was reporting a decade ago, and it's not changed. it's the same debate in most ways. >> guest: politically, president obama makes the argument that you have to do it all in one go, that you have to -- >> host: comprehensive immigration reform. >> guest: comprehensive reform, fix the legality for illegal unskilled people coming in from mexico at the same time of fixing the highly skilled thing, and comprehensive immigration reform would be great, a fantastic thing. i don't see he's put political capital into it or that he's done anything, and i also don't see why it all has to happen at the same time. i see no reason why you shouldn't. improve things as quickly as you can. ..

direction world and these things lost forever so eventually it will recover but then the rate of recovery and i would say i'm most optimistic about america. i'm pretty optimistic about india because the thing they've got good demographics. >> host: given the -- >> guest: the political situation is on a day-to-day

level it's awful with the corruption and the inefficiency in the building roads properly. but long term it's pretty stable and they have a democracy that works. they have the ability to change government. in the long term it's stable and they have fantastic bubble of working age people coming up and i'm much more worried about china. china has been growing very fast but i think it's going to start hitting the brakes. the labor force service to street already were. the country is going to get old before it gets rich.

both parents could go out to work that one kid would have for grandparents and no other children so someone to look after and the father as well and that sort of power cord to through this period in china. when you move on a generation suddenly you've got the only child that is looking after the two aging parents and the grandparents suddenly the dependency ratio flips. the society is getting much older, much faster than the society had ever gotten old before and that will affect the dynamism. that's another huge question. it's got to happen sometime in the the question is will it happen peacefully from within from foreign educated chinese. >> host: think you so much for your time. we continue to look forward to your observations of the world.

>> guest: thank you very much. the name of the book is in the shuttle of the oval office

profiles of the national security at pfizer's and the presidents they served from jfk to george w. bush. simon and schuster publishers and professor i.m. destler is the co-author along with daalder. >> it was created with eisenhower and 53 because we wanted personal policy aide to manage the lubber ret paul will you. but it was created semi into the accidentally when he brought the bundy to the white house and the administration was a of a job available called assistance to the national security affairs. would you like it? kennedy knew exactly what he didn't want. he didn't want an eisenhower process that only involved the rest of the people. what he would want was a person

close at him who would be sure he got brain development and that's connected him to officials of various levels of government that didn't undercut the secretary of the st. but. spearman what was the eisenhower then created? >> you wanted to have a glow were and despite what are the basic policy approach to the major issues and major parts of the world. as we put it in much more basic defense posture, policy towards committees by the department get together and draft documents

that were essential d.c. stuck to fund meant. preside over this meeting. it was created by the national security act of 1947 and it is established to give -- the people the pushed it wanted to constrain the president by forcing him to meet with his cilluffo advisors before his made decisions because franklin roosevelt made decisions the way he wanted to and they didn't like that. now president truman was pleased with the national security council was created us law. it's part of the act of 47 but he wanted to constrain him. he said there is no committee. we are not the cabinet system

therefore when it came time to have a meeting he convened the meeting and invite all the people basically handful of people, defense etc., and then they had a number of sets said clint meetings he decided not to go to so jefferson demonstrate his independence, there's always when the korean war broke out at the started to meet regularly with the nsc. eisenhower also was a three much president and saw himself as the decision maker but he placed in much higher value on a regular weekly meetings with this committee. so he convened just about every weekend was in town there was a national security and they would typically consider this policy papers which the been living. it yugoslavia or somewhere and

then there would be basically the decision of the move me but desert by the staff essentially saying this is our policy until further dissevered plant through the world. said it was a bitter feeling to have to think whether there's a crisis everyone is going to pick up paper. subpoena the crisis would be different but he thought having paced. believed to say it is worth everything. >> professor destler, but did the whole of the national security adviser -- how is it viewed by the state department originally?

it was harder than the state department. now early incarnations of the national security adviser were careful not to that to give the state department a primary role short of the president in that seat belt tension began during the kennedy administration because while president and george bundy himself from the national security adviser, i'm convinced they didn't seek to undercut the state department but the salles above all to have factions to present issues to the president come to look into assess who are responsive to the president and i'm sure worker velo people who aren't. and indeed the secretary of state. he was very comfortable with this new version of the national

security adviser. so what eisenhower was president, it had a huge demand for plenty ended almost secretly that became. he handled everything from the cia intelligence operations to putting people together when you have to make a decision about the suez canal. as the university called there was won by. critics landed on it and said this is crazy you can't run politics this will you have no idea what you are doing and because the way he concealed ten d people come and say we don't on the planning process this seems useful, let's see what happens. well, he's very smart, and then

along call something the bay of pigs which is a fiasco an effort to send to cuba to overthrow the government of fidel castro. it was a badly planned operation. people assume kanaby would necessarily send u.s. troops when was about to feel meaningless know we was seeking to send u.s. troops, so it was a disaster. >> it should george bundy have a role in that? >> he had a role but not a dominant role. he didn't control process. the cia people including a guy named richard bissell controlled the process and bundy in fact wrote a letter which i discovered the library leader the% offered his resignation saying i will serve you better in the cuban cresol.

kennedy said i've got to bring a military person because they have to get control so they brought in general maxwell taylor but he also said we've to coordinate policy more generally, so everything should go through bundy and she has been sitting across the parking lot in the executive office of the president said he looks around and says i've got. i've got to you within one minute of the president. so he looked around the was used for storing files so bundy said on a my staff are more important than files and he managed to get persuaded against donald who was the perfect so they got offices for upwards of aids, psychiatry in the white house which meant when the president was and

that's when he put it because kennedy was the sort of person who liked to head of questions. if the bundy had a piece of information he would like to discuss it. it's a very bank bang administration and like to talk in shorthand. a thing like obama. he didn't like people to lecture him. he thought he understood things just tell me what's new and interesting. >> who was george bundy before? >> dean kawlija and felt he was the de facto president of harvard college because he was smart and brought a very impressive people to the faculty. free person in a position he was popular among faculty and he got to know him because he was on the review of over. he was a harvard grad and i

think it was the senator from massachusetts, kennedy's all george bundy operate with others and he was impressed with that so that made him. that's where he came from. he had previously written the memoirs of henry simpson, very important figure in the national security policy world war ii and before that. he hadn't done major work inside government before, but people sometimes felt if you can manage it would just professors you can probably manage the government, too which turned out to be his case we estimate that president johnson have a national -- >> johnson had a national security, he had to. the first was with george w.. he inherited by mooney and serves to him between 66 as long as he serves kennedy.

initially johnson first of all was desperate to keep the kennedy people. he wanted for legitimacy, continuity and he needed them. he didn't have the background or the staff people for that substantive expertise. at the same time he resented them because he felt they looked down on him whether it is true or not so sometimes things a self-fulfilling that you think some heated looked on johnston a little bit. anyway, he needed time to get the dog and. he even invited george bundy's mother to the white house so west to help situation bundy to stay on. but he's an came apart bundy pushed very hard for expending our involvement in vietnam which has the most egregious mistake and its policy.

he then later regretted it but he wanted the president speaks out, to be articulate and defense policies that is the one thing i want to defend as long as possible so he gets a domestic program. if i found out i would be set -- you will take away my society come my program as soon as the have the excuse. so i want you to keep -- the fact that i'm angry. the thing to go ahead is when bundy was invited the prominent realist critics of the vietnam and bundy accepted that in the johnson demand that he had to go to the dominican republic at that time to be an emergency on voice and he sent him to the name republic but he had to cancel because then he came back and felt the obligation and he

absolutely wiped blumenthal out. especially on region he found other positions of margin call taking. this generally was superior and the public view. he was very happy to receive bundy's resignation. the lawyers didn't tell him that but anyway, their relationship wasn't the same and with the foundation called and asked if he would be interested in being president they said yes and then johnson saw someone who was

convinced advocate of what we were doing in vietnam to fight the north vietnamese communists and he was also reassuring to the president we are on the right track come abraham lincoln was criticized, you know, you are being confident so last hour recommended for the job was appointed to and in fact johnson said i have my goddamn intellectual now. closer to johnson than bundy ever was but he was not asked stressed about the system so he couldn't do the job as well because as we point out in the at and the station after administration you have to be trusted by -- the people have to

believe he will bring issues street to the president and if your view doesn't agree with deutsch should bear will to preserve it. >> professor, henry kissinger, brzezinski, condoleezza rice have all served as national security advisers. has the problem of the nsa corona? >> it's interesting. at least the adviser, the top is henry kissinger. he was looking for richard nixon. nixon didn't trust the state department. he very much wanted to. he found a partner and so increasingly in the beginning he would resurrect the meetings like eisenhower and have an open

process everybody to argue but it would be structured so he could creaky decisions. and we did some innovations in terms of i would like to see where the tree to reach a consensus on policy. and on nixon they are supposed to reach a consensus all the options were so the president could to one of them and not be buried under a bureaucratic consensus. they did that for a while but she really didn't like high level meetings with people shouting at each other and challenging the view of the president. he found himself in a particular problem but he couldn't sort of feast on somebody even with a president to say i've heard you and i'm not doing that and support you to do what i'm doing which is this. he couldn't their fourth basis he have the option with retreating from the problem had his -- the most problem was never involved with, henry kissinger and i say because

kissinger cultivated the president and reinforced his ego to asia must agree at the same time he's a brilliant policy person and he worked very hard to beat nixon before when he decides the chinese response he has to send somebody china. it turns out nixon was a little worried about the initial but the president is always kind of pursuing this. it's the president whose terrible and therefore. nixon was actually the real driver of the policy even convinced we should do something about the policy. nevertheless, nixon figured correctly this is your to china. this will be the era.

because he runs so janeiro process there is no one else that knew what was going on for seniority, so he says in this the missed ship to beijing and he is a successful trip to negotiate to make china a the following year the turnaround in the relations and so in that sense the relationship was a great success and the security advisor was the central of it. changing one of the most important policies we have in terms of the personalities this was something that exacerbated rather than an improved relations and its national security advisor and later on nixon did appoint him secretary of state in the second term but he clearly would not have done so if he felt he had no choice.

by that time he was buried in acquisitions balk birth of the committee of the quarters and reports which turned out to be true. the president. he appointed kissinger as secretary of state and kissinger interestingly for somebody in his power because he was so great to the president brings people over to the state department and he operates very effectively from their. >> has increased the and it stays that way the difference between kissinger and the bundy under bundy the people that are labeling the state department of

the system because they can get to bundy and they can get hurdles and so forth. in the administration people didn't like the system because they felt shut out. a lot of the senior people were shot because kissinger and nixon didn't tell them what was happening either so you had a -- it monopolized power that meant they could only italy a narrow range of issues but they dominated those and nobody has done that. the next prominent adviser was brzezinski. he, like kissinger, had been a professor at harvard and brzezinski of columbia and both have been prominent foreign policy writers and intellectuals and he tutored jimmy carter wouldn't have much politics and was the personal stories and had

very strong views on what policy should be. he tended to be more anti-soviet a huge are you the law of the secretary of state who was a strong but cautious middle-of-the-road person on policy and the -- brzezinski would speak out publicly for positions the president had not yet endorsed and that meant that the administration looks like it was speaking with more than one voice and the press got a hold of it and a reputation became very negative. people sit under brzezinski once

or twice the president would give a speech the would look like half is written by. finally a predator introduced a bill saying the national security advisor should be confirmed and it's clear that we have the two secretaries of state we should therefore confirm the other ones as well so the whole thing -- the office became a major issue. sprigg is the nsa the senate office now? >> its never become the senate office. most experts wiesel's including high of management and budget which is a white house official runs a large staff the national security adviser is not in turmoil. to jump toward the president now

there are a lot of interesting stories in between but the person who ends up in bodying the best way to play the role is brent scowcroft who had destroyed twice. he had it under gerald ford and under george h. w. bush the senior and scowcroft was a person underestimated by many and a very strong intellect, hard-working, and he basically said about the job you take this job, you've had this in the first year and it's not just trust with the president come its trust with your peers and the people that wrote so they were for the purposes. it takes about a year to do that. once you do that, then.

don't go on what options, and do this internally. the perfect example was the middle of the second year of good george h. w. bush administration and people figured out how saddam hussein is not going to invade kuwait so the administration, would we do, what do we do? one senior advisory national security and everyone is kind of and by the way we have here so at that time scowcroft said that was off base. the rule is we need to enforce that. you shouldn't experts to read this should be a rule all know and stopping hitler and this was

a perfect case in which should not stand it should be readers so he throws the motion this is we need to have another and here's what i think maybe the argument i would like to make and george h. w. bush says why don't i make the argument and scowcroft says no. if you make the argument everyone is going to follow you because you're the president. let me make the argument. they will argue with me if they want but i will make the concluding and then if you would move on that direction. we need scowcroft next to this. articulate since he was moving of confronting the clear stance and they do so. finally as we know ordered a friend in marine times and negotiated a worldwide against

some which was effected and three we are talking with i.m. destler, the co-author of this book in the shadow of the oval office profiles of the national security advisers and the presidents they served from jfk to george w. bush to read professor, would you do with the university of maryland? >> a teacher and the school of public policy which is a grudge with school which prepares people for government service. to begin your also the dirt of the economic policy program is that? >> the international security economic program is now part of our curriculum. we've probably 130 or 140 new students come and the equivalent of what they call national security and economic policy. and that basically the premise

is particularly with the end of the cold war we need people to have some understanding of both the security side and economic policy in terms. the united states and the executive branch has to governments want to handle the national security issues and are of the economic council created by bill clinton which handles the economic issues they knew the love of the president the secretary of state is involved in the economics but by and large to different groups of agencies so we try to ensure our students have least have little received in the security issues and the international economic issues and it seems to me that today with the european crisis likely to do more to drive relations with europe and the economic growth of china if it

wasn't obvious before it's obvious now people need to understand the linkage. it's economics and security. >> looking back at some of the national security advisor, henry kissinger, colin powell, condoleezza rice went from nsa to secretary of state. is that significant? >> this consistent in that the secretary of state said even though it wasn't the most influential position is often thought of as the most prestigious and the most prominent senior cabinet officials and the united states. we are year basically a the end of the reagan administration he was promoted to deputy then became chairman of the trend chiefs of staff as a military officer and then later on he could have run for president in

1996 and maybe have one but he was -- he didn't refer to keep this time as the scope but even when he said i was the obvious for the next president even though george bush and you never got along, he wasn't an effective state because people knew the president. bush relied on her very much and when she replaced the secretary of state even by most measures she was less qualified by experience to turn out to be a stronger and more effective secretary of state because she had the presidential relationship which of course she had built in the procession of the national security adviser. >> how did james jones to for president obama and tom donnelly?

the ann jones appointment is a puzzle. i'm sure if you could get inside the president's mind he would explain why he voted james jones and there's a whole the reason. a senior retired marine general which secretary by refusing to be considered as the joint chiefs under donald rumsfeld because he thought correctly if donald rumsfeld who was charged w. bush's defense secretary with people down and not showing strength in terms of their own positions. rumsfeld is one of these people that gained power but everybody else. this the same george bundy used to get powered by enhancing other people and so they would work together. anyway, -- >> how did general john --

>> okay. obama found himself not involved in the national security and if he did he wanted to see a senior person dealing with the secretary and he wasn't particularly strong. avaya still. somebody appointed a cabinet positions but he was already waiting to come to him rather than being street he was the one and so he wasn't -- the cyclist wanted different three they wanted to structure the normal president took his eyes off as an interesting structure. but obama was said miller ken st that he lacked to have people around for what they contribute

to the discussion to look their office was. it didn't serve that need intelligence was very formal. in tehran who have better relationships with the president began carrying pieces of this. most importantly tom donnelly was the executive, man something called the deputy service committee. h. w. bush administration on lord are a very important vehicle headed by the national security including the deputy secretary of state come secretary defense, cia etc altogether trying to handle this important operational issue that may or may not reach the presidential level. anyway, his doctor seemed to be a master not handling this

process and so i sometimes say well what was quick and then the good pa the bill but he didn't finish the sidewalks. they didn't want to see whether the students for blocking. khator the grass was worn down. the effect was the same because more than anybody else, donilon was in fact so as sensible thing when i'm leaving for time and jones to get to which tom donnelly i think is a lot better. he is able to manage the process, he understands the subject, there are however. if you look at the people that write about the subject there are two different views of what

the national security at pfizer should be. one is the broker manager of the few who senior official management and the other is the policy guru which is the thinker who puts together a grand design. to people outside the process, kissinger and brzezinski will clich the second power. they were people who designed policy, developed the grand concession and there's some truth to this judgment. it takes the role of national security adviser beyond what it's likely to be and it's likely to direct the policy management. brzezinski one of his friends turned out to be not an effective policy manager. as he was