credit and we made life a little more difficult for iran to sell its oil,, however it is still doing so. it still exports 2.2 million barrels a day. in my view the legislation that has been worked on here is still two week. it gives the president to easy outs to avoid sanctions that would cramp iran's export significantly. it gives the national security out and also gives an out where the president says there is not sufficient supply to offset the loss of iran. there would be a waiver. ..

this meeting as part of an ongoing series of meetings we have had for the whole year sentence the beginning of the revolution in tunisia, egypt, libya and yet men and also the ongoing events in the area and

bahrain. our speakers today are david ottaway to my left. he is a senior scholar at the woodrow wilson center, a former cairo bureau chief for the "washington post." we have the bios of the speakers distributed, so i'm a very brief, david last paper as part of our occasional papers series with saudi arabia in the shadow of the areas recalled. there are a side which to urge you to pick one i'm your way out. our second speaker is henri barkey, senior fellow at the wilson center.

he's lehigh university and i just received a copy of his latest book. iraq and its neighbors and the united states, which he calls adventists with pb lawyer events. curt third speaker is trita parsi. he is the president of the national iranian american council, former public policy scholar after the wilson center and his upcoming book had a single rule of obama's diplomacy with iran will be coming out in the new year and we have planned a book talk for mr. parsi in february. i think i would stop here. i would ask each of ours he

cursed his heat for 15 minutes so we have enough time for a discussion. there is an overflow on the floor will take in writing. >> thank you. thank you. i am going to focus on the rapprochement between saudi arabia and turkey and look at it from the turkish viewpoint more then for the saudi viewpoint rather than the turkish viewpoint, which i have a feeling henri will deal with later. i think the first thing that strikes me about this new relationship between saudi arabia and turkey is if you look at their history -- history is, you would not immediately say they might ever become friends. ms has really brought home to

meet earlier this month. i was in rehab for a conference and organized on the saudi foreign ministry and they took us to the history of the museum of national -- natural history, which is a whole history of the arabian payment back to the big bang when the world began. and there's the three wahabi states and there's quite a bit about the relationship between that scott saudi arabia today and the ottoman empire. and there was a startling reminder to me of how these two have historically react to it and then enemies. the ottoman empire established an outpost and now has to oasis,

which is an eastern province. in 1551 and stayed there until they were driven out until 1680. maca came under ottoman rule starting in 1517 and five the army of the first wahabi southeast state. i caught the wahabi saudi state because it's the riots between british theater and the saudi family and a palpable thing got going. and continues until this day. but the first weekend firming in 1744. and immediately went to war against the ottoman empire the ottoman sol timecode monitor algae come albanian ruler of egypt and turkey retaining control of maca in the muslim world that have been lost to the

wahhabi saudi's and 18 of three. in 1818, mohammed ali's son reached korea, which had been the capital of the first wahabi saudi state. he captured it and destroy it the first walk wahhabi state. they sent back to constantinople to be executed. so that is quite an interesting history to the relationship. and the ottomans were in trouble at that hejaz where the sub 10 is located in the western coast of saudi arabia. until 1916, when the sheriff of mecca went into revolt the te lawrence in and eventually try to set up a kingdom there and the sound is captured in 1924.

anyway, the point is that this relationship between saudi arabia and turkey carries a lot of historic baggage and help keep them a part for many decades. but all of this began changing after 9/11. this was because the three developments happening simultaneously during the past decade. first is the fallout from 9/11 which i'll discuss shortly. the second was the aka party coming to power in turkey in 2002. undeterred with iran iran accelerating its nuclear program. now what happened after 9/11 and you will need to remember it there were endless debates does here in saudi arabia about whether we saw each other as friends or because 15 of the hijackers were from saudi arabia and osama bin laden was behind

it. there was a lot of tension in the relationship. in in the saudi's decided they had to look for allies elsewhere than the united states. and indeed they did. when abdulla became king in 2005, one of the first -- the first was to beijing, just to indicate where they were really thinking they were going to get major help. but in august 2006, he went to istanbul and this began a whole series of exchanges between the senior leaders of the two countries. abdullah abu who has been both prime minister and president of turkey has spent eight years in jeddah, working for the islamic evolvement big. so he knew saudi arabia and they knew him. so there is a huge flurry of

diplomatic contacts and relationships between the two. i think initially the motives were quite different. the turks were looking for new business has turkish foreign policy is a master than by its economic policy and trade policy. they were looking for new markets. but the saudi spray from the beginning were looking for a these sunni counterweight to iran. unfortunately, turkey's policy of zero problems with all its neighbors capture key for really coming out on this side of the kingdom and the feud between saudi arabia and iran. furthermore, turkey was buying gas from iran and they have a lot of economic relations and the turks didn't want to -- i mean, we will hear more about this, but thinking she's not to alienate your hand.

strangely enough, things really didn't begin to change until the arabs praying at the beginning of this year. and one by one, the turks and the saudi's found themselves more or less done the same side eventually in libya. took turkey about to come over to the side of rebels player and the saudi's are behind them right from the beginning. but more importantly, syria, where they are now both on the same side, working with the opposition to overthrow the al-assad regime. though not for the same reasons i don't think. in the case of turkey, i think it's more a personal betrayal of pious side of prime minister aired a gun and the promises he made to aired a gun and didn't the field. the saudi's position is really

to eliminate uranian influence in syria and assorted kittie vaden for what happened in iraq, where the american invasion created a shiite dominated government tilting towards iran, from which was a major loss in the saudi constellation and thinking about the arab world. so coming here they are in the same i fighting to overthrow the hussein government. and man, in september, turkey decides that it is going to host a nato early warning antimissile system aimed mostly against uranian. ms publicly puts turkey on the saudi arab sunni side of the saudi iranian conflict.

i think that's a major turning point in the whole relationship because that is where turkey commit itself militarily to be in on this side of the saudi side, the arab side of the conflict. you might ask, so how solid is this new rapprochement between the saudi's and turks? in my view, it is mostly based on immediate state interest. and it mostly has political rather than security meaning for the kingdom, for the saudi kingdom. yes, it is true the turkish decision to host a nato early warning system is militarily important to the saudi's. but turkey in my mind simply cannot replace the united states as the ultimate guarantor of the kingdom's security.

i think turks are very unlikely to be called upon to ever send troops into the kingdom because of their past history. if it comes to the military showdown between iran and saudi arabia. i think they're much more likely to look for pakistanis and even the americans to come to send them then they will turn to turkey for their protection. so you have -- official you have the saudi's welcoming turkeys do engagement in the arab world and saying they see no competition for leadership. unofficially, i think the saudis remain very weary of the turkish bid for influence and leadership in the arab world. one because of the historic baggage between the two. secondly, the turkish model of multiparty democracy, even if it's islamic oriented is anathema in the kingdom.

they're not interested in any form of democracy. and then, you get these vibes when you see. i've had occasion during the jeddah economic forum in march, it is speech given before a largely saudi audience. and spoke for the wonders of the new government and what they are doing overseas, et cetera, et cetera. at the end of his speech he got hardly any applause at all. i was really struck by the lack of excitement in the saudi audience for your dugong. there's another strange things going on. the saudi ambassador to ankara, the last one left early this year and the saudis have not replaced their ambassador there. they named him, but he hasn't come out.

for reasons that remain them a bit scary to me the saudi leadership at the highest levels, but i think there is some tension between the two. anyway, i expect you'll see a lot of see a lot of publicity about this new relationship on both sides because it suits their interest and there's no doubt about it at the turkish turn against a side is big news for the saudi's because the king has all kinds of reasons he wants to get rid of this side and a callaway government there. i think what what you'll see is the to line out depending on the issue. he ran will help keep them together. and to me, it is not impossible that the began working together

in iraq for the sunni sanction of the iraqi equation have some say in voice in the government there. i would say that what we are seeing is all about arab rail lee peek, not ideological affinity or promotion of democracy in the arab world behind this alliance. but it is important and particularly to the saudi's. one of the major new developments in saudi arabia's search for allies around the world. >> thank you, david ottaway. >> thank you, haleh, for inviting me. i brought for this presentation the type that kind of we think

we keep talking about friends and enemies. it seems to me that maybe we need to come up with a new word. the only way to come to my mind was acquaintances. but that was not exactly what i need. this was essentially, in many ways, captures more of the essence of the relationship between the free. that is to say we're not talking about friends and were not talking to enemies. talking about its making do with what they have in front of them. in fact, when you look back, not very far back, in 2010 people were talking about this great turkish syrian accents and now we see people talking about the major risk between iran and turkey. the fact of the matter is event happened. some are momentous and there's very uncertain times for them at least.

but things will change in these countries will adapt and what really exists during competition. competition is influence, competition for just be able to say i am the number one in the region. there is no question that with the arab spring and the iraq war, three countries now have potentially been taken out of the current equation. iraq, syria and egypt. they have no influence at the moment that leaves the free content is saudi arabia cut iran and turkey and these are the only arab countries. in many ways, this saturday's see themselves staring match in a do or die confrontation with the rain and. also think kerry and, nuclear. they see the emergence of the new iraqi state as a major commit major loss of the strategic position.

they represent the fact he is in our country along with the shia prime minister and has occurred for president. and by contrast, dave may take some, as we heard from david come to some great relief in the fact that he ran mean friend, if you want, ally of syria is in deep trouble and is about the regime may collapse. and with it of course that would be a serious blow not just to iran and syria, but with respect to hezbollah which has been iran's great arm for both deterrence and punishment for anyone they do not like. so both interior in iraq, you can look at turks may be as a

potential balance. it is ruled by a party that are sunni and feeling and orientation. but it is also not exactly an islamic country. it is a secular country and the prime minister went beyond a truth it three in north africa, basically saying that individuals cannot be secular but government has to be secular. it is a government in turkey that is actually still a member of the west, has alliance with the west. it is increasingly playing an important role in foreign policy both in the region and beyond. in fact, when you look at turkish foreign policy, it has really two drivers. number one is if turkey wants to be an important local server. it's not just regional.

the region in some ways is a steppingstone to grow if you want. the turks are not part of many internationalist tuitions. they are part of the g20 and the security council and are trying to go back to the security council and try to play in international role. clearly what has happened is the arab springs has opened up many new opportunities. the other driver is commercial. and here, the turks when you look at the turkish economy. since 2000 has nothing to do with the aqap is almost exponential in terms of the rate at which it's increasing. and, exports are critical to turkey. so when you look at turkey's

problems with the neighbors policy, it was driven by imperative to open up markets and sell more things to the neighbors. neighbors which have been this aqap government's perception in previous times. to some extent, this need for europe needs to have -- to be able to export has also driven turkey to be really very oriented in the region. chaos can, but it never sought it. it didn't seek it because it didn't want to upset commercial relations. so when you look at the relationship turkey's relationship with all of the countries, it was one of if you want, not bigger problems with neighbors come up with bigger problems with regimes.

the regimes with which turkey establish relationships. it is regimes that have controlled -- control of the access to trade. but at the same time, it turned out to be quite pragmatic and adaptable. this change for instance. they took advantage of this actually. they turn to bat to their advantage, to use in many ways to camouflage the policy with respect to libya and syria. nonetheless, it may use it to garner greater sympathy and support on the. street. we should believe them, but there's no question these opinion polls, they show that both turkey and avalon are

clearly popular against it. but they are proven to be very adaptable. when they first defended gadhafi and then went things. the same thing is happening with a shoreside in the sense that the shoreside was the poster child for turkey's problems for amnesty in 1998 and it almost worked to initiation where the two countries were talking about two people, one government. so much that supposedly there is so much integration between the two. and yet, there is a change. the change again as pragmatism. yes, there is a lot of peak as david mentioned by the words aside, but it is a idea that as sure as god will not survive.

the sooner he goes to bed the better for turkey. this after all, a country that is in civil war or in this type of instability is not likely to be a very good trading partner for turkey or any kind of partner for turkey. so the sooner bishara goes, this is exactly the same thing they did with respect to gadhafi come with him they had very, very deep economic and commercial relations. and you see this change also by the way in iraq, to wear for many years the turkish government could not even under the word of the cary g. today the kurdistan regional government is the most important trading partners. if you go to northern iraq, just about every other shop is full with turkish good, everything is turkish. and it is really into syria and iraq that you see now a

three-way -- let's call it competition for a lack of better word. that is to say the opinions and turks have kind of carved out -- iraq will be to its own influence. in the north they are far more prominent, dominant. in fact because the kurds want it that way, too. they see the relationships to the west that are most important link. this outcome of the shia south is obviously much more dependent on iran. and the center of quarries you commit the readings are probably more prospal back. but nonetheless, i think we should not exaggerate either iranian influence in the wake of the american departure from iraq i think will be going to its

own -- will charge its own course. in iran-iraq libya does. the war is a memory. but the point is that his competition. and clearly the saudi says david also mentioned the saudis are also involved in the sunni opposition if you want. they also tried after the election but they also heery. so that competition will exist. now before i talk to syria, which in many ways is the most interesting case and i'll conclude on syria. and we see a few more things about the turkish iranian relationship. it has gone through ups and downs, but fundamentally it is a relationship that is solid but

unexciting. the two countries do have very strong commercial ties. the turks are completely dependent on energy from russia which is the primary gas supply. but it is not just obviously their oil. the energy needs continuously increases. they alienate iranians. not that they can similarly iranians have built the pipelines. pipelines are not like tankers. you just cannot shake the nation for one day to another. so both countries know that they have to coexist with each other. there are times. there are no problems, zero

problems with the regimes -- the neighboring regimes. they never could decide the 2009 elections with in and shot as the first to congratulate off and finish at -underscore risk it three. the pressure on the united nations when they came up with the apartheid agreement that really upset the united states and created a huge crisis with the united states here. but on the other hand, you see, for instance that the radiance are now supposedly unhappy about what the turks are doing an arab spring, especially in syria and we also heard mention of the events that the turks put and we heard officials saying if there is an attack on iran, one of the

first targets of the iranian as tally shall be macchia, which is where it's going to be. you have to understand god knows when that reader is going to come in. did you think the turks had a choice when it came to at? because the turks would have created such a crisis in the west. would've been the only country in nato would have come against the nato consensus. they certainly would not have gone against the united states. because of the relationship, some of the tension that exists in the city, played right into the hands. so you understand that. yes they will make some noise about it, but i don't think there is ever a situation. syria will be the most important

test of turkish iranian relationship because clearly i'm sure i don't need to talk about this. syrians come from iran and the massive syria will be devastating because it also stops asks us to hezbollah. but it isn't so much that the turks have taken a position against our side. but it also they are actively now engaged in undermining and stating the position in istanbul and is instrumental in helping to come together. and they engage in some sanction. but they have in many ways the turkish position on the side it is like a good housekeeping seal because they were so close. i mean, these truly are part of one family.

so they tried on 180 degrees basically because they don't carry much where we. but the question is, if there is a civil war in syria, what will the turks do? with the interview militarily? further be a conflict? i would say not just the land border, but also think about the proximity. turkey is the only country that can pay a very active role to interview militarily or the civil war. we will see how they react and whether it becomes one of amnesty. thank you. >> thank you very much, henri. >> thank you so much, haleh. it's a great pleasure being

here. thank you for the kind introduction. as always come you up at the timeliness issues in turkey and iran and saudi arabia is critical due to the role in shaping the regional security architecture in the region. it will focus primarily on the cannot discern the geopolitical days. i ran times been a long time of the status quo and the american-led security work. long harbored aspirations for preeminent, the current order of what little oil is left of it is in order favoring western oriented states and that tends to punish any opposition to american leadership or to israeli interests. at one of the most powerful states in the region, air and is now part of any security arrangements. it has no pact. it is not part of any security body. in fact, most security bodies tend to be created in order to

balance and contain iraq. so iran has no voice, no seat at the table. and if you are not at the table come you're essentially undemanding or at least that is to avoid the iranians it. as such, the ratings have welcomed american decline of the region and taken advantage of washington's many mistakes in the last couple of years. in the period prior to 2009 committee ratings managed to expand their influence in the region boasts by filling the vacuum created by decline in american power, but also by expanding its soft power base by challenging very vocally and increasingly unpopular american region. on the other side of the spectrum, u.s. saudi arabia, a key or of the old american order. it is in order that has crumbled and its washington has come to recognize, the status quo is not sustainable about what israel and the two states that are most

adamant are pressing in the united states to resurrect the old order. the old order brought with it several dividends quite beneficial to the saturdays, and order contained iraq and it contained iran. it is an order that made sure the west bank of the pro-western governments in the region in spite of their lack of the domestic popularity or legitimacy. it is also an order that made sure the american saudi relationship is on a very strong footing then at least pay some nominal calls for resolution. it is an order that created division between the so-called moderates and the radicals in the region in which saudi arabia very generously was put in the destination of the state. but since the invasion of iraq, most of the deliverables of this sort there have essentially evaporated. iran has been unleashed as a result of the defeated hussein.

iraq has fallen into the hands of the prorated shiite regime. at least that is the way saudi arabia has to do it. washington has in the eyes of the saturdays betrayed its long-term allies amongst her allies for citing some other pro-democracy movements. i'm a witch has resulted in significant tensions between united states and saturdays. if defining delineation becomes this, but if it does become based on whether states favor democratization are not in the region, that would mean that saudi arabia would be squarely on the wrong side of history at least according to the definition by president obama. turkey on the other hand is a more complicated case. while saudi arabia was an ally of the u.s. will they begin opening to fight in washington, 150 and obama had abandoned the desire to resurrect the old

order, turkey has been a pretty vocal ally that only turned defiant and assertive in order to hasten and secure a strong position in the new order that the united states no longer have the ability of turning the clock back. now, his current position is largely driven by a sense of washington's ability to restore to order is lacking. and now turkey sees in this transition as henri pointed out, an opportunity to expand its leadership and still some of that vacuum. and i think it is oftentimes been viewed as turkey perhaps has become a lost allied or perhaps a pro-iranian power were in reality it seems much of turkey's positioning the region has been aimed at countering iran's accounts to turn to the post-american order into a pro-iranian order. recognizing the propensity from a hostile rivalry with theory and, turkey has sought a balance

that by expanding its many areas of cooperation of iran as possible. an ancient rival is the turks recognizes the damage the rivalry could do to turkey's continued fight. as a state with a foot in europe, it also recognizes the benefits that have come by transitioning the security paradigm in the region towards collecting security, something that would ensure while you cannot eliminate rivalries come you contain them in nature they turned left to start it. the upheaval in the region in the last year has put the existing tensions and the divisions between turkey, iran and saudi arabia to the floor. saudi arabia's quiet quest to contain and iran is now in the open. private conversations about cutting off the head of the snake seem increasingly part of public policy, particularly in saudi arabia and using the oil weapon against iran. turkey is no problem policy and attempt to maintain healthy

balance between corporation and competition a ran has essentially prematurely ended as a result of what is happening in the area as we also pointed out. iran's endeavor to use its soft and hard power to clinch a leadership in the region in the aftermath of the american accent has fallen behind due to its own treatment of its own population in 2009 and the depletion of the regional soft power. tehran in many ways is the regional state that has lost its momentum. i think very few things that can be said about tehran's reaction, calculations and maneuvering as a result of the strategic disorientation. after initially underestimating turkey's intent and capacity can iran is recognizing turkey cannon is putting a very potent ideological challenge to iran's leadership in the region. while iranian leadership rested on the idea of islamic resistance against and out increasingly less relevant was

an maximum popularity and support as long as the risk between area populations and regimes are at its greatest amount of time in iran was one of the few states that adopt did the position vis-à-vis ice. turkey's assertiveness in bed for theater should face on its economic leadership in process and its ability to define a secular, democratic system with a strong islamic identity. tehran has in a way been taken off guard by the rise of turkey. and you can increasingly see anti-turkish, anti-sub seven articles in the u.s. accusing erdogan for a neo-ottoman policy and argument that also in some quarters in washington. and tehran is increasingly putting rhetorically in the same cab is israel and saudi arabia, both to warn ankara about the sally in their view of putting its eggs in the western basket

at a time of american decline, but also to discredit turkey a date in the regional audience by lumping it together with israel. moreover, there has been some indication of the closer corporation and courtney should treat iran, china and russia, particularly after the way libya ended. the chinese have no interest in seeing the morph into an opportunity to expand a number of pro-american regimes in the region. their interest lies in ensuring that there is a maximum amount of independent state in the region and as a result, seed states such as syria or iran becoming targets is not something the russians and chinese would view lately. take the needle again since the revolution or security council is a case in point. this has enabled closer partnership between tehran and moscow. you can see whether it's long-lasting or not remains to be seen. in reality make the argument that tehran realizes that it's

faces few short-term opportunities to expand its influence. in the short term, iran is on the defense. on the defensive vis-à-vis turkey and on the defensive vis-à-vis saudi arabia. it is to a certain extent vis-à-vis the united states and certainly vis-à-vis the situation in syria. been on the defensive is not necessarily the same assessing themselves as being weak on the contrary, i think the iranians are comforting themselves by adopting a longer-term view what the economist short-term setbacks of what's happening in the region to be offset by the regional state natural gravitation from the west -- away from the west in the long run and towards more independent postures, particularly if the national islamic movements continue to squirt it to reset the ballot boxes. that is at the end of the day to weigh the hardliners in iran predict the arc of history would have been.

>> thank you very much. i'll open the floor now. a question for you. after the whole incident that tehran were trying to assassinate the saudi ambassador in washington, erdogan came back and tonight it. last week, the intelligence minister went to saudi arabia. i mean, what do we hear from the saudi side? the iranian side i believe was relatively quiet about this trip and they came out first in the adduct pressed. why did they -- what is the read of the saudi's? >> you know, i haven't heard anything about the saudi is.

even when relations are really bad, they've always kept lines open. we adjust the seeing the two of them who operate on opec despite their differences. and they will continue to exchange messages and talk to each other when things are really so serious that they are in danger of consecration. but whether or not it is true that they did try to assassinate the saudi ambassador here, i think the saudi's are of a mind set that sight better to be expected from the iranians. >> now, i think you're absolutely right. this is a controversial visit and do not necessarily have the full support of the political establishment. part of the reason it was initially written about.

there was a fear that this would come across as if he ran with the weaker party. there is another visit by deputy foreign minister i. believe what i was supposed to take place at the saudi's counsel. but i think one of the outcomes that the iranians he was actually the collaboration and opec that took place. one of the factors that apparently led iranians to believe they could go there with someone of a strong card was because of the drug situation in which the iranians returning to their benefit in conversations with the saudi's. >> do you care to comment on each other's presentations? >> know, the only thing i would say again in terms of one thing i want to say about the turkish position in general as i think the turks kind of enjoy the fact that the iranians are on the defensive. the more iranians are in the defensive, the more they will

need them. that's exactly how they want the radiance. so although the turks have been very explicit and opposition to any kind of action in the same thing for syria, but the fact of the matter is they like the fact that they are ganging up in iran and that would mean the radiance would meet the turkish goodwill morass and it's going to be a price for that. >> just, i am not a proponent of the american decline in the middle east. i've been wandering around the middle east since 1960 and i never thought i would see the day when the arab countries called on nato to come in and overthrew an arab leader led by the two former colonial powers of the middle east, dan frantz,

and with united states to handle the logistics, et cetera. that to me is an extraordinary event would have been in libya in terms of not the decline, but the return of american influence to libya. then the calls for no-fly zones -- it just came back from khartoum, sudan. the opposition mayors conference no-fly zone. some of the oppositions are talking about it. there seems to be no hesitation to see in the waistcoat ring involved in helping solve some of these. when it comes to the gulf, the united states has just signed a $60 billion arms agreement with saudi arabia, the largest in its history. we are going to be providing arms to every part of the saudi military. this is an extraordinary development. the gulf cooperation states have just agreed finally to set up an integrated early warning antimissile system to protect

them from iran. the united states is providing the equipment. the expertise, training and i suggest probably the running of this integrated antimissile defense system for sometime to come. so i don't see america in decline in the middle east. it's taking different forms. we are trying to go from one type of relationship to another, that he ran past, particularly in the gulf, a rand has really cemented the u.s. gcc gulf cooperation council relationship >> opening the floor to your questions. yes, please. can you please wait for the mike and identify yourself? thank you. [inaudible] >> thank you off with a wonderful presentation.

david correctly talked about is your problem policies of turkey, but i suggest that saudi arabia has basically had similar type of policy when abdullah was actually crowned prince. yet a rapprochement with iran after how many by select it in 1997 and try to let their 90 shoes at the other countries that a mom, yemen, uae. so, this is quite a different abdullah now and the policy -- the shift is unbelievable. it is very similar to obesity and turkey. it looks like there is a match there. that as far as turkey is concerned, yes we have seen some sharp moves by the prime

minister they are. and i am not sure if it is going to be well taken in the arab world. it's a great it would probably see it as a very opportunistic moves by turkey that case. as far as the popularity, yes it is more popular, but so was ahmadinejad before the 2009 election. so the ability of that i think is questionable. as far as turkey's health is concerned, nobody mentioned the major problems they had with the kurds, that they don't even consider first-class citizens. but they also have major problems. you mentioned the icing problems and so on, which is true. but they have not been welcomed by the europeans than they would never be welcomed by the

europeans. but also when the fall of the former soviet union, they were basically rejected in other areas in the region, and the central asian republics basically. so in fact, i think iran is probably the best option in they're very natural ally. i like to take your input on that. >> are not quite sure what the question was. >> even the most natural ally. >> arab world today, because of what is going on in iran is more than ever today sunni versus shiite. and that is the way unfortunately you might well argue the way the saudi's are reading the whole struggle in the cold. i'm talking about the goals and the labonte, not the monograph.

and that is the way the saudi's have decided to play the game. and they are turning it into a sunni shiite struggle and they are not going to allow shiite iran to make any wargames. that is why they sent troops into bahrain if they can possibly help it. in fact, they are trying to release the whole trend. the thick. nature in the gulf arab world is what dominates. >> look, when it comes to turkey being opportunistic, i think there's anything wrong with adopting such a policy. i mean, if you love as you try to make lemonade with it. so i don't think it's necessarily a bad thing. however, when you look at arab reactions to this, there might

be some reaction to turkey. however, with the turks have done and i would argue that had it not been for the break, but the stringent for the diatribe against israel, the demolition of the ativan, that without that which provides essentially an overachiever camouflaged, if you want, turkey would not have had that my cheese in terms of shifting policies. is that a lot of maneuverability? so yes, there's a lot of opportunities that they use very well to their advantage. >> i would agree that the turks are going to go -- [inaudible] whether they view iran as a natural ally or not i'm not so sure. it's very different in two q. at

10, 15 years ago. but one of the common threads perhaps the post-turkey and iran face is exactly the type of framing of the region that they represent. the saudi's have been able to drive this very, very hard gamble on dividing the region between sunni and shia. early on we seen similar attempts to divide the region between arabs and non-arabs. if you pursue that frame, turkey also adept at coming on the outside. saudis oftentimes talk about being legitimate and arab affairs. turkey is also not arab state. due to linnean nations will be problem. i don't think it necessarily create a national problems, but does so show weaknesses between a partnership of turkey and saudi arabia. >> i decide to add one thing.

there is one odd policy positions given the site of essentially in favor of change in the region spring. that is bahrain. they have it set absolutely nothing about what is going on a train to come in the intervention in bahrain. so in that sense, maybe there is some thought the sunni shia divide the john is very pragmatic because bahrain is tiny. it's not that important than saudi arabia is much more important. >> yes, please. wait for the mike and can identify yourself. another gentleman. >> dave buggers, a historian. one of the arguments one hears in the iranian nuclear debate is that if the iranians get nuclear

weapons, all the various other regional powers will start trying to get the nuclear weapons, too. is this a given, or are there other possible alternatives to at the regional power -- the regional countries will do? i'd like your take on this. >> getting nuclear weapons is not easy. we don't put a camera in iowa and. but, -- [inaudible] >> that's what i was going to say. maybe that's the wal-mart. so savvy as they have that option. we don't know what the arrangement is between the saudis and pakistanis. when it comes to turks, i mean, the turks do not have a nuclear power sites here. so if you're talking about getting a nuclear weapon, they have to build it personnel take

it 10 years. secondly, the turks to have 60 tactical weapons today on nato and the united states guidance. so technically, they are covered by the nuclear umbrella, which also allows them to be far more -- when you look at the turkish leadership come he believed a nuclear free middle east because you're ready to give either 60 weapons? they say no. so from that perspective will have their cake and ate it at the same time. >> i don't think it's something that should be dismissed. i think it is one of the fact areas as to why it is important to address the iranian nuclear challenge with a lot of good insight and foresight. but i think also as one of the weapons that are used by the states that do want to see the united states take out a cover position vis-à-vis iran to make

indications that they are so against their nuclear program because that immediately feeds into the argument that we are sane poster reading proliferation and as a result it is critical to prevent that by taking on strong position vis-à-vis iran. but again, at some point of course for political reasons and may feel exaggerated, but i don't think it's completely unfounded. [inaudible] >> i am from the wilson center. my question will be related to the first run, going back to the sectarian division problem intended to related questions. the question of syria, how it's really played with it. tired and to an extent do you think it will be able to continue his position?

maybe even strengthened the position rather than popular demands of changing this regime. and related to the second aspect is how so area plays the wahhabi actors, not just in the area but although for as an anti-shia propaganda. how do you see that as a force of saudi arabia can play against iran? ..

>> et cetera strong part of their didn't. there's this whole religious war between iran and saudi arabia, one of the leading shiite power and the other saudis, et cetera. custodian of the two holy mosques. so it's very intense and it has been ever since 1979. and the saudis play it all the time. then they tried hundred national dialogue at home to relieve the tensions between sunnis and shia, which is kind of ironic but they have this national dialogue going on and they are

trying -- they're going into different directions on this. >> we have 35 people in the overflow, i'm taking one of their questions. it's to all three of you. have the influences of individual a mom, islamic religious leaders increase in any of the government of saudi arabia, iran and turkey? >> in turkey really don't have any important religious leaders, except for one, and that is somebody who happens to live in pennsylvania, united states, and has an enormously large following and has millions of businesses, associations. and by and large, his

organization, although does not agree with the government all the time, has supported the akp and has been helpful to their electoral success. they were influential before, the difference between now and akp is not there, out in the mainstream and they don't have to hide. >> i think you have a situation that is somewhat the opposite. i think that it's very difficult to make very clear cut with the power balance is between various power centers, i think a trend that has been over the last 15 years is a decline of the influence of the clergy, at the expense of course of some other element such as the irgc, et cetera. this is a mean to irgc has control of the country. it seems have been a trend away and you can see greater dissent

against khamenei and current interpretation. you have worries in iran of what will happen. will he be able to emerge as a shiite ideological challenger. you already have a situation in which there's for a little following for the type of iranian interpretation of the main street school of thought. so i think it seems an opposite trend but it's not necessary sufficient to say the regime is about to collapse or anything of that kind but it is nevertheless a different iran compared to 15 years ago. >> i'd say the influences sort of the same ambiguous relationship. the saudi family has had with the shake who are the descendents -- descendents of mohammed.

sometimes the officials established, wahhabi establishment there is subservient to the government. it's help of the government battle al qaeda and extremism in islam it is extremism inside the kingdom. it's been very helpful to the government in that way. on the other hand, they fight each other over whether women should be able to drive, whether there should be an overhaul of education system. so domestically you get, you have a struggle going on between them about the direction, the number, whether women should be allowed to have sports in their schools. can you believe it? that sort of thing. i mean, they are really in battle with each other. >> yes, please. the mic is coming, thank you.

>> joel, csis. none of you have mentioned the word egypt in an hour and a half. okay? apologies, in passing. [laughter] could you then review the three states, vis-à-vis, egypt and particularly have their take on the outcome of the elections? >> who wants to go first? >> i think the saudis, you know, saudis want to see stability in egypt. they are not crazy about democracy, obviously. in fact they used to have strong support from mubarak in struggling with the united states that was trying to push democracy on both of them. i think they are very worried about stability, period. i think they would prefer to see

the military stay there and play, continue to play, they would help a stabilizing role. we are not so sure that they can play a stabilizing role, but they would decide on having a military stay, and they have given, they've committed $4 billion since this all began to egypt. so far they've given half a billion dollars to help them with their financial situation, which is far from what egyptians me but they committed to putting into, up to 2 billion of the 4 billion into stabilizing the financial situation of the country. so they are not, you know, not trying to isolate egypt. now, the elections, the way they're going, they're going to bring the muslim brotherhood, it's going to have the plurality of votes in will probably lead a

coalition government. the relationship between the saudis and the muslim brotherhood is extremely ambiguous. the muslim brotherhood, during the first gulf war, sided with saddam hussein. this really interrelated the saudi so taken in thousands and thousands and thousands of muslim brethren in the '50s and '60s, after nasser turned against the muslim brotherhood. so here they had sheltered the muslim brotherhood for decades, and they felt betrayed by the muslim brotherhood during the first gulf war. furthermore, they planed them muslim brotherhood -- they planed the muslim brotherhood for politicizing islam and creating what some people call neo-wahhabi which is a mixture of wahhabi's and muslim

brothers, but very politically minded. so i don't think they're happy to see the muslim brotherhood win as big a vote have gotten. on the other hand, i think they're happy to see the others doing so would because many of them owe allegiance, ideological allegiance to the wahhabi in saudi arabia. >> as on famously, as you know, called on mubarak to step down and he was seen as one of the first western leaders to do so, there was not much love lost. mubarak was some who is very much enthralled, i mean for the united states, stood in the way of ambition in the region because egypt was always the center. when it came to gaza, it was always mubarak who called the final shots and not the turks, as they wanted to.

the final analysis when it comes to egypt what it tends to want is to see egypt it back together and reestablish some kind of stability, because again, the long-term interest with egypt is commercial. there were a lot of companies that were doing business in egypt, loss of textile companies had moved to egypt because of low labor costs. so, and part of the comments regarding secularism in terms of the fact that the states to be secular which angered some in the muslim brotherhood i think had to do with that. it was basically saying come on and get on with it. set up the states and move on. and i think that's what basically what is needed in egypt or the fact that egypt is not the real player in the regional balance of power, most turkish advantage but it is also, they do not want to see

egypt crumble or collapse. >> i think the egyptian case is very interesting as it shows that some of the initial predictions that the arab spring, particularly with following the bar, mindful of how strongly negative he was towards tehran would lead to an immediate plus for the iranians and about a year into a think we've seen much of that so far. we've not seen relations established between the two countries. that may still happen but it certainly hasn't moved at a particularly fast-paced but i think looking at the elections i think there is are probably quite come to we sing the muslim brotherhood coming to power in iran because, in egypt, because they have managed to take advantage of that and a duty that exist between the brotherhood and other players such as saudi arabia. take a look for us at the relationship between iran and hamas. earlier on we see most of its

funding from saudi arabia, and then later on the iranians managed to take events of conditions there and expand its influence in gaza. i think there is are looking at these things as opportunities, but not the top of it clear to doubt that i think some people in washington there. i think similar situation, the emerged industry which will surely be lost for the iranians if aside false. but rethink their relationship with the regime is not just limited to a side it's also in the security apparatus as well as the fact that even becomes a loss of iranians, it doesn't necessarily automatically translate into a win. it's most likely this and there will be that city will turn into yet another one of the week states in the region to become a proxy arena for the major powers to fight each other rather than squarely falling into the capital deals. >> yes?

>> henri, you mentioned the crisis that erupted between washington and over turkey's deal with iran on the nuclear issue, particularly the a ringing enrichment deal they helped broker with brazil. and it seems like when you look at the issue of, actually turkey and the u.s., aside from the obama erdogan chemist ago one of the big reasons has been turkey stepping away from the iran issue. these being a very vocal advocate for iran. but you also mentioned you see sort as things get harder for iran possibly been coming back to turkey. and i'm wondering, what are the conditions for that happening without it again driving a wedge between washington and opera? how does turkey start working more closely without endangering its closer or improved relationships with washington?

>> look, i think when you look at the washington relationship at the moment, i become everybody will tell you that it has never been so good. large measure has to do with syria. because i suspect this is where we are seeing a great deal of cooperation between the two countries. not only that one and obama talking quite often on this issue, as they have on other questions with respect to spain, but as i said earlier, whatever happens in syria, turkey will be critical. land border, the coastal links. so if you're washington and you're doing some contingency planning, you have to be working with the turks constantly. so there's not that much that is what i think in danger the american turkish relationship at the moment. there has been some, but the iranians have done, and there's been some accusation in turkish,

in the turkish press and also by turkish officials indirectly that the iranians have an or to punish the turks or to send them a signal kind of supported some of the attacks against turkish military targets which were quite effective. i think there's a split between hard-liners and moderate ones. the hard-liners have the position of being more pro-iranian so it's possible the iranians were helping. but even there i think the iranians will have to be very, very careful when it comes to that. iranians don't want to anchor the turks. it is not the turks will do anything against iran. they have, they want to continue this relationship. it's not a zero-sum necessary relationship between iran and turkey. what happens in syria again,

it's very, very difficult to play it out. if there is a turkish intervention that is designed to overthrow assad. i think that will be seen by iran as a very, very hostile act. but beyond that i don't see anything that will happen. >> i was wondering what's the sort of situation surrounding hezbollah? i know that saudi arabia strongly support the anti-hezbollah units within lebanon, but is turkey going to be playing a role? will have some sort influence of that any future? >> i mean, the turks, again, when you look at the whole of syria, there's not much that hezbollah is involved in.

especially if the sheriff were to go. then it will encourage all anti-hezbollah actions. hezbollah is a weakling that cannot define itself. it's most powerful actor in lebanon. but it is doubly going to make life very difficult and they have come out swinging. so there will be a all, even if there is a regime change in syria, syria will not change its position but it will change its position on hezbollah, precisely because of that. but what the turks are worried about, and they did send a warning about i think 10 days ago, basically both of the syrians, not to do something crazy in the region. because that there has been that in an act of desperation maybe we use -- maybe -- i don't think

they will do it, but you can create this scenario in which events happen that a gauge hezbollah directly or indirectly, and then you have a firefight over lebanon between these guys and hezbollah which would maybe would work for his advantage in terms of galvanizing the public may be, or the region. so the turks don't want to see that. as much as they did not like the israelis, the fact is they do not want to see a major confrontation because it will work against the whole region and themselves. [inaudible] >> between? >> hezbollah and -- >> no. in fact, i don't think in the short term that is what they're looking for. in fact, if you take a look at a lot of the different things that happen with iran in the last year and a half, they have been

struck by misfires his, assassinations, major sanctions, as well as things blowing up left and right around tehran and elsewhere as well. i think the real question is what is the iranian retaliation? i don't think we're seeing any strong signs of any major things they are doing. that brings to the question why aren't they doing anything? one reason for that they be that the iranians are calculating that at the end of the day, however costly the sanctions are, however problematic these are for them, they can still absorb all of this and still outpace the west when it comes to their nuclear program because they are still continuing. is continuing slower but it is still continuing. but if they risk a confrontation but if you're tight on a larger still. the dynamic may change. and they could end up in a much worse situation. so at this point i think that may be part of the reasons why. but the question then is how

long can they absorb these things without retaliating? and i frankly suspect that the israelis are testing that right now. >> no more questions? okay. let me ask you one question to all three panelists. we had met early december a year ago, the region would have been whatever it was been. very normal. mubarak, where would we be a year from now, speculatively? what will the situation be in morocco, and tunisia? >> a year from now? >> descender 2012 -- december 2012.

>> i think what's going to override everything is some kind of more serious confrontation with iran. if the west goes ahead with its attempts to squeeze iran on oil exports, i think you're talking about when are they going to retaliate, that this could trigger something. and i know the western governments and the united states are studying in great detail, together with help from the saudis, about how do you shut down, or at least decrease iran's oil sales, without sending prices skyhigh. and, you know, call it a journalist abides in the air, as you go around the region and talk to people.

i just get a feeling that something is going to happen with iran that's going to overshadow whatever, you know, the pro-democracy movement and all these arab countries, and this will force people to choose sides, and either be on, you know, the side of the united states and the west, or the side of iran. >> yogi berra who said making predictions is difficult at making predictions about the future is even more difficult? let me say that the shark will be gone 12 months from now. if he is not, the nasty why but i don't know. but i think will be gone but the issue i think would be chaos in syria and probably chaos in iraq because there's a way in which was happening in syria is also affecting iraq now. and we see in terms of the way the different committees in iraq

are positioning themselves, you know, the government supporting him after all we did in terms of suicide bombers to cross his country into iraq. by the way, saudi bombers crossed syria into iraq, see a target. so in that sense i think what happened in syria is going to spill over into iraq and not necessarily, naturally will pull in other countries to play the game. but i don't see a major confrontation. i do see more and more chaos in the region. >> yogi berra may have known a lot about making predictions but he didn't live in the era of the seas that it gets much worse making predictions of the future live on c-span. i would tend to agree with david. i think the big game changers not necessary although it would be either very big factor.

but it is whether something happens between the united states and iran. and david mentioned the oil issue. i think that's a very, very critical issue. i would add a couple of other factors that makes quite explosive and very difficult to control. you have on the other hand the fact that politically it would be far less costly for the israelis if they were to choose to embark on a preemptive military strikes against iran in the midst of an american election year. with a racing the rhetoric from the republican side. and since the tensions with u.s. over this issue in the past has been a very important factor for israelis to make a decision, i think that's going to be something to watch out for. you also have, of course, the fact that the iranians are now putting cascades in. and they will probably be operational sometime or completed sometime within the next six most of the israelis are presenting that as a new red

line. there's been plenty of red lines in the past. they turned out to be far more pink than read. but this one, in my assessment, actually does have some logical foundation to it because taking out an installment is quite different from taking out, 100 meters or so underground, compared to taking out a facility that is above ground. so if they become operational with 3000 or so, and it would bring some, clear alarm bells in washington. into it today, we still have in real sustainable to post a difference about the type of the escalatory mechanisms that ensures that even if there is a complication, that you can dial it back. i think we should listen to what admiral mullen said just a couple weeks before he left office. warning about the risk of an accidental war in the persian gulf, because iran and the united states did not communicate. they have not communicated.

that's a lack of fumigation brings about misperceptions which leads to miscalculation, which then leads to escalation, as affable and put it. so that to me is the biggest game changer in the region 12 months. >> with that very happy note, let's in this meeting. thank you. [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

>> from this discussion on turkey, iran and saudi arabia we will stay in the middle east region with the next discussion. we will bring to you on the end of the iraq war and the implications of the arab spring. we'll be going live shortly to the carnegie endowment for international peace just on the other side of town from the woodrow wilson center. while we wait for the group there to get set up we will take a look at house speaker john boehner's remarks about the payroll tax cut extension the past in the senate and heads to the house today.

>> good morning, everyone. >> good morning. >> americans are tired of washington's short-term fixes and giving's, which are creating uncertainty for job creators at a time when millions of americans are out of work. democrats and republicans agree that the payroll tax cut needs to be extended for a full year to provide a kind of relief that americans need in this struggling economy. the house last week passed a bill to do just that. but instead of passing the house -- [inaudible] the payroll tax credit for a year, the senate democrat leaders passed a two-month extension, punting the problem into next year. we oppose the senate bill because doing a two-month extension instead of a full year extension causes uncertainty for job creators.

i used to run a small business. i met a payroll. i hired workers. a two-month extension creates uncertainty and will cause problems for people who are trying to create jobs in the private sector. the idea that tax policy can be done to months at a time is a kind of activity we see washington naturally put our economy off its tracks. last week both chambers worked together to pass a full year bill to fund our government. and i don't think this issue is any different. it's time for congress to do what has worked, and no more taking the can down the road. tonight, the house will vote on the senate passed bill. this is a vote on whether congress will stay and do its work, or go on vacation. i expect that the house will disagree with the senate amendment. and instead vote to formally go

to conference. the formal process of which the house and senate and resolve differences between the two chambers, between our two bills. and i expect the house to take up legislation that reinforces the need to extend the payroll tax relief for a full year, rather than just two months. again, to provide certainty for job creators. and i think the best way to resolve the difference between the two-month extension and a full year bill is to follow the regular order here in congress. when there's a disagreement between the two chambers, we sit down at a conference and resolve those differences. that's exactly what i believe the house will do. the president has said repeatedly that no one should be going on vacation until the work is done. democrat leaders in the house and senate have said exactly the same thing. so i think it's time for the senate democrat leaders to

follow the president's example, put their vacations on hold and work in a bipartisan manner to finish the nation's business. >> if you can't work out a deal for a year-long extension, in the short amount of time you have left, are you prepared to let these tax cuts lapse altogether? >> i think we've made it perfectly clear, we believe and for your extension of these tax cuts are very important. i don't believe the differences between house and senate are that great. it's time for us to do our work. >> mr. speaker, if you and your colleagues in the house was so against the two-month extension, short-term, why did you not raise the red flag with your republican colleagues who for the most part voted for this? >> we expressed our reservations about what the senate was doing. but understand, i make perfectly clear to senator reid and senator mcconnell sometimes made last week that i would not enter into negotiations with

them and tell the senate produced a bill, the senate produced a bill. we expressed our reservations, and i do believe they are trying to resolve the -- >> you can find the rest of the speaker's comments online at c-span.org, as we go live now to the carnegie endowment for international peace, and the discussion under way there about the end of the iraq war and the arab spring. >> one '02 panels, one where we'll focus on iraq and look at the views on u.s. intervention and departure as we all know. yesterday marked the end of the u.s. military presence in iraq, and the soapy group -- look at iraqis but also in the region views on the departure and what it means for iraq. and in this first panel we will have first jim sobb e., the

founder and president of the american arab institute, present the findings, and then we will have two colleagues and your friends comment on the findings. edward gnehm, jr. is a kuwait professor at george washington university, but who i know more closely, intimately as the american ambassador to jordan when i was still in government and we had a very close relationship, and our own marina ottaway, senior associate at the carnegie middle east program. we will have a short coffee break after that, and then we will start the second panel where we will look at political change in government in the arab world in general. in arab countries that were also

called by the zogby grew. again jim will present the findings. i will comment on these, most unfortunate is canada right now. came from jordan yesterday on a plane that was diverted there instead of to washington because of a sick person on the plane so he unfortunately could not be with us today, but perhaps we can ask skip to also comment on the findings that jim would present. so with that i senate floor over over to jim. >> thank you, martone. thank all of you for coming. i want to acknowledge i trust these polls were done in september of this year. and they were done for the forum which is held annually in the united arab emirates. at that form we released the polls there that dealt with the

role of social media in air of spring. these two sets have not been released yet, and so i am releasing them now. as marwan noted we pulled in iraq six other arab countries, cannot states and iran. in an effort to measure attitudes at this point towards the war itself, its impact toward the feeling that iraqis and people in the region have about the future of iraq in the wake of american withdrawal. and how iraqis see their country in the world. there are three essential observation i want to make up front that pretty much follow through all of the findings. the first and foremost i think is the divergent attitudes we find among three major iraqi groups. we have come to talk about them a lot, but he we have some hard numbers to put to the differences, attitudes between

kurds on the one side and shia and sunni arabs on the other. then there are, there's the partisan divide that exists here in the united states. it is so deep that sometimes you get the feeling that democrats and republicans are looking at two different wars that took place in two different countries. and then finally, the attitudes of the respondents in the air countries and in iran that both neighbors and are in some proximity to iraq. those attitudes were more negative towards the war, and more positive about the future of iraq's post-withdrawal prospect than the iraqis themselves. i'm going to start, as i begin, with the iraqi people and their attitude toward the war, general assessment. we found that over all iraqis feel that they are worse off than they were after the war

itself. when we asked the question specifically, after eight years before, are you better off are worse off than you were before the war began? 42% worse off, 30% only say better off, 23% say the same. you will notice here the divide, as i pointed out, sunni and shia more inclined to say worse off, only among the kurds is there a sense that iraq is better off or that their situation is better off than it was before the war began. when you ask in the broader region, you get a much more decisive response in terms of worse off. in jordan and saudi arabia, i'm not going to give all of the countries polled. those are in the booklet you have in front of you, and the result of able if you want to log onto our website, or write to the arab american institute we can send you the whole poultry bridges in jordan and saudi arabia, the two countries most in the neighborhood or closest to iraq, almost

two-thirds say worse off. in iran for more than a half, but slightly less concerned about iraq being worse off than saudis and jordanians. over all in the arab world, about six in 10 say worse off. look at america. when you split it up, democrats, only 24% think iraq was better off than it was after the war, before the war. whereas 50% of republicans say iraq was better off. iraqis are better off. this translates to come we asked the question, was the war worth it, overall 56% of americans say it was not worth it. 75% of democrats say it wasn't worth it. but a plurality of republicans, 43%, say that it was, in fact, worth it. when we ask questions of iraqis as to how the were impacted

various aspects of their lives, did it improve their personal safety and security, data improved education, didn't make them freer, did it make them respect the rights of women more? in almost every instance, the results pretty much track the numbers we have here for effect on personal safety and security, and in which he you see over all kurds largely to the war a positive rating in terms of how it impacted their lives, where as soon be give overwhelmingly negative, and sunni only slightly more positive. but still a substantial majority negative. and again, democrats and republicans, by two to one, republicans seem to always want to find the war having had a positive impact. democrats much less so. where you see the numbers don't go up to 100, it's because there were people who were not sure,

which was itself interesting i think. in some of the instances you will see the no impact or not sure numbers equal almost 30, sometimes 35%, which is somewhat surprising after eight and half years of a highly debated and highly contested war here at home, which took a tremendous toll on lives and treasure, that you have, you know, about a third of americans would be the no opinion or sort of ambivalent about what the outcome or the consequences of this war. is the withdrawal positive or negative? decisively, americans, republicans and democrats, say it was positive, it is positive but it is something to look forward to a minor iraqis. it's the same. iraqis overall 60% with shia more highly supportive of withdrawal. sunni and kurds though in the majority still saying that it was positive.

what emotions do you feel about? here, the convergence of attitude you have between iraqis and americans that a withdrawal is posix breaks then we see how do you feel about the withdrawal. americans very happy, overall democrats overwhelming happy. republicans almost 60% happy. but iraqis, the plurality worried. worried about the outcome, of what will happen now that american forces are leading. with sunni arabs in the majority being worried about the outcome. why are they worried? asked what their concerns are. almost 60% say they're worried about a civil war, worried the country being split into parts, worried about terrorism, worried about almost every instance, the questions we asked about what are you worried about, coming up in the future, almost 60% say that they are worried.

and that goes across the border between sunni, shia and arabs on one side, and kurds on the other. optimism and pessimism about the next four years, while iraqis are worried, arabs are not. almost and in sensitivity or disconnect between arab attitudes about this war and about how iraqis themselves are feeling about it. two-thirds jordan, 75% in saudi arabia are optimistic about the next four years in iraq, and 60% in iran. when we asked iraqis to assess other countries, how do they feel about other countries and the role that they might play in the future? only 24% favor will attitude towards america. 7% among sunni. 25% among shia, and 63% among

kurds. the iranian numbers, only 2% of sunni and 5% of kurds have a cable rating towards iran, where is 41% of shia do. and in turkey, shia 53% favorable rating, 40% among sunnis and only 5% of kurds with a cable rating towards turkey. uae is one of the few countries that actually was rated positively across the board. saudi arabia had favorable numbers along several of the groups, but not across the board, bring its overall number down to the 39. democracy, can't it work or whether not work? this was almost the definition of being conflicted. i'd like my country to be democracy and it will work your 21%. i want my country to be a democracy but it will not work year, 41%. i don't want my country to be a

democracy because it will not work here, 20%, meaning that 40 -- untie, 62% of iraqis would like the country to be a democracy, but 61% of iraqis don't think a democracy will in their country. attitude towards iraqi leaders, murray hill -- in the rielle maliki has a federal rating only among turkeys. less stable rating among shia, he is the more popular leader over all in terms of rating. of all of the people that we pulled in the country. and al sadr is more favored among shia and any other iraqi that we surveyed. and look at very low favorable ratings among sunni and kurds.

issue here as of iraqis being conflicted i think comes through they are being divided also comes to. the fact that americans have sort of a weird but deep partisan split also comes through. one can't blame the iraqi people for being conflicted and divided. i mean, after years of ruthless rule and an invasion and occupation, and an accompanying it terrorism and ethnic cleansing, while the trappings of democracy have been set up, the country is somewhat dysfunctional at this point. and so iraqis are deeply worried about their future. happy america is going, worried about what happens now that america is gone. and don't quite see their way through to the future. i think i will leave it there, marwan, and we will hear what these folks you have to save. >> thank you very much. a couple surprises here, things that we expected that things that i guess many of us did not expect. let me turn it over to skip.

skip of course was american, the american u.s. ambassador to kuwait. and as such has i think a uniquely, unique perspective on these issues. >> thank you, marwan but it's nice to be today, and think you very much, jim, for your presentation. i was intrigued of course by the polls and results. i felt that my first reaction was it does confirm many of the things that we had ss would be the case, and i particularly think of the three demographic groups in iraq. in fact, they were going to have different attitudes about certain of the questions that you asked, particularly like u.s. presence, the kurds always seen the american presence as very supportive. along the questions of whether or not we are worse off are better off, and particularly the concerns about the future. i looked at whether we're better off are worse off. the first thought that came to mind was is really

understandable, given what the iraqi people have been through since 2003. and i believe did like the phrase that you selected, gestational state. i think every does capture in a correct way that it's sort of at that point in life, where there's still a lot that can happen and a lot the formation that needs to take place. it's easy to forget, or to rationalize if you're an iraqi today, the better past. to think back on the days of saddam hussein, straightforward about it. when they could say that violence hardly existed, at least violence on the street certainly, other kinds of violence. that generally safe conditions, schools were a different things. had job security. most people worked for the government. all of these things have been really turned upside down, and so today they see a situation

which there's a great deal of uncertainty. so it's easy to understand how those are likely to be the way they are. but i'll make this prediction for the future. human nature. if things to improve in iraq, if they do get better, you will see that comparison of shift and we will see more people in iraq saying we are better off than we were before. i was impressed, frankly, with the similarity used between shia and sunni toward what had and hadn't improved. this was, i think you showed a, but when you look at those two communities, political freedom is not improve. economic development has not improved education has not improved. health care has not improved. personal safety, security, relations with neighbors, also very negative. government has not improved. women's rights are little bit better. so it's really only as i think

in religious freedom with the shia clearly say that they have a better situation than they did before. but i think that commonality between two communities that are often at odds with each other is worth taking note. on the question of withdrawal, i think it's clear to most observers who know any of history about iraq that it's not surprising that virtually all communities in iraq support the end of the u.s. military presence. if you see anything at all about history, even under the monarchy i think i'm just after world war ii, the government then signed a renewed agreement with the british which did, in fact, have the duties involved. the streets were in turmoil. there was rioting. there was a call for the execution of whoever signed the agreement. the prime minister who did left the country in the middle of the night, never to return. so there's a whole history of

iraqi nationalism that is very powerful and very potent. and to have thought that we are going to a continuation of the status of forces agreement is really very simplistic. i say that though with one point of criticism. i think the administration really didn't approach the whole issue of ongoing military presence a properly, or in a way that might have led to a different conclusion. but certainly given to political fragmentation at the center, we were not going to buy plenty figure that would stand up and say we want u.s. forces here, that they can have immunity that they had before. just impossible. worried about the future, absolutely. and i think they have every reason to be. but i did notice and note the concern about domination by neighboring states. and not unhappy that iran was up

there in terms of concern by all three immunities, over their involvement. kuwait, along with the, with iran, are not considered a countries likely to be helpful to iraq. and i was intrigued that jordan received such high ratings in a very positive way. so i wanted to take a moment and talk about jordan, which was mentioned in several places in the poll, also kuwait which is not in the poll but i think i can share with you some insight. i just got back a few days ago from there. that 61%, see the u.s., 60% as chiefly beneficiary but also relative to al qaeda. and say that 92% of jordanians

believe that the u.s. made a negative contribution in iraq. the concern about the future of iraq, they mention civil war, terrorism, the foreign neighbor influence. i think all of this is very unsurprising. when you realize that the jordanian public at least were very, very heavily against any sort of military intervention by the united states. made it quite clear prior to 2003 that the ties that jordan has had with iraq over time, both economic, and this was good, but also oil, that they received in concessionaire rates, the port which was so critically important to the iraqis during the iraqi iran war. there were these ties in the sense of a presence just east. and, therefore, these concerns that you see the jordanians speak about i think again, i think are legitimate.

they worried about iraq being dominated. it's the sunni issue certainly. they worry about the turmoil and chaos inside iraq with the resulting, say, flow of refugees from the country as they saw in 2003, four, five and six. and they also would see a disruption as this economic trade relationship which has been pretty much reestablished. so i think those views all really quite understandable. kuwait is unique, and we have, they have openly and forthrightly, the kuwaitis i think, i know the government, in fact i think it's quite clear about the populations. they would as justice in have been stay in iraq for as long as they could possibly keep us there. they are suspicious and they are certain in their mind that iraq remains a threat, will be a threat. they don't see this historic relationship being so different,

though they claim and help so and are trying so. having an american military presence is a security blanket. compensated for today by a decision by the u.s. government to continue to have a military presence in kuwait itself. that's suffice it to go part of the way. but to really have, say, the kuwaitis, really have confidence in, particularly again the fragment of the clinical situation. in baghdad and the willingness of legislators in baghdad to use the kuwait situation for their own political gain, quickly add plenty of kuwaiti politicians are doing the very same thing from their perspective. so let's would keep this imbalance. i get quite a few thoughts, just a few more minutes. polls, these are clearly based on individual attitudes, and it's good, i learned a long time ago in my surveys that people by the nature of us think human beings can hold very

contradictory, inside of us. and when you rarely pull ourselves apart, look at ourselves and see it, and i think of my time in jordan but other countries in the region where i have had passion, not me personally but on the mainstays for what it is and does and doesn't do. and having to turn right around and say so you have to do something. well, to have enough confidence in asking? but to end up having a longer conversation at dinner and he'll talk to me about their children who are in school, go talk to me about medical problems they've had. in other words, it's not unheard of, and people inside themselves have very contradictory feelings and emotions. and i think that's something always to keep in mind. the poll of course doesn't cover the attitude of government. it's not intend to end this is not meant to be a critical remark at all.

it simply to say that, let's don't forget when we're looking at public opinion, and i do believe that public opinion an ounce -- amounts more today than it did a couple years ago. decisions by government leaders while they were considered the public views certainly are going to still make decisions of their own national interest, and that's going to impact on the relationship just as we see the saudis as their reaction to a shia controlled iraq at this point in time. will the u.s. withdrawal provoked a debate in the region? it does. you know, debate now, it is, he was reliable security partner. are we in fact a diminishing power fading out, can be counted on, find an alternative security arrangement. and i would just say this. this widespread sort of discussion in the region that the u.s. is a declining power is

not true. and i've spoken about it in kuwait recently and have done so in other countries. the u.s. commitment and interest we have in the region are going to keep us there, and, therefore, we are not likely to be leading. but the united states government has enormous task in front of it, which is to convince people that that is the true, this whole idea then of arab governments reaching and looking for alternatives, and turkey is always a good example today of being an alternative partner in the security arrangements difficult for. the expansion of the gcc military capacity in the gulf, or a more assertive arab league and often these are described as actions governments are having to take because of their concern about u.s. commitment. i think that's wrong, too, because, in fact, the united states has been pushing these governments to do some of these

very things. we are happy to have turkey more engaged in the region. we've wanted for 20 years to see the gulf cooperation council have a better security arrangement and better capability. the same would be true of the arab league. and certainly we work closely cooperative. so i don't see this as a zero-sum game at all. i don't think people in the u.s. government do, but see it as a way of enhancing, frankly, the america partnership in the region. and i will stop there. >> thank you, skip, for the region perspective as well as the u.s. perspective on the issue. let me ask marina to give her comments before we opened it up to the floor. >> thank you very much. something that he did not mean to talk about but i just want to add something to your last comments about u.s., the saudi perception that the u.s. is losing power. i just came back a short time

ago from a trip to the gulf, and i heard a lot about people are talking a lot about this. and my impression is that it's not that they want the u.s. not to help calm your absolutely right, but they're afraid the united states is no longer capable of keeping peace and control. that seems to me is really the crux of the discussion. it's not so much you guys go away, oh, my god, you'd cannot keep order in this part of the world. it seems to me that is really, at least that's what i had been hearing. i want to make a few comments about what i found most interesting or most surprising in the polls, and then raise the question in light of what has been happening in the last weeks or last few months essentially, you know, how this, whether these polls to reflect the,and, yeah, present concerns, we would

find a different situation. of course, we can only speculate, but let me start with the things i found most interesting. the fact that one-third of americans have no clear opinion on whether, you know, of what has been the outcome of this war, first of all, it is obviously in contradiction with some of the answers to your questions that seem to be very clear opinion about whether the war was worth it and so on. but the most important point here is it's a good reminder of how much of the war, the war in iraq has we dropped off. ..

i think if you go to small-town away from washington often on weekends, and he read the local newspaper, it does not talk about for news and that is what most people read, this kind of local newspaper and there has not been a word about iraq for a long time. so for a country it's an important conflict and it's really interesting. i found very interesting the relative optimism of people in neighboring countries about the

future of iraq and this may be a very important reminder about how we should not confuse the opinion expressed by leaders with the majority of the population, because again if you go to the area and you try to talk to governmental officials, you talk to all pole unquote opinions and so forth, the attitudes or pessimism about the future of iraq is very strong, but particularly in the gulf. what you hear is the doomsday scenarios about how iraq is now completely dominated, that the country country as you know going to bebecome an appendage to the iranian republic, to the islamic republic of iran.

this is a cliché but used ural here at all the time. to serve iraq to iran on a silver platter. the country was cut off before so it is clearly not reflected in public opinion, which is again, the united states is not the only country where the public is really not very much in the loop if you wonder what the attitudes are. very interesting also i think is this last attitude towards iraqi leaders and why i came to really read -- cannot read the figures very well but the fact that muqtada al-sadr has, there is not that much difference between muqtada al-sadr and nouriel maliki oath in terms of positive and negative attitudes. it's not a huge -- it's not a

huge difference among the shia population and i think it is a very good reminder of things that we are seeing developing now. first of all how dependent maliki is on muqtada al-sadr. muqtada al-sadr is as popular. it is very different and for maliki to obtain the support he is among the shia population if it was not for muqtada al-sadr which also explains that you raise about why maliki could not say yes to the american presence because muqtada al-sadr, i mean extending immunity to american troops so that they could stay, because muqtada al-sadr had made it quite clear that if you pull out of the coalition, if the

maliki was to extend such immunity. so i think that is really a good reminder of essentially how bifurcated the leadership of iraq is. we think of nouriel maliki but it is really brewery -- nouri al-maliki plus muqtada al-sadr which is really the control on the country. their opinions about allawi. not surprising, he was after all the representative of the sunnis and to some extent the kurds certainly. the possibility of forming an alliance with him with maliki on the formation so that is not surprising but it is really very similar i think towards nouri i maliki and muqtada al-sadr. the last point that i want to

bring up is what i really found surprising is the fact that such a small percentage of kurds have a positive attitude about turkey, because they seem to contradict essentially what we have seen lately. i am not surprised that those opinions have been expressed in 2003 or even in 2004 and five. actually i was surprised that it was as high as 5%, but when you talk about the kurds, when you to log to turkish officials they talk a lot about the very positive role that turkey has played in the area in terms of investment and developing building infrastructure. turkey seems to have more or less accepted the situation. they have never liked the idea

for obvious reasons that they fear the same demands in their own country, but yet all indications have been that there has been no reproach medicine to shall he that at least turkey and kurdistan have found another positive one and it seems to belie that. again it shows the level of public opinion if not at the level of leaders, they are suspicious of turkey still very much there. and that i did not expect to see. let me move now to discuss it that what is happening right now, because if you have been following closely, not only have the last couple of months before the withdrawal of u.s. troops been very difficult essentially,

there has been an increase in -- there has been an increase in violence in the country that his -- there has been an increase in terrorist attacks but the developments that took place just this last week and over the weekend, are positively dramatic. in other words, we all heard last week all of the speeches that were given, you know, obama and al-maliki about all the positive things about it and what we are seeing now, i mean the impression that one gets, is that things are falling apart in iraq, much faster than anybody expected. in other words, it is almost as if you know, everybody was waiting for the last convoy to pull outs to really do some of the things that they wanted to do all along. essentially, not only is it no

longer part of the coalition, it's open to discussion how much it was ever part of the governing coalition. yes in theory they were part of the government but it was always they were marginally part of a government that they are not even participating in the parliamentary sessions. they have pulled out of the parliament. there are arrest warrants out for some of the -- not against allawi himself but certainly against other prominent personalities. in other words, there seems to be a very clear decision taken by maliki that you know, they are not going to be very patient with the sunnis essentially, that the sunnis are not going to be an integral part of the government and that's of course that justifies essentially and explains why all iraqi's, no

matter which group they belong to, have expressed several months ago such strong concerns about the future. i am happy to see them -- happy to see the americans going but what is going to have going to happen next? >> it also the news against the vice president. >> the vice president, yes. and yeah, there is a whole list. and also what we have seen not only in the last few weeks, and even more pronounced trends towards their regionalization of the country that is trying to buy various provinces to try to set themselves up as autonomous regions or semi-autonomous regions. although we obviously failed to kurdistan as a semi-autonomous region. i don't think it could be much

more autonomous than it is now and still be part. i think it is semi-independent. that is semi-independent in reality. it is not autonomous but what we see increasing and trend has been developing over the last two years essentially on the part of more regions to set themselves up as -- excuse me, provinces trying to set themselves up as regions. there are a lot of things that i certainly don't know. i'm sure some of the intelligence community does but i don't know about who was -- do towards the creation of more regions rather than provinces because of course not everybody has, not everybody is -- kyrgyzstan and at this point they do not share the old revenue to the same extent.

so, and a sense what we are seeing now is the realization of modest fears, of those fears that you documented in the opinion survey a few months ago. it all seems to come to pass. it will be very interesting to see, to know it would be if the polls were taken again right now and let me stop there. >> marina thank you very much. i will ask jim about implications for democracy in the region. it seems to suggest that the iraqi government is no more responsive to the needs of every you know, the iraqi's and other arab governments that are goings through transitions are responsive to their own public. if this is true, what does it say about sort of democracy in iraq after the war and democracy in the region that is undergoing

transitions, but where people still don't see eight years after the war their own government as being more responsive to their needs than before? >> well it was an infantile fantasy of the neocons in the first place. [laughter] that iraq was going to be the regional model. and everything was done actually two subhurt iraq being a democracy in the way government was structured. it was structured as a sex. model, which is inherently not democratic and we are seeing that play out at this point. so, i didn't see iraq and i don't think the region well as a whole, i also didn't believe that if iraq succeeded it would read the beacon that would like the way to the whole region. it was not done by the people. it was done by a foreign

government. tunisia is more of an example of how people can from the bottom up create change. that is sort of the trial run that inspires iraq. it certainly is a tragedy though to see the situation unraveling. i just want to make the comment that to me the problem isn't that we withdrew or that we set the date for withdrawal. it's that we didn't take advantage of the time between when we set the date and when we withdrew to help create structures that were more sustainable than what we left. it seems that we did everything right to get everything out, and in kuwait waiting to be positioned elsewhere, but what we didn't do was help create sustainable institutional structures and the government, in the country, or in the neighborhood to create a regional security arrangement with the neighbors, who were going to be involved.

we knew they were going going to be on bald. they are ready were involved but they are involved under the table, not sitting around a table fighting a -- finding a mechanism on how to move forward. i just want to make one comment on marina's observations about the ambivalence is, the u.s. ambivalence and skip the air of ambivalence toward the united states. on the fourth anniversary of the war, did a tv show on my abu dhabi viewpoint show with students in baghdad and students in iraq. i will never forget the iraqi woman who very passionately in one sentence said, without pause, you have to leave, you have to leave. you have to leave. not now. [laughter] and this is what comes through, and if i didn't read these numbers, but when we asked the questions about withdrawal, how

long should the u.s. forces stay? almost half of iraqi said as long as needed. and 10% saying, one year. only 29% said levison is possible and that was across the board among shia, sunni and kurds. a little more than a half or a little less than half on all three. on the u.s. and, when should we leave? as soon as possible 47%. stay as long as needed, only 22% so, it seems the u.s. was set up and wanted out, because frankly they never saw the point of it. this ambivalence issue. we were detached from the war from the beginning. it was never a shared sacrifice. it was never a country investment. in lives and treasure and in emotion. we didn't understand the country when we went in. i don't think americans still, the last poll we did only one third of americans can find iraq

on the map after 4500 people died from our country, only one third of us can find it on the map. given that, it's done, finished, get out so the president did what people wanted to do but iraqi's are saying, what now? and i think that there, if anything, what this war may do or the outcome of this war may do is further impact america's image of the region as this thing unravels. if in fact it does. >> i couldn't agree with you more gem in the fact that you brought up the statistics about us staying really goes back to my observation that i went through quickly which is that we didn't use the time that we had a position there. if they had more leadership on the part of the united states to get some of these decisions made structurally we would have had support from the iraqi's for that. we would have an opportunity we simply didn't use but your

question marwan about iraq as a model. iraq is a democracy even from the beginning the way things unfolded it probably hurt the whole idea of democracy in the region because more of my friends throughout the region said that this is what democracy is all about, not for us, and they have course look to the chaos and the uncertainty. they looked at the government that seemed, unable to do anything. and of course not bringing about anything official to the population and that is simply not what they wanted. >> on the issue of democracy, i agree with both comments concerning democracy. i think it is very easy to forget that certainly while not a democratic country it is a pluralistic country. in other words this is a country that clearly says -- one of the last centers of power this point. you have first evolved all all

the sino large political alliances, these large political alliances fighting with each other. these are real. these are real -- these are groups to which people are in allegiance whether it is maliki's state of law. it mean something to the people involved and of course you have kyrgyzstan which is a totally different problem. how long it is going to go on i don't know, but don't sort of dismiss the -- don't discount the speaker of the parliament who is really very important figure in the center of power in his own right and we are

beginning to have more and more of these provinces that are claiming a agreeable economy. there are centers of power in the provinces, not just in kyrgyzstan but in many, in many different provinces. the problem is and here's where the real danger is now, this problem is without roots. i mean you cannot have democracy without pluralism but pluralism without rules is not going to -- is not going to lead to democracy. it is going to lead to chaos in the two civil war and i think here is where we come to the issue of the u.s. alone. because i think one, it is not so much that we did not build the institution. i don't think you can build institutions. it takes time. we always talk about building institutions. in fact it does not work that way in many ways, but we really did not -- we rush through the process of writing the

constitution and setting up the political system so much that there was never a chance for the iraqi's to try to reach some consensus on what they wanted. we have forgotten now, but what happened in 2005 in iraq was an incredible feat of political and -- on the part of the united states that had nothing to do with the country, because this is a country that you know still is in a state of war for all practical purposes and the occupation. if elected and assembly. it wrote a constitution and the constitution was supposed to be written between generally -- i understand from people who were directly involved, that it took so long to set up the mechanism for writing this constitution that in the end it took long because the constitution was cast for less than six weeks. essentially, it was the official

process internally so it never had a building of consensus about what the country wanted. and what we are seeing now, because the elections have created new centers of power, the system has created new centers of power but there is no agreement on the rules. >> all right, let's open it up for questions. maybe we can take three or four questions at a time to allow as many as possible to ask questions, please. >> one of the things i was watching over the weekend was a man who -- three sons and his three sons have been killed by his neighbor. it is sort of like looking out the tutsi and hutu in rwanda. did your study take into consideration the, still, the

body of former neighbors who on both sides of the internal war and how are you going to be consoled eight them? >> okay. >> i apologize for being late, but i saw the slide their, the attitude towards iraqi leaders and since the number and percentages of the kurds and the sunnis are much lower than the rest of the country, don't you think that particular slide has to be normalized, to show that huge difference there, because the kurds and the sunnis collectively have about 40% and the she is have 60% roughly, so

it gives a different perception when you show allowing for example, what kind of support he had from the sunni group or from the kurds, but don't you think that there has to be -- that it has to be normalized? thank you. >> hi, just have a question for dr. zogby. i know you have a lot of questions on the survey to ask about iraq's people with regard to the troop withdrawal. i was wondering if any of the questions were in context about yes the u.s. invaded iraq that it was also the same entity that imposed economic sanctions and i'm wondering if they -- if the two different situations were reconciled in that question, because it is interesting to see people in a soul society sort of wide not reflect on what it did to them before all of that. >> one more question and then we will give the panel i chance to answer.

spam my question is to mr. zogby. you mentioned that said arianism, the emphasis on sick terry and with this government was inherently undemocratic and i think that is probably putting the problem the wrong way around. i think the emphasis was on democracy which in iraq is inherently sectarian. because of the 60% of the shia and the fact that they have not been in power. i guess centuries. so, it looks like to me that is sort of the wrong reading. >> let me start with the reconciliation. the answer is we did not ask questions about that. but we did find in the poll numbers the deep divide come through but we didn't specifically ask questions of that sort. the numbers are -- you say

normalized and i say average on the totality and if you look in the poll toward the end of the booklet that you have, the section on iraq that is on page 21, attitude towards iraqi leaders, the total, the total is there and you will see that despite the fact that al-maliki al-maliki -- i am sorry al allawi's numbers are not as high among the shia, much higher among the kurds in much higher among the sunni, overall the favorable rating in the -- is overall favorable over nouri al-maliki overall. if you do a one man one vote you do a -- his list wins by a slight edge over al-maliki in favorability. we did not ask about sanctions.

i did one of my tv shows right at the beginning of the war, and we did ask that question and it still is a wound deeply felt. it was then and i assume it is still today off though with the passage of time, there are many other wounds i think that have eclipsed it. on the sectarian issue and democracy, the first poll we did and iraq was october 2003. we found a much, and much lower inclination towards terry and, sectarians self-identification than we do today. i think that to some degree, we structured governance in iraq around sect identification and it certainly did appeal to leaders. i don't think that those leaders had a mass base support for sectarian divide. in fact one of the tv shows that

i did early on i remember asking the kids in the audience on the iraq side, how many of them came from mixed marriages. most of them did. this was like, this was like syria though before the war. sirri a vote before the war. people from one community tarried another community and with no sense of divide in that way. one of the things that worries me about syria is when people say opelka it can't happen here. we are so different. no one ever expected it to happen in baghdad either. no one ever expected it to happen in beirut and no one expected it to happen in sarajevo. this was the sect leadership in iraq, who found a system of governance that said this many shia, this many sunni, this many kurds were to their advantage. i don't think there was a broad mass support for the lebanon is

asian of the iraqi political system which is why i say that our use of sectarianism undercut the push to democracy and brother played into the sort of creative warlords out of sectarian leaders. >> okay, please. microphone. that poll but i'm talking about october 2003, less than one of five iraqi soccer legend as having any basis for any role to play in governance as they were called back then. and today you would get some very different numbers. >> thank you. i am not sure if it was mentioned or not the number of percentage of the iraqi's? what is the number? the demographics were the poll

are in the back. it is 1000 iraqi's nationwide. 1000 iraqi's nationwide, yes. that is what it was. >> okay, can i have the reflection -- >> that is going to be the second half of the discussion. >> there is a whole session about it, so -- >> stanley kober. in his first and not grow address abraham lincoln said that hoblick opinion has to be the master of a society, that majorities minorities can change with elections as public opinion changes and that is how they change really. what is being suggested here as a result of the invasion, the sort of sect terry and identity politics strengthens and it raises the question to me if that was the case and if lincoln was correct, but we will talk

about institution building. that it was this creation of sectarian difference that was fundamental. >> my name is morrow and i'm at the center for international enterprise. with the work with the iraqi public sector and one of the things we are finding in a recent surveys is there is quite a negative perception of the political parties themselves that instead of working for the will of the people many politicians now work for the will of their political party and i'm wondering mr. zogby if you have any questions that related to that issue and if you could comment on it? >> you one more. okay, shall we? no? [laughter] >> were you asking about here in the united states united states or here in iraq? [laughter]

>> no, we did not poll on favorability toward parties or toward groupings, just toward leadership, and as you see in the numbers, every iraqi leader has a net, a net unfavorable attitude. a highest favorable rating is al-maliki, i'm sorry, is allawi and that is at a 40% level. respectable by american standards. i guess where we are today, but if we didn't poll institutions, supposedly pulled institutions the numbers would be low. but no, we did not poll them. and, i am not quite sure i understood or maybe i will do for the question on the sectarian issue in public opinion. >> the question was asked by the gentlemen here. >> if i understood in terms of the specific question, if i understood it correctly, i think

it is true that what makes a democracy possible is the fact that people change their opinion from one election to the other. otherwise you would have majorities and minorities and then you will have no, an unsolved war essentially. so in fact the most important voters, those people who change their minds all the time. if you are not doing much for democracy in the long run because you issa voted the same way. people vote by their identities, and identity does not change obviously, then you risk having permanent majorities and permanent minorities. you are absolutely right on that

one. what i would like to bring up, i am not totally convinced about this idea that sectarian -- sectarianism is the result of the way begin the mac handled the formation in the beginning. sectarian -- it was built into the nature of the parties that came together to form the iraqi national court. just look at the names of the parties. i am surprised why after the first elections people say oh my god, people are voting for religious parties. when you have parties and the national congress with names like the supreme council for the islamic revolution in iraq, what did you think that was essentially? but all the political parties that existed before the u.s. invasion where based on sectarian divide. i mean and this is one of the problems that we are seeing in country after country.

>> may have been one of the reasons why was a problem for us to have seen iraq through the lens of the iraq national congress at all, and had them as the people who directed traffic for us very young. we learned how many of them had we learned had been discredited. which is why i worry about the same situation in other countries as they are developing that when you rely on these exile groups, you begin to develop a very different perspective of how the country operates or what the future of the country should look like. >> that there has never been and this is the last point i will make, let's keep in mind that there is never been a situation where elections were won by parties that were formed after the concession started. it is a movement that could end up -- and that is very problematic,

because very often these parties or their movements are not what one would like to see with democracy but unfortunately, that seems to be the case. don't misunderstand me. i'm not a fan of the u.s. invasion. i'm not a fan of the way the u.s. handled the situation with over the period but i think this problem of sectarian was built into something that the u.s. did. >> i wanted to actually bring up something for us all to remember, jim, the merrick in public and its disengagement from the issue. i would market from the day that the president announced his withdrawal to solve everybody's problem. not of course everybody but the one thing that also the american public and i'm afraid the u.s. government doesn't think very deeply about it either is what i'm going to call the balance of power in the region, and how the

withdrawal of the united states, how the intrigue of the united states -- entry into iraq and the destruction as iraq is a power center at least can be in the region. this region is still struggling with who is in charge and how it is going to be dealt with and balance. the saudi iranian competition, the small goat stay. iraq isn't there. and you could take it on into the role of egypt. i think one has to understand that the americans withdrawal and repositioning of itself is seen by the people in the region as an unsettling new sort of ongoing development in this decision about who is going to be in charge and what is going to happen. i don't think we should predict that and i don't think many people in washington calculated that when we went into iraq and how we have dealt with things since then. >> if you look at the whole

question about who benefited from the war, the differences in opinion are fascinating. although almost across the board everyone thinks that america benefited except for americans. 40% of americans on the other hand think no one benefited. again, this total ambivalence, the sense that we don't know what happened and we just want to wash her hands. it's over, be done with it. the second anna fisher of the war almost across the board is as real and then ran. only the american people say number two, that the iraqi people benefited. the iraqi people don't think that the iraqi people benefited that the american people do and our two top, what we said no one benefited and the iraqi people benefited. after that, we are completely out of sync with the rest of the world. >> anymore questions on the issue?

>> i have two brief questions. was there any work done to disaggregate the american military effort from the american civilian effort in terms of feelings in iraq and the other one was was there any data to show the let's say, the perceived importance of military, american influence in iraqi politics over time? i am sorry if that is a little bit complicated. i'm asking the question because having worked there is an american felt more and more powerless over time that material affected outcomes in iraq and that seemed to happen fast. it seemed to drop off a cliff and not much time and so the first question, there was a concerted effort in 09 and 2010 to put a civilian face on

activities of it and i'm wondering if that showed up in any sort of perception? >> if you look at the poll, we didn't disaggregate as you asked, looking backwards but we did looking forward asking what future role peoplesoft for the united states. and, about a third see the u.s. as simply being a source of interference for an interference, but 15% want a special alliance in 14% see the u.s. playing a security role and 12% as an investor in development etc.. there is the same kind of, sort of the conflicted nature. on the one hand get out and on the other hand we are afraid about what happens when you leave and the other hand you still have a role to play in these different ways, so i think looking forward, the iraqi's aren't ready for us to wash our hands of the country completely. >> thank you very much.

this concludes the first half of our workshop. i want to thank jim, marina and skip for a very interesting and perceptive remarks about the iraqi issue. in the second panel, we will talk about the region, the pulse there were conducted not just in iraq but the six arab countries and cover the issue of political change in governance more broadly, so maybe we can take a ten-minute break for coffee and then reconvene for the second panel. thank you. [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] >> and a short break here at the carnegie endowment. we will be back when the next panel returns for more discussion. the next panel on the arab spring. in the meantime we are going to take a look at some of the new rules proposed for drivers who text with the national transportation safety board from this morning's "washington journal." >> host: every monday at this time, we focus on your money, how your tax dollars are being spent. this week we look at the national transportation safety board in light of its recent recommendation urging all 50 states to ban texting while driving. dabber hersman is the chairman of the ntsb. thanks for being with us this morning. >> guest: happy to be with

you. >> host: why this recommendation? >> guest: really it is the culmination of 10 years of investigation for the safety board in a the past we have investigative where distraction has been prevalent when it comes to highway accidents we have made recommendations about novice drivers, young drivers in and the learner permits of their stages of learning how to drive and restrict electronic devices. we have made recommendations for school bus drivers and motorcoach drivers and also made the conditions for commercial drivers driving 80,000-pound vehicles. we have made recommendations in all the other modes of transportation really this is the last frontier. >> host: when you say there have been years of research and investigation going into this tell us about the role that ntsb plays when there is a crash. you go on the scene. you look at exactly what has happened then you are essentially investigators piecing together what went wrong. >> guest: we are. wewe we are in independent invested an independent investigatory body and our job is to investigate the accident,

determine what happened and make recommendations to prevent it from happening again so our charge is very simple but it is not up to us to implement those recommendations. that is up to others and so we make recommendations for people who we think can change what is happening to prevent accidents, to stabilize. >> host: let's get to statistics related to distracted driving this comes from the ntsb and the "new england journal of medicine." 600,000 crashes related to distracted driving, 3000 deaths a year and four times more likely to crash resulting in a hospital visit. tell us about how you came up with these numbers and what are you evaluating to learn that? >> guest: well really those specifics and the data are other researchers information. according to nhtsa the national traffic highway safety frustration there were 3000 fatalities last year due to distraction, all types of distraction. the ntsb are charged is to

investigate accidents so please look at a handful of accidents each year and what i can tell you is distractions being a more prevalent cause of an accident or contributing factor in accidents across the spectrum and we don't go into these accident investigations looking for cell phone use or texting. it is just that we are finding it more and more as a part of our investigation. >> host: i mean, that is a key point you bring up. you don't go into it with an agenda per se. you are looking at with a clean slate in trying to evaluate what went wrong. given us a good example of distracted driving. >> guest: well, sure. i can start with one that occurred with the young novice driver in the washington area. it occurred on the beltway and we issued recommendations in 2003 and that driver was on a cell phone, a new driver, not familiar with the car. was talking on the phone. she lost control of the vehicle, went across the median and flipped over on another vehicle and killed five in that

accident. with that we made recommendations for novice drivers. we have also seen accidents involving motor coaches, some pretty spectacular crashes, one in which a motor crash driver was on a hands-free cell phone and was talking hands-free. he was driving down the gw parkway, coming from baltimore washington international airport going to george washington in mount vernon, taking a motorcoach full of school schoolkids for fieldtrip. he had driven this route before. he was the second bus in a two bus convoy. there were signs approaching this bridge for him to move over into the left lane is of the low clearance. he did not heed the sign and in fact when our investigators interviewed him, after the accident, he didn't see the signs, didn't recognize the first bus that moved over into the left lane and he told our investigators he didn't even see the bridge. he crushed the top of the bus and it was very fortunate there

were no fatalities. we have seen tractor-trailer accidents where they crossed the median hitting a 15 passenger van. one of the worst accidents that kentucky has ever seen and a number of people were killed, 11 fatalities. he was dialing in the minutes before the crash, so we have seen sue many accidents and we don't go into them like i said looking for distraction for cell phone use. those just happen to come up. >> guest: let's go to the phones in here from eau claire wisconsin, john independent line. good morning. >> caller: good morning. i just wanted to call and. i commend the ntsb for their activities for trying to to limit texting and cell phone use and in all vehicles. i have always been a proponent of hands-free devices. certainly a truck driver trainer and a business for over 20

years, and training for the last year and still to this day technology has been outstanding for blu-ray technology. but still, every day i see drivers out there, commercial and automotive, using normal handheld devices up to their ears and myself, i wouldn't even consider using a handheld by meir. >> guest: . >> guest: are you in a vehicle right now in talking to us on a hands-free device right now? >> caller: yes i apparently am. >> host: let's talk to our guess. hands on the wheel were his parting words. >> guest: be very careful and i would tell you not to talk in the phone while driving because studies have shown that even while you're talking hands-free, hands-free is not safer than handheld in many circumstances and a lot of it depends on the kind of conversation that people are having. it's about not just the

manipulative, the visual or the handheld distraction. it's about the auditory. it's also about your cognitive distraction and your brain being focused on all civil tasks. carnegie mellon has done brain scans looking at people talking on the phone and 37% of your brain when you are having a conversation with someone on the phone is actually pulled away from the driving task so we know that there is a distraction and we know that there are lots of distractions when you are driving. but this is one that actually freezes your crash risk and the likelihood that you will be in an injury or fatal accident. there are a number of statistics that support that and statistics done of commercial drivers behind the wheel too. >> host: a story in "the new york times" looks at your agencies call to ban cell phone texting and things like that. says it's the first call by a federal agency to end the practice completely rather than a partial ban some legislators have put into place by allowing

hands-free talking. does your agency, does the ntsb have to worry about the political ramifications or whether or not an idea will be popular? can you just go out there and make your recommendations on based on what you're finding? >> guest: i think in fact it is not to worry about what is popular. we don't take surveys to find out what we should say in effect many the recommendations we made are not popular with folks whether this policy make her's or the average citizen, because we are asking people to change behavior. asking people to do things that might be hard but we are not here to win a popularity contest. weirded investigate accidents, determine what happened and prevent other accidents from happening again so that while it may not be the popular recommendation it is a safe recommendation and likely changes the seatbelt use, with drunk driving, what with putting children in appropriate appropriate restraint and even other popular -- unpopular recommendations we have made like helmet use, these are

things that we know will save lives and prevent injuries. it is up to other people to decide if they want to embrace them and implement them. >> host: frederic maryland, georgia, republican caller. good morning. >> caller: good morning. >> host: go right ahead. >> caller: my question was, is this recommendation for legislation and cop this mobile to mobile devices? i guess it's sprint now that has mobile to mobile and it has been used for a long time. it is currently being used by business truck drivers, bus drivers and taxi drivers in their day-to-day work. >> guest: are recommendation goes to portable electronic devices so really it is very broad and looking at all of those devices it can be brought into the vehicle or installed in the vehicle that contribute to distraction. george i know that you are talking about some things that people might be using to talk

with dispatch and things like that. we want to make sure that those devices help to aid in the driving task and don't distract a driver from the task at hand. we recognize the difficult issue, but we just see too many accidents as a result of distraction. we are more concerned with those personal devices that are being brought in. they are doing more and more every day. is not just about staying in communication with people. it's about surfing the web, checking your e-mail, posting to facebook and even playing games or watching movies. all of these things are distracting. >> host: let's take a look at a distracted driving out by the national highway traffic safety administration. it is looking at texting while driving. >> the average tax takes your eyes off the road for nearly five seconds.

>> host: that as i mentioned was an ad by the national highway traffic safety administration. explained to us the difference between your agency and there's. >> guest: the ntsb is an independent agency and investigate accidents to determine their probable cause. we make recommendations. we don't have preparatory authority so we can't force people to do anything and they can't really incentivize them either because we don't have any grants. this on the other hand is a standards setting organization. they set standards for the design and manufacture of vehicles, automobiles, motorcycles and they also are involved in educational campaigns and enforcement campaigns. so they are the ones that help the state to put on click it or

ticket for seatbelt use or over the limit, under arrest for drunk driving so those are in senate campaigns that are provided by the states. >> host: let's go to omaha, nebraska. jim, democrat. hi there. >> caller: hi there. you were saying about how the text messaging distraction, i totally agree that the text messaging distraction is ridiculous and a lot of accidents have happened but we have laws for distraction like -- nobody enforces these laws. how do you expect to enforce this law? the outrage is driving the people but yet we are not getting it done. in all these years from before, how are the text dollars going to do this?

>> guest: i think enforcement is always a challenge and what we know the safety board is it takes three things to make something a success when it comes to highway safety campaigns. the first thing is having good laws and making sure people understand what those are. the second is education and making sure people understand what the risks are as well as the consequences for their behavior and the third thing has to do with strong enforcement. that is exactly what you're talking about. enforcement is a key component to make sure compliance goes up. when we look 40 years ago we had about 15% seatbelt use in the united states. now we have over 85% and that is because we really had three things, good laws, good education and good enforcement so we have to get to a point where we actually change people's expectations about what normative behavior is and encourage them to do the right thing but also have consequences if they don't. i think we have seen changes when it comes to drunk driving and scene changes when it comes to restraining our children and

we have seen changes when it comes to seatbelt use. all of those things have taken time but they have required some buy-in on all three areas, laws, education and enforcement and hopefully as a society we can move forward on this issue of distraction. >> host: our caller from omaha mentioned laws on the book. was take a map of the united und states showing where there are laws banning texting while driving. as we can see it's a growing map. is this something you see is the as the wave of the future that states may take on, continue to take it on rather than maybe a federal law? >> guest: in fact a recommendation is to the 50 states and the district of columbia because when it comes to highway safety, they are the ones that set the standards especially when it comes to enforcement for what is acceptable behavior when it comes to driving on the roads. we think about seatbelt laws and other things that people have to do state to state. >> guest: that's right. to state to state that there is the ability of the federal government to incentivize

grantor federal funding to do some of those things that the states really are moving forward. 35 states with texting dance. a of the number of with handheld views. nine states and even more have and teen drivers are young drivers and their learner stage permit from talking or texting. >> host: st. clair missouri, larry independent line. hi dairy. >> caller: hi, thank you for taking my paul -- call. i would like to ask about the accident that happened on interstate 44 which prompted you to come to this plea. the young man with texting i believe and he ran into the back of a tractor. however there were two school buses traveling and the people that were in line because of the accident said the school buses came pipeline so evidently they were driving too fast. i am not sure if the young man was killed because he ran into

the tractor or because the bus ran into him. my thing is that one of the bus drivers was like 75 years old. that may be a little too old to be out driving school children. so can you just address the fact of the bus drivers driving school children around, being of an age where they are confident? >> guest: there were a lot of questions actually in that call. the actual sequence of events was initiated when a 19-year-old driver either sent or received 11 text messages in the 11 minutes before the accident, change lanes. there was a lane closure because they were in a work zone and rear-ended a bobtail tractor-trailer. that set in motion a sequence of crashes. a motorcoach had observed this crash occur. he pulled over off to the side of the shoulder.

the first school bus was coming around the motorcoach and the first school bus struck the driver. >> you can find the rest of this conversation on line at c-span.org as we head back out to the second panel on iraq and arab spring over the carnegie endowment for international peace. >> it is not one of the washington usual suspects and unfortunately he was not supposed to be, so you have to put that with us again. we will do the same thing as before. we will get the results of the polls and then comment and open it up to the public. >> thank you for staying. for staying around. it was nine months into the arab spring that we conducted this

poll. it was the same poll that included the questions on iraq. it included issues on democracy, on political change, on satisfaction, the degree of satisfaction of the way things are taking place in their countries. ..

but have their rent or of the issue after, for example, in egypt it was number one and is now number two top priority in 2009. but you can see that employment is the number one issue across-the-board. everyplace but they you a eat, and we can describe -- we can discuss why of it later. it was number four in 2009. employment is the number one concern. and up until 2009 what we find is that bread-and-butter issues, unemployment, health care, education were always in the top ranking. there were unique issues of concern in every country. in egypt corruption and nepotism was always a big issue. it was the same in lebanon.

terrorism in some countries. israel and palestine, a big issue with jordan. it also an issue of great importance in uae and saudi arabia. what is striking is when you go to 2011, the countries that we had pulled before and pulled again, the issues of political right, political reform, and sell rights, corruption issues are now in the top tier in most of the countries. and as you can see, in some more so than others. in lebanon, for example, five of the top four issues include ending corruption, political reform, civil-rights, and democracy. in uae the top two issues of civil rights and political debate. saudi arabia, number three is ending corruption, number four is it democracy and number five is civil-rights.

the one that is unique in this regard is egypt. nothing changed. the top four issues in 2009 are still the top four issues now. what that says to me is something interesting all by itself. the people who led the revolt in egypt, the youth, were a democracy movement. but the mass base in egypt are four -- poor, hungry, jobless, need government services, and find that corruption and nepotism have harmed their ability to move forward. there is a disconnect between the revolt and the mass base. we are seeing that play out in the election and in the aftermath of the election, but egypt was the one place where the top four issues before i still the top four issues now. iran is, i guess you could call it a political basket case. employment is number one, but democracy, terrorism, women's rights, political seclusion --

no, that is iran right now. oh, to the sip. >> not iran. it says it is tunisia. >> no, actually, it is not. women's rights only in tunisia or women's rights number four. only in tunisia. and uae was another one. let me go back, if i can come up to here, where you can see that iran numbers. the employment is number one, then democracy, civil rights, political reform, ending corruption, political debate. so the top seven issues, six of them are democracy related in iran. it was the only country where the democracy reform and rights issues literally dominated everything across the board. you're absolutely right that the issues, that was tunisia. in tunisia it is employment,

democracy, terrorism, and women's rights. and of women's rights, interesting and tunisia, in that for those who feared the culture of tunisia is set by the decades this go probably where women's rights are a part of the culture of the country. it is something people are concerned about, and therefore want to protect across-the-board final question we asked was, is your country on the right track. we asked another question of whether the pace of change. but what you are seeing is that in most of the countries, in particular in saudi arabia and casey -- uae, which again, warrant separate discussion, things are fine. political debate in reform issues have broken into the top tier, but people a political is

satisfied because life is good. they have a job of the government services, access to governance. they feel comfortable about the present and secure in the future and therefore government is on the right track. in egypt, jordan, the numbers are pretty good. the most worrisome, obviously, is live and on where only 45%. those numbers are always very low. always a very low. and iraq and iran are also quite low. the tunisia numbers are interesting. 54 percent. 40 percent were not sure, which is itself interesting. there is a kind of -- now, understand that it was done in september, which is the month during which tunisia was preparing for its election, which expires maybe a lot of the intensity or the concern.

when we did the other poll about iraq, the tunisia numbers are way off because it was a probably the last thing on earth they wanted to think about with their election as being within weeks from when the poll was done. so the bottom line here is that i think that the arab world is on the cusp of change. we are seeing not iraq, but the "arab spring" having elevated issues of democracy and right into the political mainstream. people still want jobs, to raise a family, to have the ability to provide for their future. they also now are beginning to talk about rights and reform issues. the question is how governments respond to this new vocabulary and discourse is court to determine the future of the region in the years to come, and i will now wait for your response. >> okay. thank you, jim. i found this to be a very

interesting set of points. in my days in government i also conducted a lot of polls in jordan to gauge the public mood, and they do very well with your findings. the first comment that i want to make is that, as we have seen from these, arabs are no different than anyone else. the number one issue is employment. they want to be employed. this is a region that is very young, 70 percent of the population is under 30 years of age. this is the number one issue on everyone's mind. so from that aspect i was not surprised to all. seeing the results of this poll. but i want to caution about not to read into this the because employment is the number one

issue on everyone's mind the political reform is either not important or can wait. that is with the conclusion is. i say this because of two things. one, it is clear. political reform issues have been, indeed, elevated in most -- in all of the countries that were -- including in my own, but the other conclusion that i want to make is that, even economic issues like employment are going to need economic reform that come in the longer be done in isolation of political reform. in other words, economic reform in the region. in fact, countries such as egypt or tunisia or jordan have done a lot of economic liberalization and privatisation and opening up of the system. what they have failed to do is

that they have not done so within the context of the political reform process that develops in parallel a system of checks and balances so that abuses were checked. as a result of that people don't look nicely today at the economic reform issues. so if employment is the number one issue for people, and it is, of course, the way to address the employment cannot be done without politics. in other words, economic reform measures alone college have been tried in the past, cannot work if there are not done in parallel with the reform process, but it is a reform process. the other comment i want to make is on corruption. actually today starting to serve as a unifying factor among the different groups in the country's.

you look at lebanon, even at jordan. you might have a diverse ethnic groups or religious groups that do not agree on everything and have different needs and different demands from the system, all of them agree on cost. all of them. this is an issue, if you want to see it in a positive way, what is positive about this is that it is serving to bring people together in ways that other issues have not done so in the past. somewhat struck and somewhat not by what we have seen on israel and palestine. once again, even in jordan when i use to conduct politics consistently employment was the number one issue consistently.

what it shows is that right now in this snapshot in time people's focus is on reform issues. whether their on economics or politics. that does not mean in my view that people don't care about his role in palestine, even if it is dropped in party at this time because of this concern. it also does not mean in my view that people should read into this, just because the arab uprising is on reform issues, israel and palestine issues ceased to the importance to the public. just look at what happened in egypt with the storming of the israeli embassy, and you would understand the strength of feeling that people have about this issue within the proper context.

as arab governments countries make the transition to democracy arab regimes are going to have to be more responsive to the public. guess what, when the president of egypt is elected whip position that will take on is wrote after their elected to say that they will not be by their concern for this issue, i think, would be terrible misery this situation. it is also interesting to see where is palestine on the prairie list of the iran deadlock. political issues, as jim said, at the top. it shows you the disconnect. it exists between the public and the government and a rock and both issues. political reform issues and of

the arab-israeli context. his interesting interesting to see people i satisfied that jim also said that the change, with the pace of change and people who are not. the one country that is doing from probably the view of the majority, of if all of us, the one country that is doing best in the transition, tunisia, is among the countries where people are least satisfied about the pace of change. that is positive and just shows you the fed up with the old system and their rig for change. as opposed to say we would agree that they are in need of political reform process, but their situation, from their point of view, is more or less

okay. and that -- that is very interesting to look at the tunisia figures verses the jordanian figures or the saudi ones. jim, you did not talk about the youth and the social media. i don't know if you want to mention that. but if you don't, i would like to say something about it. [laughter] there is also a section about social media. to me i think a number of very important results,. first, the notion that these uprisings were the results of social media is probably romantic and exaggerated. that is not to say that they did not -- social media did not play a role. it certainly did.

his shows that rates in most arab countries and dramatically up the, in say, egypt and the last tour three years, but to reduce come back to their region were still the internet penetration rates have not crossed 30 or 40 percent in many countries, to deduce from that that the engine that was the only or even the major part, i think, is a simplification. they still play and port royal. the melo form which is available to everybody also. come right from jordan for years ago people used text messaging much more than they use it in this country.

at think text messaging compared that is what i want to say. i don't also want to belittle their importance. i think this is a rising phenomenon. a very encouraging phenomenon in the arab world, as we have seen in egypt and tunisia in jordan and elsewhere. we are witnessing the growth of youth groups who more less are characterized by the same traits. internet savvy, somewhat elitist , not afraid to voice their views as opposed to -- love what was said about the use in egypt, and i keep repeating it. this is a revolution, she said, on behalf of the parents, not in opposition to the parents.

so democracy, very politically aware, but they lack political organization because, you know, they and everybody else to not have the cultural society, the political parties, a center. until that culture one emerges. it's not just important to start the revolution, what is more important is to institutionalize it. until they understand that the only way you can do this is to not just go to the street but to organize, politically organized, will not going to start to see endeavors society, but i think they're well. future is within a given that 70 percent of the population. that gives me hope. we are seeing it in lebanon.

there is still a small but growing movement to cut across religious lines. hair seeing it in jordan. we are seeing it in egypt where people are cutting across lines, etc. it is a movement that could only positively draw in the future, and i will stop at that. >> let me react to three points. in the agreement largely. first on corruption and nepotism. it is eight enormous an editor to change, and it is one deeply felt in many of the countries, and in this current poll it is in the top tier in four of the seven countries, so you're right it is a major -- and one of the great delegitimizes, i think, in tunisia in egypt of the regimes

that were overthrown. israel, palestine, and ron, i think that is also very interesting. not to say there is not an iranian sentiment, but i think it is intriguing that i don't think when the leaders use it the use it for their own people but actually recognizing the point you made that across the water it is a major issue in the gulf and in court -- jordan. and i never believed that is row was the target of ron. i believe that it is a tool used by iran to appeal to arab public opinion, which is what their ultimate goal is, the gulf region. of the social media issue and use. one of the things that i learned in this, in areas where you expect there to be differences in attitudes between him and

people and older people, that does not ever seen to be the case. there are gender differences, to be sure. a woman, for example, in most countries will work women's rights much higher than mint except in saudi arabia where in some polls men are more supportive than women. it is behavior among youth that is different, and in this instance in particular on use of internet and where people get information, older people tending to get information from more traditional media sources in denver people tending to get information from facebook and internet sites as opposed to the way they're all there appears to. so behavior different attitude not that much different. >> take advantage to ask a

question and also don't -- also make one comment. the fact that the social media, they play a role, but they're not a cause. it was attributed to the use of the latest technology. you remember iran and the smuggling into the country. the uprising of 1848 in europe was to the newfangled invention called the newspaper. so it would not have been possible without the newspaper. the one which i have not found an explanation is the revolution. one that i never stumbled across an explanation. so i think, you know, the bottom line is that people use whatever is available to get the message across the question, though, is

concerning the results, the real satisfaction, which was expressed by people in it and -- in saudi arabia. now, concerning the americans, did you pull across the board or these just a rockies? >> when we polled the emirate's we pull three different ways, everyone in the country, arabs, and we pulled iraqis. when we were pulling in the use of social media we did arabs. when the did the iraqi attitudes we pulled arabs. in this part we included everybody, but segmented out the larger public. so i think you're right. if we had polled everyone this satisfaction levels would have

been very different. when you talk about just iraqis, satisfaction aside. >> and the other side, less understandable to me because why they express such a degree of satisfaction. it is true that i don't think that there may be in the unemployed and rockies in the country. that may be because there are so very few of them to begin with, but there is -- >> saudi arabia, massive poll that we did for mckinsey. and i think that the reports of saudi unemployment are misleading. in that for example, we will get a 30-something percent unemployment, but many of them are students, and many of them -- is after you have looked at

the demographics and down the whole breakdown you find that the person who is unemployed lives in a household of ten people, four of whom are working , and at this person who says he is unemployed also reports and then come, a monthly income of some significance number of riel's every month then i question whether or not there is a -- you know, that is the same as someone who is unemployed living in a household who is unemployed, by and large lives in a household of three or four people, only one of whom is employed, and reports no monthly income. so the saudi who is reporting and come from parents or property or stock market for some other source and is in a

household of many people, at least three of four of whom are working, that is a very different category. the number of real employees who are economically needy is much less than what you would expect it to be if you just look at the unemployment number, which is not to say it's not need in the country, what it does not affect the satisfaction levels to the degree it would bore numbers are very bad to levels of satisfaction and also on unemployment in need. >> the key very much. let's open. >> thank you all so much. i am with usaid, and based on something that jim said, but for all of you. you pointed out that in tunisia women's rights are such a concern because of a cultural history and you said it is part of the environment. however, my question is about to

iraq. for several decades women held a prominent place in government and political decision making, well educated can tell basically the u.s. invaded. why is such a supplement in status when starkly has been quite good? thank you. >> let me take another question. >> alexander mubarak from q our research, no relation. quick question to you. you said that the behavior differed between the older population and the net younger population except for opinion was the same, and i am wondering if that is the same for rural and urban areas as well. >> of just take these two and then come back. >> okay. royal caribbean. we mostly call bourbon because it is all face-to-face and very difficult in a country like a

rock or a run to go throughout the entire country and create a reasonable sample. refocus on our bin, and we include about, depending on the country and, you know, 80% to 60 percent of the population because these are very concentrated urban areas, so i don't have world numbers. we have done that poll that we did, that i mentioned, on the middle-class. they were very large samples of 3,000 in some instances, and we did go beyond into the outlying regions, but in this one we did not. so i cannot really give you a number there. and the questions you asked was about women in iraq. the ranking was low. i think, you know, without being disrespectful of women's rights, a bigger fish to fry. other issues trumped. and for women it is not a

question of women in iraq saying it was a very profound need. i think in situations of -- we saw that here. remember during the woman's movement when it sort of a overlapped with a very intense mobilization on the civil rights movement, white will insane to black woman, why are you taking the lead? there were some that did, but for the main and in the african-american community the issue of political rights and civil rights and national rights tromped, and i think in iraq that is what you're seeing with the turmoil is what is and where simply making, you know, keep yourself safe during the day in finding a way to sustain their lives and the fear of, you know, getting blown up, those are the issues that ultimately end up crabbing. and so as to an overall

assessment, women's rights improved or not improved is one question, but where it raked in terms of a political priority is pretty down the scale. and look at in iraq, israel, and palestine, does that mean they don't care? we polled before. it is a big issue, but it is not a big issue speaking of fish to fry now when iraq is facing a fight for its very survival giving the internal struggle is facing as it moves forward. same in tunisia were on the cost of an election, does that mean with all the history they have of the plo having its headquarters there and previous polls finding a very deep attachment with the issue. does that mean they do not care? no. it just means the right now and september of this year when there were facing a national election in their country that would determine the future of,

you know, what kind of country tunisia was going to be, that was not a priority issue. in fact, the women that -- the roles of women would play, something that many people in tunisia wanted was secure. that was far more important, but in jordan, saudi arabia, and uae, right up there on top. the one place was interesting was lebanon. but in lebanon, israel and palestine is not the issue. it is israel that is the issue because lebanon has its own axe to grind. that is israel's behavior in lebanon on. we did not ask it the way. we asked about the israel-palestine conflict which is something in lebanon that is secondary if we had asked about the behavior of israel, which is something very different. >> i just want to ask something on women's rights. part of the problem extends beyond iraq.

unfortunately, and i say this as an arab, i think the issue of women's rights is not seen by many arabs as one of needed important. with countries like tunisia and lebanon, but in general if you ask people for political reform, the issue of woman's rights does not come out as an important issue. and the reason is more cultural than legal. culturally i think women are not seen as a people, sadly. and legally they are not seen as a cool. he would be surprised to find out whereas issues pertaining to a culture take time, some things can be done about legal discrimination, and is not being done. so in most arab countries, if

not in all arab countries, there is legal discrimination, and i'm not talking about -- i'm talking about everything. social security. health benefits, pension, everything. there is a difference when it comes to how you treat women and how you treatment. and the difference, sadly, is more or less accepted by the vast majority of men in the arab world. >> look at they. ♪ numbers, fourth among women and second among men next to the next-door neighbor, saudi arabia, very different, but the uae members were also interesting, but you're absolutely right. it is not an issue. >> update. you had your handout. >> molly williamson, american academy of diplomacy. first, my compliments to the sustained excellence of the doe

people. >> i would say i think you and my brother thinks you. [laughter] >> my question is what happens if nothing happens? across the board the importance of employment, emphasized 70 percent of these populations under the age of 30, 50 million new entrants into the labour force expected over the next ten years which is 5 million new jobs every year just to sustain today's unemployment rate. you know, if the united states knew how to do it, we would, but we don't. and it would appear that nobody else does either. so what happens if not only is there not and not seeming to be addressing of transparency, accountability, judicial independence, and implementation

, but most fundamentally the economic well-being, the employment prospects for being able to educate one is young and not being addressed. what will happen? >> i would like to make a comment -- comment on women in iraq. in particular in the north is where it is quiet, not so much violence and bombing. there is actually a women's rights wave periods of the discrimination against women is way up, even worse than the central. so it is not -- the balance of bigger fish to fry is an issue, but there is also an absence of the legislation. one of the highest probably per capita was in kurdistan.

thank you. >> let me just take the issue of the employment question that molly williamson raises. we do other polls for the oliver wyman group, a business confidence. a major issue that we focused on is the youth polish and government reform making possible growth in the economy. and because the situation is not sustainable. the employers of first resort, not last resort. as a result of that in saudi arabia in particular he asked a college graduate read the pledge of graduation what is coolest, to the government job, but if it

is better, pay is better, security is better and there are available. encourage the private sector or make space for the private sector to grow because the question is, this is not sustainable. you mentioned the number of jobs. the number that has to be created is greater than the number that has been created the previous that have been done by the government, and here they have to be done by the private sector. while oil income is up, it is not of sufficiently enough to say it could be a never ending expansion of government created jobs tub toward these new young people coming into the market. everyone knows it. the efforts of whatever it is called from country to country have not succeeded, in part because the private sector itself has not stepped up and moved into whatever spaces been created. one of the things that was done

in saudi arabia, was the king created his own stimulus package to promote private investment. when we polled -- polled business elites and say, is given the choice between harry and exit at worker or a national worker had more pay, if they have the same skills, he will go with the cheaper, which is one of the reasons our labour reform becomes an issue. government, more than the private sector, sees the need to create more opportunity for the national that are coming into the market. they're just not finding a way to observe them. i agree that it is a huge problem as the region booze forward and one that must be addressed. it has not yet exploded. he's -- egypt is the one place where we see i think a real role

. somebody was describing it as the wait time. grown so long. in gaza it is a nightmare. 80 percent of young people have not had the job and no prospect of a job. these are reasons that are not only sustainable, but absolutely terrific. >> thank you. government, arab governments employee or economic strategies and implement strategies in the past of centered around prizing states around enterprises and trying to attract foreign investment to be able to, you know, create jobs that took care of the big companies, but it did not take care of the semis. in this country, for example, small and medium enterprises

employ 70 percent of the workforce. in a country like jordan they employ 30 percent of the work force. a huge, huge gap. and there have been no policies aimed at encouraging sme, neither in jordan or most arab countries. so you cannot keep employee people through government. 50 percent, almost 50 percent of the workforce in jordan is government employees. you talk about killing productivity, that is a sure way to do it. and you're not going to create 50 million new jobs if you don't look at productivity, which is my second point about our, you know, education policies. education policies so far are not cured to encourage productivity, not geared to encourage creativity, critical thinking. not giving people the skills that they need to enter the

markets, you know, the work force. they are cured to basically, if i can be candid, employed people to be no more than government bureaucrats able to post a pencil here and there. seriously. you're not going -- and governments have not spent money and resources on education in the needed way. they have spent some money, but not on the right way. the university education model and jordan in the 70's was ten times better than today, even though today we have 35, you know, public and private universities, two or three, but the quality of education then was much better than today because not enough attention is given to this aspect of the

problem. >> okay. yes. >> international petroleum enterprises. on the connectivity that you all talked about and warned not to read too much into it. you mentioned the disconnect, particularly in egypt. what we have done in the region, we found out that maybe they have not gone far enough. when you look at yemen or syria or libya, the percentage is off low, from one-and-a-half percent to 4% connectivity. and yet we have seen more problems there. of the other and we have seen you the with more than 40%

penetration, and it is exactly the opposite. so we do, in fact allow read too much into it. the other point about peron and the changes, i am really not sure how much of it is the impact. since the 2009 election in iran, things have been quite different from what it was prior to that. so i am really not sure to what percentage of that move, is any movement, what percentage is new. but my question is, actually on the employment side which is common for all of them, tunisia in particular had a very low unemployment problem. i think it was like three and out%. and yet we saw the problem there. so isn't it -- aren't we trying to politicize this situation and

the majority of the countries there, the process with the exception of maybe tunisia, when the problem, as it was said cal was employment, mostly economic problems. the results basically showed that employment is number one, which is a good portion of, you know, the economic problems. thank you. >> let me work the connectivity issue. just quickly on iran, i never made the point that there is -- that these numbers in and of themselves are deterministic as to what the causes of the revolution are. i would -- you know, i don't know -- are not going to point to a particular cause in tunisia. i think, you know, with everything from the corruption of the regime has a lot to do with what was going on.

in iran i'm not arguing that the "arab spring" produces this change in priorities. it does in the other countries, i think, to be sure, but in the introduction of a right to this section, i make the point that this was an "arab spring", not a regional spring. the massive strike led by lawyers and pakistan did not create a blip in the arab world. the riney in revolt in 2009, people said, look rather admiringly, but it did not change the landscape at all. it was a young man into the share who burned himself that actually created the wildfire that began to spread. so this was arab. and in the reverse i don't think -- i think while iranians have

looked at the "arab spring," and there have been much commentary about the fact, they can't. why can't we. i was arguing that the "arab spring" effect is an error by fact. of the connectivity issue, though, the numbers are about right. although it and uae they are much higher, almost 80 percent, but that is because they're is a huge export pat and the country. and when the libyan revolt started, facebook and twitter users dropped precipitously. this was not a libyan phenomenon. in the arab countries to offer the most part, the 30% range mentioned is about right in the countries that we polled. in their urban areas where we polled it is about double that. it is about double that, and

facebook penetration is very high. in jordan and lebanon it is more than 1-to-1, because people of multiple. and in most of the other countries, of those who are online, it is about 60 or 70%. so in the explosion of facebook is amazing. has increased, you know, trajectory that looks like this. now, it did not create the revolt. it was a tool that was used by those who were organizing the result. and it has limits. built-in limits. it created space factory vacation. it provided a way around national, traditional media that blocks amount. if you were a youth organizer trying to poll together a rally

and held a press conference he could be sure that they would not cover it. that media spread by really. the page crew incredibly over time. and like move on not work, they were able to create via ups that created flash rallies and ultimately much larger rallies and actually worked. as a tool, it was an effective use. the thing we noted was our survey was not only of opinion, but behavior. and we had people tracking messaging on facebook and twitter well we found was that the youth revolutionaries were not the only people using the device. if he tried those supportive of the regime and the supportive of the demonstrators, there were days when the supporters of the regime had far more messages on facebook and twitter than the demonstrators did.

it was not until mubarak stepped down that is shifted with the caveat, and that is that you then had a split between the brotherhood and its use of facebook, which it uses rather extensively. i remember when the constitutional reform that was passed, if you talk to young people in the movement, they were convinced that it would pass overwhelmingly because everybody they had talked with was voting against the constitutional reform because it was a device of the government working together with the brotherhood. tracking messaging above ss and twitter and facebook. but a margin of literally tens of thousands to one the messaging voting for the constitution trumps those who were opposed. so the point was that people who did not want change to the same degree that the young people want to change or using the same

tools as than it -- regime which had its own electronic army in place. the syrians are doing the same. this is a neutral tool that can be used by anybody. it worked for organizers. it created space and allow them to communicate and to organize. one thing i think that it did most successfully in syria and delivery at -- libya in particular is created not only its own network, and i mean network in the media sense, it's on television network, they were able to download selected material from bbc or whenever and put it up for people to see. if he did not have access you know, through facebook, did have access to a whole, sort of pre selected media that told the story, the narrative that revolutionaries wanted to tell.

secondly, it developed the synergy with traditional media in that it broadcast to them information that was able then to be picked up by the international media and make this story bigger so that we would not know about what was going on in syria had it not been for social media, it's been broadcast their information to the traditional media, which is then picked it up, which is why what our survey found was that

in part because people, once you post, if i can say whatever they want to say, everyone else can. the efficacy this on the network get into believe it much more than if i just read it on facebook and it is someone's opinion. as one to make those comments because we did not get into this part of the survey, but those are all available in our material that is on our website. you can find a poll and all of its forms, all of the issues that covered including social media, and that was the power we presented at the forum in opera dhabi in november. >> i would like to ask another question myself. the issue of employment.

do you have any day in your polling that allows you to judge to what extent people see the connection between political reform and employment? the point was made earlier ron that it is not just an equation of solving economic issues. you cannot solve economic issues without addressing some of the political issues. >> we never asked the question directly. the fis strike three or four questions together an appeal to come up with something in terms of an interpretation, but no direct question that tall with that connection. one thing, the privatization issue, that became its own problem, as it has in the former soviet union countries as of. people looked at egypt, for

example, and saw the gdp going up. they looked at tunisia and saw the gdp growing at -- going up because there was a degree of privatization, and those economies were growing. but it was also the queen autocracy factor. growing for a small number of people and was not filtering down so that real income of real people was getting lower. well, it sounds of light here. the income dampen america today between the very rich and poor is greater than it was in egypt at the time of the revolution. but there is no deterministic factor. it is a shocking number here, but it also a shocking number there. the world bank and the imf are looking at egypt and saying it is doing very well. that was not the number your getting back from people. it is not doing well.

>> okay. are there any more questions? ice c-span2 there. and that take one last round. >> stanley colbert. it has been said that the people have lost their fear. that is why they're going out in the streets in egypt and syria and tunisia. now, it's a nationally we preserve peace through deterrence, and we have to restore a deterrent. deterrence is based on fear. so if people lose their fear domestically that also manifests itself internationally. if countries face a strategy of deterrence. >> any other questions? okay. [laughter] >> in think some people have lost their fear, but not everyone.

you lose your fear about one thing, but not something else. it may be true that in serious of folks have lost their fear of the regime and demon

>> thank you very much. thank you for your participation. and let me against his brother. [laughter] [applause] >> thank you. thank you. >> and thanks for carnegie for hosting this. i appreciate it very much. thank you. [inaudible conversations]

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[inaudible conversations] >> house speaker >> the senate approved that two-month extension on saturday. the senate approved payroll benefits and medicare cuts to doctors. votes expected to start at 6:30 pm eastern and it's possible the house will vote tonight on that payroll tax cut legislation. speaker boehner predicts the bill will not pass and after that, he says house and senate leaders should negotiate an agreement to extend the payroll tax cut and to, quote, stop the

nonsense. later in the day, harry reid would not revaccine the senate unless the house passes the two-month payroll cut extension. >> i always knew there was a risk in the bohemian nationale and i decided to take it because whether it's an illusion or not, i don't think it is, it helped my concentration, it stopped other people from being boring to some extent. it will keep me awake and prolong the conversation to enhance the moment. i was asked would i do it again, the answer's probably yes, i would have quit earlier possible hoping to get away with the whole thing. easy for me to say, of course, not very nice for me children to hear. it sounds irresponsible if i say, yeah, i'd do that all again to you. but the truth it would be

hypocritical to me to say i would never touch the stuff if i had known. i did mexico and everyone knows. all of life is wager and i'm going to wager on this bit. and i can't make it come out any other way. it's strange. i almost don't regret it, though, i should, because it's just impossible for me to picture life without wine and other things fueling the company. and keeping me reading and traveling. >> thursday, journalist, critic, and "vanity fair" columnist editor passed away at the age of 62 from complications in his battle with esophageal cancer. watch his 100 c-span searches online at the c-span video

library. >> with the iowa caucuses and new hampshire primary next month, c-span series the contenders looks back at 14 men who ran for president and lost but had a long-lasting impact on american politics. here's our lineup for this week, tonight henry clay who ran against andrew jackson. tuesday, james g. blaine who lost to grover cleveland. wednesday, william jennings brian, thursday, five time socialist party candidate eugene debs, friday, charles evans hughes, chief justice of the supreme court, then on saturday, three-time governor of new york, al smith followed by businessman and member of the liberal wing of the gop, wendell wilke, the contenders every night at 10:00 pm eastern on c-span. >> republican presidential candidate rick perry over the weekend was making a bus tour through iowa. on saturday morning, he stopped at an italian restaurant in spencer, iowa. this is 45 minutes.

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> thank you guys for coming today. my name is cindy, this is willeda, my mother, and this is a great pleasure to introduce a strong conservative who comes

from a small community called paints creek. he took part in 4h and eventually earned the rank of eagle scout. he served his country as a pilot in the united states air force and has served the state of texas as governor for more than a decade. his home state has created more than 1 million jobs during his 10 years as a governor even as america lost jobs. >> a former proud textan, would you welcome america's jobs governor and republican candidate for president, rick perry. mra[applause] >> thank you. you're a sweetheart. thank you. [applause] >> thank you very much. it's an honor to be here and i just told the owns of this great

restaurant -- i had a couple of my folks who came by last night and had dinner here so they said it's the best italian they had ever had, so quite a compliment, i would say. and quite a structure. we were down at the cafe earlier and they were telling about moving this place from where it was down main street. as they relocated here on the riverbanks, so it is good to be in spencer, iowa. we have had a good -- i think we're working on 18 hours. we don't stay anywhere for very long but it's been hospitable but thank you all for coming out and i want to say thank you for your help and for your support and for helping set up today and make it happen and for all of you that are in here, i'm going to take a few minutes and share with you why i want to ask you to go caucus for me on january

the 3rd. the 27th we'll be back in iowa. i think we stay through just before christmas. then we're coming back and spending time in iowa and, you know, iowa -- iowa chooses the presidents. and, obviously, we want to ask you for your support and challenge you at the end of this as well, but i love this country. and this country has given me so much more than i ever be repay it and what i do or how i'm able to serve and as a pilot in the united states air force and coming back and making the decision to give back to my state as a state representative and as the governor here for the last, almost, 11 years, but i'll never be able to pay this country back. but this part of it. and i think all of us can probably say that in some form or fashion that this country and the freedoms that have made this country great is really what we're -- what we're fighting

for. it's what we're standing for. this is why this election is so important. and we all know we got some problems. as a matter of fact, we got some big problems in this country. and i was sharing that i can kind of diagram one of those big problems that we got if you just take a map of the united states and you draw a straight line between washington, dc, and wall street, that's the problem. we've had these wall street types and you got these federal agencies, whether it's freddie mac or fannie mae and members of congress -- in my opinion and very corrupt and fraudulent ways scratching each other's back and log-rolling if you will and where people on wall street have become insanely rich because of policies that have been put in place in washington, dc. and you and i -- main street is paying for this. we're seeing these billions of

dollars and now we found out -- you know, i thought $700 billion of t.a.r.p. money was bad. i mean, that kind of spun me up through the ceiling when $700 billion was used to get these banks out of hock, and then we find out a few weeks ago that that was paltry money. $7.7 trillion. i mean, i can't hardly get my arms around that amount of money. $7.7 trillion that was transferred from the federal reserve, printed up money to help pay these banks off more. to get them out of hock at the time they were making $13 billion of profits. there were millions of hundreds of dollars bonuses being paid to the leadership of this banks. that's what's wrong with america. these insiders, whether they're

on wall street or whether they're in the halls of congress have put our country right on the pricipe of bankruptcy. there has to be an outsider who doesn't have those ties, who does not have the long history of being part of the problem and, you know, i'm all about main street. when you look at what we've done in the state of texas and i tell people -- i said, texas would be the 13th largest economy in the world if it were a stand-alone entity. the policies that we put in place in texas will work on a grand scale, keeping the taxes as low as you can on the job creators. having a regulatory climate that is fair and predictable. you do that into washington dc and you have a balanced budget

to the united states constitution. you have that type of discipline and only an outsider, i will suggest to you, is going to be walk into washington, dc, and to have the credibility and to have the record to be able to get this country back on track. i mean, just clean up the corruption in washington, and on wall street. no bailouts and no more earmarks. i'm going to talk about earmarks in just a second. but if a bill comes to my desk that's got earmarks on it, the old veto pen is coming out. i don't care whether it's democrats or republicans it's going to get vetoed and that's the type of just discipline that we have to put in place. you all aren't being bailed out. and the idea that we're talking about bailing out big companies that are too big to failing, well, if they're too big to fail, they're too big.

when we're talking about bailing out wall street or there's conversations about bailing out european banks. that's nonsense. washington doesn't need to be bailing out anybody. what washington, dc, needs to be doing is putting policies in place that frees up entrepreneurs from overtaxation and overregulation and washington, dc, needs to get out of the way and let the private sector do what it does best is creates jobs which in turn creates wealth. government doesn't create jobs. what government can do is either be an impediment to that job creation or they can get out of the way and not overtax and overregulate. and that's what we're talking about. i mean, the -- i shared with you that during the time i was the governor in the state of texas, we created over a million of net new jobs. in fact, this last couple days,

there was a new list of the best performing cities in america four out of five of those cities from my state. it's because we've been disciplined and we've put regulatory policies in place that has allowed people to be able to know that they can risk their capital and have a chance to have a return on their investment. and that's what it's going to take in washington, dc. but i'll suggest to you an insider from wall street or insiders from washington, dc, are not going to do it. we look at, you know -- who's going to be standing up for conservative values. who's going to be standing up for young people like yourselves that are in the workforce, just getting started out there, whether it's overhauling social security, whether it's making sure these programs that are going to be in place and folks who are on social security today, that program is going to be there for you.

guys like me who are approaching social security age it's going to be for us but for young people in the workforce we got to be honest with you and say, listen, we're going to overhaul the social security program and whether it's allowing you to keep part of that social security payout and put it in a private account, whether it's upping the age -- i mean, there's a lot of ways to address this but we got to have the courage to go forward and to do this. but the most important issue i will suggest to you is spending. and this concept of earmarks and -- i mean, i will suggest to you that earmarks -- it's a plague. it's a plague on congress, and two of my opponents that i highly respect, newt gingrich and dr. ron paul, but newt was the originator of earmarks back in the '90s. i mean, if there was a granddaddy of earmarks, he would

be it. and then dr. paul -- i mean, he's stillbirthi birthing earma we speak. you look in the last two years, he has -- as a matter of fact, he was only 1 of 4 republicans -- the republicans stood up and said you know what? we're going to do away with earmarks, but there were four republicans that didn't follow that and dr. paul was one of them. i mean, he had earmarks -- i think over the last two years approaching half a billion dollars worth of these special interest earmarks. and -- i mean, one of them was for $2 million for bike racks, trash cans and decorated street lighting in one of his cities in his district. now, i'll be real honest with you. i don't think that's where our monies need to be spent. when we got the economic crisis

that we've got on our hands. and we've got to have people who have the discipline to just say no to spending until we get this debt crisis that we've got in this country under control. you know, earmarks -- for some people, earmarks have become an art form. and, you know, newt doubled them in the four years when he was in congress. and, you know, he solicited for members of the legislature who had tough re-elections and he would go and say, listen, we'll put these earmarks in so you can go back to your district. but i think americans are tired of that kind of special interest spending. they just want to see someone who will stand up and say, what we need is someone who will walk into washington, dc, and just say to all of this special interest funding that we're seeing in dc and call an end to it. the idea that this campaign

isn't about me. the fact of the matter is, my purpose in life was never to be the president of the united states. but there's a point in time -- our country is in trouble. and all of us have a duty to get this country back in shape, to put it back on track with the values that we know this country was founded upon. our founding fathers who saw and felt that overburdening far-away centralized government that was dictating to them how to live their lives. 200-plus years ago, and we find ourselves now facing that same type of pressure from an all-knowing all-consuming centralized government, a long way from iowa, but they're telling you how to live your life. they're telling you your kids

how and when and where and why they can pray in school. tell us how to deliver health care. their department of education is down there trying to tell people in spencer, iowa, how to educate your children. and americans are tired of that. and they want an outsider to walk into washington, dc, to use their veto pen to get this spending binge under control so america can be strong economically again because if we're not strong economically again, we're not going to be strong militarily. and if we're not strong militarily, we're not going to be strong around the world. i mean, this all goes back to having economic sense put back into washington, dc, to stop the corruption, and to stop this washington to wall street nonsense that's been going on. i just want to share with you

one thing as i wrap up. if you'll have my back here in spencer and across iowa on january the 3rd, i'm going to have your back when i'm president of the united states. and i'm going to get up and i'm going to fight for you every day. [applause] >> i'm going to try to make washington, dc, as inconsequential in your life as i can. [applause] >> i think we ought to make congress part time, cut their pay, send them back to their districts, allow them to have jobs like you all have, work in their district with their constituents, spend a whole lot more time in their districts, and i'll guarantee you, we'll see less problems coming out of washington, dc. there's some folks that have stood up and say, wait a minute, you just can't do that. i mean, there's too much going on for them not to be there full time. in my home state, and i shared with you -- i mean, it's a big state, 13th largest economy in

the world, second most populace state in the nation. our legislature meets for 140 days every other year. and we've got that balanced budget amendment to the -- or to our constitution that requires that we can't spend more money than we bring in. they come in, they get their work done and then they go home to their real jobs, their day jobs, if you will and live within the laws of which they pass. i know in my heart that if washington, dc, would work under those same type of parameters, i'm going to walk into washington and i'm going to bring a budget forward that's going to cut $5 trillion out of obama's budget that he's laid out. [applause] >> we're going to eliminate agencies of government, three that come to mind the commerce, education and the energy department. create millions of new jobs, whether it's opening up our

federal lands so that we can use the energy that's underneath the federal lands. we have 300 years of energy in this country yet we're spending hundreds of billions of dollars to foreign countries for their oil and a lot of cases countries that are hostile to the united states. open up our lands, independent of those countries that don't have america's interest in mind. that's the kind of leadership we need in this country. i am the anti-washington, anti-wall street outsider that america needs. and, again, if you'll have my back on january the 3rd, i'll have your back in washington, dc. god bless you and thank you all for being here with us today. [applause] >> i'm going to open it up for a few questions if i may. hey, buddy, how are you? [laughter] >> that's what this is all

about. he may want to ask the first question. yes, sir. >> thank you for being here today, governor. you said repeatedly that you're the outsider candidate. another outsider candidate was herman cain who dropped out a few weeks ago. but he was a businessman and was very popular here, was very popular nationally. he told barbara walters the other day that he would like to be secretary of defense. he has experience running large corporations in the defense departments and spends almost a trillion dollars a year. would you consider putting herman cain another washington outsider in charge of the defense department? >> well, i think it's a little bit early to be deciding on your cabinet. but he has all the characteristics of the type of people that i'll bring forward. i want to share with you an

agency of government that, obviously, being a former air force pilot, being the commander in chief of the texas national guard for the last almost 11 years and seeing your young men and women deployed and the costs to our state, the loss of equipment, you know, frankly having a businessman or woman who has both a deepened understanding of how to balance the books, how to find and ferret out fraud and excessive spending is very important for the department of defense. i think we've cut too much out of our defense budget already and this president is, i think, playing with fire and putting america in jeopardy because of his lack of leadership when they created this super committee instead of him being engaged

with writing a budget and being there every day to help write a budget because if they didn't get that done, half a trillion dollars more was going to be cut out of the department of defense budget. and i just -- i consider that to be irresponsible. this president -- i mean, the question is not whether he's been a failed president. i mean, that is answered. the question's going to be, who are we going to put back into place? and bringing outsiders into washington, dc. people that share my philosophy, that aren't worried about the next job, aren't worried about going to wall street and getting a cush job after we helped them get special interest. people like herman cain that understand just making hard decisions, sometimes you just got to, you know, bear down. the epa was that agency that i was wanting to leave you with, an agency that is costing this

agency hundreds of thousands if not millions of jobs because of this administration's love affair with the radical environmental left. one of the reasons this xcel pipeline that creates tens of thousands of jobs, if not hundreds of thousands of jobs from the canada oil sands down into the united states to be refined here and the jobs that would be created, the independence from foreign sources of oil and yet this president has said publicly that he's going to veto that bill. i hope he comes to his senses. you're going to trade the next election and supporting the next election for jobs today in america? that's not leadership. and we need somebody in the epa

who philosophically will walk in there and test every regulation that's been put on the books since '08 and test them if they create jobs or they kill jobs. if they kill jobs, throw them out. if they create jobs, we'll consider leaving them in place. that's the type of philosophy. and i think the herman cains of the world don't -- washington doesn't owe them a thing. but they owe america something. they owe america a great thanks for allowing someone like herman cain to be able to become a successful businessman. that's the type of men and women that i'll be asking to come, to sacrifice one more time for their country, to get this country back on track and to make the hard decisions and make the wise decisions and forget about all the self-dealing and get rid of the fraud and corruption that we're seeing in washington, dc. yes, ma'am.

[inaudible] >> yes. [inaudible] >> and my thought was if you were elected president would you do your utmost to try to go for our military forces? so we're not being forced to have this ever happening more, you know, that they would be able -- [inaudible] >> and walk with our military forces wherever they are? >> yes, ma'am. what she's making reference to is -- i have -- i have said in one of my ads that you've probably seen that president obama is in a direct war against

religion and i laid out a couple of examples over the course of the last few weeks. one of those has been where, you know -- there have been outrage from time to time and they backed off. being able to have our chaplains go into walter reed, for instance, and take their bibles in and what have you and then they backed off of that. and, for instance, the catholic charity that were receiving some federal dollars to help with individuals who have been sexually trafficked, and they said we're not going to let you have that money to the catholic charities and being antiabortion. i consider that to be a direct war upon religion. the ideas we were talking about

earlier. this isn't directly about this president, but about supporting his leftist agenda. the judges on the supreme court make decisions about where and why our children can pray in school. you know, has it come to this in just country that we're going to have to work to pass a constitutional amendment that allows our children to pray publicly at our schools? you think about it, the biggest day of their life, their young life, is when they graduating from high school. and to have some federal judge, walk in and saying you're not going to have an invocation, you're not going to say the word "jesus." you're not going to say the word "god," and we need a president of the united states that's not

afraid to profess their faith, that is a person of value. our founding fathers expressed their belief in that almighty creator. they put it in our declaration of independence. we were created, life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness that means something. and we've allowed our freedoms to be chipped away as washington has gotten bigger and bigger and more powerful, our liberties have been constrained and become smaller. i want to be that outsider that goes to washington, dc, that brings back the values that made america great and put -- if it requires putting it in the constitution with constitutional amendments, i'll campaign all across this country and the

states to make it happen to get america back being america again. [applause] >> yes, ma'am. >> i have a question about an issue that hasn't received a lot of attention. [inaudible] >> it's an option for the irs to audit our taxes for us. [inaudible] >> trust and the irs doesn't seem to go together in the same sentence. her question is there's a piece of legislation by a congressman cooper that would allow the irs to do our taxes for us. i'm obviously not for that. i laid out -- i've got a better idea, and that is to ultimately

change the irs as we know it today. and from my perspective, it is about creating a flat tax. you put a flat tax of 20% on personal income. you deduct for mortgage interest, you deduct for local taxes, you deduct for charitable contributions. you do away with the dividends tax and you do away with the capital gains tax and then you take that amount of money and 20% of that and you put it on a postcard and you mail it in. it should be that simple. corporate -- a 20% corporate tax rate. do away with every corporate loophole that's out there. and that's the simplification that needs to occur in this country. and if you make it that simple, you frankly don't need -- well, you may need a few irs people, but, what obamacare and what we have in place today with this

current tax code that is hundreds of thousands of pages or -- maybe even more than that. i mean, it's just a staggering amount of pages of rules and regulation that even accountants and lawyers don't understand it all. they admit that. simplify the taxes in this country and reduce the regulatory burden and america will explode as a job creation country. i mean, we have the resources. we have innovation. we have the technology. america can -- america can lead the world's economy back from the brink of disaster. but we've got to have a change in washington dc and i will suggest to you only an outsider like myself is going to come forward and say no to all those insiders that have gotten us in this mess to begin with. yes, sir.

you're it. >> i heard michele bachmann this morning -- [inaudible] >> what's your feeling of having the vice president -- naud na [inaudible] >> i have no problem with that at all. the issue for me is one's gender doesn't even come in to question. what comes into question is your values, what do you believe in? it will be someone if the good lord decides to call me home if i'm the president of the united states, you won't notice any difference in the philosophy or the way that america would go forward from the standpoint of how washington needs to be less consequential in your life. you just might have a little different accent. god bless you all and thank you all for coming out. i hope you all go work for us on january the 3rd. it's a pleasure. [applause]

[inaudible conversations] >> i had a job interview. [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> yeah, it is. >> and i understand that. >> and they also gave us some

clear direction business how to live our life. and i'm just saying to you, brother. >> the news media there's three tickets out of iowa. two of them are predetermined already for us. >> they are not predetermined here. why should you be one of them? why should i caucus for you in january? [inaudible conversations] >> but i'm the only one --

>> can you beat obama? >> oh, yes, sir. [inaudible conversations] >> i appreciate you coming out. >> hey, governor. >> this is my wife brenda. >> what is his name? >> nate. he was up here. [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] >> we're bankrupt if we don't. >> that's one of my worries. >> that's why i wasn't for the payroll. that money is not going into the social security trust fund. >> right, i know. >> it's got to be -- it's like transportation trust fund, it's got to be hands-on.

you can't get in it. we've together transform the program because we're fixing to have more -- [inaudible conversations] >> there's some good. it's easier to fix social security than some of the other programs. >> well, yeah. [inaudible conversations] >> hear what the candidates are saying for campaign 2012. >> if you can't live with a

nuclear iran, and i can't then you have to say what to do? and i think all options are on the table. >> if we took that oath of office seriously in washington, we'd get rid of 80% of the government. >> yeah, but your question was, who's the proven constitutional conservative in this race and that would be me. >> read the latest comments from candidates and political reporters and link to c-span's media reporters in the early primary and caucus states all at c-span.org/2012. >> house speaker john boehner this morning expects the house will reject a bill to extend the payroll tax cut for two more months. the senate approved that two-month extension on saturday. in the 89-10 vote the senate also approved an extension of unemployment benefits and delayed a cut in medicare payments to doctors. the house of representatives is back in session today with votes expected to start at 6:30 pm eastern. and it's possible the house will vote tonight on that payroll tax

cut legislation. speaker boehner predicts the bill will not pass and after that, he says house and senate leaders should negotiate an agreement to extend the payroll tax cut and to, quote, stop the nonsense. later in the day, senate majority leader harry reid would not reconvene the senate later on in the month unless the house passes the two-month payroll tax cut extension. >> you ask the consumer out there, you want a faster download of an app, they'll say yes. if you ask them does that mean you no longer have local news, weather, sports, emergency information on your television, they'll say, no that's not the tradeoff that i thought was at stake. but if it's done incorrectly, that is the tradeoff. >> national association of broadcasters head gordon smith on current legislation to sell broadcast spectrum to create new space for mobile broadband and emergency communications tonight at 8:00 on the communicators on

c-span2. as part of "washington journal"'s weekly spotlight on magazine series, matt lazlo will talk about his recent campaigns magazines and he'll take your phone calls live wednesday morning at 9:15 eastern. >> i always knew there was a risk in the bohemian nationale and i decided to take it because whether it's an illusion or not, i don't think it is, it helped my concentration, it stopped me being bored, it stopped other people being boring to some extent. it would want me to have the evening go longer to enhance the conversation, if asked would i do it again, the answer's probably yes. i would have quit earlier if possible hoping to get away with the whole thing. easy for me to say, of course. it's not very nice for my

children to hear. it sounds irresponsible if i say yeah, i'd do that all again to you but the truth is it would be hypocritical for me to say, no, i would never touch the stuff if i had known. because i did know, everyone knows and i decided all of life is a wager. i'm going to wager on this bit. and i can't make it come out any other way. it's strange. i almost don't even regret it, though, i should. because it's just impossible for me to picture life without wine and other things fueling the company. and keeping me reading and some traveling and energizing me. it worked for me. it really did. >> thursday, journalist, author, critic, and "vanity fair" columnist and editor christopher hitchens passed away at the age of 62 from complications in his battle with esophageal cancer. watch his nearly 100 c-span appearances all archived and

searchable online at the c-span video library. >> last year, national public radio fired juan williams for comments he made on fox newschannel. he feared that people wearing muslim garb on airplanes. he spoke about the experience earlier this year at the national press club in washington. this is an hour. [banging of gavel] >> good afternoon. and welcome to the national press club. my name mark hamrick and i'm the 104th president of the national press club. we are the leading's organization for journalists through our profession's future, through programming and events such as this as well as trying to foster a free press

worldwide. for more information about the national press club, please visit our website at www.press.org and to donate to programs offered through the eric freedheim journalism to the public you can also visit at www.press.org/library. on behalf of our members worldwide, i'd like to welcome our speaker and those of you attending today's event. our head table includes guests of our speaker as well as working journalists who are club members and if you hear applause in our audience, we always remind that we do have members of the general public attending so it's not necessarily evidence of a lack of journalistic objectivity. i'd also like to welcome our c-span and public radio audiences today and our lunchons are produced from our podcast that's available free for download on itunes. you can also follow the action on twitter using the hash tag pound npc lunch. we'll have q & a and i intend to ask many questions as time

permits. it is time to introduce our head table and i'd ask each of you up here to please stand up briefly as your name is announced and ask the audience to hold applause until after all are introduced. so from your right tim young. he's a freelance pundit and comic and chairman of our very awesome young members committee. tim, thank you for being here today. peggy is the congressional correspondent for the hispanic outlook on higher education. she is chair of our freelance committee. i'm told not that long ago, a number of years ago, was actually an intern working for mr. williams at npr. then comes my colleague from associated press on the print side, michelle, and she is president of the national association of hispanic journalists and member of the national press club as well. congratulations to rafaiel williams the son of our guest speaker just having graduated from haverford. [applause] >> that's fine, we can allow one round of applause.

[applause] >> well deserved. tamela bay an independent freelance journalist and she has formerly worked for npr and delease williams, the wife of our guest speaker today. stepping over the podium, bob keith is the senior press club for the national resources defense council and he's the speaker who organized the luncheon first time out great job, bob. greg month, bloomberg news he's chair of the npc diverse community. he and i worked together in buffalo, new york, years ago and we're both sworn to secrecy about that and my colleague from associated press broadcast, a new member of the national press club, lila, she works for associated press television news. steve taylor is a fox news correspondent. eric wemple is media critic with tbd and moving over to the "washington post" and congratulations there.

and wuting wang and a new member of the national press club. please give them a round of applause. [applause] >> we begin with a quotation, yesterday, npr fired me for telling the truth. that's how our guest speaker started a column in the wake of his ouster from npr following controversial remarks that he made about muslims, and his departure from npr in turn set off a firestorm. and just a few months later npr's president and ceo would resign apparently under pressure. after his departure from npr, juan explained that he, quote, didn't fit in their box. nor does he really fit into any box which makes him all the more interesting and why we're so happy to have him here today. our guest speaker was born in panama, the son of a boxing trainer and a seamtress, when he 4 years old his family emigrated to brooklyn.

juan would go on to win scholarships through an exclusive quaker prep school, the oak wood friends school and later to haverford college, west of philadelphia. he was in student newspapers and high school and college and an intern at the old philadelphia bulletin that he had his first taste of journalism. in a column in the npr dust-up, elmer smith who first met juan described him as, quote, cut from a different cloth. juan started his career as an intern at the "washington post" and spent 23 years there as a reporter and a writer of a column. at the "post" he reported on everything from problems in the old dc public schools, as if they are gone, to corruption by then mayor marion barry before going on to cover the white house and every major political campaign stretching from 1980 to the year 2000. his insight and reporting acumen

led to numerous tv and reporting including today and he's was part of the "talk of the nation" and he went on to position such as the senior national correspondent and political correspondent there. it also led him to regular appearances on fox news where on october 20th of last year during an appearance on the o'reilly show, he said this quoting here when i get on the plane, i got to tell you if i see people who are in muslim garb and i think you know they're identifying first and foremost as muslims i get worried. i get nervous. in cutting its ties with juan, npr said his remarks were inconsistent with its editorial standards and practices but npr's review of how that was handled itself revealed problems. clearly, he's moved on from that and just might be doing better than ever. along with daily journalism, he's the author of bestselling books about the civil rights movement and civil rights icon such as thurgood marshall. his next book due out in july is befitting of his recent