>> it's a combination of the longs and shorts. i don't, you know, i don't think that therefore the conclusion is exactly how you would -- in short -- >> at some point you had to know there was not enough money.

>> the only time that we could conclude there was not enough money was when the unreconciled accounts were -- >> well -- >> were notified. >> well, okay. were maturity transactions used to hide or mask risks associated why europe's sorch debt? it's been reported that the use of these transactions in connection increased over your time as ceo. did you use the transactions as a mean to hide the risk? >> congresswoman, the disclosure that you cited was in our reports to the public and our public disclosure documents along with its implications for

gains and losses, and those disclosure documents were reviewed by our outside auditors, reviewed by com, reviewed by -- reviewed by council, reviewedded by our audit committee, and discussions of those elements were part of public discussions with analysts and others. >> well, it's been reported by wall street journal that despite warning from board members and from your own employee, you pushed forward with the aggressive and highly leveraged positions on foreign sovereign debt. we've been watching the eurozone crisis unfold and there's specific incertainty about the resolution. why were you confident about the bets and to what degree were you willing to bet the very survival of the firm, the employees, and most importantly, the

shareholders? >> the investments that we had in the euro sovereigns were bought and financed to their maturity, and those positions were very difficult to be able to be unwound, and once they were in position they had significantly less liquidity than security held that was not financed to its maturity. on the other hand, significantly less risky because financing was in place. having financing in place diminished the overall risk of holding a particular security. >> well, you know, that all sounds good, but how did you take a company that was in exsis tense in 230 years into bankruptcy? how do you explain the

collapse? the answers sound so nice, but you riskily invested people's money without their knowledge in a market that i wouldn't invest in. >> congresswoman, sitting here today with knowledge that the market has drawn the conclusion that it's drawn and the facts are what they are, it would have been better that have taken different judgments at the time they were taken, but we and i did those things that we thought were in the best interest of shareholders and all of the stake holders given the inability of the old business plans that the firm was

executing on to generate the kinds of revenues that would protect customers as well. >> gentle lady's time expired. the chair now recognized the gentleman from georgia for five minutes. >> thank you. i thank you for coming before the committee. i don't think many people would have joined us for as long as you have and answered and been willing to answer the questions. thank you for being here. you repeatedly say that client funds were not used to purchase the foreign sovereigns. were those client funds ever pledged as collateral on the purchase of foreign sovereigns at mf global? >> to my knowledge, and, again, this is one of the things that you have to get into the records to be absolutely precise on, i'm not aware of that. >> okay.

and it's apparently from all the reports that there was comingling of funds. just approximately when do you believe the comingling first occurred? >> given all of the transactions occurring in those closing days, congressman, i don't want to speculate. i just i know that several senior management were mechanismed roughly -- informed roughly the same night of millions of dollars being unreconciled in the accounts. >> do you believe that started to occur in the last ten days before the bankruptcy? >> i'm under the impression, and, again, i don't have records to confirm, and so i -- >> yes, sir. >> further than i should go, but i am. we have to -- mf global had to

submit reports -- >> yes, sir. >> each day, and as i had suggested to one of the previous questioners, if we had been out of balance it is my presumption it would have before reported upwards. >> yes, sir, but those reports are not audited by anybody as i understand it. they are self-reported. >> they are self-reported. i think if i'm not mistaken, the number of regulators were on premise from the 26th on. that doesn't mean -- >> yes, sir. >> that doesn't mean they bought it at all aspects, but they were very close. >> yes, sir, and at that stage, at the point that the regulators came in, it was pretty much too late at that stage, wasn't it? >> congressman, certainly was

not my operating premise it was too late at those stages. we were generating liquidity. >> right. >> we were drawing our liquidity facilities, and to the best of my recollection, meeting our obligations. >> if i'm not mistaken, you were still rated as investment grade less than ten days prior to the filing, both -- i may not be correct about that. correct me if i'm wrong. >> yes. well, eng -- i think the first rating change occurred october 24th. >> and happened fastly after. >> another set of rating changes -- >> two days -- >> thursday, if i'm not mistaken, the 267th. -- 27th. >> okay. you've been a governor, a senator, had a very successful

life, accomplished a lot of things. this is -- i sense the pain that you recognize this is one of the things that you'll be judged, that your life will be judged by. what can we do -- what can we make good of this? what can you tell us? sitting where you are, what roles and regulations would you put in place if you were sitting here to prevent an mf global from ever happening again? >> congressman, i have given it some thought, not great thought. it is clear that in moments of stress organizations do not always operate in the same they they would in a normally operating environment, and i certainly would look for

triggers that would enhance the oversight of organizations, and in those conditions. >> well, thank you for joining us. mr. chairman, i yield back. >> gentleman yields back his time. the dhair now recognizes the gentleman from colorado, mr. tipton for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to follow-up on a comment congressman scott just made. ten days prior to the debacle, mf global had lowered its investment grade. was that a good decision ten days prior? >> the rating agencies from -- >> to your knowledge of the company, was that a good assessment by moody and fitch you were assessment grade?

>> certainly the facts afterwards don't make that look effective as an assessment, but at the time that they had last reviewed and were intended to review around our quarterly earnings announcement, at least several of them had put new assessment directions into the works. >> it was probably a poor assessment. i wanted to follow-up on a comment that you made earlier in questioning saying on october 30th in regards to the comingle ing of assets saying we got to find the money. was that your statement? was what the corporate mentality? >> it was all of us. >> it was all of you. >> everyone felt an obligation

to get the books reconciled. >> wherever it was, had to be able to find that. i just want a sense, truly of the corporate mentality. when you went on to head up global, did you read think the mission statement and believe in it? i can give you a couple quotes. mf global's well capitalized, well diversified. because of our financial strength on comprehensive risk management, clients can have confidence that they are trading with the strong counterparty. was that your sense? did you believe in that? >> i believed that those statements were right at the time, and that we needed to enhance it with a growth strategy that would provide for the success of the firm opposed to what had been in recent years. >> right.

as a business guy, and i'm a small businessman, was a small businessman until i took this job, you had to look at this, not trying to mix metaphor here, but you had to look at your business globally knowing the impact of the one section of the business could impact another section of the business as well. when you made that determination given the comments we were just talking about in terms of the fitch rating, looking at the horizon into the eurozone for those investments, given the poor knowledge in this country with $15 trillion in debt, we had had our credit rating downgraded. did that tie back in to the corporate man tray and the -- montra and the beliefs you said were the original intent? >> as i've tried to say probably

more articulately than here, with the analysis and the perspectives on how those particular sovereigns were looked at, we thought they were prudent investments. >> was that your personal investment? would you have been willing to personally risk your funds? >> i absolutely was willing to invest and was investing in mf global up until august. >> and i'm not trying to put you on the spot, and i know this is going to be a little maybe offensive from the stand point, but where you were stock motivated, did that help drive that decision because based over the performance of the stock? to try to get a return. >> it's one element, but also protecting the value of the toke is another responsibility, and

as a shareholder, i would expect the decisions to reflect those concerns as well. it's not only performance. >> i agree, and i can sense from you agony personally over this, and believe me, talking to our folks in rural america, 10,000 or 30,000 is not a nice evening out. that is all they have. when we look at it globally, i think we all have to be very disstressed in terms of that collateral damage, particularly now when we can't find $1.2 billion, struggle people's dollars to be able to meet their needs. i'm out of time, mr. chairman. i yield back. thank you, sir. >> gentleman's time expired #. the chair now recognizes the

gentleman from arkansas for five minutes. >> thank you. mr. corzine, are you licensed to trade securities? yes. >> what licenses do you hold? >> i would have to go back -- i have all of the -- >> series three, series seven, series six? >> yeah. >> i figured that was the case. do you trade on your own account? >> not regularly. >> have you ever traded on your own account using customer funds? >> on my own account using customer funds? no. to my knowledge, i have not. i don't trade for my personal account. >> okay. has any employee to your knowledge of mf global ever used client funds to trade on proprietary -- >> i'm going to repeat -- >> okay, got that. if you had knowledge of employee trading on customer account, what would the penalty be for that employee? >> well, certainly as far as i

could ever imagine, they would will terminated. >> ever dismissed animo for any malfeasance that would be of that nature? >> i think there is a fairly notorious trading situation that occurred in 2008 before i joined the firm, and there's other disciplinary actions taken through the years -- >> but under your direction? >> there's some, yes. >> okay. can you describe some of that malfeasance that required there to be disciplinary action or possibly termination? >> i would really like to have specifics about that so that i don't get into talking about an individual and then i don't have my facts straight. >> okay, okay. i just read an article that was put out about a farmer who had $200,000 in aning the with m -- account with mf global, not been

returned to him, almost a month since mf global filed for bankruptcy. no telling when he'll get his money back. missed a deadline for missing his seeds at prepurchased discount for the beans and corn crop, and his future is in peril. they are a one crop failure away from bankruptcy. the action we've seen here with mf global puts them that much closer to bankruptcy themselves. as the former head of the now bankrupt company that this man trusted, in fact, trusted to the degree that he'd rather have his money in a segregated accounts than in a bank, what would you say to that farmer now facing bankruptcy, and farmers who may be in a similar situation? >> congress mapp, as i said multiple times, i think about

this every day. i could not be more regretful of the stress that we are bringing to people's lives, and i could not be more anxious to see a resolution of where those unreconciled accounts are. >> let me ask you this. you have an impressive background with respect to financial services, banks industry, and so on. i am going to ask you to speculate. i'm going to ask you to think what you would do in the situation, and in all seriousness, i'd like to know what we'd tell farmers that are facing this. if you were in the situation where you had potentially $200,000 or more, you know, as congressman tipton said, $20,000 or $40,000, what would you do if you were that farmer? i understand it you also have a little history in farming.

>> my father was one of those folks that went to the grain elevator and hedged out future crops. >> so i'm, and i'm really not trying to -- i know you expressed remorse here, and i appreciate that, but in all seriousness trying to figure out, you know, how do you advise these farmers in this situation? >> congressman, i'm not sure i have specific advice. i animal can say that this process of seeking to find these funds is one that absolutely needs every resource possible to make sure that it is accomplished. i think i have to leave it there. >> sure. last question. do you have a compliance officer at mf global? >> absolutely. >> sure.

and at what point did he bring this to your attention and how often did he review the activity? >> there are, you know, there are broad set of compliance res, and -- compliance issues, and internal audits, and as i suggested, interim -- internal audits that determine what kind of operations are operating the way they are supposed to, so those are ongoing or daily. >> okay, thank you, sir. appreciate it. >> the time expired, and the chair recognizes the gentleman from kansas. >> thank you, mr. chairman. senator, a follow-up on the question from the yes -- gentleman from arkansas. you mentioned your concern about that. if you were so concerned about making certain your investors were whole, why did you quit four days after bankruptcy was declared? >> in a response to a board

request. >> okay. during the foir intervening days, what did you do to attempt to make the investors whole? >> i resigned on november 3rd. it's two days, and i spent tuesday, at least in the early morning hours, trying to find out some of the same questions people are asking here with no particular positive results on this. >> so nobody seemed to know where the funds were and no one would tell you? >> there were -- >> did you ask the questions where the funds were and what was the answer? >> people were still looking. a lot of transactions were in train -- >> i appreciate that.

i'm short of time. i appreciate it. i think it would be the same answer as before. i want to establish a time line. on the one year anniversary of dodd-frank, july 20th, you had meetings with members of the cftc. >> i had two conference calls on those days. >> i have you down according to the records at the cftc, you had a meeting with former employee at 1 p.m. on the phone. at 2:15, you had a meeting with ms. sommers on the phone, and the third meeting at 3 30u. can you explain the topic of the calls? >> to me recollection, i was on the phone call, the conference call with chairman at one, and chilton at the time you brought forward, and, again, as we have suggested and written in my

response to questions, primary subject of that conversation were between the broker dealer and the fcm. >> three separate meetings, three sprit commissioners that you participated in. did you have separate calls or participation with mr. ginsler when you took the job at mf global to the present time? >> to my recollection, you have my calls, my meetings. >> okay. >> outlined. >> you never once called their cell phone? >> no. >> did you call another member of the administration during this time about any of these issues? >> i'm sorry, congressman, i couldn't hear you. >> did you ever call a member of the administration? you're close to the current administration, as a very generous campaign bund leer, did you --

bundler, did you visit with anyone in the administration about your business at mf global? >> toy -- to my knowledge, i've never spoken about mf global to nip in the administration. >> anyone at the federal reserve? >> i visited with people at the federal reserve as i reported with respect to dealer as i testified to the primary dealer relationship always with staff and staff and never with either the president or chairman or any of the board of governors. >> on december 21st of last year, you had a meeting with cftc commissioner again about segregation and bankruptcy. do you recall the topic of those particular discussions which seem very appropriate to our conversation? >> commissioner sommers spoke

about that meeting this morning, and it had to do with issues on the treatment of swaps consistent with how futures were traded, and how dodd-frank would deal with those issues and coming to cftc discussions. i'll remember even the specifics relatively short meetings. >> we are lucky that at least the cftc had a record there was a meeting. as we learned, they don't keep notes. private secretary keep notes of the meetings that might be helpful to our understanding of the committee? >> to my knowledge, they did not. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and senator, i appreciate your time, and i appreciate the questions, but, again, i'd like to ask the question directly for myself. what do i tell my producers

that -- should i suggest you are contrite, felt sorrow, but not trying to make them whole, and just good luck, we hope you find your $200,000. is that a good summary? >> congressman, i hope you believe that i am as intent in answering the question of where this money is as anyone in the room. >> gentleman's time expired. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> the chair looks to the gentleman from wisconsin for five minutes. >> [inaudible] >> press your microphone. >> can you hear me now 1234 >> i can hear you, but i don't think your colleagues can. >> i'll move over here.

how many federal regulatory agencies have some type of oversight speedometers for the type of business you're in? >> i have not counted them up, but it is multiple. >> cftc, fcc -- there are all kinds of agencies that deal with labor and other activities, the federal reserve has oversight, not regulatory responsibility as we have become a primary dealer. the -- there are more, and then there are whole host of self-regulatory organizations, a number of which you will speak with in the next panel. >> how often did you visit with

the regulators? how often were you there? 18 months? a regular occurrence? did the federal government have a lot of responsibility in oversight. >> a lot of them visited the firm more broadly than just with me. sometimes people more senior would come and visit in offices. we've tried to outline some of those. there was one meeting where i cited where all of the regulator, or at least most of the regulators in the u.s. visited us in june of 2010 where i addressed them for ten minutes, and the rest of my colleagues at least on the operations and control side and finance side spoke more

lengthfully. these are not the only regulators. there's regulators in multiple venues across the globe that also have responsibility in oversight. >> well, then, do you think adding more regulations and more regulators -- can -- change that. do you think we can regular lace -- can we regulate greed and confidence out of fraud -- >> repeat the question. >> can we regulate greed and competence and fraud out of existence? at the end of the day, sir, we have to make a decision of how going forward we can help protect consumers and investors from having another mf global happen, and the fear is that we'll do what government always do, more rules, more regulator,

and in a year from now, there's another example, and i'm wondering what the real solution is. i'm trying to figure out if there was greed, competence, and fraud at mf global that no matter what we do on this side of the diess, it still would happen. >> whether it is for those reasons or poor judgment or bad judgment or mistakes will continue to happen in the course of human events, and that is ineventuallible. as it relates to regulation, it's more supportive rather than against, there's an enormous need for pi view and probably doesn't amount for much at the moment, but my view to have it

consolidated so that it is less complex to match. >> it is difficult to manage, suspect it, a company your size? >> with the multiple regulators that exist, and we live in a global world that increases the complexity, the segregation rules in london are different than the segregation rules in u.s. futures markets. the futures markets are different than securities markets, and so the answer is yes. a more integrated approach from one point of view would make this world easier. >> i'm trying to get a sense of my take away. thank you. it's been a long afternoon. i thank you for your time, and i yield back, mr. chairman. >> the chair now recognizes the gentlelady for north carolina for her five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman.

governor, i have 5 couple questions for you for clarification. you had the question posed to you why did you resign on november 3, and you indicated it was at the request of o board member or -- >> the lead director. >> the lead director, and that person's name? >> ed goldberg. >> ed goldberg. thank you. now i know we've talked about where we feel and #wr -- where the responsibility lies, and you identified it could be procedural, the money's gone, who do you hold responsible and accountable for this money being gone? >> this is a ceo of an organization, you know, i hold the speedometer that the implementation of the policies,

procedures, and the people in place to execute on these res lies --s buck stops here, on that score. the details of how that gets executed are an organizational issue that is broad based. we had people certainly prepared and at least from all reports to me, as best as i can recollect, were executing appropriately on those rules, again, at the chaotic final days and hours, i think you have a different set of conditions in place. >> i'd like to go back too to the relationship that you have

with chairman ginsler. he worked under you while you were at goldman sachs; correct? >> that is correct. >> i believe that means there's a couple of years that you had a relationship? a coup of years of a relationship since that time? >> we had chairman ginsler and i had other interactions. he was on senator sarbane's staff when i was a senator. i was aware of and in contact with him on an o national -- occasional basis, but not on a frequent basis, and any stretch of the ma'am nation. >> would you describe your relationship as friendly? would you pick up the phone and call him saying, hey, how are you doing?

>> we were not the kind of folks checking in on each other week to week, month to month, or maybe not even year to year. i think one of the newspapers said neither attended my recent wedding or i attended with the family. >> thank you. my last question is about the comment you made recently in retrospect, decisions made in crisis are usually not very good decisions, and that may have had a part in it, and i'd like to state that i do believe that as well, and that's one of the reasons that i believe dodd-frank is detrimmental to the country. thank you. i yield back. >> the chair recognizes the last member for questions for five minutes, the gentleman from

north carolina. >> thank you, and thank you for your patience today with the questions. according to transactions were total return swaps off balance sheet in a type of credit deer derivative. they retained the price and default risk and problemming the treatment and the disclosure, and the standards board recently decided that maturity is the only reposition transaction to get balance sheet treat, and janet says this is a form of roost to dodge using the term "total return swap," and because they are well known as a mean of using leverage. would you say her characterization is accurate and why or why not? >> congressman, there's a lot in that statement. >> right. >> i wanted to give you a chance to respond. my view is that a better analogy

would be matchbook transactions where repurchase agreements against reverse purchase agreements were put on the books of a broker dealer or app institution as oppose the to total return swap. you mentioned that you retain the price movement. you only retain the price expoture to the extent that -- exposure in the exchange of total retaining swap, and, again, i'm not an expert and certainly not expert with regard to the accounting issues on this would reflect the price appreciation or depreciation in these rtm positions both the ones that were held with respect to government, u.s. government

security agencies and corporates, or whether it was in these euro sovereigns with no price risk other than implicated margins, and you did, however, as the analyst or consultant said, retain the default risk. the default and actually restructuring risk, but i think -- i don't think it's a clear animal sigh, and it's got some conditions. some people say total return swaps are a way to take price risk off the balance sheet, and that's not the way to do it but to take matchbook risk, a substantially less off balance sheet, but it's not an analogy i'd identify with. >> all right. thank you, and thank you, mr. chairman. >> gentleman's time expiredded,

and the chair would like to recognize the ranking member for a unanimous request. >> i have questions that were submitted there to me by one who spent a good part of the hearing today. he's interested and has questions for mr. corzine so i'd like the questions to be committed and have him respond in writing. >> seeing no objections, the questions are subjected and submitted. no other questions or requests, mr. corzine, thank you for your appearance today. you are now dismissed. >> thank you, sir. i thank the committee.

>> according to a congressional

report, military communities are a key target for u.s. based terrorism attacks. the report cites 33 cases since the 9/11 attacks incoming the fort hood shooting in which 14 people died. members of the house and homeland security committees heard from defense department officials and the father of a soldier killed at a recruitment center in little rock, arkansas. this is three hours. >> good morning. joint hearing of the house committee and homeland security and the senate committee on homeland security comes to order. committees are meeting today to hear testimony on the threat posed by home grown terrorism to our nation's military communities. pursuant to the agreement reached by the committees, it's governed by the house rules of representatives unless any senator raises an objection about any specific issue.

the chair wishes to remind the gusts today, the demonstrators, the use of signs and verbal outbursts are a violation of the house of the representatives. the chair wishes to thank the guests for their cooperation in maintaining order and proper decorum. i recognize myself for an opening statement. today, the house committee on homeland security and the senate homeland security and governmental affairs committee are holding a joint investigative hearing on the homeland terrorist threat within the military itself and military communities from ideas the united states. let me start for improper leadership and posed by islamist radicalization examining it five years ago. i appreciate chairman lieberman and ranking member coal lips

working with our committee on today's hearing, the first ever house senate homeland security meeting. i thank our distinguished witnesses for appearing today to discuss the growing security issue including assistant secretary of defense and a retired marine corp. veteran and father of the private kill the in a terrorist attack add the recruiting station in little rock. i acknowledge with mr. long today is car loss, the father of the young man who murdered private long. this is the fourth hearing in a series the house committee held this year on the serious threat of violence islamist radicalization within the united states. our committee previously investigated radicalization within the muslim-american community generally, rad cagization in u.s. prisons and

probed radicalization within the united states by the al-qaeda affiliated group in somalia. this joint investigative hearing will seriously examine the emerging and growing danger to the men and women serving in uniform, and it's appropriate that we do this when so many were killed in a surprise attack 70 years ago. we had an obligation to stay in touch, and there's a growing security threat from radicalization both from within the military as well as against military personnel and their militaries residing in the united states. our troops volunteered to go into harm's way overseas to protect all of us. they should not be in harm's way here at home, and yet they are. there's a dominant threat from active duty military within the armed forces. this threat is persistent and

enduring. more than five islamist terror plots disrupted involving u.s. military insiders in the past decade, and 11 cases involved veterans of those who attempted to join law enforcement and intelligence agencies. the total number of radicalized troops is more than realized or acknowledged. since the 9/11 attacks, at least 33 public cases have been prosecuted or probed in which home grown terrorists living in operating in the united states and sometimes inside the military itself pose a grave threat, plotted to carry out attacks or perpetrated violence aimed at america's armed forces in the homelands or deployed to overseas war zones. 23 of the military targeted plots or 70% of the total, have unfolded since mid-2009. that's part of the broader serge of home grown islamist terrorism.

at least 16 external terror plots by jihadis inside the u.s. aiming for hill tear personnel in the homeland have been disrupted or investigated, and nine other reports involving u.s. persons in the homeland who traveled or planned trips overseas to kill gis in afghanistan, iraq, and elsewhere. a growing number of terrorist threats are directed to families of military personnel, particularly of concern is the safety of loved ones who has family deployed. in the last two weeks in new york city, we saw a man arrested, and among his goals was to attack returning veterans from afghanistan. as recent history illustrated, the only successful attacks on the homeland results in deaths since 9/11 are against the military. at fort hood where 1 murdered and --

13 murdered by army major, and at a little rock recruiting center where private army -- or miff private william long, the son of chief long was fatally shot point-blank by radicalized home grown. his father is with us also. we'll discuss the threat from within the military and against the military. it was part of the two decade success from trading the u.s. military for terrorism and an effort increasing in scope and threat. military communities in the u.s. recently become the most sought after targets of violent islamist extremist seeking to kill americans in the home lander. we cannot stand idly by while our heros in europe form are struck down in the place where they should be the safest. the military communes within the united states are within political significance and one

we simply cannot afford to neglect. that's why these hearing are so vital and can't back down for political correctness. it's now my privilege to recognize a very good friend, but more importantly, the chairman of the senate homeland security committee, the gentleman from connecticut, senator lieberman for any statement he may have. >> thank you very much, chairman king, and welcome to everyone to this really historic joint committee. my thanks to the chairman peter king for proposing this hearing, and to ranking members susan coal lips and ben -- collins and ben thompson for supporting the idea. there's no subject that should unit us more across both ends of the u.s. capitol and across partisan and ideological lines

than the threat that islamist extremists pose to our homeland and to our people. this joint hearing, i think, is a demonstration of exactly that kind of unity, and i hope it's not the last occasion on which our two committees come together for this purpose. today we focus on the threat of violence islamist extremism to members of the military at home. the men and women who sworn to defend our country, our security, our freedom expect, should realize a respite from wartime conditions when they are home, but the record shows that the united states military has become a direct target of violence islamist extremism here in the united states, and that means that america's troops and perhaps their families are potentially vulnerable as work

and at rest, in a military setting or a civilian one, on a base or off a base, at a recruiting station, or even at a military hospital. i want to now go to two facts which, in part, chairman king mentioned, but i think are probably surprising to most americans. the first one is this -- the only americans who have lost their lives in our homeland to terrorists since 9/11 and the follow on anthrax attacks have been killed at u.s. military facilities. private william long, who was killed by abdul at a little rock recruiting station on june 4, 2009, and whose father, we will be honored to hear testify today

was the first killed only because he was wearing the uniform of the united states army. thirteen more americans murdered on november 5, 2009 during the fort hood attack by nadal. two soldiers were killed in cue wit in 2003 by a fellow american service member. here's the second fact, which is that -- this one perhaps surprises people too. since 2001, law enforcement has thwarted and prosecuted more than 30 plots or attacks against military targets within the united states. according to the congressional research service, that represents more than half of the 54 home grown jihadists plots

that occurred between 9/11/01 and today. the stark reality, therefore, is that american service member and their families are increasingly in the terrorist scope, and not just overseas in traditional war settings, so this the premise of this hearing, this joint hearing is to the theoretical. it is based on fact. today, we want to ask our defense department witnesses what our country is doing to protect our military personnel here at home and in the broader sense, what the future of military homeland security should look like. our government's counterterrorism capabilities are critical to uncovering plots against military installation and personnel so that they can be prevented, and that means that the fbi, which has primary

counter-- domestic counterterrorism responsibility and the defense department have to open their lines of communication to each other and work more closely together than in the normal course of events that they ever would or ever have before. law enforcement agencies in communities across the country and other government agencies also should comet to reach out to muslim americans so that they can help our government meet this threat to our country from a small, but deadly number of people who are radicalizing to violent islamist extremism. finally, i want to say, not for the first time, but i'm going to keep saying it, that our government has to recognize at some point who the enemy is and call it by its exact name, not -- the enemy is not a vague catch all of violence extremism,

but it's a specific violence islamist extremism, and exploitation and corruption i would say of the religion of islam, but it is adherence to that violent islamist extremism who attacked us on 9/11/01 and have plotted to attack or have attacked those more than 30 american military installations here at home since 9/11/01, and i repeat, that's a fact, not a theory or rhetoric. one of the unfortunate conclusions that i take away from the last decade is violence islamist extremism, notwithstanding the extraordinary advances that our military, intelligence, and law enforcement personnel have made against it will continue to threaten us for years to come, both around the world and here

at home, and its targets will continue to be both civilians and military personnel, both around the world and here at home. we have weakened our enemies, but they are not vanquished, and protecting americans in general and service members in particular will require continuing preventative, defensive, and where necessary, offensive action by all the assets of the united states government. that is particularly true for american military facilities and the patriotic americans who serve in and from them. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, chairman lieberman. i now recognize my good friend, the ranking minority member from the house committee, mr. thompson for any statement he may have.

>> thank you very much, chairman king, for holding this hearing. i also thank our colleagues from the senate joining us today. this hearing will examine the steps the military has taken to ensure the safety of its basis, installation, and recruiting stations. in the last two years, two attacks on military installation within the united states have been successful. one attack occurred at fort hood texas where 13 people were killed. in the incident, the defendant is still awaiting a military court marshall. a second attack occurred in a recruiting station in little rock, arkansas. one person was killed and one person was wounded. in the little rock case, the defendant pled guilty to murder in state court. i imagine my colleagues on the other side of the aisle want to use these two attacks two paint a picture about the nature of violence extremism threat facing

this nation. once again, the picture they draw is not likely to be accurate, nuanced, or subtle. in the past, i've expressed my concerns about the nature and directions of these hearings. my concerns are amplified today. ..

how praise is probably less then forwarded and how well he or she shoots. part to chaldees aside, as we begin this hearing, i think it's appropriate to acknowledge and remember that today is the anniversary of the bombing of pearl harbor. that single event, an unprovoked attack on american military installation in american territory prepared this country in the world war ii. december 7, 1941 with a tape that would live in infamy. two veterans of world war ii fought to stop the spread of totalitarian rule genocide and restore freedom. they risked their lives to stand this nation. the same can be said of today's veterans. the men and women returning from afghanistan and iraq have placed their lives on the line and each one volunteered to go.

so as we think about the significance of this day in history and the possible meaning of this hearing, we must begin by thinking about what these two groups of soldiers fight for. each of them answer the call because they believe in america. each call because they believe this country is a beacon of hope in a troubled world. they would be willing to share their blood to protect and defend the rights and liberties guaranteed by the constitution. so as we think about our debts to the veterans of past wars, let us not forget our most basic obligations to those who currently serve. we owe them a clear understanding of their mission and a clear definition of the enemy. that enemy is not a religion. that mission is not to succeed in ideology. and while some of my colleagues appear to have difficulty grasping mess, i am glad the

military people understand it. and the days after the fort hood shooting, then defense secretary gates refused to latest tragedy at the feet of one man or one religion. he appointed a board and gave them the mission of reviewing what happened, why it happened and what could be done to prevent the same thing from happening in the future. the review board did not sweep this under the rep. they did not seek ecx nations and simple answers. they identified deficiency and dod programs and these on force protection, emergency response procedures unthreatened identification. once they identified the problems, they began to solve them. today, dod has completed 43 of the review board's recommendations. 15 additional recommendations should be completed at march

march 2012. however, in the military's ability to move forward and complete the remaining recommendations depend entirely on a. since it number 11, congress has approved a total of $1.28 trillion for military operation based security, reconstruction, for an eight and health care associated with the wars in iraq and that kenneth n. budget cuts may prevent the implementation of the rest of these recommendations. today hope we can reach a bipartisan, bicameral agreement that the military should have the funding it needs to prevent another tragedy like fort hood. if we can and something good will have come out of this hearing. with that, mr. chairman, i yield back. >> i think the ranking member and i just know for the record that the investigative report that we are releasing today, we find out more than 6024

servicemembers have served deployment since 9/11 and 14 muslim troops have been killed in battle in arlington. so there's no sign on anyone's part made by the muslim community. we're talking about a small minority, but illegal minority myth that i yield to the generally be from the state of maine, the ranking member of the senate, homeland security committee, make good friend senator collins. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. let me first point out that this unusual house-senate hearing demonstrated our joint concern for the safety of our military personnel and their families who are increased family the targets of terrorist plots. regardless of our analysis of the costs or what the remedy should be, i am certain that

each and every member of both the senate and the house committee is committed to doing every thing that can do to ensure the safety of our military personnel and their families. in that regard, i would also like to recognize the family members here today, whose lives have been forever changed by terrorism. our military service members have been on the front lines in the war against terrorism for 10 years. in iraq, afghanistan and wherever they are called upon, america's military men and women put their lives on the line for us. we are a family grateful to them and we must work to ensure that their lives are not in jeopardy due to insider threat.

tragically in recent years, we've seen several attacks from both inside and outside the gates of our military bases. as we've seen with the attacks that fort hood and at the little rock recruiting centers, our military is in fact a target for islamist extremists in our own country. in a recent report, the congressional research service notes that 23 of the plots targeting the military have unfolded in just the last 18 months. how do we identify and stop the next home-grown attack on our military? in my judgment, this must be addressed through a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy that carefully

differentiates the difference between peaceful practicing muslims and violent islamist extremists. as chairman lieberman and i highlighted in our investigation into the fort hood attack, the administration unfortunately has been unwilling to name violent islamist extremism as the ideology driving the main home-grown terrorist threat that we face. for example, in response to our committee continued interest in the fort hood massacre, the department of defense responded a few weeks ago that it is dealing with the threat of violent islamist extremism in the context of the broader threat of work place violence. this approach i would note stands in stark contrast to past

dod policies that specifically address white supremacy activities after the racially motivated murders of two african-americans by two army soldiers in the 1990s. amongst the recommendations in this senate fort hood reports, we urge that therapy training per servicemembers. and yet, he combined house-senate committee staff review has confirmed that the only departmentwide instruction to date is the interim guidance distributed to commanders on potential indicators of violent behavior. that is woefully inadequate. i do understand that dod is moving to develop a long-term policy solution and that the army is currently implementing an updated threat of fullness reporting program with

associated training. we simply must arm our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines but the knowledge to differentiate between the vast majority of muslim soldiers and military members who are peaceful practicing members with a major esteemed religion and the service member who is radicalizing imposes the potential threat. identifying fat tears that lead to violent radicalization, understanding behaviors that could be indicators of such radicalization and engaging to stop the radicalization process are all vital components of a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. it is frustrating that even though senates repeated calls for a single federal official to

coordinate act to the teeth against islamic extremism across the entire government have gone unheeded. this committee, both in the senate and the house committee has been examining the process of radicalization for more than five years, as chairman king indicated. whether radicalization occurs in persons or via the internet, the threat that such radicalization poses to our military members must be acknowledged and addressed. today's hearing should serve as a call to accelerate action to protect those who have put their lives on the line for our freedom. our servicemen and women deserve no less. thank you, mr. chairman.

>> thank you, senator collins. other members of the committees are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. in correspondence with today's witnesses, they vindicated the topic for examining and at a sensitive nature and depending on the questions asked from the main international security or compromise sensitive law-enforcement information. i consulted with senator lieberman and were in agreement that should it become necessary, the hearing should recess after the second panel has concluded and reconvene in a closed, classified session. therefore ask unanimous consent that the hearing moved to a closed session at the appropriate time should that be determined by chairman lieberman and by me. but that objection so ordered. i would also ask unanimous consent to insert into the record a statement from cumbersome and elephant who is not provided a statement to ses. he said that he was arrested included in the record without objection the worker. i would now like to welcome our

witnesses today. i would remind tearful testimony would be submitted for the record and ask you to summarize your statements at this time. with a very distinguished panel of witnesses for important hearing today. the first panel we have assistant secretary of defense and homeland defense and american security affairs, position he has held since april 2009. in this role he is responsible for supervision of homeland defense activities, defense and civil authorities in western hemisphere security affairs for the department of defense. from 1986 to 1989, senator lieberman this goes along with bipartisanship, secretary stockton served as legislative assistant to senator daniel patrick moynihan, the only politician from new york that i know who was then recommended by republicans and democrats. that was a while ago, that he certainly is a hero to all new yorkers. purchase confirmation, secretary

stockton by senior research scholar at stanford university center for international security and cooperation. i had the privilege of meeting with secretary stock 10 and certainly look forward to his testimony today. secretary stock and is accompanied to mr. chin sue divall who is a senior eyes there in the united states army for counterintelligence operation and liaison to the federal bureau of investigation. finally on the panel we have lieutenant colonel reid sawyer who has direct to your and one of the founders of combating terrorism center at west point. the career intelligence officer, general sir has served in the parade for special operations assignments including operations in afghanistan, iraq, africa and south america. also actively advises federal state and local government agencies and is a member of the fire department of new york terrorism task force. he has had two books on the challenges involving international terrorists and

then we look forward to his testimony today. and now i am pleased to recognize secretary stockton for his testimony. secretary stockton. >> chairman king, chairman lieberman, ranking member tom sent, ranking member collins. thank you for the opportunity today to testify in such an important issue and thank you so much for your focus on these topics and your leadership and for your contributions to national security as a whole. let me begin with my bottom line up front. the threat that we were discussing today is serious in its enduring. the department of defense has taken important steps in order to meet this challenge, but we do not intend to rest on our accomplishments. with your help them with the strong support of my department

leadership, i pledge to continue strengthening the preparedness of our domestic military communities against a homegrown terrorist threat as it continues to evolve. the past several years have seen increased numbers of americans that is since orbitz and inspired by al qaeda's ideology and the department of defense has become the target of choice. my statement for the record summarizes actions we have underway to counter the threat. our initiatives are directly targeted to fix the shortcomings revealed by the tragic shootings at fort hood. and in that regard, i want to thank the members of those committees for the support and work you have done in order to identify the shortfalls that previously existed and make recommendations on the improvement we have to pursue in the department of defense. in addition, we are looking forward to the threat of all

been in the future. we want to make sure we anticipate how the threat is likely to evolve so we can be prepared to counter for years to come. i'd like to highlight some specific actions we have underway in three areas. first of all, information sharing, secondly, identifying and reporting on possible violent extremists. and finally, improving incident response capabilities. four months ago, secretary panetta and the attorney general implemented a groundbreaking agreement to strengthen information sharing and cooperation between the federal bureau of investigation and the department of defense. chairman lieberman, i take very seriously what you all attach to continue to strengthen the fbi dod relationship. i will also welcome opportunity to discuss the way we work together with state and local law enforcement in order to make sure that we are better prepared

in the future to meet the challenges that we face. we have also launched the guardian for sun to share suspicious activity, information between state and local law enforcement, joint terrorism task forces and the department of defense, including installation commanders around the nation. together with other information sharing initiatives now underway, we greatly strengthen our ability to connect the dots and prevent future attacks against our military communities. we've also made progress in providing commanders and other supervisory personnel with the guidance they need to identify potential violent extremists in our ranks and ensure that necessary follow-up and intervention actions occur. in 2010, then secretary of defense gates provided interim guidance on how our personnel

should identify and report on potential insider threats. we have a series of studies underway right now to refine and build on that guidance and anticipate future home-grown rats. in march of next year, the defense science board will issue a study that recommends additional training tools to better enable our military supervisors to recognize when and how they should intervene in order to thwart potential insider threats. to longer term studies have underway are also looking -- they're diving deep into behavioral processes that lead to radicalization. so again, we can refine our programs, refine our training efforts to ensure that we can successfully intervene and prevent future terrorist attacks from occurring against our

military communities. finally, knowing that perfect prevention will always be our goal is unattainable, with an strengthening our ability to respond to attacks that do occur. we watch an active shooter training program for military police and other personnel every greatly improve incident notification systems that enable us to support and direct personnel and families and support emergency response efforts and make other life-saving improvements. chairman lieberman, chairman king, ranking member collins, ranking member tom sent, distinguished members of those committees, thank you again for your leadership in advancing the security of the united states in her particular focus on securing the homeland against threats will be discussing today. i look forward to working with you in that effort and your recommendations. thank you. >> thank you very much, secretary stockton.

i now recognize colonel sawyer. >> chairman king, ranking member thompson, ranking member collins and distinguished members of both committees. as director of combating terrorism at west point is my distinct honor and pleasure to be here before you today to discuss a critically important topic here combating terrorism center at west point is committed to setting individual underpants of terrorist threats in a such remarks are based on exhaustive for attainment study on the domestic shiite is threat with specific and say to threats of military faces in its purview. remarks will center on critical points. first the rapid rise of al qaeda inspired turn in the u.s. beginning in 2007 would build a complex landscape only growing more opaque each year. the critical part of our discussion as the military as a preferred target for individuals within the united states, a trend greater than many realize and that's the important at the state hearing in which i thank

you as well. let me turn to my first point. since 9/11 the u.s. is witness to radicalization of 70 residents and targeting of supporting a violent action throughout the united states. put another way, this amounts to an average of one attack every three months for a 12 year. but the overwhelming majority after 2007. concurrently witnessed an increasing number of groups overseas, aligned or affiliated with al qaeda which increases the number of entry points for individuals ratified in the united states, functionally decreasing barriers of entry for those who wish to practice paid in the global jihad. the conclusions have the point that the distance between failure and success is far shorter than real life. when he told they look to the 2004 madrid attacks that killed 190 individuals for the devastating attacks in london to grasp the image possible from homegrown cell. in other words, while the number of failures in important metric of counterterrorism and the

competence and may also provide a false sense of security. and the united states context, 2010, najibullah side pot provides a stark reminder of what might have been. my second point to focus on the military. perhaps most disturbing trend noted by many today is the intense focus by domestic jihad is on military targets. military presents a qualitatively different target for an attack at home and been engaged in combat abroad. there is edification among citizenry that servicemembers are safer than their home environment and a cursory look data reveals that 21% of domestic credit ipods since 9/11 within the united states targeting military forces at home. this number does not reflect totality of interest in targeting u.s. military forces by domestically inspired al qaeda individuals. the second category of homegrown terrorists or those sabbatical is here, are equally committed to targeting our military in travel overseas to participate in the global jihad. when his numbers are included,

percentage increases to nearly 50% of all pot within the united states that are seen as strictly targeting the u.s. military. it's difficult to assess whether the second group were unable to connect to networks abroad would've focused on military targets at home, it's undeniable u.s. military amongst its population is of significant interest. if we expand even further to include all pot of military targets and change course for whatever reason, we find the percentage jumps to 56% of the post-9/11 domestic path of the military. increasingly ruinous individuals creating self organizing. there's little dry contact between the south of the radicalizing agent and the mental moral barriers that target u.s. soldiers are less than one targeting civilians. this is a function of both in nature and specificity of the narrative that frames the u.s. military's war criminals and creates an imperative for

striking the military in a preemptive manner. those individuals that moved to tack against military as a group exclusively makeup of lone wolf, look up a strategic choice or lack of access to extremist network, the lack of contact with others significantly limits the ability to identify, prevent an interdict individuals. the second group of military threats the person radicalize classes once inside the military. insider threats are not only dangerous because of access which is certainly crucial to attacks, but it's a combination of access to knowledge of their organization that enables us to potentially be significantly more dangerous than they otherwise might offend. a number of insider cases are statistically insignificant when looking across entire dataset oppose a disproportionate impact when i think about the effects of this house for military and how it ratifies al qaeda's narrative. by design or happenstance attackers could prove significant effects and it's all too easy to forget its

fundamental level of terrorism and psychology of fear. in conclusion the domestic fund extremists of all me relays limited success in the u.s. to date, the threat is significant. potential physical violence from the south is one dimension. radicalization of u.s. citizens case of patter of our society from yemen or pakistan. intelligence law enforcement detect and disrupt the cells are critical but not sufficient to fully address the problem. interdiction and prevention efforts must be coupled with programs to counter violent extremism and ultimately foster inhospitable conditions for the emergence of al qaeda expired extremists in the united states and decreased military forces. thank you for holding this hearing i look forward to your questions. >> thank you, colonel sawyer and thank you for your past segments. i read last night it was really retreat on terrorism. thank you very much. secretary stockton, in your

prepared testimony and also in an article you wrote in title 10 years after 9/11, challenges for the decade to come, he said among other things al qaeda in the weekend peninsula are actively recruiting u.s. military personnel to conduct impacts on u.s. military targets. how significant do you believe the threat is from within the military and how successful has al qaeda been a recruiting members of the american military? >> the primary threat to secure a home comes from al qaeda, its affiliates like al qaeda in the arabian peninsula and its adherents. we take very seriously the continuing effort by a q. ap and other and components to recruit members of the united states military to inspire others to attack u.s. military communities and is an issue that we take

very seriously and is my focus in order to build the policies, training programs, everything else we need in order to beat this threat because those recruitment efforts are ongoing and again, this is a persistent threat, and entering threat that we need to stay in front. >> secretary stockton, we are in open session so i'm not going to ask for precise numbers, but there are there cases right now involving perspective g hodges and terrorists as you are aware of for modernism? >> i welcome the opportunity to answer that question. >> senator lieberman at the end of the second panel. we'll can be enclosed section. thank you very much. as senator collins mansion, during the 1990s, when there were white supremacist attacks within the military, whenever right-wing extremist attacks

carried out within the military, the military made it clear that right-wing extremists and white supremacist were those who carried out the attacks. and those ideologies were identified. and yet, it appears the ideology of violent islamist extremism is not identified by a name including the most recent documents. so i would ask, why does the army now believe that you should i not identify who the army is when it was particularly appropriate to identify the enemy 16, 17 years ago. >> sera, after the tragic attacks that fort hood, the army made the decision based on the department of defense guidance to revise our army regulation, threat awareness and reporting

program. when we rewrote that regulation, we change the focus from the older version that regulation was a cold war focus, espionage focused regulation. when we updated the regulation, we included indicators of espionage and international terrorism and updated indicators of extremist activity, which was a first for the army and addressing that particular problem in this manner. ..

>> they are a particular enemy today from a violence form of islam, just as in the 1990s there were white sue sue preppists, and skin heads, and the military never hesitated in identifying that enemy, and yet it appears in this new threat awareness reporting program, yes, not go back to the cold war, but white sue -- so prep cysts appears ooze if today we're being politically correct by not identifying who the target is, and i would say the same thing if we were talking about irish-catholics carrying out attacks identifying themselves. i think we are too politically correct here, and i find that

frustrating. you can answer that, and also the time question, and then i'm out of time is we will be the committee staffs, for instance, in magazine is available to the members of the armed forces. now, was that just an aberration, policy? i know for instance people can't fly confederate flags in barracks and inspire magazine is the propaganda organ of the enemy and we have been named in the magazine by al-qaeda and arabian peninsula. why the change in policy to go from names someone, naming an ideology to ignoring the ideology? >> sir, i'll answer your question about inspire magazine. regarding to inspire magazine, yes, sir, there are soldiers we have documented incidents where

soldiers have gone online and got the magazine. 234 our current ar31-12 threat awareness and reporting program i referred to earlier, we request the behavioral indicators, that's one we want soldiers to report what they observe other soldiers reading "inspire" magazine. >> if it's reported, can they keep it, and it's just an indicator or removed? >> sir, if reported to the counterintelligence authorities, we'll investigate to determine if there's a logical reason for the soldier to have the magazine. if he's associated with terrorist activity or other activity deemed not supportive of the army value, and obviously, we'll deal with the situation. the bottom line there are analysts who read it for logical reasons, and that's what we would have to determine. >> mr. chairman, could i --

>> of course. >> speak to the larger policy questions here. we know who the adversary is. the primary threat is al-qaeda and its affiliates, and everything that we are doing in terms of primary focus of our efforts concentrates on that threat, and so when you look at the interim guidance issued by former secretary gates and we provide this overall policy to each of the armed aveses expressing sympathy or support for a violence promoting organization associating with terrorists, having a copy of "inspire" magazine, these are indicators that we apply, focus on the primary threat. we are not at war with islam. we are at war with al-qaeda, its affiliates, and its adherence, and that's how we concentrate our effort. >> senator lieberman? >> thanks, mr. chairman. i want to ask two questions that come off of the report that our

senate committee did after our extensive investigation of the killings of fort hood. the first builds on what chairman king was pursuing. we found that major nadal made statements either informally and in a lecture he gave to other members of the army at walter reed which were provocative, talking about really showing he had radicalized the violent islamist extremism, and yet, none of the person -- personnel in the army who heard the statements reported them or attempted to do anything to raise the question about whether this individual really should be in the u.s. army before doing somebody great damage. one of the recommendations in our report was the pentagon

begin to train members of the u.s. military and signs of radicalization to islamist extremism, both obviously to protect the safety of members of the military from another incident like fort hood, but frankly, even to protect the religious ob sur advance of the thousands of miss limbs americans who serve in our military so people could be able to tell the difference. i mean, i think what we heard in our investigation was some of the reason why people who heard him say the outrageous violent things were not sure whether it was -- that was really islam or he was politicized islam, may have been they just didn't want to create a problem so they turn the away from -- turned away from it, but i'm concerned that the pentagon has not implemented that kind of training program which is not only in the interest of securing the hundreds of thousands --

millions of active and reserve and guard -- but also in protecting the thousands of muslim-americans in the military. secretary stockton, do you want to take a try at that? >> chairman, i would, and then i'll turn it over to talk about how the army is applying overall guidance. >> yeah. >> we agreed it's critical to continue to ensure our supervisory personnel in the military can recognize signs of recognition. the interim guidance by secretary gates takes us a long way in that regard, and, indeed, many of the behavioral indicators look back at the warning signs, the red flags that should have been going off before prior to fort hood that now we can prospectively look forward and continue to refine the training tools so that our supervisors are able to monitor and detect and then effectively intervene when, for example,

military personnel espouse violent ideology, when they praise an extremist group abroad, and above all, when they attack american values, but i'll turn it over -- >> so is there a training program of that kind going on now either for all military personnel or at least for supervisors? >> yes, sir. i think if i can turn it over -- >> yeah, did right ahead. >> about how the army is applying it, and then i have additional thoughts to share on the additional services. >> sir, after we applied the 31-12, talked about earlier talking to mr. king, we have since gone out and professionalize the training program across the army and besides the regulation, we adopted professional training program training trainers to present the training in effective way to tailor the briefings to their audience whether it's a brigade combat

team or researchers and scientists. we have ensured that there are a number of professionally done indicators into the new regulation, and if you look at table 3.3 in the army regulation 31-12, the indicators of extremist activity that may pose a threat to dsd or pose a threat to military operations, three of the indicators listed in the table, those indicaters you talked about references nadal earlier with secretary stockton would have been covered in 3.3. in today's regulation, soldiers are trained to report indicators, and we're confident we would have received reports on those had we educating them prepperly to fort food. >> that's encouraging. appreciate the answer. a time question before the time runs out. the other question was about what we found to be the lack of coordination between the fbi and

dod in the fort nadal case, and it was the personnel fbi had not really taken action based on e-mails that they knew were going from there to alawaki. we have more than 5,000 recruiting centers, military recruiting centers in the u.s.. the first american killed by violence islamist extremist here in the homeland after 9/11, was priecht william long outside a recruiting station in little rock, arkansas. i want to ask about what the level of cooperation is because these recruiting centers are on map streets -- main streets all across america, in shopping malls, wherever. these are areas of jurisdiction and local and state law

enforcement and perhaps the february. just a quick answer on what we're doing now to secure those recruiting centers of the u.s. military. >> chairman lieberman, under the memorandum agreement now, we have dod personnel embedded in over 60 fbi jttfs around the nation. we have liaison relationships with state and local law enforcement on all of the military -- in all of the communities across the nation where our recruiting centers exist. this is all that sill at a timed by the system for sharing of suspicious activity information that local law enforcement has that our own personnel has so together they can take the anti-terrorism and force protection measures necessary to secure facilities that are embedded in our communities, and where local law enforcement will always be in the lead, but we need to do is to continue to

strengthen that collaborative relationship in order to strengthen the communities. >> my time's up. thank you. i'll ask more particular questions for the record. thank you. >> thank you. >> thank you, senator lieberman. so in the order of questioners, it's going to be those who were here when the gavel came down, and then after that in order of seniority. getting it the best we can, so we'll go to, i guess -- go to the ranking member, mr. thompson. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. secretary stockton, you've had ample time to review the fort hood shooting and look at some of the information, glean from that review, have we come up with any lessoned learned from that that you think would be

instructive for this committee? >> yes, sir. the first lesson learned is that we had an up adequate flow of information from the fbi's joint terrorism task forces to the department of defense, and then down to the installation commanders responsible for antiterrorism measures, and the specific problems, the specific failures that helped facilitate the break downs in the fort hood incident, those are the ones we've helped model in order to fix in our new relationship. a few examples -- first of all, we've now had the opportunity to carefully explain to the department of justice and the fbi what kind of information that we need. we have now an institutionalized flow so it doesn't only come from the fbi to one or two people inside the department of defense. it's spread around so there is not a single point of failure so there's not a risk that the institution as a whole will sit

on information rather than acting on it. we have a special training program for the dod personnel now being embedded in 60 joint terrorism task forces around the nation so they know what to look for, so they can identify a dod nexus, a reason why we need the information to flow to us, and we have very careful measures in place to protect civil liberties, and to make sure as a matter of law and policies the department of defense is fully respecting privacy, civil liberties, and the constitutional guarantees under which we all live. >> your testimony is after that review and the regulations and rules that have been instituted that similar occurrences like fort food would be minimized? yes, sir. >> thank you. >> lieutenant colonel sawyer,

one of your responsibilities i see is to review some of the training material that is going out in the broader community to address this issue, and i think part of this some of this training material has been identified as perhaps misleading. can you suggest to the committee a way to address some uniformity standards within the training for this issue? >> yes, sir. there are two critical parts to this. the first is that we do not want to up hibt our ability -- inhibit our aid and abet -- our ability to educate on these critical threats. how do we get our intelligence, soldiers, our law enforcement to understand the threats in which they can react to them in a proactive manner and to

understand them in depth to be able to focus on the changing trajectory of the time? to achieve uniformity in this, what we need to do is really instill there's a competency in the people producing the training materials that they are academically rigorous based on sound research and in which they are producing and fact based and not void of political agenda or personal opinion, and if we accomplish that, the training is more successful and the reviews have shown this to be the case. >> thank you. one of the issues that some of us grapple with is whether or not putting into place these standards whether ce can do that -- we can do that and maintain the desired cohesion necessary for

the military to do its job. are you comfortable that those items you worked on will to on the one hand identify the issues, but will not jeopardize unit cohesion on the other? >> sir, yes, i am, and to elaborate, one of the issues that we push when we give this training to the soldiers and civilians in the army, there's a multitude of training mechanisms should they observe them and need to report it. they can report it to a counterintelligence agent, report it to a criminal investigator, to their commander, to their squad leader, to their security officer. we have put in place a link on the army knowledge network to report it electronically. there's so many mechanisms in place to allow soldiers to report the behaviors 234 a manner in which they feel comfort l, and soldiers use all

of these venues for reporting, and that's why we feel it's very effective. >> thank you. i yield back. >> i thank the gentleman. the order for the next several speakers so the gentleman from minnesota is recognized. >> thank you, chairman king, chairman lieberman for holding these extremely important discussions and open forum. as retired military officer i find it frustrating we're playing politics on threat assessment. we should be able to identify the enemy, know who they are, call them for what they are, and it's violent, radical islamic extreme i want. we owe that to our troops to detect them. as a military commander, that's the most important job is to protect my troops. with that said, secretary stockton, if you would, sir, thank you for being here.

just found out today you're a fellow minnesotan, so good to hear. you referred to a strategy empowering local partners to prevent violent extremism in the united states stating the best defense against the ideologies are well informed and equipped families. could you elaborate more by what you meant by this? >> my pleasure. the president has issued a new strategy last august, 2011, and empowering local partners to prevent violence extremism in the united states. families are an important part, muslim families are an important part of the effort in order to defeat the recruitment and radicalization of american citizens and residents and the efforts of al-qaeda to turn them into attackers against military communities and all americans. we view the opportunity to treat families across the nation as

partners in this shared endeavor as an important component of the overall strategy that the president has issued. >> thank you, thank you, sir. i appreciate you elaborating on that. mr. stuteville, sir, according to the investigation, the army doesn't currently share counterterrorism information given to it by the fbi. with its own military intelligence or commanders, can you confirm this? if so, why is this the case? >> sir, with all do respect, sir, i disagree with that statement in the fact we share counterterrorism information with our local commanders, the force protection officers and installations, security officer, and the chain of command. every time we receive information whether it be from the fbi or other agencies or

department of defense or army that indicates a threat to an up stalllation, we go to great means to ensure all leaders at every echelon have the information to make the appropriate decisions to protect their force and their families. >> excellent. good to know. thank you very much. i appreciate you expending on that. to what extent al-qaeda is attempting to infiltrate its members into the u.s. military and also to conduct counterterrorist attacks, and 23 you see an increase and a trend in this? >> sir, parts of that question would be best addressed in closed session, but in terms of the radicalization efforts, essentially they've created a distributed network in the rapid prorifflation of materials online, making it accessible for anybody to participate and

belong to the movement, and it increases the number of entry points for the individuals to join and to be radicalized, and as they continue to paint the military in this essence of war criminals as it legitimates the military as targets, it certainly p up deuces and -- induces and furthers individuals to target the military increasing the risk from insider threat. >> thank you. >> it's clear in evidence i read so far, read and heard that jihadists discussed and are carrying out attacks on soft military related targets like military funerals, stations frequented by military personnel, ect.. what can be done to harden the targets, and how can we protect the military troops when they are actually most vulnerable?

>> congressman, i welcome the opportunity to address the question in closed session, and i promise in the closed session i'll explain there's places warmer than mips. we'll keep that classified. >> roger that. my time expired. thank you very much for your answers. i yield back. >> the gentleman yields back, and i recognize the gentlelady from california for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, gentlemen, for being before us. you know, my husband, jack, is a retired military officer, and in 9/11, he was in germany, and he headed up pretty much all the law -- he's a lawyer, all the law institutions that we have and oversaw that in germany, and he recalls the day after 9/11, he had to go in and talk to the lawyers on the other side for local municipalities and explain to them how -- why we had driven

the tanks all over the towns. obviously, we had somewhat overreacted to what was happening over here, and he had to go and explain what the heck we were doing by driving tanks all over the town and shutting things down, and so i think we need to plan ahead to we don't have these types of reabses, and we need -- reactions, and we need to plan ahead as we learned in the issue with germany, to plan ahead with our local municipalities and local law enforcement when these types of things happen, when we have or to plan against a terrorist attack that might happen overseas or here in the united states, and so i think that when we soul search to try to figure out what do we need to do, i think that's important, and as a member who also sits on the arms services committee for

15 years now, we have lookedded at much of this to try to figure out, you know, what do we do, and how do we do it? i think planning is important. i think education is very important. education of the troops that i'd like to ask unanimous concept to put into the record some documents that we have here, some of the experiences that, and in particular that we have of our muslim soldiers and airmen, ect., and how they feel being in the military, wanting to be a part of what is really a great institution of the united states, and, you know, talking about how they are looked at differently within their units or their corp. even though some of them have bronze stars, silver star, you know, medals that they are always looked at with questions in the eyes of

even some of their fellow unit members, and so my question to you is, first of all -- >> would you like that into the record? >> may i introduce them into the record, mr. chairman? >> without objection, so ordered. >> first of all, secretary, what do -- what do they bring? should we just consider maybe not having muslims in our military? i mean, are they a vital part of -- i mean, i lived in the middle east. you know, i think it's important to know the culture and language of the people, but, you know, sometimes people look and say let's just not have them in our military. what would you say to something like that? >> i'd begin by referring back to the comment that chairman king made earlier in the hearing, and that is recognizing the tremendous contributions of muslim-americans to national security, and the armed forces in particular. we need muslim-americans in the

united states military. we need native pashtun speakers, dari speakers, and patriots of all religions joining, and maintaining the treant of our armed -- straint of our arm -- strength of our armed forces. you raised an important challenge which is in today's environment how do we both deal with the reality that al-qaeda and its affiliates target department of defense facilities as a target of choice and yet recognize we need and value muslim-americans in the united states military? the way forward is to focus on indicators of violence behavior, indicators of radicalism where we can watch the behavior and train our supervisory personnel to watch the behavior of their soldiers in order to identify early on and intervene effectively early on when they say indicators that within our ranks we may have potential terrorist pes p >> not just

muslims? my husband prosecuted plenty of non-muslims in killing their wives and kids and everything else in the military. >> anybody exhibiting behaviors that indicate violence. let me emphasize again, this is about al-qaeda, its affiliates, and its adherence to the security here at home. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> i recognize the gentleman from new york, mr. turner, for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. a question for lieutenant colonel sawyer. you mentioned the intellectual underpinnings of radical islam and in the training. the theology of islam is easily

understood. there's prayer and fasting and charity, similar to all religions, and an adherence to the natural law, do unto others. beyond that, there's an overlay of politics, and there's a battle within islam. the political aspects of this, of course, are problematic. it would serve our interest if we understood more about what's going on within islam. have we talked to mosques and to get a better understanding of the politics and the theology? are they inextrickble? is there a movement afoot for

the intellectual justification for a -- to combat this within islam? are we taking advantage of it, or is this considered too sensitive to address? >> sir, that -- thank you very much for that question. i think that the best way to answer that is to point out that there's a significant distinction between the politics and the teologies that are embraced within the faith and culture from the ideology that's developed by al-qaeda and its affiliates and adherence. ..

it inhibits our ability to really address the problem and a comprehensive manner and that's one of the things that at west point has done. we've educated over 4100 local, state and federal law enforcement officials over about 6000 hours of education on these issues. how is that we can make these people smarter to understand this very distinction so what we don't do is harm our ability

card behind the community and create worse relations with the american muslim community, which are absolutely essential to solving these problems. >> mr. secretary. >> very quickly again, it's an excellent question and i would urge all members and staff if they haven't already to become familiar with the power and local partners because it's focused precisely on challenges we've discussed and highlights a new way forward, a community-based approach in order to meet the challenges. >> can you identify any readers in the muslim community that are helping you in this regard? >> i'd be happy to take that question for the record. >> already. thank you. i yield back, mr. chairman. >> i recognize the gentlelady from texas, ms. jackson lee for

five minutes. >> mr. chairman and the ranking members commit thank you for your courtesy. before he left houston, i initiated with our community of soldiers a yellow ribbing campaign to welcome home returning troops out because i know from iraq at the end of december. think it is evidence not of one member's actions, but really that america loves her military. so is my chairpersons would allow me because i haskell questions, i do want to put a comment from former secretary cases says our all volunteer force has the strength of our national diversity and is composed of teachers who are first and foremost soldiers, sailors, airmen or marines sworn to uphold our national values. i'd like to change the direction of the discussion and talk about americans. american soldiers who happened to be as many different faiths. i indicated to my chairman,

mr. king, that i am here to be a problem solver. those who lost their lives for my neighbors and friends in fort hood, texas. i went to the memorial service and i can tell you it's a memory i will never forget. to keep this empathy and pain at fort hood and those family members and extended friends continued to experience will never be, i believe extinguish. to mr. long and the last of his friend, mstislav, i say to them that we are paying for the enormous tragedy and we should easier to solve problems. i do want to however quote from you, mr. secretary, as i hold up a little book and say that we are constant reminders of this book at our soldiers are in fact defending the constitution, which says that we do have the

freedom of religion. i think it is important to note the comment that she made that our primary threat as al qaeda, not at war with islam. in your statement, you indicated that homegrown terrorists may happen to be of a particular faith have limited contact with al qaeda across the ocean if you will, that they are intensified by their own research, baby internet. and so, we have within our borders and with our ability the skills and tools that should be utilized to extinguish and to stamp out those who would do us harm. let me just quickly know and pay tribute to mosh in on the crew died in afghanistan 26-year-old muslim among five soldiers that

were killed. his family acknowledged in the military he was picked on, but that his goal was to die defending or his relatives said defending against acts of terror and the voluntary interpretation of islam the vast majority of muslims denounce. let us put that at least on the record and pay tribute to those who have died. my question is specifically too i think the major failures at fort hood. why didn't the military who are aware of captain hussain silent walter reid passed that information on to the brass at fort hood? where was the disconnect? let me quickly add two other questions so you can quickly ask them. i'm concerned about targets and i know that she may refer to some of these, but the ranking member in the transportation security kameny see our soldiers traveling in airport, train stations, bus stations. some soldiers will come home in

their uniform and go into neighborhoods and corners around the nation. what if we become to do to already address the potential of soft target and soldiers who are walking alone in various places in america? and on the idea of databases, one of the recommendations of the independent review is sharing databases. may i yield to you to answer at least two of those questions? >> man, i would like to answer your first question that the activities of major exxon while they were not reported to army leaders. prior to the four-inch advances have express an earlier comment of chairman king, we did not have the right he gave zero indicators and we did not educate our force in this regard. since that time we have revised regulation and i'm confident

today the behavior indicators we have in this regulation would allow soldiers to report the information that they discussed above major hasan. so i believe that the bottom line is we did not educate our force prior to that in the information did not get reported. >> we do more as a release to behavioral training, which i think overcomes the idea of stigmatizing one religion over another. are we focusing on the actions of internet use, overly aggressive in their faith or their actions to let their families? >> man, and table three, which are referred to earlier, those indicators of extremist activities, those indicators are focused on behavioral activity that accomplishes all of those activities mentioned. >> secretary 10, any response on the soft targets that are beyond the basis for soldiers are wearing uniforms? >> secretary stockton can answer the question.

>> very briefly, local one person having their commanders tightly engaged with them so that local law enforcement can be an elite for security in those kinds of soft targets. >> i think the chairman. i think we have much more distance to travel on these issues of securing our families, military families and soldiers in the united states. i yield back. >> i recognize the attorney general, mr. lundgren. >> first of all let me say unequivocally mccree support for those who are serving in the military today and for those who are appearing on this panel. secretary scott dan, are we at war with an islamist extremism? >> no, sir. we are at war with al qaeda. >> my question has come as violent islamist extremism at war with us? >> no, sir. we are attacked by al qaeda and

its allies. >> cannot be described as being an exponent of the extremism? >> al qaeda are murderers. the ideological agenda. >> that wasn't my question. my question was if al qaeda at thing out violent islamic extremism? >> al qaeda is a valid organization dedicated to overthrow the values that we intend to stand. >> is the answer yes or no? >> can hear the question again? >> i will make it as clear as i can. we are not aware of islam. >> i did not ask back, sir. i asked whether we are at war with violent islamic extremism. that's my question. >> no, we are aware with al qaeda. >> how does al qaeda define itself? a day dedicated to violent extremism?

>> al qaeda would love to convince muslims around the road that the united states is at war with islam. it's a fine propaganda tool and i'm not going to aid and abet. >> is there a difference between islam and violent islamist extremism? >> sera come with great respect, i don't believe it's helpful to frame our adversary as islamic with any set of qualifiers that we might be had. we are not at war with islam. >> i understand that. i never said we were at war with islam. one of the questions we try to deal with is the radicalization of islam. is the radicalization of islam used. and if we can distinguish between violent islamist extremism and islam, then all this stuff about behavioral indicators doesn't mean anything. let me ask you this question. is it a behavioral indicator to put on your car that you are a

soldier of allah? >> a behavioral indicator that you have a copy of inspire magazine on your desk. >> that's not my question. as a behavioral indicator to put on your cardura soldier of allah as major hasan did? >> we have behavioral indicators now that enabler personnel, supervisors to focus on detect teen indicators of violent extremism that reflect the lessons learned from fort hood. >> is that a lesson learned? that you put the soldier of allah on your card, that you have to follow up and investigate that? >> we are training our supervisors to follow-up on appropriate indicators and exercise the leadership they need in order to provide for effective reporting. >> to agree with statement to someone representing the department of defense on the weekend after the shooting that it would be a greater tragedy to

lose our program of diversity than what had occurred? >> well, lemmie go back to some mean chairman king said. i was trained by senator moynihan. there was nobody less politically correct than senator moynihan. i follow it wherever it takes me and i strongly support the programs the department of defense to focus on al qaeda and behavioral indicators. this is not about political correctness. >> sir, i disagree with you that it may not be about political correctness. we are here talking about the fact that we now have to have behavioral indicators. i agree with that. my question is, if someone gives safe inflammatory remarks as did major hasan in an open setting, if he has on his card that he was a soldier of allah, it seems to me to be beyond common sense to think those are not behavioral indicators.

so my question is if i'm a member of the military today and i see those two events are those two circumstances, would it be appropriate for me to report those as behavioral indicators? that is not a question of whether or not you're being politically correct, sir. i'm asking to answer that specific question. if i'm a soldier nasty that question, what do you me? >> inflammatory rhetoric associated with major hasan that needs to be reported in our offices are trained not to report on that behavior. >> i appreciate that. mr. stuteville, the gentleman's time has expired. thank you. i recognize senator pryor for five minutes. >> thank you. mr. chairman, thank you for doing this. thanks for all of us. i want to thank the witnesses for being here today and thank

you for your service and just tell you how much we all appreciate everything you did for the country. let me start if i may with a sore subject for me. and that is as many of our senators and congressmen have mentioned today, we had a situation in little rock where two of our recruiters, servicemen were killed and targeted by someone who had been radicalized and he has been very open about that. he's told everyone who would listen that is why he did this and that is why they were targeted. under the department of defense regulations, they are not entitled to receive their purple hearts. so mr. stockton, could you talk to the joint committee here about why the department of defense has said they are not entitled to receive their purple hearts? >> this has been a decision like

this fire by the department of the army. so i defer to mr. stuteville. >> thank you. fair, the attacks in the little rock recruiting station for anytime in any event is a tragic situation. as you know the awarded the purple heart is governed by statutes and executive orders in the department of defense and army regulations, which state the purple heart is awarded for soldiers for winter renders received as a direct result of an actual terrorist attack on the united states. the incident and brittle rock park is considered a criminal act and was not deemed an international terrorist that. and therefore, as unfortunate as it is, secretary of the army could not award the purple heart to those two soldiers. should information service in the future that would change that to an international act, the secretary would be allowed to relook that. but at this time, the decision is based on that.

>> is the perpetrator has submitted that it was a terrorist act and he intentionally did this. he intentionally sought out these two recruiters. he was trying to kill americans in uniform. he had been to yemen and had been radicalized and he freely admits this. he is not hiding it. he's bragging about it to anyone who will listen. so i'm having trouble understanding why you don't -- why the army does not consider this a terrorist attack. >> circa secretary of the army did have information available when he made the decision. however, it still was not deemed a sufficient or enough information that it was a terrorist attack. i'll take your concerns to the army leadership at the conclusion of this hearing. >> thank you. i know they wanted to try to case, but just for whatever legal reasons i'm not sure why in state court. and it was a criminal matter in state court, but certainly the u.s. attorney tried very hard.

my understanding is to characterize a terrorist act on u.s. soil and how the prosecution than in federal court. nonetheless ended up in state court. i would very much appreciate hearing back from you on this and i know senator bozeman and i., colic from arkansas we have a bill to clarify this, but i just think we are sending a very mixed message about the threats we have here in the sacrifices our men and women in uniform make. and it is they had scratcher to me, so i would appreciate you getting back to me after you look at this. >> would the gentleman yield? senator, i amply want -- or from arkansas, but i simply want to join with you in seeking clarification in the line of duty and in combat or two may be

confusing themes when your constituents are fallen and the act terror was associated with acts of terror. so i think we can do this in a bipartisan, bicameral manner, respecting the department of defense. you quoted a statute i think was written by the congress. so i would ask as you take senator pryor's request that, that you would add for those of us who are also from texas, who had the same pain for many families and find a way not to the door the department of defense, disrespect definition of a purple heart, but to find a way to come to recognition of the violent of the attack that those who were at the hands of someone who is acting in the alleged war and terror as it relates to the united states of

america. i go back to the gentleman. >> with a gentleman yield as well? >> the senator's time has expired. i recognize the gentleman from south carolina, mr. duncan and asked if he would yield to me for five seconds. >> thank you, mr. chairman. gentlemen -- >> hill to me for five seconds. >> one observation, mr. stockton police al qaeda is the enemy. welcome about this at the pakistani television, which carried out the 10 square bombing in new york. not just al qaeda. it felt so islamic extremist groups throughout the world. >> chairman, thank you. very briefly. i agree with you. in other words it includes lashkar-e-taiba and pakistan and the al-shabaab and somalia. they are all part of this by islamist extremism movement and they all threaten the united

states of america. >> without antagonizing the man further -- [laughter] >> i apologize. just to further that point along the same lines, the administration refuses to understand and exploit terrorist semantics and the code words in the 9/11 commission report used the language of identifying enemy 39 times. she had 126 times. al qaeda 36 times, sharia two times. and the most report lessons from 2010 use these terms zero times. i have said many times in committee hearings, mr. chairman, we have to identify the enemy is forever going to defeat the enemy. i think that's important. during the cold war they conducted diplomacy on the basis of complete ignorance of the soviet definition of the peaceful coexistence. unlike the conventional american understanding, we may dislike

each other, but we will live and let live. soviet literature and political lexicons to find it rather is a form of struggle against capitalist oral forms of struggle are permissible except all-out war. i think we've got to identify the enemy. we have to be willing to discuss the true threat to this nation and discuss it in terms that are realistic. and so according to spread awareness and reporting program refuses to identify and discuss violent islamic extremism. so the question for you, mr. stuteville, were major natal have fun who killed 15 wounded 33, were they motivated by islamist extremism? >> sera, i would characterize it as their motivation particularly in terms of major has gone.

we really can't discuss those today because his issue is still as you know of awaiting prosecution. i would simply say and our new approach -- >> let me establish the fact he was sent communication with a lucky. that's been proven. >> yes, sir. >> sorry to interrupt. i still believe our current approach of behavioral indicators of any individual who does certain things i most get reported back as the best way to prevent these taxes recurring in the future. that to me is the focus in the army's approach and we believe it successful to preventing these in the future. >> mr. chairman, i really just wanted to make that point. i really don't have anything further for the sentiment other than just to encourage you going forward in the policies of this administration that we truly identify the enemy of country. let's have the courage to

discuss openly and honest early and used the terms necessary to defeat this enemy once and for all and make this country in this world a safe place. and i think we do that by being honest with herself and honest with the american people. i yield back. >> at the gentleman would yield the balance of his time. >> gentleman for minnesota. >> thank you for yielding. i appreciate the purple heart, why these young men were not receiving the purple heart at you not understand. i think they are casualties of war. they weren't terrorism quite frankly. and i also would like to see -- have statement explained to me from the secretary of the army why he does not dare to have his troopers victims -- not victims, but warriors killed in combat. thank you, sir. i yield back the gentleman. >> the gentleman yields back and i now work as the gentlelady

from california ms. richardson for five minutes. >> yes, thank you, mr. chaiman. i want to thank you chairman ring, ranking member collins for bringing this forward on this important subject. gentleman, thank you for your service. i'm going to ask you a couple questions that would simply require a yes or no answer. question number one, is there a threat military communities limited to only islamic extremists? yes or no. i will start with you, secretary stockton. >> thank you for that question. that allows me to address a couple of the other questions. >> i'm sorry, mr. stockton. i am not a ranking member with the leadership, so i've only got five minutes. so just simply a yes or no. >> al qaeda, its affiliates and adherents are primary threat. that is the center of gravity, but we recognize other threats

confront the united states as well. >> thank you, sir. mr. stuteville. >> man, and keeping to your yes or no answer, i say no in this particular case. >> the question was, is very threat to military communities only limited to islamic extremism in your answers now, correct correct? >> correct. and lieutenant colonel sawyer. >> i agree with the previous panelists. >> second question. as a threat to u.s. communities limited to islamic extremists only come a yes or no? >> secretary stock in. >> my same answer. >> mr. stuteville. >> that would be no. >> lieutenant colonel sawyer. >> noted that as well. >> third question, what other event extremists exist? secretary stock in. >> i prefer to take that for the record and go into some detail with you.

>> mr. stuteville. lieutenant colonel sawyer? >> man powered also seem proliferation of other movements. it has been carried arise by members targeting from the christian right movement and identity movement within the united states and that's the reason why my answer is no. >> thank you, gentlemen. i next question is that it's been said here today that there were in the 90s, skinheads, white extremists and so on. would you agree that skinheads and white extremists no longer exist and are not a threat to this country or military bases? secretary stock din. >> they are likely to still be a threat. >> thank you, sir. >> mr. stuteville. >> man, my answer would be no. you cannot colonel sawyer.

>> i don't really have knowledge on the sets come in slightly deeper that the record, please. >> would you say they exist? >> yes. >> would you say the exist? >> yes ma'am, i do. i went through those questions because we were told the topic of this hearing with homegrown terrorism, threat to military communities inside the united states. it doesn't say islamic anywhere in here. let me ask a separate question that i think might be helpful for you gentleman. a budget cut in this dire environment that we're all facing, there is included in the sequestration the possibility of cutting the military. how would you see these cuts would affect the work you need to do? >> thank you for that question. go to sustain the progress we have underway, but also accomplished it starts we've been able to launched due to the current fiscal environment.

they would be put at risk. secretary panetta has cynically the national security would be at risk of sequestration i fully support his position. >> mr. stuteville. >> man, i second secretary stockton comments. >> lieutenant colonel. >> i was completely concur. >> assistant secretary, were dod begins to implement the cde invited behavioral training throughout the service says, how important is it to make sure that soldiers are not targeted, that we will not find stereotyping going on based upon race religion, ethnicity? and what steps are you going to do to ensure that the appropriate trainees and monitoring access? even after you do the training and say this is supposed to be stereotyping and targeting, what are you going to do to ensure that won't occur? >> we have a white house directed review underway right now to address the challenges who identified.

we are in it for the long haul. not only to make sure in a snapshot for doing what we need to do, but to sustain those standards in the future. >> thank you. i yield back the balance of my time. >> i recognize the gentleman from michigan, mr. walberg for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i think the panel for being here and apologize for not having a chance to hear some of the questioning that went on. but let me ask what cannot colonel sawyer first, to what extent does al qaeda target military communities in the u.s.? and is this trend increasing? >> fair, it's a difficult question to answer in terms of whether there's direct targeting from abroad. we do know 56% of those direct attacks against the military in the past 10 years since 9/11 have been through passive radicalization. in other words, individuals in the united states reach unsubscribe the ideology of al qaeda and adherents of the

affiliated organizations in mobilizing radicalism around. so the fact that al qaeda is perpetrating ideology and proliferating in a way in identifying the military is a prime target in a legitimate target to act in a preemptive manner is significant because it allows individuals in the united states to seek that out and understand what terry such a powerful target. >> so the trend is increasing? >> yes, sir. it's certainly persistent as we've seen and has increased since 2007. >> that would be equal -- there'd be an increasing trend as well with other radicalized islamic terrorists organizations , including all shabbat than others? would that be the same concern? >> yes, sir. >> we are all i think safely we can say we are all delighted that osama bin laden is no

longer anything but room temperature, wherever that we might be. we are glad that he is not the focus or the phase of radical terrorism at this point. but in the process of locating him, approaching him in dealing with him, there are some of us that at least has some kind or answer questions about how it was carried out before an aftermath. so let me ask you, colonel sawyer. what is harmful for the special operations forces involved in the may 1, 2011 killing of osama bin laden to be publicly identified? >> fair, that's a difficult question would like to address and classified session.

>> secretary stockton. >> i recommend that his perch as well. >> and i assume stuteville the same thing. >> yes, sir. the public identification of these members and their families >> i'm welcome to take that. >> let me try another question related to that. should units involved in such sensitive operations be identified in the future? >> again, i welcome the opportunity. >> if i say to the gentleman from michigan, or we are going to be made in the closed session after this hearing for the secretary will be available? >> thank you, mr. chairman. i would yield my time. >> i would like to recognize the newest member of the committee or the newest member in the minority side, one of the

hardest working in california. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for this opportunity. it has been a very interesting hearing. there are so many things today disturbed about, particularly with the fort hood massacre and the failure in my opinion of the higher-ups to properly take discipline action against major hasan. i don't think it was about political correctness. i think there were so many indicators and policies that i believe were probably already in place that were just not adhered to. the fact that a guy with an army psychiatrist. he was transferred. he had desired behavior. he had a bad performance evaluation and nothing was done.

i am happy that we have new policies in place, where you think some these indicators are going to be more recognize. but i still believe there was a failure with policies that were already in place, that were not adhered to. and that is really a huge part of the tragedy that i am disturbed about. you know, my question is going to be about -- and i believe as has been said that authoress regardless of religion or ideology are what we need to be paying attention to. and if we just are focusing on certain particular ideology, then we are exposing ourselves to threats that will put our country at risk. i am concerned about the military families and the military bases. in my district adding california, my district includes the l.a. air force base.

so certainly that is a big concern of mine. but also in my community, we have housed military families forever. we have the army families they are. we have navy family housing there. air force housing. so my question is going to be, what are we doing and what can you tell me that we are doing to protect the families who live in our communities, kids are going to school. are we paying attention to potential risk and danger that families of military ties in these identified military housing projects and communities throughout the country? >> i would like to say a few words and then turn it over to my colleague. i have regular meetings with sheriff bach a compass state and

local fusion centers that apply to your district and are focused on this kind of challenge. and again, law enforcement is the installation commanders so that we can take care of military people on base on the uniform and is part of our area of focus. >> man, i have referred to our thread awareness and reporting the program several times this morning. we make the training available to family members as well. the primary focus of the training 50 soldiers and civilians in the armed forces, but the other thing we've done is we perpetrating online so that an independent with a common access card can access streaming through the training and that can center in line as well as we make it available for dependents to attend a training should the situation warrants a large enough facility to allow that. but the other parties we have since put in place across the

army did i watch program, which is a little like to see something and say something program. got access to that information. >> thank you. my college alluded to the tough decisions for the congressman will be making my budget. there are going to really be dependent on budget. can you tell me what sequestration will have -- what kind of an effect that will have particularly in the security? >> at that to take that please for the record and give you a detailed response. >> thank you. anybody else? let me just add on the family members. are we also working with schools who have these kids and their schools. our work and the teachers, counselors to us of the other two may maybe identify some of the behaviors that we're talking

about that maybe were only targeting the adults who exhibit that kind of behavior? >> community engagement has a special focus now on school and we are taking a part of the overall strategy that the white house has issued very seriously. >> thank you very much. i yield back my time. >> i recognize the chairman of the oversight subcommittee, mr. mccoy. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i thank you both that you are here today this historic hearing. it is very important. my district -- fort hood is just recited my district. i went to the funeral services for the 13 slain soldiers, with combat boots and rifles. i know you are very familiar and aware of all this. it's very emotional.

at that time we didn't really know the connection between major hasan and how lucky am to some extent we still don't know how much of a connection there really was. i do recall asking soldiers who were wounded, who i thought were the best evidence, you know, what did he say if he shot you? he screamed at. at that point in time i realize there may be some pain a little more to this case than just a murder case. and since that time, i think senator lieberman came out with an excellent report outlining a lot of these investigation. i worked in the justice department, joint terrorism task force. i understand how this all works. i understand flay says, but when it came to my attention that the gatt off in san diego had

information that major hasan at a military base north of my district was communicating with anwar al-awlaki, the greatest terrorist threat while he was alive over the internet. any idea that information was not shared with fort hood. and i asked general cullen at the ceremony. i said, one should like to have known more about this guy? or just a headset. you may want to take a look at the sky. keep an eye on him. i possibly could have stopped the death of the 13 soldiers. but i would argue is the greatest attack since the 9/11 terrorist attack. and i think in a report that senator lieberman issued, the fbi of khouri said that's a boy. that was the response when they saw major hasan being arrested. so my first question is, you know, why wasn't that

information shared that could have prevented this attack? and what are we doing to make sure that never happens again? i guess probably the best person would be aghast -- okay, mr. sub 10. i'll start in invite my colleagues to add more. first of all, and the most severe problem is that the personnel in the joint terrorism task force did not understand the duty to share this information when there is what we call a department of defense nexus. our installation commander at fort hood needed to know the information that the gatt have had and they needed to understand that they have a duty to share that with us. speculate, we did not have the kind of personnel around the nation from the department of defense and joint terrorism task forces to make it stick, to build the habitual

relationships, build the practice of sharing that would ensure that it can do base commander was getting the information needed. and finally we need to ensure that it's not happening by one season twosies. the institution to institution we get information from the fbi that is widely distributed on the rate other basis throughout the department of defense. our installation commanders and all the armed services are getting what they need in a timely and effective fashion. >> while i hope we fixed it. we can't change what happened in the past, but i sure hope we fixed that problem. and the way this guy -- no one wanted to do with it. chairman king always talks about political correct this. this was political correctness gone awry. you know, time after time, flex coming up about these defending, proselytizing. nobody wants to deal with it. as the military changing its

strategy in dealing with people that they can perceive to be radicalizing within our military and our basis? >> farrakhan again as i reiterated this morning, our behavior indicators capture all the key indicators we believe that indicate someone is going down the path of radicalization. and to answer your question further about the information between the department of services and the fbi, i would be glad to share specific examples with you in the first hearing about how the process works much more effectively. >> you may not be able to answer this question. >> the time of the gentleman has expired. >> i would like to know about mr. a lucky administer his son. >> the gentleman yield back. i recognize macculloch from upstate new york, the gentlelady

, ms. vogel. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i do appreciate this opportunity. i'm sorry miss the questioning. i was at the father of a young man stationed there while he was still awaiting word on whether or not his son was dead or alive. so we suffered through this as did the country and families to survive. i know you want to get it right. let that be the last case we ever have and one of our military bases. i currently represented these at the niagara falls air force base. to the hearings we've had in my six month on committee have learned a lot. there is a hezbollah threat facing us across the board in toronto. that's not far from air force base. security has reported there's more threats are terrorism in this country along the northern borders in the southern border. we have a large expansive and which is virtually unprotected. i just want to ask a question, do you feel there's additional threat to any bases along the

northern border as opposed to the southern border and are additional safeguards being taken to protect our? mr. secretary. former colleague of senator moynihan. we are alumni so we understand that political correct this issue as well. >> and why we are not politically correct. base commanders have the obligation not only to take general guidance that the department of defense supplies, but to take in local threats, local circumstances is a crime factor in building their specific antiterrorism and force protection packages. so i would say yes indeed a lot of the as well in other specific areas. base commanders are required to take circumstances into account. >> i like to further amplify that. u.s. command has the authority under ao are primary responsibility includes the northern and southern borders.

>> in addition to that, i doubt there's been significant movement in a northern border between interagency with doj, fbi, to share information and to make that available to a variety of sources. so to look at that as helping our understanding and the operation needed to address the problem. >> today's hearing is based on the bases. i'm concerned about bases overseas. we've had attacks because of threats that became reality and i want to make sure our focus is not limited because we have men and women serving in harms way also where. we have to protect them from these threats as well and i hope were taken in holistic approach to this. this is important to me. and also in my area has been affected by really the first known domestic terrorist after

9/11, which is the six case. we have people in our backyard who trained with osama bin laden and knew there was going to be an attack on 9/11 before 9/11. so we need to be vigilant. those people have been prosecuted. they are sent to jail and are now back in to becoming cooperating businesses and are very helpful to us. that case aside, i want to make sure there's nowhere else people are engaging in activity that could be harmful to her bases. this is very important i want to make sure you understand its importance. i am pleased to hear we all agree this could never happen again in our country. so thank you very much. i yield back the belt for my time. >> the gentlelady goes back and i wonder she's too modest to point out her husband is one of the major leaders against terrorism in new york. i asked the panel to step down, but asked them to remain to the closed session for testimony questioning of our next witness.

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] and now we are pleased to welcome of the next witness, mr. dari's long. mr. long is the father william andrew long, the young army private who was killed outside an arkansas military recruiting center in 2009. mr. long has a distinguished record of service at this country that includes 17 years unless the service in the united

states during core and 10 years as an officer. during his military career, mr. long served nearly eight years overseas in nearly 19 years in the operating forces of the fleet marine force. in addition to the overseas service of the federal government, mr. long has trails in afghanistan and is visited roughly 50 countries including pakistan, lebanon can this theory, iraq and iran. between him and his wife, his family has been connected with the united states armed forces since 1918. before he recognized mr. long for his opening statement, that to acknowledge mr. melvin put so, who was seated directly behind mr. long. mr. bledsoe testified before a committee, the house committee in march of this year. he is the father who was convicted of his murdered son. mr. bledsoe's presence here in

support of mr. long is a testament to how to to considerable pain to stand together in the fight against violent islamic extremism. mr. bledsoe, thank you for being here today and for testimony back in march. i know privilege to recognize mr. lott for his opening statement. >> chairman kean, chairman lieberman, ranking member thompson, distinguished members of congress, since my son's death, my view of change that thinks. i lay awake through my wife's nightmares that she really has been 50 feet away while andy and quinn were shot. i was a career marine both listed as an officer during could my wife served in the navy and was honorably discharged. our fantasy of the branches in world war i and we have one son who served in iraq as an army calvary scout and one son who was infantry and buried in the ground. my faith in government is

diminished. it prevents euphemisms rather than accurate language while perpetrators speak freely using the very words being defensive -- offensive to justify their actions. clarity is absent. little rock is a drive-by. fort hood is just workplace violence. three days after andy died, it was reported on the internet by nature carried to sit at the white house had released a statement on the little rock shootings. but only to arkansas and its outlets that they ask for one. according to garrett, the white house didn't think there is much interest in the story otherwise. we believe the push for certain press outlet in talk radio put pressure on the white house for the president's response on a terrorist attack against an abortion.her, which starkly contrasted the signed statement on the wounding of american soldiers in america's heartland. the white house issued the letter of condolence we received with a phone call from the president.

the president's statement is conspicuously absent from the white house would say. two new jersey men. 14 minnesota men, arrested for planning to go to somalia to join al-shabaab. tonight in seattle planning on attacking the recruiting center, are resulting in federal indictments were terrorism. the government cut a small eye crossing from him into small units and sneak him into a new york federal court. he now has all political rights for american citizens of any acquaintance writes blood out on the pavement in little rock. people within the federal government like to trumpet success in thwarting attacks. former homeland security secretary tom ridge said we just got lucky for the christmas day in "new york times" bombers failed. for some effective counterterrorism strategy. great law enforcement, but nothing was thwarted. the latest for that episode was planned by a soldier who had previously been the subject of the mainstream media blitz for

taking his conscientious objector stand to get out of afghanistan. he was painted as the peaceful muslim poster boy with principles. it is time that his discharge is on hold because he was facing child charges and was awol from fort campbell, kentucky. once again federal terrorism charges. in an attack that resulted in the first death wounding of american soldiers on u.s. soil since 9/11, action by the department of justice is absent. little rock is conducting more than a drive-by shooting. abdul mohammed's jihad in america has been downplayed by the federal government and the mainstream media causing irreparable change to families involved as well as plot outline to the american people. i am convinced the government's position can deny little rock is a terrorist attack. by not being open, transparent and despite promises to do so to this administration is changed,

two soldiers had been abandoned on the battlefield and ambience that of a political agenda. november 5, 2009, and attack took place in fort hood. in each instance a clear tie to begin in but still no federal indictments. my my take and if you plan or fail in a terrorist attack, you will be charged. but if you kill in this country under the battle battle of the banner of jihad, we are told it isn't terrorism federal judicial responses neither confirm nor deny it. we firmly believe that the white house had shown the same as that concerning little rock as was shown in the killing of dr. keller, a clear message could've been sent. the political correctness exhibited by government over anyone in demanding the truth about islamic extremism massillon vows that were going off. warnings were ignored, nature nidal hasan was able to opening praised little rock shootings in front of fellow army officers and then committed so jihads.

the last planned attack a fort hood the start because an ordinary citizen recognized science. if our government and press had done their jobs in calling out, fort hood may have been avoided. the blatant masking in disregard of the facts not only in the church on muslim faith, but those who do not adhere to the extremist beliefs demonstrated by militants and political form of jihads. i grew up in afghanistan, living there for a decade. i traveled over 50 countries. primarily many of them primarily of muslim culture. i will not condemn the religious rights of over $1.5 billion. but rational people do not deny these events were the result of men who adopted in part as what we are told is a particularly warped interpretation of their religion. the confucian been shown by our leaders is undermining the security and terrorism fabric of our nation.

the message being sent to the military community to nice these heinous of terrorism. abdul hakim mohammed formerly carlos bledsoe was unquestionably a radicalized violent islamic extremists determined to reach jihads. my family kept silent for over two years. we will not be silent again. we are speaking not out of hate, but because our country needs to hear the truth. this administration needs to heed the words of first corinthians 14: eight. if in fact if the trumpet an unclear sound, who will prepare for battle? thank you. >> thank you for testimony. thanks for your courage in being here today and thanks to your wife who is not here, but as you have told us is the rock of the family. mr. long, one of the issues that struck us that mr. bledsoe testified back in march despite the federal government, by the

justice department did not treat this as a terrorist prosecution. if i could say some of the things we've heard, the fact the fbi was aware, mr. bledsoe, the fbi has been monitoring and for whatever reason his monitoring was pulled back or something was allowed to happen, obviously unintentionally and rather than go through an embarrassing case and prosecution, it was deferred to the states. i find it very unusual for you as someone who is actually trained overseas, sent back here, carrying out a political, jihads is murder. it's not treated as a terrorist and went people are getting on the plane to go to somalia are arrested as terrorist. so tell us what you've learned in your investigation as to why this is not prosecuted by the federal government as a terrorist offense. >> i really cannot tell you i rational people couldn't tell you why. we look to what happened to my son and after the first time

they came back and said he just doesn't read. the second time he came back he said we don't have enough information. so i sat down and went through the internet. abdul hakim mohammed has 30,300 entries on the internet alone. this is what i submit to the secretary of the army. it was not to make to determine if thing. a sketch of the army to go through the regulation that comes from regulation 60822, paragraph 2 -- eight. but under paragraph 184 and it specifically says in international terrorism and secretary of army has the authority to do that, but it has to have an investigation done and submitted by an intel major command intelligence and severing a security officer. to this point we still have no answer on whether that's