>> i believe the last 20 years has been the agent inception. the end of the cold war led to a new universe. i remember being in the british army at age

181991 -- 18, 1991 nobody knew what they're doing they have never seen action. since the korean war. fast forward and 12 years and i find myself standing in a cemetery alongside officers of the same regiment from the fighting in bosnia and kosovo and afghanistan and iraq. we meet the we would never go to war. and that seems to be a movement initially from triumph and to weigh to a

sudden moment of despair when confronting the core which we were unable to control. the third act of from 1994 when they rediscovered those the things that it could do so as a young diplomat when i left, i move to 92 kosovo and bosnia i was then the high tide that to we had the formula and this of course,

led to the edge ramp that led to afghanistan in this sense we were told they could not do it in bosnia or kosovo and people said we could not do it to an iraq or afghanistan. and then a humiliating mess a terrible realization over the last nine years the limits of our power common knowledge and legitimacy. i believe we should not come to the end of these two decades simply from despair and isolation. the middle period suggest there are things the international community is capable of doing. i believe we achieve an enormous amount cannot those

that we congratulate ourselves. the story when i arrived in afghanistan the end of 2001 was that we were not doing enough. taking our eyes off the board and people said we were distracted by a iraq. we have not brought enough troops, money, and as a consequence handed over too much power to human rights abuse the warlords, a central structures not emerging and we had not done enough. in retrospect it looks pretty good today. that period where we felt we were not doing enough which 85% of afghans which there was an explosion from all

last week certainly my blackberry works better in kabul been in some districts in england. the central bank, the currency and to restructure investment, have been in those four years and we continue to boast about it today. when they say it is not as bad as you think we have 3 million more girls in school they are talking about what happened in 2003. however, we became frustrated. by the end of 2005, the story did not begin in the united states by europe, that america had taken its eye off the ball. we had to do counterinsurgency and deploy more money. i found myself at a kitchen table sitting down with the deputy head of the united nations and number two of the british and embassy and they were saying we will deploy a troops in to the

helmand province of southern afghanistan and i was horrified. i said why would you do that? with 300 special forces sitting not doing a great deal. and they went to send 3,000 soldiers down and they said the reason why is we will bring economic development and security to have an impact on the people. i said i can assure you, you will not be able to do any of those things. this is not because i am a psychic. i failed to predict mubarak would fall quickly. i get things wrong but not because i know an enormous amount but i had been in iraq -- iraq and had seen the tendency over the last two years. i said what will happen you

will not achieve any of those things. then you will say, the problem is we don't have enough troops, helicopters, then you will want more and more and start the insurgency. and they said they would write down on a piece of paper, saying they would achieve the objectives of than six months. if they had not achieved the objectives they would knowledge it was the wrong decision in say they did not have enough troops or helicopters our resources but of course, what actually happened is we began to go from 300 troops up at 3,000 about 5,000, 7,000, 9,000 ultimately 32,000 foreign troops holding down an area that contains 3% of the

population in afghanistan. nothing sustainable was achieved. my friend could travel through home and abroad but it's as a single corner safely. the man in his 60s speaking it could foresee and he traveled remember him staying in areas which are now war zones. now there is a huge debate about the relationship between the troop deployments and the insurgency. many people believed the taliban proceeded with no relationship. but my experience is the big

taliban insurgency came after words. and i suspect elbowed difficult to prove that a troop deployment allow the taliban to present them sells as fighting for afghanistan against foreign military occupation a gave the perfect propaganda tool. if you go on to the taliban website at the switch did not recommend for everybody everybody. [laughter] the basic propaganda message is we are against corruption , a civilian bombardment, the governments in kabul and we're not living under foreign military occupation. that is part of the mobilizing structure to get people together. so what does this mean? the one thing i have taken away is a sense of real confusion that goes right to

the heart of what it means to be a politician. along time arguing against troop increases, i move to harvard where i would is very lucky man with six people between them to spend over one century in afghanistan. , while they were born in pakistan in the fifties or working in afghanistan since 19707 sa peace corps volunteer, in another had been working since the late 80's speaking the afghan languages fluently and had been to almost every district in the country. and they have said consistently set the policy that surrounded from 2007 was misguided.

that by sending more troops we would not improve the situation in. it was not creating stability but instability. that we had opportunities that we were undermining the opportunities and then counter narcotics favorably into account of what we could do to combat the her when but yet nobody listened to these people. i gather these people around the table and the senior officials kind of a listen to them. but in the end it seems to make no difference at all.

so these people who seem to have so much experience at least a the foreigners, you'd need to contrast. there are probably 50 people like that and i am included but turning up after 2001 had none of that. with their british embassy may be the military or the 12 months to wordpro -- . [no audio] and then to speak the afghan language sue evade the dprk diplomat you spend a lot of time sending e-mails or organizing visits or

answering the general's request. even if you are an officer. what are you really getting? you are a 38 year-old british major and arrive in the country and maybe you like afghans are maybe you don't you do not speak the language fluently. you walk around in body armor with people trying to shoot you. you try to have a meeting with the afghan tribal chiefs. and out of this complicated process you tried to create economic government's and above all what you do to say i inherited a dismal situation. and the government having no

idea what he is doing. but then the foreigners came in and we grasped the situation and got rid of the police chiefs and as i a understood said tribal structure replacing in then we had some schools and clinics that went very well but then in a way it was not possible. then i have no idea what my predecessor is doing. and then promoted from the deputy police chief and telling the this training was fantastic but it doesn't

matter where have made development situation and i had been in iraq 2003 tooth through 2004. but then was briefed by the new colonel but six of 12 months later he said ihop no idea what my predecessors were doing. i arrived here and there was an absolute disaster. hundreds of people lined up outside my building price they go to the afghan government. but this is insane. everything i have done or is she has collapsed been forgotten.

but the bottom line is you should not be listening to people like me are others who have much less experience and have not seen afghanistan or have the experience. nevertheless we do not listen to the people. a what i have realized is whether an academic and not not, there was a 60 page document arguing over it.

to sit down with his senior general or ambassador to say this is not going to work because you misunderstood the relationship between the police chief and then it is tough to get things done with the afghan government. forget it. forget that details. the things that matter, it is the only conclusion is the year and gilts and optimism. here. a lot of what happens in the countries is driven by fear. afghanistan nor are rack is an existential threat to global security. and it turns out the first

kind of spirit is we are very, very frightened of that country bork iraqi is. arad has the existential threat to. but then to say vietnam's poses the greatest threat that has ever faced man. that is first but the second kind is we're not worried about the country itself of foreigners to come in. we're not really worried about afghanistan itself but al qaeda who come to afghanistan to use it. the russian foreign minister in 1867 who said it is in the nature of civilized countries facing while barbarian man's if they do not settle is the threat so

it is a failed state that the third kind is not about the country but about the effects on the nabors. if afghanistan false others will get their hands on the nuclear weapons. and then it is called the dominant theory. and the fourth category of fear the more than a great thing of that logical structure is every conceivable the year but regardless what this country does our does not pose a threat, we will be defeated and humiliated. we are afraid of our pride

and our reputation will not allow us to be defeated. the weakness will be exposed to the world. this is the argument that was made in the first and second quarters per crowed 1842 come on the british army retreats and 14,000 people were massacred and the muskets firing and the 3,000 people over a 5-mile area and the single last may and. the story of the british parliament is we cannot allow this to happen because it would eliminate the credibility of the british empire. we have to get back.

it is the same thing of 1880. when we were defeated again, we had the same central fix. the same idea the reputation is eliminated around the world. this is the difference is we could overcome this. for some reason it was possible for people to stand up to say it is not that bad. the loss of zero shucking in march said and i quote, we have nothing to fear.

although the less they will dislike us. that is it. the second of course, is killed. -- when i was speaking to the british two months ago i had sitting in a front-row a man in new sitter you suggesting we die in vain? this is the whole question. "this is it." there is no point* of my standing up but it's the

only question is there are ways but they are not very good ways. i made a speech that no soldier dies. and there was a time that people thought that. the dubai your copy of the iliad, you don't get a sense the soldiers died in vain. it does not take that position. she does not think the fact the somehow out undermining the hair was some. there was a time when the retable to honor and respect.

for that sacrifice. the regimen for the country without but today that is very different. today you have to say but it would be very difficult unless they had to sign. >> and the blood you are steep din in makes those tasks tedious. >> that brings me to the final thing that his optimism. this is in the idea and a. making a joke earlier about the fact that since 2005 i

had the most extraordinary secrets. but a new strategy delivered. the general of 2005 but 20006 but then to become a friend for the taliban prepare 2007. >> i will keep going. 2008, 2009. knee deep in that decisive year. 2010, the british foreign secretary said it is a decisive year. 2011 saying this is the decisive year. what is happening?

somewhere, you can understand if you want the optimistic military. you don't the soldiers, who say we cannot do this. but it is something that every problem has a solution. i remember going to see ambassador holbrooke of four -- four years ago and said the situation is completely an acceptable. what will we do? >> but he said go get them. i will give you three months. way and come back with a solution. no. i am understand how this happens.

but you look at this and say it is horrible. people are being killed, pirates kumbaya terrace, famine, we have to sort this out. what do we do about the situation? >> i feel that to temptation most wrong way about the situation sino the least about. the less i know of a situation in the more libel i am to feel threatened. there are to clear things that we need to make sure. but going back to what i do know about, is would choose good now to give an example of know if it works in the united states, but if

somebody said the situation in south chicago is completely unacceptable. literacy, crime, i wanted you to sort it out in two years. maybe you are a community organizer or social worker in say i have been working there 20 years rehab programs running and it is a complicated system. don't give me problems come give me solutions. no. the problem with international is the problems are exponentially more difficult. it is a very difficult to do with problems or at least three have the last two weeks plymouth those are terrible but we speak a common language and have a

free media and the centuries of leaders in the insurance but those special problems and the the five of 7 miles across the world in bush you have been locked into the compound which does not operate which there is no accountability because nobody is elected and nobody pays taxes but then you have a problem. yet, but to think those maybe easier. but let me finish and remind you is fierce-- three things

for pothier and gilts and optimism. thank you very much. >> caller: [applause] is. >> this is a large crowd. i am a child of vietnam's. while you're talking i could think of a president johnson and admiral allocate allocate-- mccain the general abrams and the observation is that are we so stupid that we keep going through this every generation? you talk afghanistan and iraq we have the same conversations of the unnumbered are we really that stupid? >> it is a very good question.

not so much stupid but these things are emotion no. that is why i talk about fear and guilt and optimism. there is nothing wrong with their brains but it has to do with their culture and our roles but. wrote in a way if you are a commanding general of our ambassador there is a limit. in fact, i have enormous respect and admiration or general eikenberry. but i notice as soon as he began to criticize, whom ever bred day would leave period -- impressed and they now pay is up to it.

of i think he will be proved to be vindicated in 20 years. but as soon as you begin to say those things something meighen's you are stretched. it is not a question of intelligence. we have an argument with general petraeus and he can chop you up 75 ways. and he can show with this is working. but the problem is and i did not know what we could do as the public or politician. i do know that my whole speech today sounds fine and

people could applaud year, but i could have a tabloid newspaper to say trace the politicians in sold since the troops but i can be disgruntled. >> that is true? >> but if an you imagine in a new workday politician but unknown in of koppel visits come much to have the confidence to take on the experts say and the giono's because of his extraordinary about times. a few steps that far outside of the establishment.

>> if you're in politics 20 years ago, i hope that you remember your book. [laughter] thank you very much. [applause] thank you for the work you have been doing. i met you in afghanistan in 2008. >> good to see you again. >> my question involves hitting said they all on the head to get the international community to get those rights. my question involves to take a day save them to work with you or like the governments of fund the budget but don't do what we ask them to do hawed we know freer correct or when it lourdes wrong and

but the bottom line is of course, that we have understand, intellectually it is not our trade. this year they will spend 100 and afghanistan. that is so much money it is unimaginable. i was three dain korver douse critique but it regains they would spend $8 billion per year. >> so instead of fish like a sovereign type of country be he has a different idea. karzai broadly speaking has say traditional it is part

of the tribal chief man would do too do? we contradict him and his brother is a drug or he cannot have the police chief for governor. is this a sensible? what we end up doing overtime is creating their relationship spending 125,000,000,002 support the president but yet we have humiliated and undermined and micromanage him so now he is but they are undermining all of hour. >> you don't have to be a great mafia boss to see what you should be doing is to decide whether or not i should be president.

you delegate and let him run it as he wants to. if you don't, can you get rid of them? to make the worst of zero votes is to keep him there cnf with the said stage situation and the actual core is not without incident. i went to the british ambassador recently. the president basically sat there for 25 minutes same bed counter insurgency strategy was of a waste of time, alienating the people he can understand why people joined the taliban and he may be paved -- join also. then they said it seems like we agree. [laughter] i don't have an answer except to say that but then

going out exactly a that way. i can talk about that. but with the war crime treaty. thank you. >> you mentioned three aspects of how this stuff happens. i would like to read to more one is career. you spoke about that. it is beyond me to understand how people like clayton powell can somehow not speak on memorial day but yet we've for debt of this is one of the people who stood up before the united nations and told everybody about the aluminum tubes and got us into a war

that seems to be a mistake. colin powell. >> some that's it is one aspect. somebody starts to make a lot of money and we don't even know where billions of dollars have gone. i would like you to speak a little about what is going on that we really don't see she. >> that is a very good point*. it is true that to money matters but doesn't necessarily the way that we immediately assume. $125 billion per year co-op everybody and it corrupts everybody and it is not that there is the of military

industrial complex with the president tells them what to do but what happens is you create a huge industry overnighter 10 years where people who write books, professors at universities, members at think tanks begin to get sucked into the system. the amount of money swirling around is beyond dvd's. it is almost impossible somebody in the united states to has the slightest acquaintance of afghanistan not be able to make between 500 and $1,000 per day as a consultant. almost impossible. i have not met anybody who cannot do that. this is where more money is interesting. you can understand the arms manufacturers but it takes some time to realize save the children, care, could

begin to endorse some of this but it is not that they are part of the military but they will be taking money for good reasons to live the humanitarian assistance. they are terrified and do not want it to happen again. it is very convenient for those who take the money to know what they're doing and very convenient to endorse the canvas but the president of afghanistan said to me, please stop describing afghanistan as the humanitarian issue but we must be the number one terrorist threat to because

if we're not we will not get any money. now this is where it could affect and by those could well mean people who tried to run businesses syncing i am on the side of the taliban or the ban who feel i will fly to pakistan by all major nonprofit organizations and think i will leave today? but that is before you get near the armed manufacturers. >> could you talk of a tow bid about the bias that a

lot of people did not get hurt cut and now they have made a huge mess but if they answer as a complete failure to a plant that in between period where we had already abound-- abandon them in before they went back can. it is not simple. it was a mistake but what do you do to get out of the mess? >> the central question which is raised by many pay paul we can make of stories

about what we could do. what i would like to say to you is rich but we could increase the likelihood with the foundation and creates a situation where al qaeda could not development where the consistent really should get as a result the -- reasonable solution. but none of these are guaranteed. they're so disappointed. and it does not make sense. not in terms of the american

in national interest or in terms of the moral obligations of the world to continue to keep 140,000 troops in the ground of afghanistan. not to say that we don't care but there are 40 or 50 other countries we need to think about. if we are worried about terrorism egypt is more important or simply about human misery then chad is more important. we cannot allow ourselves to feel through some of gilts. a sense before the situation for the we're not improving that we have been in the country about 15 years and have given it our best shot

and have lost lives and spent a lot of money but we will start to come out in a sensible way and manage this situation the best we can but treat afghanistan the way we've treat other countries around the world will not imagine it is the existential threat to keep the president's may need to do what the united nations. >> hello. you were talking about money earlier. why so much? i noted that the united states they paid between when budget thousand and $1 million? >> the price has gone up. >> why so much?

>> because you bring it is that amount of money paid to afghanistan. every afghan becomes a contractor and the economy is growing but there was some saying approaching but the entire taxation and revenue comes from the government is less than $1 billion per year and we're putting in 125 billion. we're spending every year in afghanistan just to train the national army, a 12.$5 billion just to train them. the entire revenue would not have a a1 month training course. it is invoice doing that with very strange results.

>> day do say you thought it was a failure but also 2003 to 2005 in the book you also noted the end goal was to create a gender sensitive multi as next day based on end democracy. do feel that was achieved? [laughter] supposing next week we talk about the job in the government. give been what you have done all your interest was sort of responsibilities du hopes to have been mined? [laughter] >> that is a fair and helpful question. [laughter] >> i love running things and

one of the things i loved about working if this but then my biggest resources should be able to make the trip. and we have 320,000 and 3,000 and speaking the afghan language. but in the entire section last year there is not a single person. the institution has too much with management best practices. the language common knowledge, the.

>> q sputter -- spoke about the ways they reinforce the policies. >> how might it dissuade us? >> this is wonderful program not sure of the answer. plant if you could rebuild the it then to get the space, that is one. budget to the second is to try to shift the views of what the descend chin is about. put it put around the

corporation's idea of how many troops or how much money you make. how many people? but you get the idea. the basic idea if somebody is stuck on top of a mountain and you send up a team to get them it is like interception. there is some things you can do to prepare like have a patent to run map but second, there are some dangers you can avoid. if you sudden they find a the frost on the grass but there is a whole set of dangers you cannot predict. coming in there is the avalanche with the altitude sector and the most

important thing in that situation is to know when to turn back. if you are a the fire man o' war policeman's, -- but the basic deal should be to understand there may be limits to what you can do. you will do your best to stop the severance pay you have to acknowledge something may happen when you hit the ground. and i have invested so much in the guy is stuck up there and that is what gets you killed. but it is to try to give back. >> we will take the

last three questions. >> i wanted to take this and a slightly different direction in regard to the era of spring and in libya you advise the commission 19732 not allowed in a combats on the field and the skills and optimism with the troops then those that were funded and the fear we didn't take action against gadaffi. so with this your advice now with the middle east term background? >> by the way spending 10

years in afghanistan the first go round in the '80s but i did not make that much money per day. it was more like per month. [laughter] but to look at that point* transferring to future leaders as soon as possible and one fellow who did that superbly this is a major from the special forces and once he succeeded brilliantly, and it have been other detachments area is. he was yanked out and sent to iraq and there is an article "the washington post" named by a the

endorsement, general petraeus it will be the great thing but as i checked with my contacts and a couple of nights ago, and none of that seems to have filtered down to the ground. this would require to be there for five years. what the hell did you do before last year? have you heard of the strategy of one tribeca time and that is happening that you can detect in is saddled wade to salvage its? -- is that no way to salvage a. >> but no matter how much we are nowhere near the solutions of my question is on the fear and the gilts

that is interesting why after the capture of bin laden which was the perfect occasion to deal with the fear and guilt. >> now i will move. >> but the adm of one on the ground and yes of course, absolutely right. that has to be approaching the right situations and it seems to be something very difficult to achieve in the modern world. >> conte contrasts the career for richard holbrooke but if his opponents named lawrenceburg and no but nick

i am not moving into for 60 years. but he beat on the ground for another 75 years but at exactly the same age became the influence and has spent in his entire career about five and a half years from wall street and much was sucked into washington politics and he became very absorbed. and i remembered a new yorker said those politics are so important he endeavored to visit the region at least once every two months. something has changed in the world.

and it seems to be bad to allow people who do delegate interest. although the air of spring is a new, the central point* is we should think more symbolically. the point* is not gadaffi but all hold middle east ihop held the united states allies relate to those countries. did we get off on the right foot? are we on this side of progress or dictators say and do we wish to be seen may gain day strain to move? i thought what was smart is he was limited and said we will have a no-fly zone but the problem i believe it is other countries such as france began to push and push.