he was enroute to speak. he was enroute to seattle to speak at a university there, and he passed away before he got to speak of a heart attack. "roots" was very emotional for mr. haley. what it took from him, he gave back to all the people throughout the world. to be able to look back up on their ancestors. he said he just, he realized after he had quinn -- written "roots," that he had done it for all those who had no one to tell their story. >> is there a nonfiction author or book you'd like to see featured on booktv? send us an e-mail at booktv@cspan.org or tweet us at twitter.com/booktv.

>> next, lewis sorley recounts the story of general westmoreland. mr. sorley speaks at the national archives in washington, d.c. for about an hour. [applause] >> there are many people here who have encouraged and supported me over long years of research and writing. i would like to acknowledge one in particular, former colonel viet who has come from houston to be with us today. viet and i have been friends since 1961 when as captains we were classmates at the armor school at fort knox. viet served bravely and honorably during the long years of the vietnam war including an

assignment as province chief. after the war he and his family came to america where thanks to incredibly hard work and fine family values, they have prospered. viet has also written "steel and blood," an excellent book about armor in the vietnam war. ladies and gentlemen, colonel viet. [applause] as you know, we're going to talk today about the life ask career of general westmoreland. i warn you at the outset, this is not a happy story. but it is, i think, an important, even essential one. my contention is that unless and until we understand william westmoreland, we will never fully understand what happened to us in vietnam or why.

his involvement in the vietnam war was the defining aspect of his life. he himself perceived that and was driven for the rest of his days to characterize, explain, rationalize and defend that role. his memoirs reflect the fixation in a long career totaling 36 years as an officer in a string of postings to increasingly important assignments, the four year he commanded american forces in vietnam and the aftermath constitute virtually the entirety of account. all the rest a meager tenth. understanding westmoreland is not easy. he turns out to be a surprisingly complex man. fueled by ambition, driving himself relentlessly, of impressive military mean,

energetic and skillful at cultivating influential sponsors. from his earliest days of service, he led his contemporaries, was admired and advanced by his seniors and progressed rapidly upward. but few who served with him would claim they really knew this distant and difficult man. general walter kerwin recalled that although they worked very closely together, he and westmoreland never had a personal relationship, never even, he said, a normal conversation as colleagues ordinarily would. you couldn't get to him, friendship and that kind of thing, kerwin remembered. westmoreland had an extraordinary capacity for polarizing the views of those who encountered him, few of who

remained indifferent. his executive officer when westmoreland was army chief of staff described him as the most gracious and gentlemanly person with whom i ever served. and an executive officer westmoreland had in vietnam regarded him as the only man he ever met to whom the term "great" could be applied. there are others, though, many others who held a darker view. among the most prominent was general k. johnson, a man of surpassing goodwill. i don't happen to be a fan of general westmoreland's, said johnson. and i certainly didn't become one as a result the vietnam war or later during his tenure as chief of staff of the army. a general officer who served with westmoreland in vietnam

described him as awed by his own magnificence. westmoreland was born and raised in semi-rural south carolina near spartanburg where his father was manager of a textile mill. an eagle scout at age 15, president of his high school class, first captain at west point, westmoreland was encouraged from the his earliest days to think of himself as specially gifted and specially privileged. his father wrote to him at west point during his plebe year saying, you do not know how happy and proud it makes us all to know that you are making good even the small buys and negroes are interested and proud of it. and later during that same period he wrote to him again and said, when you need anything, write me, and i will send it to

you. there is nothing too good for you. and a subsequent letter, still doing west moreland's plebe year as a cadet at west point. when people here, said his father, white and black think you are about the biggest man in the country. roosevelt has no act at all compared to you. they really believe you will be president of the u.s. someday and talk this among themselves. westmoreland entered world war ii in the ninth infantry division taking his unit into combat in north africa. there they performed with distinction earning a presidential unit citation. subsequently, in sicily westmoreland served temporarily under then-brigadier general maxwell taylor of the 8 2nd airborne division, an

association that would become extremely important to westmoreland throughout the rest of his career. after sicily for the rest of world war ii, westmoreland was a staff officer. when the fighting was over, he was given command of an infantry regiment for six months in the army of occupation. then back in the united states westmoreland was able to get an assignment where after attending jump school, he had a hearing command of the 504th parachute infantry regiment and then three years as division chief of staff. then late in the korean war westmoreland took command of the 187 regimental combat team, a unit that constituted the theater reserve and consequently was stationed in japan and periodically deployed to korea. westmoreland commanded the outfit for 15 months.

of which nine months were spent in japan where after he had been promoted to brigadier, he was able to live with his wife and their young first child. and six months of the 15th spent in korea. during one such korean period when they were not in combat, westmoreland desirous of qualifying for the master parachutist badge made 13 jumps in one day. after the war and some scheming on westmoreland's part, the korean won a citation. new brigadier westmoreland experienced his first pentagon duty with an assignment in personnel. i have not served there before, he said, speaking of the pentagon, and i didn't want to serve there then. but soon maxwell taylor became army chief of staff and rescued westmoreland from the personnel

poll timor as making him secretary of the general staff. two years later having in the meantime been promoted to two-star rank, westmoreland was rewarded by taylor with command of the 101st airborne division. things moved quickly for him after that. two years as a division commander were followed by a three-year assignment as superintendent of the united states military academy at west point, then promotioned to lieutenant general and six months in command of the 18th airborne corps. just long enough to qualify him for another promotion soon thereafter. westmoreland was sent to seat that many in january, 1964, as deputy to general paul harkin who was then &ning u.s -- commanding u.s. forces there. and then in june 1964 westmoreland replaced him as u.s. military assistance command vietnam, the start of a four-year estimate in that post

for westmoreland. beginning in the spring of 1965, united states began deploying ground forces. these forces concentrated almost entirely on large unit search and destroy operations primarily in the deep jungle. fixated on these large unit operations which were referred to by many as the war of the big battalions, westmoreland largely ignored other key responsibilities, most importantly the upgrading of south vietnam's military forces and dealing with pacification. his way of war did nothing to effect the situation in south vietnam's hamlets and villages where the enemy's covert infrastructure was left free to continue using coercion and terror to dominate the rural populace.

meanwhile, westmoreland deprived them of weaponry giving the u.s. and allies priority of the new m-16 rifle. the south vietnamese deaths went for years equipped with world war ii vicinity am equipment while being outgunned by the communists who were provided the great ak-47 assault rifle and other advanced equipment by their backers, the soviet union and communist china. it is very important to know that it was left to westmoreland to devise his own approach to conduct the war. the conventional view of the war, even now, is that it was micromanaged from washington. there are many stories of how, as we all know, lyndon johnson's white house the famous tuesday lunches and so on, he and other topmostly civilian officials

would even select and approve individual bombing targets in north vietnam and things like that. but those decisions had to do with actions taken outside south vietnam. within south vietnam, the u.s. commander had very wide latitude in deciding how to fight the war. this was true for westmoreland and equally true for his eventual successor. this was not, this latitude was not a good thing. there were many weaknesses in this strategy, he said, which in numerous interrelated ways played into the hands of the enemy. for one, chasing around the countryside was futile. general phillip davidson, westmoreland's chief intelligence officer, said that westmoreland's interests always lay in the big unit war. pacification bored him. and, said davidson, the search

and destroy operations favored by westmoreland accomplished little in providing the secure environment which pacification required. the measure of merit in a war of attrition was body count. westmoreland underestimated the enemy's staying power, calculating that if he could inflict enough casualtieses on the communists, they would lose heart and cease their aggression against south vietnam. instead the enemy proved willing to absorb enormous losses and still keep fighting. thus, the progress that westmoreland claimed in racking up huge body counts did nothing to win the war. the enemy simply kept sending more and more replacements to make up its losses. westmoreland was on a treadmill. westmoreland also overestimated the american people's patience and tolerance of friendly

losses. on a visit to south vietnam, senator hollings from westmoreland's home state of south carolina was told by westmoreland, we're killing these people, the enemy, at a ratio of 10 to 1. said hollings, westie, the american people don't care about the ten, they care about the one. westmoreland department get it. his response to any problem was to request more troops. the result was a buildup of u.s. contingent of ground forces that eventually reached well over half a million men. but when the troop requests kept coming with no evident progress in the winning of the war, washington's patience finally ran out. in the spring of 1967, westmoreland asked for 200,000 more troops but got only a fraction of that amount.

at the time he stated publicly that he was delighted with the outcome. but in his memoirs decided instead that he had been extremely disappointed. later still on the witness stand in a libel trial suit he brought against cbs television, he changed his stance again and said he had not been extremely disappointed. in response to cbs attorney read from west more lapp's own book, extremely disappointed, forcing westmoreland to recant. and then land in the wake of the endmy's 1963 tet offensive, westmoreland asked for another 206,000 troops, a request he then spent years denying he had ever made, but he did. he got just token forces and was soon on his way home. it is clear that westmoreland thought he could take the war

over from the south vietnamese, bring it to a successful conclusion, then hand their country back to them and go home in glory. but he could not. ambassador ellsworth bunker saw that this was the case, concluding that when the united states first got involved, the political and psychological nature of the war was not understood. and, he said, because we didn't understand it our military thought we could get in and do the job and get out much more quickly than proved to be the case. i think, said bunker, that's one reason we were slow in training the vietnamese instead of starting really to train them in an intensive way when we first went in there. we department begin -- we didn't begin to train the vietnamese with the objective of their taking over from us until general abrams got there. this disparity in resources, especially weapons, persisted throughout west more lapp's tenure in vietnam.

ambassador bunker noted it in a reporting cable to the president on 29, february, 1968. only weeks before westmoreland's departure after his four years in command. said bunker, the enemy has been able to equip his troops with increasingly sophisticated weapons. they are in general better equipped than the army forces a fact which has an adverse bearing on morale. westmoreland has had been this command of the u.s. forces for nearly four years and maintained he had done everything possible to build up the south vietnamese. another ambassador of the time, general maxwell taylor, now, i think, wearying of his sponsorship of westmoreland was even more blunt. we never really paid anticipation to the arvin army, he said. we department give a damn about them -- we didn't give a damn about them. not until general abrams came on

the scene did this attitude change. 1967 was a fateful time in the westmoreland's vietnam service. everyone agrees that 1968 was a fateful year. 1967 was equally so. during that year westmoreland made three trips to the united states where in public appearances he gave a very optimistic assessment of how the war was going, and this became part of what was, came to be called the johnson administration's progress offensive. very, very encouraged, said westmoreland in a planeside press conference upon arriving in the u.s. in november. i've never been more encouraged during my swire almost four -- my entire almost four years in country. and at the national press club he asserted that we have reached an important point where the end begins to come into view. and, he sad added -- he added, the endmy's hopes are bankrupt.

on another visit that year he spoke to a joint session of congress rendering another optimistic report and being so taken with the experience that he later described it as the most memorable moment in his military career and his fine e hour -- finest hour which gave him the greatest personal satisfaction. i must say i find it both ironic and sad that a famous general finds a political event the most satisfying of his military career. 1967 was also a time of vigorous debate about the enemy's order of battle which means his strength and organization. westmoreland denied senior civilian officials accurate data by imposing a ceiling on the number of enemy forces his intelligence officers could report or agree to and by personally removing from the order of battle entire categories that had long been

included, thus falsely portraying progress in reducing enemy strength. by may of 1967, president johnson was referring to the war as a bloody impasse. military historian russell whitely commented succinctly on lbj: no capable war president, he wrote, would have allowed an officer of such limited capacities as general william c. westmoreland to command our forces for so long. meanwhile, westmoreland challenged by newsmen on his on optimistic pronouncements resorted to his familiar reliance on body count. we are bleeding him a great deal more than he is bleeding us, said westmoreland. westmoreland sought to portray the year of 1967 as a triumphant one during which he was winning the war. [inaudible]

1967 was characterized by accelerating efforts and growing success in all phases of endeavors. that was not, though, how he or his performance were seen by others. general bruce palmer was by then serving as deputy commanding general of the u.s. army, vietnam, and when general abrams arrive inside may of that year -- arrived in if may of that year, general palmer told him he really had basic disagreements with westie on how it was organized and how we were doing it. and later general palmer elaborated on those views in an interview with journalist mark perry. said palmer, it was just a mess. we were losing and trying to put it together, and it just wasn't working. there wasn't anything that was working. in late summer of 1967 ambassador ellsworth bunker submitted this assessment. we still have a long way to go. much of the country is still in vc hands, the enemy can still

shell our bases and commit acts of terrorism in the securest areas. vc units still launch large-scale attacks, and a vs infrastructure still exists throughout the country. that was what westmoreland had to show for three years in command of u.s. forces. by the end of 167 -- 1967, remembered nicholas catsenbeck, a grim sense of siege was descending on the white house. finally, even general william depue, architect of the search and destroy concept and approach to the war admitted that it was a losing concept. we ended up, he said, after it was all over with no operational plan that had the slightest chance of ending the war favorably. in the face of this united opposition to this way of war, westmoreland maintained then and

later that the north vietnamese, the enemy, in mid 1967 were in a position of weakness. this is the saddest result of all, of many years of research on these matters. there were many instances including and especially concerning matters in vietnam where westmoreland had been handgun to shade or mis-- willing to shade or deny the record when his perceived interests were at risk. one episode involving his lack of confidence in the marine leadership is both illustrative and revealing. shortly before the tet offensive began in january 1968, westmoreland decided to send his deputy north to establish and run a tactical headquarters that he designated forward. from there general abrams was to

control the operations of all u.s. forces in the area including those of the marine corps and, of course, the army. west more lapp's chief intelligence officer, phillip davidson, had returned to a visit to quezon, a remote outpost garrisoned by the marines and briefed westmoreland on the situation there. the description of the unprotected installations and the general lack of preparation to withstand heavy concentrations of artillery and mortar fire, he said, agitated general westmoreland. finally, he turned to his deputy and said something to the effect that he had lost confidence in marine general cushman's ability to handle the increasingly threatening situation. his response was to set up forward and send abrams up to take command. marine reaction was predictable. one division commander called in the most unpardonable thing that

saigon did and said that marines viewed it with shock and astonishment. westmoreland soon held a press conference in which he denied that any loss of confidence in marine leadership had been his reason for placing the new headquarters over them. westmoreland also cabled marine general cushman to say there has been extensive backgrounding here in saigon with the various news bureau chiefs to point out that establish of mac v forward carried no stigma whatsoever with respect to the marines, that it was merely a normal military practice and that it was only temporary. unfortunately, only the temporary was true. the other denials were false as evidenced not only by general david soften's eyewitness account, but also by a lengthy and anguished cable westmoreland had sent contemporaneously to general earl wheeler, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. as you perhaps appreciated, he

began, the military professionalism of the marines falls far short of the standards that should be demanded by our armed forces. indeed, they are brave and proud, but their standards, tactics and lack of command supervision throughout their ranks requires improvement in the national interests. and there was more. i would be less than frank, added west more lan, if i did not say that i feel somewhat insecure with the situation in the province in view of my knowledge of their short shortc. without question many lives would be saved if their tactical professionalism were enhanced. after the war when the marines were writing their history of the conflict, they sent a draft of the 1968 volume to westmoreland for comment. he marked it up so extensively and took issue with so many of the judgments rendered that he was invited to discuss the whole matter in person.

he accepted. and in a selling with a firm of marine -- in a session with a number of marine corps historians again insisted with regard to establishment that that particular action had not a damn thing to do with my confidence this general cushman or the marines, not a damn thing. this was not only false, but giving the existing paper trail reckless in the extreme. westmoreland racked up a lengthy record of false, misleading and inaccurate statements or omissions ranging from a finish. [inaudible] to a closure on base and to a prediction of the early end of the war to light at the end of the tunnel. some of these matters were petty, others of crucial importance, but they were alike in one respect. when westmoreland saw his personal interests at stake, he did not hesitate to conceal or

abandon the truth. when at the end of january 1968 an enemy tet offensive began, westmoreland's long term at bat was nearing an end. "newsweek" magazine described in a devastating measure of how far he had fallen. in november, they said, when he was conjuring up the light at the end of the tunnel, he was affectionately called westie. but by last week he was general westmoreland in most official and unofficial briefings. the tet resurgence of enemy forces led many to conclude that in his optimistic forecasts of the previous year westmoreland had either not known what he was talking about or had not level with the the american people. it is hard to know which is the more devastating criticism. what was clear, however, was that with his unavailing

approach to conduct of the war, westmoreland had band anderred -- squandered four years of support for the war by much of the american people, the congress and even the media. for the next four years, westmoreland served as army chief of staff. the army of that day was struggling with many problems, some a result of the ongoing war in vietnam, others more societal in origin. ..

and he added are had too much to occupy me to get into the details have such matters as army reorganization. i frankly evaluating the priorities of my time gave high priority to go around the country and giving them the facts of life with respect to the military. during his four years as chief of staff westmoreland gained no more understanding of the war and he had when he was in vietnam. tom foldgard was chased -- stationed in saigon in 1972. they both attended a small function at ambassador bunker's residents when he said i was astonished by his apparent lack

of understanding of what was going on in the war even then. in later years westmoreland viewed himself as very much put upon. might years have been fraught with challenges and frustrations, he said to a hometown audience. nobody has taken more than i have and i am not apologizing for damn thing, nothing. i welcome being the point man. that outlook, no second-guessing of himself and no regrets persisted through the end of his life. as army chief of staff and beyond westmoreland made strenuous effort to shape the historical record in ways favorable to his version of reality. this included writing his memoirs. when they were published kevin buckley of newsweek bureau chief in saigon reviewed the book commenting that from the

beginning westmoreland probably expected to write a memoir of victory similar to general eisenhower's crusade in europe and the defeat in vietnam did not deter him from doing this. wrote westmoreland self pityingly as american commander in vietnam under wind many frustrations, endured much interference believed with countless irritations, swallowed many disappointments, bore considerable criticism, previewing this same book the well-known military commentator marshall concluded that westmoreland remains the symbol of the country's most mournful misadventure abroad ever. two major episodes, both extremely traumatic mark the westmoreland retirement years. first was his dramatically

unsuccessful campaign for governor in his native state of south carolina. then there was a failed libel suit against the cbs television network for documentary charging him with manipulation of enemy strength figures while he commanded u.s. forces in vietnam. in each of these cases westmoreland ignored the advice of highly qualified men who had his best interests at heart and who counseled against the courses of action westmoreland took. in the political campaign westmoreland came in second in the republican primary to a state senator who then went on to be elected south carolina's first republican governor since reconstruction. westmoreland said it is hard to shake hands with people who ask people for favors and talk about himself. despite a campaign theme surprising him as the only candidate with proven leadership and administrative ability to carry south carolina to

greatness westmoreland ran a poorly managed campaign that was late getting started, never got out a coherent message and wanda deeply in debt. afterwards westmoreland called it his most humiliating experience. in 1982 cbs television aired a documentary charging westmoreland with having manipulated reports of enemy strength during the vietnam war. westmoreland had willingly participated in making the program being interviewed on camera and asking to be paid for doing so. the resulting broadcast was not favorable to him with numerous former intelligence officers describing how enemy's strength data had been manipulated and howard westmoreland himself had decreed certain whole categories of enemy forces be taken out, artificially driving down a total of enemy forces so as to claim progress in his war of

attrition. against the advice of high-powered attorneys westmoreland brought a libel suit against cbs seeking $120 million in damages. subsequent to the broadcast it came out that its producer had committed numerous violations of cbs guidelines. the basic findings were seen as valid. in the course of a lengthy trial westmoreland was represented by an attorney who had never before tried a case in court and things did not go well. still, the case dragged on for some 18 weeks of testimony. than just days before the case was to have gone to the jury westmoreland withdrew his suit. in exchange he received a statement from cbs which he claims exonerate him and no money. then he said the effort to defame, dishonor and destroy me

and those under my command had been exposed and defeated. i therefore withdrew from the battlefield, all flags flying. editorial opinion was not so favorable. the new york times stated the prevailing reaction. at the end it concluded general westmoreland stood in imminent danger of having the jury confirm the essential proof of the cbs report in court as on the original program, the general could not get past the testimony of high-ranking former subordinates who confirmed his having colored some intelligence information. said one of the jurors to the press on the way out the evidence in favor of cbs was overwhelming. westmoreland's life since vietnam has been miserable, said a for aid. westmoreland himself seems to

have contributed much to that outcome. the vietnam war is my number one priority he told an interviewer some years after his retirement. i tried to spread myself in and visit all sections of the country. but in an assertion completely undermining the meaning and purpose of all those years of incessant, even frantic activity westmoreland told a college audience that in the scope of history vietnam is not going to be a big deal. it won't float to the top as a major endeavor. westmoreland's ultimate failure, it seems to me, would have earned him more compassion had he not personally been so fundamentally to blame for the endless self-promotion that elevated him to positions and responsibilities beyond his capacity. it the aggressive guy who gets his share he maintained, that principle applies to most

anything. that is the way he operated. in later years westmoreland widely regarded as a general who lost his work also lost his only run for political office, lost his libel suit and lost his reputation. it was a sad ending for a man who for most of his life and career had led a charmed existence. general westmoreland lived a long life. afflicted by alzheimer's disease for release to the last decade he died in july of 2005 and was buried at west point in a grave he had selected while he was superintendent there. as a final irony, given westmoreland's strong and vocal opposition to the admission of women to west point the cadet honor guard for the ceremony was commanded and very ably by a female cadet officer.

thank you very much. i will be glad to entertain questions. [applause] anybody want to start? >> yes. >> please. >> you have given as a colorful, interesting psychological analysis of general westmoreland but my question has to do with the sociological or organizational one. it and hear about the role of the commander-in-chief or his supervisors in the military bore some responsibility and has that changed now? could you compare that with

where we are in 2011? >> a very good first question. i thank you for it. time magazine sent me some interrogatories which i responded to and posted on there website. they asked me if i thought the subtitle was fair. i said it was. general westmoreland had to decide to fight the war and his relentless pursuit of -- the next question was if you think the subtitle is fair, are the other co-conspirators? that was a good question and pretty much what you are asking too. i began by saying there are a lot of candidates for the top tier of fella miscreants. i described three. lyndon johnson, president and commander-in-chief, robert mcnamara, secretary of defense and general earl wheeler who for

long period of time was chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. i tried to explain why general westmoreland was commander of vietnam for so long when so many people saw that he was not achieving the success that he was claiming. i quoted any number of them here. general bruce palmer, a four star general at west point, general abrams who came in as his deputy and succeeded him. general fred weiss who was a three stock commander and became -- general davidson and many others who saw that this was not working. so you have to say why was he allowed to continue? and it is hard to explain. it shouldn't have happened that way but a partial explanation has to reside in an examination of the people above him who had the authority to replace him or direct him to conduct its

operations in a different manner. you start with lyndon johnson. in my estimation no knowledge of military affairs in general and in many ways rather obtuse as well. secretary of defense robert mcnamara the same. no real knowledge of military affairs. so that we get to general earl wheeler and in my estimation he was a major part of the problem. essentially a staff officer, low command experience and none in combat and seemed to endorse westmoreland's idea that firepower was the way to conduct this war. so he was no help. i expect to light -- i assert that these three people in the chain of command who had the authority to replace westmoreland or direct him to do something different than what he was doing lacked the knowledge and even the confidence to do

that. but there were others who were working hard to achieve the objective that i believe should have been -- one of the most important i referred to as general harold johnson. in the same four years westmoreland commanded in vietnam general johnson was the army chief of staff and early on he conducted a study known as the provin, which said what general westmoreland is doing is not working and cannot work and the reason is ignoring the situation where the enemy's covert infrastructure was dominating. so provin said this is the way to fight the war and this is what general abrams did when he

fought the war in spring of 1968. he implemented the provin study at the provin study said the war of attrition, this has to be a war of population security. instead of search and destroy we will conduct clear and hold operation and the hold was provided by territorial forces of the south vietnamese given the first priority general westmoreland would never give them and the measure of merit is not by accounting the population secured. it is important significant that by the autumn of 1966 at the latest the two senior officers in charge of the two forces that were fighting the ground war, general johnson of the chief of staff of the army and general wallace green, commandant of the marine corps agreed that westmoreland's approach was wrong and the alternative was

prescribed by provin. general johnson tried hard to get the provin approach some support in the joint chiefs of staff. he didn't make much progress with earl wheeler in charge of his commitment to fire power. that didn't go anywhere. the study was briefed to general westmoreland who rejected it out of hand. probably not too surprising. the officer of the day named burke chandler, later well-known and successful writer about the war in viet nam said he was a staff officer assigned to right westmoreland's response to the provin study. we all thought this was great but we were not allowed to say is that. we had to say there are some good ideas here for study and we are already doing many of these things and so on so that did not go anywhere until the commanders change. that is why i said in the course

of my remarks that the reason general westmoreland is the general who lost the vietnam war was he basically squandered four years of support for our war in vietnam and even though in the latter period after he was succeeded things went much better mirror the end and probably the people just ran out of patience and support for the war even when we were just given the money. they were motivated to pull the plug. you asked me about the current situation. i am not very well qualified to comment on that. you are looking at a genuine dinosaur. i have occupied myself day and night for 30 years thinking about 1960-1975. while i have the general awareness anybody reads the newspapers has about the

situation in iraq and afghanistan, i can't profess to any particular expertise. i will say that in the early and later years of our involvement in iraq we see a similar pattern in that early commanders went about the war in a way similar to what general westmoreland did and when we change commanders, general david petraeus came in and i think exhibited a more abrams like understanding of the nature of the war and, should be conducted. many of you know that when he came back in the period between his service and iraq and his service in afghanistan general david petraeus was in fort leavenworth and tasked with writing a new counterinsurgency manual that would be issued by the army and the marine corps. is a well done document and if you read it you will be amazed at the parallels between the prescriptions there and the provin study and what general abrams said when he later took command. that is a long answer but you

ask the fundamental question. i thank you for that. i don't know enough about that. i would hang myself with ignorance. i can't do that. other questions? yes please. >> would you comment on what happened after westmoreland appeared as a man of the year on the cover of time? i was in vietnam in 67 and there was a lot of talk about westmoreland running for president and it was coming out and i don't know if that is in your book or not but it seems to me in retrospect that that may have added a great deal to is ego. >> that is a good question. the question has to do with -- the time magazine cover, first issue of 1966 general

westmoreland was on the cover not a photograph but in a bust that had been sculpted of him for that purpose and it said 1965 man of the year. that is the year we were building of forces in vietnam and even then he was talking optimistically about the outcome. there are two earlier biographies of general westmoreland. the first one is called the inevitable general. is written by a journalist from the baltimore sun his name is pat ferguson. a very good guy and i talked to him at length. this book was published in 1968 so it was written in 1967. long before the end of westmoreland's career and before the end of his service in vietnam so you have to ask why was this book written at this

time. there's a kernel known to some people in this audience who was very close to general westmoreland especially in his chief of staff period and unlike many of those who worked as aids to westmoreland he stayed in touch with him for the rest of his life. called miles said he always kept a 15 harbored presidential aspirations and that he was never able to shake his view that this was the campaign biography. others have said that although there was the uproar in the summer of '67, that might have called for westmoreland to be reassigned at that time lyndon johnson may have perceived that westmoreland had political aspirations and it is a very convenient thing for him to leave him 12,000 miles away and under his command instead of bringing him where he could join the political season. general bruce palmer said very straightforwardly to me in an interview when westie came back from vietnam he had presidential aspirations.

he talked to me about it and i tried to say to him, this wasn't a popular war. as it turned out to be deleted try to become governor of south carolina. he was a very inept campaigner and even worse and it -- in and manager of his campaign. there were people in the republican party who thought he might be a viable candidate if they cannot close lyndon johnson in the autumn of 68 elections but nothing came of that. westmoreland always denied that he had presidential aspirations but i have a lot of confidence that bruce plummer -- i believe he did. the situation never allow anything to come. thanks for that. anybody else? >> right here. recently i read h r mcmasters's book dereliction of duty. you knew him well and he stayed

at your house when he was writing the book. in that book, he really lays it on president johnson and secretary mcnamara and he also said -- the crux of my question, he kept saying -- every time he saw the joint chiefs, largely ignored but every time he saw him he said that. with westmoreland's emphasis on body count, what did that have to do with leading to that? the cause of it? or is it somehow -- >> very fine question and i will start by saying i have enormous admiration for h r mcmasters. that is a wonderfully fine book and i am glad to see when i go into bookstores even though it has been out for many years you see it on the shelves.

it has a long life. we talked about what you asked about many times. basically his book ends before my count begins. in particular we discussed his take on general johnson who i refer to several times, wrote a biography of general johnson called hon. warrior and i concluded he was one of the finest officers we ever had and one of the most modest. some of the criticisms h r makes in his book, i think are colored by the fact that he covered a later period when provin makes its appearance and so on might have influenced how it are evaluated him. let's talk about lyndon johnson. i didn't have time to cover this in the prepared remarks but i think you could also say the other criticisms are leveled at

him that in the course of his conduct to the war general westmoreland was guilty of macrodisobedience. i say that because in early 1966, february of that year there was a major conference in honolulu. one way of conducting the war was to have conferences periodically at various locations and the president would come sometimes and lyndon johnson came to the conference in honolulu in february of 1966 and westmoreland came from vietnam and so did the two senior vietnamese. the point of this conference was to boost american support for pacification. which you already heard me say westmoreland ignored. pacification bored him and so on. is not just lyndon johnson

focusing -- lots of times when he said that but now he is saying we have got to get behind pacification efforts if we're ever going to get out of here. i am putting words in his mouth but that is the implication of what he said. so we go back to vietnam with those instructions and william c. westmoreland says retrospectively i was getting pressure after pressure after pressure to pay more attention to pacification and i wasn't going to do that at the expense of leading off the war against the enemy's main forces. i don't know how you view that but that seems at best insubordination of a high degree and at worst disobedience of orders from his commander in chief. so you ask for evidence of that we look for evidence of that,

one of the details that impressed me greatly and i devotes an entire chapter to this is what westmoreland did or did not do with respect to arming the south vietnamese at least as well as the enemy was armed. i look at the m-16 rifle as an example and it wasn't until abrams came on the scene as deputy in may of 1967 that the vietnamese began to get any help at all. so i think lyndon johnson was persuaded and i don't know by what sources that pacification was important. after abrams took command we had this magnificent team. one charged the embassy, abrams in charge of the embassy -- they agreed it had to be one work of combat operations but much change from the big sweep and pacification and upgrading south

vietnam's armed forces and only that way could we succeed. >> could i ask one more? >> we have time for one more or no? short question. >> in the book besides johnson, mcnamara and wheeler, you talk about mcmaster says max taylor who was the ambassador at that time over westmoreland also was party to confusing things. let me put it that way. any comment? >> there are a lot of things that could be said about general taylor that maybe don't quite match his reputation he still enjoys pretty widely. i have indicated more than once he was probably westmoreland's most important patron and thanks to him westmoreland reached the high levels he did including his

assignment to vietnam but i think maxwell taylor and westmoreland didn't have a falling out. they had a divergence of view.. seems to be documentable that when the first ground forces came ashore marine elements in march of 1965, taylor had no advance notice they were coming and westmoreland knew that and didn't tell anyone and the white house knew that and didn't tell him and the pentagon knew that and didn't tell him. he was pretty marginalized by that point. that detailed analysis and evaluation of general tyler's popularity is a topic for the other day. he was in the against as well and i will leave it at that. take you very much for coming. it was a great pleasure. [applause]