canceled in 1993 was because it was competing with the international space station. the manned spaceflight program which has cost about 10 times what the accelerator would've cost and has produced nothing of scientific value. i think nasa, i think the obama administration is more eager to cut back on the manned spaceflight program then congress will allow. and i keep my interactions such as they are with members of congress suggest to me that they simply don't understand that putting people into space has nothing to do with exploring the universe or learning the laws of nature. >> steven weinberg, nobel prize winner, qt professor, author of several books, including this one, "lake views: this world and the universe."

this picture on the front of the book is his view of lake austin from his boat dock. he joins us here at the university of texas. >> thank you. >> you're watching book tv on c-span2, 48 hours of nonfiction authors and books every weekend. >> this is a book tv on c-span2. currently we are the university of maryland, college park, maryland, hornbeck library and a katherine anne porter room here and we're talking with university of maryland professors who are also authors. and we are pleased to be joined by history professor jon sumida, who has written this book, "decoding clausewitz" -- "decoding clausewitz: a new approach to 'war'." professor sumida, it was carl von clausewitz? >> he was a prussian officer who

fought against napoleon. he first went into action as a teenager in 1790s. later rose to be a midgrade officer, was present at the great battle in 1806. was a subordinate of the chief of staff of the army, and was a participant in the reform of the prussian army after the great defeat. in 1812, he resigned his commission because he disagrees with the king in terms of their decision to be an ally of france, their former enemy, and invade russia. so he goes over to the russian army, serves as an advisor to the czar, and is attached to two senior russian commanders, fisa some of the great battles of 1812 including, was at the retreat of the french army when

it's trapped in the late fall of 1812, goes on when the prussians changed sides to fight at the great battles, and then in the 1815 campaign, the waterloo campaign, fights. so he's a very experienced officer. after the war he is appointed to head the prussian war college, and from 1818-1831, he spent most of his time writing about his experiences in the great wars. he dies from cholera. his collected writings are published posthumously. the first four blogs make up the book known as onboard. on war is a famous book regarded by many as the most important

book ever written on armed conflict. it is currently standard reading and all the war colleges of the united states armed workforce. and your book is called "decoding clausewitz." why? >> well, it's called "decoding clausewitz" because i think that "on war" has been very badly misunderstood. and it's not like it's just any common book. we misunderstand many books, but this book because of it place to american military education. for it to be misunderstood, has a real world consequences that are despicable. one of them miss conceptions is he is a proponent of the offenses. and when, in fact, the very reverse is the case, but he is a great proponent of the defense as a stronger form of war. and in particular, he argues that if the defender is willing

to resort to guerrilla warfare, there is no such thing as a decisive victory for the attacker. >> what does that mean? >> well, it means that clausewitz believed that your main army could be defeated. your country could be occupied, and your capital in the hands of the enemy. but if you have the will to resist, if necessary army our own population, that in the end the attacker would be compelled to modify his political objective, and you can preserve your sovereignty. >> is that not the way that clausewitz is taught today? >> that's usually not how it is taught. he is frankly, not always but, frankly, taught as a proponent of the offensive and decisive battle. is often characterized as a rationalize of napoleonic methods of war. when, in fact, the exact opposite is the case. use the proponent, not of napoleonic methods but for those

who oppose napoleon. he is after all a prussian, not a frenchman. professor sumida, clausewitz is known for saying that war is merely a continuation of policy by other means. >> well, he did say that but it's often given a meaning that at the very least historical clausewitz was trying to sleep. it is usually intended to mean that when you go to war you should have an achievable local objective and clausewitz meant much more than an immense a number of different things. number one, that phrase is accompanied by other phrases which clarify what he meant in certain instances. he not only said that war should be an extension of politics, or policy by other means. he also said that policy politics affects the attacker, or the defender. and he also argued that politics policy does not just mean

foreign politics or international policy. it also means domestic politics. and the significance of that is that clausewitz believe that domestic politics could actually shape, that is opposition to a war, for example, cause the leadership of the country to modify its political objectives. and the corollary to this is that the objective in war might not just the military objectives but it might be political objectives. politics would be very much sympathetic to the notion that even if you lost all of your major battle, if you protracted resistance, and caused domestic difficult in the attacking country, that you could preserve your sovereignty. so obviously the applicability of this idea to the present day is quite large.

>> when did "on war" become popular in the united states? >> well, "on war" is referred to in textbooks at the u.s. military academy during the second world war. it's interesting that in that textbook no mention is made, the phrase. but it really becomes required reading aztecs and u.s. military is probably in the 1970s, especially after 1976 when the michael howard and peter correct translation of "on war" is published. this is a translation that while not perfect, it's much more accessible than previous translation in fact oxford in 2005. a german scholars observed that germans preferred to read clausewitz in the english translation rather than in the original german because they thought it was more clear. i can't vouch for the truth of that, but it's an interesting

observation. >> since 1976 when you say it became more use in the military academy, three major wars have been fought. the cold war, the iraq war, and the current war in afghanistan. do you see traces of "on war"? can you see traces of "on war" in those wars speak as well, more in the breach than in the observance of "on war." again, i recall in 2003 vice president cheney said as justification for the invasion of iraq that everyone knows that the offense is a stronger form of war. and, in fact, everyone might know this, but that category would include carl van clausewitz who argue quite the opposite. for reasons i think that are applicable to that particular case, and other cases. i think, clausewitz is convinced that time works for the offender and not the attacker. and that a strategy of attrition on the part of the defender will

ultimately cause an attacker to modify his political objections. and this is of course a perfectly consistent with clausewitz strategic perspective because it's only -- his own country, prussia, had france as a next-door neighbor. if there was going to be any hope for prussian national survival, particularly after 18 to six when it had been completely smashed by french military victory, clausewitz would have to come up with a theory that was strategically encourage the leadership of his own country. i mean, i don't know if clausewitz is absolutely right, but he had very good reason to argue what he did about defense. >> jon sumida, have you had a chance to discuss her book in front of military classes? >> yes. i teach at the school of advanced were fighting which is insane school for the u.s. marine corps, and i've lectured at the pentagon.

and at other military institutions. i've been gratified by the response, much more favorable than i would have anticipated. i was asked by the editor of, mike briggs at the university, kansas, what i thought of the action passion of the reaction to my book would be. and i was pretty certain that because they cut across so much of the interpretation of "on war" and would not be entirely favorable, so my reply was, that the week after my book was published i would be burned at the stake at the army war college, and a week after that my ashes would be in acid, and the week after that the fumes from the dassault ashes would be shot into space by the air war college. and the week after that, the marines would make the required reading at the school of

"decoding clausewitz" published by the university press of kansas, a new approach to onboard. is also a professor at the university of maryland. >> we would like to hear from you. tweet us your feedback, twitter.com/booktv. >> on your screen is the newest book by longtime washington foreign correspondent georgie anne geyer, predicting the unthinkable, anticipating the impossible. georgie anne geyer, what is this book about? >> this book is a compilation of the soviet communism. and i thought for many years that will we have to do, those of us in influence, would have to anticipate, have to predicting. they predict that that very

easily. >> throughout your years as foreign correspondent, where half your travels take and you? what are two or three of the most exciting places you have been in situations you have been? >> egypt, israel, vietnam, that's very exciting. cuba. interviews many times. and really everywhere. i can't think of places now. >> so if people sit down to read predicting the and thinkable, what will they find in the? what would you like them to take away from that book? >> the terms -- [inaudible] we have great diplomats, and

military men who have predicted. it never sort of gets to the upper regions of the white house, at the state department. >> so if you were to travel today, where do you see a future problem or future situation that we should be aware of, thinking about how? >> well, certainly syria. i think the rest of the middle east is going to come out of this quite well, that syria is such a nasty place, that it will have to be an all out resolution. [inaudible] they are not doing much of anything. they depend upon us, and so most everywhere you look, including our own, we have