i didn't cover the trial so for me to go back to the record, to go back and see how the reporters inside the courtroom covered it, how abundance and the policy makers and some of the public opinion people bold public opinion in the newspapers, you know, how they all go about it everybody is beginning to throw flags and seaweed and it is this america? can you really prosecute somebody like this? and use testimony that's supposed to be secret from another grand jury? there are all kind of legal corners that were already cut but it showed you that they were bound and determined to finally get edwin edwards, and they did. but he survived it and now he's in his rv traveling the country.

>> jonathan who has covered afghanistan since 1981 talks about the soviet experience in that country from the lesson is the obama administration learned from it. it's hosted by the center for international policy. >> skycam at the center for international policies and we welcome jonathan steele and all of you and in particular his wife and i was in afghanistan in august with edward over here and i was stunned by the security in kabul. anybody have one point the british consoles have a six hour fire fight and we are sitting in power in our bunker in our hotel

my colleagues had been narrowing of this. i want to talk about these guys renting these security advances in afghanistan and kabul because kabul had been more less out of the fight. i had been reading your book. it is phenomenally good and we welcome you here and look forward to hearing from you for some questions. -- before very much for coming. what i wanted to is give a little bit of a flavor of what it was like during the soviet occupation because as was just said one of the main themes of the book is a sort of comparison and contrast between the soviet occupation and the u.s. british nato occupation today. and then i want to end with the seven-point plan for peace, how we all get out of here.

i was in the middle of an interview with the afghan foreign minister when the heavy boom of the detonation interrupt the us. what was the explosion i asked? explosion? solution the minister responded with raising of his eyebrows as though i was imagining things. it was november, 1981. almost two years since the troops had invaded and the officials been from moscow and its allies in kabul is that everything is under control. yes, the dynamite team and another boom sounded then distanced. he looked eager to assure me that i was mistaken if i thought that i could hear the sound of the war in central kabul which is the stone's throw from the presidential palace they do almost every day. the minister wanted me to

understand that the explosions couldn't be military. he destroyed the main items of the bandits and they can't act in a group formed it's only a few individuals who indulge in the terrorist activities and sabotage which is common all over the world. we hope to limit that also. now in the first weeks after the invasion of december, 1979 the it and so confident of the quick victory that gave the western reporters astonishing access even allowing them to ride in the cars and taxis alongside the stove because soviet convoys. by the spring of 1980, the mood had changed. they were no longer welcome. only for the trusted soviet. the war became taboo in the media. while the western journalists applied for visas were routinely refused.

so the only way was to endure the days and nights of walking along the precarious mountain paths with guerrilla fighters from the mujahideen from the safe havens in pakistan. a few stories that appeared in the western paper were cautious, sensible and low key. but many were self promoting accounts by the reporters on the afghan will then have to slip into afghanistan alongside the men with guns. mujahideen groups of course carried this adventure journalism as i call that uncritical, exaggerating and occasionally dishonest. but it helped bring support and funding from the western government and sympathetic groups. by 1981, the soviets were realizing the no visa policy is a mistake. the case wasn't being heard. so a handful of western journalists were let in for short trips in small groups were occasionally on their own.

so november of that year 1981 on an autumn morning after changing planes and an overnight stay in the heat of india's capital was struck by the extraordinary clarity as anybody that has been there recently knows the sky is deep blue and the color almost matches the country's most famous mineral the city sits on the plateau by the mountains with dust. the word was actually invented if you like for these mountains in central asia. behind them cluttering in the distance the snowcapped peaks of the hindu kush. but it wasn't just a couple's majestic surroundings that exude a sense of calm. the city itself did. where was the war? where per the rational is i wondered? in the two weeks i spent i saw hardly a single soviet troop. the soviets prefer to leave as many as possible to afghan so

they could. the effort in kabul was successful and security was an afghan army and police hands. what i could see the soviets were indeed able to depend on afghans for the urban law in order. i need to subsequent trips during the soviet occupation in 1986 and '88 and on both it was exactly the same. the suicide attacks had become a permanent threat in today's kabul. but unknown during the soviet occupation afghans went about their daily business without the fear of sudden slaughter. unlike kabul today where no diplomats foreign contractors have their partners or their children with many soviet diplomats king with their families. the soviet embassy had a flourishing kindergarten, grade school and high school and the city's university campuses most young women were unveiled as for

most of the females in banks, stores, schools, factories and government offices. a few were the head scarf over their hair but only in the bazaar were the poor people shocked with the increasing common. from the evidence in my own eyes the mujahideen claims were false the dozens of the stores in the street as much land from the countryside as they needed. pomegranates, watermelons, grapes spelled out. i never discovered the definitive explanation for these explosions that i had heard during the interview with the foreign minister, but his point was unaffected by the destruction of the war and was actually banned. i had no other explosions to bring my time in the city. of course the countryside was another story. but the united nations guest house in kabul, the favorite place congregated aid workers and their frustration with the restrictions they faced.

the u.n. had dozens of consultants involved in the rural development but they were not allowed out of kabul to supervise the project they were supposed to be running. the government officials admitted that because of the mujahideen's activities land reform was operating in only a quarter of the country's districts and half of the schools in afghanistan were closed. similar to the situation today i think. foreign invaders and the afghan cities with some help from the local security forces to keep open the main roads that connect the cities that penetrating the country's villages and finding support is an altogether harder task can of course it is particularly hard in the southeastern country that borders on pakistan. every day during the soviet period house with now dozens of resistance fighters infiltrate afghanistan from the bases and refugees camps just as they do today. so it wasn't surprising that

mikhail gorbachev who became the soviet leader in 1985 asked the general who was the soviet military commander of the time and afghanistan to evaluate the army's options. as they reported the only way to achieve military success would be to seal the country's borders with pakistan and this would require at least a quarter of a million troops. he said this is unrealistic. sound familiar again? how many times that u.s. commanders and diplomats urged pakistan to stop the infiltration of taliban and al qaeda fighters? shortly before gorbachev took over, the head of the defense ministry's operational urban afghanistan had warned the kremlin to the afghan government was failing and the key counterinsurgency strategy of holding the territory.

his comments were the same as the problems facing u.s. voters today. he was counterinsurgency works for the same form of the clear build. but like the russians, the americans and the british and kandahar and helmand find the clearing is much easier than holding were willing. now the origins of the soviet decision to send troops into afghanistan were quite similar to those of the americans in the september and october, 2001. the kremlin wanted the regime change in kabul just like the americans. in 1979 the soviet leader brezhnev was furious with the afghan had murdered his rivals and assumed total power. the kremlin wanted him out. so the first task the the soviet forces undertook when they reached kabul was to assassinate but anchor in revenge are not

the best guides to claim the political decision making. the kremlin had considered invading afghanistan at the various points during 1979 to defeat the insurgency which is already operating against the government. but it repeatedly ruled out the intervention on the ground that it would only make things worse. finally, in december 1979, brezhnev was so furious, so desperate to remove the daughters -- doubters. similar to the mood in 2001 after 9/11 here. the bush administration was consumed by the notion in there and revenge and of course it wasn't confined to the of penetration in the american public wanted that, too. pnac. the americans expected the intervention to be short, just as the russians did in 1979. they bought the regime change would be achieved for rapidly in

kandahar, quickly. the foreign sources would then be able to leave. no serious thought was given in moscow or in washington to the possibility that the armed resistance would develop or that the strategy of the regime change whatsoever and soon more into nation-building. when i talk to soviet officials in kabul in those years and 1980's i heard the same language that i was to hear from the u.s. and british officials a quarter of a century later the talked about afghanistan's poverty, lack of development that promised to modernize the country, introduce good governance and the resistance was greater than had been before the troops arrived but they were reluctant as indeed the british and the americans are not to concede that the presence of foreign forces had increased resistance and support of new insurgency's on the nationalistic and patriotic lines. they turned their eyes away from evidence that the intervention has actually made things worse. they prefer to see the russians

as a struggle between the progress of the afghan government and a fanatical the insurgency. the american and british officials to take a one of the so-called ten dollar a taliban who say they are just fighting for money or because of the grievances or because the young men who are unemployed. the over local of the surveys that have been done in taliban attitudes, taliban fighters attitudes to show that most of them are motivated by and that is a desire to protect against foreign occupation, just as the mujahideen were doing against the russians in the 1980's. let me now come to the differences. those are the similarities between the soviet and the american occupations. now, the differences and they're really almost more important. march, 1985 as i mentioned the soviet union got a new leader mikhail gorbachev. like barack obama, gorbachev had inherited a war which his

predecessors have started and wasn't going well. obama famously described the war might in afghanistan has not a choice but a necessity. gorbachev that were trapped himself in that kind of language. his instinct was the war was a stalemate. the soviet army could not be defeated. on the the other hand, the russians could not defeat the other side. they were trapped in the war of attrition with no end in sight. the war was taking a toll on the soviet lives. total losses defeated 9,000 by the time that gorbachev came five years after the war started. now the opening of most of the kremlin archives since the collapse has given this remarkable insight into the discussions of the transcript of the meetings that went on in the soviet. so we know a great deal of what is going on and when gorbachev

met the afghan leader that they had imposed after murdering the new leader had been five years by the time gorbachev came in, garbage of's message to him was we know this term. you naturally understand as other members of the afghan leadership obviously do the the soviet troops cannot stay in afghanistan forever. so that is the first difference between the two occupations. gorbachev decided early on the war was not winnable. obama is not yet to concede it at that point. the second crucial difference is that the soviet military made no attempt to oppose gorbachev's view in fact they shared it. we know that the chief of the general staff told the november of 1986, and i quote, after seven years in afghanistan there is not one square meter left

untouched by a boot of a soviet soldier. but as soon as they leave the enemy returns and restores it all back the way that it used to be. so it was gorbachev's response being faced in the legacy from his predecessor? he didn't decide the problem had to be solved by trying to build the afghan army but the policies that obama and david cameron have adopted. no, he invited them to come to moscow and told them he had to negotiate with the insurgents. and after one of those meetings, gorbachev told the soviet colleagues that he had been blunt with the afghan leader. quote, i told him if you want to survive, you have to broaden their regime social basis. forget about socialism, share power with the people who have authority including the leaders

of the bands and organizations that are now hostile towards and the hostile organizations. he didn't have a soviet david petraeus. telling him the more troops would make a significant difference. nor did he to his strategy of building of the afghan army as nato is trying to do. the plan is to keep heavily defended oliver afghanistan but now put afghan troops instead of the foreigners. it will help. one reason is actually the bulk of the afghan national army consists of the tashi exit is backs of in the past two areas of the south, they are considered just as foreign as the nato troops. nato officials recently admitted that the program of trying to get more pasterns into the

afghan national army has the objective of getting in the end of this year to fall. 4%. but anyway, the key point is the strategy is doomed, but merely perpetuates the war high-cost of money. the only way out as gorbachev decided was through the talks. ideally he saw this happening in the various levels. one was the regional international level to get the neighboring countries outside on board and the other was among afghans between the government and the insurgency and the soviet leader's fortunate in the there was already the international trucks and after the invasion of the u.n. and whose mission was to try to persuade the kremlin to pullout of the formula whereby pakistan and the u.s. would stop the insurgents from using pakistan as a base called out of

afghanistan it came up. it came up with the actual u.n. meetings. under brezhnev peace talks haven't gone anywhere. gorbachev took them seriously and they went forward and in the agreement of april, 1988 in geneva, which allowed the authorized full pullout of the troops. now he had hoped, gorbachev had hoped this deal would be matched by one between the various afghan parties and would then end the civil war and create the government of the national unity. but he was careful not to condition the two things on each other. he didn't try to link the implementation of the soviet withdrawal to an interim afghan agreement because that could have risked the delay in the soviet pullout. so in february, 1989 the last soviet troops did pullout nine years after they had entered afghanistan. but the moscow government did

not fall as many in washington had predicted the stayed in power for another three years continually trying to talk to the mujahideen leadership as well as to representatives of the other main center of the afghan resistance which was the former king who was in exile in italy. so that is the first of the difference between the russian and the american war. gorbachev put real pressure on his plans in kabul to reach out to the opposition and forge a coalition government. obama by contrast only pays lip service to the idea of the negotiations. no real political muscle behind it. well i want to went to the failure of the afghan a initiations except to say that response will for the very largely is because the total and don't negotiate you will win even julie and you will have the

whole thing, no need to negotiate. and so this myth and one of the things i deal with in the books conference 13 myths about afghanistan. one is that the west walked away after 1989 and is complete nonsense and the west continued to arm the cia, continued to arm the mujahideen and told them not to negotiate in the book that cannot recently he was on foot to the mujahideen and makes it quite clear that was u.s. policy. and yet somehow in the mind of the people as the west walked away and i heard ryan crocker give an interview in august i think it was of "the wall street journal" he used the same phrase again said we will not walk away like we did in 1989. incredible how this is allowed to maintain itself. now let me come onto the issue of talks.

what are the obstacles? as the negotiations atmosphere was clouded by fear and suspicion along with teacher and ander and the loss of loved ones, the television and the manly pashtu in and tashi, was that minorities are worried that they might seize control of the country once again. for yet taliban are worried that the u.s. will never leave and the recent murder of the firmer president who is the head of the high peace council was tightened in the suspicions. although it is notable that taliban not claim the response of the for his murder. now some people say that the taliban are not interested in the talks because they think that they just wait long enough they will find everything just like the mujahideen were told in the 1980's, end of the 1980's. the nseries contact is made with the taliban leadership no one can really be certain what their position is. we cannot prejudge in advance and say they are not interested

in the negotiations unless they made contact. and there has been evidence of the flexibility on the taliban side building up. so the sensible possiblities to open a dialogue and try to discover their views. and we do know that in september this year, the end of ramadan the taliban leader marked the remarkable statement that showed that his goal, stated goals to improve ordinary afghans are not to continue al qaeda's global jihad. they are not interested in the global jihad. they are concerned about the future of afghanistan alone. most have always argued the taliban had a different perspective from the arabs who use their country as a safe haven. and the ramadan statement with a long way toward confirming that. although he didn't directly address washington's demand that

the taliban disassociate itself, the speech portrayed his organization very clearly as one with afghan interests in mind and not a global jihad against the rest. he talked about the abysmal poverty and the need to develop its foreign investment. he tried to reach out to the the sheikhs, uzbeks by promising that come close, all ethnicities will have participation in the regime and portfolios will be dispensed on the basis of the marriage. he said again, "contrary to the propaganda launched by our enemies, the policy of the islamic tel dan is not aimed at monopolizing power. so they've changed the line from what they had in 1996 when they captured kabul and they did try to monopolize power. the key obstacle to the serious negotiation lives here in the city. in the duty and in a decision within the obama administration

of paralyzing policy-making. the cia appears to recognize it is a stalemate that was a very interesting by david ignatius in september of "the washington post" saying that the assessment of afghanistan by the cia which somebody hadn't shown him but talked about in broad terms used the word still meet repeatedly. unfortunately, obama's speech in july when he announced the drawdown of the 30,000 troops set almost nothing about the negotiations. it maintained the existing strategy and kept open the option of u.s. troops made indefinitely in afghanistan and even as we speak, ryan crocker has been tasked with working out what is a strategic partnership agreement and this by little usf in agreement with authorized a long-term basis after 2014 for as many as 30 to 40,000 u.s.

troops in afghanistan. it might be designed in a different way not as combat troops but as traders, advisers, logistics experts, but they would still be armed, uniformed u.s. troops. this agreement, this strategic partnership agreement is a disaster waiting to happen. if it is between karzai and the americans it will completely seven kaj any chance of talks. since they insist on the complete departure of all u.s. and foreign troops. they've been fighting on the nationalist terms to the occupation for the last ten years and they are not going to stop fighting as long as the u.s. troops remain in the country. maintaining the u.s. troop presence will also undermine the objective of the neutral afghanistan which is the object of everyone in afghanistan's neighbors. they don't want foreign troops in their either. so the bilateral deal between the u.s. and kabul to base the

troops after 2014 would make nonsense. now let me come onto the seven-point fact which is really two main points and five from it. the first thing obama has to do is to announce a change of course towards negotiations. now ideally, he would say that the war is not winnable but i recognize that is very difficult for the u.s. president to say. it's not as bad as saying we have been defeated which is terrible and i don't think he would say that and that is terrible. but even to say the war mike is not winnable would be a step too far but it would have to be made clear after the president said we are moving 100% towards negotiations and all of the briefings that the administration officials give to people to say our assessment is the one the cia gave in july the war isn't winnable and we would

go on and on and on if we pursue it. second is to announce new u.s. goals for afghanistan. and the first of these would be the creation of a government of the national unity that includes representatives of all of the insurgent groups and therefore the and the risk of the new round of the civil war when the foreigners leave. the government of national unity, the government of the national salvation in different countries after the arrangements have been made come up with different, but the point is the same. second, the goal would be the establishment of a sovereign independent non-aligned afghans state. third, the u.s. would seek the new government that would not accept any al qaeda activity in

afghanistan. so those are the two main things. the change of course and the highlighting of the need for the creation of the government of national unity. now come from that are other things. first, obama should suspend immediately the current talks on the strategic partnership agreement between the u.s. and afghanistan which would authorize as i just had described the in defendant troops. that agreement must be immediately suspended. number four, the bounty on the head of mullah omar which is several million dollars should be lifted. and all the other television and insurgent leaders must have their bounties on their heads where it applies lifted and the u.s. should support the opening of the taliban office in dubai

or wherever else of the taliban leaders can travel without fear of arrest or assassination. .. andy gdc spare, which lasted several months is greatly the kind of model. unfortunate and the american didn't mind like it and they sabotage it by assessing whether the taliban leaders in the area

and they set the agreements often we entered the town. which had been demilitarized them all forces gone now. but that is really the model, to try to agree to cease-fire seizing tribal elders between local commanders and the u.s., rather than the current policy, which it do the constant night raids, a dozen raids on taliban, suspected taliban compounds with local commanders and many of them ended killing civilians. next, the administration should support the appointment of the united nations mediator to start the talks without the afghan groups as those at the regional powers, exactly on the exactly understand patterns that tito cortez was trying to do in the 1980s and probably in the report came out in march this year advocated exactly that of the u.n. mediator who can start peace talks.

and the final point is that the conferences planned in istanbul in november and banned in december this year should be delayed indefinitely. because at the moment, the agenda at these two conferences, which the administration is planning is essentially to try and isolate the taliban and, call on the surrender to support the garrison strategy, which is the current payout policy. these conferences. they can ratify an international agreement. and for the regional powers to make patches that they accept neutrality that they will no longer interfere. at the conference business come at the end of the process, not

now where they are propaganda attempts by the administration to further isolate the taliban. thank you fan match. [applause] >> well, thank you. >> there's so many things in this book that i love. you made this and it just amazes me. and i think it's true -- [inaudible] the point you make, the soviet military did not pose the civilian decision, whereas in this country, the civilian leadership, the friends of mine covered the very, very closely from the "washington post." the white house wants out. all they want is, as he said of

the russians, all they want is to get out and keep doing that. my wife who covers the military says they don't like to lose wars. the military has huge influences in the country. and you know, it's gotten to the point where again as we said earlier, the game changers enter the dataset. the republican -- most of the republican presidential contenders also are calling for a speedy react to her. >> they haven't, sir sanders said, support talks. i mean, if republican candidates were saying everyone out, but the way out through talks. typically say we want out it's a bit like nixon in 1968 saying i have a plan and hubert humphrey did not want to wait five more years of war under nixon. >> they are not known for deep

thinking. i don't know what they want to do with the economy level in afghanistan, but in a sense a case obama the political curve to change course without being called a softy. in listening to you after listening to now for the last year, he's been telling me various things. and of course, on our trip -- matt, and you want to say anything? this week, marcus had, marcus had filling in for previously british ambassador said we made a lot of mistakes in political alienation and to push them to

very similar to what we saw in iraq, our exclusion and alienation push they gave comments follow up on and comments outlined that peace in afghanistan over been the american government. that backs up my five months out of the air, we was actually our policy was not to we were told that comment on why we are several years experience

using the northern island analogy, sometimes you have to start talking to people shooting at you and there is no other way. however distasteful it may be. and i think at the time, the speech was completely ignored in washington and the state didn't pick it up at all and get a new in britain. i don't know why macs that -- i don't know mark at all. i met him once or twice. he used to be rather gung ho, peddling the kind of efficient lines. so it is not changed, maybe it's the same sort of view that's hopeless. in some ways, the british are more keen to stay there than the u.s. military because the former head of the army, after iraq, was very wide about forthcoming defense cuts. and he told sharon, actually

it's in his book, you know, it's a question i've used them, not lose them. i'm afraid if we don't send our troops to afghanistan, they will be cut. the defense budget will be cut him a lot have any troops. it's completely cynical. so it's a bureaucratic empire. and you know, if you say that 30,000 u.s. troops coming out according to the obama plan, which is just under a third of u.s. troops, that it's actually over the next two years 18 months. it's a quicker pace on the british with job. if 5000 out of the almost 10,000 with god. we are reducing proportionally less from the american side. >> a follow-up for the mediator. you see anyone out there in your travels and her talks, d.c. a bloc of nations or different

groups or individuals who would be appropriate for that role? search on may, it cannot be -- you know, you talk about the things that the u.n.? such credit and afghanistan, particularly with the insurgency that a u.n. broker talks would be difficult as well because of the credibility problems. so you do see any groups or institutions or nations or individuals? >> sunset had to be a muslim, but that's a bit artificial. i think it not line of argument ensues partly as a way to saying he has to be the man. but he getting on a bit now. i think he is coming up to 75. i think he still very active and quite ambitious and so he probably would quite like to have the job, but i'm not sure whether anyone would agree with that. bendel, the former e.u. representative has been

mentioned as well. he's younger, mid-60s they think. and he is very active and extremely knowledgeable and it's always been an advocate of talks. >> he said a lot in the u.n., cambodia and elsewhere, so he would be good. >> thank you very much. very, very interesting and fascinating comparison between the soviet experience. you're right about many points. and i happen to believe that once we switch to counterterrorism strategy to counter insurgency, we enlarge the political complexity exponentially. and that is what we're meant to do, based on this

counterterrorism, counterinsurgency strategy, which blamed phenolic complexity of past events in pakistan and other countries send this never-ending environment. i was surprised and i'm glad you mentioned 4% of the afghan army is passion. >> ethical. >> already. even worse. in reality, we are talking about what? is that whether this? >> there's about 45 in the population. >> okay. and the additional issue is of course posh tent in afghanistan and passions in pakistan. we have to see the complexity of the issue. and now to the key question that i found very interesting that you believe it is possible to create this national unity

government, including posh 10 in the original sin of the conference has used that was in 2002. 2001. was the course no inclusion of the taliban and passion that was mostly northern alliance and all of that. and what shootout was a problem from the beginning. and still, we did a better job i would say than any empire before , right? you can go to the soviet union. we did create a constitution in the islamic republic. that has never been done before under colonial efforts. so far you have a starting point on how to create this national

unity approach that is the critical issue here. and how to include the pashtun any meaningful way. at the two-year mark your reasoning of why you think this is possible and why it is useful to reach the goal to drop, let's say in december where we will try to make an effort to stabilize and demilitarize the whole country. >> that's what we have to do. >> demilitarize the whole thing. the military can only achieve so much. and the issue from the beginning with much more of a civilian after and maybe some other force is the regular military forces to militarize the whole country. and so, i don't get the point of

using the one conference because, you know, suppose we would be able to make a demilitarization and reduce the role of western powers to a nonmilitary effort, i would see that as a contribution to creating a kind of national unity that was given and that we've been missing so far. >> well, let me do it the three points. first of all, i wouldn't say that i'm optimistic. i would not spam optimistic. i'm quite pessimistic because of the complexity of the issues, and the degree of hostility on all sides and a history of afghan political news negotiation. you know, what would happen in the 1980s when they try to form a government of national unity and when the mujahedin finally got control in kabul and then started a civil war among

themselves, even though they were all allegedly on the same side because they had been fighting it together in the knowledgeable regimes. so i'm not truly optimistic. i am not saying the government of national unity is possible. so the point is to know where you're going or where you want to go and do everything try and get there. so i think it is the only desirable way is through talks. now with the conference in december is to have an agenda, which is to support 100% united negotiations in line with the thing i said in my seven-point plan, that the u.s. president sometime in the next few weeks says this is a complete change of policy. we are going towards this end in istanbul, which is the regional conference and a wider one, that's fine. i mean, i don't see that as the current agenda of the conference

is. they have a new obstacle as they pursue the current agenda. so i'd rather have no conference than one that makes things worse. so by all means come use whatever instance you have to change the conference and get them to come out for talks. but i'm afraid because it's literally 10 years after the 2001 conference, it will be a self-congratulatory thing as over 10 years we've achieved good governance and how many schools have been built in all this usual thing and a huge jamboree. but that will be part of the self-congratulation. were doing well, it's got to there were building up the afghan army. plus, the isolation of the taliban, which i mentioned before is the second part of the agenda. so you know, i see it as an obstacle, not a step forward unless it radically changes its agenda. >> no representatives will tell you invited.

>> no, no is invited. they will not be invited. [inaudible] >> well, you can't tell until you start trying. when the british negotiated with ireland, nobody really quite good to talk to in the contacts and so on. it do take 25 years, which is another reason i'm not very optimistic. it took 25 years -- 22 years actually from the secret talks of the british government and the ira to reach the friday agreement, which in itself in 1998 was signed in partially implemented 13 years later. so that's not what i'm tremendously optimistic. one of the points i make in the book and it's worth saying is that it is about american exceptionalism. unfortunately, from our point of

view today, virtually every war the united states has been involved in has ended with the very, including the civil war. korea and vietnam are really the only two wars that the u.s. is involved in, where there was a negotiation. we are to one side because it was a u.n. operation essentially. vietnam was a bilateral u.s. thing with the vietnamese. the road negotiations, henrik is under achieved an agreement in comparison in 1973. and then two years later, it was violated by the north vietnamese. i mean, there were some charges the u.s. had violated in the south vietnamese had violated certain aspects. but a dominant violation came from the northern side and sent troops across the dmz into south vietnam and captured eventually i gone with the humiliation that

the u.s. ambassador leaving by helicopter et cetera. so i think for certain generation of u.s. policymakers, there is a feeling that negotiations are a sign of weakness. we don't quit. we don't give up. we fight, we prevail. as if you do negotiate, these foreigners, whatever you want to call them can't be trusted and they are cheaters. we are not quitters. cheaters. and so, that i think makes it much harder politically for the abandonment to come out 100% for negotiation unless they can get republicans to come in behind the idea and then it doesn't become another childish juvenile thing that you're quitting. now you are, yes you are and so on. >> any other questions? >> i'm a little bit of a negotiation skip day. we have seen a couple efforts in the last 18 months or the u.s.

has tried to reach out and we've gotten very. we try to reach out and the pakistanis immediately arrested them. we try to reach out it was a random shop keeper. the entire talks in berlin where struggle because people supposedly in the presidential palace leaked it to the press and that was bad. so how do you convince skeptics like me that this is really possible? >> well, you are echoing what i was saying a minute ago, but that is what i think the crucial thing is for the u.s. to change policies. if the u.s. is 100% and recharge of the different search engine, we are not going to assassinate when lifting the bounty and so on. and then the message goes down to the line to other western embassies, jakarta site, pakistani government, to everybody has to be followed up.

it has to be followed a very impressive u.s. negotiations. >> questions of the karzai among them much more inclined to negotiate than the afghan government, particularly the northern alliance opposition. >> is a very emotional person because sometimes you said publicly i'm going to join the taliban. and he says my brothers, my disaffected brothers said that phrase several times. taliban jan i think he said. so that of course makes them suspicious because they think at some point this could be some secret deal and karzai will and the whole thing over. so yes, there's massive suspicion, but i still think the war is not working, so you have

to find an alternative. and you have to try and end the civil war. i mean, there's the argument the u.s. pulls out. and perhaps that may be what happens and i'm pessimistic about that. what may happen eventually if the u.s. will pull out, leave a few thousand troops behind described as trainers and then the afghan civil war will continue and the comforting psychological line for everybody or to adopt and were there for 10 years, 12 years and we brought a constitution and then these people look at them in ages fighting each other like they did in 1993. >> is it possible that we could pull out and support karzai, maybe after 2014 will be someone else and he could survive at least in the near-term. i think you depicted in this book, najibullah -- i mean --

>> the taliban can capture kabul again. people have a record. when they came in 1996, and they were new and people didn't quite know what they represented and it was with a four years of fighting in kabul and they said many things to do than this. now they've lived under the tile again, so they know they are not wonderful. so there's more suspicion. so i think will be much harder or they try to capture kabul to succeed. so i don't think that fear need to be too strong but they could take over, but obviously some afghan do. >> let me ask you a question. one school of thought is that the taliban want two things. they want us out and negotiating that they is the key aspect. and they also want something

sociable. harrison argues that the real problem is that guys are supporting this gravy train. these guys are really, really rich. from the moment they cut a deal with the taliban, this money come in these gravy trains want to stop or at least slow down. and so, there's so many people getting so rich and some inside afghanistan as well. and they argue that we need to do is we need to set our own. they save three years, all of our troops out. he said at that point, everybody knows they've got to cut some sort of deal. karzai in all these people around him at that point will say okay, reach out to our brothers. it's not that china and the soviet union here. they struck a deal, which is what afghans do. until you put it big in certain,

they will strengthen us on to get very, very rich. all you have to do is see where the money ends. so how you see -- >> i agree with that. as i've said, gorbachev wanted talks among the afghans to in the civil war, but he also won at the soviet troops out. he didn't condition when on the other. he was very careful not to be trapped by that because the talks had not succeeded and gone on and on so that troops would still been there. so we had to say, this ultimately is a unilateral decision, irreversible. we are pulling out and you can sort it out yourselves. but he did use the intervening time between taking that decision in the end made from the soviet troops will leave to try and broker does intra- afghan deal to in the civil war. so that is what i'm saying and create in that case that obama

should make it quite clear that all troops coming out by the end of 2014, not leave behind this indefinite presence and use the next three years to really negotiate as possible through the u.n. mediator and into the civil war. >> was very class of soviet -- to the soviet regime get rich by the soviets lavishing money on them? >> the fascinating thing because during the research of this, i located three former ministers of the ahmad shah massoud and a button regime. they came in after 1992 when the ahmad shah najibullah or shame collapsed. they got assignment from the government as political refugees to live in britain. where did they live? they live in public housing estates on the fifth floor, 10th floor, third floor and

very modest two, three room flat. and quite clearly, they do not have a lot of money. one of these was the foreign minister of finance, the mayor of kabul, one with the prime minister. these have access to enormous parts of money and a living modesty as refugees. i think they were much less corrupt is what i'm trying to say. >> now we are getting archive. >> can i just come back? >> there was never much unity in afghanistan in the first place. can you see away of better integrating these regional sources in afghanistan at self by changing the constitution or

changes so we could at an early stage integrate these local forces that have been so strong in the past and will, as i understand, always be in the future, too. i would be an important ingredient. >> now, i agree. the other international organizations try to bring peace to that country. i mean, -- >> ii think the change of constitution is probably essential. and it would ideally involve some sort of devolution of power because kabul has never been very powerful in terms of collect team taxes were running much. so you would have to have some kind of devolution of power to the provinces or groups of provinces nominated as regional or whatever you like, but certainly devolution. the tableau band would end up as

the dominant force in the southern posh pashtun province says and kabul would use some kind of federal center without a great deal of power perhaps. i think probably would have to do to. on the question of what do you do about the so-called warlords in these private armies, and that is very complicated how you would do that. i mean, i think that was one of the failures that they didn't demobilize the armies properly and they were allowed to remain as they were. and then in the first elections, initially anybody who is head of the armed group was not allowed to be a candidate and a u.n. survey drew up the rules for, for parliament. but then very last minute, such pressure from the warlords at the u.n. changed its own rules and said no, after a anybody can be a candidate, so all these

people like abdul rashid dostum get into parliament and so on. >> you wouldn't go as far as say we've created a separate state in afghanistan? >> i wouldn't go that far, no. i mean, afghanistan is amazingly held together. you might've thought you looked at the map that someone want to join use pakistan. their earlier days in the soviet was use pakistan, that these attacks have shown no interest in joining them. they have shown no interest in joining tajikistan. so somehow there is some sort of glue that holds the country together, even if it is therefore in. we can fight tapley among ourselves. >> big worry when edward and i were there, the big worry was how to avoid the civil war when

americans without and people in kabul that if the americans to withdraw, as people in the northern respects anti-sheiks and warlords are arming each other tonight there is -- i don't think it's the most likely scenario, but there is a question that there is a real chance of another war, which is a horrible -- just awful. >> well, the bickering bohemia report talked about some piece writing shows for kabul. obviously there would've been honest with you in to occupy the whole country and then were back to square one. the indonesians in the norwegian% gain. but just to protect the rule and most of us fear it is strong and perhaps legitimately. maybe they're some sort of international force the e.u.

good idea. >> during the transition period. if for nothing else, just to give contracts to people who are going to cut these deals. >> it might be necessary for five years after an agreement for some guarantee your mandated in the capital city perhaps. >> with regard towards the shift towards negotiation, when utah policymakers unless into a they say, they tend to have more of a challenge in covering to a position of two more years. one is that a lot of them just only see military and international. when you have that developers to define coming in upcoming u.s. involvement in international innovation and slash the budget is not then again internet for

policy rules, there is a real capacity and view that permeates policymakers that it's a real impediment. the second thing that's taken hold of a lot of the big challenges that they will agree there is only a political solution. he agreed as a negotiation required, but they believe you could only negotiate from a position of strength and you only get to that position by bringing the taliban to the negotiating table by point of gun. >> you can't negotiate with tel aviv where they are right now because they don't come to the table. that is a very widely held position and one that permeates a lot of decision-making that takes place in d.c. or wondering if you could comment. >> now, that's an accurate description of reality and i lj. i don't know how you do it that exactly because, as i mentioned,

this american history and ignores is a big tree always. the british have had lots of humiliation and we've negotiated the end of so many words in kenya, cyprus and palestine that were very successful. so, you know, and northern ireland were recently. you know, people just sort of feel that is part of thing. you can't always win. you have to accept that here the history is not always goodness. but the negotiating from strength is really a particularly pernicious argument because you tend to have it both ways. of course were willing to talk once they've got them down here. but you know, that's why think it would really be important to get the message out that the wars they still made. you know, maybe inside a 50/50

or 55, 454-5347, but ultimately neither side can win. i'm not sure people at taliban hate the americans are leaving, why do we say and strength when it had pulled out because of domestic power. so there's always that argument in any conflict situation or negotiation for strings, but ultimately in world history is none of u.s. history. it is negotiation for the best way and most words to end a negotiation. [inaudible] >> yeah, yeah. >> well, the other point is they keep saying you mentioned princess gran drell was a senior fellow and has long been 40 years. he makes a point that in fact we are in a weaker position now that we were three years ago and will likely be in a weaker

position next year. so he may not be losing, but we are not getting into a stronger negotiating position. i'm not pointed out and certainly edward and i thought that the taliban are controlling half the country. there is no sign that. they do realize we are in a withdraw. so you got some great incentives. >> as you said in the beginning, it's increased enormously. [inaudible] and then the assassinations of afghan government officials have gone up, the figures show. it's asymmetric warfare. they moved to assassination. then there's the story, the interesting story in "the new york times," where half of the provinces of afghanistan, the

taliban said two people at different cell phone companies, unless you shut down, we are going to blow up your pipelines and mosques and so on. so companies obey that. thatcher shows economic power. a simple little thing like blowing up a pipeline can undermine -- make everybody use a phone that is not working. it's because of the taliban. so it is that since it is so powerful. >> we've got a room full of people where the problem is obviously -- as i was listening to you coming you mention the cia is the one sort of skeptic. now you've got the author of an insurgency program running the cia. it will be interesting to see how that plays out. but it's clear that the white house wants out.

[inaudible] >> the president, all you have to do is read obama's words by bob woodward. they're really looking for a way out. >> the polls show that most americans are against the war and walked out. and what is stopping obama? >> you know, there is a wonderful piece in the post today, talking about the military. they all want to be tough here. they don't want to spend money on the military. they want to be tough. such as they were losing or even that there is no military solution. but i predict within the next year you might just see i was dry and 33,000 troops coming you can't win a counterinsurgency when you're trying down. so the handwriting is on the wall. they started to withdraw but have a changed policy. they don't have to. that's our job.

>> you've got to change those germans. you've got to get the germans on board, too. >> they try to be good. i tried to say that. i [inaudible] -- kissinger increased the price by staying out of point in time for everything was going in a different direction and caused many, many lives and that's the issue here, not to make the transition to the necessary civilian process, without the west appearing to turn around and leave behind. you have to have a measure of stability they are, in order to justify your own resolve. and we all know with drive is going to come. so, how can we find a moment -- the right moment where it at

least doesn't appear. >> getting our country, and france in the u.k. and certainly in this country is a very unpopular policy. >> very unpopular. >> i'm joking the same in germany it's the public candidates with 32% and 70% not in favor. it's a situation you have to deal with. canada has 30 gone. >> if you have the situation, it shouldn't be the end of politics i would give obama the benefit that he wants to get out. you can't show weakness in election year against republicans say i would listen to the military. so you have to find a smart way

and offered to fit in afghanistan to be honest about that, too. if you let the taliban come back right now, a lot of people will suffer. women with the affair. everybody wants to go to school. everybody wants more in life. and you have to provide the ground for this way of helping them move in the right direction. always thought the constitution is the way to do. here's your constitution. take it and implement it. >> modifier. modifier, but implemented. you are responsible to ownership. that's what we have in the way. >> i would also hesitate. the soviet model is a little bit like this.

in a different way, you're on your own. it leaves a lot of issues behind to tell people you are on your own, fine. down the line that's always will be fought. but at the same time, to get mullah omar is chance to reestablish what he tried before, don't do that. >> at, that during the negotiation on the constitution and you would find exactly what the taliban wanted and it would be forced to compromise, too. everybody has to be realistic. it's not a question of handing over to the tablet and. as they pointed out in the speech and of course he cannot we see in the speed and it's

deceptive and so on, but nevertheless he's made the public speech. they hear that at the very different kind of noise than the one the taliban was saying in making in 1996, et cetera. so everyone is subject to change. >> i think the soviets, for me personally, the soviet experience was very impressive on my decision-making. as we been a lot of documents. george washington university archive has this ton of stuff on lines. and it's very striking when you see gorbachev and 83, saying, we need to get afghanistan. so a couple years before he premieres coming year do you knows. so if you look at it an offense in this country, what is against them is this ideology that pervades soviet foreign policy thinking, that you have to have

four buttons. we have to defend our borders. some of that comes from experiences and what world war i and world war ii and somehow they are afraid what happened 78, 79, through the middle east will explode into their muslim areas. a lot of it is what you see in those documents is if we don't go in to afghanistan, the americans will go over and over. when i tried to get out 86, 87, we kick it out because if we get out, americans will come in. i'm pretty sure there was no american plan to go and come even though we lost a listening post in iran and everything. there is no plan. so what you see coming now is the same pinky within the united states foreign-policy establishment, this idea of containment, and the bases are going to be the biggest issues for us going forward. the white house in washington d.c. can live with us

withdrawing from afghanistan and afghanistan collapsing. car bombs go off in that at nearly every day. more civilians are being killed in iraq than are being killed in afghanistan by terrorism attacks every year by a good amount. we don't care. we go on. we lived in the fact that we're throwing out of iraq. we could do the same in afghanistan, but i think this idea that we have to a basis because again with this mindset that pervades their foreign-policy establishment of containment of foreign president after we use against the soviet union, which was industrialization of 200 million people with a couple dozen client states will not use that against al qaeda. the problem is unique people. you need a gorbachev type was able to lead in able to break those thoughts, the site deas, this foreign-policy standards

were based assessments that i now present. an interesting thing yesterday in "rolling stone," michael hastings had a very good piece on obama's decision-making for libya appeared very good, very instructive. you see how this strain of humanitarian interventionism pervades and that is what one. that is what pushed the president to intervene in libya. it's the same thing happening right now in d.c. not the concern of the collapse, the concern that we will lose our ability to contain our project power into iran, which are the two places people get all upset and wet their pants in washington d.c. so i think that's what it comes back to us how you come back and get other folks within the white house who are advising the think differently or who are tied into this strain of foreign policy

we've had for the last five or six decades. that's the real problem is not so give us get us into the future of us to break the cycle of thing in where we have to have a presence, to what we did against the soviet union, against groups like al qaeda and others. >> i agree with you. china, too, looking ahead, afghanistan is essentially located if you want to project power to china. >> so john, we all have to reach her boat. how do we get it? >> order it on amazon. >> i highly recommend it. it's absolutely wonderful. we really appreciate your coming. how long will you be in the u.s.? [inaudible] >> good, i wish you and not to

both move into the security council. more than likely -- >> you will view it in found. >> the thank you. we really appreciate it. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> now more from booktv city tour. we visit that brush, louisiana with the help of our cable partner, cox medications. next, an interview with robert mann, the arab "daisy petals and mushroom clouds."

lbj can agree goldwater and the ad that changed american politics. >> one, two, three, four, five, seven and, six, eight, nine. >> tag, nine, eight, seven, six, five, four, three, two, one, zero. these are the stakes, to make a world in which all of god's children can live go into the dark. we must either love each other or we must die. >> vote for president johnson on november the third. the stakes are too high for you

to stay home. >> the ad aired on december 7, 1964 in the mid-is monday night at the movies i'm in d.c. the show was david and i sheba and it only aired one time. it aired one time of 60 seconds and never paid for another airing of it. in the 1964 presidential election it was funded john wang or full-term and his republican opponent was barry goldwater from arizona. seeking a an research that johnson's, democratic national committee and the firm they hired, and very up-and-coming prominent advertising firm from new york came out of the research they did in again and talk and he did about where goldwater is vulnerable, work we go after him quite initially they thought it would be civil rights because he voted against civil rights act of 1954. but that issue faded. then they thought it might be

vietnam, the vietnam war, but neither candidate is interested in talking about vietnam that time. so it came down to goldwater's statements about nuclear weaponry. goldwater had made so many reckless remarks. for example, he joked about not being a missile into the mentzer met the kremlin. he said i don't want to send a missile to the moon. i want to send one into the kremlin. he said that we are to consider using nuclear weapons to defoliate the jungles of south vietnam. he said the nuclear bomb is merely another weapon. and then he said what he said about his position about nato commanders in the field being able to make the unilateral decision to make nuclear weapons. there is a lot to work with their when it came to nuclear weapons. so it was almost in a sense a no-brainer. this is an issue you must talk about, especially given the atmosphere at the fear people had about the prospect for a

nuclear war with the soviet union. that election was a gutless and cheers after the cuban missile crisis, when most people in the world that we were on the brink of nuclear war and the united states and russia, nuclear annihilation. there is a lot of fear about the impact of nuclear war, potential war between the u.s. and soviet union. there was a whole fear of the nuclear file from the testing of the united state in the soviet doing of nuclear weapons. i've been a nuclear test ban treaty passed. so there is a lot of fear about nuclear war. while not the only issue is a very big in overriding issue that played out in american politics for the years leading up. goldwater didn't respond immediately. he waited a little while and goldwater himself, at least in public, didn't make a big deal about it. he condemned, but didn't dwell on it and i think probably wisely so.

but the republican party, the senate republican leader, chairman of the republican party and a number of people associated with goldwater's campaign expressed their outrage, filed official complaints with the fair campaign practices commission, called on the networks not to run it again and really made quite a stink about it. and the johnson campaign started magnanimously or people around john and said were not going to run it again. of course the best i can tell never planned to run it again. but i think it can be argued that johnson's campaign was hoping for the reaction they got from the republican party. he wanted to draw attention to the spot. because of the outrage that was -- they came on the tuesday and wednesday after the spot ran, all three major television networks aired this spot in its entirety later in the week.

so for an expenditure of 25,000, 35 dozen dollars, roughly 100 million people saw the when it was paid for were shown on the newscast. the lower of that spot is it destroyed goldwater's campaign. in fact, if you look at the gallup polls before the campaign, johnson was a 60% pure coldwater said 29%. a month later after the spot aired in a number of others is attacked goldwater's position on war and peace in general and a lot of other issues where goldwater was honorable, and later, goldwater actually draft not at all. he was still a 29%. johnson got 64. so after that month of barrage against goldwater, it was johnson's numbers that went down, not goldwater's. as best they can tell, there is no specific point about the. more than likely you do that today. in fact, any contain before

airing something that unusual and shocking would probably have convened a number of focus groups and done a lot of research. the johnson people and ddp, the ad firm didn't appear to know what the reaction would be. and so, there is quite a bit of reaction, but it was volcanic dodo. a lot of phone calls to the white house. mostly it was people that were sort of shock and a cast that this little girl picking daisies. it was consumed by a nuclear blast. that they are aware predictable cries of outrage from the republican party and the goldwater came came about it. but it's hard to say what the public's response was to it because as best i can tell, i could not find any evidence anyone had told specifically about that spot, even though 50 million people saw it and would probably be very easy to conduct a poll and find out what it was, they didn't do that and

perhaps because they never planned to air it again, so i pull aquatics if you look at the spot to hadley stevenson, the democratic nominee for president in 1952 and 1956 and a spot that kennedy ran in 19 xt and goldwater spots in 1964, they'll look pretty much the same. so goldwater -- while johnson was revolutionizing political advertising, goldwater's campaign mistake in the past. coldwater sponsored mostly him look into the camera, talking to the voters. there is a little bit of a production quality to it, but not much. they were nearly as creative as johnson's work. so in that sense, goldwater was stuck in 1956, 1960s by a campaign to more johnson was revolutionizing politics. i do think it did want being and

in the polling evidence supports this. it didn't persuade people not to support goldwater because support is pretty the support he had was solid in hard-core and not going anywhere. what he did do was solidify for a lot of independents to swing voters that might have been thinking about either not putting for johnson and persuaded them not to goldwater was a dangerous man. they already sort of understood that, but they raise their fear if goldwater is elected president, they would likely be a war between the soviet union and united states. ..