with the son he carried the compass and maps in his head and traversed the land when it was lush in the warm the time and when was covered with the frost, the cherokee is described as clouds close in on the trees. the wilderness was indeed his cathedral. next military historian lewis sorely recounts general westmorland who led american forces in the vietnam war from 1964 to 1968. mr. sorely speaks of the national archives in washington, d.c. for about an hour. >> there are many people here

who have encouraged and supported me over the long years of research and writing. i would like to acknowledge one in particular, former colonel viet who's come from houston to be with us today. viet and i have been friends since 1961 when as captains we were classmates at the school at fort knox. viet served briefly and honorably during the years of the vietnam war and again putting an assignment as the chief. after the war he and his family came to america where things to be incredibly hard work and find family values they have prospered. viet has also written steel and blogging in excellent book about the vietnam war. ladies and gentlemen, colonel viet. [applause] >> as you know we're going to

talk today about the life and career of general westmoreland. i warn you at the outset this is not a happy story but it is i think an important even the central one. my contention is that unless and until we understand william charles was marland we will never fully understand what happened to us in vietnam or why. his involvement in the vietnam war was the defining aspect of his life he himself received that and was driven for the rest of his days to characterize, explained, rationalize come and defend that row role. his memoirs were left to the fixation and in a long career totaling 36 years as an officer and a string of postings to increasingly important assignments in the four years he commanded american forces in

vietnam and the aftermath constitute virtually the entire the of the account, all the rest a meager tent. understanding westmoreland is not easy. he turns out to be a surprisingly complex man, fueled by ambition, driving himself relentlessly of the impressive military means, energetic and effective self-promotion and skillful at cultivating influential sponsors from his earliest days of service he led his contemporaries, was admired and advanced by his seniors and progressed rapidly airports. but few who served with him would claim they knew this distant and difficult man. general walter kurland was was orland's chief of staff over a year in vietnam requires

although they worked very closely together, he and wes mullen never had a personal relationship, never even he said in normal conversation as colleagues ordinarily would. you couldn't get to him friendship and that kind of thing he remembered. westmoreland had an extraordinary capacity for polarizing the views of those who encountered him. few of whom remained in different. his executive officer when westmoreland was army chief of staff described him as the most gracious gentlemanly person with whom i never served and an executive officer he had in vietnam regarded him as the only man he ever met to whom the term great could be applied. there were others though, many

who held a darker view. among the most prominent was harold johnson, a man of surpassing decency and good will. i don't happen to be a fan of general westmoreland's said johnson. i don't think i ever was coming and i certainly didn't become one as a result of the vietnam war or leader during his tenure as the chief of staff of the army. a general officer of another service who served closely with westmoreland in vietnam described him as odd by his own magnificence. westmoreland was born and raised in south carolina near spartanburg where his father was the manager of a textile mill. an eagle scout at age 15, president of his high school class, first captain at west point, westmoreland was encouraged from his earliest days to think of himself as a special the gifted and

privileged. his father wrote to him at west point during his plea saying you do not know how happy and proud it makes us all to know that you are making good. even the small boys and the negro's are interested and product, and later in the same period he wrote to him again and said when you need anything right to me and i will send it to you. there is nothing too good for you. and a subsequent letter still during westmoreland's plea as a cadet at west point when he went further the people here said white and black think you are about the biggest man in the country. roosevelt has no act at all compared to you. they really believe you will be president of the u.s. someday and talk about this among

themselves. westmoreland entered world war ii is the commander of an artillery in the ninth infantry division, taking his unit into the combat in north africa. there they performed with distinction earning a presidential unit citation. subsequently in sicily he served temporarily devotee than brigadier general maxwell taylor, then the division artillery commander of the 82nd airborne vision an association that would be extremely important to westmoreland for what the rest of his career. he was a staff officer when the fighting was over he was given the command of an infantry regiment or six months in the army of occupation. then back in the united states he was able to get an assignment to the decision there were division or after attending a school he had a year in command

of the infantry regiment and then three years as the division chief of staff. then leave in the korean war he took command of the 27 airborne regiment combat team the unit that constituted the theater reserve and consequently, stationed in japan and periodically deployed to korea. westmoreland command the outfit for 16 months of which nine months were spent in japan where after he had been promoted to the brigadier he was able to live with his wife and their young first child and six months of the 15 spent in korea. during which such. when they were not in combat, westmoreland for the master parachute badge made 13 jumps in one day. after the war on his part they

awarded the 187 presidential unit citation. the new brigadier westmoreland experienced his first pentagon duty with an assignment and personnel. i had not served there before, he said, speaking to the pentagon, and i didn't want to serve them. come soon maxwell taylor became the army chief of staff and rescued him from the personnel making his secretary of the general staff. two years later having in the meantime been promoted to the to starring he was rewarded by taylor with command of the 101st airborne division things move quickly after that. two years as a division commander followed by the three year assignment as the superintendent of the united states military academy at west point, then a promotion to lieutenant general and six months in command of the 18th

airborne corps and another promotion soon thereafter. westmoreland was sent to vietnam in january, 1964 as deputy to general paul perkins who was the then commanding u.s. forces than in june of 1964, westmoreland replaced him as the command of the u.s. command vietnam the start of the four year stint in that post for westmoreland. beginning in the spring of 1965, the united states began deploying ground forces to vietnam. under westmoreland who had decided to conduct a war of attrition, the forces concentrated almost entirely the large unit search and destroy operations primarily in the deep jungle. fixated on the large operations

which were referred to as many by the war of the science, westmoreland largely ignored key responsibilities, most importantly, the upgrading of south viet nam's military forces and dealing with pacification. his way of the war did nothing to affect the situation in south viet nam's villages where the enemy's covered infrastructure was left free to continue using the coercion and tear her to dominate the world populace did approve the south vietnamese of the modern weaponry giving the u.s. and other allied forces priority for issue of the new m-16 rifle and other advanced military wherewithal the south vietnamese went for years equipped with castoff world war ii vintage u.s. equipment while being helped by the communist provided the great ak-47 assault rifle and other advanced equipment by their backers, the

soviet union in the communist china. it is very important to know that was left to westmoreland to divide his own approach to caulker the war. the conventional you view of the war also it was micromanaged from washington, there are many stories of how as we all know at lyndon johnson's whitehouse the famous tuesday luncheons and so one he and other top mostly civilian officials would even select and improve individual bombing targets in vietnam and things like that. but those decisions have to do with actions taken outside of south vietnam. within south vietnam the u.s. commander had latitude in deciding how to fight the war. this was true for westmoreland and his eventual successor. this was not come his latitude

wasn't has concluded a good thing. there were many weaknesses in the strategy, he said, which in the numerous senator really it ablaze played into the hands of the enemy. for one, chasing around the countryside was fitial. general philip davidson, westmoreland's chief officer said that westmoreland's interest always plays in the big unit war. pacification for him and said davidson the search and destroy operations favored by westmoreland accomplished little in providing the secure environment which pacification required. the measure of merit and the war of patrician was body count. he underestimated the staying power calculating that if he could inflict enough casualties and the communists they would lose heart and cease their aggression against south

vietnam. instead the any proved willing to observe enormous losses and still keep fighting. thus the progress that westmoreland claimed racking up huge body counts did nothing to when the war. the enemy simply kept sending more and more replacement to make up his losses westmoreland was on a treadmill. westmoreland also overestimated the american people's patience and tolerance of friendly losses on the visit to south vietnam, senator hollings from westmoreland's stand of south carolina was told by westmoreland we are killing these people, the enemy come at a ratio of 10-1. he said westie, they don't care about the ten, they care about the one. westmoreland didn't get it.

his response to any problem was to request more troops. the result was a buildup of the u.s. contingent ground forces that reach well over half but when the troup request kept coming with no evident progress in opening of the war, washington's patients finally ran out. in the spring of 1967, westmoreland asked for 200,000 more troops but got only a fraction of that amount come he stated publicly that he was delighted with the outcome. but in his memoirs, she decided instead that he had been extremely disappointed. leader still, on the witness stand in the libel trial suit he brought against cbs television he changed the stands again and said he had not been extremely disappointing in response to the cbs attorney from his own book

extremely disappointed. forcing westmoreland to recant. and then win in the wake of the enemy's 1968 offensive, westmoreland asked for another 206,000 troops request he then spent years denying he had ever made, but he did. he got token forces and was soon on his way home. it is clear that he thought he could take the war over from the south vietnamese, bring it to a successful conclusion then have the country back to them and go home and glory, but he could not. the ambassador ellsworth saw that this was the case, concluding that when the united states first got involved, the political and psychological nature of the war was not understood. and he said because we didn't understand it, our military thought we could get in and do the job and get out much more

quickly than proven to be the case. i think, said a bunker, that's one reason we were slow training the vietnamese instead of starting really to train them in an intensive way when we first went in there. we didn't begin to train the vietnamese with the object of their taking over from last until general abrams got there. this disparity of resources especially the weapons persisted throughout the tenure in vietnam. ambassador blunder noted in the 29th of february, 1968, only weeks before his departure after his four years in command. he said the enemy has been able to request his troops with sophisticated weapons. they are better equipped than the forces a fact which has an adverse bearing on the morrell. he had been there and granted the u.s. forces for nearly four

years and then leader maintained he had done everything possible to build up the south vietnamese another ambassador of the time general maxwell taylor i think of his sponsorship of westmoreland was even more blunt. we never paid attention to the army, he said. we didn't give a damn about them. not until abrams came on the scene did this attitude change. 1967 was a fateful time in westmoreland's vietnam service. everyone agrees that 1968 was a full year. 1967 was equally so. during that year, westmoreland made three trips to the united states where in public appearances he gave a very optimistic assessment of how the war was coming and this became a part of what was called the

johnson administration's progress offensive very encouraged and he said a plant site press conference upon arriving in the united states in mid november i've never been more encouraged during my entire almost four years in the country, and at the national press club he asserted that we have reached an important point where the end begins to come into view, and he added, the enemies hopes are bankrupt. on another visit that year he spoke to a joint provisional congress rendering another optimistic report and being so taken with the experience that he later described as the most memorable moment and his military career and his finest hour which gave him the greatest personal satisfaction. i must say i find it both ironic and sad that a famous general finds a political event the most

satisfying of his military career. 1967 was also a time of the vigorous debate about the enemy's order of battle, which means his strength and organization. westmoreland denied the senior civilian official secular data by imposing a ceiling on the number of enemy forces his intelligence officers could report or agree to and i personally removing from the order of the battle the entire categories that have long been included thus falsely portraying progress in reducing in any strength. by may of 1967, president johnson was referring to the war as a bloody in past. a military historian russell widely commented simply on lbj. no cable war president, he wrote, would have allowed an officer of such comic to capacities as general westmoreland to head of the military assistance command vietnam for so long.

meanwhile, he challenged by newsmen on his optimistic pronouncements resorted to his familiar reliance on the body count. we are pleading him a great deal more than he is pleading us. he sought to portray the year 1967 as a triumphant wondering which he was winning the war. the command history for that year 1967 was characterized by accelerating efforts and growing success in all phases of the endeavors. that was now not how he or his performance was seen by others. general bruce palmer referred to earlier than serving the deputy commanding general of the u.s. army vietnam and when general creighton abrams are right to be the deputy to westmoreland in may of that year, general palmer told him that he really had a basic disagreements on how it

was organized and how we were doing it and later general palmer elaborately to own those and in an interview with mark perry said it was just a mess. we were losing it and trying to put it together in just wasn't working. there wasn't anything there was working. in the late summer of '67 the ambassador ellsworth bunker submitted this assessment. we still have a long way to go. much of the country is still. the enemy can still shall our bases and commit acts of terrorism in the secure areas and the unit still not large skillet tax most of which the populace has still not actively committed itself to the government and adc infrastructure still exists throughout the country. that is what westmoreland had to show for three years in command of the forces. by the end of 1967 we remembered mix of the kunkel list in the grim sense of siege in the white

house. finally, even general william architect of the search and destroy concept admitted that it was a losing concept of operations. we ended up, he said, after it was all over with no operational plan that had the slightest chance of ending the war favorably. in the face of this united opposition to his way of the war, westmoreland maintained then and later that the north vietnamese, the enemy and mid 1967 were in a position of weakness. this is the saddest result of all of the years of research on these matters. there were many instances including and especially concerning matters in vietnam westmoreland had been willing to shade or misremember or deny the

record and his perceived interests were at risk. one episode involving his lack of confidence in the leadership is both illustrative and revealing. shortly before the tet offensive began in january, 1968, he decided to send his deputy north to the region to establish the technical headquarters he designated. from their general abrams was controlling the operations of all u.s. forces in the area including those of the marine corps and of course the army. the chief intelligence officer for the davison had returned to a visit to qassam, the remote outpost near listened by the marines and briefed westmoreland on the situation there. the description of the unprotected installations and the general lack of preparation to withstand heavy concentration of artillery and he said

agitated general westmoreland he turned to his deputy and said something to the effect that he lost confidence in the marine general's ability to handle the increasingly threatening situation his response was to set up and send a brahms up to take the man. the action was predictable one division commander called this the most fun part of the thing that saigon did and said the marines viewed with shock and astonishment and all the conference on which he denied the loss of confidence and the leadership had been his reason for placing the new headquarters over them. westmoreland also tabled the marine general to say there has been extensive background here in saigon with the various news bureau chiefs to point out that establishing carried a stigma whatsoever with respect to the

marines that it was a normal military practice and that there was only temporary. unfortunately, only the temporary was true. the other denials were false as evidenced not only by general david's eyewitness account but also by the lengthy and anguished cable was westmoreland had sent contemporaneously to the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. as you perhaps appreciate, he began, the military professionalism of the marines false fall short of the standards that should be demanded by our forces indeed they are brave and proud but their standards, tactics and lack of command supervision throughout their ranks requires improvement in the national interest, and there was more. i would be less than frank come added westmoreland come if i didn't say that i feel really insecure with the situation in the province in view of my

knowledge of their shortcomings. without question, many lives would be saved if they're tactical professionalism were enhanced. after the war, when the marines or writing the history of the conflict they sent a draft of the 1968 volume for comment. he marked it up so extensively and took issue with so many of the judgments rendered that it was invited to discuss the whole matter and person. he accepted and in the recession with a number of marine corps historians again insisted with regard to the establishment of that particular action had not a damn thing to do with my confidence in the general or the marines, not a damn thing. this was not only false, but given the existing paper trail, reckless in the extreme.

westmoreland wrapped up false, misleading and inaccurate statement of commissions ranging from the battle to the troup request from the situation of vietnam to the closure of the base and from the battles to the prediction of the early end of the war to the light at the end of the tunnel. some of these matters or petty and others were of crucial in importance, but they were alike in one respect when he saw his personal interest of state he did not hesitate to conceal or abandon the truth. when at the end of january, 1968, the enemy ten offensive began, westmoreland's long term was ending. newsweek magazine described in a devastating measured of how far he had fallen. in november they said when he was conjuring up the light at the end of the tunnel he was affectionately called westie but

by last week he was general westmoreland and most official and unofficial briefings. the resurgence of the enemy forces led many to conclude that in his optimistic forecast of the previous year he had either not known what he was talking about or haven't leveled with the american people. it is hard to know which is the more devastating criticism. what was clear, however, was that with his unavailing approach to the conduct of the war, westmoreland had squandered four years of support for the war buy much of the american people the congress and even the media. for the next four years, westmoreland served as the army chief of staff, the army of the day was struggling with many problems, some the result of the ongoing war of the vietnam and others more societal. these included in discipline,

widespread drug abuse, racial disharmony, budgetary shortfalls, and the necessity to prepare for the end of the draft and in pending transition to an all volunteer force. faced with these multiple crises, westmoreland decided to focus his attention elsewhere. ..

>> he gained no more understanding of the war than when he had when he was in vietnam. tom was the cia chief of station saigon when they made the 1972 visit there. they both attended a small function at ambassador bunker's residence, where said polgar of west moreland, i was astonished at his lack of understanding of what was going on in the war even then. in later years, westmore viewed himself as put upon. my years were fought with frustrations and sadness, he said to an hometown audience. no one's taken more good enough than i have, and i'm not apologizing for a damn thing, nothing, and i welcome being the point man. that outlook, no second guessing of himself and no regrets persisted through the end of his

life. as army chief of staff and beyond, westmoreland shaped the historical record in ways favorable to his version of reality. this included writing his memoirs. when they were published, kevin buckly, formally the bureau chief in saigon reviewed the book commenting that from the beginning, westmoreland probably expected to write a memo of victory similar to general eisenhower's crew -- crusade in europe. this vietnam has not stopped him from doing this. as commander in vietnam, i underwent frustrations, endured much interference, lived with countless irritations, swallowed many disappointments, bore considerable criticism. reviewing this same book, the memoirs, well known commentator

concluded that westmoreland remains the most mournful disadventure abroad ever. two major episodes, both extremely traumatic mark the westmoreland retirement years. first was the dramatically unsuccessful campaign for governor in his native state of south carolina, then the failed liable suit against the cbs network for a documentary charging him with manipulation of enemy strength figures while he commanded u.s. forces in vietnam. in each of these cases, westmorelandignored the -- ignored the advice of men who had his best interest at heart and counseled against the action he took. in the campaign, he was second in the republican primary to a state senator who then went on

to be elected south carolina's first republican governor since reconstruction. westmoreland said he found it very hard to shake hands with people, to ask people for favors and talk about himself. despite a campaign theme, describing him as the only candidate with proven leadership and ability to carry south carolina to greatness, westmoreland ran a poorly managed campaign, late getting started, never had a message, and wound up deeply in debt. afterward, he called it his most humiliating experience. then, in 1982, cbs television aired a documentary charging westmoreland with having manipulated reports of enemy strength during the vietnam war. he had willingly participated to making the program, being interviewed on camera and asking to be paid for doing so. the resulting forecast was not

favorable to him with numerous former intelligence officers describing how enemy strength data was manipulated and how westmoreland himself decreed that certain whole categories of enemy forces be taken out of the order of battle, thus artificially driving down the total 6 enemy forces as to claim progress in his war on attrition. in due course, against the advice of high powered attorneys who cautioned against it, westmoreland brought a liable suit against cbs seeking $120 million in damages. subsequent to the broadcast, it came out the producer had committed numerous violations of cbs guidelines. the basic findings, however, were seen as valid. in the course of a lengthy trial, westmoreland was represented by an attorney who never before tried a case in court, and things did not go

well. still, the case dragged on for some 18 weeks of testimony. then, just days before the case was to have gone todd jury, -- to the jury, westmoreland withdrew his case, and then he was exonerated and received no money. then he said the effort to defame, dishonor, and destroy those under my command had been exposed and defeated. i, therefore, withdrew from the battlefield, all flags flying. editorial opinion was not so favorable. the "new york times" stated the prevailing reaction. at the end it concluded, general westmoreland was in imminent danger of having them prove the cbs report in court as on the original program, the general could not get past testimony of high ranking so boar daunts who

included he colored some intelligence information. said one the jurors to the press on the way out the courthouse door, the evidence in favor of cbs was overwhelming. westmoreland's life has been miserable said a former aid. westmoreland himself seems to have contributed much to that outcome. the vietnam war's my number one priority he told an interviewers years after his retirement. i tried to spread myself thin visiting all sections of the country, but then in an assertion completely underminding, demeaning of purpose of all those years of incessant and frantic activity, westmoreland told a college audience that in the scope of history, vietnam is not going to be a big deal. it won't float to the top as a major endeavor.

westmoreland's ultimate failure, it seems to me, would have earned him more compassion had he not personally been so fundamentally to blame for the endless self-promotion that elevated him to positions and responsibilities beyond his capacity. it's the aggressive guy who gets the share, plus westmoreland maintained, that principle applies to most anything, and that's the way he operated. in later years, westmoreland, widely regarded as a general who lost his war, also lost his only run for political office, lost his liable suit, and lost his reputation was a sad ending for a man who, for most of his life and career, had led a termed exist engs. he -- existence. he lived a long life, inflicted with alzheimer's disease his

last decade, died in july of 2005, and was buried in westpoint at a grave he collected while superintendent there. as a final irony given his very strong and vocal opposition to the admission of women to westpoint. the honor guard for the barrel ceremony was commanded and very ably by a female cadet officer. thank you very much. i'll be have happy to answer your questions. [applause] anybodywant to start? stop -- stunned, just stunned. >> the mic. >> yes, ma'am, please. >> you gave us an interesting,

colorful analysis of him, but it has to do with the organizational one. >> yes. >> i didn't hear about the role of the commander in chief or his supervisors in the military. weren't there some responsibility there, and has that changed now? i mean, could you compare that with where we are in 2011? >> that's a very good first question. i thank you for it. "time" sent me integ interrogatories, and i responded to had and they asked if the subtitle was fair, and i said it was, and i explained why and explained that here i think, it's the fact he had to decide how to fight the war and his releaptless pursuit -- relentless pursuit to the unvailing war. if you think the subtitle is

fair, who's the other co-conspirators, and that's a good question and pretty much what you're asking. i began by saying there's a lot of candidates of the top tear of fellow miscreants there, and i describe three. lyndon johnson, president and commander in chief, robert, the secretary of defense, and general earl wheeler, who was for a long period of time there chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, and i tried to explain why general westmoreland was allowed to be commander of vietnam for so long when so many people saw that he was not achieving the success that he was claiming, and i've quoted any number of them here. general bruce palmer, a four star general who was his classmate at westpoint, and then another who succeeded him, and general fred wyatt and later became the chief the staff,

general phil davidson, and many, many others who saw this was not working, and so you have to say, well, why was he allowed to continue? it's -- it's hard to explain that. it shouldn't have happened that way, but a partial explanation, at least, has to reside in an examination of the people above him who had the authority to replace him or to direct him to conduct his operations in a different manner. you start with lyndon johnson. in my estimation, no knowledge of military fairs in general, and in many ways rather obtuse as well. secretary of defense, robert, is the same, no real knowledge of military affairs, and then we get to general earl wheeler, and many mist -- and in my estimation, he's the main problem, and he endorsed

westmoreland's idea that fire power and going in the jungles was the way to conduct the war, so he was no help. i speculate -- well, i'll go further than that -- i assert the three main people in chain of command who had the authority if they had chosen to use it, to replace westmoreland lacked the knowledge and even the confidence to do that, but there were others who were working hard to try to achieve the objective that i believe should have been sought, and one of the most important referred to is general harold k. johnson. general johnson was the army chief of staff, and early on, he conducted a study, it's known as the proven study -- p-r-o-v-e-n study, and that said

flat out what the general is doing is not working and cannot work, and the reason is it's ignoring the situation in the hamlets and villages where the infrastructure was dominating the populous, and so he said here's the real way to fight the war, and this is exactly what general abrams did when he took command in the spring of 1968. he implemented the proven study, and said instead of a war of attrition, it's got to be security. instead of search and destroy oarptions, we conduct hold operations that was provided by much upraided territorial forces of the south vietnamese because of what westmoreland never gave them, and now it's not body count, but population secured. it's very important and significant, i believe.

that by autumn of 1966, at the latest, the two senior officers in charge of the two forces that were fighting the ground war, general johnson, chief of staff of the army, and general wallace greene, come daunt of the marine corp. agreed this approach was wrong and prescribed the alternative. general johnson tried hard to get this approach some interest and some support in the joint chiefs of staff. he didn't make progress there are earl wheeler in charge and his commitment to fire power. 245 didn't go anywhere. the general was briefed. he rejected it out of hand, probably not too surprising. an officer of that day named herb chandler, later a very well-known and successful writer about the war in vietnam said he was the staff officer assigned to write westmoreland's response

to the proven study saying we all, the young staff officers, thought it was great, but we were not allowed to say that. we had to say there's good ideas here for study, and we're doing most of these things already and so on, so that did not go anywhere until, as i said, the commanders changed. that's why i said in the course of my remarks that the reason general westmoreland is the general who lost the vietnam war is that he basically squandered four years of support for our war in vietnam, and even though in the latter period after he was succeeded, things went much, much better near the end of congress and probably the people just ran out of patience and support for the war, and even when we just gave them the money, they were motivated to pull the plug. now, you asked me about the current situation. i'm not very well qualified to

comment on that. you're looking at a genuine dinosaur. i occupied myself day and night for 30 years thinking about the period of 1960 through 1975, and while i have the general awareness of anyone who reads the newspapers has about the situation now in iraq and afghanistan, i can't profess to any particular expertise there. i will say that in the early and latter years of our involvement in iraq, we did see a similar pattern in that the early commanders went about the war in the way similar to what general westmoreland did, and then when we changed commanders there, general david petraeus came in, and i think he exhibited a more abram's like understanding of the nature of the war and how it should be conducted. many of you know that when he came back in the period between his service in iraq and service

in afghanistan, general petraeus was in fort worth tasked with writing a manual to be issued by both the army and marine corp., and it's a well-done document, and if you read it, you'll be amazed at the parallels, i think, between the prescriptions there and the proven study of what general abrams did when he later took command. that was a long answer, but that was a very fundamental question, and i thank you for that. >> [inaudible] >> i can't. i don't know enough about that. i just hang myself here with ignorance. i can't do that. thank you. other questions? yes, please. >> would you comment on what happened after westmoreland appeared on the cover of "time" as the man of the year? i was out in vietnam in 67, and there was a lot of talk going around about westmoreland running for president, and it was coming out of that, and i

don't know if that's in your book or not, but it seems to me in retrospect that that may have added a great deal to his ego and convictions. >> good question, and there's a little in the book on this. the question has to do with, of course, "time" magazine cover, the first issue of 1966, general westmoreland was shown in the cover, not in a photograph, but a bus that had been sculpted of him for that purpose, and it said he's the 1965 man of the year. now, that's the year when we're beginning to build up forces in vietnam, and he is talking even then on optimistically about the outcome. there are two earlier biographies of general westmoreland, and the first is called the inevitable general

written by pat ferguson, a good guy, and i talked to him at length. this book was published in 1968, so it was written in 1967, long before the end of westmoreland's career and before the end of vietnam. why was this book written at this time, and there's a colonel named paul myles, well known to some in this period, and unlike those who worked as aids to westmoreland, he stayed in touch with him for the rest of his life. paul myles said he thought westmoreland harbored presidential aspirations, and he was never able to shake the view that this was to be a campaign biography. others have said that although there was the uproar in the summer of 67, that might have called for westmoreland to be

reassigned at that time, lyndon johnson may have perceived he had political aspirations, and it was very convenient for him to leave him 12,000 miles away under his command rather than bringing him back where he could join the political trail. bruce palmer said very straightforwardly to me in an interview when he came back from vietnam, he had presidential aspirations, and i tried to say to him, westy, this was not a popular war. as it turned out, he did try, as i described, to become governor of south carolina. he was very inept campaigner, and even worse, probably, an inept manager of his campaign. there were people in the republican party who thought he might be a viable candidate that they could use to oppose lyndon johnson, i guess in the autumn of 68 elections, but nothing came of that.

he always denied the presidential aspirations, but i believe that he did, but the situation never allowed anything to come of them. thanks for that. anybody else? >> right here, bob. >> yes, please. >> recently, i read hr mcmaster's book, and i know you knew him well, even had him stay at your house while he was writing the book. >> yeah. >> and in that book, he really lays it on president johnson, secretary, and he also said, and the crux of my question -- >> yes. >> he also kept saying kill more vc every time he saw the joint chiefs, largely ignored, but every time he saw him, he said that. >> yeah. >> now, was that with westmoreland's emphasis on body

count, what did that have to do with leading to that? >> that's -- >> cause of it, or is it something else? >> that's a very fine question, and i'll start by saying i have enormous admiration for hr mcmaster, a brilliant general and a fine author. that book's been out for years, but it's still on the shelf. it has a long life. here i talked about the things you just asked about many times, and basically his bookends before my -- book ends before my account begins. we discussed his take on general johnson, whom i referred to several times. i wrote a biography of johnson called "honorable warrier" concluding he was one the finest officers we ever had, and one of the most honest, so some of the criticisms that hr makes of him in his book, i think are colored

by the fact that had he covered a later period when proven makes its appearance and so on, it might have influenced how hr evaluated him, but let's talk about lyndon johnson. i think, i didn't have time to cover this in the prepared remarks, but i think you could also say besides the other criticisms i've leveled with him, that in the course of his conduct of the war, regime westmoreland was guilty of macrodiso bead yeans, and -- macrodisoobedience, and the reason i say that, january of that year, there was a major conference in honolulu. one way of conducting the war was to have conferences periodically, various locations, and the president would come sometimes and lyndon johnson came to the conference in honolulu in february of 1966, and westmoreland came from vietnam as did the two senior

vote vietnamese as they then were, and the point of this conference was to boost american support for passification, which you've heard me say westmoreland ignored and the intelligence chief said passification and so on, and so it's not just lyndon johnson focusing on kill more vc, although he said that lots of times, but now we have to get past the passification effort if we're every going to get out of here. i put words in his mouth, but that's the implication of what he said, so we go back to vietnam with that -- those instructions, and william c. westmoreland says retrospecktively, i was getting pressure after pressure after pressure to pay more attention to passification, and i wasn't going to do that at the expense of leaving off the war of the --

against the enemy's main forces. now, i don't know how you view that, but that seems like at best insubordination of a high degree, and at worst, disobedience to orders to his commander in chief, so you asked for evidence of that or we look for evidence of that. one of the details that impressed me greatly, and i devoted a chapter to this is what he did or did not do with respect to arming the vote vietnamese,and i look at the m-16 rifle as an example of that, and he never did anything for them, and it's not until abrams came to the scene as deputy in 1967 that the vietnamese began to get any help at all, so i think lyndon

johnson was persuaded, and i don't know by what forces that passification was important, and after abrams took command, we had a great team there with bunker in charge of the embassy, abrams in charge of the mill care, and colbie in charge of passification, and they agreed it was one war of operations, but much changed from the sweeps and passification and upgrading the armed forces, and only that way did they say we could succeed. >> thank you. can i ask one more? >> [inaudible] >> do we have time for one more, or no? >> short question? >> short question. in the book, beside johnson, robert, and wheeler, that you talked about, mcmaster says bad things or says max taylor, the ambassador at that time over westmoreland, also was party to confusing things, let me put it

that way. comment? >> all right. there's a lot of things, i think, could be said about general taylor that maybe don't quite match with the reputation i believe he still enjoys pretty widely. i already indicated more than once he was probably westmoreland's most important patron and thanks to him, westmoreland reached the high levels he did, including the assignment to vietnam, but i think that maxwell taylor and westmoreland, if they didn't have a falling out, they had a diversion of view appointments. -- viewpoints. it was documentable that when the first forces came ashore, marine elements of march of 1965, taylor as ambassador had no warning they were coming, and nobody told him, and the pentagon knew and didn't tell him.

he was marginalized by that point. that's the detailed analysis and evaluation of general taylor's topic for another day, but he was sinned against as well as sinning. i'll leave it at that. ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for coming and for the great questions. [applause]