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>> in 1956 the suez crisis broke out 9 days before the presidential election. in his book "eisenhower 1956," nichols writes about how president eisenhower reacted to the crisis. mr. nichols discussed his book at the atlanta history center. center. >> good evening. welcome to the atlanta history center. i'm president and ceo of the >> i am sal cilella, president and ceo of the center. this the lecture is made possible through the support of the livingston foundation of atlanta and we're grateful to them for their continued support. our next lecture will be held may 16th and will feature james b. stewart, author of tangled web, false statements undermining america from martha stewart to bernie madoff. i have seen some of the previews of this book and you would be well advised to be here.

it is fascinating. also in may join us for a lecture featuring best selling author of devil in the white city, eric larsen will be here discussing his new book in the garden of beasts, lovely girl terror, american family and hitler's berlin. tonight's lecture is being recorded by c-span and check your local listings for the broadcast date. you can see it again. at this time would like to ask you to turn off your self funds or pagers or any other electronic devices that might disrupt our program whereas the bill the airline flight, turn off everything that doesn't keep you alive. delta air lines stories are cheeky. our authors this evening is david nichols who will speak for 40 minutes and take your questions. david nichols is leading expert in the eisenhower presidency. this evening he will discuss his new book "eisenhower 1956".

the president's year of crisis, suez the birth of war which is one of seven history books worth taking out in 2011. eisenhower in the beginning of the civil rights revolution, and lincoln and the indians. people love ph.d. from william and mary and currently reside in kansas. please join me in welcoming david nichols to our stage. [applause] >> thank you. it is an honor to be year and to be wit >> thank you. it is an honor to be here with people who love history. that is the best audience one can ever have and i am grateful. first we need to shoot down the nasty rumor that has been going around that my publisher beleaguered bill simon and schuster third of all the trouble in the middle east just to sell my book. that is not true.

it is not true. this is also a day when the news is telling us and author allegedly has been making up stuff and i want you to know, accepting commentary in the conclusion, not a phrase is in it that is not rooted in a document or in compelling circumstantial evidence. eisenhower 1956 is a new story. in so many respects because it is based on hundreds of top-secret documents that have been declassified since the last major book on the suez crisis of 30 years ago and when i get done with the presentation those who have not read the book unless it most of you have not will think you know the story but please read the book because the book is better than the speech i guarantee you. i know the book. it is above all a deeply personal story about the man we

affectionately call hike. word about this complex man. eisenhower was a military man but was not militaristic. he did not think that war was the solution to anything. he was one aide recalled slow to pick up the sword. his public persona, that grandfatherly man was largely rosa's personal image. he was a tough minded commander-in-chief. the people who worked for him never doubted who was in charge. ike was a citizen of the world more than any other president and never forgot where he came from. he was not a professional politician but was one of the most successful in our history and supreme reproductive of his

damage. john foster dulles was a lightning rod for controversial policies that were in fact ike's creation. he had a wild temper that exploded like a rocket but that tends moments requiring great decisions he was unfailingly crew, call and deliver it. this was a profoundly religious man who had prayer at the beginning of cabinet meetings yet when the famous temper erupted he could turn the air blue with soldierly profanity and did so frequently. above all eisenhower saw himself not as a warrior but as a peacemaker. that is what this book is about. tonight at a time of war and unrest in the middle east it is fitting to review the most dangerous international crisis of the eisenhower presidency. that crisis was in the middle

east. drama and number one begins sept. 20 third, 1955 in denver, colorado on the golf course. dwight eisenhower did not enjoy the vocations of much in years. the president of the united states had himself cooked a huge breakfast that morning for his fishing buddy. golf was the president's priority for the day. after a briefing at his airport office eisenhower headed for the cherry hill country club and his secretary remembered that she had never seen him look or act better. eisenhower's golf game -- four times that day. phone calls from the secretary of state john foster dulles. this was before cellphone. and irritated and probably profane ike had returned to the clubhouse for each call only one of which actually got through. that call was important.

dulles confirmed to eisenhower that the soviet union had made an arms deal with egypt. ike knew this would open a new chapter in the cold war and ike and dulles agreed he should send a message to the soviet premier but the president wanted to think about it overnight. he told the los he would call him the following morning. that phone call was never made. ike went back to golf where his game deteriorated. as the day wore on the president experienced growing discomfort. he declined his usual evening drink, had little appetite for dinner and retired early. he said i have a paint in the lower part of my chest. since he had complained earlier about in digestion, he had milk of magnesia. at 2:54 mamie call the president's physician who rushed

to the white house. schneider initially put out the word that this was the digestive upset but he knew it was a massive heart attack. he waited until midafternoon that day before transporting the president to the seventh army hospital. even then had ike walked to his car instead of calling an ambulance, if you want more detail of the mismanagement of this situation you got to read the book. no halftime tonight. eisenhower was in the hospital for six weeks. in those days the gold standard for treatment of heart attack patients was total bed rest. ike's doctor did not let him read a newspaper, listen to a football game on the radio, was alone do a serious presidential business. he did not take a step across his room. this incredibly active man felt like a caged animal.

at the very moment the soviet union attempted to change the balance of power in the middle east eisenhower was out of commission. secretary of state john foster dulles was on his own, unable to consult the president as he normally did. burying of the myth that john foster dulles ran foreign-policy, everyone close to both men and i talked with a number of them knew that ike was in charge. wise and our was not in the white house -- 3-1/2 months excepting two night on his way to recuperate in gettysburg. drama number 2 is the one the heart patients are restricted in his other activities. the whether you should run for a second term. in 1956. i am satisfied ike was always intended to run.

in the age of roosevelt you had to be a second term to have a great president and ike wanted to be a great president but the heart attack raised the question of whether physically he could run. ike repeatedly discussed possible successors with aids, none of them had a snowball's chance of getting nominated little on elected. the only republican with sufficient stature to run was chief justice earl warren of the supreme court and if you want to know why ike through cold water on that option you have to read my other book on eisenhower and sobor rights, chapter 5 will tell you about it. eventually ike shot down every argument against running and convince to solve it would be healthier serving when retired. ike also feared that no one else could prevent a nuclear holocaust. in january of 1956 eisenhower

was informed that in the nuclear exchange with the soviet union, 65% of the american population would be casualties. years later chief of staff sherman adams said would surely applies to president obama today. the real reason the president wants to run again is because he doesn't think anybody else can do as good a job as he is doing. after waiting so long that no one else can put together--so long that no one put together a viable candidacy, ike announced his candidacy on feb. 20 ninth, 1956. number 3. the aswan dam. that project on the nile river was the mention the centerpiece,

president nasser plan for egyptian progress. historians ignore the fact that eisenhower attempted to resolve the arab-israeli conflict that indoors to this day. on august 26, 1955, john foster dulles publicly announce the administration's plan code-named alpha for resolving the arab-israeli conflict. that plan reads like it was written in 2011 discussing borders, palestinian refugees, wooley places in jerusalem etc.. in the alpha plan, aid to the aswan dam would be to entice answer to make peace with israel. like most middle east peace plans the alpha plan was dead on arrival. once he began to recover eisenhower resigned the question of aid and in december of 1955 persuaded the national security council that the united states

should make an offer that would head off soviet financing of the dam. in the following month, negotiations with the egyptians broke down. ike paid little attention to those negotiations. he was preoccupied with his health. the decision about running for second term and beginning to campaign. by june 7th, 1956, eisenhower appeared to have recovered from his heart attack. that morning he presided over a national security council meeting and had another 15 appointments and practiced golf. he attended the white house news photographers' dinner and stayed up until midnight, a schedule his doctors would have vetoed a few weeks earlier. the president's car dropped dr. schneider off at his home and ike retired to bed almost immediately. the doctor was removing his close when the phone rang. snider reached for it with a

shudder. only the first lady could be calling at such an hour. this is another anguishing medical drama. you need to read the book. it turned out that ike had an obstruction in his upper intense and -- in test and. 13 -- intestines. thirteen doctors agonized with it to stick a knife and the president who suffered a heart attack eight month earlier. they waited until 2:00 on june 9th to operate. dr. snyder later opined the surgery would have taken place hours earlier if the patient had been mr. murphy. once again, eisenhower was out of commission for weeks. for the middle east the timing could not have been worse. by the time ike returned to the white house on july 15th, 1956, john foster dulles had decided to withdraw the american offer

of aid to the aswan dam project largely because congress was opposed to it. on july 19th, 1956, important date, dulles, in of 12 minute meeting, obtained eisenhower's assent to a decision to withdraw the offer of aid to as one. ike was not on top of the issue. his recovery from surgery had been difficult. he was plagued with depression. that afternoon dulles afford the egyptian ambassador of the decision. dollars told friends that the united states had made, quote, a big chess move and that nasser was now, quote, in a hell of a spot. a week later retaliation, nasser nationalized the suez canal company.

saying he would use its profits to build the aswan dam. the british and french had controlled that company for decades. two thirds of the oil for western europe came through the canal. now the united states and its allies were in a hell of a spot. immediately the british and french prepared to go to work but eisenhower was adamant that war was not justified. egypt, he said, had a right to nationalize the canal because it was in egyptian territory. to ike the question was where the egyptians would keep the canal open and functioning effectively. eisenhower shook off the lingering effect of his surgery. for three months he made frantic efforts to keep the british and french talking instead of fighting. you have to remember this context legal 11 years after world war ii. still shellshocked.

the british and french maid nasser into another hitler. by september 1956 eisenhower's allies gave up on him and any support for taking out nasser and implement a program of deception. the failures of american intelligence were momentous in this crisis. the cia did not force the nationalization of the canal and completely missed the plotting among the british, french and israelis. now for the plot. on wednesday, october 24th, 1956, in a villa outside paris leader still the french foreign minister, prime minister david nigeria of israel and patrick dean lind original deputy undersecretary of state for great britain signed a secret protocol providing that israeli troops would invade the sinai peninsula on october 29th. this was the plan. once the israelis advanced for

the suez canal britain and france would issue an ultimatum to israel and egypt to cease fighting. if for egypt rejected the ultimatum britain and france would begin bombardment of egypt on october 31st followed by a troupe planting the. remember this was secret. it was not in the newspapers. what was in the newspapers was the soviet union had sent troops into budapest, hungry, killing dozens of protesters. eisenhower knew nothing of the secret meeting in paris. that day the intelligence advisory committee chaired by cia director allen dulles assumed that war was not imminent and postponed for a revision of intelligence estimates. the committee ignored an fbi report that an unnamed country was considering military action

against nasser. on monday, october 2019, eisenhower, campaigning in florida was handed a note as he boarded his plane for richmond, virginia. the note said the israeli army had attacked egypt and israel's forces had driven in 25 miles of the suez canal. in the white house that night and a tree and profane eisenhower ordered secretary dollars to fire a message to the israelis telling them we are going to apply sanctions. we are going to the united nations. we are going to do everything there is so that we can stop this thing. ike knew that if the suez canal was disrupted or pipelines destroyed the british and french would attack. he didn't know they already planned to do that. if the british intervened. the ike said they might open a deep rift between us. with the election eight days

away eisenhower declared he did not care in the slightest whether he was reelected or not. on october 30th of the british and french implemented to the letter the secret plan they endorsed on october 24th. they delivered a 12 hour ultimatum that israel and egypt cease military operation and withdraw forces ten years from the suez canal and accept occupation of the canal zone by anglo-french forces. the british and french mistakenly assumed that once they acted, their world war ii ally in the white house would bail them out with oil and military equipment. they were wrong. instead, an angry eisenhower told an aide those who began this operation to be left to boil in their own oil. that night in the un security council british and french vetoed an american resolution

calling for a cease-fire in egypt. less than half an hour later the deadline for the french british ultimatum expired and the largest naval -- in the eastern mediterranean since world war ii seized for each of the. the next morning when they, october 31st, eisenhower was hard by news that soviet troops had pulled back from budapest and the soviet government had declared its intention to practice non-interference in the internal affairs of the satellite states. in egypt, british planes were now bombing airfields, railways and communications centers, turning the the part rows of aircraft into burning wreckage. nasser abstruse had sunk of 320 foot long ship loaded with rocks and cement in the suez canal. the first of thirty-two ships come clear.

eisenhower concluded that he should address the nation on october 31st. foster dulles, sick and exhausted, wrote a draft of the address and ike read it, declared it an absolute disaster. late in the afternoon ordered a new speech be written. minutes before the broadcast in the oval office, speechwriter made the speech to the president a page at a time across the table. the speech was short and terse. eisenhower revealed given the detail in the security council he had taken the unprecedented step of appealing to the united nations general assembly. the united states was not consulted in any way about any phase of these actions eisenhower said. nor were we informed of them in advance. and he pledged there will be no united states involvement in these present hostilities.

and whitman described thursday, november 1st. bill 1956 as another day of great crisis. sherman adams called this quote back the worst week that eisenhower experienced in all the years i worked with him in the white house. that morning the president was besieged with rumors that the soviets were planning to deploy aircraft on the syrian basin. ike asked the chairman of the joint chiefs whether the russians might have slipped some atom bombs to the egyptians. eisenhower canceled all campaign events except the one scheduled for philadelphia that night, november 1st. and whitman recalled the typewriters had to go to the train to complete this speech in time. in philadelphia, in convention hall, ike looked out at 18,000 full expecting a rousing

campaign speech. instead he launched into what a columnist called a high level speech by a man who spoke not as a republican partisan but as president of all the country. eisenhower stated that the nation had pursued a path of honor by standing against the use of force in both hungary and egypt. united states, he said, cannot and will not condone armed aggression no matter who the attacker and no matter who the victim. we cannot in the world anymore than an hour own nation subscribe to one law for the week, another law for the strong liberal one law for those opposing us legal another those allied with us. point only be one law. there will be no peace. the president concluded. we believe that the power of

modern weapons makes war not only perilous but preposterous. and the only way to win world war iii is to prevent it. eisenhower was completely drained by four days of unrelenting crisis. he drank two scottes for dinner on the train and three highballs afterwards, riving at union station 12:29 a.m. nov. second. on november 2nd eisenhower learned at 4:00 in the morning the general assembly had passed the americans cease-fire resolution by a vote of 64-5. with the soviet union voting in favor. democratic candidate adlai stevenson was critical of the situation. we have alienated our ancient and strongest european allies, he said. we have alienated israel.

we have alienated egypt and the arab countries. and in the united nations our main associate in middle eastern matters now appears to be the soviet union. in the very week when the red army has been shooting down a brave people of hungary and poland. stevenson concluded i doubt if ever before in our diplomatic history has any policy been such an abysmal and complete, catastrophic failure. ike was not sleeping well. his doctor was concerned. the president's blood pressure, his heart skipped beats and he suffered constant abdominal discomfort and diarrhea. the records at the eisenhower library are marvelously detailed. one day i told one of the library staff that they don't

report on the president's diarrhea was just a little more information than i really wanted or needed. late in the night of then late in the night of november secondly bristol john foster dulles was rushed to walter reed hospital where the next morning doctors removed a cancerous tumor from his colon. on saturday morning. ville november 3rd, news from the middle east was visible. syrian senators -- egyptian troops were pouring into cairo to defend the capital and the anglo-french air strikes had destroyed the egyptian air force on the ground. eisenhower's political opponents continued to attack his policies. eleanor roosevelt accuse the administration of favoring the arabs over israel and asserted britain and france had been brought to the point of desperation by american

policies. it leaves us in a strange position, she says, of supporting the kremlin and an egyptian dictator against our own strongest allies. six of the eight democratic members of the senate foreign relations committee publicly agreed with stevenson and roosevelt that the president's middle east policies had failed. eisenhower, they declared, presided over, quote, four years of in decision, tech business, timidity and bluster. the night of november 3rd stevens asserted, quote, the president's age, his health and the fact that he cannot succeed himself make it inevitable that the dominant figure in the republican party under a second eisenhower term would be richard nixon. stevenson asked the crowd the want to place a hydrogen bomb in

his hands? on november 4th, dwight eisenhower confronted a perfect storm. the soviet union ordered 2,000 troops into hungry. tens of thousands of hungarians would died or were wounded at day. eisenhower quickly concluded that the united states was in no position to interfere in hungary. his allies were tied down and hungary was not accessible by sea and the american forces could not respond by land without violating territories of communist states. in the middle east israel now control both the side and the gaza strip and held 5,000 egyptians prisoner. on monday november 5th, election eve, british and french paratroopers landed in egypt. and suddenly the leaders of the

soviet union for more fuel on the international fire. the premier said messages to anthony eden and eluded to modern weapons of destruction. we are full of determination to crush the aggressor and reestablish peace in the middle east by using force. simultaneously he proposed to eisenhower that the united states and the soviet union jointly mobilize their mobile fleet to stop aggression and terminate further bloodshed. he warned the president if this war is not stopped, it is fraught with danger and could grow into a third world war. eisenhower interpreted the russian proposal as an ultimatum. he drew a line in the middle east stand calling it

unthinkable. that was one of his favorite word. unthinkable that the united states would join forces with the general assembly has already ordered, unilateral action by the soviet union, eisenhower stated, would be forcefully opposed by the united states and ordered the 6 fleets stationed in the mediterranean, ordered placed on alert. this was election eve. the stresses were taking a toll on the president. after a tense meeting, ike's blood pressure was elevated and his heart beating regulator. he developed a headache, he had only eaten carrots and a glass of yogurt, the doctor recorded his education was due to what he termed an ultimatum served upon him by bogan.

i am confident lawyers with a totally profanity, he growls that if he were a dictator he would tell russia if they move a finger he would drop our entire stock of atomic weapons on the. tuesday was election day. heros in the leasing greater turmoil. in a meeting that morning, our people should be alert that russian planes in syria would inevitably trigger british and french attacks on those airfields'. if that happened as ike liked to say the fact would be in the fire. he inquired of the chairman of the joint chiefs whether american naval units were equipped with atomic anti-submarine weapons. not long after the president left for gettysburg, and whitman recalled the news of the middle east looked so bad, at one point of the white house was

contemplating asking of the president to turn around and come back to the white house. rumors were rampant. soviet and intervention, some of the bad news came from moscow. the american ambassador cabled that the soviet mood had become more ominous. soviet leaders were prepared to take military action unless a cease-fire was quickly achieved. the staff hastened the president's return by flying him back from gettysburg. ike arrived at the white house at 12:38 p.m. following a short briefing, strode into the cabinet room where 18 men were waiting. the vice president and top leadership and defense departments including the joint chiefs, this was a council of

war. he briefed the president regarding steps the joint chiefs were prepared to take to ensure readiness for fighting a major work with the soviet union. eisenhower review each step urging careful, delivered implementation. then the sun broke from behind the clouds and the president was informed in the middle of this meeting that the british prime minister was available by phone. eisenhower interrupted a meeting to take a call and confirmed the conversation that even had ordered a cease-fire in egypt. this was the tenth conversation, much more detail than i am presenting here, with a clearly resentful even. ike asked if british compliance with the cease-fire would be without condition and eat and

growled we cease firing tonight at midnight provided we are not attacked. eisenhower had foreseen what he would still try to play. he insisted that british technical troops not be used to clear the canal. that would have constituted an occupation. and no british or french troops or soviet or american for that matter served in the united nations peacekeeping force. the conversation came when egan asked about foster dulles and the election. ike replied we have given our whole thought to hungary and the middle east. i don't give a damn how the election goes. eisenhower knew that the peace was still fragile and soviet intentions were still unclear. he ordered implementation of most of the readiness steps discussed in the meeting. that night the joint chiefs put

the sixth atlantic and pacific fleet on battle ready alert and deploying additional ships, submarines and tactical resources and placed heavy troop carrier wings on 12 our alert. ten:00 p.m. the eisenhower party traveled to washington were a sweet had been reserved for watching the election returns. as you all know the president won rhee election by a huge margin. ike did not go downstairs to address his supporters until 1:45 because his reluctant opponent adlai stevenson waited until then to make a concession speech. approximately 2:00 a.m. cairo time, 7:00 in washington d.c. the fighting ended in the middle east. present me a too brief a lot,

after november 6th eisenhower continued to be concerned about the possibility of soviet intervention because the british, french and israelis declined to withdraw their forces. they would not withdraw. eisenhower adamantly refused to provide oil and financial support is bankrupt allies. there were they wrong on the pound, finances in terrible shape. refused to provide support and the allies were facing a cold winter but he would get them nothing until they committed themselves to withdraw. it got so dense that they often refuse to pick of americans. gas stations declined to sell fuel. it took a month to get the commitment and another month for withdrawal. israeli withdrawal took even longer. a huge story that i don't have time to get into.

the israelis evacuated sinai but refused to leave the gaza strip and the mouth of the gulf. they continued to occupy those two spots. finally after presidential pressure on march 1st, 1957, the israeli government announced its intention to withdraw. a big story about this because politically this was a hot potato too. there's the eisenhower doctrine. in a four our meeting with congressional leaders on new year's day 1957, who else but dwight eisenhower could hold four our meeting of congressional leaders on new year's day? eisenhower present resolution to those leaders endorsing military and economic aid to the middle east and if necessary military intervention by the united states. the house passed a resolution on

january 30th, same day ike berated the king of saudi arabia before the cameras in a state visit. the king insisted this president come to the airport to greet him as something ike had never done with any other foreign leader. saudi oil had its clout in the dave too and ike agreed to go. he grumbled to and whitman that now he suppose he would have to greet everybody at the airport in the future. once israel agreed to withdraw the eisenhower doctrine passed on march 5th. in a breathtaking two months dwight eisenhower persuaded the congress of the united states to dramatically reorient american policy towards the middle east. the eisenhower doctrine committed the united states to replacing the british as the guarantor of stability and security including oil resources in the middle east and for good or ill as president obama experience the past few weeks,

for good or ill that obligation is the cornerstone of american policy. thank you. [applause] >> if you have questions please come to the microphone. >> use the microphone, folks. no such thing as a dumb question. or comment. contrary, and? sorry. >> that was a great talker. thank you very much. had a question. did the obama administration contact you about their involvement in libya? if not did you find similarity

in how he dealt with libya in comparison with the suez canal incident? >> they have not -- the obama administration hasn't talked with me. i am meeting with former senator chuck a goal in washington d.c. who i am told bought 27 copies of the book and gave to the president and one to the secretary of defense and the vice president. i have talked about it. my suspicion is he is a little uncertain intervention in libya is a good thing. it always is tricky. we have to be careful about taking a historic figure and applied it to the situation 50 or 60 years later but there are similarities and was an our approach to things. eisenhower generally did not like a brushfire wars. he ended the one in korea and refuse to go into china or egypt. he just didn't do it.

and he disliked very much larger military interventions. he believed if you went in. colin powell gets the credit for the doctrine of overwhelming force these days. he ought to remind us why eisenhower talked about that all the time. eisenhower got into a fight with the great german general -- overwhelming force. marginal -- he understood very well the trouble with partial intervention is they spin out of control. they are very hard to manage. the libyan one appears to be that way too. i don't know whether the president will want to talk to me about that or not. i am a little concerned about this becoming a stalemate. you can have not only a unilateral quagmire like we had a couple other places and a multilateral quagmire too. yes, sir? >> what was richard nixon's role

in this? >> there's a lot of mythology about the nixon and eisenhower. i don't want to get too involved. the eisenhower presidency has been distorted by my profession shamefully. just because people didn't do the research. one of the things is the relationship with eisenhower and nixon, eisenhower never kept a vice president he didn't want. you have to know eisenhower to understand he didn't abide -- not true. he kept that doctrine. but anyway. dr. snyder -- nixon was basically to answer your question ike's political surrogate. when eisenhower quit campaigning which he did once the crisis broke out, nixon went out and substituted for him and took on adlai stevenson. nixon provided support in

congress. i have not looked carefully at what he did but the eisenhower doctrine--a major role presided over the senate. i am sure he was deeply involved behind-the-scenes but he with a political operative for eisenhower and a skilled one. the way nixon -- people forget what else he did. somebody else? yes? >> what was the affect of these events on nasser? >> the affect on nasser. eisenhower saved nasser's tied. eisenhower decided to join with the allies. nasser would have been toast. would you would have done was an interesting thing to speculate but there isn't any question. got to remember in those days nasser and arab nationalists were considered pretty progressive.

they were getting rid of royal thrones and colonial powers. they were pretty progressive. what happens is nasser stays in power followed by anwar sadat who is followed by you know who. hosni mubarak. he is the 28-year-old officer already on the rise at a the time of the suez crisis. and so eisenhower's policy we have to say, i sound very pro eisenhower. there are always unintended consequences. eisenhower's policy opened the door for military to ruin the middle east and at the same time it would not be fair to hang that around eisenhower's that altogether 50 or 60 years later. nevertheless it was a factor. personally i have an op-ed. i'm trying to get someone to print it in a moment. my prediction is the military

has not done anything. they have been in charge 60 years and i will be real surprised if we don't have a military officer or somebody with close ties to the military emerge as next president of egypt. >> aside from the fact that they were in different parties what was eisenhower's relationship with truman? >> i don't pretend to be expert on that. i always forget -- there is a book called harry and ike. that is the correct title but i am forgetting the author's name. i am an old guy. part of my brain remembers names has died. i get caught with that sometimes. it was not an easy relationship. having said that, truman chose eisenhower to head nato. truman's diary reveals he

attempted to persuade ike to run for president of the democratic ticket. how serious that was our haven't studied in debt. on the other hand it was very tense. in 1953 at the inauguration eisenhower did not get out of the car and go into the white house to give the outgoing president -- harry was very offended. talk about that later. it was not an easy relationship will flow in the book i mentioned they reconciled years later quite a bit. it was a fairly tense relationship partly because truman later in an oral history alleged ike wanted to marry his driver, case numbers the -- k. somersby and talked to george marshall about that and truman took on the state department,

destroyed them. at least one skull or rhino of who is pretty good things that truman made that up. i am not qualified. not giving you a very good answer. >> i had heard and where sadat made a statement years later that nasser told him that because we didn't back our allies that the united states could be trusted and became allies of the soviet? is that true? nasser said that to sadat. sadat related that. >> i couldn't dispute that. i tell folks on know a whole lot about a little. i know whole lot about what i just talked with you about. i couldn't dispute that. i think there's still work to be done on the evolution of things after the eisenhower years. the colonial diplomatic historian has been to assume the

eisenhower doctrine and eisenhower policies and nasser ends of being allies of the soviet. i am not sure nasser has ever -- it is through the soviets built the dam but i'm not sure egypt ever became what you could call a satellite of the soviet union. nasser played both sides against the middle and whether the united states cannot be trusted -- you can take that statement that look at it two or three different ways. certainly the allies didn't think he could be trusted to do what they wanted. it is a poor answer. i am not qualified to answer any better. >> i think if i know my history fairly correctly that the role of israel after world war ii was the implementation of the ball for treaty or agreement. what was eisenhower's view of

the reluctance of israel to withdraw? you were saying from gaza. >> that you are asking about that you are not asking about the creation of israel. >> i am asking when he was president and they were going through how israel was taking over some of the territories that were not involved in the agreement what was his feeling about that? >> if you are talking about -- i only know about the suez situation. i am not very qualified to speak about the rest of it. he certainly put enormous pressure on israel to withdraw after the suez crisis. he appealed to the congress on february 20th. original 1957 for support for that and congress turned him down. so he turned around that night and went to the people with a televised address and

behind-the-scenes according to his memoirs he threatened to the israelis to cut off private contributions from american jews to israel which at that time was really major. whether he could have done that i don't know. in terms of the politics of the united states eisenhower took extraordinary steps to oppose israel's policies. the earlier stuff i am not as good on. in terms of the creation of the state of israel generally truman recognized the state of israel in may of 1948, part of his presidential campaign. that was really opposed by george marshall, secretary of state. george marshall, eisenhower's interim. there is substantial reason to

believe eisenhower agreed that marshall and people in the state department believed. henderson is a graduate of my school, southwestern college, great diplomat who believed creation -- recognition and creation of the state of israel would lead to endless turmoil in the middle east that he was not wrong. that doesn't mean you can't support that because there is a dramatic and wonderful story for the state of israel and i moved and touched by it too that mine is mixed in the flowers in that situation. i wish i could answer you better. >> did the hungarians expect the americans to come to their aid in 1956? >> significant evidence that they didn't expect that and there was great disillusionment among pro hungarian groups and refugees. hundreds of thousands of refugees left and all the united

states did was make provision. i forget the numbers of refugees who came to this country but there was great disillusionment and criticism of eisenhower for that but he was very clear headed than it could not be done and going back to our earlier question mrs. eisenhower did not believe taking on military tasks that could not be completed successfully. he regretted deeply but quickly made the decision -- you have to go back to world war ii. we have a lot of mythology about what happened in world war ii. without the soviet union in world war ii a case could be made that the war would have come out very differently and the soviet union suffered 35 casualties estimated on the eastern front and the united states and allied powers did go to the mainland and to 1934. this was a totally different

situation. the soviet union reached the other side. britney and france were not available to help. he was roundly criticized. my book doesn't do justice to that subject i regret to say. >> would you address the eisenhower and vietnam? >> i some like a broken record. i tell you a lot about a little. i do know about that and clearly the decision not to intervene in china in 1954 particularly -- and number of advisers wanted him to do it. he thought about it and he was surrounded by a number of people who thought he should do it. they came back the next day --

and he did not. having said that, eisenhower left in vietnam. the geneva convention of 1954, i know something about this, the extension in 54 called, unifying elections in vietnam. those elections never took place because the united states reported the separate country in south vietnam even though it really wasn't a separate country. never was. this was an outcome of the cold war. otherwise open to a lot of questions. i haven't done detailed research. he believed putting ground

troops in asia -- american experience in validates the judgment on that. anybody else? how are we doing on time? really good questions. terrific. >> along the same line eisenhower was involved in the bay of pigs and that crisis arose soon after his presidency ended under the kennedy administration. his decision to be involved with the freedom fighters, sounds consistent with all you said about eisenhower's reluctance to engage in brushfire wars. >> that is a matter of controversy. i know some historians are working on it.

the historians who tend to deified john f. kennedy -- i will confuse you -- i really like kennedy in many ways but the historians who are biased toward him have tried to argue that eisenhower set things up and kennedy carried out. i am convinced them-one scholar i know has seen argument that i haven't seen is convinced eisenhower would never have done it the way kennedy did. through the air support and even the plan with air support just didn't look like an eisenhower kind of intervention. eisenhower would have done what he did lebanon in 1958 when he led an 14,000 troops. he really believed in overwhelming force. he was open to covert action. we know that in guatemala and iran. he was not an angel when it came

to covert action. the cuban invasion is a strange phenomenon. the cia, if you new to do what contingency plans the cia had you would be horrified. these contingency plans were around. when the new president came in, as every officer does, most people took in the plan to president kennedy, and they were after eight years quite a few people who were upset with eisenhower and inches to have a president who would do something different and one of the big arguments was limited war. with a you could have limited war. eisenhower said massive retaliation. limited wars for dangerous. he didn't like them. he thought they could lead to the holocaust whereas maxwell taylor who is head of the joint chiefs of staff and eventually for kennedy and head of the army when ike was their belief in limited war. a book called the uncertain