this instant -- distant and difficult man. west moreland's chief of staff for over a year in vietnam recalled that although they worked very closely together, they never had a personal relationship, never even, he said, a normal conversation as colleagues ordinarily would. you couldn't get to him. friendship and that kind of thing, kerr win remembered. ..

there were others, many others who held a darker view. among the most prominent was gerald johnson, heyman of surpassing decency and good will. i don't happen to be a fan of general westmoreland he said. i don't think i ever was and i certainly didn't become one as a result of the vietnam war or later during his tenure as chief of staff of the army. another service, served closely with westmoreland in vietnam described it as awed by his son magnificence. westmoreland was raised in south carolina near spartanburg where his father was manager of a

textile mill. an eagle scout at age 15, president of his high school class, first capt. at west point, westmoreland was encouraged from his earliest days to think of himself as specially gifted and specially privileged. his father wrote to him at west point during his plebe year saying you do not know how happy and proud it makes us all to know that you are making good. even the small boys and the negro's are interested and proud and later in that same period he wrote to him again and said when you need anything, write me and i will send it to you. there is nothing too good for you. subsequent letter still during westmoreland's plebe year as a cadet at west point went even further. the people here said his father, white and black, think you are

the biggest man in the country. roosevelt has no rank at all compared to you. they really believe you will be president of the u.s. sunday and talk this among themselves. westmoreland entered world war ii as commander of an artillery division taking his unit into combat in north africa. there they performed with distinction earning a presidential unit citation. subsequently in sicily westmoreland serve temporarily under brigadier-general maxwell taylor, then division artillery commander of the 80 second airborne division, an association that would become extremely important to westmoreland throughout the rest of his career. after sicily for the rest of world war ii westmoreland was a staff officer. when the fighting was over he was given command of an entry

regiment for six months in the army of occupation. back in the united states westmoreland was able to get an assignment to the 80 second airborne where after attending hill school he had a year in command of the 504 parachute infantry regiment and three years as division chief of staff. late in the korean war westmoreland took command of the 187 regimental combat team. a unit that constituted the reserve. consequently was stationed in japan and periodically deployed to korea. westmoreland commanded for 15 months of which nine months were spent in japan where after he had been promoted to brigadier he was able to live with his wife and their young first child. in six months of the 15 spent in korea.

during one such korean period when they were not in combat westmoreland, desirous of qualifying for master parachute badge made 13 jumps in one day. after the war and some steaming on westmoreland's parred the koreans awarded the 187th citation. brigadier westmoreland experienced his first pentagon duty with an assignment in personnel. are had not served there before, he said, speaking of the pentagon and didn't want to serve then. but soon maxwell taylor became army chief of staff and rescued westmoreland from the morass making him his secretary of the general staff. two years later having in the meantime been promoted to two star rank westmoreland was rewarded by taylor with command of the 100 first airborne division.

things moved quickly for him after that. two years as a division commander were followed by a three year assignment as superintendent of the united states military academy at west point and promotion to lieutenant-general and six months in command of the eighteenth airborne corps. just long enough to qualify for other promotions in there after. westmoreland was sent to vietnam in january 1964 as deputy to general paul harkin's who was commanding u.s. forces. in june of 1964, westmoreland replaced him as commander of u.s. military systems command vietnam the original the start of a four year stint. beginning in 1965 the united states began deploying ground forces to vietnam. under westmoreland then decided to conduct a war of attrition

these forces concentrated almost entirely one large unit search and destroy operations primarily in the deep jungle. fixated on the large unit operations which were referred to by many as the war of big battalions westmoreland largely ignored other key responsibilities. most importantly the upgrading of south vietnam's military forces and dealing with pacification. his way of war did nothing to affect the situation in south viet nam's hamlets and villagess where the enemy's coverage infrastructure was left free to continue using coercion and terror to dominate but rural populist. westmoreland deprived the south vietnamese of modern weaponry giving u.s. and other allied forces priority to issue the new and 16 rifle and other advanced military wherewithal. the south vietnamese went for

years equipped with a cast of world war ii u.s. equipment while being outgunned by the communists who were provided the great ak-47 assault rifle and other advanced equipment by their backers, the soviet union and communist china. it is very important to know that was left the westmoreland to devise his own approach the conduct of the war. the conventional view of the war even now is that was micromanaged from washington. there are many stories of how we all know that lyndon johnson's white house's tuesday lunches and so on, he and other civilian officials would even select and approve individual bombing targets in north vietnam and things like that but those decisions had to do with actions taken outside the south vietnam.

within south viet nam the u.s. commander had very wide latitude in deciding how to fight the war. this was true for westmoreland and equally true for his eventual successor. this was not -- his latitude was not a good thing. there were many weaknesses in the strategy which in numerous interrelated ways played into the hands of the enemy. for one chasing around the countryside was futile. general philip davidson, westmoreland's chief intelligence officer said that westmoreland's interests always lay in the big unit war. pacification bored him. and the search and destroy operations favored by westmoreland accomplished little in providing a secure environment which pacification required. the measure of merit in a war of

attrition was body count. westmoreland miscalculated the enemy's staying power. calculate that if you inflecting of casualties on the communists they would lose heart and cease their aggression against south vietnam. instead the enemy proved willing to absorber enormous losses and still keep fighting. progress that westmoreland claims in racking up huge body counts did nothing to win the war. the enemy simply kept sending more replacements to make up his losses. westmoreland was on a treadmill. westmoreland also overestimated the american people's patience and tolerance of friendly losses. on a visit to south viet nam, senator holly from westmoreland's home state of south carolina was told we are killing these people, the enemy at a ratio of 10:1.

the american people don't care about the 10, they care about one. westmoreland didn't get it. westmoreland's response to any problem was to request more troops. the result was the buildup of ice u.s. contingent of ground forces that eventually reach well over half a million men. but when the troupe request kept coming there was no evident progress in winning the war, washington's patients finally ran out. in the spring of 1967 westmoreland asked for 200,000 more troops but got only a fraction of that amount. he stated publicly that he was delighted with the outcome but in his memoirs he said instead that he had been extremely disappointed. later still, on the witness

stand and a trial suit he brought against cbs television he changed his stance again and said he had not been extremely disappointed. in response to cbs attorney from westmoreland's own book extremely disappointed, forcing westmoreland to recant. in the wake of the 1968 tet offensive westmoreland asked for 206,000 troops, request c-span years denying he ever made. but he did. he got token forces and was sued on his way home. it is clear that westmoreland thought he could take the war from the south vietnamese, bring it to a successful conclusion and handed their country back to them and go home in glory but he could not. ambassador ellsworth bunker saw that this was the case including

that when the united states first got involved, the political and psychological nature of the war was not understood and he said because we didn't understand it, our military thought we could get in and do the job and get out much more quickly than proved to be the case. i think that is why we were slow in training the vietnamese instead of we need to train them in an intensive way when we first went in. we didn't begin to train the vietnamese with the objective of their taking over from us until general abrams got there. this disparity in resources especially weapons persisted throughout westmoreland's tenure in vietnam. ambassador bunker noted it in reporting cable to the president on 29 february 1968. only weeks before westmoreland's departure after four years in command. the enemy has been able to equip

his troops with increasingly sophisticated weapons. they are in general better equipped than the forces, effect has an adverse bearing on our men's moral. westmoreland had been in command of u.s. forces nearly four years and later maintained he had done everything possible to build up the south vietnamese. another ambassador of the time, general maxwell taylor, wearying of his sponsorship of westmoreland was even more blunt. we never really paid attention to the army, he said. we didn't give a damn about them. not until general craig abrams came along did this attitude change. 1967 was a fateful time in westmoreland's vietnam service. everyone agrees 1968 was a

fateful year. 1967 was equally so. during that year westmoreland made three trips to the united states where in public appearances he gave a very optimistic assessment of how the war was going. this became part of what was called the johnson administration's progress offensive. very encouraged, said westmoreland in a press conference upon arriving in mid november. i have never been more encouraged during my entire almost four years in country and the national press club he asserted we have reached an important point where the end begins to come in to view. and he added the enemy's hopes are bankrupt. in another visit he spoke to a joint session of congress rendering another optimistic report and and being so taken with the experience that he later described it as the most memorable moment in his military

career and his finest hour which gave him the greatest personal satisfaction. imus say i find it both ironic and sad that a famous general finds a political event at the most satisfying of his military career. 1967 was also a time of vigorous debate about the enemy's order of battle which means his strength and organization. westmoreland denies accurate data by imposing a ceiling on the number of enemy forces and his intelligence officers could report or agree to and by personally removing from the battle entire categories that long been included falsely portraying progress in reducing enemy strength. by may of 1967 president johnson was referring to the war as a bloody impasse.

military historian wrestle wagner commented succinctly on lbj, no capable war president will law officers of such limited capacities as general westmoreland to head military assistance command vietnam for so long. meanwhile westmoreland challenged by news men on his optimistic announcements resorted to is familiar reliance on body count. we are beating him more than he is leading us at westmoreland. westmoreland sought to prepare it the year 1967 as a triumph in which he was winning the award. reading command history, 1967 was characterized by accelerating efforts and growing success in all phases of these endeavors. that was not how he or his performance were seen by others. general bruce palmer referred to

serving as deputy commanding general of u.s. army vietnam and when general craig abrams arrived to be the deputy to westmoreland in may of this year general palmer told him he really had basic disagreements with westy about how we are doing it and later general palmer elaborated on those views in an interview with journalist mark perry saying it was just a mess. we were losing and trying to put it together and it just wasn't working. there wasn't anything that was working. in late summer 1967 ambassador ellsworth bunker submitted this assessment. we have a long way to go. the country is still in d.c. hands. the enemy can show our bases and commit acts of terrorism in secure areas. units known large-scale attacks most of the populace has still not actively committed itself to the government and d.c.

infrastructure still exists throughout the country. that was what westmoreland had to show for three years in command of u.s. forces. by the end of 1967, nicholas katzenbach, a grim sense of siege was descending on the white house. even general william the duke, architect -- approach to the war admitted that it was a losing concept of operations. we ended up after was over with no operational plan that had the slightest chance of ending award favorably. in the face of this united opposition to his way of war westmoreland maintained then and later that the north vietnamese, the enemy in 1967 were in a position of weakness. this is the saddest result of all of many years of research on

these matters. there were many instances including and especially concerning matters in vietnam where westmoreland had been willing to shape or misremember or deny the record when his perceived interests were at risk. one episode involving his lack of confidence in the marine leadership is illustrative and revealing. shortly before the message began in january of 1968 westmoreland decided to send his deputy north to the ichor region to establish and run a tactical headquarters that he designated mac forward. general abrams was to control the operations of all u.s. forces in the area including those of the marine corps and the army. westmoreland's chief intelligence officer philip

davidson had returned to case on, remote outpost garrison by the marines and brief westmoreland on the situation. the description of the unprotected insulations and general lack of preparation to withstand heavy concentrations of artillery and mortar fire agitated general westmoreland. finally he turned to a deputy and said something to the effect of he had lost confidence in the marine general cushman's ability to handle the increasingly threatening situation. his response was to send abrams up to take command. the marine reaction was predictable. one division commander called this the most unpardonable thing that saigon did and said marines viewed it with shock and astonishment. westmoreland soo held a press conference in which he denied any loss of confidence in the marine leadership had been his reason for placing the new headquarters over them.

westmoreland also cabled marine general cushman to say there had been extensive backgrounding in saigon with various news bureau chiefs to point out it carried no stigma whatsoever with respect to marines and was normal military practice and was only temporary. unfortunately only the temporary was true. the other denials were false as evidenced not only by general davidson's eyewitness account but also by whang the ending which cable westmoreland had sent to general wheeler, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. as you perhaps appreciate, he began, the military professionalism of marines falls far short of the standards that should be demanded by our armed forces. indeed they are brave and proud but their standard and tactics and lack of command supervision

throughout the ranks require improvement of the national interest. and there was more. i would be less than frank added westmoreland if i did not say i feel insecure. with the situation in view of my knowledge of their shortcomings without question, many lives would be saved if their tactical professionalism were enhanced. after the war when the marines were writing their history of the conflict they sent a draft of the 1968 volume 2 westmoreland for comment. he marked it up so extensively and took issue with so many judgments rendered that he was invited discuss the whole matter in person. he accepted and in the session with a number of marine corps historians again insisted with regard to establishment of moving forward at that particular action had nothing to

do with my confidence in general cushman or the marines. not a damn thing. this was not only false but giving the existing paper trail reckless in the extreme. westmoreland racked up a lengthy record of false, misleading or inaccurate statements or omissions ranging from any order of battle to his troupe requests from the situation in viet nam to closure of bases and battles where he had ranked prediction and early end of the war to a light at the end of the tunnel. some of these matters were petty. other is of crucial importance. but they were alike in one respect. when westmoreland saw his personal interests at stake he did not hesitate to conceal or abandon the truth. when at the end of january 1968 the enemy's tet offensive began westmoreland's long term at bat was nearing an end.

newsweek magazine describes the devastating measure of how far he had fallen. in november they said when he was conjuring up the light at the end of the tunnel he was affectionately called westy but by last week he was general westmoreland in most official and unofficial briefings. the tech resurgence of enforces led many to conclude that in his optimistic forecasts of the previous year westmoreland had either not known what he was talking about or had not leveled with the american people. it is hard to know which is the more devastating criticism. what was clear was that with his approach to conduct of the war westmoreland had squandered four years of support for the war by much of the american people, the congress and even the media.

for the next four years westmoreland served as army chief of staff. the army of that day was struggling with many problems. some the result of the ongoing war in viet nam and others more societal in origin. these included widespread drug abuse, racial disharmony, budgetary shortfalls and the necessity to prepare for the end of the draft and impending transition to an all volunteer force and. faced with these multiple crises westmoreland decided to focus his attention elsewhere. i spoke in every state of the union he later recalled. i consider myself a military spokesman of the army and that i should be exposed to the american public and put forward the army's point of view. i felt an understanding of the military was the primary mission that fell on my shoulders when i was chief of staff and he added i had too much to occupy me to get into details of such matters

as army reorganization. i frankly in evaluating priorities of my time gave rather high priority to going around the country and giving them facts of life with respect to the military. during his four years as chief of staff westmoreland gained no more understanding of the war that he had while he was in vietnam. tom strait was the cia chief of saigon when westmoreland made a visit. they attended a small function that ambassador bunker's residents, i was astonished by his apparent lack of understanding of what was going on in the war even then. in later years westmoreland viewed himself as very much upon. my years have been fraught with challenges, frustration and sadness he said to his audience.

nobody has taken more than i have and i am not apologizing for a damn thing. nothing. i welcome being the point man. that outlook, no second-guessing of himself and no regrets persisted through the end of his life. as army chief of staff and beyond westmoreland made strenuous efforts to shape the historical record in ways favorable to his version of reality. this included writing his memoirs. when they were published kevin buckley, formerly the newsweek bureau chief in saigon reviewed the book commenting from the beginning westmoreland probably expected to write a memoir of victory similar to janet general eisenhower's crusade in europe and the defeat in vietnam has not deterred him from doing this. wrote westmoreland's of pityingly, as american commander in vietnam i underwent many

frustrations, endured much interference, live with callous irritations, swallowed many disappointments, bore considerable criticism. reviewing the same book the well-known military commentator marshall concluded that westmoreland remains the symbol of the country's most mournful misadventure broad effort. two major episodes, both extremely traumatic marked the westmoreland retirement years. first with a dramatically and successful campaign for governor in his native state of south carolina. then there was a failed libel suit against the cbs television network were a documentary charging westmoreland with manipulation of enemy strength figures while he commanded u.s. forces in vietnam. in each of these cases

westmoreland ignored the advice of highly qualified men who had his best interests at heart and counseled against the forces of action westmoreland took. in the political campaign westmoreland came in second in the republican primary to a state senator who went on to be elected south carolina's first republican governor since reconstruction. westmoreland said he found it very hard to shake hands with people. to ask people for favors. despite a campaign theme. he ran up for a managed cam plane, never got out a coherent message and wound up deeply in debt. westmoreland called it his most humiliating experience. in 1982 cbs aired a documentary

charging westmoreland with having manipulated reports of enemy strength during the vietnam war. westmoreland had willingly participated in making programs being interviewed on camera and asking to be paid for doing so. the resulting broadcast was not favorable to him with numerous former intelligence officers describing how enemy strength they had been manipulated and westmoreland declared certain categories of enemy forces be taken out of the battle artificially driving down the total enemy forces so as to claim progress in his war of attrition. against the advice of hy attorneys westmoreland brought a libel suit against cbs seeking $120 billion in damages. subsequent to the broadcast it came out that its producer had

committed numerous violations of cbs guidelines but the basic findings were seen as valid. in the course of a lengthy trial westmoreland was represented by an attorney who had never before tried a case in court and things did not go well. still, the case dragged on for 18 weeks of testimony. just days before the case was to have gone to the jury westmorland withdrew his suit. in exchange he received a statement from cbs which claims exonerate him and no money. then he said the effort to defame, dishonor and destroy me and those under my command had been exposed and defeated. are therefore withdrew from the battlefield, all flags flying. editorial opinion was not so favorable. the new york times stated the

prevailing reaction. it concluded general westmoreland still in imminent danger of having a jury confirm essential proof of the cbs report as on the original program the general could not get past the testimony of high-ranking former subordinates who confirmed his having covered some intelligence information. said one of the jurors to the press on the way out the door, the evidence in favor of cbs was overwhelming. westmoreland's life since vietnam has been miserable says of for aid. westmoreland himself seems to have contributed much to that outcome. the vietnam war is my number one priority he told an interviewer some years after his retirement. i tried to visit all sections of the country. but then in an assertion completely undermining the

meaning and purpose of all those years of incessant and frantic activity westmoreland told a college audience that in the scope of history vietnam is not going to be a big deal. it won't go to the top as a major endeavor. westmoreland's ultimate failure it seems to me would have earned him more compassion had he not personally been so fundamentally to blame for the endless -- that elevated him to positions and responsibilities beyond his capacity. it is the aggressive guy who gets his share, that principle applies to most anything. that is the way he operated. in later years westmoreland, widely regarded as a general who lost the war also lost his only run for political office, lost his libel suit and lost his

reputation. it was a sad ending for a man for most of his life and career had led a charmed existence. general westmoreland live the longer life. affected by alzheimer's disease for a least his last decade he died in july of 2005 and was buried at west point in a grave he had selected while he was superintendent there. as a final irony given his strong and vocal opposition to the admission of women to west point the cadet honor guard for the burial ceremony was commanded very ably by a female cadet officer. thank you very much. i will be glad to entertain your questions. [applause] robert anybody want to start?

just stunned. please. >> you have given us a very colorful, interesting psychological analysis of general westmoreland but my question has to do with the sociological or organizational one. i didn't hear about the role of the commander in chief for his supervisors in the military or some responsibility there. has that changed? could you compare that with where we are in 2011? >> of very good first question and i thank you for it. time magazines and recent interrogatories that they posted on their web site and they asked me if i thought the subtitle was fair. i said it was eminently fair and

i explained why. the primary reason being general westmoreland had to decide how to fight the war and his relentless pursuit and unavailing approach but the next question was if you think the subtitle is fair who are the other co-conspirators? that was a good question and it is what you are asking too. i began by saying there are a lot of candidates for the top tier of miscreants and i describe three. linden johnson, president and commander-in-chief, robert mcnamara, secretary of defense and general earl wheeler who was chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. i tried to explain why general westmoreland was allowed to be commander in vietnam for so long when so many people saw the he was not achieving the success he was claiming. i quoted any number of them

here. general bruce palmer, four star general who was westmoreland's classmate and general laborers who was his deputy and succeeded him, general fred whyand became chief of staff and general bill davidson and many others who saw this was not working. so you have to say why was he allowed to continue? hard to explain that. shouldn't have happened that way but a partial explanation has to examine the people above him who had the authority to replace him or directors operations in a different manner. you start with lyndon johnson. in my estimation no knowledge of military affairs in general and in many ways rather obtuse as well.

robert mcnamara the same. then general earl wheeler. in my estimation he is a major part of the problem. essentially a staff officer. low command experience and none in combat and he has been to the north. westmoreland's idea that fire power is a way to conduct this work so he was no help. i speculate -- i will go farther than that. i assert that these main people in the chain of command who had the authority to replace westmoreland or direct him do something different than he was doing lacked the knowledge and confidence to do that. but there were others who were working hard to try to achieve the objective i believe should have been and one of the most important i have returned to his general johnson. in the same four years

westmoreland commanded in vietnam general johnson was the army chief of staff and early on he conducted a study, pacification and long term development of vietnam's. the study said flat out what general westmoreland is doing is not working and cannot work and the reason is it is ignoring the situation in the villages were the covert infrastructure was dominating the populace. so he said here is the real way to fight the war and this is exactly what general abrams did when he took command in the spring of 1968. he implemented the proven study which said instead of a war of attrition this has to be a war of population security. instead of search and destroy operations we will conduct clear and hold operations and the hold was provided by territorial

forces of the south vietnamese given the m-16 rifle. first priority is general westmoreland would never give them and the measure of it now is not body count but population. very important and significant, i believe that by the autumn of 1966 at the latest two senior officers in charge of the forces fighting the ground war, general johnson, chief of staff of army and general walls green, commandant of the marine corps agreed westmoreland's approach was wrong and not a viable alternative. the alternative described by the book. general johnson tried hard to get this support in the joint chiefs of staff. it didn't make much progress with earl wheeler in charge and his commitment to fire power. that didn't go anywhere. the study was brief to general

westmoreland and he rejected it out of hand. not too surprising. an officer of the they named chancellor, well-known and successful writer said he was the staff officer assigned to write westmoreland's response and he said we thought this was great but we were not allowed to say that. we had to say there are some good ideas for study and we're already doing many of these things and so on. that did not go anywhere until the commanders -- that is why i said in the course of my remarks that the reason general westmoreland is the general who lost the vietnam war basically squandered four years of support for our war in vietnam and even though in the latter period after he was succeeded things

went much better near the end and probably to people ran out of patience to support the war and even when we regaining the money they were motivated. you asked about the current situation. i am not well qualified to comment on that. you are looking at a genuine dinosaur. i have occupied myself day and night for 30 years thinking about the period 1960-1975. i have the general awareness of anybody who reads the newspapers about the situation now in iraq and afghanistan, i can't profess to any expertise. i will say in the early and ladder years of our involvement in iraq there seems to be a similar pattern in that the early commanders went about the work in a way similar to what general westmoreland did and

when we changed commanders general david petraeus came in and i think exhibited a more abrams like understanding of the nature of the war and how much should be conducted. many of you know that when he came back in the period between service in iraq and afghanistan, general david petraeus was in fort leavenworth task with writing a counterinsurgency manual that would be issued by the army and marine corps. it is a well done document and if you read it you will be amazed at the parallels between the prescription there and the program's study and what general abrams did when he took command. that is a long answer but you ask the fundamental question. i thank you for that. i don't know enough about that. i would hang myself with ignorance. i can't do that. other questions?

>> would you, and on what happened after westmoreland appeared on the cover of time as man of the year? i was out in vietnam in 67. there was a lot of talk going are round about westmoreland running for president and was coming out -- i don't know if that is in your book or not but it seems to me in retrospect that that may have added a great deal to his ego. >> that is a good question. there is a little input from this. the question has to do with -- time magazine cover and the first issue of 1966 general westmoreland was shown on the cover not in a photograph but in a bust that had been sculpted of him for that purpose and it said the 1965 mann of the year, the year we are building up forces in vietnam and he is talking even then optimistically about

the outcome. there are two earlier biographies of general westmoreland. the first one is called a the inevitable general. it is written by a journalist for the baltimore sun named pat ferguson. i have talked to him at length. this book was published in 1968 so it was written in 1967. long before the end of westmoreland's career or even his service in vietnam. you have to ask why was this book written at this time. there is a colonel named paul meyers known to some people in this audience. well known to general westmoreland and his chief of staff period. unlike many who worked as aides to westmoreland he stated touch with him for the rest of his life. he said he always thought

westmoreland harbored presidential aspirations and was never able to shake the view that this was to be a campaign biography. others have said all those there was the war in summer of '67 that might have called for westmoreland to be reassigned. lyndon johnson may have received westmoreland had political aspirations and it was a very convenient thing for him to leave him 12,000 miles away and under his command rapidan bringing him back to join the political season. general bruce palmer said very straightforward to me in an interview when wesy came back from vietnam he had presidential aspirations and talked to me about it and i tried to say this wasn't a popular war. as it turned out he did try to become governor of south carolina. very enact campaigner and even worse probably enact manager of

his campaign. there were some people in the republican party who thought he might be a viable candidate to oppose lyndon johnson in the autumn of 68 but nothing came of that. westmoreland always denied that he had any presidential aspirations but i have a lot of confidence in bruce palmer so i believe he did but the situation never allowed anything. thanks for that. anybody else? >> right here. recently i read h.r. mcmasters's book dereliction of duty. i know you know him well and had him stay at your house when he was writing your book. in that book he really lays it on president johnson and secretary mcnamara and also said, the crux of my question,

he kept saying any time he saw the joint chiefs, largely ignored but every time he saw him he said that. was that with westmoreland's influence on body count, what did that have to do with leading to that? because of it? >> a very fine question. i will start by saying i have enormous admiration for h.r. mcmaster is. a brilliant scholar and that is a wonderfully fine book and i am glad to see when i go into bookstores even though it has been out for many years you see it on the shelves so it has a long life. we talked about what you asked about many times. basically his book ends before my count begins. in particular we discussed his

take on general johnson and i wrote a biography of general johnson called hon. warrior and i concluded he was one of the finest officers we ever had and one of the most honest. some of the criticisms h.r. make of him in his book are colored by the fact that had he covered a later period in light of -- might have influenced our h.r. evaluated him. let's talk about lyndon johnson. i didn't have time to cover this in the prepared remarks but i think you could also say besides the other criticisms leveled at him that in the course of his conduct of the war generally westmoreland was guilty of macrodisobedience. the reason i say that is in early 1966 there was a major conference in honolulu. one way of conducting the war to

was to have conferences at various locations. the president would come sometimes and lyndon johnson came to the conference in honolulu in february 1966 and westmoreland came from vietnam and so did the vietnamese. the point of this conference was to boost american support for pacification which you already heard me say westmoreland ignored and pacification bored him and so on. it is not just lyndon johnson focusing -- lots of times when you say that but now he is saying we got to get behind pacification efforts if we are ever going to get out of fear. i am putting words in his mouth but that is the implication of what he said. so we go back to vietnam with

those instructions and william c. westmoreland says retrospectively i was getting pressure after pressure after pressure to pay more attention to pacification and i wasn't going to do that at the expense of leading off the war against the enemy's main forces. i don't know how you view that but that seems like insubordination of a high degree and at worst disobedience of orders from his commander in chief. so you asked for evidence of that or look for evidence of that, one of the details that impressed me greatly and i decode an entire chapter to this is what westmoreland did or did not do with respect to arming the south vietnamese as well as the enemy was armed, look at the

m-16 rifle as an example of that. he never did anything until abrams came on the scene as the deputy in may of 1967 that the vietnamese began to get any help at all. so i think lyndon johnson was persuaded and i don't know by what sources that pacification was important. after abrams took command we had a magnificent team. the ambassador in charge of the embassy and abrams in charge of the military and will mm-hmm -- william colby in charge of pacification and they agreed it had to be one work of combat operations but much changed and pacification and upgrading south vietnam's are forces. only then they said we could succeed. >> can i ask one more? short question. besides johnson, mcnamara and

wheeler that you talked about, mcmaster says max taylor who was ambassador at that time over westmoreland was also party to confusing things. let me put it that way. any comment? >> there are a lot of thing that could be said about general taylor that don't quite match the reputation i believe he still enjoys pretty widely. i already indicated more than once he was probably westmoreland's most important patron and thanks to him westmoreland reach of the high level he did including his assignment to vietnam. but i think maxwell taylor and westmoreland had a diverging viewpoints. it seems to be documentable that when the first ground forces

came ashore marine elements in march of 1965 as the ambassador had no advance notice they were coming westmoreland knew that and didn't tell amanda white house knew that and didn't tell him and the pentagon knew that and didn't tell him so he was marginalized by that point. their evaluation of general taylor is for another day. but he was in against as well and i will leave it at that. thank you very much for coming. [applause] >> you were watching booktv on c-span2. forty-eight hours of nonfiction authors and books every weekend. >> i will talk about why i wrote the book and what i hoped to

accomplish with this book. i wrote the book because our party is across roads. there is a division and going forward i believe we have to unite. as a matter of fact i extend on one of my fox interviews and invitations for karl rove and i to kiss and make up. we can go forward a united party. i do talk a lot about the cronyism especially of the republican party in delaware which those leaders have been ousted but the reason i bring that up is not to perpetuate it or fan the flames but put it to rest and to say that that crony crowd would embrace the principles that the grass roots crowd, that our party was founded on legal not just our party but our country was founded on we will be a

powerhouse if we can unite. i detail some of these things my campaign has in toward and what i went through as a candidate again to illustrate a point of what happens when we divide instead of the night. everyone knows. it is no secret that the 2010 elections, the republican party was divided. but there are some examples to look at and i draw the contract between kentucky and my own race where in kentucky we have the -- senator mitch mcconnell really campaigning against rand paul. he was the worst thing to happen to politics until we won the primary. the day after he won the primary the two -- mitch mcconnell and rand paul were harmed in harm saying that is the path. we have to move forward to make

sure this guy crosses the finish line. unfortunately that didn't happen in delaware. but it has got to happen in order for us to win in 2012. that is the message i hope people can take away with them by reading this book. i tried to tell the story how i got involved in politics and what made me embrace the principles i did and why i chose to become a republican. are told it in a way that political advisers have said was a little too on this. i shouldn't have admitted some things. i did that so the reader can relate because it is not about how many mistakes we have made or if we have ever fallen because you simply cannot pretend to be perfect. too exhausting to keep up that facade. we are human. what it is about is whether you get back up again. whether you are willing to own up to your mistakes and whether

you are willing to correct your mistakes and whether you are willing to forge ahead and in spite of the opposition, that is why i chose to address many of the things i did in my book and talk about it and some of the hardships i personally endorse so people can be inspired. >> you can watch this and other programs online at booktv.org. >> this month booktv took a trip to knoxville, tennessee. with the above local provider comcast we met several authors and historians to look at the literary culture of the city. those interviews can be seen throughout our programming this weekend on booktv. >> when i got to sell my books every person i worked with data rejection letter from which was kind of cool. you go to a meeting and we love your stuff and icy