>> is a very elusive body and various organizations including the branches of the military and turn off all security service including the fbi and the united states. it is an equivalent to the cia and in the army we are intelligence branch which keeps doing pretty much whatever the nsa is doing. what is their working philosophy you. because it is a work of trial and error and terrorism unlike other parts of the warfare she can. but it's not the kind of threat to the military used to do for and what happened over the years is the terrorism took an increasing blow.

it was a very annoying phenomena that they had to respond to quit often. the problem with terrorism i don't fully there was an awful burden on policy makers to make a decision, to reassure the public but we are in control terrorism is something that's hard to control. it's much more challenging than fitting a division where and the egyptian and armored brigade that israel is rather unique in the sense that it's filled with terrorism for years and years and all kinds of terrorism had they perfected a model that you have seen? >> whenever they do perfect model the terrorists are innovating and so for a sample of we think about last several

years when israel was coping with a very formidable challenge of suicide bombers. between 2004 preoccupying parts of the west bank wouldn't be a good solution and it did work because since 2004 the number of attacks is significantly bad. i didn't eliminate terrorism because then hamas for example will learn that in order to keep so once you direct the barrier, they will come up with more which would lead to the new challenges. >> in your book you talk about four different models of

terrorism. >> we're talking about the gist of it is to close it down and use the more model which is treating terrorism as this was the immediate response of the united states trying to put your service and in this kind of framework that it's something we know how to deal with and of course if you go to the military for a fisa problem is the peril was some is not a threat and that is why what i'm introducing the criminal-justice model and introducing the model that in my opinion is more suitable to a reading terrorism rather than using military force.

i think that terrorism is, again, it's not that i'm trying to -- i think we've to demystify terrorism and what the problem is that once we declare the war on terror, we are doing something quite a bizarre. we are declaring a war might in the country over entity so you cannot receive terror and realize the clothes that she is calling it to where were perpetrating a tax. they did not pose a strategic threat. it would frighten the public. policymakers tend to look for those formulas the knollwood dealing with this phenomenon and therefore what you see, the immediate response.

if you really want to reduce the impact of terrorism, go to look at aid from a different perspective than a military one. so, you were in the united states after 9/11, then president george w. bush, dr. loco war, terror in your view. when the united states launched the war in afghanistan, it was the right thing to do. you pretty much destroy al qaeda within the first six weeks and the taliban regime and then there were. and in the 11th year of the war in afghanistan it's not a war on terror. it's a completely kind of war over the years and if i united

states took many important measures over the years in an attempt to corporate turbans and increasing security, using all kinds of measures that are enhancing the capabilities of the intelligence community but the reaction was the most important one in the, you know, eliminating the threat and by the way, today using tongs, targeting specific individuals in the al qaeda network rather than thinking about them as these kind of you have to deploy and the u.s. saying to enter the war again. now how many -- in israel is the war model the one that is usually you used or all four of the models that you identified? >> mostly the policymakers are run of the world. the democratic settings, they

are being held accountable by their constituents. that's when i started doing research after the second intifada. and i remember i came to the u.s. and 04 at the last stage. it's looking for an answer and when you see the policy maker who is taking a top position and deploying in special operations. i mean elaborating on a book of all kinds of the assassination at him this, etc.. reassures the public that something isn't being done. flexibility go back to the famous six and zero of the game 1972 and it compared to the government who launched again the plo. we see that the end of the day it was a very intense.

i'm not sure of that was to undermine to seek still while people are being attacked so they started seeing individuals that many of them had nothing to do with. i'm trying in to see the policies need to -- i need to. weaker till the the threat of terrorism and one of the problems they want. there is no solution to the programs. you can reduce the intensity of the attack. the humanities at terrorism for

centuries. we've never gotten -- we've never e. eliminated. but the public still expects policymakers to do this and this results deutsch of measures which at the end of the day not very effective. how many professors the university of texas austin? he is a professor of government and middle eastern studies. he is also the head of the tighter lab here at the university of texas. what is the tiger lap? >> it's a small resource center where we are conducting research and terrorism, insurgency in gargle was and graduate students are doing their limitations trying to analyze the copy utilizing various resource that fits. so the ability still believes it can be supporting the.

a professor, looking back the operation of the 1972 retaliation by israel for the munich attacks. have there been schools of thought and israel about how they would approach that today? what they would do differently. >> we see there is a very interesting link between israel