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tv   Book TV  CSPAN  December 31, 2011 4:30pm-6:00pm EST

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>> you can watch this and other programs online at booktv.org. >> and jonathan steele who has covered afghanistan since 1981 talks about the soviet experience in that country and the lessons that the obama administration have learned from it. it is hosted by the center for international policy. >> this is the center for international policy. and we welcome jonathan steele. welcome all of you. in particular job is still. and i was in afghanistan in august. and i was stunned by the deterioration of security.
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anybody have one. , the british consul to, a six hour firefight, sitting in our bunker in our hotel , a colleague who had just been narrowly missed being hit by stray bullets. i want to talk to these guys, writing about the security advances in afghanistan and trouble. it is a had been more less out of the fight. ahead in reading your book. it is phenomenally good. by far the best book ever read in afghanistan. we welcome you here and look forward to getting a questions. >> but i want to do is give a little bit of a flavor of what was like. one of the main themes of the book is the comparison and contrast between the soviet
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occupation and the u.s. british nato occupation today. i want to end with the kind of seven. plan for peace. >> sending. >> i was in the middle of an interview with the afghan foreign minister when a detonation interrupted us. what was that explosion, ast? explosion, what explosion? elaine november, 1981, almost two years since soviet troops had invaded. the officials then was that everything was under control oh, yes, the dynamiting. in the broom and the distance. he looked relieved and eager to assure me that i was mistaken if i had thought that i could hear the sound of war from his office .
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that was the stone's throw from the present a palace. they do it almost every day. sometimes twice a day. producing stones for destruction and stand. well, the minister wanted me to understand that the explosions could not be military. since the war was virtually over. we destroyed the main high debts of the bandits and mercenaries. now they can't act in a group. it's only a few individuals to involuntary stick to these and sabotage, which is, and all of the world. we hope to eliminate that also. now in the first weeks after the invasion, december 1979 there have been so confident of quick victory that they gave western reporters astonishing access, even allowing them to write what drive rented cars and taxis alongside soviet convoys. by the spring of 1980 the mood had changed. the press was no longer welcome. there were no embeds for reporters to accompany a fighting unit, even footrest
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soviet correspondents. the war became a taboo on the soviet media. along with western journalists to apply for afghanistan vises, routinely refused. so the only way to cover the conflict was to endure days and nights of walking along a precarious mountain paths with guerrilla fighters from the merger had been of safe havens in pakistan. a few stories that appeared in western papers were cautious, sensible, and low-key, but many were lamenting self promoting a cow's of rock exploit by reporters dons the pie shaped afghan hats to slip into afghanistan alongside men with guns. the mood encourage this avenger journalism uncritical, exaggerating, and occasionally dishonest. but it helped to bring support and funding from western governments and sympathetic groups.
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by 1981 the soviets were realizing that they're no visa policy was a mistake. their case was not being heard. so a handful of western journalists were let in for short trips in small groups of occasionally on their own. so november that year at the land in trouble. a great on a morning. after getting into the was struck by the clarity of cobbles there. and this guy is the blue, color that almost matches the country's most famous mineral. the city sits on a high plateau surrounded by a ring of cocky mounds, cocky by the way the dari mark meaning the dust. the word was actually invented for these mountains in central asia. and behind them glittering in the distance the snowcapped peaks of the hindu kush. but it wasn't just the majestic surroundings that exhibited the sense of call. the city itself did.
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where was the work? where are the russians to my wondered? in the two week test bed in this city i saw hardly a single soviet troop. they prefer to leave as many military duties as possible to afghans the effort of the security was an afghan army. from what i could see soviets were indeed able to depend on afghans for urban law and order, if not for real war fighting. i made to subsequent trips during the soviet occupation in 1986 and '88. on both visits the cities, is exactly the same. the car bombs and suicide attacks which have become a permanent threat in today's troubled or unknown during the soviet occupation. afghans and about their daily business without fear of sudden mass slaughter. unlikable today were no diplomats or foreign contractors have their contract is for children with them, many soviet
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diplomats came with their families. a flourishing in the garden, grade school, and as cool. most german women were unveiled. the fino starting banks, schools, factories, and government offices. if you had scarf over their hair, but only in the bazaar. the all embracing barker common. on the evidence of my own eyes, the city under siege. pomegranates of watermelons, grapes spilled out. i never discovered with definitive explanation for these explosions that i have heard during the interview with the foreign minister, but his point that carvel was unaffected by destruction of war was actually valid. i had no other explosions during my time. of course the countryside was another story that the united
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stations guest house and, -- kabul, a favored place for foreigners to country, a worker still may have their frustration for the restrictions that it faced. the u.n. had dozens of consultants the involved in rural development, but they were not allowed out. but there were supposed to be earning. afghan government officials admitted that because of the majority in activity land reform was operating only a quarter of the country's districts and have the schools and afghanistan were closed. sounds rather similar to the situation today. the foreign invaders, afghan cities with some help from local security forces. they can keep open the main roads to connect the cities, but penetrating the country's villages in fighting support there was an altogether harder task. it's particularly hard in the south and east of the country's exporters and pakistan.
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every day dozens of resistance fighters infiltrate afghanistan from their bases in refugees -- refugee camp just as they do today. so it was not surprising that gorbachev became soviet leader in 1985 as general mikhail let's a coup was the soviet military commander at the time afghanistan to evaluate the army's options. he reported that the only way to achieve military success would be to seal -- seal the country's borders to pakistan which would require at least a quarter of a million troops. he said this as unrealistic. sounds familiar again. how many tons of u.s. commanders and diplomats urged pakistan to stop the arbitration of taliban and outside a fighters across the border. shortly before gorbachev took care of it the head of the defense ministry's operational group warned the kremlin that
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the afghan government was failing and the counter key insurgency strategy. u.s. counterinsurgency work for the same form. what the russians the americans and the british in canada are fine that clearing is much easier than holding or building. now, the origins of the soviet decision to edge spent 2,000 troops were quite similar to those of the americans in september and october 2001. the kremlin wanted beijing chains, just like the americans. in 1979 the soviet leader was furious that the afghan president had murdered his rivals and is in total power. the kremlin wanted him out.
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for the first task the soviet forces under gen when they reached it will was to assassinate demean. anger and revenge and up the best guides to cool political decision making. did considered invading afghanistan and various points to defeat the insurgents which was already operating against the government. but it repeatedly rules out intervention on the ground that it would only make things worse. finally in december 1979 so furious and so desperate to remove and that he overruled all the daughters. very similar to the mood in september 2000. the bush of restoration was of -- consumed by emotion. it was not confined to the administration, the american public wanted that to.
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payback. the americans expected the intervention to be short, just as the russians did in 1979. it covers scene change would be achieved rapidly in kabul. foreign forces would then be able to leave. no serious thought was given between moscow or washington to the possibility that armed resistance will develop or that the strategy ever seen change would suffer the initial crippen more fit to nation building. and the more i talk to soviet officials in kabul in years in the 1980's i heard the same language that i was to hear from u.s. and british officials a quarter of a century later. at talked about afghanistan as poverty, lack of development. they promise to modernize the country, introduced governance. they did admit that armed resistance was greater than it had been before their troops arrived. but they were reluctant as, indeed, the british and americans are not to concede that the presence of foreign forces and increased resistance
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and stopped knew insurgency. they turned their eyes away from all evidence that the intervention had actually make things worse. they preferred to see the findings as a struggle between the progressive afghan government and the insurgency. so it is with american and british officials today. they go on about $10 a day caliban. local grievances of their young men who are unemployed. they overlook all the surveys that have been done. tell bad attitudes, taliban fighters attitudes which show that most of them are motivated by patriotism and the basic desire to defend their country for foreign occupation. just as the moose had they were doing. that may never come to the differences. those of the similarities between the soviet and american occupation.
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and they're really almost more important. in march 1985 the soviet union get a new leader, miguel gorbachev. gorbachev had an heir to the war that his predecessor had started. it wasn't going well. the choice but necessity. he never trapped himself and that kind of language. his instinct was the war was a stalemate. the soviet army could not be defeated. on the other hand, the russians could not defeat the other side. they were trapped in a war of attrition with no end in sight. the war was taking a high toll in young soviet lives. total losses exceeded 9,000 by the time gorbachev came to power five years after the war started now, the opening of most of the kremlin archives as the collapse of the soviet union has given us remarkable insight into the discussions and transcripts.
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so we know a great deal of what was going on. when gorbachev met the then afghan leader, the one that imposed a to murdering the new leader, five-year isabela. his message was, comrade, if you naturally understand, as the members of the afghan leader obviously did the soviet troops cannot stay in afghanistan forever. that is the first difference between the two. gorbachev decided early on the war was unwinnable. obama has not yet conceded that point. the second crucial difference was that the soviet military made no attempt to oppose gorbachev's you. indeed they shared it.
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we know that the marshal who was the chief of the general staff told the politburo in november 1986, and i quote, after seven years in afghanistan there is not one square kilometer left untouched by a boot of a soviet soldier. the enemy returns and restores it all back to the way it used to be. so what was his response to being faced with an unwinnable legacy from his predecessor? he did not decide the problem had to be solved by trying to build up the afghan army, which is, of course, the policy of obama and david cameron. no, he invited him to moscow and told him he had to negotiate with the insurgents. and after one of those meetings gorbachev told his soviet colleagues that he had been blunt with the afghan leader.
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i told them if you want to survive you have to broaden the regime's social base, forget about socialism, share real power with the people who have authority, including the leaders of organizations that are no hostile towards you. telling them that surges of more troops would make a significant difference. nor did people in this strategy. the plan is to keep heavily defended garrison's all over afghanistan. it won't help. one reason is the vast bulk of the afghan muslim army consists of tadzhiks and brubecks they are considered just as foreign
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as nato troops. nato officials who recently admitted that their program of trying to get more press genes into the afghan national army has the objective of getting them out by the end of this year . anyway, the key point is that the garrisons strategy is doomed . it merely perpetuates an unwinnable war to high costs in lives and money. the only way out, as court judge decided cal wasser talks. ideally he saw this happening in various levels. one was the regional and national level to get the neighbors the neighboring countries outside powers on board. the other was among afghans between the government in the insurgency. and the soviet leader was fortunate in that there was not already in international track scene after the invasion. the un had appointed a mediator is mission it was to try to
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portray the kremlin to a pullout . pakistan in u.s. would stop the insurgents from using pakistan as a base. when the colleagues has written a book. it came out a long time ago. so these u.n.-mediated talks have not gone anywhere. they culminated in the agreement of april 1988 in geneva which allowed the authorized pullout of soviet troops with dignity. now, he had hoped might gorbachev had hoped that this deal would be matched by one between the various afghan parties that would then end the civil war, create a government of national unity. he was careful not to condition the two things on its other. he did not try to link the implantation of the soviet withdrawal to an end traffic an agreement. that could have risked an
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indefinite delay in february 1989 blast troops did pullout. the government did not fall and washington and stay in power for another three years, continually trying to talk to the leaders as well as the representatives of the other main center. that is the third between the russian and american more. to reach out to the opposition. they only pay contrast to of lip service to the idea of negotiations. i will go into the failure of the intra afghan negotiations except to say that responsible
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for it very largely was the west, the united states and pakistan because they kept telling them, don't negotiate. you have no need to negotiate so this myth and one of the things that i deal with confronts 13 myths about afghanistan, the mets that the west walked away after 1989, complete nonsense. the west continue to arm. the cia continued to on the merger had been and tell them not to negotiate. if you read peter tosses but it came out recently he was the envoy. it makes it quite clear that that was u.s. policy. and yet somehow in the mind, the west walked away. i heard right cockpit. the loss three journal. he used the same as admiral mike mullins. again, you are not welcome. walkaway like we did in 1989.
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incredible how this has been allowed to maintain. now, let me come wanted the issue of talks. what are the obstacles? as with all negotiations the atmosphere is clouded by fear and suspicion along with hatred and anger over the loss of loved ones. the taliban are mainly bush gen. worried mit's will control the country once again. the top now worry the u.s. will never leave. the recent murder of former president who was head of the height peace council has heightened the suspicions. it is notable that date have not planned responsibility for his murder. now, some people say that they're not interested in talks because they think they are just waiting long enough and will when everything, does like they were told in the 1980's, the end
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of the 1980's. but until serious contact is made with the taliban leaders no one gun really be certain what the position is. we cannot prejudge advance to say they are not interested in initiations. and there have been evidence of flexibility opening up, building up. the sensible policy is to open a dialogue and try to discover their views. we do know that in september of this year that the end of ramadan did tell a bandleader marked the end of ramadan with a remarkable statement which shows that his stated goals are to improve life and not to continue the global si hot. not interested in global jihad. he is concerned about the future of a afghanistan alone. most analysts have always argued that the taliban have a different perspective from the arabs to have used their country
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as a safe haven. the end of ramadan stigma when a long way toward confirming that. although he did not directly address washington's demand that the taliban disassociate itself, his speech portrayed his organization very clearly as one with afghan interests in mind and not. he talked of afghanistan's abysmal poverty and the need to develop its mineral wealth, including foreign investment. he tried to reach out by promising that all of these will have participation in the regime . dispensed on the basis of merit. he said, again, contrary to the propaganda launched by her enemies the islamic emirate is not aimed at monopolizing power. so they have changed the line from what they had in 1996 when they captured trouble when they did try monopolize power.
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the key obstacle to serious negotiation lies here in the city. ambiguity and inefficient within the obama administration is paralyzing policy-making. the cia appears to recognize that the war is a stalemate. a very interesting report in september, the "washington post" saying that the district assessment by afghanistan by the cia with somebody had not shown an but talked about in broad terms, used the words still made repeatedly. unfortunately obama is the speech in july when he announced the drawdown of 30,000 troops said almost nothing in the negotiations. he maintained the existing their strategy and kept open the option of u.s. troops remaining indefinitely in afghanistan. even as we speak tasked with working out what is called a
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strategic partnership agreement. and this bilateral u.s. afghan agreement would authorize a long-term basis after 2014 of as many as 30 the 40,000 u.s. troops in afghanistan. they might be defined in a different way, not as combat troops, but as trainers are advisers or logistics' experts, but they would still be armed uniformed skewed as trips. this agreement is a strategic partners agreement that is a disaster waiting to happen. if it is signed between karzai and the americans it will completely severed ties any chance of talks with the taliban says they insist on a complete departure of all u.s. foreign troops. they have been fighting on nationalist terms for an end to the occupation for a lasting years, and it will not stop fighting as long as u.s. troops remain in the country. it will also undermine the objective of the neutral afghanistan.
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every one of afghanistan as natives. they don't want foreign troops and there. so a bilateral deal between the u.s. and kabul to base troops after 2014 would make nonsense. gabba let me come onto the so-called seven. thanks a piece which is really two main points and five that flow from it. the first thing obama has to do is to announce a change of course toward negotiations. now, ideally he would say that the war is unwinnable, but recognize publicly that is very difficult for u.s. president to say. it's not as bad as saying we have been defeated which would be terrible. i know you will say that, and i don't think it's true. even to say the war is unwinnable would be a step too far, but i think it would have ted be made clear after the
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president's asset we are now moving 100% for negotiations and all the briefings that the administration officials give to people. the war is unwinnable. we just go on and on and on. announce new u.s. goals for afghanistan. the government of national unity that includes representatives of all the in certain groups and therefore is the risk of a new round of civil war. the government of national unity, the government of national salvation. different countries they come up with different traces. the goal would be the establishment of a sovereign independent and non-aligned afghans state.
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thirdly they would see pledges by the new government that it will not accept any help china activity in afghanistan. so those are the two main things. change of course. a highlighting of the need for creation of a government. now, from that low other things. firstly abolishes suspend immediately the current talks on the strategic partners agreement between the u.s. in afghanistan which would authorize, as i have just been describing. that agreement must be talks on that must be immediately suspended. number four, the bounty which is several million dollars should be lifted. and all the other taliban and
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insurgent leaders must have their bounties on their heads lifted. and the u.s. should support the opening of a television office in guitar or divine or wherever else so that taliban leaders can freely travel there without fear of arrest or assassination. next the obama administration should offer to suspend the u.s. policy of assessing local commanders in return for the opening of discussions with local tribal leaders in southern afghanistan and anywhere else on creating mutually agreed cease-fires by the taliban commanders as well as the u.s. and afghan government forces. a experienced three years ago when they did try and demilitarized, they may contact with taught that commanders and received the cease-fire which lasted several months. the kind of model.
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unfortunately the americans at that stage did not like it has tended to have sanitized it iss getting one of the taliban leaders in the area. .. to stop at talks with all the afghan groups as well with the regional pastime exactly in the
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same packing diego is trying to do in the 1980s and as you probably know comment bickering report which came up in march this year advocated exactly that committee appointment at the high-level u.n. mediator who can start these stocks. and the final point is that the conference is planned in istanbul in november and december this year should be delayed indefinitely. because at the moment come the agenda of these two conferences, which the administration is planning is essentially to try and isolate the taliban and [applause] on their surrender, that essentially to support the kerry spin strategy, which is the current nato policy. so these conferences should be delayed until we've had real progress on the toxin at some point yes, we need international conferences to ratify an international agreement that is
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reached. so the regional powers to make ledges that they accept and non-alignment of afghanistan and will not try to interfere. but there is international must commit the end of the talks negotiations, not now where there is an attempt to further isolate the taliban. thank you very much. [applause] >> well, thank you. [applause] so many things in this book that i love. one of them just amazes me -- and i think it's true this point you make. the point you make is the soviet instead of being pro assistants, the soviet military did not pose the civilian decision, whereas in this country, the civilian
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leadership who covers this very closely in the "washington post" that the white house wanted out. all they want is to get out in it. that defeat, some sort of dignified attitude and it's my wife who covers the military says the military has a huge influence in this country. but it's gotten to the point where as we said earlier, the game changers out of the natural deficit. a lot of the republican -- most of the republican presidential contenders. >> they are meant as far as i've did support talks. i mean, if republican candidates were saying not only do we want now, but the way out for talks
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talks -- just if they could say we want out is a bit like nixon in 1968 saying i have a plan and hubert humphrey did not want and we had five more years of war under nixon. >> they are not now for inking or what to do with the economy or afghanistan. and i found, it gives obama the political curve to change course without being caught a softy. listening to you -- i've been listening to not for the last year. he's been telling me the same day. and our trip we reinforce. not committee ought to say anything? >> i want to ask you about this week mark the senior civilian for nato in afghanistan that we made a lot of mistakes in london and one of them primarily being,
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as you describe come in the political alienation and exclusion of southern passions from the political process, which has pushed them to support the taliban. it's very similar to what we saw in iraq, our exclusion, are alienation of the sunnis were repeat them really no choice. several comments follow up on the previous ambassadors. corporate goals comments were et says the line that the biggest obstacle in afghanistan over the last decade has been the american government. and that backs up my time in afghanistan being with the embassy in the five-month notice they are, we were against negotiations. it was actually our policy was not to be involved. and we were told that was their direction. can you comment on why we are seeing a string of british
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diplomat senior guys for several years of experience in the country over the last are now saying, is that coming out of frustration or is this kind of leading into kind of a desire for the grits to find some other solution out of afghanistan before we get to 2014 when we are supposed to be out of there. and nancy briefly, this current policy, we'll be in the same situation we are now three years from now, just maybe even worse. >> well, i'm not sure why my change of mind. sharon cooper calls changed it because he thought the hopelessness of what was going on in helmand. he's given these very neat assessments by british officers and u.s. offices he was meeting. and he just didn't seem to match what he was seen with his own eyes. he couldn't believe. he thought they were prisoners of their own sort of rhetoric.
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and he came to the view that there should be toxin he actually persuaded david miller band who is a former foreign secretary to make that speech in march 2010 at m.i.t., where he actually said, using the northern analogy, sometimes you have to start talking to the people who are shooting at you. and there's no other way. i'm not the time, this feature is really in washington and they didn't pick it up at all and then of course the government fell to the new government in britain. i don't know -- i know cooper calls quite well, but i don't know mark at all. i met him once or twice. he is to be rather gotten home, so it is not changed. maybe it's come to the same sort of views that it is hopeless. in some ways, the british
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military are more keen to stay there than the u.s. military because the former head of the army after iraq was very worried about forthcoming defense cuts. and he told sharon cooper con in his book, you know, it is a question of use them, not lose them. i'm afraid if we don't send troops to afghanistan, the defense budget will be tied to my autonomy troops. so it's completely cynical for the preservation line. and you know, if you say that 30,000 u.s. troops coming out according to the obama plan, which is just under a third of u.s. troops, that's actually over the next two years, the next 18 months is the quickest pace than the british withdraw. they only withdrew 500 out of almost 10,000. so we're actually reducing proportionate last in the
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american fire. >> just a follow-up on the mediator. do you see anyone out there in your travels in your talks? do you see a bloc of nations for different groups or individuals who will be appropriate for that role? and mean, certainly you know, the u.s. or burst because for almost out of that. i tend to think the u.n.? such credit in afghanistan, particularly with the insurgency that a u.n. broker talks would be difficult as well because of credibility problems. so do you see any groups or institutions or other nations or individuals? >> some people said it had to be muslim, but that's a bit artificial. i think that line of argument was used partly as a way of saying the man. brahimi is standing on a bit now. he's coming up in 75. i think he is still very act of
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an ambitious and so you probably would quite like to have the job, but i'm not sure that everyone would agree with that. you know, the former e.u. representatives have been mentioned as well. he's younger, the mid-60s i think. and his very active and extremely knowledgeable and has always been an advocate of talks. the nokia served a lot in the u.n. and cambodia and elsewhere, so he would be good. >> thank you very much. very commit very entertaining. the soviet experience and what we're going through now. you're right about many points. and i happen to believe that once we switch from the counterterrorism strategy and counterinsurgency, we and large
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the complexity by, i don't know, exponentially. imagine so we have to deal with now, based on this counterterrorism -- counterinsurgency strategy, which brings in all the complexities with posh dance in pakistan and other countries in this never-ending world. i was surprised and i'm glad you mentioned that there is 4% of the african army is pashtun. >> that's the goal. >> already. even worse. in reality, we are talking about well? [inaudible] >> about 45% of the population, yeah, yes. >> and the additional issue is the worst they're posh dance in afghanistan and passions in pakistan. and we have to see the complexity of the issue.
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and now to the key question and i thought it very interesting that you believe it is possible to create a national unity government, including posh terrace in the original sin of the conference in december in 2002 -- 2001, was of course no inclusion of the taliban goes mostly northern alliance and was a problem from the beginning. and still, we did a better job than any empire before. i mean, you can go to the soviet union. we did create a constitution.
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that has never been done before. and so far, you would have a starting point. how to create this national unity approach is a critical issue here. and how to include the pashtun in a meaningful way. that you seem to be optimistic. i would like to hear a little bit more of your reasoning why you think this is possible and why it is useful to reach the goal to drop, let's say, the conference in december, which will try to make enough to civilize and demilitarize the whole country. that's what we have to do. he militarized the whole thing. that, you know, the military can only achieve so much. and the issue, you know, was
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much more of a civilian after and maybe some other forces and regular military forces. they demilitarize the whole constitution. and so, i don't get the point of using the one conference because coming in now, suppose we would be able to make the realty militarization and reduce the role of western powers to a nonmilitary effort, i would see that as a contribution to creating the kind of national unity in afghanistan we have been missing so far. >> well, let me deal with that. first of all, i wouldn't say that i'm optimistic. i would not say i'm optimistic. i am quite pessimistic excess of the complexity of the issues in the degree of hostility on both sides and the history of afghan political negotiations, you
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know, what would happen in the 1990s when i tried to form a government and national unity and look what happened when the mujahedin finally got control in kabul and started a civil war among themselves, even though they're all on the same side because they've been fighting together the posh dance and the najibullah machine. so i'm not really optimistic and i'm not even saying the government of national entity as possible. it's desirable. the point is to know where you're going or where you want to go into everything to get there. so i think it is the only desirable way is through talks. now with the conference in december was to have an agenda, which is to support 100% item negotiations in line with the thing i said i'm a seven-point plan that the u.s. president sometimes in the next few weeks as this is a complete change of policy. we are going towards this in an istanbul, which is the regional
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conference, that's fine. but i mean, i don't see that as the current agenda of the conferences. they think they would just add a new obstacle if they pursue the current agenda. so i'd rather have no conference than one that makes things worse. so by all means come use whatever instant you have to change the agenda of the conference and get them to come out for talks. but i am afraid because it is literally 10 years after the 2001 december conference, it will be a self-congratulatory thing of over 10 years we received the other report of good governance and how many schools have been built in all this usual thing in a huge jamboree. but that will be part of it and were doing well and so were handing out to the afghans and the afghan army. plus, this isolation of the taliban, which i mentioned
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before is in the second part of the agenda. so i see it as an obstacle, not a step forward unless it radically changes its agenda. [inaudible] >> they specifically said they would not do it in writing. [inaudible] >> well come you can't lose the trade. and the british negotiated with with -- you know, nobody quite knew who to talk to and the secret contacts and so on. it did take 25 years, which is another reason i'm not very optimistic. it took 23 years from the opening of the first secret talks between the british government and the ira to reach the good friday agreement, which in itself in 1998 was signed in at only been partially implemented 13 years later. so that's not why i'm
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tremendously optimistic one of the points in the book and maybe it's worth saying that it's about american exceptionalism. unfortunately, from my point of view today, virtually every award in the united states has been involved in has been dead with the jury, including the civil war. career in vietnam are really the only two where there has been a negotiation. it is a u.n. operation. vietnam is a bilateral u.s. thing with the vietnamese. there were negotiations. henry kissinger achieved to an agreement in 1973. and then two years later, it was violated by the north vietnamese some charges the u.s. had violated aspects of the south vietnamese, but there is a dominant violation came from the
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northern side and sent troops across the dmz into south vietnam and captured eventually by her citizens in saigon and the humiliation of the u.s. ambassador for the embassy, et cetera appeared so for a certain generation of u.s. policymakers there's a feeling that negotiations are a sign of weakness. we don't quit. we don't give up. we fight, we prevail. thus if you do negotiate, these foreigners, whatever you want to call them can't really be trusted as you see the terror paper we just signed an cheap. we are not quitters. they are cheaters. and so that i think makes it much harder politically for the obama administration to come out 100% for negotiations unless they can get republicans to come in behind the idea.
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>> any other questions? >> we've seen a couple of firsts in the last 18 months. the u.s. has tried to reach out and we've gotten burned. we try to reach out and pakistanis immediately arrested him. we try to reach out to mullah us miry and the random shopkeeper. there is a talk in berlin where we struggled because people supposedly the presidential power leaked it to the threats and that was that. so how do you convince skeptics like me that this is really possible? >> well, you're echoing what are they saying a moment ago. that is what i think the crucial names is for the u.s. to change policy. if the u.s. has 100% we are foreign negotiations and will do everything we can to reach out to the different groups and were
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not going to assassinate then. and then the message goes down to a western embassies, to karzai, pakistani government, to everybody and then has to be followed up. it mustn't be rhetorical. it's a very impressive u.s. negotiation. >> among afghans coming to karzai group is much more inclined to negotiate than a lot of the other people in the afghan government, particularly the northern alliance opposition. >> is a very emotional person. sometimes he is said publicly and i'm going to join the taliban and if it goes on like this. and he calls my, my disaffected brothers he has repeated that phrase several times. taliban jan i think he says. so that of course makes them suspicious because at some point there's going to be some secret deal. karzai will handle thing elsewhere because he's posh to.
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so yes, there's massive suspicion on both sides, but i still come back to my basic point, which is the war is not right, c. have to find an alternative. and you have to train and the civil war. perhaps that may be what happens happened sonatas by an pessimistic about that. what may happen eventually as the u.s. will pull out, leave a few thousand troops behind, described the trainers and then the afghan civil war will continue and the kind of comforting psychological line for everybody or to adopt because you there for 10 years, 12 years, try to bring good governance across the constitution and then these people look at them and their chests fighting each other like they did in 1993. >> is it possible that we could pull out, support karzai's war, maybe to 24 and he could survive
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at least in the near-term as you depict in this book. i mean, if the soviet union had collapsed -- >> the taliban and can capture kabul again like they did before, people have a record. when i came in 1996 they were kind of new and people didn't quite know what they represented and people were so fed up with the foyers and said anything was better. now they've lived under the taliban, said they know they're not wonderful. so there's more suspicion. i think you'll be much harder if they were to try to capture kabul to succeed. so that's your need to be too strong. obviously, some afghans to have it. >> let me ask you a question. one school of thought is that the taliban want two things.
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they went out and that they is the one bit of leverage that we have and may also want that. they argue that the real problem is that guys were supporting. this is really, really rich. and the moment they cut a deal with the taliban, and this money, his gravy train is going to stop or everything will slow down. and so, there's so many people getting so rich. some are from afghanistan as well. in some views i do what we need to do is we need to set a date of our own and save three years, all of our troops out of five years. and he said at that point, everybody knows they've got signed a deal. karzai in all these people around him at that point will say okay, reach out to our
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brothers. [inaudible] they start cutting deals, which is why afghanistan deal. until you put a date certain, they'll just written stringers on forever and get very, very rich. all you have to do is go to divide and see where the money is. so how do you see? >> i agree with that. as i have said, gorbachev wanted talks among the afghans in the civil war, but also wanted to send the troops out and he didn't condition one on the other. he was very careful not to be trapped by that because the afghan guards had not conceded and gone and i'm on a soviet troops wasilla. so ultimately it's unilateral comebacker versatile. inserted at yourselves. but he did use the intervening time between taking that decision and the end date for when the soviet troops would
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leave, to try and broker this in traffic and steal to win the civil war. and so that's why obama should make it quite clear that all troops are coming out by the end of 2014. and he is the next two years to really negotiate with the u.n. mediator and into the civil war. >> was very class-size soviet that they get similarly rich by the soviets lavishing money on a? >> it's a fascinating thing because during the research for this, i located reformer ministers of the opposite of the amin and the mashup of the regimes who are living as refugees in london. they can and after 1992 when the
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regime collapsed as political refugees to live in britain. ported to this? they live in public housing estates on the fifth floor, 10th floor, third floor and very modest but there's two or three of them. and quite clear, they did not have a lot of money. and these are men who won was the foreign minister of finance. one was the prime minister. you know committees are men who had access to enormous price of money. and now they living very modestly as refugees. then much less corrupt is what i'm trying to say. [inaudible] >> there was never much national unity in afghanistan in the first place, right? [inaudible] >> can you see away at
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integrating these regional forces in afghanistan itself by changing the constitution and changes that we could, at an early stage, integrate these local forces that have been so strong in the past and will, as i understand, always being the future, too. that would be a think an important ingredient. >> no, i agree. >> other international organizations are trying to bring peace to that country and it has been enough. >> i think the change of constitution is probably essential. and they would ideally involve some sort of revolution of power because kabul has never been popular and collecting taxes are running much. so you would have to have some kind of devolution of power to
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the provinces or groups of provinces to nominate a certain region or whatever you like, but the taliban probably would end up as the dominant force in southern posturing provinces, but that tajiks would remain in the northeast and so on. and kabul would be some kind of federal center without a great deal of power perhaps. i think you would have to do that. ..
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when you looked at the map that there would want to join is pakistan, especially now. in those earlier days it was soviet is pakistan, but they have shown no interest in joining them in northeast afghanistan. no east in joining tajikistan, so somehow there is something, some sort of glue that holds the country together, even if it's only to keep the foreigners out. when we are all together and we can fight happily among
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ourselves. >> the big worry when at third and i were there, how do you avoid a civil war? the americas move out. there is a real worry. but of the americans to withdraw people in the north. warlords. armen themselves. and there is -- i don't think it is the most likely scenario, but there is the question that there is a real chance of another civil war, which is a normal financial burden. just awful. >> well, i think the bickering did talk about the united nations peacekeeping forces. you know, obviously it would be madness for the un to try to occupy the whole country. to be back to square one. the bangladesh and jordanians and indonesian's in our regions. crazy. but just to protect couple.
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that is our most of this, strong and legitimately, some sort of international force would be a good idea. >> transition. and if nothing else, just to give confidence to people who are going to cut these fields. they're real. >> widely necessary. five years after the international agreement. a little guarantee. at the mandated force. >> with regard to the shift to negotiations, talk about and listened to what u.s. politicians say, they tend to have one of two challenges. one is that a lot of them just policy military pull and the international of the nine states. when you have active efforts to
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define the u.s. involvement in the international organization and efforts to flash budgets, non pentagon, foreign policy, there is a real capacity problem and you that permeates a lot of policy-makers. it's a real impediment. the second, the big challenges that they will agree that there is only a political solution. they agree its initiation that is required, but they have the belief that you can only negotiate from a position of strength, and you only get to that position by bringing the taliban to the issue the table. >> did you can negotiate with their right now because they don't want to come to the table. you have to basically beaten to the table. that is a very widely held position, and one that permits a lot of the decision making that takes place in d.c.
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>> well, i think that is an accurate description of reality, and i acknowledge it. i don't know how you deal with that exactly. as i mentioned, you know, american is true in the worst of. the british have had also humiliations. we have negotiated the end of so many wars. was a very successful. northern ireland more recently. so, you know, yemen. you know, so people just feel that's part of it. you can't always win. you have to accept that. it's always good news. but the initiative from strength is a particularly pernicious argument because we carry on fighting. of course you're willing to talk once we have them down.
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i think it really would be important to get the message out that it's a stalemate. maybe you can go 55, 45 of 5347 or something, but ultimately neither side can win. i'm sure people on the taliban sides to the americans are leaving. less negotiate from a position of strength was that the pullout because of domestic pressure in the u.s. and the election campaign. there's always that argument. and you have a conflict situation. anti negotiation or the sale in the issue from strength, but ultimately you know. the world history, is not the u.s. history, negotiations are the best. most wars to end by negotiation. >> well, the other point is that they keep saying we're getting stronger, but the reality, as
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you mentioned the senior fellow here. he makes the point that, in fact, we are in a weaker position of them were three years ago and reelected to be in a weaker position next year. so time is not on our side. we are not getting into a stronger negotiating position. we saw that. the tall ben occupying half the country. and i have a presence in every single province. they do realize. yet to create some incentive. >> it has increased enormously. intercontinental. and then the assassinations of afghan department officials. it's asymmetric warfare. move to assassination.
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the cell phone network. the cell phone closedown. to six in the morning. the taliban say, you know, for different sets itself fund companies. lest you shut down we will blow up your pylons. you know, so the companies abate that. but to shows the economic power. the simple little thing like blowing a pylon. it can undermine, which i use the phone, it's not working. is that sense. >> you have room. the problem is obviously in washington. a roomful of washington activists here. i was listening. you mentioned the cia as a skeptic. now you have the author of the counterinsurgency program running the cia.
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that will be very interesting. it's clear the white house wants out of this. >> very keen. >> all you have to do is read the obama's wars by bob woodward. they're really looking for a way out. >> most americans are against the war and one out. what is stopping obama? >> the military, there was a wonderful piece in the post talking about this militarism. nobody wants -- they all want to be tough. they'll want to spend money and be tough. it's tough to say that we are losing our even that there is no military solution. but is going to happen. i predict that within the next year. they have already. by withdrawing the troops, you can't win a counterinsurgency when your drive down. so the handwriting is on the
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wall. this hour the withdrawal but they're not change the policy. they're going to have to. that's our job. change. and you have to chases germans. we have to get the germans on board. >> they tried to be good. after say that. they don't want. i mean, increase the priced for things by upon a time when everything was blood in a different direction. it cost many, many lives. as the issue here. remain in the necessary civilian process without the west appearing. we have to have a measure of stability there in order to
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justify their own results. and you all know what john is going to come. so how can we find a moment, the right moment where it if it doesn't appear to be a defeat. >> it in your country, france. in the u.k. as well, and certainly this country, it's a very unpopular policy. very unpopular. 85 percent. >> the public opinion, afghanistan, 70 percent afghanistan, 30 percent are not in favor. >> canada has already gone. >> yes. he had that situation. it should not be the end of politics and the end of designing. i would give obama the benefit of doubt. he wants to get out, but he can show weakness in an election year begins republicans and say i would listen to the military.
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you have to find. the of the benefits of afghanistan, be honest about that. if he let the telamon come back right now, as a lot of people, this effort, everybody wants to go school. everybody wants to catch up with modern life. and you have to us go by the ground in a way of coping. the move in the right direction. dallas got that's the way to do it. here's your constitution. take it and implemented. modified. absolutely. modify it. implemented. you're responsible for the ownership.
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>> of wood also hesitate. the soviet model, i mean in a different way. your honor of now. that's what gorbachev told me. >> and that leaves a lot of issues behind. if you tell people you're on their own, find. down the line that's what we want. has to be implemented. but if there's a chance at the same time, it gives them a chance to reestablish will try before. >> but during the crisis of negotiation around the various things including cease and the constitution and so on, exactly what they wanted. it would be forced to compromise.
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everybody has to be realistic. as i pointed that in the speech, of course, you can always say in the speech. nevertheless he is made a public speech. the year that it's a very different kind. when there were making. so everybody change the subject. >> i think that the soviets, for me personally soviet experience was very impressive. when i was reading a lot of it, a lot of documents. anyone here is interested, george wallace in university, the archive has a ton of stuff on my. those archives you were talking about, all on line, and it's very distracting to see gorbachev in 83 saying we need to get out of afghanistan. i mean, a couple of years before he was premier, he already knows. when you look at it in the sense of this country, but this
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mindset, this ideology that pervades soviet foreign policy thinking that you have to have a forward presence. have to defend our borders. some of that revenue comes from their experiences in world war one and/or to being invaded. somehow right there are afraid that what happened this subject. it will flow into the muslim areas, but this idea that one of the things you see in those documents is if we don't know wind the americans will. over and over a. when they're trying to get out and '86 and '87 you can get out because if we get out the americans will come in. and i'm pretty sure there is no american plan to ever go wind, even though we lost all our listening posts. our bases. there was no plan. so what you see coming now is the same thinking within the united states foreign policy establishment. whether it be democrat or republican, this idea of
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containment, for presence. and i think the basis is going to be the biggest issue for us going forward. i think the white house and washington d.c. can live with us withdraw from afghanistan and afghanistan collapsing. car bombs go off in baghdad nearly every day. more civilians are being killed in iraq and are being killed in afghanistan by terrorism attacks every year by a good amount. we don't care. we go on. we don't even tie that into the fact that we are pulling out. i think we do this in afghanistan. the biggest promus going to be basis. i think this idea that we have to have the basis. again, we have this mindset that pervades our foreign policy establishment of contained in a foreign presence. use it against the soviet union which was an industrialized nation a more than 200 people with a couple dozen klan states. we will not use that against al qaeda. and the problem is the you need people. you need a gorbachev tight who
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is able to lead and able to break those contained fonts, those ideas, those born policy standards or based assessments that are not present. the interesting thing, yesterday in rolling stone michael hastings had a very good piece on obama's decision making for libya. very good, very instructive. in d.c. have this train of humanitarian interventionism purveys throughout some of the advisers, and that is what one. that is what pushed the president to intervene in libya, and so i think the same thing is happening right now. not this concern that there will be a collapse in afghanistan, but concern that we will these bases, lose or presence and lose our ability to container predict power into iran or pakistan which of the two places where people get all upset and wet their pants in washington d.c. these days. so i think that is what it comes back to. how did you crack that night and had you get other folks within
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revising the president who is thinking differently or who are tied into this stream of foreign policy that we have for the last 56 decades. that's the real problem. and that's what will get us into other problems in the future unless we break this michael up thinking that we have to before. after a presence. we have to contain. we have to do what we did against the soviet union against groups like alkyne and others. >> china, too. looking ahead, centrally located if you want to project power to china. >> so we all have to read your book. how do we get it? that we get it? >> amazon. i got mine from amazon. i just highly recommended. it's been wonderful. and really appreciate. how long will you be in the
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u.s.? >> well, we are going tomorrow. >> well, i hope tickets widely reviewed. you know, i wish you would both move into the national security council. one likely you. >> the review in rolling stone is something. the thank you very much. [applause] [applause] >> is there a nonfiction opera but you would like to see featured? send us an e-mail. or tweet us at twitter dot com.
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>> this weekend book tv and american history tv look behind the scenes at the history and literary life of that larouche on book tv island hopper c-span2, a trip into the mccotter tonight at 10:55 p.m. said to be in the hands of french revolution activist john paul morrow when he was assassinated in 1793. it only aired once, but it may be the most famous political ever produced. daisy petals and mushroom clouds monday at 5:45 p.m. in american history tv tonight at 6:50 p.m. it served as the model for solarized or cause to come. historians and participants on the impact of the 1953 baton rouge bus boycotts. and a 745 and mature the louisiana state archives of materials dating from the louisiana purchase in 18 at
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three. the 18 to indicate that created a very short-lived west florida republic of louisiana. plus louisiana state had documents all this weekend on c-span2 and three. >> its of this night at the national press club. several different of reserve year selling their bucks to support charity, and one of those of this. when have covered his book, a new voice for israel. first of all,. >> the pro-israel pro peace lobby, new organization about three weeks old. repress for american engagement to help achieve middle east peace. >> how do you stand compared to apec? >> we a part of the jewish community that believes that that today's solution would be in israel's and the united states best interest, and we want to see the president do more, not less to help achieve
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peace. >> what is the new voice? >> the new voices have to essentially provide a counterweight to some of voices. for too long they have reported to speak for the entire jewish community and to have had positions on these issues that are more hawkish than the average jewish-american. and particularly for those two are 40 and under in the jewish community, supporting israel does not mean supporting every decision of the israeli government, and it does not mean taking them focused -- the most hawkish possible view on every issue. >> what is the position that you do support that might be different then what you say? the traditional establishment. >> well, for instance the president gave a speech in may in which he said the two states need to be based on the '67 lines, the pre-1967 border between the west bank and israel we think that is exactly right.
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the president took a great deal of heat from organized jewish groups and other voices. we believe he should have gotten a great deal. that is the only way that israel is actually going to survive at the jewish and democratic country is if it does achieve is to state solution on that basis. >> published a new voice for israel, fighting for the survival of the jewish state. >> book tv recently visited batteries louisiana. the help of our local cable affiliate. the visit was part of our cities tour, checking out literary culture of several locations around the country. next, an interview with drizzle emanu-el. the author of a more noble cause. the struggle for civil rights and louisiana. >> the new wireless civil-rights attorney.
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and he was one of the most influential civil rights advocates for louisiana for about for five decades. and segregating all of the society in louisiana. he came back to louisiana in 1926 after graduating from law school. he used his political career to open doors for african-americans first with cases that dublin teacher salary equalization. he worked with louisiana naacp as well as the national office of the legal defense fund headed by thurgood marshall. and he was read into their philosophy on fighting for civil rights through the legal system. in those cases there was a vote
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of rights public facility and educational opportunities in a non segregated basis. the sheer volume of cases that -- is so impressive. there are some that or more personal and that they involve his son. and those with the cases to desegregate lsu. louisiana state university was not open to african-americans when he started the first in 1946. and in that case there was a postman from new orleans that wanted to attend law school and lsu. there were no law schools for african-americans than in the
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state. and the result of that case was the opening of the law school at southern university. later in the 1950's he fought for -- to open the doors of lsc law school, medical school, graduate school, an undergraduate. these cases where the foreground. 1953, his son was the first african-american to obtain the undergraduate school here. basically it was a media circus. they followed him around budget with all time he was here. he even discussed a time when he had to swim in the pool.
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>> quite a spectacle of having an african-american in a pool that typically is a segregated situation in that time. there were times when he was with the students to abandon his door and these items at his door to try to keep problem by. loud radio and his door. there was isolation, extreme isolation that a talked-about. even the embarrassment in class when teachers didn't know how they would be allowed to speak. and even he said he felt like he was just a social outcast.
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he said for about a we see now finish school. there were some legal maneuvers that i believe the court decides the judge decided that the decision allowed him to come was decided by one judge instead of 83 judge panel while there were dealing with that legal issue, he was asked to leave. he never came back. but to have a father see his son go through some of the things that he did during those eight weeks, it has to be a difficult thing. i remember interviewing his mother. i never got to meet him. he died in 1973.
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and meeting his mother still had tears in her eyes wish to talk about the time and how his -- person was treated. she still talked about those times seeming like a very emotional for him as well. but he also is refreshing in that he now sees it as a town in his life the overcame. it meant something. melanie sees the students on campus now, the alumni chapter that was formed in his dad's name and the building on campus that was named for his dad, and the number of students like students that are getting a good education, he feels like he d

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