>> next, military historian, trained by recounts the career of general william westmoreland who led american forces in the vietnam war from 1964 to 1968. mr. tenet speaks at the archives in washington d.c. for about an hour. [applause]

be not very many people here who have encouraged and supported me over long years of research and writing. i would like to acknowledge one in particular. farmer urban colonel humpty attu s. comfort in houston to be with us today. we have been friends since 1961, when as captives we were caught mates at the armory school at fort knox. cert great and not terribly turn a lot worse in the vietnam war, including a statement of private's chief upon treat. after the war, he and his family came to america thinks two incredibly hard work and find family values they have prospered. he has also written, steel and blood, and excellent talk about armor in the vietnam war. [applause]

as you know, we are going to talk today about the life and career of general westmoreland. i warn you at the out that this is not a happy story. what it is i think an important, even if some show on. my contention is that until we understand william child westmoreland, we will never fully understand what happened to us in vietnam or why. his involvement in the vietnam war was the defining aspect of his life. he himself perceived that and was driven for the rest of his days to care to rise, explain, rationalize and defend that role. his memoirs reflect the fixation. in a long career, totaling 36 years as an officer in a string of postings to increasingly

important assignment to the four years he commanded american forces in vietnam and the aftermath cost virtually the entirety of the account, all the rest. understanding westmoreland is not easy. he turns out to be a surprisingly complex man, fueled by ambition, driving himself relentlessly impressive military mean, energetic and effect the self-promotion unskillful at cultivating influential sponsors from its early stages or is he that his contemporaries, was admired and advanced by his seniors and progressed rapidly upward. but few who served with him would claim they really knew this distant and difficult man. general walter kerwin who was

westmoreland's chief of staff in vietnam recalled that although they worked very closely together, he had westmoreland never had a personal relationship, never even he fed a normal conversation as colleagues are nearly way. you couldn't get to, friendship in that kind of thing kerwin remembered. westmoreland hot and extraordinary capacity for polarizing the of those who encountered him. few of whom remained in different. his executive officer when westmoreland was army chief of staff described him as the most gracious and gentlemanly person with whom i overserved, an executive officer, westmoreland had in vietnam regard them as the only man he ever met to whom the term great to be applied. there were others though, many

others who held a darker view. among the most prominent was general harold k. johnson, a man surpassing decency and good will. i don't happen to be a fan in general westmoreland he said. i don't think i ever was. they certainly didn't become one as a result of the vietnam war or later during his tenure as chief of staff of the army. general officer of another service he served close to you with westmoreland in vietnam described him as awed by his own defense. westmoreland was born and raised in semi rural south carolina near spartanburg, where his father was manager of a textile mill. an eagle scout at age 15, president of his high school class, for his captain at west point, westmoreland was

encouraged from his earliest days to think of himself as specially gifted specially privileged. her father wrote to them at west point during his plea year, saying you do not know how happy and proud it makes us all to know that you are making good. even the small boys in the are date and proud of it. and later that same. sad when you need anything, right and i will send it to you. there is nothing too good for you in a subsequent letter, still as a cadet at west point went even further, the people here said his father, white and black think you're about the biggest man in the country. roosevelt has no act prepared tea appeared they really believe he'll be president of the u.s.

sunday and taught this among themselves. what a fun chaired decided in the ninth century division, taking his unit in north africa. there they performed with distinction with a presidential citation. subsequently in sicily, westmoreland server temporarily under then brigadier maxwell taylor, commander of the 82nd airborne division and association that would he come extremely important through 1010 through the rest of his career. after sicily, for the rest of world war ii, westmoreland was a stop-loss it. when the fighting was over, he was given command of an infantry regiment for six months in the army of occupation. then, back in the united states, westmoreland was able to get an assignment to the 82nd

airborne division are after attending school he had a year in command of the 504 parachute temperature regiment in three years as division chief of staff. then, late in the korean war, westmoreland took command of the 87 airborne regimental combat team, the constituted the theater cannot reserve and consequently was stationed in japan and periodically deployed to korea. westmoreland for 15 months. of which 9% in japan, were asked to repeat had been floated to brigadier was able to live with his wife and their young first child. i'm six months of this team spent in korea. during one such korean. , when they were not combat, westmoreland desired and so qualifying for master parachute made 13 jumps in one day.

after the war and some steaming on westmoreland's part the koreans warranted their presidential unit citation. new brigadier westmoreland experienced his first pentagon duty with an assignment personnel. i have not served there before he said, speaking of the pentagon and i didn't want to serve there then. but stan maxwell taylor became army chief of staff and rescued westmoreland from the personnel mores making him his secretary of the general staff. two years later, hunting in the meantime been promoted to start rank, westmoreland was reported i.t. with commanded the 101st airborne division. things moved quickly for him after that. two years of the division commander for qualified to do three or send in a superintendent of the united states military academy at west

point, then promotion to lieutenant general in six months in command of the 18th airborne corps just long enough to qualify for another promotions and thereafter. westmoreland was sent to vietnam in january 1964 as deputy to general paul harkins who was then commanding u.s. forces there. then in june 1964, westmoreland placed the commander of u.s. military service command vietnam, the start of a four year stint for westmoreland. beginning in the spring of 1965, the united states began deploying ground forces to vietnam. under westmoreland, who had decided to conduct a war of attrition, these forces concentrated almost entirely a large unit search and destroy operations primarily under the

general appeared fixated on large ad operations which were referred to by many as the war of the big battalions, largely ignored other key responsibilities. most importantly, the upgrading of south vietnam's military forces in dealing with pacification. his way up or did nothing to affect the situation in south vietnam's hamlet villages, where the enemy's covert infrastructure was left free to continue using coercion and terror to dominate the world populace pic meanwhile, westmoreland deprived, giving u.s. and other allied forces priority four issue of the new m-16 rifle and other advanced military wherewithal. the south vietnamese went for years come equipped with cast of world war ii vintage u.s. equipment while being outdone by the communists who were provided

a great ak-47 assault rifle and other events equipment by their backers, the soviet union and communist china. it is very important to know that it was left to have time to do the work. the conventional view of the war, even now is that it of his micromanaged from washington. there are many stories of how we all know ben johnson's white house, the famous tuesday lunches and go on, he and other attacks mostly civilian officials would even and approve individual bombing target in north vietnam and he was like that. but those decisions had to do with actions taken outside of vietnam. within south vietnam, the u.s. commander had very wide latitude in deciding how to fight the war. this is true for westmoreland

and his successor. his latitude was not a good thing. there were many we assist in the strategy he said, which in numerous interrelated ways played into the hands of the enemy. for one, chasing around the countryside was futile. general philip davidson, chief intelligent thought or said that westmoreland centrist i was lay in the big unit more. pacification or 10. anthony davidson to search and destroy operations favored by westmoreland does little in providing secure environment which pacification required. the measure of merit in attrition was body count. westmoreland underestimated the staying power, calculating that if he could inflict enough

casualties on the communists, they would lose heart and seize their aggression towards south vietnam. instead, the enemy proved willing to keep writing. alice, the progress that westmoreland claimed in racking up huge body count did not name to win the war. the enemy simply kept sending more and more replacements to make up his losses. westmoreland was on a treadmill. westmoreland also overestimated the american people's patience and tolerance of friendly losses. on a visit to south vietnam, senator hollings from westmoreland state of north carolina was told i westmoreland, we are killing these people at a ratio of 10 to one that hollings. the american people don't care about the time.

they care about the one. westmoreland didn't get it. westmoreland's response to any problem was to request more troops. the result was the buildup of the u.s. contingent of ground forces would eventually reached well over half a million men. but when the troop request kept coming with no evident progress in winning the war, washington's patience finally ran out. in the spring of 1967, westmoreland o-oscar 200,000 more troops, but it got only a fraction of that amount. at the time, he stated publicly that he was delighted with the outcome. in his memoirs decided instead that he had been extremely disappointed. later still, on the witness stand in the suit he brought against cbs television, he changed his stance again and that he had not been extremely

disappointed. in response to cbs attorney read friend westmoreland thumb but, extremely disappointing, forcing westmoreland to recount. and then ran in the wake of the enemy's 1968 defense, asked for another 600,000 troops are requesting then he spent years denying what he had ever made but he did. he got token force is and was soon on his way home. it is clear that westmoreland thought he could take the war over from the south vietnamese, bring it to a successful conclusion, then hand their country back to them in coahoma glory. but he could not. ambassador bunker thought this was the case two including when the united states first got involved, the political and psychological nature of the war was not understood. and he said because we didn't

understand it, our military that we could get in and do the job and get out much more quickly than prove to be the case. i think that bunker that is one reason we were slow in training the vietnamese instead of starting to train them in an intensively when we first went there. we didn't begin to train the vietnamese that the objective of their taking over from us until generally risk out there. this disparity of resources, especially weapons persisted throughout the tenure in vietnam. ambassador bunker noted and cable to the president in 29 february 1968 only weeks before westmoreland's departure after his four years in command that bunker, the enemy has been able to equip its troops with increasingly sophisticated weapons. they are in general better equipped than the army forces come a fact which has not are

sparing on army morale. westmoreland had been there in command of the u.s. forces for nearly four years and later maintained he had done everything possible to build a the south vietnamese. another ambassador of the time, general maxwell taylor, now i think wearing of the sponsorship was even more blunt. we never really paid attention to the army that. we didn't give a about them. not until general creighton abrams came on the scene did this attitude change. 1967 was a fateful time in westmoreland's vietnam service. ironic reads 1968 was a fateful year. 1967 was equally so. during that year, westmoreland made three trips to the united states, where in public appearances he gave a very

optimistic assessment of how the war was going and this became part of -- came to be called the johnson administration's progress defensive. very, very cursed by westmoreland in a press conference upon arriving in the u.s. in mid-november. i've never been more encouraged to read my attire almost four years in the country and at the national press club he asserted that we have reached an important point when he begins to come in a few and he added the enemy's hopes are bankrupt. on another visit he talked to the joint session of congress rendering but not domestic report and been so taken with the experience that he later described as the most memorable moment in his military career and his finest hour which gave him the greatest personal satisfaction. i must say i find it ironic and

not that of famous general fund a political event the most satisfying of his military career. 1967 was also a time of figure is debate about vietnamese border battle, which means his strained and organization. westmoreland tonight senior civilian officials accurate data by imposing a ceiling on the number of enemy forces and intelligence officers could report and a personally removing the entire categories that have long been included, thus falsely portraying progress in reducing enemy strengths. by may of 1967, president johnson was referring to the war is a bloody impasse. military historian russell whately commented specifically on lbj. no capable war president would've allowed an officer of such limited capacities as

william c. westmoreland to have military assistance command vietnam for so long. meanwhile, westmoreland challenged by new man on his optimistic enough than resorted to the familiar reliance on body count. we are leaving him a great deal more than he is bleeding that westmoreland. westmoreland thought cheaper trade the year 1967 as a triathlon during which he was winning the war for the mac the command history for that year 1967 was characterized by celebrating efforts and growing success in all phases endeavors. that was not how he or his performance was seen by others. general bruce palmer referred to earlier was by then serving as deputy commanding general of the u.s. army vietnam. in may of that year, general

palmer told him he really had a thick disagreements with west ham hound resorting he was doing it. later, general palmer collaborated on those views in an interview. it was just a mess. we were losing and trying to put it together and it just wasn't working. there just wasn't anything that was working. in december 1967, bunker submitted this secession. we still have a long way to go. much of the country is still in the hands of the enemy can still scheller behcet's and commit acts of terrorism in the secured areas, still large-scale attacks, most of the populace has still not actively committed itself to the government into d.c. infrastructure still exists throughout the country. that was what westmoreland hunter show for three years in command of u.s. forces. by the end of 1967, remember

katzenbach, a crude sense of siege was descending on the white house. i know i come even general william, architect of the search industry concept and approach to the war admitted that it was a losing concept of operations. we ended up after was all over with no operational plan that had the slightest chance of ending the war favorably. in the face of this united opposition to his label or, westmoreland retained dynamited at the north vietnamese in mid-1967 war and position of weakness. this is the saddest results of all of many years of research on these matters. there were many instances, including and especially concerning matters in vietnam,

where westmoreland had been willing to misremember or deny the record when his perceived interests were at risk. one episode involving his lack of confidence in the marine leadership is both illustrative and revealing. shortly before it began in january 1968, westmoreland decided to send deputy north to the ichor region to establish money tactical headquarters that he designated forward. from there, general abrams was to control the operations of all u.s. forces in the area, including those of the marine corps and of course the army. westmoreland's chief intelligence officer philip davidson had returned to a visit and brief westmoreland on the situation there. the description of the

unprotected installations in the general lack of preparation to withstand heavy concentrations of artillery and mortar fire he said agitated general westmoreland. he turned to his deputy have said something to the effect that he had lost confidence in very general cushman ability to handle the increasingly threatening situation his response was to set not be forwarded to send abrams to take command. during reaction was predict will. one commander called this the most unpardonable thing saigon did and said marine theater was shocked in astonishment. westmoreland on a conference in which he denied that any loss of confidence in marine leadership had been his reason for placing the new headquarters over them. westmoreland also cabled marine general cushman say there has been extent of back room here in saigon with the various news bureau chiefs to point out that

established carried no stigma whatsoever with respect to the marines is merely a normal military is and was only temporary. unfortunately, only the temporary was true. the other denials were false as evidenced not only by general davidson's eyewitness account, but also by lengthy capo, had sent contemporaneously to general r. wheeler, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. as he perhaps appreciate he began, the military professionalism paul short of standards that should be demanded at armed forces. indeed, they are brave and proud, but their standards, tacked to extend command supervision or up the ranks requires improvement in the national interest. and there's more. i would be less than frank if i did not say that i feel somewhat

insecure in view of my knowledge of their shortcomings, without question, many lives could be saved if there's a tactical professionalism were enhanced. after the war, when the marines are writing their history of the conflict, they sent a draft to the 1968 volume to westmoreland for comment. he marked it up so extensively and took issue with so many of the judgments rendered that he was invited to discuss the whole matter of%. he accept did and in a session with a number of marine corps historians again insisted with regard to the establishment of maxie forwarded that that particular action had not a thing today with my confidence in the rain, not a thing. this is not only false, but giving the existing paper trail

reckless in the extreme. westmoreland racked up a lengthy record of false misleading and inaccurate statements or emissions come arranging for enemy order of battle to his troop request from the situation in vietnam to closure of caisson they sent from bottles of prediction at the end of the work to light at the end of the tunnel. some of these matters were petty. others of crucial importance. but they were alike in one respect. when it has personal interest to stay, he did not hesitate to conceal or abandon the truth. at the end of january 1968, they began with nearing an end. "newsweek" magazine described a devastating measure of how far he had fallen. in november they said when he was conjuring up the light at

the end of the tunnel, he was affectionately called wednesday. but by last week he was general westmoreland in the most official and unofficial briefings. the resurgence of enemy forces led many to conclude that in the thought domestic forecast in the previous year, westmoreland had either not known what he was talking about or had not leveled with the american people. it is hard to know which is the more devastating criticism. it was clear however that with this unavailing approach to combat of the war, westmoreland had squandered four years of support for the war by much of the american people that congress and even the media. for the next four years, westmoreland urges army chief of staff. the army of that day was with many problems, some of the ongoing war in vietnam, others

more societal origin. these included in discipline, widespread drug abuse, racial disharmony, budgetary short of a necessity to prepare for the end of the drive and impending transition of no volunteer force. faced with these multiple crises, westmoreland decided to create assistance elsewhere. i spoke in every state in the union he later recalled. i considered myself a military spokesman of the army and that i should be exposed to the american public and put forth the army's point of view. i felt that an understanding of the military was the primary mission that fell on my shoulders while i was chief of staff. and he added, i do too much to occupy me to get into some details of such matters as rbb organization. i frankly and evaluating priorities of my timekeeper rather high priority to going around the country and giving them the facts of life with

respect to the military. during his four years as chief of staff, he apparently came no more understanding of the war than he had had while he was in vietnam. paul carr was the cia chief decision saigon would westmoreland made the 1972 visit there. they both attended a small function at ambassador bunker's residence, where paul carr was astonished by his apparent lack of understanding of what was going on in the war even then. in later years, westmoreland view themselves as put upon. mayors have been fought with challenges, frustrations and sadness he said to not be in. nobody has taken more cost than i have and i'm not apologizing for anything, nothing then i welcome being the point man.

that outlook, no second-guessing of themselves and no regrets persisted through the end of his life. as army chief of staff and beyond, westmoreland made strenuous routes to shape this historical record in ways favorable to his version of reality. this included writing his memoirs. when they were published, westmoreland formerly the "newsweek" bureau chief in saigon reviewed the book, commenting that from the beginning, westmoreland probably expected to write a memoir similar to general eisenhower's crusade in europe and defeat in vietnam has not deterred him from doing this. who wrote, westmoreland and we as american commander in vietnam, i underwent many frustrations, endured much interference, lived with countless irritations, swallowed many disappointments and more

considerable criticism. reviewing the same boat, the memoirs of the well-known military commentator concluded that westmoreland remains the symbol of the country's most mournful dissidents are abroad over. two major episodes, both extremely true manic mark the westmoreland retirement years. the first was a dramatically unsuccessful campaign for governor in his native state of south carolina. then there is a fair suit against the cbs television network for a documentary charging with unrestrained figures so he commanded u.s. forces in vietnam. and each of these cases, westmoreland ignored the advice of highly qualified men who had his best interest at heart and the council because the courses of action westmoreland to.

and the political campaign, westmoreland came in second in the republican primary to a state senator who then went on to be elected south carolina's first republican republican governor since reconstruction. westmoreland said he had found it very hard to shake hands with people, to ask people for favors and talk about themselves. despite a campaign theme describing him as the only candidate with the proven leadership and administrative ability to carry south carolina to greatness, westmoreland read a poorly managed campaign late getting started never got out a coherent message and wound up deeply into. afterward, westmoreland called it his most humiliating experience. then in 1982, cbs television charged westmoreland of having manipulated reports of enemy strength during the vietnam war. westmoreland had willingly participated in making programs

being interviewed on camera and asking to be paid for doing so. the resulting broadcast was not favorable to him with numerous former intelligence officers describing how enemy strength data manipulated and how westmoreland himself had decreed that certain categories of enemy forces be taken out of the bottle, thus artificially driving down the total of enemy forces so as to claim progress in his war of attrition. in due course, against the advice of high-powered attorneys cautioned against it, westmoreland body suit against cbs seeking $120 billion in damages. subsequent to the broadcast, it came out that his producer had tbs guidelines. the basic findings however were seen as valid. in the course of a lengthy trial, westmoreland was

represented by attorney who had never before her tragic case in court. things did not go well. still, the case dragged on for some 18 weeks of testimony. then, just days before the case was to have gone to the jury, westmoreland withdrew his suit. in exchange, he received a vanilla statement from cbs, which he claimed exonerated and i know money. then he said the effort to defend, dishonor and destroy under my command have been exposed and defeated. i withdrew from the battlefield all flags flying. editorial opinion was not so favorable. "the new york times" stated that prevailing reaction. at the end of included general westmoreland student imminent danger of the essential truth of the cbs report for in court as

on the original program the general could not get past the testimony of high-ranking former subordinates who consumed him having colored some intelligence information. as one of the jurors to the press, the evidence in favor of cbs's overwhelming. westmoreland way since vietnam has been miserable said former aide. westmoreland himself seems to have contributed much to that outcome. vietnam small war told an interviewer some years after his retirement. they try to spread myself in and visit all sections of the country. but then, and an assertion completely undermining the meaning and purpose of all this years of incessant, westmoreland told the college and then in the scope of history, vietnam is not

going to be a big deal. it won't float to the top is a major endeavor. westmoreland's ultimate failure seems to me would have earned him more compassion i did not personally been so fundamentally to blame for the endless self-promotion that elevated him to positions and responsibilities beyond his capacity. it is the aggressive guy who gets his share plus westmoreland maintained, that principle applies to most anything that is the way he operated. in later years, westmoreland widely regarded as the general who was busted for also lost his only run for political office, lost his libel suit amongst his reputation. it was a sad ending for a man who for most of his life and career have returned existence.

general westmoreland lived a long life afflict it by alzheimer's disease for at least the last decade. he delayed in july 2005 and was buried at west point in the grave he has selected while he was superintendent there. but the final irony, given westmoreland very strong and vocal opposition to the admission of women to westmoreland, the cadet honor guard for the ceremony was commanded them. ably by female cadet officers. thank you very much. i'll be glad to entertain your questions. [applause] anybody want to start? >> yes, sir.

>> yes, ma'am, please. >> you've given us a very colorful, interesting psychological analysis of general westmoreland, to my question has to do with the sociological organization one. >> yes. >> i didn't hear about the role of the commander-in-chief or his supervisors in the military. weren't there some responsibility they are? that has that changed now? i mean, could you compare that with where we are in 2011? >> that's a very good first question. i thank you for it. "time" magazine has a signature rocket towards which i responded to in posted on their website. they asked me if i thought the subtitle is fair. and i said it was imminently fair and i explained why and i covered much of that here i think. the primary reason being the latitude that general westmoreland had to decide how to fight the war in his

relentless pursuit of an unavailing approach to the conduct of the war. but the next question was, did she think the subtitle is fair, who are the other co-conspirators? as a good question and it's pretty much what you're asking, too. so i can i say that a lot of candidates for the top tier of this. they are tonight described. pete lyndon johnson, president and commander-in-chief, robert mcnamara, secretary of defense and general wheeler who was chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. and so i try to explain why general westmoreland was allowed to be commander of vietnam for so long with so many people thought he was not achieving the success that he was claiming. i have quoted any number of them here. general bruce palmer, a four-star general who was westmoreland's who came in as

deputy succeeded in. general fred wyant who was a three-star commander and later also became the chiefs of staff intrapersonal tables didn't and many, many others who thought that this was not work. and so, you have to say, why was he allowed to continue? and it's hard to explain that. it should have happened that way. a partial explanation at least has to reside in an examination of the people above him who had the authority to replace a more direct him to conduct this operation in a different manner. so you start with lyndon johnson. in my estimation, no knowledge of military affairs and general and in many ways rather use as well. secretary of defense, robert to merit the same. no real knowledge of military affairs. so then we get too general or wheeler. in my estimation, wheeler was a major part of the weekend, very

little command experience and none in combat. he seemed to endorse westmoreland's idea that firepower and thrashing about the jungles of the way to conduct this work. so he was know-how. i speculate -- i go further than not. i assert these three main people in the chain of command who had the authority that goes into use it to direct them to do something different than what they were doing lacked the knowledge and even the confidence to do that. but there were others who are working hard to try to achieve the object is that i believe should have been sought. one of the most import i prefer to shut or else k. johnson. during the four years, general johnson was the army chief of staff. early on he can did a proven study, that stands for

pacification and long-term development of vietnam. and the study said, what general westmoreland is doing is not working and cannot work and the reason is it's ignoring the situation in the villages where the covert infrastructure was dominating the populace. and so proven fact, here's the real way to fight the war. and that's exactly what general abrams did when he took command in the spring of 1968. he implemented the study. in the present study said in instead of a war of attrition, this is a war population security. instead of search and destroy operations, will conduct clear and hold operations in the hold was provided by much of grated territorial forces that the south vietnamese given the m-16 rifle first priority that general westmoreland would never give them in the measure of merit now is not a decal.

its population security. it's very important and significant, i believe, that buyout of 1966 at the latest, the two senior officers in charge of the two forces are fighting a ground war, general harold k. johnson chief of staff of the army and general wallace scream commandant of the marine corps agreed to westmoreland's approach was wrong and on the viable alternative. the alternative prescribed by both. general johnson trade hard to get this proven approach some interest in some support in the joint chiefs of staff. he didn't make much progress there with earle wheeler in charge in his commitment to firepower, that didn't go anywhere. the study was briefed to general westmoreland. he rejected out of hand, probably not too surprising. an officer of that day made her

chamber were very well-known and successful writer about the war in vietnam said he was a staff officer assigned to write westmoreland's response to the proven study. he said we ought, needing to step up is that this is great, but we were not allowed to say that. we had to say there's good ideas here for study and were already doing many of these things and so on so that did not go anywhere and tell as i the commanders changed. that is why i said in the course of my remarks that general westmoreland is the general who lasted the more is that he basically squandered four years of support for war in vietnam. and even though in the latter. after he was succeeded for a war in vietnam. and even though in the latter. after he was succeeded for a war in vietnam. and even though in the latter. after he was succeeded things went much better near the end of congress and probably the people and support for the war and even when we were just given the

money they were motivated to pull the plug. you asked me about the current situation. i'm not very well qualified to comment on that. you are looking at a genuine dinosaur. i occupied myself a night for 30 years thinking about the period 1962 night 1875. and while i have the general awareness that any use in this newspaper has about the situation now in iraq and afghanistan, i can't profess to any particular expertise there. i will say in the early and latter years of our involvement in iraq, we did seem to see a similar pattern in that the early commanders commanders one about the war in a way similar to what general westmoreland dead and then we change commanders general david petraeus came in and i think distributor mark abrams like understanding of the nature of

the war and how it should be conduct it. many of you know that when he came back in the period between his service in iraq and service in a guinness and, general petraeus was in for a leavenworth and was tasked with writing a counterinsurgency than although it then be issued by both the army and marine corps. it's a well-done document. if you read it, you'll be amazed at the parallels between prescriptions they are and what general abrams did they later took command. you asked a very fundamental question and i thank you for that. i don't know of us about that. i'll just hang myself with endurance. i can't do that. thank you. other questions? yes, please. >> which you comment on what happened after westmoreland appeared on the cover of time says the man is here because i was out vietnam in 67 and there

was a lot of talk going on about westmoreland running for president and is coming out at mcafee. i don't know if that's in your book or not. it seems to me in retrospect it may have added a great deal to his ego. >> that's a good question. there's little in the book on this. the question has to do with the "time" magazine cover, the first issue of 1966, general westmoreland was on the cover that in a photograph, but in a bus that had sculpted of him for that purpose and if that 1965 men of the year. i see when we began to up forces in vietnam and he is talking even then optimistically about the outcome. there were two earlier biographies of general

westmoreland. the first one is called the inevitable general, written by journalists from baltimore's land whose name is pat ferguson, very good guy. i've talked to him that links. this book was published in 1968, so it was written in 1967, long before the end of westmoreland's career, even before the end of the series in vietnam. you have to ask why was this written at this time? and there's a kernel name paul miles sent to somebody in a sundance especially in his chief of staff. many like those who worked as a scummy estate in touch with him for the rest of his life. paul miles said he always not westmoreland harbored presidential aspirations committee was never able to shake the view that this is a campaign biography. others have said that although

there was the uproar in the summer of 67, that might have called for westmoreland to be reassigned at that time. lyndon johnson may have received the westmoreland how political asked her ration that it was a very can be needed for him to lead and 12 miles away under his command instead of bringing him back where he could join the political hash chains. general bruce palmer said very straightforwardly to me in an interview when he came back from vietnam coming at the presidential aspirations. he talked to me about it. i tried to stay tuned, this wasn't a popular war. as it turned out, he did try, as i describe to become governor of south carolina. he was buried up to the campaigner and even worse in inept manager of the game. there were people in the republican party who thought they may be a viable candidate that they could use to oppose

lyndon johnson a gas in the ottawa 68 elections, but nothing came of that. westmoreland always denied that he had in a presidential aspirations, but i have a lot of confidence in bruce palmer, so i believe he did come up with the situation let anything to come of it. thanks for that. anybody else? >> right here, bob. >> yes, please. >> recently i read h.r. mcmaster specter election of duty. i knew you knew him well, even a stitch or how silly was while he was writing about. and not vote, he lays it on president johnson, secretary mcnamara. and he also said in the crux of my question, he also kept saying every time he saw the joint chiefs of the largely ignored, but every time he saw him, he

said that. now, with that with westmoreland synthesis, what did that have to do with leading to that? because other? or is it something else? >> that's a very fine question. i'll start by saying that enormous maturation and i think that's a wonderfully fine book. i'm glad to see when i go into bookstores and even though it's been out for many years to still see it on the shelves, so it has a long life. here again i've talked about the kinds of things you ask about and basically his book ends before my account begins. in particular, we discussed his take on general johnson referred to several times. i wrote one called honorable warrior and i concluded he was one of the finest officers we ever had in one of the most

honest. for some of the criticisms that h.r. makes a 10 i think are colored by the fact that when potvin makes his appearance in someone might have influenced how h.r. evaluated him. but let's talk about lyndon johnson. i think i didn't have time to cover this in the prepared remarks, but i think you could also say besides the other criticisms have leveled at him, then in the course of conduct, general westmoreland. the reason i say that is in early 1966, february that year, it is a major conference in honolulu, one way of conduct in the wherewith to have conferences periodically at various locations on the president would come sometimes to lyndon johnson came to the conference in honolulu in

february 1966. and westmoreland came from vietnam and so did the two senior vietnamese. president chu and vice president jia says they then were. the point of this conference was to boost american sport for pacification. these are bigger to say westmoreland it toward an intelligence chief ignored him and so on. and so, it's not just lyndon johnson focusing on kill more of a love which has only said that. now he says he's got to get behind pacification efforts are forever going to get out of here. i'm putting words in his mouth, but that's the implication of what he said. so we go back to vietnam with those instructions. in williams the westmoreland says retrospect of late, i was

getting pressure after pressure after pressure to pay more attention to pacification and i wasn't going to do that at the expense of beating off the water against the enemy's main forces. now i don't know how you view that, but that seems like vast insubordination of a higher degree and at worst as commander-in-chief. so, you've asked for evidence of that or we look for evidence of that. one of the details that impressed me greatly and i devote an entire chapter to this is what westmoreland did or did not do with respect to arming the south vietnamese as well as the enemy was armed. look at the m-16 and the fact is he never did anything before that. he was seen as deputy in may of

1967 that the vietnamese began to get any help at all. so i think lyndon johnson was persuaded and i don't know by what's worse is that the pacification after abrams took command, we had the ambassador ellsworth and then charged of support for pacification and they agreed it had to be one war or combat operations, but much change from the big cities. and pacification and upgrading south vietnam's armed forces. and only that way they said could we succeed. >> thank you. could i ask one more? >> to we have time for one more or no? >> short question. in the book, besides johnson mcnamara and wheeler wichita about, mcmaster says that

exerts as mac taylor her was a master at that time over westmoreland also was party to confusing things. let me put it that way. comment? >> there's a lot of things i think could be said about general taylor that maybe don't quite match with the reputation i believe he still enjoyed pretty widely. evert indicated more than once that he was probably westmoreland's most important patron thanks to him, westmoreland reaches the high levels he did including his assignment to vietnam. but i think that maxwell had westmoreland if they didn't have a falling they certainly had a divergent viewpoint. it seems to be documentable that when the first forces -- ground forces came ashore, marine elements of march 1965, taylor as ambassador had no advance notice they are coming and

westmoreland did not enter the taliban and white house do that and didn't hallen. and the pentagon knew that ended tallent piercy was pretty marginalized by that point. but the detailed analysis and evaluation of general taylor's topic for another day. but he was send against as well as sending. ladies and gentlemen, thank you for coming and for the great questions. [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]