>> this past wednesday was the 70th anniversary of the attack on pearl harbor. craig shirley details the bombing and the subsequent reaction by the government, military and public as they entered into world war ii. this is about 50 minutes. >> thank you all for joining us here at the heritage foundation this afternoon. as you noticed, we're somewhat back in the 1941 era with our music beforehand. we would ask everyone here in house if you'll make that last courtesy check that cell phones have been turned off, it will be appreciated. and, of course, we welcome questions from our internet viewers at heritage.org and we will post within 24 hours on our

web site. our guest today is craig shirley. craig is president of shirley and banister public affairs, a government relations and marketing firm. he has written for "the washington post", the los angeles times, the washington times, conservative digest, the weekly standard, many other publications. he previously authored reagan's revolution, the untold story of the campaign that started it all. that was the first book detailing reagan's pivotal 1976 challenge to president ford in the republican primaries. and he also authored rendezvous with destiny: ronald reagan and the campaign that changed america for the 1908 campaign -- 1980 campaign revealing the behind the scenes story of that run for the white house. you will note there is a consistency in craig's books -- [laughter] rendezvous and this are both very well researched although this one was over about 15 month months, and this one's only about 31 days.

you're getting very more detailed. we are pleased to have him with us today. we'll do some questions up here, and then we'll open it up to the audience as well. there were a lot of things different in 1941, there were a lot of things still the same. the redskins were being referred to as the dead skins among others, so those of you in the room who are football fans will appreciate that one, of course. and they were doing some other arguments that each we were doing still today, was capitalism dead, for example? and several of those things. craig, you talk about leading up to the seasonth, and what about the culture of that time did you find more interesting or surprising? >> america was very inward-looking country on december 6, 1941. um, that was a saturday. and it was quiet in america. people were, if they were listening to the radio, they were listening to bob hope or

shirley temple or local programming like here in washington on quiz kids on wrc and things like that. that night they were going to movies and seeing "meet john doe" and "the maltese falcon," "citizen kane." maybe a movie starring ronald reagan. but america was looking forward to a somewhat prosperous christmas for the first time in years. unemployment had recently dipped to about 10% which was the lowest it had been during the administration of franklin roosevelt. they were not thinking about war, not in the context of american men and women getting involved in a war. world war i had left a very bad taste in americans' mouths. um, the war to end all wars, the war to make the world safe for democracy had done just the opposite and given rise to very undemocratic institutions in

italy and germany and other places. we were walled off, we believed, from war by two giant oceans, um, and after world war i there was a saying going on in america that the only thing we got was death and debt and george m. cohen. so we were distinctly isolationists. in fact, neutrality acts had been passed in the 930s including one that prohibited american soldiers from leaving north america, that's how -- and, of course, we passed, you know, smoot-holly and other restrictive trade acts. so we're very inward-looking, very uninterested in getting involved in the european war and weren't even thinking about war in the pacific. that's as of the evening of december 6th. >> i think you also mentioned on culture cigarettes were everywhere -- >> cigarettes were everywhere, that's right. >> still, following the tradition. they were advertised everywhere -- >> everywhere. everybody smoked. the average american smoked

about 2500 cigarettes a year. people smoke inside movies, when they went to the movies, they smoked on airplanes, on trains, in libraries. cigarettes were very much a part of the culture and considered to be sophisticated. >> and you had radio was the major finish. >> absolutely. radio and television. at the time -- i beg your pardon. newspapers. this was no television per se. there was a little bit, but not really. although the first investigation ad had been broadcast in 1941 for bulova watches, but there were almost 2,000 daily newspapers in america in 1941, most of which were afternoon newspapers, not morning newspapers. >> we also noted the culture was somewhat different. i was noting you start each chapter with headlines and some

other things that you've researched. >> right. >> for example, airport coffee shop refuses to serve colored quartet out of the washington evening star. >> right. >> that, of course, they were very conscious of the divisions -- >> yes. >> did that also not play into the interment that eventually came about too? >> well, i don't know if it ises that overlooked in the whole issue, john, is also italian-americans and german-americans were also interred by the fbi eventually over the accepted figures about 100,000 japanese, italian and german-americans were interred at some point during world war ii. but there was great fear in america after december 7th not only because of the attack and, obviously, there was great anger, too, because after the attack then japan declares war on america, and this really offended americans' sense of

fair play. but the, there was, the government knew and the roosevelt hughes knew that both the germans and japanese had incredible spy networks operating in the united states and in the territory of hawaii including this memo right here was prepared by the office of naval intelligence on december 4th, 26-page memo that we found in the roosevelt library, and i don't think it's ever seen the light of day before, but it goes into great detail about japanese espionage activities, especially naval around the country and in the canal zone and in the hawaiian territory. >> so where do you fall on that longstanding question? >> no. it's, i dug as far as i could on that, john. in some ways it's similar to the time before september septembern that there were pieces to the

puzzle scattered about the government, but they had never been assembled, and even so is even if they had been assembled, nobody, i think, would have come up with the idea that the japanese were going to attack on pearl harbor on december 7th. straws were in the wind. we knew that. the government knew that, the navy knew that and the roosevelt white house knew that. the japanese had had become increasingly militaristic, they had invaded east china, manchuria, they had quit the league of nations, they signed the pact with nazi germany and fascist italy. they signed the tripartheid pact in 1941 which formed a mutual defense treaty with those two and thus formed the axis powers, the three principle axis powers. so there'd been more and more belligerent behavior on the part of the empire of japan, and so we were watching very closely --

obviously, not closely enough, but i just want to read from this memo. this is page 2, and this is the memo that we just, we uncovered. it says the focal point of the japanese espionage effort is the termination of the total strength of the united states. in anticipation of the possible open conflict with this country, japan is vigorously utilizing every available agency to secure military, naval and commercial information, paying particular attention to the west coast, the panama canal and the territory of hawaii. so there were theories, there was speculation. the hilo newspaper the week before actually had a headline that said, which is, you know, island chain that japanese attack expected this weekend. other people, other areas of government had speculated about

a military move by the japanese, but most thought it was just beyond imagination, and everybody thought that the next military move had -- because they'd already invaded french indochina, they had masked 100,000 troops there -- massed 900,000 troops there. >> was that's what they were negotiating -- >> yes. right as bombs were falling in pearl harbor, secretary of state cornell hall was meeting with japanese envoys. but the negotiations had broken down at that point. the japanese had sent -- tokyo had sent the 13th part of a long, long communique, and it was all, basically, an attack on the united states, attack on diplomatic policy, and they were essentially announcing that they were breaking up diplomatic relations. but that's not a prelude to

war -- and withdrawing their ambassadors. but many countries have broken off diplomatic relations and withdrawn ambassadors without it being a declaration of war. >> and we did not declare war on all three. >> no, we didn't. that's a very interesting point. um, the night of december 7th president roosevelt convenes a meeting at the white house with the members of the cabinet and with the congressional leadership. one of the members of the cabinet was henry stimpson who was the secretary of war, very capable public servant n. his papers we found a declaration, a draft of the declaration of war against japan and germany and italy. but as we all know the next day roosevelt only declared war on japan. but it was clearly being discussed, clearly being considered because there was a draft of the declaration of war against all three axis powers. >> but they were not considered

a unit. >> no, we definitely considered them a unit -- >> actually waited until -- >> well, we waited until they declared war on us. >> are on the 13th. >> yes, on the 11th. my assumption is that it's interesting because japan attacks us on the 7th. we declare war, and then they declare war the afternoon of the 7th. we declare war on japan on december 8th, but in the intervening four days between the 7th and the 11th there is, i detected no national will in this country, there are no columns, no editorials, no outrage from the citizenry saying we have to go to war with nazi germany and fascist italy. it's only after they declare war on us that we go through the motions of declaring war on them. >> and in some ways it's ironic because roosevelt almost immediately goes to the european theater as his primary focus. >> yes. yeah, and there was, and in the days after we are now at war and truly a world war, there was

churchill was pressuring roosevelt to devote material and the arsenal of democracy first to europe and then wait for the pacific later. and, indeed, there's some evidence that roosevelt was more inclined to see it in two stages. one is to help great britain and then, two, to take on the japanese. >> would any of that had to do with the curve condition at the time of our military? >> yeah, very much so. we, we didn't really have a two-ocean navy, and so we were moving ships back and forth between the atlantic and the pacific. and, of course, the japanese had done great damage at pearl harbor to, you know, much of the fleet. fortunately, the three carriers had been out on assignment so that they weren't there, and that was the principle target of the japanese were the three american carriers. so, fortunately, they were out.

but we were under, we were completely defensive in the pacific. we eventually lost wake island, we eventually lost guam, we eventually lost the philippines, the british lost hong kong and singapore and malaysia. well, they went after midway, but we didn't hold midway, and they went after midway again in june of '42, but we were able to hold it again and win that decisive battle. >> i'll be glad to recognize audience questions, so if you want to put a hand up at any time, i'll catch ya, otherwise, we'll coop on going from -- keep on going from up here. i'd like to go oaf a few people -- go over a few people. what about admiral kimmel? >> a true victim. had been recently installed as the head of cinc-pac in the pacific and was unaware, was getting no warnings from

washington as was short, the army general who's in charge of the garrison, walter short. but they in the days after pearl harbor, scapegoats were, frankly, needed. and the blame was either going to go forward because there were calls for information, and the media wanted to know how did this happen, how were we caught with our pants down? quite frankly, the blame was either going to go to roosevelt or stimpson and hall in the navy, or it was going to go to husband kimmel and short. and it was kind of a political calculation. the people in washington are more politically sophisticated than these two military men, and they have access to the media that these military men didn't have access to. so eventually they were replaced by, by fdr and, actually, both

left the military in january of 1942. >> if i remember right, you say kimmel was obsessed about pearl and it being a target. >> yes, it was. and he had recorded it, and he had taken some preparations, obviously, not enough. but he was very concerned about it. he did have planes up flying, navy planes flying, scouting out, you know, around the hawaiian islands looking for possible ships coming in. but -- >> but i think you also point out they were always on the same schedule at the same time. >> that's right. >> in the same round. >> exactly, exactly. and so, and, of course, the japanese consulate was there, right there on oahu in a beautiful location, so right there out of the consulate they could see the comings and goings of naval vessels, and they could see -- because the planes were sent up to do their inspection of the surrounding waters around hawaii.

they were set up every day at the same time. so the theory was the japanese were able to schedule the fleet to come in close at a time when those navy planes weren't on their surveillance missions. >> if you'll wait for the hope and don't mind -- microphone and don't mind identifying yourself as a courtesy? thank you. >> hi. my name's joseph. regarding the situation as far as the united states looking outward or inward in december 1941, how much knowledge was there within the country that we were actually firing the germans, the german navy and the american navy were, in fact, de facto at war? >> north atlantic finish. >> there was a lot of fighting going. there was a couple of ships -- wasn't there an american cruiser? >> [inaudible] was sunk. there were both commercial and naval vessels that were fired upon and sunk in the north atlantic. ever since -- back in the spring of 1941, of course, fdr, as you

know, had instituted lend lease with great britain to help churchill. upon that action adolf hitler ordered a shoot-on-sight order to the wolf packs that were patrolling the north atlantic. but the american people knew about it. and it was not a spur to them to get involved in the european war even though this was -- war was, in fact, going on, naval war was going on in the north atlantic. and, of course, roosevelt in kind ordered naval ships to defend themselves against the u-boats. >> well, and -- >> there wasn't any impact there? >> no. not on public opinion. >> political. >> right. the lucetania wasn't the spur to get us into world war i either. >> well, in some respects we forget over a period of time japan was already at war in asia from '37. >> yeah. >> they had been four years, so war was part of the lexicon.

and then we're at two years and three months with germany and europe. >> right. >> so it's not totally isolation in that, it's just we don't want to get involved. >> we're aware of it, we just don't want to get involved in it. >> right. >> especially committing actual manpower into combat situations. >> yes. down here in the front. if you'll also wait for my colleague, he's coming. thank you. >> how much impact did it have when the united states decided to curtail supplying japan with certain critical kinds of material? >> there's a theory that's kind of floated around there for years that we somehow provoked the japanese into attacking us. one of them was fdr had personally ordered the fleet moved from san diego to honolulu in the spring of 1941. and, but those embargoes and, by

the way, we didn't embargo oil was we didn't -- because we didn't want to send too much of a shock to their economy, so we kept shipping oil. uni, scrap metal and things like that we stopped shipping. but that was in response to the invasion of china. it wasn't that our actions provoked them into military actions, we were taking economic actions in response to their militaristic actions. >> somebody else from the audience? i'll start down my other list of people. >> over here. >> sorry. i usually look to my far right. [laughter] >> i'm norville add kin. was it a cultural thing that we greatly underestimated the japanese military prowess? >> maybe that was a factor. surveillance was not easy on an

island that was thousands of miles away from the united states. we had no nearby bases to do overflights, it was all based on hearsay or secondhand mostly. the military did their best to track the japanese ships in the pacific, but we would frequently lose track of them. we attempted to track japanese ship movements but also lost track of those as well. there's probably a little bit of that. there's definitely, it was a failure of imagination on the part of everybody in america to imagine that a japanese armada could sail thousands of miles, stop in the middle of the pacific to refuel and then steam up again and make this way all the way undetected because, you know, we forget that pan am, for instance, they had routine overflights between san francisco and the philippines

and other parts of the pacific. there were commercial vessels and fishing ships that operated there. there were naval ships that operated there. so i think it was partially an assumption that nobody could get away with this, with this massive strike. but there's probably a little bit of cultural aspect to that as well. >> any underestimation of our ability to respond? complacency? >> they thought, the japanese bought into the myth that america was, was soft, that we were only entered in creature comforts, that we could not conduct aggressive warfare, that we didn't have the national will to do it. >> and, of course, it did take us until april to hit tokyo? >> yeah, that's right. >> just a symbolic -- >> yeah, exactly. >> yes. back in the back. >> barry wasser. billy mutual many years before had predicted a japanese attack on pearl harbor, and i think he was off by one half hour in the

morning. was that an issue where they took his advice, or did it go back to biwater's original documentation? did you find any answer to those? >> no, i didn't. i do know is that there had been some analysis of previous military action by the japanese and what was noted was the, for instance, the case of the russian japanese war at the onset of the 20th century. and the japanese instigated war with russia had attacked on a sunday without announcing or declaring war first. they sailed into the harbor, their navy, and essentially blew part the russian navy that was there. so the japanese, as far as i know, never actually went to the formality of declaring war before they actually engaged in

war. there were other predictions about, you know, possible attacks, but again, i go back to just nobody would conceive that somebody would be that audacious, that they would try something so risky. >> sure. >> speaking of audacious, it wouldn't have seemed to have been quite as audacious for the japanese to attack the philippines. we didn't even really have much of a naval presence -- >> no. >> and a very minimal army. was there no thought given -- >> i beg your pardon? >> that would also look like on the map, well, that's the next target. >> there was, it had been reported as of december 1st it looked as if there was a horseshoe encirclement of the philippines and douglas mac around author around the main island and, as a matter of fact,

they did attack on december 8th. and that was a natural target. as was thailand because japan, as you know, has no natural resources per se. they don't have oil, they don't have natural gas, they don't have rare earth metals, they don't have the precious metals that are needed for in a peacetime economy or even a wartime economy, so this is why they're expanding outward, to plunder from their nearby countries those resources that they need to supply their military machinery. but, and the philippines were, obviously, also rich in natural resources and precious metals. and so that was, clearly a target as was thailand. but the theory was among a lot of navy men and the japanese had said as much themselves, what they really wanted to do, there was a cultural resentment on the part of the japanese that the british and americans were in the western pacific, so that is to that extent, that was true. what they really wanted to do

was to decapitate the british and military presence in the central and western pacific and then have that region all to themselves without any interference from either of the allied powers. >> you've mentioned one character. want to say anything more about general mcarthur in this case? >> he was brilliant. i think that his occupation of post-war japan was, should have earned him the nobel peace prize. he was able to do it better than it was handled by america in europe, especially in berlin, cutting berlin into three sections, four sections was ludicrous. >> right. >> it led to the divisions and, of course, i think what happened at yalta was most conservatives say was astonishing.

churchill was there, not just roosevelt, and he allowed stalin to take all of eastern europe. mcarthur would not take any gulf from the russians. they tried to occupy the island chain, and he told them if you do that, i'll throw the entire general staff into prison. so he's able to keep the russians from taking any territory and, of course, he brought in a constitution, he brought in a peacetime free market economy and otherwise -- and brought in progressive changes for the culture and for women and truly remade the country and did a brilliant job at it. he made the mistake at the philippines on december 8th not dispersing his planes. they were still lined up wing tip to wing tip at clark field, they were also done that way in hon honolulu, and it was easy for one bomb dropping from a japanese plane to destroy many planes on the ground. so by mid december he has no air

force to fight off the onslaught of the japanese air force which, obviously, led to the eventual demise of the filipino and american army there and mcarthur's retreat to australia. but his counteroffensive, again, was an act of brilliance in moving up the asian peninsula and bypassing japanese strong points. douglas mcarthur had his good points and bad points, but i think his good points far outweighed his bad points. >> another controversial figure, charles lindbergh. >> yes. was the spokesman. he was not the head of the american first movement, but he was the most famous member of the america first movement. he was not, you know, a nazi sympathizer, he was an american. he did not like franklin roosevelt, and franklin

roosevelt from all accounts did not like charles lindbergh. but there were many people involved in the america first movement. people think of it as some kind of right-wing isolationist operation, but by december 6th it's a very respected political institution, and there were men and women involved. walt disney was a member, al smith who was the democratic nominee this 1928 was a member and so was herbert hoover, lindbergh, e.e. cummings, lowell thom, the communist activist, and the america first movement was so pretty cay potent that they were making plans to open up offices in every congressional district for 1942 to support the most isolationist candidate running for office whether they were republican or democrat, and there were many members of roosevelt's own democratic party who were strident isolationists.

>> on that issue, too, the united mind workers were isolationists. >> yes. >> unusual. >> yes. >> but you also indicate prior to the 7th that campuses, college campuses were more pro-war than they were -- >> there were some academics and intellectuals. it's interesting that if you -- along the coast and along, in the cities among the editorialists, there was more interest in helping churchill in great britain. but that's because they were more democratic or more in line with the democratic party, with the campus, and they knew where fdr was and what his thinking was. but then if you go down the middle of the country and the rural parts of the country is more isolationist. >> anybody else? audience, while we're going on? you mention, again, what about winston churchill and the relationship? had it built before this? >> they'd only met once before,

in 1918, and they weren't really all that enamored of each other. although they had a lot in common. i mean, john meacham said that it was the love of the sea and love of strong drink and love of adventure that brought them together. meacham's book, "franklin and winston," is a brilliant exploration of the relationship between the two men. they grew to become very fond of each other although churchill was more fond of roosevelt than roosevelt was of churchill. churchill once said that meeting franklin roosevelt was like opening a bottle of champagne, and roosevelt once told churchill he was glad they live inside the same decade, so there was a respect. churchill came to visit, it was astonishing, and it was big news in america. churchill came to america several days before christmas in 1941, stayed at the white house, didn't stay at the british embassy, lived in the west

wing -- >> the night before anybody knew he was here. >> exactly. left london by blacked-out train and then took a harrowing flight -- or took a ship across the atlantic, landed in boston, then flew from boston to washington. all top secret, never was in the press, only people on a need-to-know basis knew about in the and then all of a sudden here's churchill in washington. and this was big news. winston churchill was a hugely popular figure in america as he remains today. but there was one funny story is that churchill was up early bathing and was in his birthday suit, and the president opened his door to his suite in the white house, and churchill -- [laughter] >> in the altogether. >> they were both surprised. >> audience?

everybody knows 1941. okay, there we go. i know, this is ancient history to you. [laughter] >> if we could go back to the general mcarthur. i know what like truman thought and stuff about using the nuclear weapons on japan. what was mcarthur's thought on it, and do you think if we would not have used the nuclear weapons, mcarthur would still have had the capability to kind of control the entire japan issue after, like, meaning, like, would russians had more power if we didn't use nuclear weapons? >> mcarthur was personally repulsed of the use of the atomic bomb, especially on civilian cities. and there was a lot of people who thought at the time that truman should demonstrate the might of america by detonating in tokyo bay with minimal loss

of lives so that the emperor himself could see the awesome power of the atomic bomb. the commonly-held -- and it's probably true -- belief is that the war would have gone on for several more years, the japanese culture is such that to surrender to your enemy is the worst thing you can do, to be captive of your enemy is worse than death, that's part of the shogunite culture that was dominant in japan at the time. but it would have cost maybe a million casualties on the part of the allies if we had gone through the invasion and had to fight inch by inch by inch to take the entire, all the japanese islands. so and, of course, truman never looked back. there was never any regret. he never second guessed himself. so there's probably a lot of truth to the notion that it did shortcut the war, and it did, ultimately, save lives although i personally think that truman

should have tried demonstrating it without hitting a civilian city first and given them, the emperors, time to consider, you know, the implications of it being dropped on cities. >> [inaudible] >> i -- mcarthur still would have been supreme commander, he still would have had allied forces there to occupy the -- there may have been more resentment because he was, he was a student of history. and be he knew that alexander and caesar and others had failed in conquered countries because their policies were very tough on the local populace. and he was not going to make that mistake by allowing allied troops to be harsh or cruel to the civilian population. >> [inaudible]

oh, sorry. if it would have taken us a few more years to take over japan, do you think russians would have made more, you know, taking more than north japan? >> they would have had more, i suspect, more of a pretext. of course, they only declared war on japan after japan surrenders. [laughter] but they may have, they were part of the allies and may have been part of the invading army, i don't know. certainly, you know, mcarthur would have been in command of them. he would have made sure of that as, you know, would, you know, fdr and then later truman. but i don't know. i don't know. that's a good question. >> i think i want the go to the day of december 7 and focus a little bit here in washington. >> okay. >> i found it interesting that the prognostication of the bombing was, like, 30 minutes off, and it was interesting to realize that hawaii at that time

was on a half hour different time frame from us, which i had not realized. so actually, when the occurrence first struck, it was, like, 1:05 here. the redskins were playing the eagles at giveth stadium, and people were not with cell phones, of course, and a few people would have press announcements come, call your office, do this that and the other, and as you wrote in one point in it as the rumor of war spread, the sees emptied. one enterprising wife sent her husband who was attending the game a telegram. deliver to section p, top row, seat 27 opposite 25 yard line east side, griffith stadium: war to japan, get to office. using the pa to announce the war news was against management's policy. now, of course -- >> because how many times had war occurred while the redskins were playing a game? [laughter]

>> right. and the other thing is today it would have been panic with the cell phones and communications. >> sure, yeah. >> go into a little bit how we did communicate, how washington reacted and, of course, the rapidity and the massive extent to which the government took over. >> well, radio and one-on-one communication dominated everything. everybody gathered around radios in the parlors or car radios on the streets or radios that might be set up by the radio repair stores which were not unusual, i remember that as a boy, the tv and radio repair. there'd be a radio right out there on the sidewalk playing local music or whatever. they were in hotel lobbies all listening to the radio and then, of course, afternoon newspapers which were unprecedented because you didn't do a sunday afternoon newspaper, but the washington and other newspapers had giant extra, you know, japan attacks,

exclamation point -- >> without pictures. didn't have any. >> no, no pictures. >> how long did it take to get the full attack documented? >> it was weeks. the american people were not told the ec tent of the damage in pearl harbor for weeks afterwards, only the names of a couple ships leaked out, and they were not told the extent of the destruction of several hundred planes there, nor were they told the extent of how many men had actually died during the attack at pearl harbor. it wasn't for weeks that americans were told the full scope of it. the reason being is that the roosevelt government did not want to let the japanese know how successful they had been. so the idea was to put a clamp on it. washington reacts extremely quickly. francis little, who's the attorney general, starts to order the round up of japanese right here in washington, washington becomes pretty much an armed camp. military men were told to report

in uniform to their base immediately. roosevelt is, that afternoon is taking reports that are coming from the navy and coming from the army. he's meeting with george marshall and frank knox who was the -- frank knox was the secretary of the navy and harold stark who was the chief of naval operations. he's meeting with his political people, hopkins and steven early who was his press secretary. his guards are posted around all federal buildings, navy and marine guards with m-1 caribbeans outfitted -- carbines. machine gun nets go up at all federal buildings. the bridges are closed between virginia and washington and martial law's, essentially,

imposed very shortly. so washington becomes an armed camp. the constitution and the declaration of independence were put in hiding out in maryland because we were fearful. at that time they were on display at the library of congress, but they were hidden because we were fearful of them being destroyed. >> military assignments of the personnel were always published in newspapers. so and so's been shipped out -- >> yeah, yeah. assign ford the sanitation -- assigned to the sanitation corps in georgia, and this is when he's reporting. so it was all in the newspapers. >> rather interesting. sure. we know we haven't put one person -- >> i'm the kind of guy that comes the these things and nitpicks little things, but a couple of questions -- >> you don't have to do that. [laughter] >> a couple of things that i might comment on or question.

one, mentioning the isolationist sentiment or the pro-war sentiments in american colleges, i would tend to think that was much less in sympathy with any democratic party ambitions, but more so an anti-fascism based on, you know, what they'd seen fascism do in western europe and also a naive outlook on the, what's the right word, the goodness or the badness of the soviet union. >> yeah. >> that there were a lot of american college students who were still somewhat, you know, communist. >> right. >> i mean, communism was a viable thing at that time. so i would kind of say that that was the anti-fascism was more of a, more of a -- >> there were a lot of factors. there wasn't just one factor. as far as the academy and the editorialists and the writers

wanted to be more pro-interventionist than, say, others in america. there were many factors. and, certainly, sympathy for the soviet union was a factor, do knockout about it. but -- now doubt about it. but gallup had done polling the month before, and fully 70% of the american people were opposed to entering the european war. >> the other thing, and i don't have my facts clear on this, but it is something that a friend of mine who is also somewhat of a military history buff had talked about was the idea of thailand in world war ii. my impression, you were saying that you thought there was a threat of japan invading thailand -- >> which they did do. >> but, information, they became -- in fact, they became allies. >> the other objective of invading thailand was we were using under the lend lease, the burma road to sup ply khan kai-shek, leading the chinese

nationals against the japanese in east china. so one could take control of the one and their mineral resources and, two, cut the burma road. >> i was making the difference, also a greater threat perhaps to indonesia with more having really more natural resources even to exploit -- >> which they eventually went after. but they had put in for french indochina over 100,000 troops, and there's only really one place to go from there, and that is into thailand. >> i know there was something i wanted to ask, and i've forgotten what that was. i would strongly recommend any young people, people, and i'm su feel the same way, who question the use of the atomic bomb, look at the nature of the japanese fighting and the way they fought on iwo jima and on okinawa which were both japanese soil. they were the soil of japan.

but even on okinawa, the indigenous people weren't particularly loyal to the japanese, but the fighting was incredibly intense. and that's how they extrapolated how we might lose a million casualties in the invasion of japan. >> right. >> it was very, very -- >> they would have fought to the last, there's no doubt about it. >> it would have been a bloodbath. >> right. >> we're going to go to one question over here. >> you mentioned that kimmel was a scapegoat. >> right. >> and you also mentioned that admiral stark was a cno in 941, yet admiral king was the cno for most of the war. >> right. >> were there are transitions in leadership that kind of heads were cut off because wrong place, wrong timing that went beyond hawaii? >> no, actually, with very few exceptions, you know, the roosevelt cabinet did not change

the military leadership. george marshall was the secretary of the army for the duration, stimpson and hall were in place most, if not all of the time. really the only significant change was of short and kimmel in the pacific. but other than that there was not a lot. as it turns out, roosevelt had at his disposal a lot of very capable military men. you know, eisenhower and patton and mcarthur and king and nimitz and others. these men took leadership positions, and roosevelt wisely stuck with them. >> only -- oh, go right ahead. yeah. >> thank you. stephanie. with the wars in iraq and afghanistan, we are familiar with the concept of suicide missions and suicide attacks.

did you in your research come across any fascinating information about the cam kamike pilots back in japan and how they carried out attacks in december 1941 and elsewhere? >> yeah. >> and how much of that was a departure, um, of conventional warfare and what our ideas of how war should be conducted? >> for the japanese, it was not a departure n. the japanese culture to be a prisoner of war, to be a cap tiff of another man was the worst thing you could do. death was preferable, far preferable than to being a prisoner of war. there were rumors after december 7th that kamikaze pilots had been used, but there was no -- i found no evidence of kamikaze, that there'd been organized kamikaze attack on pearl harbor. there were also rumors of kamikaze attacks at other subsequent battles in the pacific, and this, i think, were more accurate. it was a part of the culture.

and the gentleman made reference over here about how the japanese soldier would fight to the death, and it was the same thing with the japanese pilots, it was a great honor to die in warfare. >> you had a great quote in the book, if you don't remember it, i have it in front of me, but i want you to comment on harold ickes. the insignificant secretary of the interior? >> yeah. it was interesting. he expanded his portfolio beyond the interior. he was, apparently, a fabulous public speaker. but he did take up and, i think, justifiably the cause, the interest of what was happening to jews in europe and was really the only member of the roosevelt cabinet who was expressing public outrage and public interest in what hitler was doing with his final solution. so he was abrasive, but he was

also, happened to be right and i think was a good man. >> i can't resist a clare boothe luce quote since this it's the e you use in the book. the mind of a commissar and the soul of a meet axe is how she described -- [laughter] so there were some definite characters. >> absolutely. >> let's take one last question over here. >> more a comment that i'll attribute to admiral nimitz. it was said at least in the naval war college that the war in the pacific was war games entirely during the 1930s, and every move was anticipated with the exception of the kamikaze attacks. again, a cultural difference where americans didn't think that way, so they didn't include that in the war planning. >> but that is, and i'm glad you brought that up because kimmel talked about that, too, in his book. in the 1950s he wrote a book published by regnery, and al told me about meeting admiral

kimmel as a child in henry's, in his father's house. is that the job of war gaming needs to consider everything, you know? martians from space and all these other things. and one of the things they war gamed out was a japanese attack on pearl harbor. but they're supposed to think about every aspect of warfare. and in the japanese culture there have been novels written about japan attacking pearl harbor. it was very popular with the culture about the japanese military attacking pearl harbor. >> well, i do recommend december 1941. it's a wonderful diary of each day of that particular month back when the national debt was $57 billion -- [laughter] as pointed out, i think, on december 20th in the book or thereabouts, and cheery oats was the brand new cereal of great fame, electric typewriters were

just starting out, and a few ore things were -- other things were making the world more civilized at the time. please join me in thanking my good friend, craig shirley. [applause] >> for more information visit the author's web site, craigshirley.com. >> when the president and the congress were debating after the 2010 elections whether the bush tax cuts would be extended because of the recession and whether it'd be a bad idea to raise anybody's taxes in this town economy, one of the things the republicans said is tax cuts are always wonderful in a down economy, but spending cuts don't hurt at all. which is self-earthly crazy. -- self-evidently crazy. there's really no difference from a macroeconomic point of view as our friends in the u.k.

are finding now when they went for an austerity response for the current circumstance. one of the things they wanted to get rid of was the 1603 tax credit, and they said it was a spending program. this is the kind of argument that ought to be held in a seminary over some obscure provision of scripture. [laughter] in my opinion. but you be the, you be the judge. the republicans say we ought to get rid of 1603, it's a spending program, it's not a tax cut. and it is, but it isn't. when the congress did things like loan guarantee for new energy companies, like the infamous solyndra loan guarantee was actually adopted during the bush administration, signed by president bush and supported at the time by almost all the republicans on the energy committee. and it's hard sometimes to pick

winners and losers, that's not what 1603 does. 1603 recognizes that a lot of people building solar and wind installations are start-up companies. so if you give them a 30% tax credit that you would ordinarily give someone for building this new factory, it will be worthless to them because they have no income to claim the credit against. so what 1603 does is, basically, give them the cash equivalent of the tax credit if they're start-ups. now, if you just don't like solar and wind energy ask you want to keep the -- and you want to keep the oil depletion allowance or any of the other tax credits for traditional energy, you can make that argument. but with it's a very significant number of the new solar and wind projects have used 1603.

so my argument is it ought to be extended because we've got thousands of more facilities in solar and win power which are becoming more economical every time. the price drops about 30% for solar and wind every time you double capacity. and solar in particular has had significant technological advances in the last three years. it's, ironically, one of the reasons solyndra went down, because the technology, other technologies got cheaper faster than anybody figured. and took them out of a competitive mix. so i like this 1603, and i think it should be continued because i think we should be sporting start-ups -- supporting start-ups as well as existing companies. and a very significant percentage of america's new jobs over the last 20 years have come not just from small businesses, but from small businesses that were five years old or younger. so this is the kind of thing that i think, you know, my argument is we should say where do we want to go with this

country? we want to build shared prosperity and modern jobs and be competitive, and then back up from that and say how do we get there, what's the government supposed to do, what's the private sector supposed to do? i think if you to that instead of government/no government, you come out and say this 1603's a heck of a deal, and we ought to keep doing it. >> since you mentioned the end of 2010, i wanted to give you an opportunity to sort of repeat something that you said to me earlier which is where you said you feel the one part of the book where you gave the president a bum rap. since that's been in the coverage a lot -- >> i was really upset. i didn't know whether it was the white house or the congress that resisted raising the debt ceiling in 2010 after we lost the election. >> when we still had the majority. >> when we still had the majority because i knew that congress was meeting in november and december of 2010. and i knew if we waited until january, the republicans would drive a very hard bargain.

and so i said in a very kind of muted way that for reasons that were still unclear to me, this didn't happen. and gene sperling actually sent me an e-mail and said, who worked for me and a scrupulously honest person, he said, oh, we tried. you know, we didn't make a big deal out of it because the main subject was were the bush-era tax cuts going to be extended. but this shows you i'm trying to force myself to say once a day either i don't know or i was wrong. [laughter] because i think it would be therapeutic if everybody in washington did that. [laughter] and so i want to be as good as them. so here's something i was wrong about. since raising the debt ceiling simply ratifies the decision congress has already made to spend money and since the budget is the only thing that the

senate votes on that is not subject to a filibuster, i thought that the debt ceiling vote was not subject to a filibuster. and i was wrong. so gene sperling sent me a message, he said senator mcconnell said he was going to filibuster it unless we agreed right then to all their budgets that they'd run on. so turns out he couldn't raise the debt ceiling, and i was wrong. see, it didn't hurt too bad. [laughter] and that's one way we get less ideological politics, if people find errors they make and fess up. >> moving a bit out of washington, um, one of the things that you do frequently in the book is to cite examples of kind of where you think this sort of appropriate partnership and shared responsibility between government and the private sector is working at the state levelful maybe -- level.

maybe you could talk a bit of your theory about that and, also, share some of the examples particularly from your time as governor of arkansas sortover what worked then and what has continued to work and not worked subsequently in arkansas. >> well, first, i think we americans are used to people at the state and local level hustling business, trying to safe -- save businesses, trying to expand businesses, trying to locate businesses there. and it is largely a bipartisan activity undertaken, perhaps, with varying levels of exuberance by elected officials, but one reason i was able to stay governor for a dozen years and never got bored with the job and loved it the whole economic development aspect of i. and the interesting thing is that in most every state in the country although it's gotten more partisan now since 2010,

but i think that'll settle down, it's largely a bipartisan activity. and so i try today cite some areas -- tried to cite some areas in the book. for example, to give you one just practical example, there's a long section in the book about what i would like to see done to clear the mortgage debt more quickly. and i guess i should back up and say these kinds of financial crashes take, his corpsically, five to ten years to get over. and if you have a mortgage component to it, it tends to push it out. we should be trying to beat that clock. i'm for the president's jobs plan. i think there are a lot of good ideas in there. but -- and thai -- they'll give us one and a half, two million jobs according to the an cease. but if you want to start having the 40 -- 240,000 jobs a month,

if you want that, you've got to flush this debt and get lending going again. and so kenneth rogoff at harvard recommends that since some people say, well, but if we lower the mortgage rates, if we bring the mortgage down to the value of the house, then the people who hold the mortgages will lose money. who's going to compensate 'em? and what's it going to be? rogoff has suggested that the banks are the people who ultimately hold the mortgages, instead of writing them them down, just cut them in half by taking an ownership position in the house so that when the house is, ultimately, sold, the people who issued the mortgage or own the mortgage will share in the profit, and you get the same practical result. you no longer have a bad debt on

the books, and the homeowner's got a mortgage that he or she can pay. .. >> you can watch this and other programs online at booktv.org. >> uncompromising is the name of the book. the rise, fall and redemption of

an arab american patriot in the cia. when and how did you serve in the cia? >> i originally started for the fbi as a special agent and worked with them and for five years and worked with the cia in 2003. i worked in some high-profile cases for the fbi like the uss cole, the bombing in riyadh, the assassination and murder of the u.s. agent in 2002, and looking at cia officers, they value the culture and linguistic abilities and from the fbi to the cia i was dispatched immediately in baghdad. i was involved in the downfall of saddam hussein. that was a successful operation. it tale a lot of cases i worked for for the cia.

>> how long were you with the cia? >> ten years total government service. >> the subtitle of your new book and compromise is to rise, fall and redemption. why in that order? >> my career skyrocketed. seasoned agents with years of experience. and same thing. i was given a lot of missions i needed to accomplish that were tough and hard emissions that detailed in the book but after i returned from baghdad i was falsely accused of being a supporter of terrorism. eventually and was exonerated and i am here telling my story. >> tell us quickly about that accusation. >> involved the terrorist group hezbollah and the fbi 5 i had

documents related to hezbollah. obviously that wasn't true. the evidence against me was labeled secret. the evidence was not shared with me. the cia conducted an investigation and they both exonerated me publicly. >> were you arrested? >> i was not. i pled guilty to charges because i was threatened. the government said they would export made to lebanon and announce the lebanese government that i worked for the fbi and the cia and that is basically it. i pled guilty to these false charges. >> do you detail valiant and compromise? >> i sure do. i described a number of cia missions and cases. i was involved in missions for the fbi and describe the circumstances around the false accusations and finally the exoneration. >> as an arab american woman in

the cia did you face situations that may be a white male would not? >> given my language skills, and cultural background, i was given missions to get out and collect intelligence. i was disguised -- under which were my weapons and i was able to collect intelligence that others may not have been able to. i discuss these cases in the book and i hope you get a chance to read it. >> did the cia have to fit your book? >> i had to submit my manuscript to the cia and they had to approve it. >> why did you leave the cia? >> it was part of the plea deal unfortunately. when people ask me all the time would you ever go back to government service and i tell them the same thing. i am living proof that the justice system works because the truth was told in this end. i am happy i served my country and i will serve my country

again at a drop of a dime. this was not -- this is an optimistic story. in any other country has been accused of these horrendous charges on would have been executed. only in america you get the chance to tell your story and to know that justice prevails in this meal and that the truth always comes out. >> this is booktv on c-span2. we talking with not proudy. and compromise:the rise, fall and redemption of an american patriot in the cia. >> a short of her interview from c-span's campaign 2012 bus as it travels the country. >> karen beckwith, political women, "political women and american democracy". how did you decide which essays to include in this work?

>> my co editors and i organized a grant from the ehrenburg foundation. the project on american democracy at the university of notre dame that we would convene by our estimation, best scholars in women and politics in the u.s.. not only in the u.s. but scholars who were working on u.s. women and politics. so we brought together a range of people whose -- convened for two day conference at notre dame after which at that conference we discussed all the manuscripts that constitute the chapters of this book. and had some commentary about it and discussion and an edited collection which cambridge university press published in 2008. >> describe the role of women in this book. >> there are several emphases in the book. what we are not doing is looking at public policy per se. we are not looking at women in

the executive because even in 2008 there were so few women in the executive and not yet a major female candidate for the nomination for president of a major political party in the united states. women at the executive level means the research wasn't there yet. to support a good discussion. finally we didn't address women in the judiciary. what did we addressed? we looked at the behavior of women as voters. the behavior of women as candidates for office in state and national office, behavior of women in close parties. behavior of women once elected to national office. the gendered nature of political institution, u.s. politics and women in politics and comparative politics, the picture is not so pleasant.

it was a single plurality system. we have two major political parties which are in formal in their internal construction, have no clear formal instructions for become eric cantor day. we offered very little clear structural means, working the party so to speak to increase women's candidacy. >> in relation to the political party, as a woman voter, what are the findings into encouraging participation directly related? >> it politically relevant demographic category, there are less men than women in the voting electorate.

women turn out at higher slightly percentages than men, the absolute number of women combined the delight and turn out for a big -- women are disproportionately democratic. assist is true across all age groups but not so true across all racial groups so racial ethnic groups, women had a slight presence in the democratic party compared to men. when we come into an election, very important. women are more likely than men to vote for the democratic presidential candidate that has been the case in 1992. that has been between two percentage points depending upon the false you look at. as the democratic advantage in the electorate for the democratic party in general, the absolute numbers in the preference for the democratic

party. the issues that mobilize women and a track their vote, special welfare issues. they so-called morality issues but on these it is in different directions so for example on issues like same sex marriage women are much less opposed to that is an r men for example. not by a huge margin but there is a difference. women are more concerned with foreign policy security issues and that can have an impact on women's vote and social welfare issues which include things like health care, unemployment, state of the economy, education. >> with a woman candidate for president coming into the campaign to you see those preferences change in 2012? were based on your research do you think they will largely remain the same? >> i see no female candidate as

a presidential candidate in 2012. there are only two on the list that i know of. sarah palin who has not yet declared and michele bachman who is doing very poorly right now in early returns or early poll results in the republican party debates and the polling numbers for her. i don't see either of them being the ultimate candidate for the republican party and the democratic side all things being equal the current president barack obama will be the party candidate. that will foreclose any opportunity for women in that party to come forward. some icy no presence for women as presidential candidates in 2012. i do say however that some polling data and the most recent i have seen is only from 2008 coming in early in 2008 presidential primary. about 87% of americans say they would vote for a qualified woman regardless of sex, that they would be as willing to vote for

a woman as for man. americans are more likely and more willing to vote for someone who is african-american or someone who is jewish for president and for woman. i think that number is slightly lower than has been the previous results because in 2008 there was a clear potential female candidate and that was hillary clinton who ultimately failed the nomination. >> what are some recommendations for women in that position? or running for office? does that matter come up in your book or something you touch on? >> we do look at women candidacy for lower-level office. a couple of recommendations. these are recommendations for women. let me make clear we will need about 4,000 women nationwide to contest and win elections to have equitable representation in

the senate and house. there are that many elective offices at the legislative level at least there require we need 1 million qualified women. i think we can find 43,500 but women to run, that is not the issue. the problem is with political parties and the unavailability of actress to candidacy for the incumbency, if we have as we do 83% of congress fear consisting of men and most of those men in conference it will be very difficult for new openings for new candidates whether or not they are women. part of it has to do with political parties. willingness to persuade members of congress to stepped down, willing to support women challenging within their own parties, willingness to recruit women for office. right now the so-called big money people on the republican side are trying to recruit