>> a large dose of humility is required when talking about things like pakistan or nuclear war, for that matter. so let's talk about pakistan today and tomorrow. i think the present crisis began with the 1999 musharraf coup, but really from 1965 onward, pakistan has been in crisis. and after musharraf's failure or collapse as a leader, i think the hope for pakistan gave way to deep pessimism, and a lot of the literature, a lot of the writingings about pakistan is characterized by pessimism. but i detect four broad scenarios about the future of pakistan. the first one is not the most popular, but the dominant seems to be the muddling-through scenario. now, that's actually a term of -- and charles wrote a marvelous article about the science of muddling through, and that happens when you're not

quite sure what to do. do a lot of things when you're not sure what comes through. the forces of unity and coherence will insure that it will not dramatically change soon. despite chaos, it is best to assume stability. and i hi this is the view of -- i think this is the view of jonathan paris, wrote a fine study out of london about the future of pakistan, and the book "the hard state." and our book on the future pakistan, only at least my chapter look ahead five years in a sense muddling through but with a shorter time frame. now, there are two other scenarios are variations. one is muddling through plus and one is muddling through maines. minus. one is a book by a renowned journalist, and i call in the if syndrome. and the author argues, it's a collection of essays that make

up other arguments, that if pakistan can only reform its economy, if only relations could be normalized, if only the terrorists could be trained, if is the operative word here. but after that then there's a bright prospect for pakistan, and nobody doubts that pakistan perhaps had a bright future given the talent of its people, its location. pakistan had a lot of resources and assets, but clearly, it's underperformed in many ways. so the muddling through, posse their owe is if all these things happen, when we had the meeting to discuss our book, for some discussions i ruled out the term if. in fact, a conversation about pack tan should not include the -- pakistan should not include the word if. if you start using if, well, i think we should ban the word if in these conversations. now, the muddling through minus scenario is quite different, and

it's characterized by the book of bruce riedel's writings, armageddon in pakistan or referring to -- he also refer today the emirates of pakistan. and a new book that's coming out, "pakistan on the brink," i think that's the second book i've seen with that teat l. they argue that -- title. and they argue that pakistan may not muddle through, and all three authors are concerned that as the islamist factor is going to overcome good intentions and good people and drive pakistan if not to destruction, to worse and worse scenarios. so all these authors pick on the islamist factor as a critical variable, a negative future for pakistan. they don't predict it has to be, but they're less optimistic, certainly, than others about what happens if muddling through doesn't work. there's another option, the one i favor, and i don't have a good title for it, but i call it the

serial transformation of pakistan. nothing massive is likely to occur. and, frankly, if there's a coup d'etat, i don't think it would change things at all. i think pakistan will continue the way it is going. pakistan is what aristotle called a mixed constitution. it's part democracy and part military autocracy, so these kinds of states are very hard to predict. but i think what is likely to happen and what is happening in pakistan is parts of pakistan are changing in different ways. i won't go into the details, it's spelled out in my own chapter in the book, but it's a very different one that the one ambassador schafer and professor wine balm were in -- weinbaum were in. not always pleasant, although this some cases it's changing for the good. now, to conclude, pakistan is a crisis state or crises, sequentially crises, and why is in the case?

because it's a paradoxical state. a paradox is a statement or proposition that seems self-contradictory or absurd but may express a truth. there are many paradoxes, but at least three, i think, are important for this discussion. first there's the domestic paradox. as i said, aristotle talked about mixed constitution. pakistan is part democracy, part military autocracy, you can't tell at any moment what kind of state it is, in a sense that's an asset, and it's very hard for other countries to deal with pakistan. it behaves like neither all the time in which pakistan we're keeling with. -- diegoing with. second -- dealing with, second, there's a nuclear pakistan. too nuclear to fail. yet nuclear weapons do nothing to advance the economy, deal with the many domestic problems and the possession paints pakistan important to others and to pakistan's own population, but that's all they do.

this doesn't bring pakistan many advantages. i do believe it has kept the indians out of pakistan, but they may not have been interested in invading anywhere. so some of a.k. khan's worst scenarios could come true, he talked about war between the americans and the soviets, he also wrote about catalytic war where a smaller nuclear state triggered off a war between major nuclear states. here i think pakistan's relationship with india and china is something that deserves further study. and, of course, the new issue did not write much about nuclear terrorism. there's a third paradox in that pakistan's relation with other major power is the deeply problematic. india/pakistan relations are better than u.s./pakistan relations. it professes to be a democracy, but it's three most important allies are china, north korea

and saudi arabia. so pakistan's identity, i think marvin hinted at this, is problematic. but i'm can confident that there are enough good people in pakistan, i think, husain haqqani at the top of this list, really could manage the state given the opportunity to do so. so crises are going to continue. the fact that the military may take over in form, if not in name does not trouble me. what troubles me the most is the deeper, underlying transformation of pakistan that's going on right before our eyes. i have some comments on policy, but i'll deliver those after. he's saw, thank you. >> well, thank you very much, steve. and before we get to our final speaker, i am reminded that professor fair has to leave at 11:30. so i thought that if there were one or two questions that specifically touch on the legal and judicial issues that she

raised, i will take them now, and thenly turn to our final panelist. could i remind you, if you're going to ask a question, please, identify yourself and your affiliation even if i know you and to wait for the mic so that our watchers on c-span can also hear your question. there's a question down here in front. wait for the mic, doctor. >> thank you. i am doctor -- [inaudible] pakistan american league. christine has a very good handle on the affairs of south asia. the haqqani case, i think she has it more than anybody else. and the case in the judiciary and when he was the chief minister of pun grab and he was -- punjab and he was approaching different parties -- [inaudible] haqqani together, they were best

friends and adviser to chief minister of punjab at that time and then he was secret adviser to sharif who have the prime minister. who was the prime minister. so i think the case is in the judiciary, and if somebody wants to help haqqani, i think one needs to hire a good attorney who knows the international law as the constitution of pakistan. and i think that would be helpful for him. if that can be done, certainly there -- [inaudible] but one thing i assure you, there's not one single individual on whom the future the democracy of pakistan lies. thank you. >> thank you. do you want to answer, or -- [inaudible] >> if there's another question for dr. fair, i'll take it. right there in the third row. >> professor christine fair, i would like to, please -- >> could you identify yourself,

please, sir? >> i am -- [inaudible] i'm a freelance writer. i'm from balochistan. i'd like to, please, ask you the tragedy that mr. husain haqqani faces. it is more or less the tragedy of pakistan. may i, please, ask you is it instead of the generals who are hiding bin laden being ousted, the ambassador was trying to control islamic fascism, he faces all these problems and -- [inaudible] clearly shows pakistan is a failed state. >> i mean, i can accept the premise of that question because i don't personally accept them. let's again go back to what is the case with husain haqqani. no fir charges have been filed.

he lives under virtual house arrest, so the irony is he is experiencing fundamental deprivation of liberty. thank you, doctor, for pointing out that the relationship between the current supreme court justice and sharif goes way back because sharif was his prime champion and, in fact, that was the reason why the coalition between the tmln and the tpp broke apart in the first place, was over the position of the supreme court justice and the sharifs and zardari. i also want to point out, this is the judicial system. the supreme court is very different in that it has been pushing the perimeter of what it is allowed to do. and it gets away with it because it's the only arbiter of actually what it does. but curiously, while husain is not subject to charges and yet this has become, oddly enough, memogate has become almost a

proxy about husain committing treason, i don't know how much this has been picked up here, another one of the things said in the various exchanges that were suddenly published was that the director of the isi, general pasha, went to the gulf seeking permission to sack zardari. in fact, at least one journalist wrote about this and became quite explosive in pakistan, and he is subsequent he no longer in pakistan. but what is curious if pasha diss actually do that, that is treason under article vi of the constitution, and where is this much-vaulted, independent judiciary that isn't taking up the question of pasha going to the gulf? that is very clearly an article vi, high treason offense if it's true. so i think the point that you made about the relationship between plmn and ppp and the supreme court and sharif verse

is us zardari and the others is at the core of what's going on. the fact that the court has not exercised similar interest in investigating whether or not pasha was an act of high treason should cast a lot of dubaity over the judicial proceedings that are ongoing. >> i have one more question for professor fair which has been submitted on twitter. >> yeah, twitter. [laughter] it's not from you, is it? >> i don't know that the tweeter is identified. can the swiss case which the prime minister is being pressed by the supreme court to reopen be reopened even if a letter is submitted? >> beyond -- i don't know. i have absolutely no idea how this works. i don't know the statute of limitations with the swiss case. but one other thing to note is that the -- >> [inaudible] >> okay. so, look, i'm not -- zardari, we all know he is notorious for,

you know, extra-market capitalization. [laughter] and there has been, you know, when i was a student, he was called mr. 10%. so there have been a number of charges against him, and he's spent some time in jail. and part of the national reconciliation order was dropping those charges. so in 2009 the supreme court which, again, as i said, has had it out for zardari for some time both personally and because of the support the supreme court justices have received from sharif, they contested the legality of the current ppp office holders who had cases pending against them in the first instance. for example, folks sitting in office that contested elections, the entire viability of their elections can be potentially invalidated and, obviously, zardari himself becomes vulnerable to charges as well without pakistan.

the supreme court said something interesting again pushing the envelope of what it can do because it says it can. it has told president zardari that he is not automatically going to enjoy immunity from prosecution, that he actually has to request immunity and, obviously, in making such a statement it's clear that the court may not grant him immunity. so this is part of this evolving set of actions that the supreme court has taken which i think clearly identify it as being interventionist and actively colewding with these -- colluding with those that have issues with this goth to bring it down -- government to bring it down. >> thank you, dr. fair, and we will now move to our final speaker, lisa curtis, of the heritage foundation. lisa has worked in the executive branch of the government and also on capitol hill, so she has a very broad perspective from which to address her topic which, i believe, is the implications of all this for u.s. policy.

lisa? >> thank you. thank you all for coming today and the heritage foundation, also, is very pleased and proud to co-sponsor this event today. so i was asked to look at u.s. policy options in dealing with pakistan, the crisis state. clearly, the perpetual instability in the country, this escalating internal power struggle between the civilian and military leadership makes it really difficult for the u.s. to develop a coherent policy toward pakistan. and i think we have seen that with the response to the memogate affair. the memogate affair broke just before our thanksgiving holiday and then right after our thanksgiving holiday you have the strike on november 26th against the pakistani soldiers, this is a nato strike that killed 24 pakistani soldiers and sent u.s./pakistan relation into a tail spin. so this certainly has complicated how the u.s. has

responded to what's happening to husain haqqani. on two occasions the state department has spoken out. i agree with chris that this is not quite enough, but let me just point out, first of all, they spoke out when it was claimed the zardari government was prenotified or knew about the bin laden raid before it happened. thankfully, the state department corrected the record and said that no pakistani officials were informed ahead of time before the bin laden operation. second was last friday. as you know, a group of us, um, including everybody at this table and several others who follow pakistan very closely wrote a letter to the administration calling on the administration to insure that the person of husain haqqani was protected. we had reason to believe his life might have been in danger and also that he was accorded due process of law. we were pleased that as we were

in the process of drafting the letter, the state department did speak out in support of fair and transparent treatment of husain haqqani. but aside from this, the u.s. has remained relatively quiet. um, i think they have their reasons for this. one is what i explained, this nato air strike which has complicated the military relationship, um, and certainly the u.s., you know, has an in having a good relationship with the military for fighting terrorism, but also in seeing democracy succeed in pakistan. and i believe that the zardari government is forced out whether it be through the supreme court, and it looks like the army is working in tandem with the supreme court albeit behind the scenes, that if zardari government is forced out before its term is over, this is going to send a negative signal that

civilian democracy has really not taken root in pakistan, that the army still wields, um, inappropriate control within the system, and even though, you know, the zardari government may not be perfect, it's an elected government, and we need to keep that in mind. not to mention the fact that this crisis in the civil military relationship is distracting all of the leaders from dealing with some very serious problems whether it be the economic malaise affecting the country or the ongoing terrorist attacks. we just saw a couple of more serious terrorist attacks. well, all terrorist attacks are serious for that matter in the last couple of days. and i don't want to get into the details of the case because chris did an excellent job in doing that, but i just want to point out i've been disappointed with the pakistani media in not exploring more who is month soar jazz because the whole case

revolves around the claims of one individual who, as chris noted, has a certain reputation for exaggerating his role particularly when it comes to important u.s. foreign policy issues. this has been documented in the u.s. media. but i also want to point out because this happened, actually, when i was a diplomat in pakistan, i was there '94-'96, and actually the first time i met husain haqqani he was information minister under benazir bhutto's government at that time. but what happened in 995 was jaz apparently went to bhutto

>> certainly, no strategic dialogue, there's no alliance as such, but perhaps some cooperation on overlapping interests and not a complete cutoff of u.s. assistance. now, the only problem with this she power in owe is that -- scenario is that pakistan itself

is not cooling down. pakistan poses a threat to the region and beyond. extremists continue to wield influence in society. i think ambassador schafer talked about the assassination which is, you know, indicative of a trend of if not rising extremism in the country, an inability of people opposed to extremism able to raise their voices. you still have links between the lashkar-e-taiba group and the civil military classes that we're talking about today which actually open doors for jihadists to come in and exploit these problems. and just to add to the complications, pakistan is the fastest growing nuclear power in the world today. a study out just yesterday from another think tank questioned the safety and security of those

nuclear weapons. so, thus, ignoring pakistan is simply not an option for the u.s. the second option in addition to this cooling down scenario is containment. people have thrown around this word, "containment," for a few months now in relation to pakistan policy. of course, the whole idea of containment was initially brought up by george ken nonin 1947 in trying to stem the advance of communism. it's also been used in relationship to iraq and iran. i think it was president carter that started a policy of dual containment of iraq and iran which, of course, went throughout the '80s and even into the '90s. now when we think of containment, we think of north korea, we could even think of iran. so how would you think about containment in the case of pakistan? well, we might view it as trying to stem the advance of terrorism and extremism.

but the problem is pakistan itself is under threat from extremism. pakistani leaders are indirectly promoting this dangerous ideology by their sort of physical support to groups that adhere to it like the lashkar-e-taiba. but at the same time, most pakistani military officers are disdainful of the extremist ideology, and they don't want their children to grow up in a society that's dominated by it. so how do you deal with a state institution that is willing to take risk to its own country's stability and willing to provide support to violent groups that it actually, ultimately, does not control? and i would just posit that trying to formulate a policy towards such an institution that is both fighting and facilitating terrorism is next to impossible. so i have two minutes to talk about the last and what i believe is probably the most

sensible u.s. policy approach, and this is one i'll call it principled flexible approach. this is -- there's no grand strategy, no containment, there's no engagement just for engagement's sake, but there are a few broad principles that the u.s. lays down but then allows itself the flexibility to evolve to the unpredictable events in pakistan. so some of the principles that i think would be important is, one, standing up for civilian-led democracy but not getting involved in the details of the power tussles that are happening. that is, the u.s. should be making statements, um, standing up for the importance of democracy but at the same time not try to actually shift the power balance within the country in one direction or the other. i think this almost always backfires when this is tried. the second principle is just to

accept that pakistan does not share the same priorities with regard to the terrorism issue. um, and this would lead to not providing pakistan undue influence in afghanistan, sort of recognizing that we have different goals and for pakistan to participate in a reck sill yes, sir process in -- reconciliation process in afghanistan, they would have to demonstrate they're willing to use the leverage that they do have with the afghan taliban to bring them to the table to compromise. the third would be conditioning aid to pakistan but not cutting off. we're already move anything that direction. moving in that direction. the congress recently passed legislation which would condition all aid to pakistan on it meeting certain counterterrorism benchmarks, so we're already move anything that direction. now some people say, you know, why would you condition the aid, it's not going to work, it's not going to change pakistan's strategic calculations. but i would say that even if it

doesn't change their calculations, at least the can stop throwing good money after bad. that, you know, this is u.s. resources and that we should be deciding how to spend them based on, you know, what the u.s. is actually seeing in return. fourth would be working with partners to help shape pakistani behavior. this would start with the nato partners which is already happening to some degree but would also have to involve china and pakistan. pakistan has certainly played up its relationship with china in the aftermath of the bin laden raid. but i think china's concerns, china's own concerns about pakistan's future stability will limit the extent to which it would want to bail pakistan out economically, and it also opens a door for the u.s. to potentially be able to seek cooperation with china in convincing pakistan to take a

more comprehensive view against terrorism and extremism in the country. saudi arabia also would be a very important country for the u.s. to reach out to. the only complication there is saudi arabia is also interested in limiting iranian influence in afghanistan, and so i think saudi arabia would have to be convinced that the u.s. would have a long-term presence and commitment in afghanistan before it would really seriously work with the u.s. in trying to prevail in pakistan to crack down on the taliban. i'm going to end there. thank you very much for your attention. >> well, thank you, lisa, and thanks thanks to all the panelists. [applause] and now we will take questions. i would remind you once again that if i call on you, and i will tray to keep track of -- try to keep track of hands as i see them, if i call on you, please, identify yourself and your affiliation and, please,

wait for the mic. so the firsthand i saw was about in the middle there. sir? >> thank you. i've done some writing on asia. i want to speculate on three issues, in fact, and it's open to the panel. one is the timing of the memogate. why now? two is why monsoor jaz, exactly why? and third is why were the two key officers, general kayani and general pasha given -- [inaudible] >> anybody want to take those? i think the answers to the first

two are somewhat murky, why now for memogate? well, because jaz released his letter or at least gave an interview about his letter. why did he do it at all and at this time? that's a question to which there isn't a clear answer. there are lots of suspicions. but on the face of it since the same charges that are being leveled against husain haqqani could, in principle, have been leveled against him, um, the motivation for that has to lie in stuff that we don't really know about but can only speculate on. why were those two officers begin extensions -- given extensions? i have to assume it was because the government of pakistan and the army leadership wanted things to come out that way. there's lot of speculation about the u.s. having encouraged the

extensions. i have no knowledge of that. i've always felt that the u.s. ought to stay out of decisions of that sort, but i can't tell you whether that is, in fact, how it played out this time. front row, sir. >> um, hello, i'm from the hudson institute. i wanted to ask a couple of questions that were, um, posed by lisa curtis' remarks but really among to the panel as a whole. the first has to do with the question of internal stability, whether one can make any kind of, look to any kind of long-term relationship with the pakistani government considering that. and it seemed to me from what christine fair said that the behavior of the supreme court has added a whole new element of or layer of problems at this

point. in the past you had the situation where it was a struggle between civilian governments and the military, but there wasn't, strictly speaking, an arbiter between them. the court has claimed that in a way that role, but and was heralded a few year ago for having stood up to musharraf. now it seems to be undermining the credit it earned during that crisis of two, three years ago. so that, um, that seems to remove one final element in the institutions which provides for an adjudication internally. the second thing has to do with the policy approach question. um, generally speaking, over the past few years there was this debate that said that one could have, either have a strategic

relationship with pakistan, that we could have one, or a transactional one. and it was, actually, the position of, um, ambassador haqqani that the way to improve thing between our two countries was to try to go up to the strategic level and to address some of the issues of paranoia that marvin weinbaum referred to. now it seems as if we're look only at the transactional and that the transactional question is between our military and their military, essentially. but our military has, seems to have also it patience with their mail tear. -- military. i think in particular of the -- >> could you get to your question, please, sir? >> surprising remarks of admiral mullen. so i wonder where we're moving to, you know, whether there is a

kind of motion towards really a kind of disengagement that comes precisely from that part of our government that has been most engaged with the pakistani goth? >> lisa? >> i'll be really quick. i think the u.s. tried to have a strategic relationship with stand pakistan. the obama administration started a strategic dialogue to handle a host of issues, issues also of concern to pakistan because the complaints then were the u.s. is so focused only on the counterterrorism issue. but that just didn't seem to pan out. and we've been sort of forced into a transactional relationship because that dialogue did not work out. um, you know, you could argue why that happened, was it drone strikes, was it pakistan's continued support to the afghan taliban, i'm sure there are numerous reasons. but i would just say that if pakistan would, feels that it needs the force the u.s. to choose between india and pakistan to have a strategic

relationship, it's not going to happen. that i think there has to be an understanding that, yes, the u.s. would like a strategic pickup -- relationship or relationship with pakistan, but it's not going to choose between india and pakistan. the u.s. relationship with india is extremely important and will remain so. so my fear is that pakistan uses as a litmus test the u.s. relationship with india, and that, i think, would be to pakistan's detrimentment i -- detriment. i think the relationship can be broad based, but the u.s. has, you know, clear strategic interests that at the moment just seem to die verge with pakistan, so we're forced into a transactional relationship. >> i, actually, don't buy the distinction between strategic and transactional relationship. we have been trying, actually, not just since the obama administration came in, but going back to the 1950s to -- and both sides have been, have

been trying to portray our relationship with pakistan as a wall-to-wall, strategic engagement, what you might call being a little bit flippant, a big strategic bear hug. um, that has been a great talking point and a great rallying cry for high-level meetings. it has twice already come -- on the basic interests between the united states and pakistan, and if you count the current strategic relationship from 2001, we are, you know, at least three or four years into the period when the difference in u.s. and pakistan strategic interests has reared its head again and has interfered with our genuine strategic

collaboration. um, i don't think that identifying narrower interests in common and pursuing them is a bad thing. you may give the name transactional and intend that as an insult, but actually if united states and pakistan could work seriously towards some more limited interests, we'd both be better off. finish and i think that's where u.s -- and i think that's where u.s. policy needs to be going. in a sense, i think it may have been going in that direction although the talking points are still strategic relationship. i think there is, in fact, a recognition that the largest and most ambitious version of that is out of reach at the moment. >> can i just add that i think until relatively recently, certainly earlier last year, it was all about building trust. and the idea was that what we

had to do was to demonstrate that it was more than simply a relationship based on a need for pakistan to deal with our problems with terrorism, al-qaeda, afghanistan. and there were, as has been suggested, there were some real moves on our part to move in that trek. the events of this past year demonstrated as few things could that we really didn't share that many strategic interests in common. that there were some basic divergences between what pakistan saw as being in its interests and in our interests. so what we are left with now as, i think, has been suggested here, we're left now with finding those common

denominators on which we still have a critical convergence. there are not very many at this point. but they remain critical enough that both sides do not want to see a rupture of the relationship, and that's essentially where we are. and it's by necessity going to be -- characterize it more transactional because the strategic implied a far more comprehensive set of common interests than, as i suggest, we now find possible. >> i have -- did you want to speak to this point? you get the full treatment. >> two brief points on policy. first, it's my understanding that there is no formal written agreement between the united states and pakistan on any issue. what we have is american legislation which is interpreted differently by americans and pakistanis. but this administration and the

bush administration never put on paper exactly what the american obligation or commitment to pakistan is and virus versa. therefore, if you talk about trust, you talk about trust in a contract that's not written, we need to have trust, but we also need to have verification. trust but verify. secondly, on a policy issue i would add to lisa's list of countries we should be consulting with, india. india's relations with pakistan are better than ours, india has vital interests, more vital than we have, as well as china. and i think that, in fact, the pakistan army may want to see the relationship -- i wouldn't be surprised if it doesn't. as far as i know, the shipments to afghanistan have not been renewed from over land. if that's true, then they're clearly trying to speed up our withdrawal from afghanistan which they assume and they argue has always been the cause of pakistan's problems. that proposition will be tested very soon. we'll see how the pakistanis handle the taliban on their own. >> on the court issue, very briefly, i think if chris were

here, she would question whether, in fact, they are an arbitrator, certainly an honest arbitrator, and would characterize it more as a surrogate for the military so that whereas it does serve to indirectly implement what the military's interests are, nevertheless, it still has to be viewed as independent in the sense that it acts, it acts in fashion which suggests independence. but, in fact, reflects far more. i don't want to say a set of instructions, but certainly an understanding about what is in the military's interest. >> i have a couple of people on my list, but i'd like first to pass on one of the questions we've received from twitter. as many of you know, one-third of the pakistan senate is going to be elected in march. this is an election that takes place in the state assemblies.

it's not a national election. and the questioner asks what would be the implications of a ppp victory in the senatorial election? and i think the real question that we ought to be answering as well is what do these senate elections mane? mean? so would any of my colleague on the panel like to tackle that one? go ahead, lisa. >> yeah. i think the implication is that the if ppp does very well in the senate elections, then that will help them in the general elections that are scheduled for next year, a year from now. um, but, you know, i think, again, it comes up to the timing. i think somebody had asked about the timing, and my first thought was the timing of the memodate issue, we have to ask jaz. he's the one who wrote the article in the financial times that brought up the case. but, you know, we're talking about timing, and i think chris raised this as well.

you know, why two years after the fact all of a sudden the supreme court now is saying, it's threatening to disqualify the prime minister for not following through with the supreme court order to, um, banish the nro and move forward with corruption charges against president zardari. so, yeah, i see suspicious timing all the way around here. and so, again, it raises the question of why is this happening now? we only have a year to go until election. it's just my feeling that nothing would do more to kind of help solidify democracy in pakistan than to allow a government to run its full course. um, it just seems to be something that has alluded pakistan throughout its history. um, so i think that, you know, all of these issues perhaps are related and, again, i just come back to the importance of

respecting electoral democracy, and that is the best thing if we're talking about preventing future crises this pakistan. if pakistan wants to be a prosperous, powerful state, it talks about retaining the regional position, the best way pakistan can retain its regional position is by strengthening its democracy and its own economy. >> so the next question i have on my list, wait for the mic, please. >> thank you. i'm with the american enterprise institute. and, you know, i have a question about pakistan's liberals. ambassador schafer alluded to ta sir, and he was killed a little more than a year ago, and we just had people on the streets of pakistan not so long ago celebrating the anniversary of his murder. but at the same time, pakistan is striking in some way because it has, there's no shortage of

intellectuals, writers and so on who, in fact, and i think husain haqqani would be a preeminent example of that, who have been willing to challenge the dominant narrative, and very often at great risk to themselves, have sort of taken positions that go against fundamentalism or intolerance broadly. so i want to sort of get your sense of where is, how strong are pakistan's liberals today compared to where they were, say, four or five years ago, and be where do you see the trend line heading? >> i use the word in my remarks earlier about embattled, and i think that that does describe where they are at this point. nobody doubts, as you suggest, that they have been very courageous individuals who have spoken up, and in fact, you know, in some ways you've gotten more criticism in pakistan than you get in india.

certainly with regard to foreign policy. there's more of a dialogue that goes on in pakistan. but those who think that somehow the saviors here are going to come from civil society, and there are many pakistani progressives who see -- like melia lodi who was referred to earlier -- who see civil society as somehow being able with a youth bulge that somehow this is going to create a constituency here which is, which can counter the islamic constituency, for example, i don't see the evidence for this. it, there's one real problem as i see it, and that is that class that we're talking about, the danger is they're losing faith in the system. this is what happened in iran in the 970s -- 1970s when the

middle class, the educated middle class lost faith in the system. many, many pakistanis in that group have one foot inside pakistan, one foot outside of pakistan. and that strikes me as a, as something which could very well, which could very well be overwhelmed by populist forces and islamist forces. so i think in answer to your question, they're there, and wee ought to take note of them. but it's going to have to come from below as well as from above. >> [inaudible] >> [inaudible] from pakistan american league. a couple of observations and a

small question actually. when we talked about disengagement with pakistan, by any analyst right now as you said also, this engagement in is not an option as a solution. both these countries need each other. and their friendship many times highs and lows came, triumphs and tragedies came -- >> could you move your mic a little bit closer? >> [inaudible] in the relationship but somehow, ultimately, always the relationship survived. and even now while we are talking here, the highest level of american army and pakistan army are still engaged in dialects. it is important to really bring stability in that region because this is being a test to pakistan itself. and the stability in pakistan, india and in afghanistan, it is

interdependent. the second thing lisa mentioned was about pakistan's obsession regarding india relationship with usa. i think the things have changed with passage of time. since usa's relationship with pakistan is totally independent of relations of the usa with india. in the same way pakistan relationship with usa is independent of pakistan relationship with china. but both friendships, both relationships are critical and important for china. and the question is regarding jaz. i sometimes am i maized -- amazed that so many things have been said about him. many people have met him, i also met him many times. but how could such a man have access to the highest corridors of power in america -- [inaudible] to the national security and then become --

[inaudible] and then also have access with the isi chief in pakistan? how it happened? >> can i say something? okay. i can't speak to the access that he's had in pakistan, but i do feel i have something to say about here in the u.s. because, um, i think jaz, and i have not followed the case to the detail that chris has, but i think he's made claims that he met with u.s. firms perhaps even in these blackberry messages that he has handed over. and in my conversations with u.s. officials, um, he never met any u.s. officials. the only contact was with general jones when general jones was not in his position as national security adviser. he had already retired from that position. um, you know, we can speculate on why general jones decided to pass this memo on to admiral mullen. i personally don't think it was

a great decision. but, you know, at the same time general jones has filed his affidavit, he has said that, um, he had no belief that the memo was drafted by haqqani, he thought this was a personal effort by jaz. so i think the problem here is monosoar jaz is painting this picture he had all this access in the u.s., but in you actually -- if you actually talk to people, he did not. but because the u.s. government isn't going to slander somebody or, you know, pronounce something that is not asked of them, the u.s. government has not been able to get out their side of the story to the extent that i think would be more helpful here. and that's why i was saying i thought it was very helpful when they clarified jaz had claimed that the zardari government knew about the bin laden raid before it happened, the u.s. government was very clear, no

pakistani officials were informed before that raid. but unfortunately, until questions are asked specifically, then the u.s. government, you know, because not answer. so i think that there has been some misperception particularly in the pakistani press about jaz's access here in the u.s. >> i think what lisa says is correct, but let's dot a couple of is and cross a couple of ts. um, this is the third instance in which i have been aware of jaz claiming to have been an emissary or envoy trying to resolve some nasty international conflict. in each case the u.s. government was involved in some fashion. in each case the people i knew who were involved in the issue

contradicted the claims jaz made about the depth and effectiveness of his involvement. that's the first point. um, and it's a very important one. second, the u.s. government for very good reason does not want to make itself the story in this case. as far as the action is concerned, admiral mullen has confirmed having received the memo, having concluded that it was not credible and having, therefore, decided to do nothing about it. that, essentially, is the only action that was taken by the u.s. government. with the poisonous state of u.s./pakistan relations at the moment, the u.s. government would not consider that it was doing either itself or ambassador haqqani any favors by raising its profile and becoming to any greater extent than is already inevitable a part of the story. so you're not going to see a

u.s. government position paper on the credibility or otherwise of jaz. >> i would add a footnote. his role model seems to be that of the main character in the woody allen movie called zelig. [laughter] and in all critical world events for his whole life, it's a marvelous film. he's everywhere. and i think maybe that's jaz's vision of himself. [laughter] >> a second footnote, but of a little different order, i suspect. he has had minimal effectiveness from everything we've noted. he is a blowhard. he's all of the things you've heard. but my information is that he has been used in the past as an emissary. that is, that's not all

fictitious. that people in high places have turned to him and sought his assistance. so, um, he doesn't -- it's not entirely that he's an imaginary figure here. why, why individuals would go back to him given his reputation is, for me, the hard thing to understand. [laughter] >> okay. we have one last question from the gentleman in the third row. >> i would, please, the learned scholars here today from different think tanks, i would -- my name is ahmad -- [inaudible] and i am a freelance writer. i would, please, like to ask you in pakistan bin laden was killed, but -- [inaudible] is still there.

zawahiri who's now the al-qaeda head is still there supported and hidden by the pakistan military. i would, please, like to ask the u.s. scholars when are you going to be brutally frank and call a spade a spade? isn't pakistan a rogue state? >> you know, i think one of the messages that you get from this panel, and it may be a somewhat unsatisfying message, is that, is the tremendous dilemma that the united states faces in trying to work with and around pakistan on very important policy issues. this is not new. this is something that we have dealt with for at least 50 years, but i would say it's at a more acute stage now than it ever was. the doctor said both countries need each other, that is for

better or for worse still true. so the united states is probably not going to come out and say pakistan is a rogue state, we'll have nothing to do with it for all of the reasons that lisa curtis just mentioned. what the united states is trying to do is to pursue its interests. that's what countries do. and these interests are some of them in line with what the government of pakistan seeks, and some of them not. that's where it gets difficult. pakistan, too, is going to pursue its interests, and all of what we have been talking about this morning suggests that there is agreement on some of those interests and disagreement on others within pakistan and that they all get caught up in the internal drama of pakistan in which, unfortunately, our friend husain has also become a pawn. did you want -- >> can i just add one point?

>> yeah. >> so i agree with everything said, but i think the only thing that does seem certain at least to me is that until the pakistan military leadership develops a clearer and more comprehensive policy toward terrorism rather than this idea of fighting some, facilitating others, that, um, there will be no clarity in u.s./pakistan relations and both sides will continue to remain fairly dissatisfied with the relationship. >> and i would add -- >> final comments from the panel. lisa has just had hers. >> i would add that pakistan's decision to both oppose and to support terrorism complicates its relations with china and with india as well as other countries. it's not just the united states. >> marvin? last -- >> it comes back, of course, to what pakistan thinks is in its own interests. it is not, it is not supporting or choosing among terrorist

organizations without reason. it has in it own objectives a sense that some of these organizations do work in etc. interests -- in its interests, do work benefit of what it seeks as the way of it strategic regional goals and global goals. until that changes i think we can expect that pakistan will continue to be selective among good terrorists and bad terrorists or good extremists and bad extremists. and it's only when the correlation of forces is such that it recognizes that these elements are a danger to pakistan itself and removes, moves away from the denial of this that i think we'll see real change in its policies. >> well, with that, let me invite you to join