hardly changed. if you want to stay overnight, you have to go back up to hagerstown. it's a small battlefield in the sense. the potomac river is three miles back. his army faced possible destruction. what if you want? if he won he wasn't going to hurt the enemy at the potomac that much.

he can't pursue -- i mean, he's not going to tear into the rear of the potomac as he crosses south mountain. so what we asked his men to do as one confederate officer, i think it is the greatest day in the history of the army worth rank-and-file. sacrifice folks ventured the hours and minutes at sharpsburg for the confederate. there's a north carolina soldier who somehow had time to chat in his diary. my god, when will the sun go down? the sun seemed to hang in the sky. in the opening attacks and we note the east and west would send dunker chair chuck, one that fighting was over 3000 men thousand men on the ground and then it's going to shift to a recall bloody lane. and the yankees are going to

break through bloody lane. and who is in the front? james long street in detail, a major general rally not 200 then he could find somewhere. this is northern virginia at that moment and they are going to counterattack with 200 men are so. this is how close they came. and then you have the collapse and burnside gets rolling and the only thing that saves lee's army is the division. what he asked his men to do is simply remarkable. and they did it. and you know it is also interesting about it? as the battle was shifted from the north end through the center at the bloody lane, midafternoon and jackson has been there. what's left are hanging on in the west was had dunker church and so forth. lee sends a request to jackson

to have jeb stuart conduct around the army of the potomac to see if he could counterattack. they are hanging on by a thread and lee is looking to see whether they could counterattack the wing of the army of the potomac. the boldness of the very idea is astonishing. it really is. and of course it's an outcome of the bloodiest bloodiest day in american history. and lee would say later -- you would admit himself the wiki asked his army to do is probably the greatest moment. i would almost agree with that. and a safe tan. of course lee was all over the field. jackson was suburban so as long street and subordinate commanders. just as a phrase you may remember, john patrick's division of union, many came from pennsylvania. they were going to charge into the west words. they would lose 200 men in 20

minutes. 2200 men and 20 minutes because he didn't bother putting skirmishes out. they just plunged in there. this is the level of fighting you are going to see they are. in the aftermath of that, lee would establish what congress would approve and of course long street jackson became a two-quart commanders. it was lee who will promote to widen the date. james long street at the stonewall jackson. so was lee would've fallen in battle, long street would've assumed temporary command of the army, not stonewall jackson. i., you know, they are two different men in general. jackson i have always been amazed at how a man could oppose his low not only on his men, that upon his enemy. and jackson did that. i remember in april 62, he wrote

to his wife to create an army of the living god. and i believe that. always like to say, the only problem that jackson was hit whole bunch of centers following bad idea and a lot of them left the racks and so forth. there was jackson who would do this. i mean, he told vmi cadets as they are leaving, when virginia is succeeded, he said in the civil war, when you take this or do you the sort. from the moment stonewall jackson became a confederate officer, he had achieved the sword and he was throughout. james longstreet is a different man. james longstreet is probably the best act titian in the army. longstreet was much more careful in the expenditure of things. could longstreet at 101862 campaign? i don't think so. jackson knew the region, the second they what it took us they

would push men and push meant, we hijack this and push men and we understood it. but when you wanted to defend a position for you wanted to launch counterattacks, you didn't give it to old jack. u.k. they told pete and that's very longstreet has excelled. i'm not going to talk much about fredericksburg. as one confederate soldier said he was the best data we ever had. it's a terrible, terrible day for the army. you think about it. his regiments and brigades after brigade is going to charge toward that stonewall. and it's so has the, so heavy that dead men are moving because the whole it's very striking them such frequency that are actually making their bodies

move as more and more unit soldiers are going up that slope. it presented a place where the potomac proved the courage of itself in the front of stonewall fredericksburg. during the winter of 1863, lee would be plagued with what arguably would be a worsening condition that goes on and that is the shortage of food and so forth. and armaments and everything you need. he had to scatter units and it's only going to get worse and 64. this 63 is a precursor of the difficulties. lee was an excellent and the straighter. if you look at lee's confederate courier, most of his time is spent trying to load the army together. probably in assumptions that george washington was confronted with the resolution, the details of the ceo trying to make sure we have food, things like that. he hated paperwork and his staff

behind his back often to take a period i know we have this image of a foul temper when he was around. when he was aroused he had a foul temper and some of the staff would complain how they just wish the old man would calm down, things like that. the city called the tycoon behind his back. what do you say about chancellor go? it's epitomized. joe epitomized the redesign is movement against them during the war. i don't know if that's for sure when krantz manages to crossed the james, but nonetheless, hooker had lee cod. what the sub can do? he decides the real thing is

that river comes to the divides devices have become which is already outnumbered two to one and will send jackson against hooker. the critical day in some ways there is may 1. as hooker family is coming out of the wilderness, they're going to run into jackson and hooker will order them back into the wilderness. that negated their artillery. he didn't have calgary with them. the best thing about the potomac relative to the confederates was their artillery. they were well meant under henry hunt, but that was negated with this battleground that they chose and with jeb stuart been able to shut off all the avenues, meaning there is an area, they were able to execute jackson's famous link mark around the army of the potomac and of course in the afternoon they would've sold down the plank road and collapsed the 11th accord.

in the whole battle has changed there. they fared it can, it was a bloody, bloody fast for press works in these woods. jackson had been wounded the night before. you destroyed his good friend friend in the army and replaced it and they had to unite the wings of desire me. so he had to attack there. again, circumstances tell lee he had to attack. you have to unite the wings of his army. because they hooker figures that the gap there, he will bathroom possibly crash some segments of lee's army and they will do it and that is sedated really seals it more or less who's going to admit chancellorsville. joe hooker will retreat across the hammock and as many say this is lee's greatest victory, it is only expected.

when they heard the news about chancellor bill, he wrote what a glorious army. so i stole this words for the title. i had some poor choices for a title and this seemed like a glorious irony after chancellor bill, which i think is a fair description. it was said and does not know after chancellorsville and i think it's critical to understanding what will transpire, he does not know that he has defeated the commander of the army of the potomac, meaning joe hooker. he had not defeated the rank-and-file and many of the core commanders. george meade and john reynolds over on the verge of discussing the fact whether they were going to disobey hooker sorter not retreat across the river.

he had to send them an order saying you across the river. the rank-and-file is a different story. but there's no way lee could note that. and after chancellorsville, if you start to read all these things the confederates are rating, and they essentially okay, wherever the army potomac case, we'll meet at how we will put an period and that is the way they look at it. by the time they are going to reach gettysburg and pre-mantle of the british officer, other observers at the army, besides their own men, and they believed they were invincible. and they could probably have a right to believe that. why did set t-tango pennsylvania? well, charles marshall quoted him as were sort writings and so forth. marshall would say that from the

time the lee took command in the link all these campaigns together, dale came together. in other words, the safety of caring toward north was part of lee's ultimate plan. i told you that davis was looking and 62 in talking about the possibility that danny go into pennsylvania. and so, to lee here was an opportunity to finally do this. also, i think you can in some ways argued that this is the best army he commanded at a given point. now, jackson is dead. i understand that. i mean come you can't replace jackson and that's going to show. but don't ask me, please, if jackson was engaged to have been. i don't know. but anyhow, there's other commanders he could not replace. i understand that. but if you look at armaments of all the things that go into it,

but when you read their records in their diaries, there's very little stradling in pennsylvania, which had been a purse. lee called it the curse of the army. you're not going to see that in pennsylvania. are they going to leave the roads venture the cumberland valley? the outcome and are going to do that, but though the backend air. there's a difference. if you read a farmhouse and rate that, grads and chickens but come back to camp at night come here with the army. they're just having a good time. they have a very good time in pennsylvania. as leawood marched north, you can write to davis. they sensed at the time would come. it looks like we have a chance. in fact, it was the buddy

repulsed. this is our chance to maybe hit them again in freezeout come out with a victory and bring the lincoln administration to negotiating davis. davis was so taken and it sends, but he formed a three-man commission that would negotiate with the lincoln government upon the confederate victory in pennsylvania. so when we went north, he went north to settle. now, if you read his report, you'll get a different interpretation of that. it's almost like i'm taking the boys into pennsylvania were planning to spend a few times there on a holiday event, home. we are not going to fight a gentle battle. he didn't. on july 1st, folks, he was looking for the army of the

potomac in pennsylvania because he was hoping davis would march after him and be strung out. he did not want that site on july 1st. part of the reason when i was here, jeb stuart failed him in this campaign. some argued and he certainly had orders to do what he did, but anywhere he failed in serious misjudgment, last lee blind to what was then assigned. i'm the first 1863 across the south mountain and here is that rumble of artillery. he is upset because he had issued orders not to bring unafraid. he knew federals were in the area. who they were and how many. but of course on that day, it's one of the rare moments in the history of the army.

they were able to bring together more men on the battlefield than the yankees had. the bank at one point he urges about 28,022. these are the first in 11th or off the field south of town. so we had one another single that jury. everything he asked is meant to do, they did again. james long street will write their and arrive in the battlefield may be at 5:00, 5:15. he will turn his source out the seminary ridge and rate to the present-day seminary. he said he saw lee was engaged, so it took some time, looked across, but that then you could see the other hills to the rear. he concluded that's pretty good ground if you're going to fight the defense. so he met lee maybe 15, 20

minutes later. longstreet said general, we have the more we want them. all we need to do is move south maybe 10, 12 miles. find good ground. it will be done. and you can argue that he's right about that because it features jump ahead, the first time in the history of the army of northern virginia, where the holiday battlefield and were driven from it would be april 2nd, 1865, 1 week before appomattox. they are going to defend the crown. chances are pretty good that the yankees will not drive them from the ground. we looked inside no, if they are there tomorrow i'm going to attack them. he said if they are there

tomorrow, there's a good reason we shouldn't attack sent. that is arguably the most serious controversy of gettysburg. longstreet believed at this point we are missing too many lives and have decided on the defense. yet the sound argument and not defense. we have no way of knowing what you would assume. again, this isn't just based on some kind of guests. the confederates had held seminary way for the yankees to see what lee was going to do. yamasaki thinks that 10 is going to attack. can you imagine the senate telegram. lee's army is a mile away and i am watching them. i don't think that would. in fact, it's a 10 dozen attack on july 3rd, he may soon have to be on july 4th. i can't give you a definitive

answer on pickett's charge in that sense. i can do what lee said to tell you what he did. i probably asked more than he could deliver. i think that's right. to think that he had to believe they could take that position because if he did not believe that they could take perry rich on july 3rd after what they had done july 2nd, they came very close to a second. but it is a different army at the potomac they are fighting as one surgeon with the later. we are aligned by jackasses. there were fewer at gettysburg than there were prior to that. take out the leadership they deserve there. it's a sense of invincibility. it is the sense that whatever i've asked these vents to do,

they have done for me. one thing you can't calculate busy right about northern virginia, how do you calculate the fighting spirit of these men? you can't measure it, but it's there. there was something about the confederate infantry others would write about. longstreet would say later i do remember the soldiers. others would say, but they were different. they had this planned, the spirit that you look a what they do in this period of time and you say, where is it? it comes from within. on the other hand, unfairly by history as we look at the potomac and say they don't measure up. yeah, those police measure up. they were commanded by mcclellan, pope, burnside and hooker and a few other lesser

lights and things like that. so it's also leadership. but on that day in july but heard, as i consider it in since the enemy must've believed they could do it because they always had. they step out there and that they are in the bridge the guy who went out i told you about subject division. those were the fellows who stood and shouted fredericksburg, fredericksburg. one of them said,, come to death a day waiting on them and they held because they were lying or family underestimated that. he had misjudged his opponent. and for many in this confederate army. these boys, gettysburg, the boys in blue, gettysburg becomes a redemption for it. if you look at gettysburg, gettysburg is private combination of what we plan to do if you will from the time it

took command. when he took command and they will move out in seven days as they told you, the war in the east change. they redirected the war. i think they case the confederacy the only chance of winning the war. so if you will, i think figuratively and literally the army and northern virginia was reborn in june 1862. thank you. [applause] [applause] >> well, mr. wert is going to take some questions now. anyone who would like to ask a question should step up to the microphone. don't be bashful. we have a gentleman here. okay, sir.

>> this has been perhaps the most dramatic and interesting and comprehensive discussion of the civil war. thank you. they also make a suggestion that in the future, that we have a screen showing the geographic relationship of all the times he mentioned. it would really complete our vision of what you are saying. he said a great message. thank you. >> thank you here that's very kind. the reason it's not there is i'm probably a computer. everybody asks me, and you know powerpoint? i'm thinking powerpoint? just as a confessional, i write my own books on legal pads with cheap pens because i have a wife who is a wonderful site.

she takes everything into the computer for me. and then says you know what, jeff, this is, which i think she enjoys. [laughter] but your point is well taken. i agree with you. i'm too old and too ornery, but i'll think about it. thank you. those are very kind words and i appreciate it. >> hi, i'm joe yudkin, director at the lehigh museum. what do you see about scholars and lay people who consider lee daytrader and have thought that the best thing would be to have executed him? what are your thoughts on that? >> is a very very difficult question. interestingly i think about a week ago we saw online in the

"washington post". he could not understand whaley was so pretty in america because he was a traitor. i think every confederate arguably i guess if you will come up philander standing with the trick-or-treaters. but the finer moments in our history our moment they think in a sense of forgiveness and lincoln saw that. johnson would do it for different reasons. remember, harry truman does it after world war ii themselves. and yes, they were in a sense if you want to look in the now confines of the constitution. but you know, we're a country created by traders. they were in a line of traders.

and too bad they weren't. they were just following in the revolutionary father's footsteps. and that is why to have executed the everybody else by leaking officers family abandoned even the idea of bringing davis to try out after having an imprisoned for two years or so. but the men who fought against some, if you look at them, that is what they couldn't understand. they couldn't understand how can you southerners risk this country quiets this is like no place on earth. they bought into american exceptionalism. they really did. i mean come on a guy from wisconsin can they been fighting for the best country, they got it at that time. so in a sense, technically i

guess constitutionally since i'm not a lawyer, they were, what lincoln would've done certainly already calling ben johnson would pick the best thing to do is heal this terrible wind and go on and let these men go away. yes, arguably the almost destroyed the country. we have to go for night and that's the way i look at it. >> excuse me again. how do you compare the mentality of the confederacy as a revolution, very much the same way we are seeing in the middle east. people are striving for identity and recognition. can you interpret that in the confederacy? >> i don't think so. there's a real argument to be named by the top down revolution and the confederacy.

this has led guy there classen politicians. what you are seeing assuming in the middle east is not the wealthy. i don't think there's many very wealthy and established areas in the streets there. i think they are trying to cling to a because there are people like gadhafi. again, i don't know for certain anyway. but in fact, northerners saw in those terms that time, disses slaveholders pulling their people into a war. you know, they're the ones who blamed for these leading slaveholders politicians to sessions. so i think it's a different economy. in many ways, too, the american revolution was actually led a man who had a lot to lose. it is unusual revolution is not

parents. mostly as you point out, it is the people who want to gain something. our revolution was led by a man who had a lot to lose. so in that sense, it was a different one. [inaudible] >> was it really all lee's fault or did the commanders under sub can really let him down? for instance, i guess the attack didn't take place when they were supposed to. the artillery bombardment was on schedule. nothing seemed to be scheduled right. and finally, longstreet agree to the attack and to place much later than the schedule. another point was a costa rica mander -- calgary commander, there was some field and he was

being acquitted to come in back of the union line and had men they are trained to take over the canyons and everything else and they really let him down by not getting through to do that. so really between them all, they had stripped lee of his planned. is that possible? >> i can answer that in a number of ways. first of all, one of the favorites for its of historians and for anybody else is where the 10 reasons for the confederates to have lost a gettysburg? what always is interesting to me is the number 12 union army. they never make the top 10 and they should probably be in the top three. but anyhow, with that said, longstreet made a critical mistake on the night of july july 22nd. lee wanted to take his division on the field at dawn. they were going to attack the

same. they had attacked twice i can't. we field a peach orchard into the southern part of it. longstreet does not send the border. he comes up with a very lame excuse. so the pickett's charge that you know and we all know that yes indeed cobbled together by lee put together because his original plan would be to attack at dawn and renew the assault at cole harbour. so yes, lee had to change that. so during the morning, he'll put together what we know as longstreet's assault, more familiarly pickett's charge. for the team at jeb stuart, i wrote a biography on the third day of gettysburg. i have looked and looked like everybody else. and i cannot find that piece of paper that says jeb stuart is supposed to attack the rear of

the union army at gettysburg when a breakthrough. i think stewart was sent out there to protect the plank, possibly it's unclear because jeb stuart says in its report upon instruction of the commanding general. that's all it says. well, job, we assume you were cute. but he doesn't tell us what they were. this idea that he was supposed a knife in the army as they broke through has no paper trail to say that's the case. he may have been trying to get to the baltimore pike at two taverns, which would've cut supply line. he was out there anything part of their would've been certainly we don't think we've met with stewart. if he met with any corps commander that night, it would have been. he certainly doesn't mean that the old war long street. there's no evidence that i could have found.

so whatever instructions he received in paper, whatever our god. that's all i can tell you. longstreet -- sub 10 would say that night he could not understand why mori and for not pointing into the assault. in longstreet had commanded in the division. he sends two brigades forward with that. he's ready to move forward with the other three, canceled the order. if you read her diary, they wanted to go up and have longstreet for the fact that he didn't send them. james kemper would call the union position at gettysburg a cul-de-sac attempt. so they didn't go. so there's a lot of reasons. but every army makes -- it's a human endeavor, right? but i hope that straight out. pickett's charge was a put together a fair because of

pickett not been on the field when he was supposed to be, which was not george pickett's fault. that burden rests with james longstreet. >> at the end of day one and day two on the left wing of the confederate army because they think they sort of abdicated authority they are and gave the great opportunity both days, but primarily on day two. he was sort of nonexistent. >> everybody heard that question. it is a very good question. one of the other controversies of gettysburg is the deal with the shoot of richard jewell, recently married, contributed to his problems. [laughter] well, that's what they say. he lost his fightings. really? [laughter] my wife is here. you know, i am with you on this

because lee send them a note with walter taylor saint if you can take the high ground, take it is practical. so he looks at it with old jim morley and go, you know, that's pretty tough ground dictate. we're going to need help. because johnson division is set. so he writes and they sent word back to lee said camejo press? lee chicks with ellen says i don't think we can. so he goes around and says okay, what we'll do is when johnson's division arrives, we'll have him attack. the problem with that is you will did not clearly tell johnson did he expect it have to do it in the dark. that is to take all. if the union position of gettysburg is that.

i mean really. nobody in here -- that's a lie. there is the people in here that know a lot about civil war. lieutenant colonel david allen, you know, he was the joshua chamberlain of cold sale on july 2nd if you want to make that argument. but i know from being gettysburg when he at times, the jet daniels and jeff daniels won the civil war at gettysburg. you just look at the movie and we all know that. but you are getting to july 2nd. said 10 win over that morning and asked what he could to. he said you know, i don't think we can do much. but lee said he will move forward with longstreet and a demonstration of to convert into attack. lee's method of command prior to that was there on the ground in

a sense of closer to it and he could do was long street and jackson. it's sort of falters at gettysburg and that is one of the reasons. porter alexander will write the army has to be a well oiled machine and i gettysburg it claimed. ap hill is hard to find. when i was writing july 3rd, where was he? i could not find a contemporary piece of paper. i wanted to limit my resources and funders to sit under as it was reasonably fresh in peoples minds. the only thing i found was a postwar count but said he'll stood by. so there you have he'll been insane units heading out problems do not. so when the sense that the

machines we created partly came apart at gettysburg. but yet, i don't want to not emphasize, you know, dates you can't take away from william scott hancock. you can't take away from the irish brigade, phil donner brigade. to do that is to discredit history and discredit those men. they put up a heck of a fight at gettysburg and they did beat the army of northern virginia. it's as simple as that. and we go through all -- the reason we deal with their is we are pretty low now the confederates upon the military histories of the war. the losers ready battery history of the war than the winner is because they think most northerners have gone on with their lives and saying we won. get over it.

[laughter] you know, down there -- and i respect that. down there, they have heard the stories they've heard about their great grandfathers farm been burned another things. and you've got to respect that heritage that they have in that sense of and has great. and to them, there's only one more down there. you know, really when you talk to many of them. but to uscome in that sense they since 18 northerners have john. i don't know how true it is anymore, that the old adage in the book business is if you want to read a civil war book from the three every four will be sold stuff that makes indexing. to write yankees is to not sell books. [laughter] now, i've written them both. but anyhow >> were going to take one more

question. that said. >> my question is about a year or two ago, a book called lee's army you cite his book in your tag. how different is the interpretation? >> it is a wonderful book. it's a more quantitative book in a sense like that. i think 600 letters diaries and memoirs he used to get a profile of the army, where joe did not go into great depth on the campaigns. that's what i look at. mine is more the campaign and the leadership row. my book is not encourage ms. of the battle and tea. it's one chapter. gettysburg is to only because of all the movements. chancellorsville is one. i try to portray the sense of what it was like to combat first of these battles.

also mistakes or leadership or so forth and all that. joe's book is a wonderful book based on a lot of years of research. he wrote an excellent book in a use it because he profiles numbers. but his chapters on the campaign, that was not his purpose. my purpose is primarily looking at the campaigns and the battles in the sense of what the army was doing and not. so that is where we differ. thank you. >> thank you all for being with us. [applause] >> welcome would like to thank all of you for being with us today and jeffry wert for the insightful presentation. we hope you'll come back and visit the lehigh heritage museum.

now mr. wert is going to sign some books.