>> next on booktv, benjamin runkle presents a history of manhunts launch by the american military and intelligence agencies. mr. runkle recounts numerous campaigns including the death of osama bin laden, which ended the longest manhunt in american history. this is about 45 minutes. >> okay welcome to the tattered cover and thank you very much for supporting your local independent bookstore. benjamin runkle is a former paratrooper and presidential speechwriter with a harvard ph.d. and a bronze star from operation iraqi freedom. he has worked in the department of defense and the national security council and is currently a professional staff member on the house arms services committee. he is here tonight to discuss and sign his new book, "wanted dead or alive" some to manhunts

from geronimo to bin laden our recent review in the "washington times" stated, in "wanted dead or alive" mr. runkle accomplishes two seemingly contradictory feats. his colorful fast paced account of each manhunt appeals to those who enjoy a good adventure story, but is keen strategic insight provides ample material for further reflection. is writing is readable without being breezy, meaty without being pondering. mr. runkle's at the deserves attention from both policymakers and the general public. please welcome benjamin runkle. [applause] >> thank you tamara for that kind introduction. it is great to see some old friends here tonight and i appreciate so many others were willing to miss the season opener tonight to be here as well. i promise i will be brief and you will be able to catch the second half of the game but the scheduling conflict of football i couldn't think of a more appropriate time to be

discussing the subject of the strategic manhunts than the day after day after yesterday's tragic anniversary. out of curiosity and let me just say how many people remember exactly where they were on tuesday, september 11, 2001? that is not surprising everybody raises their hands. by comparison how many people remember where they were exactly where they were on tuesday, september 18th, 2001? nobody raised their hand at all, so not surprised. a cliché and an understatement to say 9/11 is a day that will forever be etched in the memory of all americans illiterate. in comparison to the previous tuesday's event, september 18, 2001 seems relatively inconsequential. america was still in the state of shock and mourning from the attacks that killed nearly 3000 people yet was desperate to regain some measure, some small measure of normalcy. less than five miles away from where rescue cues still search for signs of life amongst the wreckage of the world trade

center the new york stock exchange reopened for business that morning. later the cry of play ball would replace the morbid silence that had settled over major league baseball stadiums across the country and in washington d.c. that morning president bush went to the pentagon to meet with the secretary of defense and senior military leaders to review the decision to activate 35,000 reservist. as the president arrived at the pentagon to smoke lingered in the air wafting from where american airlines flight 77 slammed into the building's outer ring. after the meeting, after the meeting after gathering with some survivors of the 188 people killed at the pentagon and a spontaneous rendition of god bless america the broke out in the pentagon cafeteria the president spoke to reporters. one member of the press corps asked questions on everyone's mind. do you want bin laden dead? president bush replied and in his texas drawl which i won't imitate, i want justice. there is an old poster out west

as i recall that said wanted dead or alive. for the president supporters which at the time seemingly are impossible now but at the time included a large majority of americans a statement was a symbol of american resilience and swagger on the face of unspeakable tragedy. for the president's critics as the war on terror drag on in afghanistan especially in iraq the remark would calm to epitomize bush's simplistic cowboy diplomacy. even president bush himself would eventually express regret over his choice of words that day. either way it was an iconic moment in the nascent war on terror. with those four words president bush inextricably linked the conflict in the public's mind with the fate of one man, osama bin laden. in reality the statement was mr. maddock as it seemed at the time. although president bush -- authorizing operations designed to capture and kill bin laden he was not the first u.s. president to do so. in response the august 1998

african embassy bombing president clinton's sided cruise missiles at a qaeda training camps to kill bin laden and authorize the use of lethal force if necessary to capture the saudi terrorist. moreover bin laden was not the first individual singled out as a strategic objective a u.s. military campaign. on may 3, 1886 more than a century before 25 million-dollar reward would be offered for information on bin laden's whereabouts. the u.s. house of representatives introduced a joint resolution quote authorizing the president to offer an award of $25,000 for the killing or capture of geronimo. 30 years later in response to poncho via's raid across the mexican border into columbus new mexico in march 1916, president woodrow wilson announced quote, a force will be sent at once and pursued with a single objective of capturing him and putting a stop to his forays. within hours of the 1989 invasion of panama of a administration of george h. w.

bush declared that the capture of general manuel noriega was their quote ultimate objective. in fact, the united states has deployed military force with the objective of killing or capturing an individual man nearly a dozen times since 1885. wanted dead or alive is the history of the strategic manhunts and the lessons america can learn from them. now, it is a reasonable question to ask given the headlines of the last six months with bin laden dead why should we care about the calgary's pursuit of drama or the marines hunt for nicaraguan insurgent leader augusta santino 80 years ago? what applicability does it have to our lives? besides a cool adventure story, the reality that operations targeting the visuals will increasingly be attractive to u.s. policymakers for several reasons. on the one hand is colin powell noted in his memoirs, reflecting on the hunt for noriega when he was chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, quote a president has to rally the country behind his

policies and when that policy is war, just have to or else political public opinion against political abstractions. a flush them blood felon serves better. but beyond the american tendency to personalize complex american sensitivity to noncombatant casualties and the in the ability of the individuals whether leading rogue states are terrorist network to threaten the u.s. interests will be magnified by the evolution of technology especially the growth of the international media and the diffusion of weapons of mass destruction and the increasing lethality of technology. at the same time the ability of u.s. forces to legally target individuals will make such operations increasingly tempting. does, rather than make war on populations there'll be a strong motivation to kill or capture individual or rogue leaders that threaten our security. given a probability of future strategic manhunts it is therefore important to draw some lessons learned as to why some

campaign succeed or why some fail or why for example it took 13 years to get bin laden when the average successful manhunt part two that was only 18 months. based upon the 125 years of american manhunts i examine and "wanted dead or alive," i come to for counterintuitive conclusions. first although u.s. forces almost always enjoyed an edge in technology over there corey, this advantage is rarely decisive. ever since general nelson miles a wrecked it heliograph stations throughout the area of operations in the geronimo campaign, he was forced to leverage their relative advantage in technology. yet even in recent manhunts in which we have deployed sophisticated intelligence and recognizance assets, sensors and satellite technology, technology will only play a peripheral role. neither saddam or bin laden were located by drones or iraq leader al zarqawi for that matter.

their voices were never captured. the reality is for every technology there is a countermeasure or his former delta force commander labor argued quote the reality and complexity of life or chile guarantees there'll never be an all-purpose technological panacea for finding people. my second conclusion is that more troops to not guarantee success. this is surprising or controversial conclusions as it becomes conventional wisdom that the reason bin laden escape from tora bora in 2001 was because the bush administration failed to deploy enough troops. yet the history of the strategic manhunts suggest additional troops are not a guarantee of success. the punitive expedition against wachovia deployed twice as many troops, 10,000 pursued a fee of over as the geronimo campaign which was 5000 troops which have the time was a quarter of the united states army over exactly the same train yet it was the earlier smaller manhunt that was successful and then only because the party of five tracked down

the apache leader and convinced him to surrender. similarly the hunt for noriega and mohammad a deed in somalia both involve roughly 20,000 troops pursuing an individual and an urban environment yet once exceeded where the other failed suggesting troop strength is not a decisive variable. also one could also point out that small advisory teams, u.s. advisory team slot large deployments were instrumental to capture and successful hunt for che guevara and pablo escobar. with regard to tora bora the larger u.s. force would have significantly increased the chances of capturing bin laden. the cia official in charge of the agency's afghan campaign told president bush early december that quote no one has enough troops to prevent any possibility of escape in a region like that. if we applied planners in march 2002 in operation anaconda assumption that it would take between 90 to 100 troops were

required to block each path in comparable to rain and the shy cove valley that it would have taken between 901,500 u.s. troops to complete -- completely cordon off the passes potential escape routes out of tora bora number that was quite frankly logistically impossible. moreover at the delta force commander at tora bora confided to me that the afghan forces in the area could have either turned on additional u.s. forces or at best gone humbly the u.s. forces operating blind in those mountains. to historical operations conducted over are similar to rain provide useful counterfactual's to discredit the conventional wisdom about tora bora. in march of 2002 as i mentioned, after three months, roughly 2000 u.s. troops were devoid at the shy cove valley in afghanistan to attract several hundred al qaeda fighters and suspected al qaeda senior leaders. as sean naylor notes and not a

good day to die "mcaleese as many al qaeda escapist either despite the reliance on conventional forces. and where's the bush administration has been faulted for not deploying an additional 823,000 forces depending on which academic critique you see on it in the 1930s and 1940s the british hunted the rebellious religious leader and waziristan with 40,000 troops over the same terrain in waziristan and they never caught their prey. in reality because of the need for operational surprise, smaller is often better in a strategic manhunt and as i say this goes counter to what we think. a lot of people box the men but backed off and cuts off of the operation is. when general miles ordered gatewood not to approach the hostile apaches with fewer than 25 soldiers, it gave would disobey reader -- later recalling hell i couldn't get near geronimo with 25 soldiers.

marine officer in nicaragua from 192-72-1932 noted "large troops have the mobility necessary to overtake bandits and force them to decisive action. of course the small force package comprised of two dozen seals and five helicopters and as you saw the national enquirer this weekend one puppy allowed operational supplies critical to the success of the raid on abbottabad to kill bin laden. the third conclusion is that although terrain is obviously a factor in every military operation whether a tank battle or special operations raid there is no simple type of terrain to predict success or failure. u.s. forces have successfully tracked on the targets and jungles, urban environments and mountains and have also failed at each type of terrain as well with regards to bin laden. although the terrain of tora bora and that border certainly compensated their pursuit of the saudi it wasn't decisive from 1998 to be dozen one and from 2006 to 2011 bin laden was

relatively stationary with an intelligence problem not a terrain problem. finally more important than physical terrain is what i call human terrain which refers to the local population amongst which the target operates especially where the availability of human intelligence, indigenous forces that u.s. troops came ally with and whether there is a border across which the target can escape. intelligence particularly that provided either by local sources or by operators within the target network almost always are more important and advanced technologies, satellite intercepts and satellite photos. of the target is perceived as a hero or a robinhood figure in northern mexico or nicaragua, poncho villa or sandino or the pashtuns in eastern afghanistan, the protection offered by the local population will support almost any number of satellites. conversely, if the target is committed acts that makes them

detested in areas of operation as was the case with geronimo shea guevara noriega pablo escobar, a lack of sanctuary available intelligence will prove decisive. now this last finding and i can say this from experience in d.c., this last finding is deeply unsatisfying for policymakers and pundits. you don't get to blame someone if it comes down to somewhat and answer up well, they are easier to catch although that is true but it suggests some variables that are critical to operational success are not under the control of u.s. military commanders at the outset of the manhunt. nevertheless, he united states has been much more successful than i think is commonly realized in conducting manhunts. when i first had the idea for this project and this is a great state testament to i guess procrastination i had the idea for this project back in 2003. i didn't ask us to writing until 2008 but at the time bin laden and saddam were still at large, black hawk down was on dvd and the u.s. was historically five out of 10 and strategic and hunt

and quite frankly seemed like a fairly futile or haphazard endeavor. yet with the killing of osama bin laden in may we are now eight of 11 in these campaigns. now despite this record of success i surprisingly found and i wanted to be able to write something to be able to say of course we need to go after these guys. this is important. this is what will win the wars but i surprisingly found killing or capturing the targeted individual seldom correlates with strategic success. this is because the hunt forces the target to go to ground which renders him strategically ineffective. this is why we are strategically successful even if the quarry escapes such as poncho villa who never threatened the u.s. border or sandino who fail to take over or destabilize nicaragua. however, this also creates basement space for directors to step to the floor which means the strategic threat can continue even when the target is eliminated. does when pablo escobar was killed they campaign trafficking from columbia nearly shifted

from -- in the capture of saddam hussein in the killing fields are marked a decisive turning point in the iraqi insurgency that was hoped for at the time. ultimately i argue a campaign strategic outcomes depends to finally that manhunt disrupts the broader support network which was key to the strategic success of the hunt for geronimo where they had a cool policy but effective at dislocating exiling the apaches, of shea which was part of a broader bolivian counterinsurgency strategy in noriega where they eliminated his support structure in the panamanian defense structures before they listed his surrender out of the vatican embassy. but, as i noted at the outset beyond policy implications the heart of the book is really an adventure story behind the manhunts. these campaigns were really tom clancyesque thrillers but in real life filled with drama tragedy courage and a gallery of larger-than-life figures both in the mending pursuit and the

american warriors dedicated to apprehending them an excuse me. i would like to actually read three excerpts from the book. three episodes from the book to sort of demonstrate this fact and starting off with personally my favorite bad guy as it were. historical revisionism had been kind to many individuals targeted by u.s. strategic manhunts. geronimo and poncho villa had been romanticized by hollywood. augustus india know and shea are icons that left us throughout the world. even osama bin laden was revered by significant proportion a significant portion of the islamic world despite the large number of muslims killed an al qaeda spat. despite this image of the third world battling the military is highly unlikely that history will be so kind to general men well and noriega. where is most of americans antagonist had admirable qualities whether sheer physical courage or commitment to some

cause however misguided it is difficult to find any redeemable traits in noriega. shourd and cors and an alcoholic with a reputation for sexual violence. noriega was stuck with the silver k bettina or pineapple in reference to his acne scarred face. he seemed to elicit hatred and almost everyone he encountered. former assistant secretary of state elliott abrams recalled the dictator quote a remarkably ugly man history nature showed through. greasy and thoroughly offputting. colin powell recalled meeting noriega, quote i found him an unappealing man but the pot marked face beaty darting eyes and an arrogant swagger. immediately had the crawling since i was in the presence of evil. is james baker then secretary of state put it more colloquially, noriega quote was a case of what we in texas called bad chile. [laughter] noriega enjoyed a productive relationship with u.s. in intelligence agencies and served

as a conduit for u.s. aid supporting the iran contras the though even though we help the contras he was shipping arms to marxist rebels in el salvador who oppose the u.s. backed government. is known to be passing classified information to cuba, libya and warsaw. by 1987 noriega was dealing with outright terrorist organization organizations such as the radical actions of the palestinian liberation organization. despite this pattern of double dealing -- the great quote that secretary of state george shultz observed we can't buy noriega. we can only rent him. now, prior to the invasion, noriega had been consular track and members of the delta force aided by experts from the national security council and central intelligence agency. the surveillance and intelligence cell code-named code spike, excuse me monitored

radio and telephone to medications and directed a network of informants to trace the dictator's movements. noriega's last known location this was on the night of of the semper 19th when the u.s. invaded with 23,000 troops, was in a house in colón at 6:00 p.m.. shortly thereafter he left in a convoy of cars in us a south towards panama city. part of the convoy turned off the road towards it a the airfields while the other headed straight towards the command seal which was the panamanian pentagon. although the joint special operations command was confident noriega had not returned to his headquarters they could not definitely say where he actually was. h-hour u.s. troops raided noriega's beach house in his apartment near colón but found both of them empty. this is a great puzzle. at 13,000 troops stationed in panama. we had every intelligence asset possible looking after him. why couldn't they find him under those circumstances? in reality, noriega had returned to panama city around 8:00 p.m.

heading straight to a panamanian defense forces club. despite the mounting evidence of the impending invasion, he dismissed the possibility of a u.s. attack and reports of troop operations designed to scare him into fleeing. he proceeded to get drunk. adventure lee deciding another form of entertainment was needed. a sergeant on his staff was dispatched to pick up a prostitute who met the intoxicated strongman at the recreation center just east of tokyo man airfield. is dalliance was interrupted at 1:00 a.m. with a thumping sound of an a c-130 gunships and a canon prepping the objective that the first ranger battalion of salt. noriega's bodyguard went outside castile russ back and sides to collect his boss and the dictator's entourage piled into the two hyundai hatchbacks. the reason why u.s. intelligence can find them was because he was hiding from his wife that night

to get a prostitute. now, the avenues will of escape or slam shut. the avenues of escape or slam shut throughout panama. by very special operations forces. the mission of hunting for noriega was given to the delta force. for intelligence that was deemed credible delta force could go from tip to take off in 30 minutes in between december 212 the 24th launched 42 raids on every known or suspected safe house where noriega could hide. yet for all delta considerable skill, they could not apparently ever gets up to the elusive dictator. once they thought they were getting close on one -- often they thought they were getting close. on the pacific ocean u.s. forces found lit cigarettes in warm coffee cups. other locations they found pdf soldiers but no matter how rapidly they kicked down the doors or poured in through windows, the operators would be told noriega had just left or

was at another location. as the cycle repeated itself in the days after the invasion, raiding troops made a series of azar discoveries. at noriega's residence at four commodore for example u.s. troops found pictures of hitler and extensive pornography collections for which is dire he visits from two voodoo priestess is from brazil and 50 kilograms of white powder initially believed to be cocaine but later identified as flower from a king tamales. keen tamales. at noriega's home, and covered more stacks of hard corporate not become a billion dollars in u.s. currency and to religious altars, one of which was decorated with jars containing human internal organs. but there were still no sign of noriega. as i say, you would think you could make this up and then get when they have uncovered sort of moammar gadhafi's palaces etc., yet is not quite this way but he has his own large collection of

dairy weird things and one of the things that drew me to the project was -- this is non-faction but you can't make this stuff up anyways. now also one of my disappointment as i have said is that whereas a lot of the targets of the u.s. intervention and the manhunts have become legends a lot of the american military heroes have slipped into obscurity. one such individual was henry lawton ercolano was an 18-year-old law student at harvard when fort sumter was fired upon in 1851. immediately dropped out and enlisted in the union army. he fought in 20 battles and eventually rose from the rank of private to kernel over the course of the war. in may 1886 when general miles took command of the geronimo campaign he assembled a company of what they described as the 100 best athletes in the u.s. calvary and he hand-picked lawton to lead them. lawton was sixth grade five inches and two to 30 pounds

which today would mean he would only be an average college linebacker on a college football team but back then what one contemporary described as a giant -- gigantic dale nail with dale wolf of the man. back in the 1880s i could've been a linebacker on an average college team. over the next two months, lawton and his men marched nearly 1400 miles and the 120-degree heat in the mexican desert in the mountains pursuing geronimo and although they never caught the apaches the pursuit help to convince drawn the most is to pander render to botanic a wood in august 1886. consequently because of was his company that asked or did the band across the border lawton became famous famous as the man to capture who captured geronimo. fast-forward 13 years ago after winning the easy conventional fight the united states army was bob down fighting a counterinsurgency and its colonial possession, the philippines. like with the iraq war essentially later capturing the leader of the filipino

insurgency was seen as the key to victory but u.s. forces were led by the cautious elwell otis who one historian has described as he was just like general mcclellan but without his good looks. for military historians mcclellan never did anything and neither did otis and he apparently wasn't very good looking either. in the months of 1899, roemer buzzed through the american barracks and officers quarters. even the most battle-hardened veteran, these whispers were confirmed on march 17 when a six-foot five-inch officer with an iron gray mustache and hair over a radically handsome face stepped off the transport at manila. major general henry lawton had arrived in the philippines. as one historian noted, lawton was quote america's kitchener who enjoyed tremendous popularity with his fellow officers, politicians and the press. in addition to his reputation as an indian fighter, he was a national hero for leading the

attack on l. canadian cube of the previous year. the military bearing he was a model officer. is known as a fighting calgary man who unlike the plotting meticulous otis disliked red red tape where is otis jealously honked into his resources were postponed decisive threats lawton was vigorous and energetic and thought to be the ideal commander for the philippines war. "the new york times" declared quote, the puffed up crackbrained egoist had to realize there were no match for the man who were captured geronimo. privately come even general arthur macarthur, douglas macarthur's father, hope to otis would soon be recalled and replaced by the more aggressive lawton. yet lawton carrier grade secret. normally easy-going lot and had a drinking problem dating back to the 1880s that produce violent fits of temper when he was intoxicated. although usually able to control his consumption on he fell into heavy drinking in cuba anders

was relieved his military governor of their pisanti out of under the pretense of ill health. lawton was summoned to the white house to make face-to-face with president mckinley for a lecture on temperance. lot and promise the president present he would abstain from drinking in his new command and deployed to the philippines with two battalions of 217th and third grade. lawton honored his promise and set out to live up to the reputation he had earned in nearly 40 years of warfighting. where otis fell to the headquarters and never left manila lawton led from the front with little regard for his safety. lawton look like a hero, talk would be hereon acted like a hero. walking erect even as he paced back and forth behind the firing line or in a white helmet polished and shone like the headlight of an engine before each battle. reporters accompanying lawton on his excursions absurd he was able to instill his tremendous energy into his officers and

enlisted men who spread a shins and dangers he shared. on may 17, lawton scouts captured the filipino capital at san isidro. yet when he sought permission to continue, otis refused effectively terminating his expedition. lack return to manila and stormed into otis' office. otis would quote give him two regimens, would allow him to arm equip and provision them to return him as when he would stake his reputation on the soldier and his position in the united states army that would in 60 days in the war and would deliver to otis alcorn auto debtor life. this was before giving a rare -- lawton left to otis' office even more livid than when he had arrived. that spring offenses was cut short by the monsoon. in the fall otis launched another offensive that although effectively disperse the

filipino army was always one step behind aqua and although. 60 filipinos led by gwen although's best friend held off 900 u.s. infantrymen in a battle known as the philippine thermopylae and held americans long enough to allow him to slip across the mountains into the dark interior. where we continue the story. lawton requested permission to cross the mountains into the valley before he got settled and again and otis orders. bachelor did not find him but he met with surprising success when the colonel surrendered to him with 1100 men and 800 rifles. perhaps discourage further insubordination and otis recalled lawton and took charge of the campaign to mop up the residual resistance around the capital. somewhat less than glorious duty

for one of the highest-ranking journals in the army. he led to san mateo village 18 miles northeast of manila. in a driving rain the u.s. forces encountered an insurgent force awaiting them entrance is near the manichaean or river. lawton pace back-and-forth behind the firing line personally ordering his soldiers on her. the filipino general likely searching for it clear reference point by which to direct fire for the downpour directed his -- death shooters to concentrate their fire on the tall figure wearing a brilliant white helmet and bright yellow rain slicker. one of the a's was hit surely thereafter. lawton carried him to shelter and despite his promise to retire to a safer position returned to the firing line. suddenly he made an awkward move in front of his face. >> i am shot lawton replied. where? to the lungs. with blood pouring from his mouth his tall frame flung to

the wet ground and within minutes the most beloved officer in the philippines possibly in the united states army was dead his head resting upon a staff officer. in case of tragic irony, lawton was struck down by soldiers led by filipino general's by geronimo. and then, finally, strategic manhunts, one of the things i learned that i didn't know when i began this book. strategic manhunts are significant because they witness some of the most important tactical and technological and the patients in u.s. and international military history. given our proximity to colorado springs, should be noted that the punitive expedition against the 1916 mark the first american deployment of the military aircraft. the san diego affair was history's first use of divebombing and close air support for a decade prior to its more famous use in the spanish civil war and the first deployment of the stealth bomber during operation just cause.

the punitive expedition against poncho villa saw the first recorded mechanized assault in may 1916 which i will recount for you. in the first two months of the punitive expedition u.s. forces narrowly missed capturing via who was wounded shot by his own men actually at a battle in march and was evacuated from the city of guerrero which had the north as u.s. church are coming from the south. by may however increasing tensions between u.s. forces and mexican government forces had led president wilson to hault operations. punitive expeditions enjoyed some success. on may 14, persian place and command a big division. lieutenant george s. patton, 30 years old was a tall thin reidy voice officer already renowned as one of the army's best athletes and pistol shots. when he learned in march that his regiment would not be going

to mexico, patton literally begged for persons to take him along offering to perform any task no matter how menial. while purchasing feed and rubio packed -- patton noticed on our mexicans. one of the guys recognize poe a number of old friends among them. although feel was still in hiding somewhere south of parole for commander general julio cárdenas was believed to be hiding in the vicinity of rubio. patent and his party a corporal six privates, holmdel and another civilian interpreter drove to flossie and it. the uncles nervousness aroused patton's suspicions and on a hunch, he ordered his convoy to drive six miles to the ranch where cárdenas family had been rumored to be residing. he saw three old men and a boy skinning a cow in the front yard east of the house. one of the men ran into the house but quickly returned and resumed his work.

patton's are halted at the northwest corner and two other cars took up positions around the southwest. pershing jumped out of the car and carrying a rifle and pistol raced along the ranch to the northern edge. two soldiers made a similar -- along the southern wall while the privates covered the windows in case any jumped out. padden reached the eastern side first and move toward the gate. when he was 15 yards from the large arched door three men -- three armed men on horseback burst out of the house. seem patton standing with his pistol drawn, the dash towards the southeast corner until he saw soldiers coming from the south. the mexicans turned and rode straight at patent. quote all three shot ami patton recalls. one bullet grappled at me and i fired back five times from a range of 20 yards. to a patent shots hit their targets one injuring a horse's belly and the other breaking the writer's right arm. patent soldiers began firing from the southeast corner putting padden in the line of fire. padden.in the corner and reloaded his three bullets hit a

foot above his head and covered him in adobe does. consequently did not see the man he had shot turned back into the courtyards. went patton came around the corner again he was nearly stampeded. he fired in brogue the horses hit bringing it crashing down on the writer. in the mexican disentangled himself and rose to fire several americans cut them down at a range of about 10 yards. the third rider made it 100 yards east of the hacienda before the soldiers fired at him. he pitched forward dead in the sand near a stonewall. two of the three mexicans were now dead. the first man who had reentered the inner patio and climbed out of a window was spotted running from a gate in the southwest corner toward the nearby fields when a fuselage brought him down. when holmdel approached him the man quote held up his left hand in surrender but when holmdel was 20 feet from him he raised his pistol and shot at holmdel. he unfortunately missed him and holmdel blew out his brains. these were patton's words.

the search turned up no further -- only card unionist family. nobody would did identify the bodies however so corpses russ dragged across the hoods of the three automobiles by hunting trophies. as they prepare to leave patton saw 40 men on horseback racing towards the hacienda likely intending to rescue card dean yes. outnumbered the americans were treated toward repeal for the first man patton shot was identified as the bodyguard. person allowed pat -- patton to savor his trophies again referring to them as the bandit and promoted him to first lieutenant. the rubio ax blade appeared in the u.s. press and newspaper readers were thrilled to have an attractive young he wrote with whom they could associate a punitive expedition and this was again the launching of patton's name. meanwhile in mexico the american bearings were rapidly decomposing against the backdrop of a blood red sunset. veteran sergeant offered an impromptu eulogy. ashes to ashes and dust to dust,

if io won't bury you, uncle sam must. and it struck me on almost every case that there were anecdotes of an avid student of military history that i could never quite decide whether it was going to be a policy book they read like a model or an cool tom clancy book that had policy lessons to it. i am happy that so far it is been that it has achieved both and with that i look forward to any questions that anyone might have. yes, sir? [inaudible] do you know why? >> that is one of the ministries. the story is that charles gatewood was one of the most talented young army officers. he was with the six calvary. the reason most people believe is because the port calvary

wanted credit. he was trusted by the apache so he led a five-man. he was very sickly and could barely stand up to the rigors of all the writing they have to do but accepted the mission of going when they could never catch geronimo to go and tried -- geronimo trusted him to go in trying convince them to surrender and he was successful at this. but afterwards, general miles, who is outwardly come incredibly shall we say ambitious to be generous to him, his uncle william tecumseh sherman said that we could never satisfy your ambitions and less the president at this same time. teddy roosevelt when he was chief of staff of the army in the late 1890s, early 19th century teddy roosevelt called him something like a strutting peacock. so basically in the after action reports he cut gatewood out of the credit as to who captured geronimo.

and gatewood lived a fairly tragic life. he never recovered from those expeditions but the curious thing about that is that miles though supported and, when he transferred the quartermaster of miles was praising for him so it was a mixed bag. gatewood would not get enough credit although in the movie, you know which is not historically accurate, the gatewood character receives full credit for it and lawton doesn't even appear as a character in it. so, but that is an excellent point and i discussed that very briefly at the end of the geronimo chapter. sir? >> the federal bureau of investigation and the united states marshals service are in the business of tracking wanted criminal fugitives. would you have any messages for those agencies on how they could be more effective? >> i don't -- i look at a

different phenomenon. i had to make a conscious decision at the beginning of this. there are some incredible stories, real life stories. the book about the hunt for eric rudolph. there are some great work that has been done on it, but i think looking at a hostile -- where i look at a very hostile and barr versus looking at fugitives in a domestic setting, i would at the moment, i really think they are two very different, comparing apples and oranges to an effect. >> can you comment on the differences between a manhunt for someone like noriega where there has been a relationship with u.s. versus someone where there hasn't been any kind of relationship? >> the funny thing is in a lot of the manhunts, i was very surprised by how many of them we had and we did have a past relationship. we incorporated with subnine

patton. he came aboard in may after the battle. he came on admiral dewey's ship. he told him to continue your revolution. we worked with them and the siege of manila, and he permitted u.s. troops to come aboard. he had captured the islands on his own and allowed troops to land in the philippines and then he went from being very well thought out to being a bad guy. the same thing, poncho via and i discussed this a little in the book, because of the vagaries of the mexican revolution. he actually has a lot of supporters within the wilson cabinet, but he did things directly leading up to the columbus rate. they have massacred his forces something like 16 american minors in january because the

opinion of him to change. similarly with noriega, he said there is a history and a lot of them but, i hate to say the united united states can be fickle. at least in those past cases. i would like to think we are a little bit wetter than that and more steadfast with our allies now but i think in some cases it is the necessity of sometimes international politics, you have to occasionally make accommodations with less than, people with less than perfectly clean hands and circumstances can change their past transgressions come back and have to come due at some point. but that is an excellent point. that is happened surprisingly frequently in the history of u.s. strategic manhunts. >> is there a rich by history as other countries governments gog