[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> no discussion of the arab spring protests, the carnegie endowment for international peace hosted this form with the

former geordie ambassador to the u.s. and middle east scholars jon alterman and marina ottaway talk specifically about how the arab monarchies of bahrain are dealing with pro-democracy movements in their countries. this is an hour and 25 minutes. >> i am very pleased to be moderating the session today. the session is on arab monarchies and how they confronted or dealt with the third spring or awakening. we have a distinguished panel with us. and this is part of a research project that is a merging of the kerr-mcgee paper and a few weeks, exactly on the topic of arab monarchies in the air of spring. the authors of this paper, dr. marwan muasher and that her ottaway.

let me introduce them as author commentator for today, dr. jon alterman. marwan muasher is vice president for studies at the carnegie endowment, in charge of carnegie's middle east work here in beirut is known to assure all of you previously as vice president of the world bank and deputy prime minister previously in jordan and prime minister company react to it than having the reform agenda in jordan and also previously very much involved in the arab peace initiative in the arab-israeli peace process. and marina ottaway is an associate the carnegie program and has written widely on political reform, political change in the arab world and africa and the balkans and elsewhere as many books and studies. our commentator for today, good friend jon alternate. correction, his name is not jon

mccain. he wanted to be just jon alterman. it's not short for anything. thomas also publicly well-known to many of you, the director and senior fellow at the middle east program at csi is here in d.c. and served as a member of the policy planning staff at the u.s. department of state and he's a member currently of the chief of naval operations executive panel and also an expert on the iraq study group and writes widely on its affairs. the topic of today sure is on the mind of many of you from when the events of the arab world just began and most of the events seem to be in the arab republics. but it's interesting the array are republics that passed most into trouble with the republics which we are trying to turn into monarchies, so harvard is trying to give power. i will start right away and give

the floor to dr. muasher. dr. muasher and dr. ottaway will have 15 minutes each and then we'll have some comments from jon and then go to the audience for q&a. >> thank you, paula. the idea that arab monarchies come introduced to reform or receipt of the republican regimes is a very popular idea, particularly here in the west. tonight justifiably so. this is because arab monarchies in general and there are eight of them to enjoy a degree that is not funded republican regimes. and the notion is that arabs can introduce the world from above and not risk leaving power at the end of the reform process, but manage it from above.

i would like to characterize in a simplistic way arab governments or countries into two categories other than monarchies and republics. in my category as we will have time and those whose time is that. on those who have time, i think arab monarchies for the most part fall within the categories of countries to do that sometime. however, also in my view is a double-edged sword because time can be used by regimes to argue that it can be exploited in a serious and sustained reform process that is managed from above and in such a manner, go through a smooth and orderly transition and not risk introducing great shocks to assist them.

wartime can be used by regimes to argue that since they are not witnessing the kind of process that are in other arab countries that they don't have to do anything. and this is in my view that more worrying and concerning issue, which is bad arab governments that do have time, whether they are internalizing the notion that what is happening in the arab world is profound and that they need to use the time wisely if they do not want to get ahead of them in an uncontrolled way. >> and so, i think with the paper that will come out shortly will show is that the potential reform in arab monarchies is still very high. in fact, with the exception may be aspiring, which does seem to be in real trouble and reform

from above is becoming more and more difficult by the day. if the political will exists among arab monarchies in arab monarchs two-liter reform process from above, they are capable to do so. so far, the paper will also conclude that why we have seen reforms insert your monarchies that are meaningful, so far existing comprehensive reform process that leads into power-sharing and the serious distribution among the three branches of government so far is yet to be filled. as you can look at countries from morocco on wednesday, maybe to buy rating on the other and other countries in between, there are serious -- there are meaningful reforms that have been introduced or at least, it's with varying degrees, but

none of them so far to the comprehensive sustained conclusive process that if a citizen the end resulted in a serious distribution of power in those countries. with that, i was like she turned my attention to jordan, the country i am most familiar with and marina will talk about morocco in some of the other states. in jordan, the reform so far and in particular as a response to the uprisings of this year, has also been so far peace made and not comprehensive. they can do to point to committee for national dialogue whose principal object move was to introduce a new electoral law, something that is very key to reform as they will indicate

any constitutional amendment any constitutional amendment any constitutional amendment any constitutional amendment 42 articles of the constitution, which have been now and not to than to live after being approved by both houses. the monarchy in jordan is not under attack as i have indicated also earlier. it is seen as a security blanket for all jordanians of all ethnic origins, and palestinian origin, but having said that, there are serious demand in the country for changes within the regime, rather they had demand for regime change. and these changes within the regime are demands that has so far reached the king himself and the powers that the king. i need to also point out here

and that is not particular to jordan, also, that there are basically no demand in the country for a constitution -- that a place to morocco as well. in other words, no one talks about and that will result in the king beating constitution monarch a law in britain because the king in jordan you can argue the king's powers are included in the constitution. so no one is talking about a king that does not have powers. in fact, i think all of the groups in jordan wanted the king to have powers, but they wanted changes to the way the system governs. there is now an increasing complaint against the role of intelligence services in the

country, a role that has become way too intrusive in a row that where the intelligence services are seen to be the actual government in place and not the form of government. there are multiple lines in jordan. people like to decide to let people like to decide to let people like to decide to let to the palestinians and point out that in fact to the palestinians and point out that in fact most of the process that has been going on now are from the east jordanians, not the palestinians. i personally think there are multiple lines of this is too simplistic a division. i think just as you can talk about east jordanians and palestinians can you can talk about the heaven hath not in the urban rural areas and the demand are valid as well. from political demands calling for an end to corruption, calling for rescinding the role of the intelligence services

through parliament and other such redistribution of power, but they're also economy demands better range from a more adequate but distribution to increase salaries and increased subsidies, et cetera. and dare i think one characteristic of jordan is that there is still an ongoing debate of who is a jordanian in the country. in 67 years after independence, the country has not yet defined who is a jordanian. there is no rational debate going on. any time this debate is taught about, people become extremely emotional, extremely irrational about it. these jordanians feel that the easter danian identities will be certain to lose by giving palestinians or gene demands more representation in parliament. jordanians of palestinian origin

are not represented. and as such, any talk about reform in the country, which must start in my view within you elect torah law faces this big problem of an honest, you know, a discussion and definition of who is a jordanian. in any other country, those who have the nationality of the country are national. in jordan that is not so. legally it is the case, but in the minds of people and in the electoral laws and all the legal environments come in it does not suggest that people are treated in the same way just because they hope jordanian nationality. there has been important introductions made with the new political -- constitutional amendments. we do have a new or will have a

new constitutional courts to interpret the constitution. the amendments now call for independent electoral commission, something which tunisians have proved to be an extremely effective way of carrying out election status in trusting them with the minister of interior. the government now has limits as to issue a temporary love, as to the solution of parliament and civil liberties have all been -- not all, the civil liberties have been enhanced in the country. but of course having said that, other events in very limited reforms regarding the king's power, the kings basically powered in the country have not been immune amendments. an economic reform has been in my view, almost no reform done since the uprisings.

the budget deficit in the country has reached an unsustainable level, more than a hundred% before grants. and even with grants and with substantial grants from saudi arabia and from the west, the government deficit is still over 6%. very high unemployment, the official figure is 13%. the other figures might be much higher. a very large public debt has exceeded the legal limit of 60% of gdp. so the country has serious economic problems. of course that the uprising and the tendency to sort of sitcom to populace demands that increase salaries and subsidies in things that the country just cannot sustain, the country is going to face come you know serious economic problem dealing with these uprisings. and there comes the issue of the gcc membership promised by the

gcc countries to include jourdan in the gcc and local cooperation and they're of course the promise is going to be more jobs were jordanian and therefore rising from jordanians coming back from the polls, lower unemployment and deployments of more grandson for any coming from the gcc country. the question today in jordan, whereas this membership would have not been contested at all, let's say 10 years ago, today the public is questioning this membership in asking that what prices are coming. is this sort of pride to slow down the face of reform in the

country or what is it and why did it come now? in general, i think as i said a country still needs a long-term package of court reform that the constitutional amendment has an important first step that cannot be the end of the road. and i such a long-term strategy needs to be developed and has not been developed yet by the government clearly i think jordanians want the king to lead the reform process. clearly there are no demand for the king to step aside with the monarchy to step aside. they want the king to lead the process, that they want serious measures in order to do that in a remain mixed about whether the amendment so far have gone far enough in introducing these reforms. the old habit in jordan of changing frequent changes to the government no longer works.

today, people are criticizing directly rather than criticizing just the government. and of course, the king has indicated that in two or three years he would like to see the government of from parliament. that is, you know, yet to be seen because so far the elect are a lot even with the amendments made to them is not going to result in a political party based parliament. i will not do so before sometime in the country. the king even if he wants to is going to find it very significant to choose a prime minister from parliament if it is not political party base. as such, it's going to be increasing beyond him to bridge the credibility gap, which today is increasing between the

republic rather than entrusting government with doing so. it will have a political party of culture and government conservative responsibility on this government where much of that will rest on the king's shoulders in the foreseeable future. let me stop with that. >> okay, thank you very much, for sharing on the context in general and a lot of depth and analysis on the changes taking place in yet to take place in jordan. thank you very much. i turned to the arena. >> thank you. let me start with some remarks with reform. before i look for the keys of

morocco, the process from the top and a sense would be the most variable korean country. a people we have seen what is happening in egyptian we are seeing what happened in libya. we are seen what happens in syria that can lead to a long. the conflict before the country settle down. so it was possible for the government that we are talking about the monarchies to start producing the reforms before this became so overwhelming that they may manage the process and appears to be a win-win situation. the problem that we are seeing is that they seem to be witnessing with the area but at this point, is that unless there is a lot of pressure from the

north, they don't see the incentive or they don't see the entries. as you heard, pretty close power or you have a vast amount of power, wide making your life more complicated by giving such containment with parliament with these political parties and so on. so what we are seen as in many cases and this is not the arab world, monarchies really don't -- or any other government does not try interviews reforms from the top of the most today. in other words they start moving when the domain has been searched. they can manage the process. if you look at the arab monarchies now in the hills of

bahrain, whereas the initial response to the protest in bahrain can situation has come now where it seems clear to me that nothing short of the positions is going to have to set aside a protest. in other words, becoming an equation is losing much of its power, much of this prerogative is not losing its position completely. so if you want an analogy, it's a better situation that we see whenever there is a strike somewhere -- you have the rumblings of the props they are. people know essentially. people who follow these things know that before long there are going to be starving people and

nothing ever is done until the people are actually starving in the streets. i'm in the same way there is the president teared that the monarchies fairly don't move until something is hidden. what is striking at this point is there is a willingness, a willingness to know which characterizes the government of monarchies or disk extreme caution in the reform policies, which martone -- and i will talk about in the cases of morocco. all of these monarchies no. in other words, there is no country, no monarchy, but no other country or government in the arab world that is saying this is not going to -- the kind of the peoples that have shaken other countries cannot take a semi-country. in fact, the signs are quite clear that they are all -- the

monarchies about what is going on in other countries. they are extremely worried. for example in saudi arabia, the population essentially was not rising up in this processing. at the same time it is incredibly high amounts of money to the population, which shows that they are extremely worried about what might happen there. the other paradoxical situation that we see is that why none of the monarchies and particularly the gulf monarchies have introduced the significant reforms of their country. more and more, dare into other countries come to stating they should major reform. but all the arab monarchies vote in favor of the arab league.

they have all coming out telling. they have to make changes. in other words, there seems to be an underwritten theme here that is necessary, but not yet appalled. so it's a very paradoxical reaction with what we have seen. let me talk about two countries. first of all, talking about rocco because morocco in many ways is a really interesting example because then morocco, the king has tried to stay within two weeks on february 20th. they announced a new constitution for you set up a

committee to start the new constitution and then the prosecution came out with a few months to prepare the constitution, so it was presented to the king done, which was probably easily given the fact that it was the representative body by this small community. and the constitution was overwhelmingly approved by the population. i think the moroccan government may have gotten a bit carried away when they announce it was 98.5% of which that kind of saying anything by 1945%. but there is no doubt that the support for the new constitution was relied because people weren't supported the king. the king presented the

constitution. the problem -- so essentially they moved very boldly. the problem is the constitution that was an act did is a very ambiguous constitution. it is a constitution that could lead to the power of the king, could lead not to a constitution of monarchy as the moroccan collar, but could lead to a monarchy with a parliament has substantial power. but it could also read very much into the status quo. there are loopholes in the constitution. they allow the king to essentially maintain a power. and whether or not the king is going to use these loopholes, it is going to depend on how

weather the political parties, whether the parliament allows him to do so. there are good reasons to believe that the parliament probably below the king to maintain all the power. what are the loopholes? the king is keeping for himself areas where he is in charge of the decision. one is the religion, which is not the strange opinion of her makos commander of the people. second as security. that's a fair day's strategic that are the loopholes you can drive the truck because it is so strategic importance is very much in the eyes of the beholder. you know, education is not an area of importance, but there should be a proposal for complete preventing in the country to include the strategic

decision and he is going to mean control of it. so essentially what it means is that the king can maintain control only if anything it wants by declaring something of importance. the question is the political parties. are they going to allow him to do so? or they are going to lose respect if he tries to put sizing this much power as he is done in the past. elections have not taken place. the elections have not been scheduled for november. so we really don't know the election. there are two indications to suggest to me that there is not going to be a what you say act of parliament. there are two main contenders

for india elections. one is a coalition of priorities, which is organized around the party for modernity, which is the frame of that cake. it is somebody who is very close to the king. .. >> there is also responsibility that the party that gets the rally of the vote will be the

party for justice and development to which is the -- which is the islamist. it's a really moderate party, and it's a party that takes the view clearly that the main goal in the election is to complete the legislation essentially of the pjd, to complete the islamist in the political system, a party that is goals to complete integration into the political system. it's probably not going to upset the character too much. it's not going to push too hard. in the end, after all the bold initiative of new constitution and so on, will find a situation com is really much like the one that existed before. why is this a risk?

can say what's wrong with that? it's a risk because there is a lurking in the, you know, in morocco, you have another islamist political organization, that has so far stayed on the sidelines of the political system. it's very much opposed to not only to the constitution that the king presented, the new constitution, but it seems from time to time, it's questioning the legitimacy of the monarchy as a whole. now, nobody nows how much support these organizations have because it has never competed in election because it refuses to see the legitimacy of the moo -- morocco state.

in other words, it's by moving so cautiously that the king may end up with a victory. he's won the first round certainly if you want. he's maintained much of his power, maintained the flexibility, but he may find himself, if he is a different type of opposition. it tells a lot, that the real terrorist of how successful the king has been comes when we see -- morocco for several election cycles now expressed dissatisfaction by not voting. the last election, about 37% of eligible voters cast a vote, and over one-third of the ballots that were cast were deliberately spoiled. they were protest votes in other words. we may very well be seeing similar -- if there is still longer temperature out, we know

the mon new york ky didn't -- monarchy did not move fast enough, and not as successful as they thought he was in staying ahead of the protest during the process of reform, and he may be, in fact, before that like many other arab leaders, forced to manage protest, try to deal with a dissatisfied population. let me move on for a moment about one more country, and it's bahrain because they are the caution, it's the opposite of what has been happening in other countries because you can say the other monarchies still have

legitimacy. they have not moved -- you know, in a sense, i think they are missing an opportunity to move more decisively, but they still have opportunity. the opportunity is still not gone, essentially. the legitimacy is really high, and that's clearly in all studies carried out. in bahrain, i think, we have a very different situation. in other words, the monarchy has pretty much lost its legitimacy, at least in the eyes of the sheer population. you hear even the most moderate members. -- the most moderate members of the institution are calling for a monarchy where the king does not have power, rules, but does not govern. they are beginning to ask for the overthrow of the monarchy completely. tomorrow, at seven o'clock in the morning, washington time,

the pashtuni commission presents results on its investigation of how the country handled the protest. briefly for those who have not followed the bahrain closely -- first of all, bahrain has a very long history of political convulsion essentially of strife where the sheer population, majority, but also does not have much power push against the monarchy, that was a ten year period of upheaval that during the 90 #s, finally, they reach -- 1990s, finally reaching agreement of the political system, a partially elected parliament, and then in the beginning of the year, as protesters broke out in other arab country, but protest in bahrain start again, and protest in bahrain were stood down pretty harshly. how harshly?

we know more clearly when the -- so far we have, you know, the bsh saying one thing, and the monarchy says the other. the report comes out tomorrow that is supposed to be the definitive study done by an independent commission from outside bahrain that will tell how the -- what actually happened. i think judging on the way in which the bahrain government, the embassy here and so on, are becoming proactive in telling everybody that their goal is to learn from the mistakes they made in the past, i think that are reason to believe that this report is going to be very critical of the government. we know more tomorrow, but clearly, bahrain is worried, and although they tell us nobody has seen the report yet, they have seen the report, and i think

it's not -- that it's not a good report. the point that is coming here, is point is the bahrain monarchy reacted to the unrest, not by moving towards the process of reform, but by hardening its position, but calling in the peninsula shield force, which means they took saudi troops, from other countries, are now in the country helping to maintain order. by doing all of this, the monarchy has lost a lot of its legitimacy and has lost the capacity to introduce reforms from the top because i think at this point, the kind of reform that should be required to pass the sheer population would be reforms that the monarchy probably cannot accept. it would amount to the demise of

the ruling family in bahrain. let me stop here, and then we can open up. >> thank you, marian, for context of what monarchies can do with their time, reform from above, and given an example like morocco and the king who may be staying ahead of political change, and a country like bahrain that clearly missed the boat as it will. thank you for those details analogies of morocco and bahrain. >> thank you very much for provocative remarks, and the draft paper i saw which help structure them. i also comment you for looking at it. we got lazy. the last time you had the fall of a monarchy in the middle east was more than 30 years ago. a lot of times you have the fall of an arab monarchy was more

than 40 years ago. we had a sense the problem had been solved; right? the instability of monarchies had been solved, and what we saw in the region over the last year caused for reinvestigation, and i commend you for doing so. there seems to be three pillars on which arab monarchies and other monarchies rest. one's legitimacy. i find this sort of a hard concept to grasp because it feels to me i never understand what people are talking about when they talk about the king because the way people talk about the king and the way they are educated to talk about the king or not talk about the king is deeply engrained in society's ruledded by kings, and it just takes going to morocco and jordan and a number of the gulf states that you understand it's not just the language >> there is clearly something else in

there deeply part of the educational and religious structure, and there is a way that the kings in this region enjoy a serious comprehensive legitimacy which is very foreign to us coming from these systems. i think part of being a king in this part of the world, part of the way that arab monarchies work is the king is an arbiter, not a disputer. it's really, really important. the king doesn't fite. the king moderates fights between people under the king, and that keeps the king pure. if a king is like a crooked referee, right, throws a call every once in a while towards the side he favors, but nobody doubts the authority of the king to be the judge of what is inbounds and what is out of bounds, and the kings who lose

sight of that role, that become arbiters, end up being former kings. being a king is really presiding over a much more dynamic system than the kinds of systems most authority leaders preprovide over. that you want a ferment within the system. subsidiary to that or related to that -- all three are related -- is a diffusion of power in monarchies. we think of kings as absolute rulers; right? the king can do whatever he wants, but that's not the way arab monarchies work. they try to diffuse power to the relatives. there's a book about the monarchies where if you look at the gcc states, senior member of the royal family is the defense minister, the interior minister, and the foreign minister of every gcc state. now, either that's a whacky

coincidence, or there is something deep in the structure of how these places work that you want close relatives covering those things. part is they get patronage from that, and you can give the money from the monarchy out, distribute it, but if you are a senior member of the royal family, you have a stake, and there's often, i think, an advantage to having sort of an incoherence among senior members of the royal family because that means an increasing number of people in society feel i have a senior role fighting for my interests, so you don't want to, again, the shaw is the example of monarch who held it too closely. they had too clear a plan for where he wanted to lead iran. he did not have enough incoherence in his government, and partly as a cops convince of that, -- consequence of that, it was too easy for people to say i have no stake in this system. i have no interest, and it's count yows. the -- continuous. clearly in the successful

monarchies what we see is the monarchs use the family. they use money to co-op important people, co-op important tribes, co-op important groups that a large number of people feel they have a stake, and the king is the ref fee. the third issue is money, and monarchs have money they put around here and there. it's not only employed within governments, but between governments as we saw. the saudis looked at the neighborhood and put $130 billion, 30% of the gdp stimulus package into saudi arabia, $10 billion to bahrain, who knows what the jordanians get or have gotten, and they will benefit to some degree. there's an interest among all the monarchies in preserving other monarchies and a sense that you can use money to help do this. money lubricates the system, and if you can't find enough money,

you have to find other ways to lubricate the system. it seems to me that for all of this where the public fits in, if you look at the polling numbers, there's generally not overwhelming polling numbers saying we need democracy. you see some things talking about people wanting a greater voice, but it seems to me really what people want is people want better outcomes, and if you look at perceptions of democracy in the arab world, you look at a country like kuwait which had a parliament for decades, but the parliament is not a great advertisement for this is the better result you get with a monarchy. a kuwait friend told me the last government hospital built there was in 1976. there's a sense that it's not moving and parliament holds everything up. the qatar and uae, there's wide

authoritarian rulers who preprovide over the wealth and employment and opportunity and travel and all the things people want. my sense is for many people what they want is better outcomes, a sense of justice. they don't necessarily need to vote. they don't have anymore faith in democratic systems than the 81% -- 91% of americans who disapprove of the job that congress is doing; right? people just want better outcomes. to my knowledge, to my understanding, they don't care as much about the mechanics of how you get there. we can argue it's more representative government, but that's an argument that's not totally solved in the arab world. what we see is despite a relative level of satisfaction, we see the preemptive effort in qatar who expand the franchise

and give people to announce the right to vote, and they have elections -- i love the system. they hand pick the people who are allowed to vote for the government. they expanded that considerably in the last round, very low turnout, about 25%, but there seems to be a commitment to give people an ability to vote, although people are not demanding it, but they said they're going to expand the vote as well. it's a preemptive move rather than moved by demand. it seems to me in many cases it's something poorer states tried to do because they did not have the money to solve the problems. i think the example of the state which is most masterfully used the franchise and used the

political process to sort of regulate the political space in the country is morocco. he's done a masterful job for more than a decade. always being on the verge of fundamental reform. i mean, there's always a latest and greatest that's really going to change it. i remember from 2004 and decentralization of power five years ago, and i'm not saying they are nothing. they are real. they have effects, but the effects are always longer term, more subtle than they are initially announced to be. by doing this and the way the king does this, the king decides what are the issues? how are the issues debated? who are the people who decide the issues? the public trusts the king to do this because the king has legitimacy. it's an effective way of

managing public demands. part of the reason the king issued the constitution so quickly is because people talked about the constitution, not because the people demanded the constitution, but the king decided we should be serious about a constitution. he convinced people, and there was already an elite discussion that can help feed that debate down. i think one of the other things the king has done very effectively, i'm not sure we 100% agree on the pjd, but it seems one of the things the king did was by having a legal set of islamists in politics and illegal islams outside of politics, so there's people saying i have nothing to do with the system. there's people saying we work within the system, try to get what we can get, and part of what that does is it means that islamists never overwhelm the entire system. you can argue it cynical. you can argue it's brilliant.

you can argue it's not really what's going on, but it seems to me that part of this strategy here is regulating who can participate in debate and how they participate in debates as a way of maintaining control over how the system works. to move on to bahrain, it seems to me that bahrain is a terrible wording for jordan. let me tell you why i think that's true. bahrain, you have 30% of the population that's sunni identifying with the monarchy and clings to the monarchy. in senior dap, you have, -- in jordan, you have 30% of the population that is senior dane-- jordanian, and those who have not had conversations with

jordanian in service and military pings, there's a sense, that i've gotten, that palestinians are interlopers, making millions of dollars in the private sector and real jordanians do the hard work of building the state. it strikes me as a sort of eerie echo that sunnies have in bahrain that they are the ones serving in the police and in the army and others are busy out doing their thing, but they are not really holy bahrain the way palestinians are not holy jordanian, and one of the things that worries me is this sense that i increasingly get that the king, because he relies on the army, and the army is an east bank institution, the king identifies more with some of his subject than others. he's not above the palestinian east bank fray, but is part of

it. i agree there's a lot of ways to divide the jordanians, but there's two incredibly different elites. there's an east bank elite, which is deeply tied to the government and a west bank elite tied to business. they see each other threatening one another and threatening the nature of the state rather than seeing themselves as inherit parts of it. all of that, i think, suggests the need for politics to help weave it, and it seems to me that the key issue of the report from everything i heard from people involved in writing it, that the report will be a political document. it's intended to be a political document. it's not a criminal indictment. it's not -- i mean, it's as much fact finding. it is intended, and this goes

back to the first point of enhancing the power of the king within bahrain because when i was in bahrain, a little more than a month ago, the perception was the king had become like the third or fourth most powerful person in the country, that the guys in charge of the military had more power, that the prime minister was extraordinary powerful. the king of the crown prince, i think anthony pointed that out, the king is probably third or fourth in the power structure, and this is intended, as i understand it, to give the king a way to reinsert his centrality, that in some ways the diffusion of power has gone too far, and this is intended, in a way, to help the king get back more of a central role, but the king of bahrain is not the dictator of bahrain. the king of bahrain is intended to be the arbiter, and because of a break down in the politics,

a break down in managing politically this schism between the sunni population feeling estranged from the population, it's the king's task to fundamentally, political task, of reasserting his role as arbiter of bahrain politics, it's a cautionary tale of how politics get away from you in minority ties which is what we see in jordan and other places in the region. thank you. >> thank you very much, jon, for that really rich set of comments and insight. we have a half hour for q&a. there's microphones all in different parts. raise your hand and stand up, please, sir. stand up so the microphone comes and introduce yourself. >> i'm adviser to apac, and two questions. first of all, follow-up on what

jon says. it seems in jordan there's an imbalance between on the one hand the minority of palestinians who have most of the money, and a minority of east jordanians who have the power, and the question is how can the government really go about repairing this imbalance? the second question is not directly related to the topic, but it could have an effect in the future. can you comment on the current move by the monarchy to have some kind of overture to hamas and related to that is the king to visit hamala. >> thank you. one in the back. >> lindsay workman from national democratic institute, ndi. first of all, thank you very much, i've enjoyed the conversation. i want to talk about demands in

the country. there's apathy in morocco, a divided society, the population bought off. what can trigger the magnetter poll of protest movement we've seen in other places in the region? >> one more question for this round. sir, in the front, please. >> yes, thank you, jim michael, consultant and development cooperation with a principle focus on rule of law. it seems to me that this top-down, really related to the previous question, i think, has to interact with a civil society that has some values of things like equality of treatment, a belief that the institutions of governance and justice can make a positive difference for the society, and where you have the

different groups contending and competing an acceptance of the idea that if you're east bank, you are treated differently than if you're west bank. if you're a woman, you get treated different than if you're a man, and these divisions in the society and skepticism i found in my talking to people in the region, the skepticism about whether the reforms are modernization or really transformational changes in the society, and i'd like to hear from the panelists about how you see engaging several society. some of them reforms, like the constitutional process have not been very transparent or pa tis pi story. how does a civic culture that's going to encourage and further a reform process going to develop in this because if it doesn't, it.>

>> you buy loyalty with favors basically, you know, east jordanian part of the population is coming to an end. in other words, there is no --

there isn't a degree of satisfaction that was there before from that part of society, and which now feels that the state is selling its assets and the state is moving away from a system that has privileged some at the expense of others. i firmly believe that if a reform process is to succeed in senior dap, it has to be -- jordan, it has to be by the king because he, alone today, can credibly claim that syria presents all the sectors of society, those who are east joanne those who are of palestinian origin, he can credibly claim that, but he cannot, alone introduce a reform process that is not inclusive to go to your question about civil

society. any reform process, and i think that applies not just to jordan, but to the rest of the arab world, that is written by the government, and then handed over to people and said this is it, guys, you implement it, is not a process that's going to work. if it is not developed by the different sectors of society themselves, it has no chance of succeeding. i mean, that's it. it's necessary, but not sufficient condition if you want. we had successful experiment in jordan of writing such a blueprint, such an inclusive blue blueprint, the national agenda of 2005 actually when all sectors of society, most sectors of society, did participate in the writing of the document, but then, of course, it was put on the shelf because the system thought it was too far reaching. today, the national agenda is outdated. today, people are calling for

way more than the narnl ajen -- national agenda. when we did it six years ago, any talk about any constitutional amendment was to boo. today, already, we had 42, and a lot of people think, you know, it's not enough. you need to do more. so a participating process is a must in the arab world, and it is a sign of the seriousness of the regime. the constitutional amendment committee, although it did produce good work in jordan, but one of the major criticisms, of course, is that it has not opposition members, none whatsoever. that's, you know, that's not -- that's not credible in my view. the question about monarchy and hah ma? there's no question that the regime in jordan is warming up to hamas more than it used to.

i happen to believe that, you know, political islam, i think, needs to be included and needs to be talked to, and that without talking to political islam in the region, you are excluding a powerful sector of society. ill in a political islam movement that is peaceful, but i believe that's with regard to the arab-israeli conflict. it is not -- it is not useful nor, in fact, credible to exclude any party. i mean, can we imagine a situation where you have a peace agreement with israel without hamas involvement? it's just not going to work in my view, but a lot of people have interpreted that to mean that hamas is going back to jordan. it's going to open offices in jordan. i have no way of telling whether this is true or not.

the official position of the government is that this is not true. there are no plans to bring back hamas to jordan. finally, on the issue of bottom-up demand, i mean, this is the question that marina posed and that arab monarchies face. you know, so far the overwhelming majority of the political and bureaucratic lawyers around the -- layers around regimes in arab monarchies are telling the leaders, these monarchs, don't worry. you know, the number of protesters in the street in jordan is no more than 5,000 at best; therefore, you have nothing to worry. of course, the counter argument is don't wait until the 5,000 become 30,000 because then it will be too late, and the best way, you know, to avoid such a situation where the street

becomes the pace setter is a reform process from above which, in my view, is totally doable in jordan, but then the monarch and the system will have to adjust the relationship between the regime and the public. rule of law has to apply. you know issue everybody has to feel whether they are east jordanian or palestinian, they have to feel they are being treated equally. i think if people feel that, and if people see as credible reform process, that might take, you know, five, or ten, or 15 # years, but if they see a credible one, that is participating and that is being implemented rather than just talked about and then put on the shelf, if they see one that is credible, i think people are patient, but what people have stopped to be patient about is

reform rhetoric that does not -- that is not followed up with implementation. >> thank you. marina, jon, any comments? >> sure. on the issue of baht -- bottom-up, first of all, i want to point out that i think there is no -- if you judge on the action of the arab monarchies, there's no arab monarchies that does not believe large key protest is possible in that country, and that they have to try and stay ahead of it. problem is, and i've argued that bottom-up, push from the bottom, is absolutely necessary for reform from the top to be implemented. nobody's going to just out of the blue start implementing reforms if they don't feel that there's not a demand for it, that there is a push for it. the problem is that the arab monarchies, many of the arab monarchies with the exception

of -- with the exception of jordan and particularly morocco, have tried to respond to the potential for the country by essentially trying to buy off the population rather than by introducing real changes. i have some more different view of the, you know, qatar and uae announcing elections, and i think they are still baby steps. i don't think there's real change there. by and large the position of the monarchies is we can stay on top of the situation without having to give in or deal with the real pressure, but they know that the jordanians are there, and it's why they are acting the way they are acting because certainly in the participation, yes, i think it's crucial, but it's not going to come unless you have more organizations. in other words, if it is -- think of the case of morocco.

the king decided to make the writing constitution, the writing process, a quote on quote, "participating process," and in addition to experts, and also set up other mechanisms, a very interesting name, but they are supposed to be the one that provided, that allow the civil society organization to make an importance on. i mean, they were asked to make submissions, and they never heard anything -- you know, they were never consulted again, and i think the problem there is i don't want to say it was their fault, but the fact is that they were not organized enough to really force the hand of the king or whoever you might think, to really take into consideration what they wanted, so if you wanted the bottom line here is that the reform from the top is only going to come if

there is sufficient push from the bottom. the problem is from the bottom can engulf the reform at the top if it becomes too much, and this is perhaps one of the reasons why monarchies are cautious because in the end they are afraid they lose control over the reform process. >> two quick points. i think what drives the demand for different political systems is the sense of a different political gets different results; right? to the extent pleef democratic system gives them better results in terms of justice, economics, and other things, that drives people towards it to the extent that they see democratic systems in iraq and elsewhere leading to chaos, leading to social conflict. that is a disincentive to pursue them. i think the other piece of this important to keep in mind is that liberal voices who push for more representative government

are not the ones who are always capturing the government that becomes more representative afterwards. there's something -- there's a sort of an unfortunate passivity about many liberals, and, you know, if you just look at how egypt played out. there's a whole core of activists in cairo who have no links to the broader country. they don't have links outside of cairo, and we've seen other parties arguably leftover parties with extensive national networks. part of opening up this system means you have to do politics in a serious way. i think one of the things that monarchies have been extraordinary successful in doing, and saudi arabia better than all, is they keep both their religious conservatives and the social liberals under their wings, protect them both, against each other, and they become the arbiter, and that, in many ways, protects the centrality of the monarchy and

makes both sides fearful of what might happen if you really had a more democratic system and it ends up continuing the system rather than opening up to political reform. >> thank you, jon. another round of questions. let me start there. ma'am? >> thank you. margarita with the department of state. i've been following the middle east for many, many years in the state department starting out as a graduate student and looking at the arab spring, i really was excited, but then i began to worry, and i'm wondering if the monarchies are dammed if they do and dammed if they don't that no government, and certainly the monarchies have not had a long experience of working in a democratic fashion, but i'm wonder if any government in the middle east now can manage the unrealistic expectation of instant prosperity as a result

of change so that much of what they are thinking goes to what mr. alterman is talking about in the sense of a better life, and i'm wondering if they really can get that even with the reforms that these governments will do. thank you. >> thank you. and i have a question on my own i wanted to ask. you mentioned in the initial remarks, the gcc, the jordanian situation. was wondering how you see that going, why the offer was made, what it might actually end up with, and how it affects jordan and the gcc. if there's no other questions, let's go to our panelists, in reverse orderment jon, you want to start first? >> yeah. my sense is that, you know, on the one hand, the loyal exports states, right, are in a pretty

good position because of where oil prices are, and that means that they don't have to do what many of them did in the 1990s when oil prices were low. you have to start thinking of political deals. i think, you know, what happens in iraq and what happens in egypt and what happens in libya and we're still going to see, you know, what kinds of transitions we have when in both syria and yes , yemen, and i think both are coming, how those play out will have a dramatic effect over the next five years on demands for opening up systems because if, you know, unwrapping the package means that all the worms get out, people say just leave the thing wrapped up. it also, you know, where oil prices are for the next ten years has a profound effect on how much demand there is for change because either people feel greater prosperity or

people feel less or feel it's growing at the right rate, and if i knew where prices would be in ten years, i'd be much wealthier than i am, but i think it's a nontrivial variable we don't think about. in general, the higher oil prices are, the more it constrains political demands and political change in oil exporting states, and the lower they are, the more it forces change, and that's beyond my ability to protect. i think, you know, to your question, i think there is a sort of regional interest in what people see in the region and al jazeera's played this incredible role not only as the narrater as this incredible period of change, but also projecting images and framing the discourse of how this all works. i think that most of the gcc states have decided that they've

seen enough of popular revolution demanding change, and my own judgment is that they are going to be looking for solutions in countries which do not involve negotiating with the street, and instead, involve forces coming in and establishing control and making deals with people from on high rather than sort of opening up a very messy process of contestation negotiation. that's a gut sense, but i think if you look at how the country's are looking at yemen and syria, i think that's what i see, and i think one of the reasons they find egypt so disturbing right now is because of a sense that they don't know where it's headed, egypt is a center of gravity for the region, and a sense that egypt is going to collapse into competing demands is very threatening to the way a lot of these countries see their

relations within the region and more broadly in the kind of demonstration effect that egypt might have from morocco all the way through to iraq. >> thank you. marina? >> yeah, i'm not so convinced that the problem for these countries is going to be the unrealistic expectations. i think people know there's not going to be prosperity. i was following very closely the transition in south africa, and everybody was saying, oh, my god, the country's going to be bankrupted because the african population is going to expect to be paid the same salaries that the whites were receiving, and, of course, that was simply not feasible because the way that the whites were paid such high salaries is that the african population was paid a very low salary. people knew there was no way of balancing the two. yes, there are expectation that

demands you walk around cairo nowadays, and you bump into a strike, a demonstration no matter where you go, but the expectation of -- of the government that have essentially try to solve the problem, not by making -- by introducing political reforms, but by making economic con sergeses. it's an attitude very much encouraged by the government. for example, in egypt, the two or three years before mubarak was ousted where there was a lot of protests, a lot of small strikes and protests all over the country, and as long as they were kept strictly economic, the government would give in so i would argue it's not so much an unrealistic expectation, but it is the -- it is the governments that have paid money rather than facing the problem of reform.

that's to say it is not out of it in the long run, and all the countries have huge problems of the, you know, tackling the unemployment issue, not even countries that are rich enough to pay off people still have to solve that problem, they cannot keep, you know, large number particularly of young people on the door and not expect trouble. >> thank you, marina. >> i think whether you're excited or worried about the arab spring, i never liked to call it the arab spring from day one. it's because this all depends on the time prism that you're looking at. if, as this romantic notion that immediately developed after january of last year of regimes leaving the scene in almost instantaneously to democratic regimes that come in, and was, of course, unrealistic and in

absence of a civil society and political culture as you said, it was simply not going to happen. if people are looking at months, of course, everybody is worried. if people are looking at this as a process that will, indeed, go through a lot of it rations, a -- reiterations, a lot of mistakes before it hopefully arrives at the stable and prosperous societies, then it's a different ball game. i mean, i'm not -- i'm not surprised by what is happening in egypt today with the army because the army, i mean, anybody who thought the army was a democratic institution let him argue with me. i mean, the army, you know, was there by necessity at the beginning, but, of course, it's not going to protect democracy. i mean, anybody could have told you that, so i think we need to be one, realistic that these

transitions are going to take time, that there are different conditions in different arab countries so some countries will do better than others in eastern europe, poland did better than russia until today. in the arab world, you asked the question whether any government can manage transition. yes. look at tunisia. it's a small country, but the transition has been going very smoothly in tunisia, and they had fair elections, have the coalition government, next head of the country now is a secular leftist agreed to by the largest, you know, party that won the elections, the islamists, the head of the assembly is another well known secular in the country, ect.. the transition is going very well in tunisia. that doesn't mean it will go as well in other arab countries,

but it does mean that it is possible, and that, i think, there are lessons that can be learned as we go through such transition. people will learn lessons moving forward. one lesson that i think the arab world already learned is nobody wants another iranian modern, another theocratic government. that's already learned. it doesn't mean religion won't play important roles in other arab governments that emerge, but i think for the large part they will be civilian governments. on the question of the gcc -- it's been six months since the gcc announced its intention to invite jordan and motto membership. nothing much has been done until then. different reasons. i mean, it's clear that not all

gcc countries are enthusiastic about this. the saudis are, but maybe it stops there. there's many questions raiseed. other questions have to do is this full membership or partial membership? these countries go through phases, you know? first they have the customs union, then free trade agreements between them, and then the last stage no one has reached which is monetary union, which nobody has reached, so is jordan, for jordan, of course, the lure is that it will have free movement of labor and capital so that jordanians can work in the gulf at ease without having to get work permits, and that more investment from the gulf will come to jordan. that's the lure, of course, but as i said, it's very interesting to me, and this is not a new demand. i was in government 15 years ago when we first asked for

membership in the gcc. it is very interesting to me today that when you ask jordannians on the street, the answer is not an automatic yes, you know? it's what's the catch here? [laughter] so -- >> what's the catch. >> so i mean, there is also, and i'm not saying -- i'm not necessarily saying that it's sort of a catch against reform or what i'm saying is that people understand today that their problems are not purely economic, and that there is a demand for better government that will not go away just because their pockets become fuller, at least in senior -- jordan. >> thank you very much. if there's no more questions, i'd like to thank you, all, for coming this morning, and certainly like to thank our excellent panel, the people coming out this a few weeks, please look for it. we look forward to reading it,

and please join me in thanking our panelists this morning. [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> it was a flood in fort wayne, i mean, people were down there filling sandbags trying to keep the river. air force one stopped, reagan had a motorcade down to the flooded area, took off his

jacket. my memory is he filled three sand bags, said, hello and hi to everyone, got in the car, went back in the plane, but that night what was filling the air waves was not three sandbags, but reagan filling bags with his shirt off. >> sam donaldson, nbc, andrea mitchell, and chris dodd talk about the legacy of ronald reagan. new york city mayor, discuss the american dream and the opportunities in the u.s., and astronauts neil glenn, and coal lips are awarded the congressional medal. for the entire thanksgiving schedule, go to c-span.org.

>> general allyn spoke to reporters today about the military in addition in afghanistan by a video conference. general allyn talked about counterinsurgency operation and planned reduction in troop levels. this is 40 minutes. >> good morning, and good evening in afghanistan. i'd like to welcome army major

general daniel allyn back to the pentagon briefing room. he's the commanding general for regional command east. general allyn and the men and women of the first calvary division assumed authority for rc east may of this year in full partnership with the afghan national security forces, he commands a combined team of 8 u.s., french, and polish task forces. rc east area of responsibility includes 14 # # provinces with a comebined population of more than 7.5 million afghan citizens. this is the general's second briefing with us joining us in august of this year and will be briefing us today from his aheadquarters. following the opening remarks, we'll take your questions, and with that, general, i'll turn it over to you, sir.

>> thanks, jane, and i appreciate the opportunity to talk with all of you. on behalf of all the teammates of combined joint task force one, it's an hon no to represent the troopers of regional command east today. we just completed the six month assessment, and with the 68,000 afghan security forces with whom we partner, we are currently on glide path to accomplish our assigned missions. our main effort continues to be partnership with and development of the afghan security forces to achieve security primacy for the approximately 7.5 million afghans in 14 provinces and 150 districts that comprise regional command east. thanks to the success of our predecessors, we are able to focus more and more on the afghan security force partnership and capacity of the afghan army, police, and border

police. the campaign continuity with our predecessors allowed us to sustain the momentum and maintain the initiative against various insur gent groups like the haqqani network. we continue to see indicators that afghan security forces and coalition forces have disrupted security threats. during last months operation's shamsheer, afghan security forces and coalition forces captured and killed a dozen haqqani leaders and captured dozens of fighters. this operation involved almost 2,000 soldiers, 60% of which were afghan. it postered us to keep the pressure on the enemies of afghanistan this winter. conversely, insurgent attacks this fall failed miserably across the board. examples of failed insurgent attacks in the last two months include suicide bombers who failed in their attempt to

attack the government center in the district on 16 october. one attacker detonated his device and killed himself while afghan police stopped the remaining three attackers. in a separate incident, insurgents tried an ineffective attack in the district center. onon the 10th of november where afghan police and security forces killed the insurgents. additionally, forces killed multipl insurgents in who attacks on combat air force on 7 october and 8 november. it's increasingly evident we are facing and defeating inexperienced, poorly trained, and led insurgent fighters. ..

against the afghan people. we see increased cooperation between the afghan people, local government in the security forces who served not to believe we are now seeing in eastern ave. in a standard result of having the right inputs for the past year now. senior leaders successes demonstrate how vital those inputs are. much more work remains to be

done, but we are seeing tangible progress in the afghan security forces and provincial government capacity. we will continue to press forward with our afghan partners to achieve a stable and secure future from the people of afghanistan. and with that, i'm happy to take your questions. >> thank you, mr. chairman. we will start here. >> thank you, general. this is raghubir goi alfred india club in asia today. my question is not some ballots in pakistan are trying to reconcile. what about schemas, is this going to help you that the haqqani network will be controlling if they are having inside pakistan said this will affect the admission and also as

a thanksgiving, what is the node during this thanksgiving as for the u.s. mission is to turn? thank you. >> well, i think i understood the second half of your question very clearly. our morale is high. our soldiers are very confident and they are very excited about the capacity developed their afghan security force partners as we look forward to celebrating thanksgiving here midweek. i would definitely feel the support of our families back home at all so of our leadership. we have many visiting us during the holiday period. in terms of whether or not the haqqani is dialogue with pakistan affects our efforts here remains to be seen and we will obviously -- we are ready

to continue to maintain relentless pressure on any and all insurgents who attacked the afghan people in the affects of the security forces of afghanistan. >> hike on a general. it's courtney kube from nbc news. imagine an opening statement the inputs are right in your area or the increasing u.s. troops there and afghan troops. we hear more and more there will be more a surge or another increase of troops before the surge starts trying down. you still anticipate that you'll have an increase in troops and perhaps an increase in operations in your area in early 2012? >> wow, thanks, courtney. and i know you are well aware

that this was really the first full fighting season with all the surge forces on the ground. and i think we can clearly see the impact that it had on denying the insurgents and the opportunity to regain lost ground, both in the south to southwest and also in the areas that we rested for their control during the summer campaign. we are obviously still in the process of the early phase of the 2011 reductions and we are on track to meet at by the middle of next month. and the resources that we have now have us in good shape for both the winter mating season and heading into the spring campaign and i would say any future decision that general allen or general scott bharati

make on resources is something that is best addressed to them. >> general, hi, david cloud with "the l.a. times." i want to ask about the partner enough for you mention. some here in washington and there ought to be a shift in that effort, away from partnering u.s. units with afghan national army units and towards an embedded advisor kind of approach. in order to speed up the ability of afghan units to take over battle space. i have to question spirit one, do you have any embedded advisor split ana units and are you thinking about moving to that kind of model india think it would be beneficial? >> well, thanks, david and frankly the quickest way that you accelerate development of afghan security is to put forces

is by putting the world's best army at that mission and that is what we have been doing with our embedded partnership with the tolais and kandaks as the companies and the talents of the afghan security forces. and we have seen market improves the brew that embedded partnership. and that is also built a confidence of the leaders as well as their confidence as we do that. now we also have security force assistance teams as a part of our effort and we aligned than with the units that are house made the most progress so that we can partner with those units that most need to develop network and frankly it is a very careful assessment that our commanders at every level make to ensure that we have learned

that it partners with the right units in the right leaders as well as our advisors working with those units that have developed to the point where advisory assistance is sufficient to sustain them towards the final readiness. >> so you have its own sake and make southern added advisors and partnered units. can you just help me understand what the breakdown is there? of the ams us in your area and the units area. how many have embedded advisers and how many are partner units? >> yeah, that's a very complex question to answer. obviously we have 60,000 afghan security forces and we have today just over 29,000 coalition

forces. so if you did wrong i'm not coming you could tell about half of the security forces enjoy an embedded or airship arrangement. but it is really based on where the main focus of our operations are, where the enemy threat requires that and those units that have advanced their readiness to the point where advisory teams are adequate to sustain them. that is where we aligned them. so within about every brigade combat team's area of operation, you have a mix of advisory team and embedded partnerships. so i wouldn't want to give you a wrong number, but suffice to say that all of our advisor teams in all of our units are fully invested in partnering with our

afghan security forces to accelerate their development. >> dan de luce at afp. can you tell us what is the state of rocket fire coming from the haqqani network over the border? 32 vatican increase since may with the pakistani frontier corps, either turning a blind eye or worse. is that still the situation? has there been any improvement? and the other question related to that is how do you how do you see the afghan forces ability and capability to defend a border without coalition forces? are they posted that and are there any afghan units that are able to operate there independently and do they have helicopters for example that supports?

>> well, dn, first of all to your question about the cross-border fires, that is actually tapered somewhat in the past several weeks. and in fact, we have had some very good cases in the last three weeks of the pakmil court meeting with us against cross-border fires and that coordination occurs with every event that happens. i would say in the last three weeks we are probably averaging three to four cross-border firing incidents a week. not all of those are confirmed to come from haqqani network operators, but the majority to come from the area from which they normally operate. now we do have afghan border police that are operating independently in several areas in regional command east. in fact, on the third of

november we transitioned an area in southwest pak tea paktika two independent control of the senate kandak episode 80 p. where they have advanced to that level and we were able to focus their partnership on other elements. part of our strategy is to ensure that the afghan border police are ready to defend their border as we continue the development and obviously our enabler capability, like helicopters that you mentioned is a key capability tailor-made for some time while we continue to train and develop their own afghan air force assets. they are not ready to do that, but they are clearly on a training path to attain that security primacy over time.

it's! tom bowman with npr. i want you to talk more about tour production next month to meet the white house called for reductions in troops. all power companies expect to pull out of the east, will it be combat or support units? and also a broader question into next year. as you know, general allen, top commander in afghanistan wants to shift more troops to the east. do you see a need for more american troops in the easter cannot hold the field i afghan forces? >> well, thinks time for for that question. first of all, we have got about 200 troops to withdraw from the east to meet our target in our

portion of the search recovery. none of those are front-line combat troops, so we will sustain our focus on part or ship and pressure on the insurgent networks. looking forward to the east, clearly the question of how many more resources you need depends upon how quickly you want to finish defeating the insurgent forces here and he used in that timeline drives what resources are needed. we saw the insurgent safe havens to do within the east. we are focused on this each and every day and we'll maintain pressure against them with every resource we have at our disposal as we develop the afghan security forces to hold and secure their nation overtime. >> general, mike evans from the

times. can you tell me as your planning various operation, how important is the element in both attacking the haqqani network and intelligence for your other operations? the second question, after 2014, can you see at this stage that it will be possible for all american forces to be out of the middle east in 2014 or do you think it will be necessary to keep some elements, particularly american forces? >> well, first of all to your question of night raids, clearly operations go in after the insurgent network leaders are a key component of the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism affaires.

those enemies of afghanistan clearly are successfully targeted at minimal risk to civilians through ninth grade and those will continue to be important and clearly we are focused on continuing to expand the afghan security force role in those operations. they are increasing every day and ultimately as we are with all operations, the goal is for them to take the lead in those operations as we continue to expand their development. in terms of our commitment to afghanistan after 2014, i know general allen has made it clear that there will be a continued need for security force development after 2014 and that is a part of the strategic partnership dialogue that is

still ongoing and so i would say that we will have an enduring commitment to the development of the afghan security forces and their capability. >> general, 750 abc news. are you saying from the 14 provinces that said 60s controls that 200 total will be sent home as part of the first roger and it charges as part of the repositioning? >> the question that i thought he asked was how much did you have remaining to meet your search recovery and that is about 200. and yes, that is across the 14 provinces of regional

communities that are search recovery effort. >> t. have any other forces that left before the 200 or with the speed to total 200 for the year? >> no, we had about 1500 total that we contributed and the largest portion with the unit that did not deploy as part of one of the brigade formations. so they were offering up on arrival as opposed to being withdrawn from the force. suppose the bulk the bulk of our reduction in the rest we are to shave from non-infantry and maneuver force for patients.

>> hi, general, courtney qb from nbc news they get. if we could quickly go back to the cross-border, one follow-up on the cross-border fire. the fact that the number of cross party has gone down in recent weeks, decided anything to do with the weather or that actually is some kind of operational reason behind not or is it just that it is getting colder and it's more challenging ? >> no, courtney, we don't see any connection to the weather at all. it is obviously a number of fat peers. we've continued to get about the same number of attacks against our border positions, but the majority firing over the last several weeks as an on the afghan side of the border. no but they were not there is

more to the explanation, that is for the enemy is choosing to shoot from. i can't answer that. i do know the positive sign from our good is responsiveness with which the pakmil border force has actions against the firing. we've also had some complementary efforts as we have maneuvered forces to deny insurgent infiltration. our counterparts on the other side of the border have also adjusted positions at our request and this is a very positive step forward and really was a direct result of the regional border corp. meeting that the afghans held with the 11th quarter of the military in kabul a month ago. another positive sign is the

communications exercises. we have done one about three weeks ago. we've got another one scheduled in november and it involves the pakistan border force, the afghan border force and also our combat outpost. again, the goal here is the pakistan military and afghan military secure that order in the bilateral way and we are increasingly allowing them to do the majority of that coordination. >> general tom bowen again with npr. the security washington is to build the haqqani network and get the leadership to the table to talk. at this point have you seen or heard any indication that the haqqani leadership is willing to come to the table for negotiations?

>> well, tom, i can only speak for who is talking with the afghan leaders and our provinces here in regional command east. so far that has not been haqqani leaders coming to the table. now we have had a fairly sizable increase in insurgent leaders coming forward across about six of our provinces based on the pressure that's been applied against over the summer. but that is not included to date any major haqqani leadership. >> otto kreisher. you said you decrease mildly noncombat units in your drawdown. we've heard one of the biggest names of the afghan security forces are the logistics and

those kinds of things. what are you doing to bolster the afghans combat support and logistics classics >> well, thanks. i appreciate you bringing up our efforts in building their sustainment capacity. it is one of the primary object as we have any ongoing effort of focus for this winter as we prepare them for the spring campaign. and our brigade support battalion to support every one of our brigade combat teams are the primary trainers and partners in that effort. they have not been touched at all but a search recovery and they are fully invested and partnered with the combat service support, kandak that are

the core element of each army national brigade and they will remain very, very focused. and at the same time, really at the national level, the national training mission in afghanistan under lieutenant general bolger has a sustainment command arriving soon to focus on the national operational level logistics development for the afghan security forces. and those two efforts combined are focused on closing the gap on tactical through national level sustainment means that the afghan security forces. >> general, luis martinez from abc. i think you touched earlier on the peace talks with pakistan, with the pakistani government and the pakistan taliban in the news today. would you support efforts given in the past when there have been

cease-fires to safe havens have been maintained and most cross-border attacks into rc staff continued. >> well, i think you're asking the strategic low-level question of a tactical commander. obviously the dialogue going on here within regional command east is occurring between insurgent leaders and government of afghanistan leaders. as an example, governor fadai in wardak was very engaged with solo groups of leaders in nirkh who expressed a desire to rejoin the government and those conversation in that dialog is still ongoing. obviously this is in afghanistan led afghanistan program and our

effort is to try to ensure the resources that they need to facilitate the dialogue if and when it occurs it is made available. >> thank you. raghubir goyal again. i may just follow general one. do you agree i've those peace and stability in afghanistan will all depend on how pakistan behaves across the border? and how do you see today's relations between afghanistan and pakistan as far as the stability of afghanistan is concerned? >> i think stability in afghanistan has a number of factors. obviously, the safe haven that some of the insurgents to join

pakistan is a contributing factor. but there are several other variables that have to also be addressed by the government of afghanistan and the afghan security forces with our support. and i would say that the pakistan and afghanistan leadership are involved at all levels in the healthy dialogue. i certainly see it with military leaders that i work with. msn mentioned the regional order corp. at the afghan border police plan with the 11th poor of the attacks and military. so i think the two countries are in dialogue and they have a lot of respect for each other. i know you understand fully that during the soviet era, there were a lot of the leaders here in afghanistan that were protected in pakistan and they've never forgotten that. so the two countries clearly

have a lot of common ground that the lien on. >> general, and this is a sort of general broad question. by 2014, american troops one way or another will have been in afghanistan for 13 years. you mention the russians just now, british, french, no one has spent so much time fighting in one particular country in afghanistan. now that you are contemplating even after 2014 there will be thousands maybe of american troops, what is your feeling about that or maybe your own guidance? what do you feel about the path of americans will still be fighting because that's the right word in afghanistan in 2014?

>> our soldiers are very committed to this mission. they see the progress of the afghan security forces are making. they also see the amount of work that is still left to be done for them to be capable of securing their nation and they are committed to seeing that through. they recognize that this is an enduring partnership. it is one that has gotten stronger each and every day and they gained confidence seen the confidence that their security force partners in the army, police and border police as they succeed in missions across the spectrum from squad level operations to brigade level operations in the regional command east. >> you mention that some of the insurgent groups have been making con packs which the afghan government, but not the haqqanis. have you been to detect and

friction between the haqqanis and some of the other insurgent groups? any clashes in the report? >> well, we have seen riffs and friction between multiple insurgent groups across team that used and has increased really as the summer campaign has continued into the fall. and we can see increasingly desperate actions as they attack civilians, murder tribal elders and results in increased intimidation to try to get support for continued operations here in afghanistan. so we expect those frictions will continue. and clearly, we know that they have an opportunity. they have an option to rejoin the government and choose peace

and that is something that increasingly the local leaders are encouraging them to do. >> general, if i could follow-up. have you seen any friction between the haqqanis and the other insurgent groups. have you been seen any clashes there? >> well, the primary dialogue with haqqani is with the larger taliban and taliban quetta shura network and not seems to continue albeit it didn't achieve any results here with their attempt at attacks against the loya jirga and i'm sure there's a lot of pointing of fingers going on as to why they didn't succeed. but frankly it was the afghan security forces that deny them the opportunity.

>> good morning, general. i am lucky now at a room with no hands raised. so with that, i will turn it over to you and any closing remarks that she played in the commissary. >> well, thank you, jane. and thanks to other teams fare. we appreciate you tuning in and hearing our troopers are doing here in afghanistan with this important mission that we are undertaking. as i mentioned, we have a lot of work to do. we have made great progress with their afghan security force partners over the last several months in some very, very hard fighting and we have hard fighting yet above and then they do not ask her. i know that she will keep us in

your prayers are with this thanksgiving holiday and think we are families as they continued to serve helplessly at home and support us while we serve here. on behalf of all of the courageous troopers task force one, it is an honor on behalf of you to represent our nation here. >> general, thank you. i can say on behalf of the men and women as my team of defense press operations and i think i can do that on behalf of the members of the pentagon press corps. we thank you. we know how hard it is a late untrue to be away from family and friends over the holiday solution while a happy thanksgiving and we will see you again in the briefing room but have a very happy holiday, sir. thank you. >> thanks, jane.

got us all of you and thanks for being here. [inaudible conversations] >> in the name of the greatest people that have ever climbed a visitor, i draw the line in the dust and toss steak i've had before the feet of tyranny and i say segregation now, segregation

tomorrow and segregation forever. [cheers and applause]

>> and the effects of america's changing demographics. discussion hosted by the center for american progress is an hour and a half. [inaudible conversations] >> at afternoon, everyone. thank you for waving. my name is danielle and and i want to thank you all for joining us for that. pass it to 70 democratics versus economics and the 2012 election. this event is so posted by two

super teams in progress 2050. progressive cities is a project that explores the history, intellectual foundations and public understanding of progressivism in america and is co-posted by ruy texeira for the coming demographic changes in america led by the nasa calmes. thank you to debut a short video highlighting the increasing diversity is an that lie within. ♪ ♪

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♪ ♪ ♪ mused mac ♪ muse >> thank you. so today i want to talk about the 2012 elections. much has been said about what is happening next year and much more ink will be split in the

next coming months. while many folks are covering core stories because that is what is not interesting, wanted to dig more into what people are thinking. what's going on in states and what trends are occurring and how do people feel about the economy in the current state of affairs. we want to have discussion on economics, demographics and implications for 2012. i'm pleased to introduce my colleague who co-authored a paper we released today can path up to 70 and after his presentation he will be a spirited conversation with our spirited panel and of course want to hear from you as well with your questions. a senior fellow at the progress center and a guest scholar at the brookings institution where he recently codirected adjoint proteins american enterprise institute project on political tomography angiography, the future of red, white and blue america in a series of reports on the political geography of the 28th election. his recent writings include besides the paper released

today, democratic change in future the parties, european paradox endocrine of white working class and the rise of mass upper-middle-class city holds a phd is the theology from university of wisconsin madison. please join me in welcoming ruy texeira. [applause] >> thanks. i guess i'll come up here for a little bit, but i'll probably start roaming around what we get to the numbers. the title of the title slide there tells the story of what the papers about peer demographics versus economics for the 2012 election. on the one hand and say that the economy writ large is the biggest factor in favor of the gop candidate, whoever that might be. bad economy in comments are likely to be the case with obama and that's the biggest thing the republicans have going. on the other hand, demographic shifts in this country as i documented over the years that

document again in this new paper are very much in favor of the democrats. it will help obama in the 2012 election. so essentially you argue a showdown of demographics versus economics and the paper discusses that in a number of different ways. first we look at the national picture to see how that equation might work out at national level and that we actually look the k-12 target states that the parties are going to be fighting about. six the midwest, three in the southwest and three in what you might call the new south that i'll get into in just a minute. what those are and some examples. so first let's look at the national situation. now this is -- these are the minorities, white-collar graduates in the white working class. there's a lot of different ways to divide the electorate, but this shows the split in 2008 between obama and mccain among

these three groups. obama carried in the minority vote by 60.8020. white-collar graduates class but only four points in the white working class of those with less than a four year college agreed by 18 points. now look at what's going to happen here -- whoops. there we go. we are going to have to points more minorities on the 1.4 of white college graduates and three points less of white working-class voters, which are obviously again obama's first group. so there are some important numbers to keep in mind as we think about what's going to happen in 2012. for thinking about minorities, 20% minority voters in 2012 is what we project. you got 80% in 2008. conservative assumption would be he's going to get 75% of the minority vote, basically democrats long-term average.

you'd expect slippage in 2012 due to the economic situation, but we think you can get 75% of the vote or two points additional share of voters who were minorities bringing it to 20% electric. it also have another percentage point where the white college graduates. so if you get 75% in the minority though, which is the decline from 2008, if you maintain the support levels among white college graduates in the white working class, he will still get a lot today about the same margin he did in 2008. of course that's not likely to happen, so let's look at other scenarios. what if the white working class here slips a 30-point deficit as the democrats had in 2010 and a wipeout election for the gop. he would still get elected in that scenario if he maintains

roughly 47% support level for white college graduates. so you can sustain the wipeout among the white working class provided he maintains the white college graduates owe. what if the white college graduates owed goes well for her, which may indeed have been so he's looking pretty decent recent polls. our calculations as he could do as badly among white college graduates in the white working class is jon kerry did in 2048 years back for 2012 demographics are different. he can do as badly as kerry did and was the white working class for 23 points and white college graduates by 11 points and would still win popular vote than 5048. so that's a reasonable target for obama. of course it's a target he may not be able to reach depending on the campaign works out. so that is the national situation. as we all know, the national

situation is not how presidential elections are decided. we only have to go back to 2002 c. there are instances and they are where we should emphasize in the popular vote does not predict the electoral vote majority. you'd usually over predicts. in 2008 not. in the end it comes down to the states. so the issue then becomes, where can obama assembled to 70 or the republican candidates assembled to 70? they basically look at the battleground in the following way. 12 states here we believe will be battleground states in 2012. we give obama 14 of the 18 states the democrats have carried since 1992 plus the district of libya that amounts to 186 electoral votes to give her public can states they carried in 2008 plus indiana plus nebraska's congressional district for a vote of 191.

that's what is left except for new hampshire which we don't discuss here. though we put them into these three buckets. six midwest states which you see they are. pennsylvania high, michigan, wisconsin, iowa. the three south estates in our three new south states. idiolect rowboats in the midwest. 20 electoral votes in the southwestern state and 57 in the three new south states. so that is what it's got to be about, fighting over those states. all of those states have different demographics. each individual state is a different set of trends in support level of friendliness or unfriendliness. there are certain things they have have in common within these three regions. so let me talk a little bit about that. i'm going to talk about it in the context of trying to look at a specific state in the specific

regions. so this is a state of ohio, the much fought over state of ohio. and here is the basic data down here for how the presidential election recount in 2008. obama got 83% minority vote, basically split the white college graduates though, which most people don't know and lost the white working class by 10 points. this is broadly consistent with the general pattern in the midwest, which is we have relatively low percentage of minority votes that will average about 15% and then you have white college graduates who are relatively friendly to the democrats and the white working class, which is relative to national standards. again remember obama last the white working-class vote by 18 points and averages a three-point deficit in the midwest and here in ohio was 10

points. so these are a slow growth states were demographics are shifting relatively slowly. you can see here stillson shift. we should have another percentage point of minorities in 2012. 2.4 white college graduates and the general pattern you see everywhere. so what obama is going to need to do -- a lot of people have pointed out in this is really true. he doesn't want this margin to collapse. the deficit may not look good when you think about it, but it's pretty good for his national average. if it goes really far south towards a 30-point for the democrats lost in 2008 -- 2010, he will indeed be a great deal of trouble. but let's not forget about the white college grad trip though. he wants to keep the even split or something close. believe you me, the republican candidate is going to be working hard to bring that figure far

down in terms of democratic support and of course he's got to get his minority base. we reckon probably 18% in ohio in 2012 who want to keep the figure is close closer secant is primarily driven by the black vote. and where is that i'll likely to have been? these three metros are the most important. khalifa and, climates and cincinnati is where a lot of the voters pick the fastest card is here in the columbus matcher area, particularly the suburbs and democrats have a phenomenal progress of the last 20 years compared to dukakis and we've obama did anyone points better in the columbus metro area. so that is quite a swing and that is the kind of thing don't need to keep out the mess really do particularly well among white college graduates and minorities. so this is the battle that will be fought out in a place like

ohio, were obviously the state of the economy will be waiting down on the democratic ticket in ohio, but he does have demographics, asserted the changes taken place in its favor and it's also got relatively favorable white college graduates to keep him. so that is the set of factors is going to have to deal with. now let's look at the southwest gate. south estates are pretty different from midwest and rust belt states. they're pretty fast growing. they've are relatively high percentage of minority voters. the average for these three states is 36%, which is exactly the level we project for minority voters in 2012 in this election. so this is the kind of state for minority vote is obviously going be critical. but how much more minority voters there are. there's going to be four percentage points more and

nevada let in five points less than the white working class, which is clearly obama's first group. so we really have the collision here between demographics and economics. democratic made huge strides in the last decade or two in the state because of the changing demographics, changes are ongoing and even in the space of four short years is going to be pretty different than it was before, but obviously the economic situation in nevada is just atrocious. the unemployment rate is over 13% that includes the all-important las vegas metro worries about 72% of the vote in las vegas. most of the rest is in reno and very little is in between. so that is the nature of the kind of struggle and a lot of the southwestern states. want to keep relatively from a white college graduates.

you want to make sure minority vote is high and highly supportive of the democratic candidate and try to prevent the bottom from falling out of the white working class though, which is the big -- the weakest part of the obama coalition air and obviously this is the republican candidate will try to do everything in reverse as it were. say let's take a look at a new south state. now, this is critical for republicans facing, these new south states. if they can get 57 electoral votes out of these three new south states, all they have to do is add that to ohio. if they can pick ohio from the midwest, which is the most probable state they are basically almost there with her 27. i think new hampshire would put them over the line. so they'll try to sweep the states. conversely if obama can carry in a far stronger position to

assemble a coalition of 270. so let's take a look at this example of a new south state. these new south states are just like the southwest states fast-growing. they will have a high percentage of minority voters. in 2012 we estimate 31% share of the overall elected in 2012 is exactly what virginia is. look at the demographic changes here. they are huge in a state like virginia should have an increase of two percentage points in the share of minority voters at 231%. white working class down five points. so this is really shifting the whole political demography of virginia in a direction that's very good for democrats and relatively bad for republicans. further virginia has been the locust of republican weakness in the past presidential elections a third of the vote in virginia and if you take the three

measures here, northern virginia, richmond, about 72% of the vote in virginia and the rest is mere 20%. these are the areas the democrats have made no progress in northern virginia ec white college graduates moving in that direction. something interesting i think is worth thinking about we've heard a lot about this alleged opposition between the virginia strategy and ohio strategy for the democrats because while ohio's blue-collar, so that the blue-collar workers in virginia is the white college graduates come asserted a more upscale strategy. we've got 31% minorities for openers in virginia. obviously that is a huge part of the challenge for obama. look at white college graduates. they are important to obama, especially northern virginia. look at the 4455. and even split among white college graduates in ohio. so my college graduates in ohio

contrary to keep apart a successful key part of a successful obama coalition in 2012. so it is not clear looking at these kind of data you would necessarily advise a radically different way of running in virginia as he would in ohio. in fact, i would argue when obama is currently doing makes a fair amount of sense. he's emphasizing the jobs issue in allyn of the economy and every can. he's trying to improve the economy and put more onus on the republicans for the bad economy and this is a classic in combat strategy. we are punished by bad economy. but the question is how much? he is trying to defuse the brain and put more of it on the other side. he's also trying to raise popular issues that preserving social security and medicare, increasing tax rates on the rich to help pay for the things america needs in a variety of other things that will come into

play. basically it's a highly relatively extreme positions at the other side that are massively unpopular and it will be hard for them to wiggle out of. that is the strategy and i think it will work well with minorities. i think it will work well with white college graduates and i think it will help lessen the pain among the white working class. so again, he needs to run in a radically different way. conversely for republicans the way they want to run its not going to be that different from state to state. they clearly want to drive down the white college graduates though. above all they want to increase the white working-class margin in their favor and they want to talk relentlessly about the economy. you know, issues 12 and three. economy is bad, i promise a president. that's the strategy that makes sense. the other thing they should do is stay away from anything that seems extreme recently tried to project at least an image of

moderation. they want to avoid some of the more hardline tea party positions that have become associated with the republican party. that i think is the basic landscape. that is the basic strategy both parties want to follow. as i say, i don't think it's going to look that different. every state will be a little different, but not massively in the way some people have argued. so i could go on forever about this. i could talk about every state, but why do it? we have a great panel. i may have been take a even have a conversation about all this stuff and we'll hear from you guys eventually. so sit wherever you want. it is open seating. and we do have an excellent panel. we have a superb panel. we have a world-class panel. but alas, i am afraid i have to tell you, ryan solon, the editor of the agenda blog for national

review, a dynamic conservative commentator can't make it. he missed his train in new york and he just can't be with us, so i know he is with us in spirit. but we do have a great panel. we have jackie calmes, correspondent for "the new york times," paul taylor for the pew hispanic center and ron brownstein, editorial or of national journal media. so let's hear from the panel. i am tired of talking. jackie, maybe you could comment if you will on the part about economics and the paper, how they'll be so crucial to the 2012 election. is obama getting over with this latest economic line? i mean come as he could of putting these issues in play in a way that's going to help them with some of these groups? >> i think it's best he can at this point. he is doing better let's say. we see improvement since august

in the wake of the death of that site. he is doing that is your hearing and seeing that he's showing -- she's been more partisan frankly it is talking more about jobs as he said. initially yesterday in the wake of the super committee, he didn't in his first remarks did not even mention deficit reduction. he came out and said let's get to work. no politics on any talk about the jobs plan. i talk about deficit reduction. so he has moved from the strategy that marked the first half of the year where he was mainly talking about compromise with republicans, including entitlement and really aggravating his base. the problem is that we have to watch for going forward is how much does this undercut his brand with independents to the extent that he looks like just another partisan and he is

implicitly saying all i said about a post-partisan figure in making washington work, forget about that. i forgot my hands. >> paula, obviously there is a lot in the report about the hispanic voters and how critical they will be, especially in certain states. i know you study this issue every day. do you have stuff you want to add? >> i've got a lot of numbers for you and they are not about to 70, but i will work my way back to 270. ..

it has affected virtually everybody and indeed it has but there is quite a differential impact. meaning white household wealth went down 16% and median black household wealth went down by 66%. down to a point where if you'd take a snapshot in 2009 of the relationship of household wealth among those three groups, whites now have a 20:won over blacks in 18:won over hispanic. this is the double rate that has prevailed for the last 25 years.

it's a somewhat shocking number if you think about the hispanic and a lot of that is driven by the value of your home and if you think about hispanics any think about what they are in this country they are the most recent immigrant group and the most geographically mobile group. the move to economic opportunity. that is what is drawn him here so through the 80's and 90s where were they likely to locate? they were likely to locate in las vegas or phoenix in -- or orlando. some of them did well enough to buy some of those houses and many of them thought as it was inflating so in the bubble hit they have suffered disproportionately whereas the white typically older homeowners bought long ago, sure they have taken a hit but it hasn't been quite as much. let's switch to poverty, which is not a subject that is easy for the american public to get its mind around and if you will permit me because in my former

life i did spend a lot of time because i got -- in the 80's i covered both of jesse jackson's campaigns and stop after stop i would hear him say as who is trying to reach out to white audiences and talk about poverty, he would basically, he's sort of understood that a lot of people -- and an in african-americans talking about it is my committee's problem so he would make the assertion again and again in the 80's, you know, most poor people in this country are not lack. most poor people in this country are white and that was absolutely true because the numbers were such that back then almost 80% of the country was white and the numbers are numbers. the rates are higher among blacks. that is no longer true today among children. most poor children in this country are no longer white. they are not lack. their hispanic. this has to do with a population and it has to do with the

economic marginality of this population group. that's true whether you count why the old method or the new method. indeed if you take the new way of measuring poverty, all the hispanics now have a higher poverty rate than blacks according to the new rates so one of the things to understand about the latino community is it is economically at the margins. it is a very difficult time and how that plays out lyrically remains to be seen. hispanics voted 66, 67% for obama having not been big supporters of a obama in the democratic binaries. they were hillary clinton survivals. they have felt the brunt of this very tough economy. briefly on demographics. hispanics are 16% of the population today. we project that by 2050 as part of what you saw here they will

be 29%. that was our projection as of 2008. that's a big rig number. we are going to redo our population projections next year. i'm guessing our projections will take down because in the last four years you wouldn't know it from the political debate going on in this country, there is excellent and a major decline in hispanic immigration. at the peak recently in 2006, there were about 1 million mexican-americans and when you are talking about the hispanic population, 63% are mexican-americans but it is far and away, there are more mexican immigrants. the united states has more immigrants than mexico than any country in the world has from all other countries in the world. it is an enormous movement of people from one country to another. it was about 1 million a year in 2006 and it is down by 60%, 400,000 a year. probably a combination of our bad economy and increased enforcement.

but nonetheless, hispanic population in mexican-american all hispanic population continues to grow at a very rapid rate. it's the birthrates of the immigrants already here that are behaving like immigrants have throughout human history. those he get up and leave and leave something familiar and go to something new are believers in the future they want a better life for themselves and their kids and they have a lot of kids. that is what is happening in this community and indeed if you compare birthrates of mexican women in mexico which 40 or 50 years ago with seven children per one and now it is about 2.5 children per woman in the birthrates of immigrants in this country, the birthrates are higher among mexican-american women so we are continuing to have this major population boom that has now driven more by birth and by immigration but it is going to continue. then that brings me back to, now we are back to the 270 which is alright, here's his population that is currently 16% of our

population. politically speaking, to use a boxing analogy, it launches below its weight. if 16% of the population but only 9.5% of the eligible electorate and three years ago it was 7.5% of the voters who showed up on election day so why the gap? the gap from 16 of the population to 9% of the eligible electorate is all about the fact they a lot of them are night 18 it in a skewed noncitizens are nonlegal's so if you factor all that in, it's a 9% share of the eligible electorate and then only 7.5% of the actual voters, turnout rates are lower among the latino population than they are among the white and black population. all of those gaps actually have been closing and the demography will close them even more, so this is a population that has a lots of -- i mean it's coming,

it's coming and every year waves of 18-year-olds turn and that is where the population, that is where the population bulge is. so my sense is, from ruy's great map and report, i think you will be the case in 2012, is a strategically located constituency of a small number of swing states in presidential elections. hispanics are overrepresented certainly in the southwestern states and in florida. it is, i mean, you know we know through the -- with george w. bush and karl rove they understood this demographic change and they understood that the battle of the hearts and minds of the latino vote is really a battle for the decade into the next generation or more so the stakes are very high i would say not just for this election but on down the pike in maybe i will just leave it

there. >> you have been all over this political demographic stuff as i have for low these many years and it's like me you freakily try to look at the division of the white population between the white working class and white college-educated voters. your thoughts based on the report? >> in thinking about the report, which i think nails the correct's trends that we are looking at i want to pull the lens back a little bit to put them in the larger context of how each party's coalition has been evolving and of balance of power between them has been evolving. from 1968 to 1988 republicans won five of the six elections for the white house and the average 52.5% of the popular vote. they averaged 417 electoral college votes over those six elections. in the three elections in the 1980s the reagan and bush elections the democrats on the small share of the electoral college vote that may have wanted any three consecutive elections is the formation of the modern party system in

1828th of people understandably at that point were talking about a republican lock on the electoral college. since 1992 democrats have won the popular vote it least and for the past five presidential elections and if obama does win in 2012, they also will have won the popular vote in five out of six elections just as republicans did in the earlier period even though not by his commanding a margin. the question becomes what took us from the first world from a lock to the this world. and i would argue with with the end it is embedded in the paper they are two things fundamentally of change that will continue to affect us in 2012. one as he knows the growth of the minority population and the minority share of the book. when bill clinton was first elected minorities cast cass 12% voted in 2008 it was 26% and it wasn't like there was a sudden surge for the first african-american candidate. there has been a steady growth driven by demography and as that

minority share of the vote has gone up from 12 to 26 in direct hydraulic fashion, the share of the vote cast by the most republican segment of the electorate, the noncollege working-class whites which is a big change from our politics in the 60s, they're sure the vote is going down from 63% to 39%. while republicans remain dominant and obama's problems were not unique to him. you have 40% but no democrat has done better than 44% since 1976 and the last five elections for obama the variation was between 38 and 44%. he was actually right in range with what democrats get with those voters which is not much. the minority share of the vote has increased. the other big changes democrats are mining -- running better among educated whites. they were running around 40% of the vote among the late '80s and into 92. that one up to 44% in 2,002,004 and obama got all the way to 47%

and even at 47% should take further qualify because outside of the south he won an absolute majority of college-educated whites. we can talk later about why this has happened. used to be democrats ran better against noncollege whites but we have had this class where they have change rose. those are long-standing trends that really have changed the political landscape and allow the democrats to move states like illinois and new jersey that voted in the earlier area. the combination of moore college was voting for them and more minority voters a motley saw in 2008 is the most significant thing was a suburbs in north carolina and denver and northern virginia behaved, what do went to the same kind of college -- transition we saw in the '90s. that is when the democratic math expanded and there is now i think it very clear model of

states where democrats do best. their states in many ways embody the same forces obama himself represent. diversity and education and the future of the democratic hardy, so the future the democratic party runs through primarily three states like that. after the election of 2008 i argued obama has assembled what i called a coalition of the defendant which is that he did best among groups that were themselves a growing society, college educated white voters is this the woman and by the way the gender gap among whites is almost entirely a function of primarily a function of well-educated voters, noncollege white women are almost as not -- republican as college educated men. the net effect of all these changes is to reduce the share of the white vote the democrats need to win every four years. as ruy pointed out if the minority share the load goes up 20% which is demographically

possible and democrats hold three-quarters of that which is not a reasonable estimate again. if he can do that, he only needs to win 40% of whites in order to have a majority of the popular vote. but there is no guarantee he can do that. democrats did not do that. republicans in 2010 won the high share the white vote that they ever want in a congressional -- the college whites fell to 39%. so as you look forward to 2012, it is unlikely obama will match you share the vote with either of these three big box. i think it was 1984 would have had the three big superpowers. either college whites, noncollege whites and minorities. and the question is can you manage the declined enough and i think if he does it is much more likely the the white upper middle class will day with him than the white working class and

particularly if he can hold enough college-educated white women. david axelrod cited to me as a potential model where he was obliterated with working-class whites. the last two-thirds of working-class white men is the one because he's -- won enough college-educated whites particularly women. that does not work in ohio. it does work attentively in virginia, colorado, nevada so one last point very quickly. the tough question i think is not answered for democrats is whether there is in fact kind of a treadmill here. and that is that as the minority share share of the vote increases and becomes more visible and becomes more identified with the democratic party over 40% of obama's votes in 2008 came from minorities. it's that phenomenon itself that presses the vote among whites.

is worth noting in a pew study of generations two weeks ago as well as in our own heartland polling we did a similar exercise. we asked people how they felt about the ongoing racial change in the country whether it is too fast, too many newcomers. whites in their poll in the pew poll were split 50/50. 50% said too much change too fast. 50% said no this is good. it is nourishing the country. i just want to read you, i asked andy to run some of these numbers for me in their poll looking at whites divided by how they feel about the racial change. of the 50% who said the change is happening too fast obama's approval was 21, 70% disapproving. disapproving. month as he felt comfortable with the change obama was at 45 to 47 and among those who are comfortable with the change, obama was winning against romney among those whites. among whites who are uncomfortable with the change

romney led 3-1. so it is not to say opposition is, obama's primary driven by race but it does mean attitudes about racial change are intertwining with broader feelings about the role of government particular. i think we are seeing much of the white elect drift go back to the '80s style. the challenge for democrats is maintaining even if the bar gets lower, clearing that bar may get harder in the white community. >> let's lets to him as a little bit this issue of how do you reach them, these white college graduates which may seem at sesta for obama but also the other side. if you are going to give advice to either side, how would they deal with them in a situation where you have got this group, a lot of them in a broad sense that seemed to be more sympathetic than their working-class counterparts. did change in direction of the

country, they feel simpatico with obama but they are probably discontent about the economic situation about their prospects for mobility. what do you say to them? what can get them on your side either way? >> well i think if these groups, think in terms of you know if obama is not reelected, there may be no reaching a lot of groups when the unemployment rate is stuck at 9%. and getting reelected next year in the face of that is arguably as great as his feet as getting elected as the first african-american president. its historic. if he does get defeated, all the things you are talking about not just the demographics but the issues that each party is speaking to is reinforcing that democratic shift so when you talk about the college-educated

white, the fact that you have a national party even debating the idea of evolution, denying climate change, these are the kinds of issues that are going to hurt them in the long run if they don't come off of them just as on immigration. you know, they are reinforcing, the republicans are each of these demographic movements by the issues, the positions they are taking and the young. i could name right at the top of my head to former republican congressman who i know quite well because their children were the same age, so they are now college age, her children and both of them had said to me that their kids up will not call them republicans. they won't call themselves democrats but the single reason they won't call themselves republican is because of abortion rights and. the combination of those two

issues. so when you take all those issues and the republicans are on the wrong side of the demographic shift in this country, that they cannot take if they are to defeat obama next year, they cannot take a lots of comfort in that for the long-term. so in terms of reaching, you see president obama, and i've traveled with them. there is hardly at trippi makes for any reason where he isn't appearing on a college campus. we were just in denver recently. and he draws huge crowds still. and its students and you see a lot of older people in the audience, faculty and i'm assuming, and they just, it's interesting because i read a story recently, i forget which of the republicans haven't made the point that he drew a large crowd of 400 people.

the contrast, but crowds that come out and on college campuses or anyplace else for president obama versus the others, and always has. i guess it was true with hillary clinton as well. so it is just, you know i think he is doing the right thing. i think he is speaking to the right issues on the campuses. but he is having to do, it's a lot of implicit defense of this. here is what i've accomplished because people, a lot of people really don't seem to know when i talk to voters or when you look at the polls, the reader e-mails that i get are all in the spirit of you know, i voted for him in 2008, but what has he done or he hasn't said what he is done and when he does give a speech, you know it is quite a persuasive case.

he recently was talking, this was an issue that goes somewhat appeals to the white college graduate. he said that you know, the passage of the increase in the fuel efficiency standard, if it'd been legislation would have been one of the most important environmental laws ever signed into law, and yet has it was done through the regulatory process and with the agreement of the auto industry, the new generation auto industry executive, most people don't even notice and so there's a kind of things he has to say when he goes to college campuses because you know they are not clear to people in the midst of all the fighting and said backs that really do make the news. >> could cilia tour a, that's the problem. can we hypothesize then as we think about what you just said jackie that this approach of

trying to essentially typecast the republicans as extreme and out of step is like a better way of reaching somebody to -- some of these more upscale constituencies and i think what was the previous model which is we are going to convince people we are bipartisan and you know we are going to deal with this terrible long-term debt trouble meant we are going to deal with the deficit and we are the responsible people. the other side is irresponsible. it totally did not pay off it looks like with the constituent so are they -- i mean is this kind of part of what it's about? >> you have to go back to try to think about what he can do to maintain the vote you have to go back to basics and think about how it moves in the first place. when you look back 30, 40, 50 from franklin roosevelt to jimmy carter democrats ran better among people who work with their hands and why do they flip that

republicans are stronger downscale lens democrats are -- [inaudible] foreign-policy argument versus the alliance argument. is the flipside of what's the matter with kansas. republicans could write a book about what's the matter with bergen? in fact they would raise taxes and answers a lot of them share their values that are more important and particularly if you are thinking about it not only the socialist issues like and guns, the women are much more open to an activist role of government right now than any other part of the white electorate. if he can defend the idea of a balanced approach to deficits for example that is not -- that is something that resonates well with some of those voters. i also think that the questions to them will be how the sharper

populist tone is received among the upper middle class voters and do they say okay yeah the people are -- at the top are screwing me to a running talks about the rich paying their fair share, they are going to be in that net because in the end i think it's going to be very hard for him even with the most populist message that anybody could want to make any roads in that white working-class. they resisted him from day one. that upper-middle-class is part of the electorate but probably the most fluid and that romney is a formidable competitor for those voters. they do not see him as an i.d. law. they see him as competent and they don't believe some of the things he says on that. >> is interesting to note in ohio the recent defeat of s.b. 5 provision two, you look at the

breaks, college-educated whites were not quite as adamantly against it as white working-class voters were but they were close to 64 versus 61 so that is a pretty populist issue i guess and they didn't seem to be all that turned out. pollyanna comment, look at hispanics job for a vote for obama and look at how they are going to vote, far larger margin. may maybe he could could chew on that. >> let me pick up on what jackie and ron were talking about. if you think about the challenge and the message, his message in 2008 was washington is broken. i'm about change especially in 2012. and i will rescue you from what they are present in. obviously it is much more partisan edge. how effective he will be as a communicator, think the most interesting challenge there is probably among the young.

he had the biggest gap young to old of any candidate sense election polls have enabled us to look at who votes by age. he was 66-31 among so-called modal lineal voters. they didn't turn out 18 months ago, a year ago so the electric -- electorate is old. can he hang on to the young. they sort of drink the kool-aid of this is somebody new. he embodies the kind of diversity that is second nature to us. his message about being above politics and changing politics is very appealing and one has to assume three years later there's a good bit of disillusionment as there is across the board. but, ron talked about the coalition. we have never in 40 or 50 years, we have never seen this old to young age gap. indeed if you go back as

recently as 1996 i believe, the clinton dole election, young voters voted more republican than older voters. we have completely turned out around. part of that is the older voters, back in the older voters were still part of the fdr coalition and they were part of the group that was the white working class and accustomed voting democratic. most of them have gone along to their greater rewards of the current generation of voters really have been more conservative throughout and very very angry about economic circumstances and probably uncomfortable and uneasy with the demographic change they see around them. the younger voters completely that into the demographic chain like obama for who he is but i wonder how they will react. they are resisting. they don't like being considered democrats or republicans. the last thing i would say about younger voters is that the system has really delivered them economically a terrible hand.

we looked at wealth by race and ethnicity. if you look at wealth or if you look at poverty or you look at income level or any indicator that make sense for how well people are doing in this country. what you find is that today's old are doing better than yesterday's old on any measure once you adjust for inflation and everything else. today's young are doing worse than yesterdays young so the young who are not going to college are having a terrible time finding a job with record high unemployment rates among under 30s especially among those who didn't go to college. the silver lining is a record share of the young are going to college. some of that is if they can't find a job anyway so a lot of them are flooding into community colleges that they can afford but you know the other side of that story which is they are coming out of these colleges with record shares of student loans debt, very hard to get