independent line. jeff, you're on c-span. >> caller: thank you for c-span. i want to say if we didn't have all the free-trade agreements we wouldn't need a government stimulus. thank you. >> host: thanks for calling in this morning. from "the wall street journal", early peak shows job gains in august. private sector employment notched modest gains in august according to payroll firm, automatic data processing inc. the latest sign that the labor market didn't collapse amid the debt debate and plunging confidence. private nonfarm employers added an estimated 91,000 jobs to their payrolls during the month, slower on that the 109,000 gained in july adp said. the services sector drove the increase accounting for 80,000 of the gain. small and medium-sized firms accounted for almost all of the increase. larger firms, those with 500 or more worker, added only,000 jobs. the figures still suggest a weak employment report from the government on friday

though at times the two reports have diverged. that's in the "wall street journal.". red bank, new jersey, gene, on our democrats line. you're on the air. >> caller: yes. i found that with the last stimulus package, i work in the schools new jersey, there was 20% bump in the nclb funding i just thought stolen. i saw people misusing the funds. it was just thrown away. i think bankers and ceos also got a lot of money. it never got down to the people that needed the jobs and people that are struggling. >> host: so you would be not in favor of another stimulus? >> caller:. no. it must, he said that the money wouldn't be misused. like obama said he was going to watch what happened to it. i just saw it stolen everywhere in schools throughout new jersey with this program that is tutoring children. the children were never even tutored yet everybody

collected millions of dollars. i saw such waste, unless he really is going to watch what happens to this money, it is just again going into the wrong hand and it is not going to change. anything and make it better so like everyday people out of work, that are struggling. >> host: that was jean in red bank, new jersey. this is the "national journal". obama agrees to address congress on september 8th. president obama agreed to address a joint session of congress next thursday at the invitation of house speaker john boehner but thursday was not obama's first choice as you probably heard. he originally asked to address congress on wednesday night, a month after they went to a to toe over the nation's debt. obama and boehner shrugged it out wednesday over the calendar and the president's desire to give a speech to congress. now you've probably seen news reports about the little kerr if you have fell. but here are the letters sent back and forth this. is the letter from president obama to speaker boehner.

dear, mr. speaker, i respectfully request the opportunity to address a joint session of congress on september 7th, 2011 at 8:00 p.m. it is my intention to lay out a series of bipartisan proposals that the congress can take immediately to continue to rebid the american economy by strengthening small businesses, helping americans get back to work and putting more money in the paychecks of the middle class and working americans. that is part of the president's letter to speaker boehner. here is speaker boehner's letter in response, part of it to the president. dear, mr. president. as your spokesperson today said, there are considerations about the congressional calendar that must be made prior to scheduling such an extraordinary event. as you know the house of representatives and senate are each required to adopt a concurrent resolution to allow for a joint session of congress to receive the president. as the majority leader announced more than a month ago, the house will not be in session until wednesday, september 7th, with votes at 6:30 that evening.

with the significant amount of time particularly, more than three hours that is required to allow for a security sweep of the house chamber before receiving a president -- >> leaving "washington journal" now and back live to the national press club for remarks from connecticut senator joseph lieberman. he chairs the senate homeland security committee. >> thank you very much, gary. thank you for welcome. every time somebody says needing no introduction i remember being at a gathering here a few years ago when henry kissinger was the keynote speaker and the moderator said, henry kissinger really a man who needs no introduction, so i give you dr. kissinger. and kissinger got up and said i suppose it is true i don't need an introduction but i like a good introduction. [laughter] so i appreciate that introduction. good afternoon, let me thank you, gary. let me thank the national consortium for the study of terrorism and responses to terrorism and the university of maryland.

in less than two weeks the united states will commemorate the 10th anniversary of the worst terrorist attack on our homeland in our history. this anniversary will stimulate quite a round of reflection on where we have come in the past decade and where we're going. whether we're safer or not. whether we've done well or not in responding to the attacks of 9/11. for me, this is the, first of several occasions i will have to reflect on these questions, and i thank you very much for giving me that opportunity. we're at a moment here at home, when the american people are understandably focused on the economic problems we are facing, rather than the threat of terrorism to our homeland

security. the fact that terrorism has receded so from the forefront of our national consciousness is a reflection not just of the failures of our economy but i think of the successes of our counterterrorism policies over the past decade. we have not had another major terrorist attack on american soil since 9/11, and 10 years ago, no one would have dared to predict that with any confidence. unfortunately our success in keeping our homeland safe i think is also prompted some to question the seriousness of both the original threat and the continuing dangers. it has become fashionable in some quarters to characterize the past decade as a period in which america mistakenly exaggerated the danger posed by islamist extremism and terrorism and

overreacted in the wake of 9/11. this view is, in my judgement, profoundly mistaken and if embraced, would lead to a false and dangerous road map to our future. the american government's response to the attacks of 9/11 and to the broader idealogical challenge those attacks represented to our country has been absolutely necessary and correct. first and foremost, we were right to recognize that after 9/11, we became a nation at war, in a conflict that was and is real, brutal and global with the forces of islamist extremism who attacked us. we have also been absolutely right to put this conflict at the top of our national security agenda, which i believe, where i believe it continues to belong for the

foreseeable future because the enemy has been weakened in the past decade but clearly not vanquished. the threats islamists pose to us and our allies throughout the world including most particularly the muslim world is absolutely real. had we not acted in the way we did for the past 10 years it is very likely that we would not enjoy the luxury today of debating whether we overreacted to the threat. our enemies would have taken advantage of our lack of resolve and i fear many more americans would have become their victims. the fact that we have gone a decade without another mass casualty attack in the united states, as you all know, has not been because our enemies stopped trying to attack us. our homeland security has been hard-won and fiercely fought. it's the result of the determination and focus of

leaders across two administrations and six congresses to enact and implement reforms and reorganizations within our government. it's the result of painstaking and often dangerous work by countless, heroic individuals, soldiers, diplomats,, intelligence operatives and law enforcement personnel to name some, operating at home and on almost every continent and what's different in too many cases as compared to pre-9/11 is that they're coordinating their operations with one another. as a result we have made tremendous gains against the forces of islamist extremism that attacked us and our allies around the world, and i believe without a doubt we're much safer today than we were 10 years ago. at the same time, we have made these dramatic and effective improvements that

i have referenced briefly in our homeland security. we also prosecuted the war against islamist terrorists abroad with a determination, ferocity and ingenuity that our enemies did not expect, from unmanned aerial drones to the unprecedented infusion of intelligence and military operations to a brilliant new counterinsurgency doctrine that blended civilian and military initiatives. the united states over the past decade has built and unleashed the most capable counterterrorism forces in human history, against what i would describe as the most significant terrorism threat in history. we showed that our best in the world military, could dominate on a very different and unconventional battlefield. and the clear result is that our attackers have failed to achieve their goals.

al qaeda senior leadership in the tribal areas of pakistan has been decimated. its affiliate in iraq which came dangerously close of seizing control of that country has been gutted. and of course al qaeda's founder and architect of the 9/11 attacks is no more. justice having been delivered to osama bin laden by courageous american hands. more fundamentally i think, our countries grasped the basic nature of this conflict almost from the start. rather than seeing it as a clash of civilizations, a battle between islam and the west, as al qaeda has sought to portray it, the united states and our allies in the world have correctly seen the war, in our case first under president bush and then under president obama, in some ways as we saw world war ii and the cold war before it, as an idealogical struggle between an extremist minority, a

violent extremist minority that seeks in very real ways to dominate a large part of the world, and eliminate the freedoms of the people in that part of the world, and, own the other side a moderate majority, in this case, on the front lines of this battle of muslims, who want the same freedoms and opportunities that we all desire. the clearly-stated goal of the violent islamist extremist, and this is really clearly stated back into the '90s, to establish a caliphate, an empire within the arab and muslim world that would overthrow existing governments there and go beyond that. it may seem fan it is a call to us but that is clearly what their goal has been. i think we also correctly diagnosed early on that the ideology of islamist extremism,

the political ideology that they made of islam, was being bred in part by the freedom deficit in the broader middle east, by the corrupt and autocratic governments there that gave no outlet to their people for legitimate grievances, let alone granting them human rights and economic opportunity. now, throughout the middle east we see the narrative of violent islamist extremism being rejected by tens of millions of muslims who are rising up and peacefully demanding lives of democracy and dignity, of opportunity in the economy and involvement in the modern world. indeed the rallying cry of the arab spring and its successes thus far are the ultimate repudiations of al qaeda and everything islamist extremism stands for. i would like to think, i

hope, that our willingness to stand up to violent extremist, repressive islam in the name of human rights may have given some, to the people of the arab world, some of the courage and principle that they have so remarkably shown in the last several months. now, did we make mistakes over the past decade in prosecuting the war against violent islamist extremism? of course we did. just as every nation including ours has made mistakes in every war they and we have fought. yet looking back at our actions over these 10 years it's crystal clear to me that we have gotten a lot more right than wrong and we're better off and safer as a result of it. and so is a lot of the rest of the world. looking ahead, though i think we've got to acknowledge some unsettling

facts. in protecting our homeland we have sometimes benefited from just plain luck. had faisal shahzad wired his car bomb correctly and detonated in times square last year or abdulmutallab succeeded in blowing up northwest flight 293 on christmas over detroit a year before that, the history of homeland security i just surveyed during the past decade would have looked very different than thankfully it today. this is the challenge we face in a country as open and big and free as our is and we want it to continue to be, it's difficult to be 100% secure and those two strokes of luck remind us of that. and while al qaeda is down

they and their ilk are certainly not out. current geopolitical realities do not justify claims of victory or a sense of closure and complacency. now in addition to the continuing threats from abroad in places like somalia and yemen and pakistan itself and of course iran which remains the number one state sponsor of islamist terrorism and just about on every continent in the world most notably in recent times, to watch the spread of islamist extremism in africa as evidenced tragically by the, by the bomb be exploded at u.n. building last week, current political realities really remind us that this war is not over but in addition to those threats from abroad, we also, as you

well know, face a new and ominous threat at home from so-called homegrown terrorists, so-called, often so-called, lone wolf terrorists. i know that has been one of the topics that you've focused on at this event today. it's most important to note, and i speak as chairman of the senate homeland security committee, that the two islamist attacks in which americans have been killed inside america since 9/11 were both carried out by radicalized muslim-americans. one hassan at fort hood and the other, bledsoe in little rock. most people don't remember bledsoe but he was a convert to islam who spent some time abroad and got up one day and walked into an army recruiting office in little rock and just shot the recruiter there simply because, and killed him.

was wearing a u.s. army uniform. the congressional research service has reported that between may of 2009 and july of 2011, two years, 31 arrests were made in connection with homegrown plots by american citizens or legal permanent residents of the united states. many who had direct contact with al qaeda or other violent islamist groups in yemen, pakistan or elsewhere. by comparison in the more than seven years before that from september 11th, 2001, through may 2009, there were 21 such plots. i think one of the major reasons we're seeing this increase in homegrown american terrorism is because our enemies know how much we have raised and broaded our guard, our homeland defenses against attacks like 9/11 from inside our country. so they are trying to use

the internet and other means to circumvent our strong homeland defenses. that's why homeland, violent islamist terrorism is a real and growing threat to america and why it demands a very strong response, methodical response. in that regard after promising to do so for quite a while, the obama administration recently released a new strategy that seeks to address this homegrown threat but to me the report which is entitled empowering local partners to prevent violent extremism in the united states, was ultimately a big disappointment. the thrust of the report and the strategy the administration announced in it that we need to engage domestically in the war of ideas against the islamists and recognize that the terrorist threat is not just coming across our borders

but that there are americans who are subject to radicalization and attacking our homeland. that of course i agree with. that is true the administration's plan however for dealing with that reality i think suffers from several significant weaknesss. the first is that the administration still refuses to call our enemy in this war by its proper name, violent islamist extremism. you can find names that are comparable to that but not the ones that the administration continues to use which are violent extremism. it is not just violent -- there are many forms of violent extremism. there is white racist extremism. there has been some environmental, ecoextremism. there has been animal rights extremism, you can go on and on. there is skinhead extremism but we're not in a global war with those. we're in a global war that affects our homeland

security with islamist extremists. and to call it violent islamic, excuse me, to call our enemy violent extreme i -- extreme system ultimately vague has no meaning. other term is used al qaeda and its allies but it is better but still is too narrow and focuses on groups as opposed to, what i would call an ideology which is what we're really fighting. i assume this refusal of the administration speak honestly about the enemy is based on its desire not to do anything that might feed into al qaeda's propaganda that we're engaged in a quote, war against islam. that is so a lie that we can and have repudiated it and done so effectively. i was struck by a recent pew

poll in the world, muslim world and particularly here and strong numbers of muslims who want to separate themselves from islamist extremism because that's not who they are. in fact in the poll of muslim-americans pew did, more than have, must half of leaders in their own community were not doing enough to attack and criticize and distinguish between them and muslim extremists. and to me that poll was just an expression of a reality that i've seen very clearly in my own interaction with the muslim-american community which is just extremely overwhelmingly both law-abiding and patriotic and nonviolent. the problem as we know when you're dealing with so

unconventional and brutal an enemy it take as very small number of people to do very great harm and, so the numbers that i referenced a moment ago from the congressional research service are significant to us. in fact our most important allies in this war i believe are the overwhelminging majority of muslims in communities around the world who want the same basic things people everywhere want, a life of freedom, a life of opportunity for prosperity, a chance to raise their children in safety and give them all the opportunities for a better future than they deserve. exactly the opposite of what the violent islamist extremists offer them. in the arab uprisings this year are the best proof that the muslim majority in the world understands that. to win this struggle it's vital that we understand that we're not, as i said a moment ago, just fighting an organization, al qaeda but we are up against a broader

ideology, a, if you will, a poe litized theology, quite separate from the religion of islam that has fueled this war. success in the war will come consequently not when a single terrorist group or its affiliates are eliminated but when the broader set of ideas associated with it are rejected and discarded. a reluctance therefore to identify our enemy as violent islamist extremism, makes it harder i think to mobilize effectively to fight this war of ideas. let me give you an example. from our senate homeland security committee's investigations into the murders at fort hood. it was clear evidence we found that major hasan's fellow soldiers were very concerned with his increasing public

identification, statements, with violent islamist ideology. at one point, for instance, he stated in front a group of them that he thought a muslim-american soldier would be justified in killing his comrades in defense of of islam. but, rather than reporting that immediately, they kept quiet. and major hasan was actually promoted after making statements like that. how could that have happened? well, maybe for some of his statements, not the one i have just quoted which was so self-evidently cause for discharge, of hasan or was cause for discharge, maybe some of it, on some of his other statements just came from ignorance about the whole reality of islamist radicalization. and think some of the rest of it came from a fear of making waves, particularly making waves that would cause the people who were

making them and in reporting hasan, put them in jeopardy of being labeled as prejudiced. to its credit the administration strategy does outline a community-led approach to countering homegrown violent extremism with the federal government playing a significant role in fostering participations, providing support, sharing information and helping to build trust between local muslim-american communities and law enforcement. i applaud that. the strategy reaffirms a commitment to promote american ideals as a counter narrative to the bankrupt ideology of the islamist extremist. i applaud that of course as well. but the document never states what we were hoping for on the committee and beyond which is who is in charge of these programs? it never defines what resources are needed to make them work. it doesn't list specific actions that should be taken by specific dates to combat the clear and present danger

of homegrown islamist terrorism. and these to me are a significant omissions. so there is clearly a lot more work to do before we have from the administration the kind of clear national strategy that will make sense from the government's point of view but sfrapgly also from the point of view from the muslim community we're trying to engage here in america here in this fight. i think such a strategy also must address the role of the internet in radicalization and what we must do to counter it and the report doesn't really do that. our senate committee released a report in 2008 on this subject which showed the importance of cyberspace to the self-radicalization process. then incidentally, terrorist, that's three years ago. terrorists communicated mostly in password-protected islamist or jihadist chat rooms. today they have spread out over the web and we're very,

and are very adept at using social media to spread propaganda and train and recruit. to address this threat we really urgently need a plan that will define how the government can work with the private sector internet companies and others to remove terrorist content as best we can, from these sites. although that is not easy to do because of the openness of cyberspace. not easy to do permanently. we also need to facilitate, i think new participations between the internet companies, to create positive content that downers the propaganda of the terrorists. we also need although the report suggests one, a really better organized national engagement with muslim-american communities who i repeat are our most powerful defense against homegrown terrorism because we obviously hope that

within the muslim-american communities leaders and members will be educated and community members will create an environment in which individuals who know of others who seem to be radicalizing will come forward and report them to law enforcement. i mean this is the ultimate in the growing and important and constructive movement of see something, say something. the islamist extremist and some who explicitly declared war on us in 1998, osama bin laden did that. they had already attacked us with a declaration of war was in 1998. then brutally attacked us on 9/11/01. these people will not soon surrender their radical ambitions. that is what it is and where we are. so as we approach this 10th remembrance of 9/11, looking back we have reason to be grateful i think for all that has been done together to protect our homeland and our people and to deny the

islamist extremists the victories they have sought. but it's also clear, though not pleasant to say, that this war goes on and will go on for quite a while. in the years ahead we and our allies throughout the world must remain as engaged, strong, a todaytive and together -- adaptive and united in this conflict as we have been during its first decade. thank you very much. [applause] >> if i understand correctly, senator lieberman has just a little bit of time to answer some questions. we solicited questions for senator lieberman from facebook, twitter and our own listeners and got quite a response. i don't know if you're able to answer a few of these time permitting.

>> i will try. good. >> the first, do you believe there have been sufficient attempts by the u.s. government at all levels to reach out and educate the u.s. muslim community about radicalization and do you believe these attempts have shown the right degree of sensitivity to the culture and religion of muslim-americans? >> the answer is not, no, not jet -- yet. i talked about this a little in my remarks. this is interesting, this goes back now a few years but i had leaders of the muslim-american, several muslim-american groups testifying at a hearing with the committee and i asked about their interaction with the federal government. i at least was quite surprised they all said that the most and best interaction that they had with the federal government was with the fbi. interesting, because the fbi had established, was part of fusion centers around the country and established an outreach program. strangely, and you know our committee created the national counterterrorism center, the responsibility

for overseeing a lot of the outreach and a lot of the response to homegrown terrorism has gone to the nctc. i have a lot of respect for mike lider and nctc but it didn't make sense that should be the case and this report from the administration doesn't make that clear either. so i think, i'll go back to another theme i stated in my report, i think we could do better at interacting with the muslim-american community and it is critical to dealing with this homegrown terrorism problem and i think one part of it, if i may repeat just in summary, is to call, to make clear that there's a distinction between muslim americans and this minority of violent extremists who have taken the religion of islam and made it into a radical political ideology. so i hope we'll do better at this in the years ahead.

>> thank you. what is your response to criticism that is the u.s. counterterrorism approach is reactive in that the focus and resources always seem to shift to whatever group is conducted the last major attack, rather than strategically looking all kinds of future threats? they give, for example, u.s. government increased focus on right wang terrorists immediately fog oklahoma city and after 9/11, the focus shifted almost exclusively to islamist terrorism. >> that is an interesting question. we were attacked through the '90s. you could go back further to the hezbollah attack inspired by iran on the marine barracks in beirut and, what was it, 1983? but, and you could go back to lockerbie with americans on that plane. but really in terms of homegrown attacks, 1993 at the world trade center with the truck bomb and abroad with the attacks on

embassies in africa and the uss cole in yemen in 2000. we only really woke up after 9/11 because it was such a monstrous attack. it's true during that period we were not focused at all. long story short, i concluded based on my own work and being greatly affected by the report of the cain-hamilton, 9/11 commission that 9/11 was a preventable attack. i believe if the federal government on 9/10, and 11 had been organized the way it has been today we would have prevented that at tack. -- attack. i think since then we've been quite broad and strategic and i think the most significant thing we've done -- look, in any war intelligence is this important. in this war so unconventional where we're fighting an enemy that doesn't come at us on a battlefield in tanks and uniforms and fighter planes or battleships. it comes at us from the

shadows essentially wearing civilian outfits and attacking civilians. intelligence is critical. and i think the most significant changes we've made, improvements we've made in the last decade, and these have really been strategic and not reactive, are the improvement in our intelligence community and the coordination of our intelligence community components including through the nctc and director of national intelligence and just to mention in a sentence, there's been a remarkable, generally unheralded, not totally perfect but i think overall good, transformation, dramatic transformation, historic transformation in the aforementioned fbi. which went from its historic role of being an investigator of a set of crimes and then, after they occur and then turning them over it law enforcement, to now being our domestic

counter terrorism unit agency, primary unit which, whose aim is to prevent terrorist attacks on us, not to apprehend after they occur. >> do we have time for one more? okay. looking at places like the united kingdom where the government has recently abandoned efforts to engage nonviolent islamic extremes how do you believe that the united states should deal with domestic idealogues who preach radical ideologies but do not promote or engage in violent activities? >> this is a very, the line between just about all muslims in america and this minority of violent islamist extremists is a pretty clear line to me. and i spent a lot of time on this. this group is a difficult one because it is right on the line. they are, they are extremists. very provocative. they have a right under our constitution up to a point to be provocative and yet,

they would claim that they're not violent or not preaching violence. it's a very hard-line. i don't have an easy answer to it. my own, i would, i try to, i would try to engage that group but i would do it with great care and, a kind of skepticism because once you're preaching an extremist ideology, full of hate, and saying oh i'm not calling for violence, that's a tough line because you're not sure that the people listening to that particular person, whether it is a religious leader or just an individual understand that all the hatred and extremism being preached stops at action. that is very hard to do. so i would engage but with a lot of skepticism and doubt. >> well i think that's all the time we have. i want to give arousing round of applause to senator

joseph lieberman. >> thanks very much. for your interest. [applause] >> i think we're immediately getting set up for lunch. do we have any directions for lunch? i think it will be served just outside. >> right around this way. so we'll break for just over an hour for lunch and then continue the afternoon program. [inaudible conversations]

the. >> senate homeland security committee chair, connecticut senator joe lieberman taking time during the congressional break to speak at the forum on lessons learned since the 9/11 attacks. senator lieberman expected to join his colleagues when the senate returns to session next tuesday, september 6th and we will have live coverage here on c-span2. we'll have more from this discussion on terrorism coming up in about an hour, 15 minutes or some next will be a debate whether we're safer since the 9/11 attacks and the wars in iraq and afghanistan. national security analysts and author, peter bergen, and terrorism expert david roth take part. live coverage, 1:50 eastern on c-span2. coming up at 3:00 a number of former radicals will talk about how they turned away from terrorism. the forum will wrap up with a look at the future since 9/11. this all hosted by the national press club here in washington and the homeland

security department national consortium for the study of terrorism and the responses to terrorism. >> this week "washington journal" has been looking at weather issues. today the folk requests you was the role of noah, the national oceanic atmospheric administration. we'll show you this segment at 7:15 p.m. eastern on c-span2. we'll follow that with "book tv" prime time. we will discuss how the west was lost. 50 years of economic followly and the stark choices ahead. an hour later. and the origins of political order and later it is with sex on the moon. the amazing story behind the most audacious heist in history. "book tv" prime time airs 8:00 fpl eastern

on. >> he is a partisan guy who wants to unite people. i mean, you, all of the problems of the era, you could get from this buy and why we couldn't and why we couldn't elect him is the same reason we eventually went to war. they couldn't be resolved. >> he has the misfortune of running against a great military hero, dwight eisenhower. and so, i don't really think that there is anyway that adlai stevenson could have won. >> if you think of al smith in 1928, lost overwhelmingly to herbert hoover but, paved the way for franklin roosevelt. there are 14 people in this series, many of whom i guaranty viewers may never have heard of and all of whom i pretty much guaranty they will find interesting,

fast nasting and certainly surprising. >> and again we'll return to the forum on lessons learned since 9/11 at 1:50. we'll have live coverage at that time. right now a look at an earlier panel discussion from the forum on global radicalization.

>> okay, without further interruption, we'll go to the first set of panelists. it is moderated by peter neumann. will do the introductions and entitled the terrorist next door. so peter? >> thank you, gary. and thank you, all for coming in. i'm peter neumann. i'm director at international center for the study of radicalization at kings college in london. if you want to learn more about it, go to icsr.info. i'm saying that partly, mostly in fact because i want to advertise the center but i'm also saying that because i think it's a testament to s.t.a.r.t.'s efforts of the past almost decade to stretch out beyond the united states and construct an international network we're proud of. kings college and start is

happy to be part of this s.t.a.r.t. consortium. i know quite how contentious this very concept of radicalization is. if you define radicalization as process where someone become as political extremist, that immediately raises question what kind of extremist? there is ex-timism of the mind, extremism of the word or extremism of the deed or indeed, violent extremism. depending what kind of outcome or result that process has, has important, political and also research implications. so the next hour we'll be spending talking about some of what we have learned over the past 10 years in terms of what that process involves, what we know, what we don't know and what we perhaps, where we will take this field in the future. and, there is no better panel, to at that you can talk about issue here than three panelists here.

distinguished members of research community. toe my left, ari. crew began ski, professor of maryland college park. john walker director of international director of center of terrorism at pennsylvania state university and to his left is, jarrett brachman, hoe used to be director of combat and terrorism center at west point and now heading up one of those startups that will hopefully not fail in this operation. >> thank you. >> a counterterrorism consulting firm. and, what we agreed is, that, i would start you off by precisely asking that question. what do we know about radicalization now that we didn't know 10 years ago? arie, maybe you want to have the first stab? >> yes. i believe that in the recent decade we've learned quite a lot about radicalization

both thee reddally and -- theoretically and empirically. people have done very good work. john horgan has done very important work on leaving terrorism behind, deradicalization. clark mccauley has done outstanding work on mechanisms of deradicalization. scott has done wonderful work on sacred values and how they enter into radicalization and leaving radicalization behind. michelle and myself have done work, empirical work with the tamil tigers and the abu sayyaf group in the philippines. and gained insight to the process of radicalization. so there is very important work out of there that has not been there before. i think the challenges at this point are two-fold. one is, to bring together these various pieces of research, carried out from

different perspectives in different parts of the world with different terrorist organizations and integrate them into coherent theory of radicalization and the way back from radicalization to understand the general principles that radicalization represents. and the second challenge is to take this theory and apply it. we, after all, terrorism is not merely an academic pursuit. we want to combat terrorism. we want to exploit our knowledge in order to reverse the process, to minimize the damage that terrorism is causing so that challenges to understand how these general principles, manifest themselves in different groups in different locations at different times and translate them into a coherent set of policies. and at s.t.a.r.t., this purpose of summarizing and integrating i would like to make a few points of about radicalization as i understand it at this point.

first of all, what is radicalization? i would be fine with radicalization as the process of coming to support or personally embrace extreme means in the service of a collective cause. the extreme means usually, especially in terrorism include violence against civilians that flies in the face of moral norms of most civilized societies, cultures and religions. point number two, is that radicalization is a social, psychological phenomenon. we now know that it is governed by the social process of networking and group dynamics, the work of mark sedgewick, radicalship, persuasion and effective bonds with friends, comrades and family play an important part. point number three, is that, radicalization involves attitude change toward viewing extreme means like violence as morally legitimate and desirable

whereas criminality also involves extreme means it lacks the moral, idealogical bases that is the mainstay in radicalization. criminals typically do not perceive themselves as heroes or martyrs and they carry out their extreme activities without the pretense of doing so for altruistic reasons or collective causes. point number four is, we know now that radicalization is often grounded in the perception that one's sacred values are trampled, the work of violence against the perpetrator is the way to restore the honor and human significance of one's group and one's self. this is personally rewarded and that is the motivational part of it, by a sense of gain one's personal significance for standing up for the defense of one's group sacred values. point number five, is that whereas radicalized

individuals might perceive violence as ultimately ineffective and even counterproductive in terms of advancing the group's concrete goals they may still deem it highly worthwhile because of the honor and empowerment and significance gained that it bestows on its perpetrators. as one example, our opinion polling data from the west bank in gaza attests that most palestinians viewed the second intifada as unlikely to advance their interests and in this sense it is foot tile, yet they massively supported it because of its perceived effectiveness in bringing about empowerment and hurting the israelis. much and the last point, point number six, there exists degrees of radicalization from mere idealogical support and legitimatemation of extreme means all the way to personally embracing the extreme means and deciding

to personally participate in violent activities. the important distinction that john horgan and have made between this engagement and the radicalization belongs in this degrees of radicalization continuum. the psychological science of motivation is beginning to shed some light as what it takes from extreme the tuds. the from mere support to actually personalization and involvement in radical behaviors. and i think i will stop here. >> thank you very much, arie. john, same question to you, what do we know that we didn't know 10 years ago? >> thank you very much, peter and to s.t.a.r.t. for the very kind invitation to come here this morning. i want to preface my remarks by saying that someone who has spent a lot of time as a psychologist conducting research on terrorism and thinking about radicalization and deradicalization and i've been asked be to a little bit thought provoking so

hopefully i won't disappoint. i've actually come to the view in recent times, i'm not entirely convinced that we should have allowed radicalization to take center stage. i think our, perhaps our preoccupation, if not obsession with radicalization has actually come at the expense of increasing our knowledge and understanding of terrorist behavior. in some ways, certainly from my perspectives it represents a fundamental acknowledgement of the challenge we have had in reconciling attitudes, beliefs and perhaps most of concern here, behaviors. i think these are certainly not new problems. problems that have been around forever, a considerable amount of time but our failure to make progress on bridging the gap between these critical issues has actually led us to seek refuge in the concept of radicalization. 10 years ago, as we were

having discussions about what makes a terrorist, i don't think we were talking about radicalization. we were talking about those same kinds of processes in very, very different sorts of ways. i also believe that if our ultimate objective is to stem and control the growth of terrorism, a central and continuing focus on radicalization may ultimately prove unnecessary. complimentary, yes, but unnecessary perhaps. now there are three reasons as to why i'm dissatisfied with our progress. the first i think is a lack of transparency around what we actually know. despite the, i completely agree with my distinguished colleague here, despite the enormous amount of effort, energy and research that's gone into this topic in recent years, radicalization, put very simply, remains very poorly conceptualized.

we have very admirable attempts, foremost these in recent times were the work of sophia, and clark mccauley. they distinguish radicalism from equating latter readiness to engage in legal and nonviolent political action. radicalism for clark mccauley is the more dangerous problem. however i don't think these distinctions are sufficient enough and these are not just academic issues. i think they are issues that have profound implications for policy and the development of proctor & gamble call counterterrorism initiatives at whatever level they are arranged. the popularity of radicalization hasn't resulted in widespread agreement on what it actually means. because it is something that can continue to be understood in a variety of different ways to quote mark sedgewick, it can apply potentially very different, significant differences for policy implications.

for some the term radicalization is synonymous with terrorism. for others it is a type of short land but analysts will often agree in private, well, when we talk about radicalization we're not really talking about terrorism but a bigger issue from which terrorism arises. closely related to this is my second point and that is, the relationship between radicalization and terrorism remains very poorly understood. as you said. within this i think there are two absolutely indisputable facts. one is obvious, the other less so. and that's the point that is less obvious that ultimately is going to give us more pause for thought as we progress. so first the obvious point. not every radical becomes a terrorist. i don't really have to say that. the extraordinarily low base rate for involvement in terrorism remain as defining characteristic of the terrorism problem. and amid the intense

politicization that we see around issues to do with terrorism and radicalization we tend to lose sight of that. there will always be far more radicals than there ever will be terrorists yet we tend to assume a kind of unidirectional relationship. in other words if you become one, the chances are you will probably become the other given the right circumstances. prevent someone from becoming a radical, then we prevent someone from becoming a terrorist and this is the inevitable logic. now the less obvious point is kind of the mirroring of what i just said. not every terrorist necessarily holds radical views. now what i've seen in recent types is that there is increasing evidence for this. recognizing that evidence has to make us pause and contemplate what seems to be an already intuitive and common sense relationship between, excuse me, radicalization and terrorism. and i think very closely

related to this is the very question about the goal of deradicalization. again you say this as someone who has done a lot of research on deradicalization. let alone the fact that deradicalization programs continue to be remain resistent to evaluation of any kind. if there are fewer radicals than terrorists in the ranges of terrorist groups, we really have to wonder for whom precisely the idea of deradicalization might actually be applicable. and the third broad point that i want to raise as a concern is that the reason why we need to regain a focus not on radicalization but on terrorist behavior is that we are dangerously lacking in our knowledge of some critical stages of the arc of terrorist involvement. and by that i mean the trajectory that takes someone from becoming involved in terrorism to remaining involved in terrorism, to eventually disengaging. in our preoccupation with

radicalization we know far less about recruitment than we really should know by now. we know virtually nothing on the social and psychological dynamics that propel individuals to specifically commit acts on behalf of groups. moving further down the different amalgam of metaphors and frameworks and processes that we have, we see similar problems at the other end of the spectrum. a focus on deradicalization with all of the, i think, naive expectations that go along with that have meant that we missed very valuable opportunities to explore the process of disengagement. we have lost sight of the daily reality of terrorism which is that just like there are floods or recruits to terrorist moments it happens on a daily basis that people leave terrorism behind. yet this is a process that we tend to fundamentally ignore. in practice, and in the words of my colleague connor lynch, some ostensible

deradicalization programs essentially focused on disengagement. perhaps an implicit acknowledgement to the fact that it is much more difficult and challenging in a practical and even philosophical sense to change individual belief systems. now in conclusion, none much what i've just said should be interpreted as a call to ignore the processes that give rise to radical beliefs. i'm not trying to say that for a second and i probably wouldn't make it out of the room alive if my colleagues believe that. i'm not saying that at all. nor am i suggesting for a second that we have in any way wasted our efforts but the problem i have is as a social scientist looking at these issues is that there are some very deeply problematic assumptions underpinning the structures that we draw on a daily basis that are very often predicted on a causal link, however implicit, but a causal link between radicalization and terrorism. i do believe, however, that

we have lost focus. we've lost specificity and as a result, i think we've lost the ability to prioritize our problems. i think as a result of all of that, and unless we try to regain that sense of reprioritization quickly i think all ever the practically oriented questions we see out there that i think are well within our abilities to answer conceptually, practically, and otherwise are going to continue to remain out of reach. so, thank you. . .

>> so i figured i would just kind of, you know, one of the things i've tried to do throughout my career is listen to what they say about their priorities, their strengths, their weaknesses, their goals. and the u.s. government and the media spun up in the mid to late 2000s about a fellow nameddal sure ri. he put out a 1600-page book in '05, and he was grabbed shortly thereafter, and we finally got around to reading it say around '07, '08. and we realized, wow, this guy's really smart. yes, redundant, but pretty smart. and we made a really big deal about his influence although we weren't actually seeing a lot of influence. we just knew that he was smart. well, what's happened in the past few years is he actually has become influential, or his work has. so i've kind of gone back to the story train, and i thought i'd try to start answering this question by channeling suri. and suri would start off by

saying imagine you've got a vacuum cleaner hardwired to accept 120 volts electric current. i don't know what that means, but i imagine that's one set of current, right? and let's say the country upgrades to 240 volts. you've still got the same vacuum cleaner, the vacuum cleaner still works brill brilliantly, but when you plug it in the, it doesn't work. this is what's going on with the methodology being employed with the global jihadist movement. we've sought to recruit people to come fight open conflicts around the world. the problem is the world has changed around us, and we keep trying to plug this vacuum cleaner into a socket that keeps burning us out. so we need to fundamentally rewire the vacuum cleaner in order to move toward and be successful. so surrey says the only way to basically rewire, we can try to tweak it on the mar janes -- margins, use adapters, but unless we go back to the foundations, the way we

understand what the issues are, what the problems are, who we are, what the challenges are, who the enemy is, why things haven't worked in the past, we won't be successful. and so surrey present as series of works on this topic. and for him, um, he says, you know, the problem with the global jihadist movement if you want to use that term is that it's been organizationally centric, it's been an organization, not a system. right? al-qaeda was never meant to be an organization. al-qaeda was never designed to be the end-all, be-all. you shouldn't want to join al-qaeda, you should want to join the global islamic resistance. it's only about incite m, about -- incitement, about giving you the proper knowledge about what's going on in the world. so for sure you go through this 1600-page book, radicalization doesn't appear once. it's all about education. he has a theory of education, a theory of mobilization. so he's saying we've got all

these spotty reactions, tactical reactions, operational-level reactions. what we're micing is a strategic -- missing is a strategic grahamwork that can only come if you design a system that transcends al-qaeda. so bravo to bin laden for 9/11, he would say. but on 9/12, when you claim credit for it on behalf of al-qaeda and not the global islamic resistance movement, now you've made it about a man, an individual, set of individuals, and it takes bin laden's death to free up the gears, right? i think when bin laden dies, in many ways surrey was probably happy to some degree. he's the consummate pragmatist because bin laden out of the way allows al-qaeda to start transcending itself. i think this recent strike has really kind of awoken everybody in the sense that maybe this is possible to destroy the senior leadership. i've been skeptical, but i think

the global movement on the forums are starting to say, wow, we really have to rethink what a post-al-qaeda al-qaeda looks like. so when you go back, you know, al-qaeda has been fully aware of this. adam, the american, for several years now has been promoting the importance of individual jihad. he said we've got attacks such as the guy who stood outside of cia headquarters in the early '90s, the dutch film maker stabber, nidal hasan, the fort hood shooter. he says these weren't al-qaeda attacks, but that's precisely what al-qaeda is. right? you can be al-qaeda by not being al-qaeda. all they did was just hear what was going on in the world around them and did something. and for sure he goes back to afghanistan and says people came to afghanistan for all different reasons. some just wanted to fight, some were bored, some were social pariahs, had nowhere else to go,

some people were true believers. you need a theory that can incompass all these people. some were really smart, others just wanted to go out and kill. we need to create a system that's inclusive enough to bring this together, and i think this has been one of the inherent schizophrenic attributes of al-qaeda is that it was built to be an exclusive elitist organization, and they realize you can't sustain that because human organizations, according to surrey, always fail. humans make mistakes, they get captured, they get killed. organizations based on exclusivist tendencies always fail. what you need is a decentralized, global, social movement that's inclusionist and welcoming. this is why he was so angry about the role of caliphism inial kind. he says it's too exclusive. we need to open up our arms and make this a global inclusivist movement. yeah, time? >> can i ask you one

supplementary question? because i know that you are following what happens on jihadist web forms very intensively. >> yeah. >> if you compare the role of these forums and the internet more generally to where we were ten years ago, how would you assess that very broadly? >> broadly, i would say around 2000 they didn't understand the power of the internet. it was kind of a novelty. 2001, 2002 as we went in, kind of decimated their training camp structure, they migrated online out of necessity. '03 to '05 with iraq they started to realize that, hey, this propaganda, beheadings, sniper attacks, this actually gets us a lot of traffic. it was at the same time that the rise of these discussion forums started to appear, bandwidth started to increase. so this became not just a one-way repository of information. you'd go download a video, but you could actually hang out there and talk to people, build communities, build networks,

relationships. you could actually live online. and so i think that's when you saw '03 to '06 you saw this massive spiraling up. let's load up the web sites with all, all the literature we've ever written. let's translate as much as possible, let's consolidate our corpus. let's make the jihadi online community as robust as possible. and that's when a lot of u.s. government efforts really went through the roof. oh or, my gosh, they have tactical manuals, bomb manuals, you know, they've got all this stuff. the jihadist movement's been there, done that. they've checked the box. their ideology is sound in their heads, they've got all the books, it's in the libraries. the people who need to read it have read it, they've bypassed all of that. so now it's about how do we get people to actually go do something? we all get the point, we all understand, we're all in this together, but we're too scared to go out and act. so that's why the inspire magazine, this english-language

magazine s not necessarily about radicalizing you, it's about prompting you, inciting you to action, mobilizing you. and that's why surrey has appeared in five of the six inspire magazines, because they understand surrey is the grand architect of mobilization theory. >> before i open for questions from the audience, i've got a couple more questions to you. john, is it the term "radicalization" you object to, or is it, perhaps, what is associated with the term? because a lot of the things that you're talking about, becoming a terrorist, what makes a terrorist, some of the social and psychological processes, would be things that i would naturally subassume under the idea of radicalization. so i don't necessarily see how that contradicts the idea of studying radicalization. >> i think, again, i'm not trying to say we shouldn't be

studying what we're calling radicalization. the logical issues i'm much less worried about. we're always going to have those kinds of issues. although i'm seeing now that while violet extremism is becoming the new radicalization. the problem i have is that there are, we are failing to clarify the links between the acquisition and the process that imorchs extreme attitudes and beliefs and how that might lead to action. i think we are far too implicit in the what we are, certainly, as academics certainly even suggesting to policymakers the link is. so the question that really started off all of my concerns, and this is what are we actually trying to do? are we trying to prevent people from acquiring radical thoughts, beliefs, are we trying to -- in the assumption that if we can somehow bring that kind of process under control, we reduce the risk that they might be

vulnerable to involvement in terrorism? now, if that's the case, i can understand that. but i don't see that assumption and logic, um, underpinning much of the research in this radicalization. >> so building on that, ari, i mean, that seems to be one of the central questions, um, any radicalization researcher is interested in, the link between belief and action. what would you say we know about that? >> tsa a classic question -- that's a classic question of the relation in social psychology studied for generations of the relation between attitudes and behavior. attitudes do not necessarily predict behavior, but they do so under some circumstances. and the study of motivation in social psychology has identified what those circumstances are. so an attitude has -- attitude is a positive evaluation of an object, and attitude has to be translated into a goal, a personal goal. and that personal goal then can

drive behavior to the extent that alternative goals do not offer variety. what are alternative goals? alternative goals are not served by radical behavior. the goals of personal development, of professional career, of having a family. to the extent that these individualistic goals can be enhanced, to the extent that these alternative paths to personal contribution, personal significance can be enhanced, then the path of pursuing the goal of terrorism may be overridden by those alternative concerns. so to summarize, an attitude is important to behavior, but it has to be translated by the mediation of goals. and these goals have to be important enough to override other concerns, person concerns, development and so forth. >> with your permission, i'd like to react to john and jared just a bit. >> sure, absolutely.

>> i think that, you know, your critique of radicalization is more semantic to me than actual because you both agree that behavior is grounded, it's anchored in beliefs about the desirability of this behavior. one doesn't behave in a sleepwalk. one has some reasons to engage in violent action. when you talk about mobilization, this is a process of persuasion that to do violence is a good thing, and why is it a good thing? because it serve collective cause, it serves justice, it serves god. so this is what radicalization means, to embrace the embracement of these beliefs. and or i think -- and i think, clearly, behavior is very important as the process of radicalization, but it is grounded in attitudes that are produced by the persuasive

process, by surrey and others. one more point with your permission. radicalization, the study of radicalization -- >> i like it how you're all very deferent to me. please, go ahead with my permission. [laughter] >> the study of radicalization is not only important in order to understand the actual engagement in violence because attitude in one's community supports terrorism in other ways than through recruitment. no terrorist activity can exist without the broad base of support, logistical support, financial support, organizational support, safehouses, transportation, finances. and it's the attitudes of the community that provide that kind of support without which the actual violence as the apex would not be possible. so, yeah.

>> arie, before i give john a chance to respond, as far as i understood john, he said it's not necessarily inevitable for someone who holds radical beliefs to become a terrorist or violent. equally, for someone who is a terrorist or violent, he does not necessarily have to have radical beliefs. so presumably you disagree with that statement. >> yes. well, the question is what does one mean by radical beliefs? if by radical beliefs one means the very intricate philosophy or ideology of violence and extensive knowledge of the koran and extensive -- [inaudible] then i agree. but if by radical belief one means very simply the assumption that terrorist behavior is worth while, that it serves the community, that it serves the cause, then i would venture to say that every person that engages in radical behavior, every person that commits to a

suicide mission believes in something, believes that this is an important thing, that this is going to gain the respect of the community, that it's going to serve the cause. and this is what i mean by radical belief. >> john? >> i'm not, i'm not worried about anyone who's got radical beliefs. i want to figure out what is it that separates the radical from the terrorist? so my focus is on what goes on there. i'm not particular -- well, i'm not as interested in the process that led to the acquisition of those particular beliefs in the first place. because that, i think, i mean, let's stop kidding ourselves. i don't see us ever, it's not even appropriate to talk about doing things to prevent the acquisition of those kinds of beliefs. and this is what i mean. i think we have lost priority about what it is we actually want to do. so let's problemetize this

better, focus on what it is specifically we're trying to do which, for me, presumably is making that distinction more clear between a person who has or is acquiring radical beliefs and maybe expressing those beliefs in any number of different ways. but what i'm interested in trying to displace is the move into political violence. >> with so let me ask jared, and then i promise i really do open it up to questions. but, jared, from following a lot of these discussions on jihadist web forums where in some case more than 10,000 people are registered and, presumably, most of them are what we call cognitive radicals, they have extreme attitudes. in your experience what distinguishes the people who go a little bit further or even the people who then tip over into real-world violence or activism from those who do not? >> yeah, it's really -- >> do you have a personal

theory? >> yeah, i don't. >> i mean, that would answer the central question. >> yeah. i know, i've been trying to find this magical algorithm so i can check off three boxes and you're going to go operational, and it just doesn't work like that. usually, you don't know the screen name of the user until they've committed an operation, and their buddies will brag, hey, by the way, this guy went out and did something, and then you're looking for that magic moment, and you don't tend to find it. you know, but for me you remember the jordanian physician triple agent, everybody in the forums knew him, he was a writer, an essayist, a pundit, he was on the top ten list of every major forum. this guy was legendary online although he was anonymous writer. he eventually fooled us and committed a really horrific act against a number of our cia officers. well, after he had completed his operation and it was announced

that the physician was actually this legendary online pundit, the movement freaked out. they were so excited because somebody who finally looked and smelled like them on the forums, one of these sitters or lurkers, right? actually went out and crossed the line and went operational. so the whole mood of the forums changed. now it's not okay just to sit and type. now there's another dimension to the forums. they are meant to get you from, you know, they're posting until you can go conduct an operation. i think that was the dominant logic for the last couple years until things like this letterman threat have come out, right? where you have a random poster making a post on this scary, you know, arabic-language, pro-al-qaeda forum saying i'm going to cut out his tongue, and he better shut up. and every major news outlet in the world covers it for days and days. and then the forums looked at that and said maybe we don't actually need to go out and do something. maybe we can just post a scary threat because they take it

seriously enough now that we've actually gone out and done something. it's almost coming full circle, rhetorical terrorism. how do you get more people more invested in lower ways while you empower them with skill set, but youal show them it's possible, and you give more avenues of entry, at, you know, lower tech ways. so, anyway, so i think that's where the forums are headed. >> thank you. so let's open it up for questions. please, raise your hand if you have one, and we'll take as many as you can and try to answer a few too. um, yes. gentleman here. could you, please, introduce yourself as well? >> >> paul from east tennessee state university to the doctor. stegman's model begins with moral outrage, and what i hear, i think a way to think about this is what dr. horgan is saying is it is not potential to get radicals to change their

fundamental commitment in order for them to disengage from certain behavior, right? >> correct. >> so if sharia-based imams in saudi arabia are focused on -- [inaudible] that's one way to go. but you're saying -- [inaudible] [inaudible] moral outrage is a necessary condition for both. so do you think that moral outrage leads to radical belief, certainly? kaczynski, mcveigh, ksm, ramsey you receive, they're

coldly pragmatic. sellingman's work, i think, is very good here. you can't think of a terror who's not morally outraged. you can't think of a radical who's not morally outraged. the question is, why, what are the roots of muslim rage, an essay by bernard lewis in 1990. big question. and for you, dr. horgan, and i like your work a lot, i respectfully disagree we should not address the viral propaganda that is used to incite on the bases of absolute goebbels-like fabrication. when you look at how iraq was used or our involvement in somalia, the million dead, the two million dead, the three million dead. these have never been countered officially with facts. >> sir, let's -- >> so anyway, moral outrage has a crucial variable.

>> okay. would any of you like to respond to it? >> yes. i would like to respond. >> all all right. >> of course, it's very important. moral outrage is very important, but it should not be seen as distinct from belief. moral outrage is grounded in belief that tremendous injustice has been done, a tremendous value of central importance has been trampled. and that's, you know, when you talk about moral outrage, it's the emotional consequence of realizing that something has happened that is unjust, unfair and harmful to the group. so it's this kind of mobilization of emotions that can under some circumstances override alternative concerns and turn this attitude, supportive attitude into a personal goal. i'm going to do something about it. >> john. >> of course -- thank you for the question. of course we should be paying attention. you can't allow this kind of stuff to go unchecked. the empirical evidence tells us

that there are very different kinds of things that happen in terms of how moral outrage becomes apparent and important as a behavior-controlling device for the individual. now, put in plain english what that means is some individuals acquire moral outrage first, and that propels them further to seek out opportunities to get involved in a terrorist group. the evidence is increasing, however, that for most it's not actually the case. for most who drift into terrorism, whether it's to, again, sort of stick to stegman's work which is very, very powerful here, you know, the risk factors were starting to get -- we're starting to get a bit of after handle on, so whether it's through kinship or the presence of a -- but it follows so many. it's a by-product of involvement. it's hanging around with people, getting exposure to some of the, some of the more inner circles. that's when moral outrage

develops in an attempt to justify what is otherwise pretty low-level and tawdry activity that you might have engaged in up to that point. so, again, it comes back the to is same old issue of beliefs and behavior. one sometimes precedes the other but not necessarily. there are examples of people, and, again, this is across the board, different kinds of movements. people who disengage from terrorist activity without necessarily having to change their core beliefs. >> let's take a few more questions. maybe we'll take this one here. >> thank you. is this on? thank you. i'm on the faculty of the national defense university. dr. newman, with your permission, i'd like to ask this question. >> granted. [laughter] >> thank you, thank you. why is it that radicalization as a concept or even the term is rarely, if ever, used for terrorist movements or

terrorists other than al-qaeda or islamic-related terrorist movements for lack of a better world? you rarely hear it talked about with respect to the ira, eta, ltte, and the list goes on. and it seems to be a concept and a term that is only being applied to one type of terrorist movement. >> hmm. who wants to respond to that? >> i have an impression about it based on research. it has to do, i think, with academic vogue. the fact that it's now in fashion to talk about radicalization, and now the group and the focus of our attention is al-qaeda. but when you talk about ltte or about the ira, you, in retrospect, use the same term because it's the here and now of discussion. so i think it's not for any profound reason other than the fluctuations of academic terminology that now focused on this particular term. >> and i have a theory, too.

i think it's intimate -- it's a new term. you will not find lots of literature on radicalization pre-9/11. and so i think it has come up in the context of 9/11 and of al-qaeda, and it wasn't used to the same extent. we were using different words for it in the case of the ira. we were discussing root causes and how people would become involved. i would call that radicalization today, but it was called something different before. i'm pretty sure that if we see a revival of, for example, the type of anders breivik type of attack, and in the context of that type of attack, a lot of people have talked about radicalization. so i think it's a function of time also. >> and if john horgan persuades us, we might abandon the terminal together. >> exactly.

it's over with today. [laughter] >> the i've given up on youtube, but i've got a different answer. i think much of it has to do with our inability societally, i was going to talk about issues to do with resilience later. um, this term has become so politicized, i think, in very, very dangerous kinds of ways that are affecting our ability, i'm worried that it's going to affect our ability to bounce back from even the smallest kinds of events you canned by -- conducted by opportunistic individuals. we're seeing a very worrying resurgence and escalation of violet dissident -- violent dissident terrorism in ireland right now. nobody is talking about radicalization. we're seeing children as young as 10, 11, 12 years old being groomed for activity in these new kinds of splinter groups, but in northern ireland people would laugh at you. it's not something that would even enter into the discussion,

so i think there are some deeply problematic issues about why we do associate it with one kind of group, but it seems to represent almost an acknowledgment of implicit failure that we so lack the ability to make informed judgments about risk that we've taken refuge in trying to address the one thing that we know is practical, and that is at least let's look at the expression of a belief and maybe try to change that. i think that's where, ultimately, our problems have started to come from. >> more questions. lady here. could you stand up so we can bring you the microphone? wonderful. and there was someone else in the back -- yes. and we'll take you right after. >> hello. [inaudible] university of maryland from india. and my question or comment relates a continuation of what professor khan said about, you know, i understand it's 9/11, ten years after that we're discussing here, we're talking

al-qaeda and jihadists and that kind of terrorism more. but when the u.s. department of state or foreign policymakers talk about terrorism, they talk about the war on terror and global efforts of terror. but very often, you know, global terror events elsewhere whether it's in india, whether it's in indonesia, whether it's elsewhere is just met with, oh, we condemn it, and we're sorry about at it. so unless we reconcile studying various kinds of terrorism, how can it be a global war on terrorism? >> okay. and we take the other question in the back right after yours. >> hi. i'm a doctoral student at the george mason university and former student of peter newman when he was at georgetown. [inaudible] my question is -- >> now, don't let me down now. [laughter] >> okay. hopefully, this'll be a challenging one for you, peter. >> okay. >> we're talking about political violence, and i think that we all agree that that's sort of

the bigger topic. and we're talking about terrorism. but at the same time, we're talking also about we're not sure how the west, for example -- [audio difficulty] in africa or ignoring violent bahrain while saudi troops enter it. so my question is, isn't the bigger topic here political warfare and sort of the elephant in the room, and why, why is it that on the one hand we applaud gadhafi's failure, on the other hand we forgot that he was supporting the african union troops in somalia who are fighting against al-shabab? >> so i'm not entirely sure we can get to the bottom of all these very global questions today. but maybe jarrett, maybe you can -- [laughter] you can -- >> i can. >> -- you can tell us something

about how the recent eventses in libya -- events in libya were received on the jihadist forums. that would be interesting. >> yeah. i mean, i think they're confused, right? there's been a lot of al-qaeda messaging. you've had two very prominent libyan senior members of al-qaeda, one who was just killed, atie ya, and they've been quiet for a while, and then libya started bubbling, and they blitzkrieged, and it was just all libya, all the time. zawahiri came out and said libya's the new ground zero for us, all hands on deck. so i think there's a lot of excitement at first. and so, you know, there's a question, well, do we have troops in the place, do we have guys on the ground, jihadist brigades there, and there was kind of a collective letdown. we're not really a part of this. so you see a lot of, like, hey, maybe we can make this more -- not really. i mean, it's kind of this, it's

petering out almost, and i think that's, you know, so there's a lot of excitement, but that's kind of what's been going on in the forums with the entire arab spring. a lot of, like, this is our chance. i guess not yet. [laughter] and al-qaeda says, just wait, just wait, just wait. people's, you know, expectations and hopes will be dashed, they will become more resonant to what we're pitching, just not quite yet. just consolidate your strength, stay underground, you know, build your weapons catches, work with the sheikhs quietly, we'll get there, and i think the movement online's starting to be like, you know, let's go, let's go. so i think there's a collective letdown. >> as far as getting a response from one of the two of you on, especially on the first question. do you sense that, you know, there's a sort of al-qaeda fatigue perhaps, you know, people are sensing that this is declining and perhaps we are more interested in other kinds of movements in the future, maybe in other parts of the

world? do you see that happening? >> well, i think the stark center from the very get go was interested in terrorism globally. historically, globally, in the all its manifestations. and for two basic reasons. one is that if we are to evolve a profound understanding of terrorism, we have to understand it in all its manifestations across time and space. and the second reason is that it seems to be the case that some general principles are emerging. when i look at the work that was mentioned here by a classmate colleague on radicalization, they draw examples from across the spectrum from the russian anarchies of the 19th century all the way to al-qaeda, the weather underground in the united states and so forth. and these things, these phenomenon resonate with what john horgan has been telling us about the pria and what fernando

has been telling us about eta. so i think scientifically there seems to be emerging a set of principles, and that was what stark was committed to from the very beginning, to understand terrorism in all of it manifestations, glorious manifestations. >> maybe we have time for a couple more questions, and i'll take the three of you. and i'll take -- [inaudible] too because he's special. but we'll start with you, sir. maybe. maybe not. >> [inaudible] >> john, here. >> good morning. mark, chief scientist with the air force. turning to jarrett's comment to your point about the model of decentralization and, if you will, inclusivity reminds me a lot of leaderless organizations in the '60s. have we learned anything, or is

this just a blast back to the past? and related to that in terms of i know this sort of bleeds into the next panel, in terms of countering that, to what extent have we learned about, you know, we talked about moral outrage. another precondition, seems to me, is an inability of the political system because of a lack of justice or whatever to resolve that problem which, again, we've seen in our own history. so i wonder if you could comment on the relevance of the model. is it really anything new and then, secondarily, have we learned anything from are the past in terms of necessary preconditions? is. >> could you hand the mic to here in the purple? is. >> jeff willis, ohio state university. john, this is for you. i guess the question is, is some of your unease about radicalization or could some of your unease be directed toward how it might obscure context? i was thinking about northern ireland. you can think of a situation in which you have republican views.

it's fine in the 1960s. early 1970s, you have protestant paramilitary organizations acting up. you don't trust the police, the troops, so all of a sudden violence makes sense. you may not be radical, but violence makes sense. and then, all right, the troops leave, the protestant paramilitaries stand down, you trust the police. your beliefs haven't changed, but as you said, all of a sudden you're not a radical any longer. so does the focus on radicalization, basically, privilege psychology over context? is because i know in the past you've written about you have to examine defense and so on. so i guess the basic question is, is part of your concern about radicalization the extent to which it might obscure context? is. >> hold on one second, john. we have two more questions on this table. the lady first. >> the hi. my name's angela king. i'm a speaker -- i'm here. [laughter] i'm a speaker/consultant/corresponden.

i'm harding a lot that we maybe need to go back and redefine or refocus our efforts, our thoughts. given our age of technology, social networking, how technology is being utilized by different people no matter what you call them, terrorists, radicals, i'm kind of wondering if some of this redefining and refocusing, to be quite frank and with all tiew respect to all of the -- all due respect to all of the academics here, there's a wealth of resources out there that can be tapped into that can give us new information that you're not going to find in a book. and i'm speaking about former defectors from such groups. so what i'm looking for is aind coof only -- kind of some telephone opinions on maybe -- kind of some opinions on maybe utilizing that knowledge to move forward. >> could you just give it to your neighbor? is.

>> my name is phillip, and i used to work in the fbi. if you were participating in the government conversations given the significance of the internet about radicalization about more aggressively shutting down sites and chat rooms, legal and sort of civil rights issues aside, what would you say? >> now everyone gets a minute or two to respond to all these questions, and we'll start with jarrett. [laughter] >> okay. so i'll rapid fire this puppy. so to mark, is this new. certainly, it's not a new historical phenomenon, but it's new for the al-qaeda movement, um, this focus on individualized jihad. from each according to their ability, in this case, to, right, to the global kind of movement. wherever you are, whatever you have, you know, for surrey i think, you know, he grew up in afghanistan where you had, you know, one of the things -- one of his mentors talked about the importance of afghanistan as a place that people could come to

march under the banner of the prophet. but you could smell the musk in the area from all -- in the air from all these guys getting together. musk to them is something that's very good. [laughter] and so i think there's kind of this sense, well, we have to be all together in this, right? and surrey's saying, no, you can do this from the comfort of your own home. you don't even have to meet anybody, you can meet each other online. so it's kind of a lonely enterprise. and i think that's the most difficult thing culturally for these kind of generation, whatever, 3.0 of al-qaeda to go with. in terms of the importance of -- [inaudible] i totally agree with you. some of the best insights i've gotten were from one of zawahiri's partners in crime who wrote a bunch of books exposing a lot of his biggest weaknesses and historical flaws. i've ticken that stuff -- taken that stuff and run with it.

only they have that kind of nuanced knowledge, and that's the stuff that drove zawahiri up a wall. because he knew his buddy had the dirt on him like nobody else. so i think there's a lot of insight there. and to phil's question about shutting down sites, you know, i was against it early on because that was my only window, but as i've seen a series of these kinds of wipes, they lose steam when you take out a bunch of sites, and they have to go find and register for a new one. it's kind of painful for them. i think there is some utility in this just shutting the whole thing down, and that's the first time i've said that. but i think we're to the point now where they're in a moment of panic about what's the future of al-qaeda, what's my future, you know, are these forums secure? sowing seeds of distrust, and, you know, this site's been hijacked by saudi intelligence, they have your pass words and e-mail now, ah, you know? [laughter] that's the best way to do it.

[laughter] oops. >> john. all right, very quickly, to answer mark and jeffrey's question in one fell swoop, it's new, but it's different. and the context is what's new, of course. so as a result of that, it's our conceptions of how we form late risk and develop risk assessments has to change because the meaning has changed and the opportunity's afforded you epitomize this. the opportunities for people to take the opportunity has changed. context is absolutely everything. h.h.h. cooper used to say? >> -- used to say in studies years ago there is a sense in which the context changes much faster than the kind of perspectives and theories we bring to bear in this problem. and we don't do enough as academics to sort of revise the earlier position. the three of us do, of course.

[laughter] and on that note, actually, on the issue of, um, defectors, and i would even go broader and say it's not just defectors, it's people who have disengaged whether they have defected or not. i would sort of gently dispute the fact that we don't, as academics, engage in that. i've been speaking to former terrorists for 15 years now, and the fact that i've been able to distinguish between, um, disengagement versus deradicalization has come from speaking with people who have left their movements. i realize that there's a very, very low risk of reengagement for those individuals, but they didn't necessarily change their views in order to get where they are. but the context around them has changed, and that's the critical issue. there's actually quite a lot of work on that right now on speaking to people who have been involved. i think recent academic experiences have shown that it's not just possible to do this work rigorously, but more importantly from our perspective

as academics, we can do it ethically, and we can do it safely. we're not, we're not thrill seekers, we don't, you know, put ourselves in harm's way, but it is actually possible to do this stuff in ways that 10, 15 years ago we wouldn't have even dreamed of. >> arie. >> as to individual jihad, there's a sense in which this notion of individual jihad is a retreat, a very clever retreat from the former stage where there was an organization behind the effort. and, clearly, organization, having a strong organization with finances, with training camps, with logistical bases is a precondition for launching sophisticated, far-reaching operations. so in a sense this idea of logistic jihad is testimony to the success of the war on terror, that they now are retreating to propaganda and inspiration of individuals. the second point with respect to

that is that it cannot be totally individualized. humans do not act alone in very rare instances. you have the unibomber, and exception has proved the rule. but they work in groups. they're affected by the social realities around them. they are affected by the leaders. so, you know, maybe surrey's trying to replace bin laden as the leader, as the inspiration behind the ideology that gets people to engage in terror im. but to think that it is going to be totally individualized is fly anything the face of understanding -- flying in the face of understanding what the social process is all about. ..

>> we are talking to a group in the philippines. whenever we can gain access to engage in as deep cutting and search in order to understand them in their own words in their own context. so you are absolutely right. we are aware of the needs to get down to the weeds and into the nitty-gritty and talk to the people who are involved. >> thank you, arie. thank you to the other two

panelist. the 60 minutes could not give you more than into a small window of what we have learned. i encourage all of you to look these guys up and read some of they writings. i think it's worthwhile. before you get up, three quick points. first of all, i couldn't agree more with arie and john. in fact, one the most academically gifted former extremist is a guy called mayor who is is here. and who works for us now to london and who will, i think, this afternoon tell us about his experience and also the fact that he was good friends with the bombers and what that implies. so that's something really to look forward to. but other than that, you will get a coffee break now of 20 minutes. and at exactly 10:50, i will see you back here -- well, i won't see you back here. other people will see you on the

panel. we will continue the conversation. thank you very much. [applause] [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> once again we're live now from the national press club here in washington as we continue the coverage of the day long discussion on lessons learned since the attacks on

9/11. up next the debate on whether we are safer since the 9/11 attacks and the wars in iraq and afghanistan. we'll hear from national security analyst and author peter bergon and terrorism expert, mr. ross, this is live coverage on c-span2. >> titled "are we safer? " thank you very much,daughter re. i believe we are on. if they could please take the lectern. thank you for mentioning my new daughter. if i doze off, it's not the speaker. i haven't slept in two months. is america safer from terrorism, that's the question that will be debated here today by the distinguished speakers. during this session of today's catastrophe, looking at issues ten years after the 9/11.

as gary mentioned, i'm arif alikhan, and i'm the moderator, and this will be a lively and engaging debate between the two terrorism experts, peter perigon and daveed gartenstein-ross. i'd like to agree on the question and format. the debate question is ten years after the attacks of 9/11, is america safer from terrorism? this is limited to terrorism against the united states, and the u.s. homeland, not against u.s. interest overseas such as embassies or military bases. and it is limited to terrorists attacks, no covert by nation's states. when we talk about safer, we are referring to likelihood and

social severity of a possible terrorists attack. they will compare the two points in time, today, september 1, 2011 and the day before 9/11. but arguments may also include how america's current vulnerabilities, if any, maybe exploited in the future. the format of today's debate is after i provide brief introductions, each participate will have five minutes to make opening statements, setting forth their position on the question. then each participate will have three minutes to respond to the opening statement of the other. after the opening and responses, we will then have question time. and as chair, i will ask questions of each participate, allow them an opportunity to respond, and then i will solicit questions from the audience to ask the debaters. the rules require that questions from the audience be directed to me as the chair, and i did receive permission from dr. neumann to do this, and then i

will then ask the questions of the panelist. obviously, given the short time that we have, all questions should be exactly that. questions and not commentary. finally, each of the debaters will then have two minutes for final submission or closing argument. gary ackerman is here before me. he will be showing the time and he's assured me if we go over, he'll give us a nasty look. finally one of the most important parts is actually at the end when you will have the chance to vote for the argument you thought was most persuasive in answering the debate question. voting will be conducted by text messaging and instructions are on your table as you can see. now there's an old political saying that you should make sure to vote early and often. we ask that you not take this thing seriously and instead wait for the conclusion of the debate. now to the distinguished guests, representing the position that

america is safer since 9/11 is peter bergon. peter is particular to many of us at cnn national security analyst, and award-winning author having written on al qaeda, osama bin laden, and counterterrorism efforts in the united states. his most recent book "the longest war: enduring conflict between america and al qaeda." he's the director at the new america foundation, and has been an adjunct facility at harvard and john hopkins university. please join me in welcoming peter bergon. [applause] >> to my right, representing the position that america is not safer is daveed garte gartenstein-ross. he has consulted on a rage of issues includes hostage

negotiations, border stories, and the most recent book was released two days ago -- >> monday actually. >> it's entitled "bin laden's legacy: why we are still losing the war or terror." let us begin with peter. if you can give us your opening statement for five minutes on why you believe america is safer from terrorism since 9/11. >> thank you. i want to thank daveed take the position that we are not safe. because then the question would be what have you been doing? you think it's more safe because you've been involved in making it more safe. let's review what happened on 9/11. as you know, four planes crashed into targets in washington and new york, killed 3,000 americans in the course of a single morning, inflicting more damage on the united states than the soviet union had done during the cold war.

since then, what has al qaeda managed to do against the united states? the answer is nothing. there isn't been a single successful attack on the domestic united states for a decade. the idea that there was going to be one in the future i think is fairly impausable. if it does happen, it will be relatively small. they will not be something that completely changing our national security as 9/11 did. and furthermore, there have only been 17 americans killed in jihadi terrorists attacked, fort hood, texas, where 13 people died. more americans die in their bathtubs than terrorists attacked. we don't fear america. we shouldn't fear al qaeda. their ability to kind of do anything in terms of catastrophic attacks or anything relatively small is constrained. why is that? well, let's review the difference between 9/11 today and between 9/11 and today. on 9/11, there were 16 people on

the no fly list. now there are thousands. on 9/11, there were perhaps a sprinkling of the joint terrorism. now there are 100. on 9/11, the cia and fbi didn't talk to each other. one the reasons they successfully attacked because they were not informed to the state of the fbi that they were in the country until way too late. joint special operations which killed bin laden was something that was almost never used. now we've had thousands of operations by special operators in iraq, afghanistan, and others, countries like yemen and somalia. lee say son -- liaison relationships, it was prevented because strong liaison with britain and pakistan and intelligence which didn't exist before 9/11. think about the fbi, almost no analyst, now there's 2,000. that's probably too many.

there's a much larger analytical capability. think about the public. they weren't aware. who disabled richard reed. it was the public. who disabilitied abdu hewal will be? public awareness is a different situation. it didn't exist on 9/11. certainly that's a good thing. from our opponent, we'll hear from al qaeda has a diabolically clever idea to bankrupt the economy. we are large. al qaeda is not economist. we are spending 1.5% of gdp and 4.5 on the entire national security. just for reference, we spend 9% in 1968 during the vietnam,

during world war ii, we spent 47%. they would aware it's benefiting lots of people. it's not a coincidence that five out of ten of the richest counties surround washington, d.c. bankrupting us has helped us. [laughter] >> sure, al qaeda says we have the great idea. we're going to bankrupt you. this is our clever plan. you don't buy the propaganda of the enemy. do you remember the east coast blackout. they said we are responsible. that wasn't true. the idea that the economic problems are caused by al qaeda, it's crazy. subprime mortgage, tax cuts at a time of war, entitlement programs, you know what the real problems are. they are not caused by al qaeda. of course, you know, al qaeda has had no meaningful role in the arab spring, we've killed the top two and most of the top

twenty. they said yesterday al qaeda is is on the ropes. leon panetta, another soft on terrorism saiding reaching the pink. and another soft on terrorism said they are facing strategic defeat. they are facing strategic defeat. to fear them would be doing their work for them. we don't want to do that. >> thank you, peter. [applause] >> daveed, you have five minutes. >> ten years after 9/11, the united states is far, far weaker country. everyone know this is. jihadi terrorists groups are not significantly weaker. therefore, we are safe from

terrorism. i'm going to turn to the current state and the global context in which the fighting against terrorism is going to move forward, and i'll talk about why it's foolish to count them out. we have an economic in shambles, national debt that stands at over $14 trillion, this debt threatens our ability to continue to maintain the current security apparatus, and also the ability to project power. our military says than. a decade ago, we derived safety to massively devote resources. that's what we did. in the coming decade, we'll have fewer resources. we may have dramatically fewer if the current concerns about the u.s. credit worthiness end up snowballing. this occurs in a context of global austerity, every country trimming the budget. it's not just diminishing, but also spreading inability. as we saw in the riot that is occurred in britain and greece.

moreover, in the global context with everything from oil, to commodities, to food, there will be further constraints on the u.s.' ability to deal with terrorists and there will be further inability. not only does it mean we'll be more hard pressed to counteract terrorism, it will be much measure difficult to absorb an attack. al qaeda didn't cause this. but it's here. for that reason, we are less safe. we are weaker, what about al qaeda? from the administration officials and others about how al qaeda is on the ropes because we've heard all of this before. september 2003, president bush boasted up to 2/3s has been captured or killed. sounds like what peter has been saying to you now. april 2006, the u.s. intelligence community by consensus said that al qaeda was defeated. that's what they held. president bush and the u.s. intelligence community then over stated al qaeda's weaknesses.

in july 2007, the new national intelligence estimate was forced to conclude that al qaeda had, in fact, protected or regenerated key elements of its homeland attack ability. there's little reason to think that right now the intelligence community has so much better of an understanding. they haven't born out, including the consensus that bin laden can be found in pakistan, and the majority view that bin laden was merely a figurehead. he wasn't. peter references the death, john brennan said that we don't know who's going to replace atia. this shows the weakness. moving about whether al qaeda is on the rope, let's turn to objective indicators of whether al qaeda is dying. the 9/11 commission in analyzing what al qaeda and other groups need to execute against the u.s. concluded that they require physical sanctuaries.

ten years ago, they had one. in afghanistan. today al qaeda affiliates enjoy four, somalia, yemen, pakistan, and north male. it's not going in our favor. nobody has a plan to dislodge them from the areas. they disrupted in europe in october of last year shows they retain the capability to under take the attacks. beyond the threat of a massive catastrophic attack, the strategy is going fairly well. the group is under mining. this is what i'm going to say. this is also true. certainly the collapse in september 2008, made the u.s. see mortal, and caused them to turn what they call a strategy of a thousand cuts. emphasizing smaller and more frequent attacks which are designed to drive up security. in the past 22 months, al qaeda groups have gotten three bombs on board. the under pants bomb and the two bombs that were placed on fedex and ups in october 2010.

the fact that nobody dies doesn't mean the attacks failed. as anwar awlaki explained, you spent to protect every package, or you do nothing and we keep trying. it ignores the $14 trillion deficit. the fact that we're not going to be able to keep up the level of security spending and there's the cainian effect. we are not building infrastructure and roads and the like. we are merely preventing a terrorists group from hitting us. one final factor that makes terrorists retain the capability is homegrown terrorism. there were 13 cases in 2009, representing at the time, 1/4 of the publicly reported cases of jihadi radicalization recruitments. those the figured decline in 2010, they were still greater than any other year. as one esteemed terrorist analyst said when it comes to the threat of home grown terrorism, there's no denying it's increasings.

that esteemed analyst, peter bergon himself. so the bottom line is al qaeda didn't pose a threat to us ten years ago. this is proven by peter's arguments. they may, however, pose an expotential threat today because of the potential we are in. >> thank you. >> peter -- >> [applause] >> daveed talks about the strategy of a 1,000 cuts. this is more line 1,000 beatings with a feather duster. let's do world war ii where germany doesn't successfully invade poland or take over. we wouldn't be writing the history of world war ii as if the nazis were a threat. the fact that the sight -- and the fact that we mentions the cargo plot, the urban warfare in

european cities. this is a record of a abysmal failure. they have had a safe haven for the time in yemen. it's expanding. what have they been able to do? there hasn't been an successful attack since july 7th, 2005. six years ago. this is really a record of failure, and it's a record of failure, but likely to continue. not to say there might not be a small scale terrorists attack at some point in the future, but nothing that would reorientate our national security policy as 9/11, and nothing that would really allow us to say we are less safe. which is really the burden of prove. he hasn't proved we are less safe. the war on terror or other sort

ever things. to prove we are less safe is high bother. he has yet to jump over. >> thank you. daveed, you will have three minutes to rebut peter's opening statement. >> the burden of proof lies on peter's side. the resolution is the united states safer? he's arguing that it is. all i have to show we are not safer from terrorism. i've already shown that. he has not reputed the fundamental pair dime, look at the u.s. and the capacity to deal with the problem. they prove al al qaeda was not a threat ten years ago. nobody died as part of the 1,000 cuts. not true, the attacks in madrid, shabaab has shown the ability to carry out the attacks. they have capacity. when you look at european plots

which peter derives, the season that we were able to learn about the plots is from a detainee held in afghanistan, who gave the intelligence officers, the name that wasn't previously known to u.s. intelligence. we're drawing our assets away from afghanistan now. will we be able to find out about the plots as resources. that's the fundamental problem. she talks about shabaab is withdrawing. they still control the west, which is the only city where amazon, the african union forces are able to operate. the bottom line this is an easy debate. peter has not reputed the argument that we are in financial trouble, which will mean that more resources are drawn away, which means that we are less resilient. he hasn't answered at all the argument that i am quoted him that homegrown terrorism is an increasing problem. it's not just jihadi terrorists groups, right wing terrorism at

home, and political, as we saw when joe stack flew his plane into the irs building in austin, texas. and the attack in norway shows that you can't ignore other nonjihadi groups. for all of the groups, the capacity to deal with them is less. he ignored the argument about how you the allies, those who we rely son, have less resources. it makes the entire system more unable and gives more room for violent nonstate actors to operate. this is very clear. he also didn't answer the arguments that i've made about why we shouldn't trust the intelligence community now. the debate is clear. at the end of the day, i know the consensus view among people is that the threat is less than it was before. but the facts just don't bear that out. when the plane -- it's one of those situations where we saw someone that was up against the ropes in the 1970s. but the harder george foreman

punched hew -- muhammed the more he got tired. it doesn't bear out. sorry. >> peter, i'm going to ask you the first question. it's related to what daveed just mentioned. you indicate that we have safer because of the unsuccessful attacks. yet, when there are one the unsuccessful attacks, at least the consensus among many that it generates incredible amount of fear among the populous and it does create an reaction, at least in the political world. how are we safer when our reaction in other words, the object of terrorism to terrorize is one would argue being successful. >> i think that's debatable. certainly the reaction to flight 253, there was a huge over reaction because of miscues or senior administration officials by saying the system worked.

look at the time square bomber. new yorkers were back taking the subway the following morning. they weren't terrorist. they came out and said, you know, we've got the thing covered. americans went on about their business. in fact, terrorism as a issue of serious consent to americans is actually pretty low at this point. obviously an event would change that. but, you know, americans are reoccupied by things like, you know, the kardashians, which is in a sense a sign of, you know, we won. they don't preoccupy. not like we are living in israel where we are cowering of fear as hezbollah attack. as you say, terrorism doesn't succeed if it doesn't terrorize. we've moved beyond it. americans look at the evidence of ten years without an attack. they can draw their own conclusions. >> i have to say that kim kardashian did have a nice wedding. [laughter] [laughter] >> daveed, sort of on that issue

now on terrorizing. you mention that al qaeda still poses or does pose an extensional threat. is it because of the economic impact that the existence of the united states is at risk? >> let me be very clear, i didn't say they pose an extensional threat. they may. if they do, it's because of the fact that we are so weak right now. i'm not convinced they do pose an extensional threat. go back ten years. we absorbed 9/11, just fine, and probably could have absorbed 9/11 easily. an attack like that that caused 1-$2 billion damage. it could be now because resources are more expensive. it could be more harder for the economy with the massive debt that we have to absorb an attack or, or two attacks or three attacks. i'm not convinced they do, i'm saying they didn't a decade ago which is exact what peter's

argument prove. they pose more of a threat now because relative to where we are, an attack like that would do so much more damage. >> but what effect has the billions of dollars that have been spent since 9/11 on the national security apparatus, homeland security, counterterrorism on the threat because you seem to suggest that that has minimal impact. >> i'm not saying that everyone in this room is wasting their time with their jobs by any means. and i think that, in fact, -- the fact that we haven't seen another successful attack that's large scale against the united states is a great tribute to the hard work that people in our security apparatus have done. it is hard work. what i'm saying rather that multiple factors, not just the war, but so many things over the past ten years. if you go back ten years ago, one reason that al qaeda was something that we could absorb is because we had the ability when he needed to to ramp up our resources. we couldn't ramp up resources in

that way right now. if something going wrong in other parts of the world. if pakistan implodes, what kind options do we have? if you are seeing other countries on the brink of somewhat or the other, iranian nuclear developments and we have so fewer options to deal. that's the case with terrorism. i don't need to win that al qaeda poses an extensional threat, but terrorism is more of a threat, or that we are no safer now than we were ten years ago. >> and, peter, let me just finish my questions with this. al qaeda has proven to be resilient. it has existed as an entity for many years. we know that we are in a fiscal situation where there is going to be some contractions. what do you think would happen if the american people become complacent and it's not as robust as it's been. >> this is a strong man. clearly there's going to be appropriate reduction in both

the defense and national security. because we face budget crisis. we are spending at least double on what we are spending on the defense today that we were spending on 9/11. the idea that we don't have the resources to do that, on 9/11, after the terrorist attack in modern history, we put 300 u.s. special forces into afghanistan. that was in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. well, president obama just, you know, ready recently authorized 100,000 men and women. if something is serious, stabilizing afghanistan is one the those serious problems. we have the resources and political will to deal with it. yes, there are resource. does it make us less safe because we are spending 5% less at dhs? >> okay. i won't answer that question. i used to work at dhs. but gary if you'd tell me how many more minutes we have for questions. okay. we have ten minutes for

questions from the audience. we would like questions rather than commentary. i was the federal prosecutor for many years, the old judge once told me the questions start with who, what, where, when, how, and why. if you could start off with that, i would appreciate it. we have one question here, the gentleman in the suit. anybody else over here? and then -- in the suit. as opposed to the man without the jacket. if you could stand up, introduce yourself, and address the question to me. >> rick norrisson, we've seen over the last six to nine months the arab spring, summer, fall, and soon to be winter. given the level of instability and continuing chaos for the next two, three, five, ten years, would the ableist expect incident of terrorists to increase or perhaps decrease? >> okay. you have violated the judges order immediately. so i know how effective i've

been. there's one other question and i can -- right here. the lady is wearing the suit. [laughter] >> what role -- what role would you place religion in the mix of factors that are driving terrorism given the evidence that we're seeing an increase around the world and few polls in others? >> okay. thank you. let me ask you. because i think we need to address this in his statement. what is the impact of instability until in the world f attacks safe havens? >> as yogi berra said, it's hard to make predictions about the future. the future is grim. let's look at the arab spring. not a single picture of osama bin laden in any of the protest. not a single american flag burning. not a single israeli flag. al qaeda's foot soldiers are absence. and that is a good thing.

now certainly al qaeda and the arabian peninsula is trying to take advantage of the power. but that's the only place that al qaeda can expand the reach in the world. whoever plays is going to get a strong instruction from the united states government, your cooperation in the war on terror is going to continue, or without your say so, including our drone and special forces program. so i think al qaeda and arabian peninsula may get a temporary bump. they are going to be on a pressure. doesn't matter what the future holds, directly coming from the united states. >> daveed, would you like to respond? >> yeah, first of all, the idea that there were no pictures of bin laden used is false. in kuwait, there were a number of pictures of bin laden that were displayed. this is neither here or there,s

in the arabic language press, and there have been protesters sympathetic. when you look at the overall picture of the arab spring, there's certainly reason for hope. but there's also reason over the next five years or so which is the period that we are looking at to be concerned. first of all, the operational capacity has increased with the violent islamic released from prison, and the talent pool is larger. it's a fair question as you see the growth of al qaeda in the sinai. there's a better question if there's more al qaeda on the ground than yemen. egypt has gotten a lot more dangerous. likewise with libya, there's the big question of controversy now about the members of the libyan islamic fighting group. they did make the revisions and made a break with al qaeda. they also said they weren't going to fight gadhafi's regime. there are significant questions that shows the operational capacity. but moreover in the terms of the

idea, it's not just about democracy. it's also about food price inflation, it's about unemployment, and the trends are heading in the wrong direction, which is one of the resources i gave. when we look at countries like tunisia and egypt, and it has declined since mubarak fell. one thing you are going to get is the discontent, especially when you have the sky high expectations as you may have with the arab spring, that idology is going to step in. we may well see that. >> thank you. with respect to the question on religious, i'll ask you first, and give peter an opportunity to respond. what role do you think religion has in making the assessment of whether we are safer since 9/11? >> well, when we talk about religion in the context of terrorism, which is one of the facets of terrorisms that we are talking about, domestic and extremism is another part of this debate.

we are talking about a particular interpretation of the religion. there are numerous terms, some of which is the jihadi view. in the studies that i've done of homegrown terrorism, religion tends and seems to be more of a factor than the analyst that minimize the role of ideology. for the debate,st not relative between me and peter, but i will say there is an ideology that one can attack to groups like al qaeda. the concern that i have when you look at the arab spring, is the ideology flourishing as people think the hoping have been dashed. >> thank you. peter, would you like to response? >> just to zoom out, al qaeda has been losing the war on terror. afterall, we're talking about muslims. they have religious views and views about groups like al qaeda that claim to speak in their name. they would be losing the war on ideas. and groups that defend is not

impressive. you know, if you look at polling data, bin laden, al qaeda, they have created in every country around the world. just to give you an easy to identify data point. think about pakistan. a country with $180 million people. look at protest that follow bin laden's death. maybe hundreds if you are lucky. the sympathy that existed, the robin hood image that he had has completely evaporated. while it will be increasing, it's not transferring into people volunteering for al qaeda or admiring their handiwork around the world. >> okay. i believe we have time for a couple more questions. i will take the question here from the man with the tie. and is there -- anybody else back in the corner over there. if we can position the other microphone over there. >> mark, question 9/11 commission noted that we had not only a lack of intelligence which is excited by our debaters, but also a lack of

imagination. my but is have we been successfully imaginative or not to build the resiliency negative to avoid the consequences of an action? >> thank you. back in the corner. please state your name. >> i'm a doctoral student at george mason. given the islamist or terrorists justifications for the use of wmd against the west, how does that effect the debate? >> okay. peter, i'll start with you on the 9/11 commission. you are familiar. the question was with the lack of imagination, isn't that concern what we don't know in the future? >> i'm more of the evidence based that i don't know what we don't know is the thing we need to fear.

that was the unknowns. this is not the right way to think. we had the treasure, that revealed nothing in terms of the tax. they had lots of blue sky ideas that get to the wmd point. they've talked about wmd and get the real problem that daveed has. he's born into the own propaganda points. we have a fact for wmd. which we ably -- obliterated the program. when we look at the 188 terrorists, charges and convictions since 9/11, interesting data point. not a single one involve chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. for all of the hysterical

concerns about the issue, and in 2004, they wrote a book saying we are due for a terrorists attack with nuclear weapons. well, we are still waiting. it's hard to assemble any kind of serious weapon of mass destruction. it's hard for the states. iran has spent ten years without success. saddam spent hundreds of millions on the program without success. while governments need to be concerned, as a real nourish terms of the debate, the idea that we are going to somehow weapons of mass destruction are going to be taken by terrorists into the united states, accept in, you know, perhaps in a an attack that might kill a few people, it's nonsensical. >> peter addressed both questions on wmd and imagination. how do you respond? >> peter talks about the freak about what we don't know, invade other countries. part of what i'm saying is the school of freak out about what we don't know has made us less safe over the last ten years.

that's part of what the debate is is. it's the doctrine that peter is critiquing. it's not about should we freak out and imagine the worse? but about how safe are we compared to what terrorists can do? 9/11 was, in fact, a failure of imagination. that is well documented. the fact that the only person in the administration who had thought of something like this within terrorists uses hijacked planes was richard clark. that's because he read a tom clancy novel when it occurred. you can see it until the various commentaries about arab spring where they can't imagine that they capitalized on this. you can see it also in the notion that we are safer, al qaeda is on the ropes, you've heard that peter is siting multiple figure. all of the evidence that you see is in the other direction. one of those things, who are agoing to do? me or the lying eyes?

you can look out and see the geographic scope has gained ground. there are areas where they've been more unpopular. they have never commanded millions of muslims. to the extent that they've had support, it's soft support. we're looking at within the small group ten years ago and remains a small group today. what is the capacity to deal with them. the capacity so undoubtedly, everyone can see it, it's lower. >> i'm going to exercise the chair discretion to ask one concluding question. peter, what would it take to maintain the safety that we've achieved since 9/11 and daveed to answer the same question as peter has the chance, what would it take to become safe? >> well, we are never going to be absolutely safe. human history suggests that's not a plausible option. but what the government has done is clearly over the last decade

has made us less safe -- made united states more safe by any metric. the facts speak for itself. if we were less safe, we would have had multiple attacks on the u.s. even the ones that the near misses. al qaeda's attack to bomb the manhattan subway. even if it had worked in 2009, it would have killed perhaps two or three dozen people. >> if i can interpret you, how do we maintain the safety in the future? >> well, it's about the public understanding there's a threat. not cutting dhs by 95%. it's about maintaining the operations. the way that the intelligence is not very good, it flies in the face of one the greatest intelligence issues. which was hunting down bin laden. none of is it going to go away. everybody is going to have to pay at the bank on this one.

there's no reason. as we know from the private sector. sometimes belt tightening is useful, and gets rid of programs which are unnecessary and the core mission is still there. >> thank you. daveed, since you don't think we are more safe, how do we do that? >> you mean what should we do or what's being down know? >> how should we achieve safety? >> i think i used the analogy in muhammad ali and foreman, they absorbed the force and turns the strength against him. over the past ten years, the ideal thing is to recognize that al qaeda is a small adversary and not over spend or make the war broader which is what we've done. those principals can be used going forward. looking at where we've made

mistakes, in that lies what a proper road ahead would be. >> thank you. we now have the closing argument. daveed if you could begin with a two minute. >> can i get five minutes or did the format change? [inaudible comment] >> okay. sorry. i misread it. >> you'll have two minutes. >> sure. this is not a debate about whether we should fear al qaeda. this is also not a debate about whether al qaeda is an extensional threat. i read the resolution. are we safer ten careers later. as i had just said, al qaeda employs essentially who is a rope a dope. let the united states hit it and hit it and hit it and eventually the united states gets exhausted. $14 trillion national debt. we are exhausted at this point in time. peter has never answered the argument that i made. the intelligence community he said it's not going to get cut

that. that's very much an open question. but it's not just us, it's also or allies. are our allies going to maintain the appropriate levels of intelligence spending, or try to free ride upon the u.s.? also the fact we are drawing down assets in afghanistan. i talked about the example of the operative which was part of the european plots and how we found them. as we drawdown the assets, are we going to be able to maintain the level of security? peter has never answered our resilience is less. we have less capacity to absorb. also when it comes to do we trust the intelligence apparatus , we've heard the claims about how al qaeda has died. peter himself says the homegrown terrorist threat is occur. it's many other things. other political groups. overall, when you look at the picture and the relative strength of the u.s. and al qaeda, it's clear. al qaeda has died, there are multiple ways that it can be

bolstered. it can capitalize. that's something that everyone in the room understands. the fact that they have an increased capability, even if the long term arab spring turns out to be a good thick, which it may well be. in the short term, the major lessons of the arab spring is the u.s. diminished capacity to deal with inability. it's very much increasings. and the u.s. is less prepared to deal with the dangerous world. the bottom line is that al qaeda's rope worked very well. the u.s. is very much depleted, much more so than al qaeda, in such a way that nonstate actors, violent nonstate actors can pose a threat. all of the arguments only proved that al qaeda didn't pose a threat ten years ago. doesn't speak to the situation that we are in now with the diminished economy, capacity of our allies and what we are up

to. >> peter, you get the final word. >> the question is are we safer today than 9/11. let's go back to 9/11. 19 hijackers were training and living in the united states. i think the fbi and dhs would be all over that. money financed the operation. i think the treasury all over that. they had a training base in afghanistan, i think we have eliminated afghanistan. they had commander control in germany. the services would be all over that. clearly things have changed. something like 9/11 can't get through. if the record of failure on the chemical and nuclear front that i earlier outlined indicates they can't get something like that either. so on the question of homegrown

terrorism, certainly there have been cases in 2009 and 2010, 76 cases. but there's been a demolition in 2011, 11 cases. in fact, an analyst said it's to the entirely clear of the homegrown threat that it's increasing, that was daveed. he's made other statement that is are useful. american flights are safer than they were before 9/11. and finally the big one, al qaeda at the end of the day is not going to win. >> thank you. daveed? >> i do have to commend you on the preparation, given that you read the work of each other extensively. we appreciate the time. please join me in thanking our distinguished guests. [applause] [applause] >> now all of you as i mentioned before, you have the unique opportunity to vote on which side of the argument was most persuasive. instructions on your table to send a text message.

if you agree with peter bergon's position that america is safer since 9/11, the instructions how to do that. if you agree with daveed garte gartenstein-ross, there are instructions there. although you are tempted to vote for me, there are no instructions to do that. i want to thank everybody for what i thought was an engaging and interesting debate. thank you. [applause] [applause] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible con-[inaudible conve] [inaudible conversations] >> this day long forum will continue in 15 minutes. the next panel is on how self-described radicals turned away. in the break, we'll show you the opening remarks from gary lafree, he's the director of study for terrorism and responses for terrorism. >> what i want to talk about briefly is a more personal

experience relating to 9/11, but also an experience that relates directly to the work that i've been doing at s.t.a.r.t. over the past ten years. during the years, i've been the lead researchers on an unclassified source of information on terrorists attacks, called the global terrorism database, or gtd for short. the gtd includes 100,000 terrorists around the world going back to 1970. in collecting and analyzing the data over the past ten years, one theme that has come up, for me at least, is how a very small number of terrorists attacks can have a huge impact on the airtights and policies towards terrorism. they have referred to the attacks as black swan events. especially rare event that is are difficult to predict, but end up having an enormous impact on human affairs for years to come. of course, a great example of a black swan event is a subject of today's summit. the coordinated attack on the united states that occurred on

september 11th, 2001. the 9/11 attack had a tremendous impact on the political, social, economic structure of the united states and the world. and it's impact continues to reverberate ten years later. but while a black swan event like 9/11 captures the public imagination and has an outsized impact on public policy, it's also incredibly rare and unusual. the major purpose of my brief remarks this morning is to use the gtd terrorism is to put the 9/11 terrorism attack, by shows thousands of other attacks that took place around the world since 1970. i thought i'd organize the comments by looking at a series of myths about terrorism that i think were greatly influenced by 9/11. i want toe talk briefly about nine such myths. myths number one: terrorists attacks were rapidly increasing in the years leading up to 9/11. the tragics events had an

immediate and dramatic impact on levels of public concern about terrorism in the united states and well beyond. accordingly, many might assume that terrorists attacks and fatalities were up sharply before 9/11. but in fact, the gtd data tells a different story. according to the data, terrorists attacked reach the 20th century high point not in 2001, but 1992, just after the collapse of the soviet union. total attacks the year before 9/11, were at the same level as they had been in the 1970s. in fact, in the four years prior, worldwide terrorists attacks were at the lowest level in 20 years. however, total attacks have increased since 9/11, so that in 2010, total attacks are nearly as high as they were in the early 1990s. myth number two: terrorists attacks reach every corner of the world.

the ubiquity of modern communications, they are constantly come barded by terrorists attacks around the globe. if you ask yourself how many times you've seen the iconic 9/11 image of a fully loaded jut plane crashing into the world trade center, it leaves the impression that no location on the planet is safe from terrorists. but in fact, our analyst of the gtd indicates that terrorists attacks are highly concentrated in space. for example, the top 20 minutes in terms of terrorists attacks, account for three in the world since 1970. about 10% of all countries account for about 75% of all terrorists attacks. only 5% of the worlds country account for half of the worlds terrorists attacks. myth number three: the u.s. is more frequently targeted by terrorists than any other country in the world. the devastating impact of 9/11

leaves many observers in the united states and aboard to assume that the u.s. is the target of an inordinate number of terrorists attacks. when we use the gtd to exam the frequency by country, the u.s. ranks about 20th in the world in terms of total attacks and about 15th in term was fatal attacks. the most frequently attacks country is columbia. while the u.s. ranks 15th in terms of total fatalities, 90% of the total u.s. terrorist fatalities are accounted for by the coordinated attacks of 9/11. if these are removed from the estimates, u.s. fatalities are similar to fatalities for canada or greece. myth four number: most terrorists attacks involve disgruntled groups and individuals from one country carrying out attacks on civilians in other countries. again, the tremendous impact of 9/11 encourages us to think

about terrorism as being mostly about unhappy individuals from one country attacking innocent civilians from another. to examine this issue in more depth, my colleagues and i looked at the total attack patterns of 53 foreign terrorists grouped identified as posing the greatest threat to u.s. security. based on gtd data, we found that 90% of the 17,000 attacks carried out were domestic attacks. thus more than nine times out of ten, these groups operated at home against local targets. this means the groups located in, for example, pakistan were far more likely to use terrorists violence against nonu.s. targets in pakistan than they were to attack either u.s. targets in pakistan or to attack the u.s. homeland. myth number five: terrorism is unrelated to traditional political grievances. because of the seeming irrationality of the al qaeda inspired 9/11 attack, it's easy

to lose sight of the fact that a large number of terrorists attacks involve fairly rational political disputes over territory. when we use the gtd data to identify the most active terrorists organizations in the world, we find a lot proportion of them involve groups having to do with political control over territory. although there are major dumps in the orientation, this explains in large part virtually all of the top 20 most active terrorists groups, shining path, farc, hamas, ltte. myth number six: most terrorists attacks are lethal. because of contract -- 9/11, it's easy to suppose that most are lethal. we find that more than 50% of attacks since 1970 involve no fatalities. many are directed at property, many other cases, they provide warnings to civilians before

they strike. this has been the common practice for eta and ira, and it used to be a common practice for the weather under ground. 30 years ago, they led terrorists researcher that terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. it's still the case that half of the attacks, about 50,000 attacks produced one fatal. by especially troubles, the attacks that produce large numbers of attacks. near 22% produce more than 25 fatalities. in fact, brian jenkins recently revisited his earlier statement and after reviewing the facts from today said, instead, that many of todays terrorists want a lot of people wanting and a lot of people dead. innocence, about half of all attacks in the database produced no fay -- fataleities. the coordinated attacks of 9/11

involve long term planning, split second timing, and innovative use of existing resources. and the sophistication of 9/11 pales into incision, to the enemies of jack bauer, bruce willis, and other television heros face. these images encourage us to think that terrorists strikes depend on sophisticated weaponry. contrary to the view of terrorism, the vast majority of terrorist attacks rely on nonsophisticated, readily accessible weapons. according to the gtd database, 30% rely on explosives and firearms. for the most part, they are common. especially dynamite and grenades. similarly, the firearms are widely available. fortunately, sophisticated weapons, including chemical, biological, or radiological are

the rare exception. myth eight: most terrorists operations are long lasting and difficult to eradicate. given the persistence of high profile long-lasting groups like al qaeda, tigers, or others, there's a common perception that industry long life spans. the gtd identifies the groups and engage the longevity from the first strike to last known strike. we found that nearly 75% of the terrorists organizations identified in the gtd lasted for less than a year. most terrorists groups are like most business startups. very likely to disappear during the first year of operation. forming and maintaining gruels is not all that easy, inspite impressions to the con tear? why do we think that? because we hear about the group that is are successful.

for every al qaeda, there are many more short lived groups such as the anti-capital brigade. myth number nine: terrorists rarely make mistakes. we could call it the myth of superterrorism. the advanced planning contributed to the notion that terrorists groups are infallible. my colleagues and i having involved in several research projects use gtd would suggest otherwise. for example, in a recent study, we use the gtd to examine the targeting strategies for the liberation of armenia, asala, we were interested because it disappears after the 1970s and '80s.

after modeling many possible explanations, our conclusion was that the most convincing explanation was a strategic shift in asala in terms of the targeting strategy. before the early 1980s, asala was careful to target turks, and avoided nonturks and armenian casualties. in the 1980s, they became far less convertive. the event in our analysis was a brutal attack on paris' airport. the explosive device detonated killed eight people and wounded 50 more. the increasing reliance on random brutal violence, such as the attack on hostile environment among the former supporters of asala. the change in targeting strategy seriously under mined the legitimacy, especially among the supporters in the armenian diaspora and supporters of the

west. there are policemen of example of incompetence in terrorists. 90 minutes after detonating a massive truck bomb in the federal building in 1995, timothy mcveigh was arrested for driving without a license plate. particularly, a group of islamic extremist drove a van into the underground parking lot, and using the timer set the bomb to detonate. when it exploded, it killed six people, and wounded 1,000 more. remarkably, three hours after the explosion, one the chief conspirators in the plot, return to the rental agency to get his deposit back for the rented van. it gets worse, when the rental company refused to return the $400 deposit without a police report, he went to the police to report it stolen. eventually, his attempts to get

the $400 deposit back unraveled the entire conspiracy. just by way of conclusion, the exceptional originally and indiscriminate violence of the 9/11 attack is directly connected to the myths. terrorists attacks are highly con traited in geographic space, they rely on unsophisticated weaponry, and frequently involve few or no fatalities, and groups disappear in less than a year, and they make strategic errors. attacks were declining before 9/11. even though they have gone up since then. very few attacks involve groups from one country attacks civilians from another. the members of the s.t.a.r.t. consortium believe that research is critical because policy is likely to be driven even more with common acts of violence. we need to guard against what

they described many years ago as quote a routine obsession with a few dangers that maybe familiar, rather than likely. thank you, i'll leave my comments right here. i see that our official welcomer and honored guest, president lowe has made it through traffic. and i wondered if i could ask president loh from the united states of maryland to step up and say a couple of words by the way of greeting. let's give him an applause. [applause] [applause] >> good morning. thank you all for participating in this conference. thank you, gary, for you and the other gary to organize this. and i must say that you have certainly debunked the mythology that i've been carrying around in my head about terrorists. and that, of course, is the value of doing research.

ever since that day of infanmy that we now know has 9/11, our nation has been engaged in the war on terrorism. our men in europe, men and women in uniform have been on the frontlines, our defense and intelligence and law enforcement agencies have mobilized against the threat to the national security, and homeland security and other agencies invested significant resources to help us understand the george of terrorism. we are very pleased that one of the many efforts around the country in universities and think tanks to understand this problem is headquartered right here at the university of maryland. having some 30 different universities from around the world participating in the consortium known as start. i'm reminded of the words some 27500 years ago from that

chinese warrior, scholar sun tzu, the author of the study of "the art of war" when he wrote know thyself, know thy enemy. i think that's appropriate to the war on terrorist. if we are to prevent and reduce the frequency of terrorists events around the world, we need to know our enemy. and this is where the tragedy of 9/11 has led to the mobilization of researchers, social scientist of all stripes, to understand why we have terrorism, how terrorists are formed, how people are radicalized, what are the consequences, and how we counter this scorch.

so i'm really very pleased to see the number of colleges and universities around the country that have expanded the curriculum for new courses, new programs, new majors, new minors, even graduate degrees on the field of homeland security. and now i want to thank the department of homeland security for funding these efforts. and i want to thank all of you for participating, i know there are many of you here from federal agencies, from the military, policy researchers, policymakers, staffers, division directors. >> from earlier today in a day-long forum on lessons learned since the 9/11 attacks. we're returning live now. the next panel is on how self-described former radicals turned away from the extremist ideology. >> we had the pressure of introducing earlier martha

crenshaw, who's going to moderate the last panel. martha is a senior fellow at the international security for cooperation, she's also the professor of political science at stanford university, and i'm very proud of the fact that she is a founding member and senior researcher for the s.t.a.r.t. center. i'll turn it over to martha to introduce the last panel. >> thank you very much, gary. thank you all of you for being here, and thank you in advance to all of our panelist. the way that we are going to do this is i'm going to introduce everybody, very briefly, then i'm going to pose a set of questions to the panelist which we'll all have a chance to answer. then we'll open it up for some questions from the audience, then i'll have a closing question for the panelist. so that we hope that this will be sort of conversational, discussion format, very informal. and to give you the full benefit of people who have had experience, we talked this morning about radicalization, we talked about deradicallization,

i think almost everybody that spoke to you was a scholar who stands out of the process. what we are bringing to you now is people who have been within the process who have both joined and left radical organizations and three cases violent organizations, and who can talk to us about their experiences. i'm going to start by introducing billy hutchinson whom you see before you on the screen. welcome, mr. hutchinson, he's physically in belfast, thanks to the wonderfuls of modern technologies, we are able to communicate. visa difficulties prevented him from coming to the united states, and they recented the libyan fighting group from coming here. this is our solution. we think it's going to work very well. the other panelist include, i'm going to start just immediately to my left, katherine power, who

is a native of colorado. she was a member of the anti-vietnam war movement, i imagine that everyone here knows of her actually, you were and are well known. she was wanted by the fbi after having participated in an armed robbery which a policeman was killed. she then lived for 23 years without being detected by the fbi until she voluntarily turned herself in. she served six years, i believe in prison, and now works in the -- in effect to conflict resolution and essentially a new life for her. and i should say that she has a masters degree from oregon state. next to her is angela king, who is from south florida, who essentially joined racist

skinhead underground organization when you were young. i think one thing that all of our panelist have in common, they joined the organizations and movements when they were very young. in the underground movement, the movement and angela became involved in crime, she was arrested in 1999, and sentenced also to six years in prison for her part in an armed robbery. you were released early, in 2001, and have since herself gotten a masters degree from the university of central florida which i believe is in tampa, am i right? >> orlando. >> just on the other side there. and she works also as an advocate for change, positive change. and our last panelist, we want to thank you him for his standing in, although i don't think you have a lot in common with noman.

shiraz maher, he mentioned peter when he spoke. shiraz was an member of an organization that is not violent, at least not violent at the moment. it professes many of the same long-term objectives as al qaeda and other islamic movements, but maintains the nonviolent posture. it is, however, banned by a number of western democracies. shiraz left the organization in 2005, as we pointed out this morning, voluntarily abandoned the organization and is now after having been a journalist and researchers is a student working under peter neumann. welcome to all of you. i'm going to start with the first question. :

>> i actually joined -- the organization i joined after i witnessed -- two actors killed in another bomb. i won't tolerate that, and

therefore -- [inaudible] [inaudible] >> thank you. katharine? >> i would say certainly there were things in my childhood and youth that made it likely i would take extreme action, not necessarily extreme, but committed action. i grew up in a family with values and you have to live in what you believe and your conscious is supreme, and so being different from other people is actually a high value, so the other thing is the familiar stuff. i had a come el -- compulsive rebelliousness so no authority was legitimate in my

eyes. >> a trait shared by many of your generation, i might say. [laughter] which is also my generation. angela? >> i would definitely say there's several things in my childhood. my parents were extremely religious, prejudice, there was alcoholism. it was a broken home eventually, and as an adolescent i suffered an acute identity crisis and questioned everything the way i looked, where i came from, to where i was going. >> i grew up in saudi arabia, and i spent 14 years there before moving to britain, and i actually by that stage wouldn't have identified even as a muslim. i didn't consider myself religious. i was leading just a normal university life basically, but was very interested in politics,

but 15 came from saudi and if this is what islam is really all about. that predisposition, everything i learned from islam i picked up from my chooldhood growing up in saudi, and that's the interpretation of what was transpiring. i spoke latent ideas there and they were picked up when i finally decided to sort of join into that movement. >> we hear values playing a large role. i have a related question which is -- and some of you anxioused it partially already -- exactly the process of involvement in an organization or movement. this could be related to were you recruited by someone? someone close to you who was instrumental in you joining an

organization? it could have to do whether there was a precipitating event. i think you mentioned precipitating events, but what would you say is sort of the turning point in the trajectory you took. if there was not a turning point, an event, again, someone drawing you into it, a decision on your part, was it something so gradual you didn't notice it was happening until there you were in the middle of it? was it more conscious, unconscious, direct, or more gradual? let's start with you, angela, this time. >> it's difficult to answer in two minutes. [laughter] there were times i made conscious decisions to turn in those directions. for example, in the 7th grade i had my very first fistfight, and

i was humiliated and assaulted and i became the bully. aside from that in the throws of the identity crisis, by the time i was in high school, i was seeking identity, a place of belonging, had low self-esteem, no self-respect, and i sought out a group of skin heads after going through click after click and still just never really feels like i found that place of belonging, so after i found them, they seemed perfect. they were angry. i didn't have to justify or explain why i was there or what i was doing, and through them, i met more organized active racists. >> uh-huh. i'll turn next to billy, and let me catch up by explaning to the audience a little bit about your background which i think in my pleasure to see we actually have you linked up. i forgot to do. you were a major figure in the

volunteer force and a major figure in the transformation of the organization into a political party that contests elections and is fully engaged in the political process. i know you were an instrumental figure in the transition, not just at a personal level, but organizational level. i pose the same question to you. was there a sharp turning point? an event? did you join in part because of other friends and relatives? you talked about your parents and their political views, but explain more how you were recruited and how you assumed a role. >> yeah, i mean, i think from my point of view, some of those are strong. i was in political groups with

others my age, and we felt that i suppose the older people, the adult people at that particular time were not strong towards our way, so i formed this organization, and we challenged the volunteer force that existed before, but whenever people were being murdered, so we reached out and formed this organization. i armed that organization with arms and the volunteer force would approach me and ask me who i am, so they actually had equipment, and i think at that particular time there were 23 people, and they -- [inaudible]

i held the leadership role within the organization and was involved in -- [inaudible] it didn't happen in two days, but over a period of probably a year, but it was our decision to start the organization because we thought no one was standing up, and we thought they were weak, and that's how we came about, and honestly, just a volunteer force -- [inaudible] people were concerned of what we were doing would actually -- [inaudible] >> uh-huh. of course, -- >> [inaudible] >> you joined an armed organization when conflict was already ongoing, actually, a very violent conflict with military engagement.

kathy? >> i would say that the vietnam war was a critical event for me although i had arrived at my higher education really ready to learn a lot that would explain my criticism of our culture, but in may of 1970, hundreds of people were gathered in new haven for an antiwar demonstration, and on that weekend, it became -- it was actually announced that the united states was bombing cambodia, and that was a precipitating event for everybody there. we called a national student strike. we went back to the university. nobody took exams or finished school that year. i started to look for some way to make a bigger commitment. i said i'm not just going to finish college and go to graduate college and talk about it. i want to do something about

it. my intention had never been to do anything violence about it, but it had been to do something that i had the thought because the trains and the weapons -- the troops and the weapons moved on trains, but if i could use a device like in vietnam to fuse the train wheels to the track, then they just couldn't have the war. it was a very naive idea, and i actually looked for vietnam veterans to help me execute it, and eventually i encountered somebody on our campus who had been a vietnam veteran and also had been in a prison for a number of years for armed robberies, and he said i understand you're looking to do something more, and i'm trying 20 put together a group that wants to do something more, and so i said, yes to that at that

point. >> well, in my own case, again, there was that sense of very rapid transformation. it was the thing that radicalized me and provoked my interest to go to the mosques. you know, i don't know where my nearest mosque is, but i want to now go and speak to muslims to find out more about, you know, what this is, and as much as you say in the question was there recruits and that classic thing, to an extent, yes, but i was seeking that out also. i thought about it, and in essence as much as they wanted me, i wanted them, and so on the one hand you have that hand trigger of events, and from that point before america invatted, within a four week window, i joined up, but the wider questions you hear of identity, where do i fit in as all young people struggling with, i was thinking about probably a year or so beforehand, so it was a

latent, i suppose, questioning of identity and who you are and where you fit into society which everybody goes through, and in our cases we have events that then took us down a particular trajectory. >> i'm hearing from all of you it was a two-way process both seeking on your part and active invitation if not recruitment on the other side, something there to be sought, something more going on that very much still is a group process once you engaged in it. another question building on that would be how it is that you first began to engage in violence, and katharine, you approached it and sheraz, you knew people who were violent, so perhaps you could speak of what you know in terms of what led them to become violence, and

particularly, how do you think people justify violence to themselves and i'll start with you, sharaz, how do you think it happened, and then i'll move to those who used violence. >> it itself doesn't engage in violent activity, but operates as the political wing i describe it of al-qaeda. it makes the moral arguments of terrorism, explains away actions, very much a cheerleader on the sidelines, and, you know, in parts of the middle east there's a warm relationship with these organizations. i suppose there's a political consul consultant it provides to groups from time to time. the bombers are fascinating in so far as one guy's iraqi and the other is indian. the iraqi came from -- he's

well-educated, very case matic, and hugely ideological, and he comes over and we become very good friends. now, the guy who built the bombs, the indian guy, was not radicalizedded at all. when he turned up in cambarrage, he regarded them as ineffective and couldn't see the point in suicide bombing. that was in 2004. 2007, he's building bombs to blow up nightclubs in london and airports in scott land. how does that happen? he was before my eyes radicalized. all of this have a sense of supporting jihad verbally when you saw in iraq, for example, fallujah, very big at that time in 2004, and they were cheered op by us and relating to iraq

and afghanistan, and that sort of thing. to some extent, this was normalized. everybody was a part of it. he formed a strong relationship with the iraqi, a natural leader, charismatic, had no difficulty in commanding support and stuff, and it's interesting to see how he essentially molded and shaped the guy. that's what transpired. he led this guy. it's interesting because us as an organization because we don't have full knowledges, but, you know, why the discussion about what is the role of terrorism? are suicide bombings bedded in islam, and are there different rules iraq to london to new york? how does that play out? that justice of eyedology plays on, but at the same time, they wouldn't condemn either. >> uh-huh, uh-huh. he writes an interesting point about the difference between

using violence and justifying it. those who justify it without participating may actually play an extremely important role in the process of violence. >> i have no doubt we helped radicalize him in that sense that what took place because it's a small muslim community in cambridge, some 300 people. we were the subculture there because people rejected our line of thinking, and that drew us close together, and we had our own base to operate from. these guys had the house with a huge hole downstairs. it was on the way to the university and on the way back, met there daily, ate together, discuss the events together, and it was such an explosive time in so far as what was happening in iraq that were we getting daily updates, and that was coming from family up there, and so as of no doubt, that whole environment and that caldron

that was building helped transformed the ending. i know that. >> a very intense sort of interaction. angela, how in the good view did you justify the violence? >> i was actually involved in several groups over the decade, and just to be very, very clear on it, just about every one of those groups very loudly proclaims that they do not instigate violence, they are not involved in violence, and i'm speaking of the far right organizations i was involved with, and while that comes out one side of their mouth, there's not one group i was involved with that was not violent, and it very much -- very much like he said, there's going to be one or two very charismatic individuals. you're going to sit around. you take events going on around you, discuss them, twist facts, talk circles, relate it in some

way to your beliefs and what you're doing, and it builds. it's almost like -- like a huge ball going down a mountain, and it collects and collects and collects and gets bigger and bigger and bigger until you get to this point where there's almost no other recourse by violence, that that's the only way to go out and get attention for what you very much believe is right at that time. it started out as small things -- getting into altercations of people who maybe didn't believe with our beliefs, and then it stepped up to the point where we had to police the individuals that were attached to us. if we thought they were doing things that maybe didn't vibe right with what we said we believed, we would go and literally beat them up, get into

fights, and eventually that also snowballs and becomes bigger and bigger and bigger and there's no control. >> it's a sort of momentum of the group that just really very hard to stop, especially for the individual. >> yeah. >> billy, the uvf justification for violence, your own personal feelings about the use of violence. i know you described # the process of engagement as feeling that the british government was not defending protestants against the provisional ira at the beginning of the troubles. can you tell us more about how violence was justified in this context? >> i think it's very similar to what everybody else shared. sharaz and angela -- you know, we had a place where people talked and it was on the way and

talk about particulars and meet on the way back. wherever we develop these things, we have to internalize them. we had a clear share of the war, and there's always casualties in the war, and that's what we viewed in particular to being okay, but people get caught up. you know, we had to continually think and work together, and we worked in groups because, you know, justified it yourself. there's no way you can justify that to the work of everybody else. the key to get attacks, you had to continually see what the ira was doing and plot what you were going to do next. it was that whole -- there's a lot of ideology in it in terms of what this is about and the

fact -- [inaudible] it was critical as well. i think the other thing was it -- people were giving particular things to do. you know -- [inaudible] they would have involved in the planning, responsive for terrorism, and, you know, there's zealous on a daily basis to terminate evil acts. people actually were advanced by leaders and sort of bomb makers and plotters. it was all of that, and, you know, you had to justify it every day, and it was not just a question of radical. there was the question of being involved and saying what could

be done and what couldn't be done. i think they said just as well, there's the thing about carrying acts across the border or hurt civilians or other organizations connected. all of these things had to be discussed, and for me, that was discussed at the board and if they justified the acts on occasions, and i know one of the things was we had decided with communities we decided we had to attack to get them to turn our way. it didn't work, but it was an effect we took at that particular time. it was a strategy that failed, but at that particular point we started to say -- [inaudible] in that type of, you know, sort of comrade, that's how we got

through it, and, you know, i suppose that's exactly easy to carry out acts of terrorism if you don't have the checking. >> camaraderie is an important factor. it's an ongoing conflicts with heavily armed groups. katharine? >> i would say that a couple things contributed to my making conflict where violence was the right responsement one is the violence of the vietnam war. >> uh-huh. >> this was the first time in the nation that you could really see that war meant children were burning, and so we really knew what was going on, and there had been years of work to end that

war, and i think there was a crisis of democratic institutions in that the war kept going on, and nothing that we did seemed to work, and i think in our powerlessness, there arose a politics of rage, and just because it feels better to do something, it's like graping at a kind of really i losive power. the rage was there. there were several bombings every day some place in the united states in those years. they were bombings of recruiting stations. there were catholic leftists destroying draft files. there was a strong sense this was not anti-personal violent, but it's really clear to me that once you make people your enemies, that's the next step, and also we studied the

anticolonial liberation movements, and they were all guerrilla wars. it didn't seem crazy to me we were in a guerrilla war. and henry kissinger felt the country was on the break of a civil war in that time. >> i, myself, remember the sense of anger and frustration particularly among students at that time, and a sense of heplessness as well. let me start with you, i think, this is my fourth question. given the intensity of these beliefs for all of you, what made you reconsider? >> well, first of all, the fact that somebody was killed. now, as somebody in the fbi later said to me, you should have known better and known if you run around with guns,

somebody's going to get killed. i think i had maybe the kind of naivety that many people who go to war have. i might get killed, but not to really see that the world as i was framing it inevitably meant that people would be killed and in my case because mine was an illegal war, i would have been held accountable for that, and i felt that the government was not legitimate to hold me accountable for that violence even though i found it abhorrent and found myself humanly accountable for it, but as i kept on living what moved me in the first place which is being aware of my world, trying to figure out how i should agent in my world, and getting out of the

closed secret clan destin, no reflection on how you behavior into a larger circle to convey the consequences of how i behaved. they were in the newspaper, in my family's faces of grief, that i had to look at that and say, what's my next step? certainly, at that point, without taking a lot of steps towards surrender and regarding the authorities as having legitimacy at that point, i put down violence. >> why did you surrender after 23 years? >> well, the really short answer is that my son was approaching his teen year, an i don't think that you can raise a child without telling them the story of your life, and so that one sort of interpersonal ethic cult

decision just required a whole lot more, and i don't think i granted the government legitimacy until i was several years into my prison sentence, and through a combination of understanding where my own come el pasoive rebelliousness, but also just seeing this is what happened. this is how people suffered because of what i did. >> angela? >> i think you changed your mind while you were in prison -- >> i had half-heartedly made an attempt several years before when the oklahoma city bombing happened when i realized that it was someone very similar to me that held belief very slave to mine. i didn't have the courage to walk away at that time.

i made small attempts, but the mentality was very gang like. you don't wake up saying, hey, changed my mind, guys, see you later. i had received subtle threats, and when i say subtle, i mean bullet holes in the building i lived in, threats against family members, so at that point not having the courage or resources, i said i'm going to be a better racist and skin head and stay involved. by the time i landed in prison, i had that nagging thought in the back of my mind for years, and it was the first time that i think i was able in a decade to just breathe normally, and it was absolutely horrifying, embarrassing, but i had a lot of

time to think. three years, and i realized several life changing things about myself and the decisions that i had made. for one, i had never, ever taken personal responsibility for anything that i had done whether it had been hurting someone with words, physically, spiritually -- i blamed every action and every bad word i ever said on things that happened to me or things that occurred in my life up to that point, so i really had to learn to step up and say i did these things. i made the decisions, and ultimately, i'm the responsible party. aside from that, growing up with the identity crisis and all of these different things, i came to realize that i never liked myself at all. i had no self-respect.

i had days that i couldn't even look in a mirror, and not just because i didn't like myself physically, but because i knew what was in my heart, and i just felt horrible, so it was quite a process to go through those things and realize i 4 to start with myself. i couldn't start outside of myself. it had to begin there, and it was only in that way that i could build healthy positive relationships outside of myself. >> uh-huh. >> not to mention that i was in a prison with women that, yes, they were criminals, but they were women from all over the world, individuals that i never would have experienced, i wouldn't have learned about whether it was their religions, cultures, how they grew up, and i had some extremely profound experiences with some of those women. one brief example -- there was a

group of jamaican women that i talked to, and we were very open. they asked me questions. i'm covered in tattoos, so i had swastikas and all things, so they would ask me, and one of the women had asked me several times if you met me outside of here before, what would you have done to me? beat me up? called me names? would have -- what would you have done? after a couple months we were playing cards because you have free time in prison -- [laughter] and out of nowhere, she said, i always hated white people. it had never registered to me up until that point that people other than white people could be prejudice too. [laughter] it just hadn't downed on me -- dawned on me until then.

as she explained, she grew up in a very poor area of jamaica, and the only contact she had with any white people were tourists who treated her like she was something disposable, and that was her only idea, contact, anything, and that's how she constructed her beliefs and feelings. it's a come glom ration of experiences that brought me to that point. >> sounds like being removed from the former group you were with and being on your own in a setting where there's time to reflect and you meet people who getout out of that kind of mind set that you had before. sharaz, how did you come to leave that organization? >> mien is similar in -- mien is -- mine is similar. i was a regional directer of north of england.

i'm running the south operations on the south model, and as a result all your free time goes because you manage cells, commuting huge distances because i'm running a big patch in the northern part of the u.k., and as a result of that, of course, every time you're meeting people in different areas and you meet your own party people, you are just fuming each other in the cost that the benefit is on the horizon. keep your bags packed. it's coming any day now. there's an effect that we charge each other up again and again and again. i resigned from the positions to go down to cambridge to do this post graduate stuff, and while i was down there, my physical space i had given up. i then began exploring some of the ideas, and that was really important as well because within

these groups, you know, you are discussing from our perspective theological justifications of what you're doing and why it's happening. you're exposed to a binary reductive view in that sense. i had the opportunity to reading stuff independently myself, read a much broader set of things related to islam tradition, living as a minority. i looked to indian muslims because it's the first time in the modern muslims had to reconcile. they are large, but a minority group, and reconcile the questions that led me into this -- who am i? what's my role in civil society? those border issues of identity, and i suppose, your position within the nation state, and so once i began to see those traditions, i didn't have to subscribe to them all, but the

validity broke down the dogma on which the islam's narrative is built, and like all things in that sense, once you start to chip away at it, you find it level very, very quickly. i make one other point that getting out was harder than getting in. three four weeks, i'm in, radically changed my life in that period. i moved out of the house i was living in, grew a beard, no longer drinking, really gone into everything that i'm supposed to be doing as it were. coming out took, i'd say seven to nine months in the sense that i'm thinking, well, i dedicated four years of my life to this, what do i do? all my friends -- i gave up my friends to come in, and now have to give up all my friends to get out. that sense of the unknown. you know, there's a basic human level, and you're important in that organization. you have standing. you achieved rank, and it's sort

of -- you just have to give it up. you say to your friends, actually, i worked from there, and you haven't. in a sense, they take that badly, and so just that whole process -- you can't discuss it with anybody. who do you talk to? if you talk to them, you're in big trouble. you are just going through a very isolating moment in time, and then you have to make that snap decision of this is what i'm going to do. and, yeah, that was terrible. >> i see angela and katharine nodding it's a difficult individual process particularly when leaving a group, and the fact, as you said, there's costs, you dedicated a lot of your lives to something, you suffered from it, prison in some cases, your feelings, your guilt about having killed someone, and, in fact, to move away from that and say i'm abandoning it is a very difficult individual decision to make, and the point about friends that you are leaving friends, you're

abandoning that movement and your own friends, but turning now to billy hitchinson where you not only moved away from violence, but led an organization from being a violence militant organization to be the foundation for a political party. when did you decide the uvf should be a part of the political process, and how did you help persuade other members of the uvf that it was the path to follow? >> the first thing is that whenever i was in prison, i had a mentor who was charismatic as a leader, and we had what we called -- [inaudible] we wore clothes, we had total

control. most people felt we were terror, but it wasn't. it was actually a very -- i suppose, a place where people -- [inaudible] i think we were known later and people on tv were talking and [inaudible] people still talk about what happened in that particular period, so he had actually done something shiraz talked about and that's we were all established in what we were about and why we do it and could we be better, you know, people knew who we were and thought what we did, and to one thing

that's real in prison is that we claimed we were soldiers, that soldiers were doing what soldiers do and bring about peace. yeah, that's -- at the end of the day, you know, i suppose the politicians have a military arm and lead the way, so we started up discussions with republicans because republicans were -- [inaudible] we had a number of to run, and the difference between them and us was similar. they were merely catholic. we were protestant. we had thorough backgrounds, andings you know, we opened up

that and found out that, you know, people in missions were teachers as well, so we worked on those things, and we were saying we can do that. i think the only thing for me is while i was in prison, it was like being in se a house divided, and when you tried to -- [inaudible] it was a very good in a sense that you were divorced and you knew what people were saying. [inaudible] from that point of view, i think that was a discussion as you mentioned, and the only thing that sort of convinced people and in northern ireland people

make the call, and we all -- [inaudible] i was on bbc news and margaret thatcher -- [inaudible] shortly after i was one of the person caught and contacted and i opened up the box between them, and from then on, we moved that forward, so for me, it's the experience, but also it's to have contact with people, and the last piece was whenever i was released.

i had a number of ideas how to move forward. i started talking about how we had people within the organization who were still on the path, some of the people were involved, and some i started talking to about what we needed to do. i had people who actually agreed even though they thought -- i got that support, and then that was introduced with john paul a and he met with me and said i wanted to talk to him about some of the work i'd been doing. we sat down and worked on a

plan, and ton honest -- to be honest, what john paul told me confirmedded my ideas that i had, and he helped me with a numbers of others he formulated, and there was a number of people in the organization saying we need to lay down arms, get down to that stage where we can go when the war is over, and it started we dropped cease fire statements and apologized to the public, and, you know, that in itself took time and a lot of courage because it was written by the people who were still the leaders at that time and not by what people were at the patronage. it was a long journey for me, and i think the time was right

because the british government changed their attitude, and, i think, you know, that was sort of, for me, what drew it all together, and i think we had seen the process in our lives, and we continue to work, and there's still a number of things to be negotiated and still a number of things people need to stand up to, and i think all of this will come about in the next three to five years, and it will be settled one way or another and be done peacefully. >> thank you. i hope so too. i think mediators and people can help the process along. i think now we should open it up to questions from the audience. you've all been listening intently, so i think we could certainly have a few questions,

and -- yes? here comes the mic, and please, the norm, if you could introduce yourself. >> hi, kurt, penn state. it sounds to me when you talk about why you left your respective groups, it was a decision you made on your own, there were some event, a personal reason why you did. presently in the past five years, there's an idea of deradicallization initiatives that people can be talked out of their beliefs. what stock do you put in that idea? do you think that would have worked for your processes out of your groups? >> who would like -- angela, could you have been deradicallized or did you have to do it yourself? >> to be very frank, i think that individuals like us are the best resources.

we don't all set out on this path. we certainly put ourselves at risk doing what we do. we're never going to get rich doing this, but some of us very deeply believe in what we do now, and believe that we have tools that are engrained in us whether because of our knowledge or things that we've learned since then. i very much believe that it's -- if i would have approached me back then and said this is where i've been, this is what i did to get there, this is how i was feeling, these were the consequences, but look at me now and what i had to go through, i think i would have listened more than i would have if a teacher said, hey, you're a real ass -- [laughter] and not to be rude, but coming across someone who had similar

experiences and are not just telling you this is what i heard or what i think, it comes across so much more genuine, and that really comes through, so i definitely, definitely think there's a good chance that if it's done the right way, that, yes, people can be brought out and brought to the other side, and it won't always be 100%, but i think we have a much better chance of doing it that way and deconstructing not just the beliefs, but the issues that led there. we need to do more than just treat the symptoms. >> can i cut in quickly? i visited the saudi deradicallization process. not part of it, didn't go through it, but went as a journalist to explore it, and it struck me as very interesting in some sense. it has aspects of it which are good, but bear in mind the people who are there have been

arrested for one and have gone through the criminal justice system, and this is the end point of the halfway house before they are released, and it's particularly saudi. it could not be exported anywhere else in the world and work. it treats saudi society the way it is, to achieve the success that it has, but the point is people go into radical networks for very different reasons. we have underlying areas of commonality and interests and personality traits, but you achieve it for a number of reasons. you go in with differing levels of commitment. i don't think there's a one-size-fits-all approach to get em out. in the u.k. what transpired is very, very different. we have people, you know, like myself, and others who left organizations like that have as it were within the muslim community have taken shine off

the groups as far as -- 9/11, the group seen as legitimate and part of the debate, seen as having a valid place in civil society and public discussion about the war on terror, what the islam's relationship is with the west, and there's shows on the bbc, for example, political channels, and we're invited on to comint. what we've done is take that legitimacy away. that's important for kids at the outset. we have people coming to us working to establish an islamic state who couldn't pray. they helped create that state, and that put them in prison the next day for not knowing how to pray. they were joining up because it was glamorous, something as acceptable, and something legit ma. that's totally stopped. that's one asset we're successful in. the state has to get involved in some level and do what the state can do and the society needs to

do what it can do in the context of white racist groups. i think you have to just roll with it. one quick thing -- in the saudi program, the success is worth bearing in mind the people go through a very low ranking, the senior ideologs are not going near the program. it's easier to win off the other guys. >> another -- kathy, sure. >> i think that what's really important when somebody's been a violent activist is that the humanitarian drive that engulfed them many times to be in that place. the criticisms of their society, there's awareness of injustice or suffering. if there's not a way for them to continue to act on that

legitimately in their lives, then they don't have any place to go. i remember very clearly, very early on as a fiewmgtive, and the lawyer said to me you're in the trouble, and if you cooperate with the state, you'll probably be find. i said, how -- when i was that alienated from my society, if i had had to give that up in order to give up being violent, i'm not sure i could have made that leap. >> uh-huh, uh-huh. billy, do you want to comment? >> sure. i think that, you know, from my point of view and from where we are, you know, here, is that, you know, it's about all the

standards that, you know, that we still have our political, our political goals, but we now recognize is we need to work. we can't have winners and losers. we have to show not just america, but britain, and work together in terms of doing that, but i think in terms of sort of covered what i think. i should -- [inaudible] people ask me to do things with others, mixes with radicals, and what they say and then try to

actually talk to them about things that they are talking about that gravitates with me. i don't think we can help people that we often deradicallize. i think we all came from different positions, but a lot of stuff we talk is similar, but it is about trying to help people and there is help. i mean, we need to listen to the other side and tell others what it is we want them to do. >> we can take another question. >> thank you. my question was for shiraz regarding the comment you made about it was easier to get in, but harder to get out. i think the other panelists eluded to similar experiences. i was just wondering in terms of cases like a couple years ago, or i guess the last year or two, there were young men from virginia or the virginia area

that tried to go to sign up to become jihad ists, and they failed to do so. has that aspect changed from the time you were involved, or do you see that changing that it's harder to get in and you are on a need to know basis or something? >> in somecepses it's hard, but other cases it's easier. looking at the way the situation was in britain because of 9/11 and stuff, people went with great ease to pakistan and across the border and all sorts, and, you know, pakistan improved in that sense. if you're an american convict and you are in the country and you don't know anybody, so in a pure border patrol way, it's harder, but to join up with radical organizations, though, i

don't think it's difficult. following on from some of the earlier sessions today, it's quite evident al-qaeda's adopting a different strategy for example now, one of the lone wolf, one of self-radical decision, self-start, low grade attacks, the idea of them pulling off another 9/11 is not on the table, but the other style is the new model which they advocate. in essence, if you're in virginia or london or whatever and you feel you need to agent and do something, the information's there. that's what it takes. >> uh-huh. well, i'm sorry to say i'm getting signals to say the time is up, and i'm really sorry to bring this conversation to an end because it's really, really interesting, all of you, and thank you to mr. hutchinson because it must be late in belfast, but help me in thanking

our panels, all of you, thank you. [applause] >> i want to thank the similar -- symposium participants for sticking with us all afternoon. in your pacts, we've got a one-pager that allows you to tell us anything that you thought we did well or not so well. always useful to have that. also, those of you who were not able to be here all day or who would for whatever reason would like to be able to see events that happened starting this morning, we will have all of them on our website probably within the next few days, so you can check out any of the events from today at www.start.umd.edu. i don't know about the rest of you, but i've been jotting down questions as the day goes on that were raised in provocative ways throughout the sessions today, how does radicalization

operate? how does radical behavior differ from radical ideology? are there better words like demobilization or disengagement? how are we doing in detouring individuals from engaging in violent extremism? how do we build more resilient communities? what treadoffs do we face in making the nation safer from terrorist attack? how do you leave radical behavior? do you provide pathways out of violent behavior? i hope we will be able to at the start center to deal with these questions in the years ahead. we just put together a new five-year research plan that now emphasizes four areas. we're going to do, i think, a lot more in the next few years looking at understanding factors that impact violent extremism. we also plan to work on advancing our understanding of the dynamic relationships between violence political

attacks and government responses to those attacks, both formal responses and sometimes informal ones as well. we also plan to examine in much greater details the impact of psychological factor on resilience including technology innovation and social media change the landscape of community responses to not only terrorism, but other kinds of catastrophes. we plan on testing new tools to help improve our understanding of the objectives, operations, and resources of people who use tornado watch. i want to thank you all for your participation in the summit. we're rapidly approaching the 10th an anniversary of 9/11 and as william faulkner noted, the past is never dead. it is always upon us.

[applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] ..

>> today the focus was the role of noaa, the national oceanic and atmospheric administration.

we'll show you this segment again at 7:15 eastern here on c-span2. and we'll follow that with booktv prime time beginning at 8 p.m. eastern. we'll discuss how the west was lost, 50 years of economic folly and the stark choices ahead. about an hour later, it's francis fukuyama and the origins of political order. later, ben mezrich and "sex on the moon." the most audacious heist in history. it's booktv prime time all this week at 8 p.m. eastern right here on c-span2. and from the campaign trail, this coming saturday sarah palin will be speaking to the tea party of america rally, that's in indianola, iowa, and we'll have live coverage beginning at noon eastern on our companion network, c-span. >> it might not surprise you that we think good things come in twos. there's c-span's live coverage of the house. live coverage of the senate on

c-span2. >> you can watch live events at c-span.org. >> or you can see them whenever you want at the c-span video library. >> c-span2 has nonfiction books every weekend on booktv. listen to us on your i toni. >> or on your blackberry. >> it's washington your way with c-span. >> created by cable and provided as a public service. >> last friday the afl-cio and the king center hosted a symposium focusing on jobs, social justice and martin luther king jr.'s vision of the american dream. in this opening portion we'll hear remarks from president richard trumka, martin luther king iii and congressman john lewis of georgia. the event was planned in accordance with the unveiling of the historic memorial dedicated to dr. king. from the afl-cio headquarters here in washington, this is about 40 minutes. >> feeling pretty good as we

started to say earlier, things are a little in flux in this city because of o postponement of the march. and the unveiling. but we are going on, and i am so happy that everybody's here. you evidently got your tweets. [laughter] and your e-mails. but good morning, again, i'm arlene holt-baker, and i'm the executive vice president here at the afl-cio, and on behalf of rich trumka and the secretary of treasury here, we want to welcome all of you to the house of labor this morning. [applause] now, of course, we're so excited for those of you that are in the room, but as you know, this is also being webcast, we're on c-span, and so we absolutely thank all of those who are participating by way of webcast. this has been an historic week in washington, d.c. in many

ways. as we all know, the unveiling of the martin luther king memorial has been postponed as the eastern seaboard is in the path of hurricane irene. natural disasters, brothers and sisters, we cannot control. but it is the manmade disasters, ones we will talk about today, that we have the power to change their direction if we so choose. we are reminded on this day of that march on washington 48 years ago when dr. martin luther king jr. moved our people and our nation to embrace his dream of america, a dream that he and the march's originator, the legendary african-american labor leader a. phillip randolph, shared. [applause] when martin luther king iii and the afl-cio began talking about

co-hosting a jobs and justice symposium during this historical week, we knew that we wanted to highlight the needs of america's struggling families, the families that dr. king devoted his life to fighting for. we wanted to hear from those who are unemployed but want to work, hear from academics who study the effects of economic and social injustice on all of our communities and hear from students who dare to dream. hear from workers who want justice and a voice at work. and hear from civil rights legends who have devoted their lives in search of the american dream. for months now the lives of million of americans have been shaken up by the economic uncertainty. just as our nation's capital literally shook this week. we hope that the discussions like the one we will have today

shake our elected officials to move with boldness and a fierce urgency of now. we call on our leaders to respond to the desperate cries of the people for jobs and justice. today many wonder where will we go from here. jesse, they ask, will the unveiling of the king memorial rekindle in all who truly love justice and freedom a renewed sense of movement unity? blacks and whites, immigrants, young and old, workers and the unemployed, gay and straight. it is up to us, sisters and brothers, whether we choose chaos or community. i would like to now welcome martin luther king iii, the executive director of the king

center and the co-host of today's symposium. martin luther king iii has taken the to have telephone lit by his -- the torch lit by his father, and he has gone around the nation and the world with a message of hope and stability as an advocate for equality and justice for all people and one who believes we must choose the beloved community. over chaos. martin luther king iii. [applause] >> good morning, and let me first thank god for the wonderful opportunity to be back at the afl-cio national headquarters and, first, to president, mr. richard trumka, to our executive vice

president -- and thank you for your warm introduction -- arlene holt-baker, and to secretary treasurer, elizabeth schuler. i apologize. and also to moderators bob herbert and mrs. maria salinas, the reverend jackson, to bill lucy. and i'm sure i'm going to miss somebody, but attribute that to my head and not my heart, but also to my dear wife, andrea waters-king. king center staff is here and friends. it is a great pleasure to join you this morning in this symposium on jobs, justice and the american dream. you might remember that at the time of my father's passing that

he and his team, reverend jackson and many others, were mobilizing for the poor people's campaign to bring together poor breaks and -- blacks and whites and native americans and americans from all walks of life to say to our nation's policymakers that we demand the right to decent jobs with decent pay. in the 1968 -- in 1968 and '67 as they were mobilizing, he was talking about a living wage. we're still trying to get the minimum wage adjusted properly. just shows how far we still have to go. and it's also providential that this is, perhaps, the last official act that i certainly am going to be involved in before the dedication that was to have taken place on sunday, because the memorial some could say as an idol, we idolize dr. king.

but it really is about working to not idolize him, but to embrace his ideals. and this is the work that we are talking about today. so i don't see it as negative that we're, that the dedication is postponed. i see it as we're here to do the work that still must be done to continue what martin luther king jr. represented. [applause] so i must thank, first, president trumka and the afl-cio for hosting and co-sponsoring this symposium, and i also thank you and all of the other unions, laborers who are supporting the king center in an effort of fundraising later today. but most importantly, for the

dedicated leadership you provide for american workers. i must express my heartfelt gratitude to executive vice president arlene holt-baker in particular for her creative vision and energetic leadership in putting this symposium together. [applause] for it is certainly one of the most substantive and relevant programs leading up, or i should say -- i was going to say leading up to the dedication of the memorial. but that's going to happen. until recently, i thought that the king holiday would always be the highest honor commemorating my father's leadership. but having a major memorial honoring him on the national mall will underscore his place in history and amplify his influence on the coming generations. because technically and

theoretically congress may one day choose to change the king holiday to human rights day. we don't know. but as long as this civilization exists, as long as our nation's capital exists, as long as we are a democratic society, there will be a martin luther king jr. memorial on the mall here in the washington, d.c., our nation's capital. [applause] my father is widely remembered for his "i have a dream" speech and his leadership of the american civil rights movement. the theme of that great march on washington that he led on that day was jobs and freedom. two priorities that remain absolutely critical for our hope for fulfilling the dream. i want everyone to know that martin luther king jr. was also a champion of the american labor movement. this memorial honors an american leader who lost his life in a labor union struggle and who

strongly supported unions as a central part of the quest for economic justice. when he addressed the illinois afl-cio convention in 1965, he said the labor movement was the principle force that transformed misery and despair into hope and progress. and everywhere he went during the civil rights movement, he welcomed the support of frayed unions because he knew they were essential for winning the war on poverty. he often spoke about the critical importance of job training and job security unions provided, and he was deeply concerned about job loss through automation and the effort of american jobs to nations where workers had subsis tense wages and few rights. my father challenged both organized labor and the civil rights movement to work together to bring about a full employment

society in which working people of all races could prosper. as he said in the speech i noted earlier, the two most dynamic movements that reshaped the nation during the past three decades are the labor and civil rights movements. our combined strength is potentially enormous if our two movements unite their social pioneering initiative. thirty years from now people will look back on this day and honor those who had the vision to see the full possibilities of modern society and the courage to fight for their realization. on that day the brotherhood of man undergirded by economic security will be a thrilling and creative reality, he said. after he was assassinated, my mother, coretta scott king, picked up the torch of public workers' rights in memphis and help today lead the campaign to

organize hospital workers in charleston, south carolina. she marched with cesar chavez and the united farm workers and supported dozens of union-organizing campaigns. she also served as the active national co-chair of the full employment action council meeting with every united states senator and nearly all members of congress in support of job legislation. and so calling for full employment and economic justice is a family tradition that i intend to keep for the rest of my days. [applause] economic injustice is even more of a concern today, for we are witnessing a widening gap between the rich and poor. making matters worse, the political guardians of the rich are not, are not only refusing even modest tax increases on the

wealthiest few, they're demanding even more tax benefits for the top earners, subsidized by the poor and working people. president trumka, if we have to fill the streets with nonviolent protesters like our sisters and brothers have done forever, i assure you that we will do that. [applause] we've suffered great setbacks in recent years, but the uprising of working women and men in wisconsin, indiana and ohio signals a rebirth of the great coalition that still provides our best hope for real and lasting change. i believe that we can adapt the great traditions that animated the union and civil rights movements in the 20th century to forge a vibrant, new spirit of

militancy and a culture of organizing empowered by the latest communications technology. so let us link arms as brothers and sisters, united and determined to put an end to the war against workers and the unjust harassment of latino workers and their families. let's join forces with an unshakable spirit of solidarity for jobs and economic justice. let's reach out to one another and build a great multicultural coalition on a scale never before seen in this nation. let's serve notice that we're not going to be discouraged by political obstructionists. we are not going to be deterred by the citizens united decision, and we're not going to be turned around by any detractors. but with our faith in each other, with our shared vision of hope and opportunity and with our irreversible commitment to solty -- solidarity, together we will launch a new era of

progressive change in which martin luther king jr.'s dream of a beloved community can become a luminous reality. thank you and god bless you. [applause] it is now my pleasure to introduce, actually, present -- he doesn't need an introduction -- a man who i am proud to call my ally and one of our partners in this movement, a man who has never backed away from the fight for workers' rights, human rights or civil rights. you can count on him to be in the front lines marching and calling us to action around jobs and justice and the american dream. the president of the afl-cio, mr. richard l. trumka. [applause]

>> thank you, martin, for the very kind introduction. but more importantly, thank you for what you do every day and what the king family does every day. we all owe you and your family a tremendous debt of gratitude, and i just want to say thank you on behalf of all of us for that. and let me say good morning to everybody, and on behalf of the afl unions of the afl-ci o and our 12 million members, i want to welcome you all here today, and i want to take just one moment to give a special welcome to reverend jackson who has probably stood on as many picket lines with me as anybody else around. and when it came to defending justice and standing up for workers' rights, jesse, you've always been there, and i want to say thank you for all of the things that you've done. [applause]

forty-eight years ago this weekend, literally, hundreds of thousands of people gathered here in washington to march for jobs and march for freedom. they came at the call of a. phillip randolph who was the president of the brotherhood of sleeping carporters and a vice president of the afl-cio and a truly historic figure in the history of the american labor movement. the buses, the signs, the food were all paid for by working men and women of america and their unions. the distributive union, the packing house workers, the united steelworkers and most of all, the united autoworkers. now, there's always this temptation at a moment like this

to sugar coat the past, to pretend that everyone was on the right side. that all of us did exactly what we should have done and the way it should have been done. the truth is that that day the afl-c irk o building was closed -- afl-cio building was closed on the day of the mar in washington in 1963. the historic fact although the afl-cio endorsed the principles behind the march, the federation had not endorsed the march it. itself. even though major unions of the afl-cio were making the very march possible. martin luther king jr. often said that it wasn't just african-americans who needed to be freed from the burdens of racism. the labor movement is rightfully

proud of all that working people did to help the civil rights movement. but we do not often enough acknowledge what the civil rights movement did to free the american labor movement. because -- [applause] as we learned and i learned particularly in the united mine workers even long before i was born, if workers let racism divide us, we will always be weak. so today our doors are wide open, and it's both with humility and pride that we welcome all of you to the house of labor. we've assembled this morning extraordinary panels to address the continuing struggle to make real in america the vision and the values of dr. king. see, as we gather to dedicate

the king memorial, far too many of us lack jobs and freedom. unemployment is still over 9%, twice, twice what it was in 1963. in state after state, powerful political forces are organizing to revive the poll tax and literacy tests under other names, to place obstacles in the way of americans from participating in democracy. today the koch brothers and the american legislative exchange council are working feverishly to undo the voting rights act, the act that truly made america a democracy in all 50 states. in the 1965 when -- in 1965 when john lewis crossed the ed delaware edmund bridge in selma,

alabama, seeking the right to vote for all americans, those same koch brother dollars were funding the john birch society's opposition to the voting rights act. you know, we have a saying in the labor movement, which side are you on? well, too many who have the funds and the power to influence america's leaders, in fact, some of those leaders themselves have taken the wrong side in american history, the side of slavery, the side of segregation, the side of denying justice, the side of economic dictatorship. in the decades since dr. king was taken there us, our nation's made enormous strides in the direction of racial justice. today as we meet barack obama is our president, and it's not just that barack obama is our nation's first african-american

president, it's that his vision for our country owes so much of its moral power and its language to dr. king. but dr. king's vision was not simply an end to racism. he saw ending racism as a part of a larger struggle for human dignity. a larger struggle centered on economic justice. the tragedy of american history in our lifetime is that today while we've defeated legal segregation and driven open racism away from our public life, we live in a country less economically equal than in dr. king's time. jobs are scarcer, it's harder to go to college, and the right to a voice on the job has largely

been taken away from america's workers. so we've become a country less and less able to hear dr. king's full message of economic justice and of nonviolencement -- nonviolence. you see, rising inequality is a barrier to hearing dr. king's message of economic justice. a foreign policy based on war, not on diplomacy, makes it impossible to even talk about dr. king's vision of nonviolence. dr. king was assassinated in memphis as he prepared to march in potential violation of a court order. with public employees, with sanitation workers who were seeking the right to form a union. i still vision that sign, a simple message: i am a man.

think about that. a country that had to be reminded that some of our most upstanding citizens, that they were men. when i listened to wisconsin governor scott walker speak of his admiration for dr. king, i can't believe anyone could be quite so cynical. it must be that he simply can't hear dr. king's message. you see, dr. king gave his "i have a dream" speech against the background of the magnificent statue of president lincoln seated in the memorial that bears lincoln's name. and now the reverend dr. martin luther king jr.'s image will join president abraham lincoln in perpetuity on our national mall. and while we have memorials to

great leaders on the mall from george washington to franklin roosevelt, i believe that president lincoln and dr. king were something more than leaders. i think they were prophets who walked among us. the men who gave their lives to defeat our great national evil of slavery. and racism. so we gather this morning to demand that dr. king be remembered and that his prophesy made real in our time, his message of justice for all, his message that the american dream is for all of us, each and every one of us, and his absolute conviction that the american dream begins with a good job and the right to vote. see, i believe that we need to carry his dream forward, and the dream of the time when all men

and all women -- not only hear dr. king's word, but they hear his message, and they act on it. thank you. [applause] and now it's my privilege and honor to introduce the moderator of our panel on jobs and the american dream, bob herbert. bob, of course, is a noted former new york times columnist who never shied away from speaking truth to power, and he's now a senior distinguished fellow at dimos. but he is an incredible voice for the message of dr. king. bob? >> i have the great pleasure this morning to introduce one of

my heros, one of my real heros, congressman john lewis, who is one of the most courageous persons the civil rights movement has ever produced. john was the national secretary of the student nonviolent coordinating committee, a big deal when i was a young man, snicc. he came to the march in 1963 from mississippi where snicc was trying to register african-americans to vote. i mean, just think about it; black people without the right to vote in this country. seems bizarre, but it didn't seem bizarre in those days. john lewis literally laid his body on the line for social justice from beatings to freedom rides to sit-ins to lunch -- at lunch counters and beyond. he is, and i just realized this today and was shocked to learn it, he is the last living speaker from the 1963 march on

washington. it is my honor and great privilege to introduce congressman john lewis, a genuine american hero. [applause] >> thank you, bob, for those kind words of introduction. mr. president, madam secretary treasurer, madam vice president of this great organization, this great institution, it is good to be in the house of labor one more time. one more time. [applause] i'm pleased to be here. jesse jackson, with you, martin

luther king iii and so many others of you who have labored long and hard. good to see you, bill lucy. [applause] now, i must be very brief. there's a group of students going to be arriving at union station, coming from the coretta scott king academy, and i'm supposed to greet them at the bus of a. phillip randolph. now, in 1963 i had all of my hair -- [laughter] and i was a few pounds lighter. 23 years old. just been elected the national chair of the student nonviolent coordinating committee, better known as sncc. early june of 1963 we had a

meeting with president kennedy right across the way in the big house, in the white house. and it was in that meeting that a. phillip randolph spoke up and said, mr. president, in his barely tone voice, he said, mr. president, the monsters are restless, and we're going to march on washington. you saw president kennedy moving around in his rocking chair. he didn't like the idea of the hundreds and thousands of people coming to washington. and he said something like won't we have disorder, chaos? we will never get a civil rights bill through the congress. mr. randolph responded and said, mr. president, this will be an orderly, peaceful, nonviolent protest. we left that meeting with

president kennedy, we came out on the lawn of the white house. martin luther king jr., roy wilkens, james farmer, whitney young and a. phillip randolph. we had a productive meeting with the president of the united states. we told him we needed jobs, we needed a civil rights bill, but we also needed jobs. a few days later on july 2nd, 1963, the six of us met at the old commodore hotel in new york city. and it was in that meeting that we invited four major white religious and labor leaders to join us. one of the labor leaders, watter rutha, uaw.

they issued the call for the march on washington. we met here, right down the street here at the capitol hill hotel. over and over again when we planned, we organized. we just didn't wake up one morning and had a dream that we would march on washington. we organized, we planned. and can if it hadn't been for organized labor, we would have never made it. so i came here to say thank you 48 years later. thank you for all that you did and for all that you continue to do. organized labor and the civil rights movement was like a glove on a hand. we go together. we learn from you, and you learn from us. thank you. thank you. [applause] now, their people, their forces want to take us back.

mr. president, you're right, they want to take us back. but we're not going back. we've come too far now to stop. we've come too far to turn around. a few days ago in atlanta, georgia, just a week ago we had a job fair. we thought maybe five or six hundred people would show up. but between 5,000 and 6,000 people showed up. our people want to work! they want dignity, they want to work, and they must be put to work. we must create jobs, we must get our president and this congress to spend millions and billions of dollars to put people back to work. we must demand that! [applause] i think in this period in the civil rights movement and the labor movement maybe a few places, wisconsin and a few other places, i think they're

too quiet. [laughter] we need to make some noise. when i was in alabama and saw those men, i asked my mother and father, my parents, my grandparents. one day i heard the words of martin luther king jr. on radio, and i was inspired to get in the way. it's time for the civil rights movement and organized labor to get in trouble again. good trouble. good trouble. [applause] don't, don't, don't be afraid! don't be afraid! [applause]

when dr. king came back from receiving the nobel peace prize, jesse, you remember this, he had a meeting an the white house with president johnson. he told the president we need a voting rights act. president johnson said in so many words, dr. king, we don't have the votes in the congress to get a voting rights act. he said, make me do it. dr. king came to selma. you know what happened. we created the climate, we created the environment to get a president to say, yes, maybe when he had a desire to say, no. a few days ago i had an opportunity to go up to the memorial, to the monument. i've been there three times.

well, four times after going yesterday. the scaffolds were still up. they invited me to go up on the scaffolds. and i was able to touch the head, rub the face of dr. king. it's amazing to me that after this man stood on the steps of the lincoln memorial 48 years ago and said, i have a dream today, in keeping with the american dream, that we can come back and see his likeness standing between jefferson and lincoln. it says something about the man, but it also says something about the movement that e led. -- that he led. the movement that he died for. those of us in organized labor and the civil rights movement

and american politics, we have to do our part. we have an obligation, a mandate and a mission to speak up, to speak out, move our feet! we cannot be quiet. people are hurting. people are suffering. mr. president, we need to end the wars, we need to stop the violence abroad and here at home, dr. king would say. we have to do it. if we fail to act, if civil rights movement and organized labor fail to act, dr. king would say history will not be kind to us. we have to act. i plead with you, get out there and push, lead, get in the way, and i will be there with you all the way. thank you very much. [applause]

>> washington journal this week has been looking at the weather. today the focus was on the role of noaa, the national oceanic and atmospheric administration. we'll have that this evening at 7:15 eastern here on c-span2. then booktv in prime time starting at 8 eastern with dambisa moyo, who will discuss "how the west was lost." an hour later, francis fukuyama on the origins of political order. and then ben mezrich on the "sex on the moon: the amazing story behind the most audacious heist in history." this saturday sarah palin will speak to the tea party of america rally in indianola, iowa. we'll have live coverage for you starting at noon eastern on our companion network, c-span.

♪ >> he's a partisan guy who wants to unite people. i mean, all of the problems of the era, you could get from this guy, and why we couldn't and why we couldn't elect him is the same reason we eventually went to war, they couldn't be resolved. >> he had the misfortune of running against a great military hero, dwight eisenhower. and so i don't really think that there's any way that adlai stevenson could have won. >> you think of al smith in 1928 lost overwhelmingly to herbert hoover, but paved the way for franklin roosevelt. >> there are 14 people in this series, many of whom i guarantee viewers may never have heard of and all of whom i can pretty much guarantee they will find interesting to fascinating and, certainly, surprising. ♪

>> history professor gene baker, real clear politics editor carl cannon, and presidential historian richard norton smith talk about the 14 men who ran for president and lost friday at 8 p.m. eastern and pacific. it's a preview for "the contenders," a 14-week series on c-span beginning friday, september 9th. >> more now from a recent afl-cio in and king center symposium focusing on jobs, social justice and martin luther king jr.'s vision of the american dream. this panel is on the u.s. economy and the need for a comprehensive jobs agenda. we'll hear from the executive director of jobs with justice, harvard university professor bruce western, and the reverend jesse jackson. former new york times op-ed columnist bob herbert is the moderator. this is about an hour. >> the second time i've had to

come to a microphone after john lewis has spoken. [laughter] that's not even right. that was wonderful. so let me introduce our panelists, and we'll get started here. first, we have devon low max, a member of the painters' union in new york who is currently along with so many others in this country looking for work. devon, if you could come up. welcome. thank you so much for being here, really appreciate it. [applause] over here. here we go. i'm also delighted to introduce kathleen hofman, a teacher in the cincinnati public school system where, as in the so many other places, teachers are foremost among the public employees being viciously attacked. katie, thank you so much. for coming. [applause]

sarita gupta is the director of jobs with justice, an organization that is seeking to build a global movement around the fight for a decent employment. let's welcome sarita to the panel. [applause] and i'm delighted to welcome bruce western, a sociology professor at harvard who has focused among many other things on the crucial issue of the decline of unions as one of the most important contributors to growing wage inequality in this country. so, welcome, professor western. [applause] you know, we're here to honor a man who stood for the best in america, but we have not lived up to his incandescent vision. our tendency, as rich trumka pointed out, has been to celebrate dr. king but not to hear him, not to heed the

lessons he offered us in such abundance. and the result is that we have lo our way. -- we have lost our way. america has become a country that pours shiploads of cash into one futile war after another while at the same time demolishing school budgets, laying off teachers, firefighters and police officers, and generally letting the bottom fall out of our quality of life here at home. an army of the long-term unemployeded in the many -- counted in the many millions is spread across the land, the human fallout from the great recession and many long years of misguided economic policies. the few jobs now being created too often pay a pittance to minimum wage or just above, not nearly enough to pry open the doors to a middle class standard of living. poverty is once again on the march, moving like patton's

third division through communities that were never able to secure more than a tenuous hold on the american dream in the first place. 44 million americans are living in poverty, more than 14% of the population. more than 15 million children are poor. that's one in every five children in the united states, and that's a disgrace. 17 million people are living in extreme poverty. a family of four in that category would have an annual income below $11,000. try raising a family on $11,000 a year. it's not a recession that those folks are facing, they're in a full-blown depression. and what are our leaders doing about this? less than nothing. they are actually cutting essential programs, trying to outdo one another in washington's latest mad political fad, austerity.

communities of color have been absolutely the hardest hit in this long and terrible economic downturn, and government policies right now are only making matters worse for them. already reeling from the hollowing out of the manufacturing sector, african-americans and latinos were clobbered by the great recession and now are being disproportionately hurt by draconian cuts to medicaid, layoffs at the state and local level and the unconscionable coordinated and destructive attacks on public employees. all of this needs to cease. and that won't happen until people organize and fight back and fight back hard as dr. king and so many others organized and fought back so many years ago. enough is enough. if there is but one message i would try to get through to the nation's leadership, it is that we cannot begin to put the

united states back on track until we begin to put our people back to work. people rightly associate the phrase, "i have a dream," with dr. king. but not so many remember or ever even knew that the march on washington in 1963 was a march for jobs and freedom. dr. king and many others understood in those days that it made no sense to speak of freedom for men and women if they were going to remain trapped in the shackles of poverty and unemployment. he pointedly warned us not to overlook what he called the circumstances of economic injustice. and we're here today to heed that warning, to make sure that we at least do not overlook the circumstances of economic injustice. i have always found dr. king's dream and the american dream to

be interchangeable. i don't see a whisper's worth of difference between the two. what saddens me is that because of our folly and our neglect, both of those dreams are on life support, gasping, straining to survive. it is up to us to change this tragic scenario, to do all we can to make sure that dr. king's dream and the american dream survive. thank you very much. [applause] so i'm going to have to put on my old military sergeant's hat and start moving things pretty quickly here. um, we're going to go to questions, if i can find my introduction here. which i can't. [laughter] devon, the first question is for you. you have the honor.

you're a painter who works in the construction trades in new york city, right? >> yes. >> okay. i want to get a sense of in this -- construction workers have been particularly hard hit in this economic environment, so i want to get a sense of what the past two or three years has been like for you personally and for your colleagues in the union. >> okay. well, for the past two years i've -- well, let me go back to 2005 when i started as an apprentice, and there was an abundance of work. i was actually turning down work, that's how much there was. and as soon as the recession hit, i stayed home for about four months which was, believe it or not, pretty good compared to the men and women that i know that have been home for over a year, year and a half. all their unemployment benefits were expired, and they can't pay their mortgages, they have a hard time trying to figure out how they're going to send their kids to school, and they just, it's hard out there for them. >> and if i have it correct, you're a member of district

council nine of the painters' union? is. >> yes. >> with so how does it work? how do you get gigs? >> well, we go to our union hall, and we talk to the business reps, and the business reps speak to the contractors who give us the work. now, if contractors aren't getting any work, then they can't send us to work. so what it is is there's about 10, 15 major buildings that have either been stalled or stopped completely because the banks aren't giving the contractors loans, and, um, they're not given the loans, so that keeps a thousand, 2,000, 3,000 workers home which, you know, they can go back if those buildings were active. >> you mentioned one fella who had fallen on particularly hard times. do you -- what happened with him? >> well, yeah. he lost his house, and at the time he was going through a divorce. so it was very hard on him.

and then there was one of the business reps actually seen him pan handling in the subways, and he had to bring him in, talk to him, and he found him a job, but the fact that he was out there pan handling, you know, says a lot. >> this is the kind of thing that's happening in this country, in the united states of america in 2011. this is not 1950, folks. starting to look a lot like the 1930s. katie, you're a teacher in cincinnati. first, you can get us started by telling us what you teach and how old your students are. >> i teach music, cunlder -- kindergarten through sixth grade students. >> so you're among those who have been targeted by the republican party's efforts to eliminate collective bargaining rights for employees in ohio. >> that's right. >> can you just tell us a little bit about that struggle and how you guys have responded? >> well, when john kasich was running for governor, he made it very clear that he was going to break the backs of the teacher

unions in ohio. and he said it all through his campaigns. the people didn't believe that he was going to do it. well, he did it. he passed, they managed through some very deefs methods, got senate bill five passed through the house and the senate. and when we had an opportunity to go to the statehouse to testify, to give amendments, they locked us out. locked the doors of the statehouse, didn't allow us to come in. and now that wisconsin, go wisconsin, has done a lot of work and has really fought and has shown what the people are speaking about, he's now getting scared realizing that the referendum that we have on the ballot in november is probably going to go down. no on issue two is going to win in ohio because 1.3 million people signed a petition to get it on the ballot.

and these were not just union folks. these were all the people in ohio that are outraged at this draconian method of beating up workers in ohio. >> i've got to tell you, i was was -- out in columbus, just happened to be there on the day those petitions were delivered. that was some scene, it seemed like a holiday in columbus, ohio. people were really pumped up. >> we had 8,000 people. we even had one of our teachers from cincinnati who ran the 100 miles from cincinnati up there with petitions on his back and then met up with the crew as the whole parade came into the, to the statehouse. it's just really awesome to see that we are, ohio is up and fighting, coming together, a grassroots, coordinated effort, and now behind that we've got this on the ballot in november. of course, now, he passed -- they passed house bill 194 which is the voter suppression. and so by september 30th we've

got to get 231,000 signatures on petitions to get that on the ballot or that voter suppression goes into effect 2012. and we can't have that for the 2012 election. we've got to have people have a right to vote. so we've got challenge, but you know what? we got 1.3 million signatures before, 231,000 is nothing. [laughter] if we come together and fight. [applause] >> you know, we just heard from john lewis and reverend jackson is here in the front row, and it's 2011, and we're talking about voter suppression. please, please. one more question about your experience out there. in addition to, um, what's happening with collective bargaining rights there have been substantial budget cuts in

ohio. can you give us a little sense of how ec tensive they've been -- extensive they've been and how they've really affected the school system and other aspects of the community life in ohio? >> well, we're really scrambling in the ohio. in cleveland, 700 teachers were let go in the spring. just last week, three days before school started, 200 more teachers were let go. cleveland teachers are looking at class sizes of 50 and above. that does not help our children. with the economic downturn in ohio and the lack of jobs, we have more and more children who are homeless, and that affects what they're able to do in the school, you know? day by day struggles are very tremendous for small children, and it's just amazing that we've had to create community learning centers where children have a place to go after school because their parents are doing whatever they can to put food on the table for their children. and it's all across ohio.

the health care workers, child care workers, everybody's being affected by what's gown on. cleveland is the mayoral-controlled school district, so he's kind of relishing all of this, senate bill five, he's kind of putting it together already. i mean, most people you should have by the end of april before you're let go from your job, but he just let 200 teachers go. so i don't know how we're going to survive. >> wow. um, sarita, you seem to be doing exactly the kind of work that dr. king urged so many of us to do. so tell us a little bit about jobs with justice. >> sure. um, so jobs with justice is, we're a national network. we have about 47 coalitions, um, in 26 states that bring together labor unions, community-based organizations, faith-based groups and student organizations. um, and our, our main mission is to support, expand, pro