>> the intelligent transportation systems will depend on gps as a key

technology for vehicle collision warning and crash avoidance systems. what's more, gps is essential for the operation of first responders, search and rescue, resource management, whether tracking and prediction, earthquake monitoring and other critical national security functions. from there the list goes on and on. now as you know the lightsquared corporation has proposed to create a wireless broadband network. the obama administration we believe deeply in what lightsquared is attempting to do which is to make the internet more accessible to more people all across the country. this is an urgent national priority. but after comprehensive testing we have concluded the current plan to provide services adversely affect gps signals. i will be happy to delve into the details during our conversation as i have in my written testimony. in short, both lightsquared original and revised list generate considerable harmful interference with gps. our researchers could not, could

find no obvious practical mitigations to solve interference issues. i would also point out the substantial federal resources including over two many dollars from the faa has been different from other programs in testing and analyzing lightsquared's proposals. even if these interference issues were somehow resolved, lightsquared would still have to design fixes for known interference with high precision gps receivers that are vital for agriculture, science and surveying. lightsquared's operating plan still leaves open the possibility of broadcasting on both bands. is a violence proposal to a quote standstill on broadband use of the upper 10 megahertz bands. considering all these factors the executive committee of the national space-based position navigation and timing group have now unanimously concluded that lightsquared proposals are fundamentally incompatible with gps use, and that no additional testing or analysis is warranted at this time. going forward, the ex-con

agencies continue to strongly support president obama's directive to make available a total of over 500 megahertz of spectrum over the next 10 years suitable for broadband use. we recognize we all have to do our part in spectrum use, making it as efficient as possible. we propose to work with the national telecommunications and infrastructure administration in the department of commerce to direct new gps spectrum interference standards. these standards which would have form future potential commercial operators would let them know in advance which uses in adjacent veins would or would not be compatible with gps. and will ensure that the national policy protection for gps evolves with clear communication. and it is simply without affecting existing and emerging uses of space-based position navigation and timing services that are vital to economic, public safety, scientific and national security needs. in some, our gps system is one of the more vital, if less

visible parts of her national infrastructure. with that i will be happy to answer any questions. and again, thank you for permitting me to testify. >> thank you. mr. galotti. >> good morning. it's an honor to be able to testify before the subcommittee and i would like to thank you for the opportunity. my testimony today will focus on the importance of what we call the global navigation satellite systems the international civil aviation. and there are a few other global systems. rush has its own which has maintenance problems over the years although that government is not committed to a next-generation system. there's the european galileo not yet operational and, of course, china is in the process of launching its compass system. because of the reliability and continued upgrading to the gps and the commitment of the united states government, gps has

evolved into the most fundamental and important piece of supporting infrastructure for the global aviation system. and just at the beginning i would like to mention that the united states is one of the primary contributors to icao in terms of technical expertise and knowledge in its support of consensusbuilding and excellence in international standards and policy development through which we are grateful. on the technical work we do it is encompassed by groups of experts nominated by the member space. the faa has been a major contributor to icao in this respect and i believe it has served the u.s. interests extremely well. icao's involvement was not what navigation systems goes back to the work of the icao committee on future air navigation system for common known as the fan fan to me. the was was a major contributor. in adopting the outcome of the committee of the tense air navigation conference making and what the conclusions released that explication of satellite technology appears to be the only viable solution to overcome

the shortcomings of the present system and also fulfill the global needs and requirements of the foreseeable future and the satellite-based systems will be the key to worldwide improvements. in recognition of the turning point, acknowledged -- announcement of the importance of gnss which was highly dependent and is on the u.s. gps, president clinton offered the gps standard positioning service to the global aviation committee through icao to support international civil aviation. this commitment was reaffirmed in 2007 under president bush as follows, the u.s. government maintains its commitment to provide gps signals on a continuous worldwide basis, free of user fees and even worldwide civil space-based navigation services and to provide open, free access and information necessary to develop and build equipment to use the services. even before the work of fan committee at office of both

president clinton and bush, the availability of gps tessellation first came about i'm sure you'll were up when president reagan authorized its use for international civil aviation after the shootdown of korean double seven. following the initial u.s., icao develop international standards to satellite navigation systems with the availability of the gps system became globally recognized by the international civil aviation community as a central element of gnss. icao and the entire international civil aviation community have now completely rely on the long-standing u.s. government policies and its commitment as a key enabler for international aviation. i just want to go over a few of the important ways that gps support international aviation. there are many areas in the world with conventional terrestrial navigation and infrastructure is inadequate, and gnss is often the only reliable source of navigation,

the navigation information. before gnss navigation and high seas airspace was inaccurate, separating distance from aircraft used by air traffic control was much is 100 miles laterally and 15 to 20 minutes in trail. the superior accuracy of gnss is best when integrated, has enabled a number of substantial navigation improvements which are the foundation of the concept of performance-based navigation. in airspace separation coming aircraft is significantly reduced thereby increasing capacity while bringing safety, efficiency and environmental benefits. the united states provides air traffic control services over a vast expanse of high seas airspace. in the north atlantic there are over 2000 crossings a day. the transpacific passenger traffic is expected to grow by 4.2% between 2009-23. expected to grow by 5.1%, and

right now there are proxim 8000 flights per year that operate on cross polar routes, and they are totally relying on gps. until very recently all final approaches for land in major airports were accomplished by means of instrument landing systems. this is okay in space better able to maintain these and infrastructure support that. in many parts of the world maintaining such systems is prohibited because of the cost and expertise. using pbn approach procedures based on gps more and more approaches lands by equipment aircraft only with little or no reliance on ground equipment, bring enormous safety benefits. and airports that previously had no instrument approaches now have pbn. today when u.s. airlines flight into nigeria, kazakhstan, mongolia, ecuador and georgetown, guyana, to name a few out of a hundred or more than a short us safe operations

because of gps. gnss is important for surveillance and are sure you're all aware of automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast, but over oceanic airspace automatic dependent surveillance contracts allows air traffic control to have surveillance whether this was impossible. finally, come to the most significant near-term air traffic management improvements that have recently become available i continues to send operation and continuous climb operation. is a major initiative at icao, and gps allows this extremely efficient flight routing to be enabled. and now just a few words about the spectrum, major issue that has as much due with importance of gps as anything else. i'm referring to the problem of frequency spectrum, available radio frequency spectrum is the lifeblood of aviation and the protection of spectrum used by aviation radio systems is

absolutely essential for safety. icao has been vehemently supporting the protection of gnss spectrum for decades in all international forms a special the world real conferences and there's one going on in geneva right now. against that background i would urge you to consider that any decision by the united states that affects the frequency spectrum which impacts on gnss will have a critical impact on safety record, the investments made in gss, international standards, and the recertification of equipment. in summit, mr. chairman, out like to appeal to you and the committee that icao and international civil aviation continued to benefit from u.s. leadership and cooperation in many ways, including people support through the sharing of technical information and expertise, supportive consensusbuilding and excellence in international standards and policy development. and concrete projects.

gps is among the most important ways that u.s. provides technological humanitarian and political leadership. icao looks for the two this relationship and working together. thank you for this opportunity should icao's views with this important subcommittee. >> thank you. thank you both. at previous hearings the subcommittee has been informed that as we gain momentum in deploying the nextgen technology it will have an enormous return on american governments investment, it reduces fuel use for the industry by some 20 or 30%, expand the capacity of system without having to build additional runways and so on, improve the safety of the system, short a time of flights. it goes on and on and on. reduce the sound footprint that planes are able to glide down lower for many of the airport

where that's been a problem. a lot of benefits from this new, for using this technology in the aviation industry, as other industries have found that i do have a couple of questions. first, mr. porcari, you mentioned that you propose the department of transportation work with the national telecommunications and information information to draft new spectrum interference standards to strengthen existing national policy protection of an adjacent band spectrum. could you elaborate on what that all means? >> i would be happy to, mr. chairman, and one thing that i think recent events has showed us is that gps is not only a national asset, infrastructure asset, but that protecting that asset we will have to be much more sophisticated in future in how we do that.

and in layman's terms on both sides of the existing gps frequency, there were mobile satellite type applications that were also quiet as it were, that did not interfere with gps's ability to hear what is a very weak signal space, basically 50 watts, 20,000 miles off. the spectrum interference standards, and we would take the whole of government approach to this, working through our position navigation and timing executive committee. the idea would be to identify before anyone puts capital at risk or major project at risk, what our compatible uses gps. in general terms, the more precise the gps receiver, for example, the avionics and aircraft, more precise they are, the more they are likely to have

a wideband receiver that, in fact, needs to be able to listen beyond the gps frequency. acknowledging that, in building a policy around that would be we think a very good choose of staff time, and from a policy perspective critical to protecting gps as an asset. >> for proposing to set than interference standards, how is the proposal different from setting receiver standards? >> there are currently no receiver standards, and the idea of spectrum interference standards would be to give everyone involved the industry and others, confidence in the long-term that as they build more and more precise gps

devices, and i know our focus is on aviation where gps is absolutely critical to operations today but will be even more so in the future, but other applications, precision farming, and others, spectrum interference standards would be clear guidelines for all users, both within the gps spectrum and adjacent spectrums. we think if we can build the kind of consistency of predictability for both the gps users, and adjacent spectrum users, that that will serve interest well. >> i understand there is some sort of a garfunkel about this and adjacent, whose interfering on whose turf in this particular area, and that, in fact, it was allowed for a little broader use

of spectrum because it didn't interfere with adjacent use, and then when the type of use was changed somewhat at the staff level, that has created a problem. is that what you're trying to avoid? >> yes, mr. chairman, that is exactly. gps by its very nature is a very weak space-based signal. it's very faint when it is received by gps receivers in the atmosphere or in terrestrial applications. i think of it in his own terms because that's probably the way to think about compatibility of uses. gps spectrum was originally put in the quiet neighborhood because it needed a quiet neighborhood with quiet neighbors to be able to have accuracy with receivers. the adjacent pieces of spectrum were for mobile satellite service, which was another quiet use. what has happened with the specific proposal is essentially

you want from a mobile satellite service proposal with limited ground augmentation to a ground-based service with limited satellite our petition. that really change the fundamental nature of signals and how they would be received. but it's i think would important to point out that gps was put in a quiet piece of the spectrum on purpose because fundamentally it has to have quiet neighbors. >> so this was well known at the tactical level at the time this strategy was put in place? >> yes, i believe that the physics and the technical parts of it have been well known all along, and i would also point out that as mr. galotti had from an international perspective harmonizing values of the frequency internationally was important as well. so that the same kind of safety of flight avionics that we are using today and as we build a larger nextgen system can be used around the world.

>> mr. galotti, in your testimony you referred to gps spectrum use being under some threat and it being discussed at past world radio conference is, and i think some current coming conferences as well but could you elaborate on that, what role you as representing the global aviation industry played in those conferences? and how have you been able to work out resolutions in the past? >> the international telecommunication holds a world radio conference every three years, and it's a huge event. it last for four weeks. the space goal very powerful representation, and also industry goals with incredible force.

telecommunication providers are, as you can imagine, have the most to gain, and they put a lot of pressure. they worked around-the-clock virtually on getting e-mails from my people at two and three in the moon. during the three years between, we meet with all of our member states and we develop, we prepare and icao position that at least the member states agree to so we get just about unanimous decision on the icao position for radio frequency spectrum. it doesn't always pan out that way at the event itself because again there's a lot of lobbying, a lot of pressure, a lot of jobs at stake. but as observers there we do have a lot of close contact with the states and the friends in the aviation industry. and we have been very successful

in working with the member states and united states has been a strong supporter of protecting the spectrum from other uses. >> thank you. mr. costello? >> mr. chairman, thank you. deputy secretary, to fall upon the chairman's question from the as the same same question that i said i was going to ask, but i would like to have you clarify a point. my understanding is that you are proposing that d.o.t. work with other agencies to develop a policy. does that mean for radio transmission standards in the spectrum? is the interference now between the agencies? i would talk about transmission standards, or what are we talking about? >> what we are really talking about is more generically and more broadly spectrum interference standards, where we could establish by consensus and

with input from everyone who is in equity in this industry, interested observers and others, the kind of standards that would protect the gps spectrum both today and in the future. and if you look at the evolution of gps, just in the last 10 to 15 years, for example, the gps uses, especially in aviation, have gotten more and more precise and they're not safety flight issues, which requires spectrum and her parents protection. we're talking primarily about transmission standard? >> we are talking about primarily the requirement for precise navigation devices that use gps to be able to utilize as broad a ban as possible. what they have done today, and which was acknowledged in the original approval of modal dash of mobile satellite services on

either end of that spectrum. so i say this because in fairness to all the potential end users outside of the gps band, establishing the stance would give them a good sense of what kind uses would be compatible in which would not. >> you also mention in your testimony that the obama administration, that their goal is to free up federally owned spectrum and make it available for mobile broadband, especially providing access to underserved rural communities. i certainly support that goal and i think many members of the committee would as well. especially for underserved communities for wireless service and where consumers would benefit from competition between service providers. let me ask you at the mobile satellite service band is not compatible with a high speed wireless transmissions, then what can the administration do to provide greater access to high speed service? >> well, the administration

department of transportation and every part of the administration is again committed to identifying the 500 megahertz of additional spectrum over the next 10 years. we strongly support -- which underlined which is the need for rural broadband and broadband competition. there are some features of the recent proposal that are very valuable from that perspective, but we think that working across the government with her position navigation and timing executive committee with ntia, will ultimately be helpful. obviously, we would not presume, in what actions the federal communications commission an independent agency would take it thank you, mr. chairman. >> mr. cole? >> thank you, mr. chairman. gentlemen, thank you for your testimony. mr. porcari, on dash that are there any standards for military

gps receivers that protect them from transmissions from outside the gps band? >> congressman, my understanding, and up with general shelton testified before this house armed services committee, is that there are not. and they do not that in at least some cases the department of defense aircraft are using commercial off the shelf avionics that are certified for commercial use as opposed to military. >> thank you, sir. i wanted to ask another question, mr. porcari. what standards are currently in place to make sure that the receiver, that equipment purchased, pickup only signals using the gps frequency band? >> there are no current standards in place, and that is a part of the reason for the discussion here and again, we think going forward having the consistency predictability of the spectrum interference

standards will help all parties involved. >> thank you, sir. mr. galotti, i will put this question to each of you. what impact by protections for gps have on the marketplace for radio spectrum, a? and b., how does this bear on the question as to whether or not gps warns protections? either of you is fine. mr. galotti, we will start with you. >> thank you, congressman. i guess, there are various figures that exist as to the number of jobs and as i said earlier that bush administration from the telecommunication providers to have significant figures on jobs, but on the other hand, aviation globally i believe, the number that is out

there is worth about $3 trillion to the global economy, a year, when you consider the economics, the tourism, the aviation industry itself, that business, carries and goods and other things. probably a good case could be made that economically aviation is critical but there would be more and more pressure, particularly telecommunication providers t. >> do you want to weigh? >> yes, congressman. i don't know the values of the spectrum in itself. i would point out that the national investment we made in gps for someone military only perspective that now from a combined military civil perspective has been enormous. it's one of the more precious and important pieces of national infrastructure we have, even if you can't see it and feel that

it's also a u.s. national leadership issue. i would point out in aviation context, i would argue one of the single best safety advances were made in the last 20 years which is the terrain avoidance warning system's, 20 years ago controlled flight for both commercial and recreational aircraft was a leading cause of accidents. the terrain avoidance warning system's that are gps enabled have taken controlled flight into terrain from a leading cause of accidents into something that is way down on the list. another example is, as of today, part of our nextgen system adsb is operational in the gulf of mexico where we've had no right cost and with thousands of flight operations a day. for example, serving offshore petroleum rigs via helicopter that had no writer covers before

that are now served by ads-b. it is important to make sure that we understand the value on both sides of the equation, including the enormous national investment that has been made in gps, which has gone far beyond military use, far beyond aviation uses, and for precision farming, construction, safety of our train systems. those are not possible today without gps. >> thank you. mr. chairman, by red light is about to eliminate so i will yield back the. >> thank you. mr. duncan. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and this is my first real involvement with this. so there's much i don't really understand, but mr. secretary, i have read this statement from this assessment that says by the deputy sectors of the department of transportation and the department of defense, and i assume that is from you? >> yes.

>> and it's a very strong statement that you put out about three and half weeks ago. and you say there that, that you mention that lightsquared had an original proposal and then they modified it. can you explain to me in layman's terms how much of a change they made in their original plan? and also tell us in our briefing papers that they are disputing your findings or your assessme assessment. >> i will be happy to, congressman. in layman's terms is all i'm capable here so i will try to do it in that sense. the original lightsquared proposal of roughly a year ago, january 2011, proposed up to 40,000 ground-based transmitters that would effectively blink of the gps signal pashtun blank out

the gps signal and large areas of the u.s. picked it was an early testing done, both by the department of defense and faa. it was clear from the testing that there is interference issue. the forum for this is a relatively obscure group, the position navigation and timing executive committee which the deputy secretary of defense and i co-chair. deputy secretary carter represented in the military and myself representing all the civil users. through that committee, which was all the executive branch agencies, which includes others, including the federal communications commission as an observer, it was clear that additional testing of a different proposal was in order. we worked with a lightsquared.

they were part of developing the testing protocols. they were part of the testing itself, and the results i think are very clear-cut. i would point out that those are, the testing results from both the npef work and separate aviation works are currently with ntia and will be transmitted to sec shortly, but those results were independently verified by both idaho national engineering laboratories and in the lincoln laboratories at mit. and to my layman's perspective, the result, especially with a precision safety of flight, avionics that we use in aircraft, the results were unacceptable. >> well, let me ask you this but i said it was a very strong assessment. and what i'm talking about is it is based upon this testing and analysis that appears to be no practical solutions or mitigations that will permit the

lightsquared broadband services as proposed offer in the next few months or years, without significantly anything with gps. i understand that the dangers or the concerns are the problems, but it is a fascinating thing to me that you could say that there's nothing they could even do within the next few years. it does tell us, and i have no connection whatsoever with lightsquared. i've never even talked to these people, but it says they dispute these findings. how do they dispute them, do you know? >> first, i believe the lightsquared representatives can and should better explain how they dispute to find. i would point out a statement, pakistan, is strong. i believe it is warded given the circumstances. when we talk about in the next few months or years, remember there's a very large base of gps receivers.

just focusing on aviation for a moment, there's about 60,000 gps receivers out there that are used for safety of flight things like terrain avoidance system. each of those is about $40,000 but if you look at on average, if you look at the life cycle of aircraft in avionics they serve for decades. and the reason for that part of the statement is to point out that there is no easy to retrofit or filter or any other kind of retrofit from a safety of flight perspective, makes a proposal as curly proposed by lightsquared compatible with aviation. >> i'm not saying it wasn't worth it and you saying it's a fascinating thing that there would be a statement that nothing could be done, even in the next few years, when technology advances as fast as it does. so it's kind of an interesting thing. thank you very much. >> thank you.

mr. cravaack? >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you for your testimony today. i can truly tell you as a pilot, there's a palpable difference in the cockpit when you have terrain avoidance systems using gps. when you're flying that approach coming in from the east going into salt lake city and you know you're skirting the top of the mountains. it was really a comforting feeling having the gps in the cockpit. but lightsquared has agreed to a standstill as i understand it on the use of the upper portion of the spectrum, the portion that is closest to the gps signal. and lightsquared stated it would like to work with the gps committee to develop mitigating strategies, as they put it, nor to initiate commercial operation in the upper spectrum within two or three years. is, in your opinion, i understand it when your testimony, you said there is a

mitigating conclusion here, and that do you really think two or three years to be able to find some type of strategy is in that window? and, number two, from what we know, even if we can identify mitigation strategy, the cost of general aviation to end with that strategy well? >> thank you congress and at first i would point out i'm not sure what a stance immense on the upper 10 megahertz. there are no time limits to that and no technical triggers that i'm aware of on that. there is a fundamental incompatibility between the lightsquared proposal as proposed, and the continued use of gps as a precision air navigation use. and again, i would point out that this has been built over decades now where more and more

we're dependent on the gps for a much higher standard of safety than we were able to achieve with the old landing system without the terrain avoidance warning systems, without wide area augmentation systems, all of those are very significant safety advances. i can't speculate on the cause because i'm not sure anyone can quantify the cost even if it could be done of retrofit its, if they were technically viable to existing avionics uses. >> but just to be clear then, there is no plans at this time to retrofit or reconfigured any systems to work with lightsquared in this bracket, is that correct to? >> that is correct, congressman. i would say in contrast, mobile satellite service uses on the adjacent vacancies, which is what they were originally zoned for, if you will, have been and

will be compatible. >> thank you very much and i will use back. >> thank you. mr. flashman? mr. farenthold? >> thank you very much. and untroubled that a terrestrial-based system like that lightsquared has the potential for interfering with gps. i'm afraid to point out the actual delicate nature of the gps system and its potential vulnerability to be, for nothing else, an attack. if reports of a drug passionate near newark airport, suppose someone not friendly to this country were to intentionally put up some high powered jamming stuff, we would be in trouble, historically. and has been considered a backup to gps, but that is currently

being dismantled. i'm concerned that women of all of this reliance on gps, from everything from my car to my cell phone to landing a 777 aircraft in the future. it seems to me that we are recruiting a vulnerable system with no backups. can y'all comment on the? >> yes, congressman. first, you brought up a very important point. you are by its very nature there are feral abilities -- vulnerabilities for the gps. you pointed out one specific incident where a commercially bought over the internet, $99 jammer caused a real issue at one of our major airports in the country. one of the things that we're done in the national position navigation and timing architecture study of the overall system, following on the federal aviation administration is committed to an alternate pnt

research program where just as today with our terrestrial radar base their navigation system, we have vulnerabilities and she basically build defense in depth with backup system. we know as we move with the implementation of nextgen as we move forward with that, that it will be more and more important to have backups to the gps-based system. they will only be short-term backup systems, and it's important to point out that we're moving aggressively -- >> can you define short-term backup? >> ivan, for short duration. in other words, if we were denied the use of gps systems for air navigation today, for an extended period of time, it would have severe impacts on the national airspace system. but if it were for 10 minutes it would be a little bit different.

>> so minutes as opposed today's? >> minutes as opposed today's. but again you put your finger on a vulnerability in the system to make it a vulnerability easy to exploit? >> well, it can be, and part of this is the architecture and design going forward of how we design the system of systems that is nextgen. we are very focused on this. also i would point out this is an important enforcement site. there is no legitimate commercial use for a gps jammer. >> all right. just for my information, i have seen press reports about other countries developing their own gps satellite. do we know where that is going? >> thank you, congressman. the russian federation had established a system in the '90s, and when soviet union disintegrated, it was not maintained. but i understand as of

december 2011 now they have a full constellation, and have committed to one similar to gps three, and they hope to have that in place by 2014. the europeans have galileo, which two satellites are up, total constellation is i believe 18. and china is putting in place what they call compass. they are two satellites in place and they plan to launch six in 2012, and the full complement by 2020. and that will initially be for east asia and china. you if you will allow me to geek out for just a second. we have a massive array of radio transmitters in the form of our cell tower networks. contain launch a denial -- is any research going into tapping into those to be some sort system as a fallback to gps?

>> i don't know. i be happy to research the and get back to the committee. >> it seems like there's a different structure in place you might be able to develop a fallback system can i appreciate the question and i will find out. >> my time is expired. thank you. >> well, i'm sure we all have a lot of other questions, but i will leave it there for this point. thank you very much. it's been very, very informati informative. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> the second panel consists of mr. thomas hendricks who is senior vice president of safety security and operations, airlines for america. sean cassidy, first vice president, airline pilots association. craig fuller, president and ceo of the aircraft of the aircraft owners and pilots association. john foley, director, aviation gnss technology of garmin a tea

inc., and doctor scott pace is director of space policy, the space policy institute, elliot school of international affairs, george washington university. i thank you for making them all of you for making the time to be with us today on this somewhat technical to a very important subject for sectors of our economy, of our safety competitiveness as a country. and we will begin with -- we will begin with captain cassidy. >> is still mourning the good morning, mr. chairman and members of the subcommittee. i am captain sean cassidy, first

vice president of vice president of the airline pilots association international and the represent more than 53,000 professional pilots based in the united states and canada. it is an honor to appear before the subcommittee to underscore the tremendous conjugation of the satellite-based navigation system makes two ensuring efficient and safe operations in the united states and around the globe. given the violent parts of the global positioning system as a key component of this country's transportation infrastructure, it is appropriate and he did a center for the house transportation for the house transportation and infrastructure committee and the aviation subcommittee to be fully engaged to protect the system. as the members of the subcommittee know, more than two decades the body will navigation information available through gps has enabled air transportation to make tremendous gains, safety and efficiency. since 1983 when gps became available to the public at no cost, the system has evolved in a vital tool for aircraft navigation, all weather approaches, and wendy's, surveillance, separation between aircraft, pilot situational

awareness. gps allows pilots to fly aircraft using the safest and most efficient routes which benefits every flight operation but particularly those over the atlantic and pacific were on long range routes were -- the enhanced agassiz allows aircraft on parallel runways to operate individually save increasing arrival rates. .. >> before gps we pilots had two choices for approaching landing at juneau, and they're both very

challenging. the approach from the east and from the west required low cloud ceilings. without gps the terrain and weather conditions forced many flight cancellations. in 19996 the pinpoint accuracy of the gps approach allows me to stay clear of the high terrain surrounding the channel and the airport. the result enhances safety and reduces delays and cancellations. since then the alaska airlines has expanded the gps-based approach to other airports in the country. in 2011 the airport completed more than 1500 flights that likely would have been canceled or diverted, and the net result was over 210,000 gallons worth of fuel that was not burned. across the united states the faa has published more than 11,000gps approaches to thousands of airports including

at reagan national where they reduce flight delays, diversions and cancellations. gps signals are low powered by design to allow them to be based on satellites. however, this low-energy environment also makes them susceptible to interference from other radio transmissions. historically permits in the closest to the gps bandwidth. one recent proposal to deploy 40,000 transmitters directly adjacent to bandwidth raised an alarm as well as to emergency services such as first responders. rigorous industry and government testing demonstrated that if lightsquared's proposal had been allowed to go forward, gps would be available across the u.s. were this proposal or anything like it to be allowed to proceed, pilots would lose a

tremendous navigational tool, and that supports a safe and sufficient air transportation system that helps the u.s. economy and secures tens of thousands of jobs. looking to the future, gps is critical to our efforts to modernize the air traffic control system. a staunch advocate of next gen. as part of the initiative, the faa's already invested more than a billion dollars in gps-based technology that is designed to replace surveillance of aircraft. gps will become more important. the pilots commend the u.s. aviation subcommittee for holding this hearing and allow us to underscore the unmatched benefit that gps provides to air transportation both now and in the future. thank you very much. >> thank you. mr. hendrix? >> chairman, ranking member and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting us to appear at this timely and important hearing, and i do apologize for my slight delay

and my pushback from my testimony this morning. it's good to see you again. as well as to the tens of millions of other people this our country who rely on it. gps will be the backbone of air navigation both domestically and internationally this the coming years. interference with its reliability would be catastrophic for civil aviation and the communities that fend on air transportation -- depend on air transportation. we deeply appreciate the subcommittee's recognition of the importance of this technology and particularly your support for the continued advancement of nextgen. we respect -- with respect to the lightsquared proposal, the incontestable fact is that it will create widespread gps interference which will have ruinous effects on aviation. experts have repeatedly reached that conclusion. light scwaid's -- light scwaird's proposal should be

withdrawn. any expansion cannot be permitted to interfere with existing or anticipated aviation gps use many of which will significantly enhance safety. we are dependent on that technology, there is no substitute for it. one with obvious lesson of the convoluted experience with the lightsquared application is the need for a government-wide policy that protects the aviation gps spectrum. without such an authoritative policy, spectrum encroachment will remain a threat. as the subcommittee knows all too well, we've historically relied on a ground-based air navigation system, a system that has become increasingly defined by its limitations. users of the system have had, for the most part, had to knew from one ground aid to the next. this inefficiency wastes time and fuel, it also restricts the number of routings that aircraft can use which in turn constricts capacity growth. gps is at the heart of the

program that will shift air navigation to a modern satellite-based system. this is a transformational change. all who are involved in it -- congress, the federal aviation administration, airlines, general aviation and the department of defense -- recognize the need for that transformation. this massive effort will result in more precise navigation, safer operations, far more direct aircraft routings, better air space utilization and capacity growth. there will be substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. one existing application of gps has produced a breakthrough in the safety of airline operations, it's been referred to earlier here. the accidents for large jet aircraft in the united states. enhanced ground proximity warning systems combine gps information with onboard terrain databases to provide flight deck crews with look-ahead warnings

of dangerous terrain. this has made air travel far safer than it was only p recently and illustrates the remarkable benefits that leveraging gps with other technologies can achieve. the introduction in the next decades of nextgen capabilities will be a game changer. it will create the satellite-based system of air traffic management that we all realize is necessary. gps is the indispensable element of this long-needed overhaul. given the essential role of gps, the federal government must develop comprehensive safeguards for aviation's use of it. the stakes are too high for the passengers and shippers that rely on air transportation, the communities and businesses that depend on air service and airlines and their employees to leave to chance our continued ability to utilize gps to the greatest advantage. consequently, we need a government wide policy that guides federal agencies' responses. that policy must make clear that interference in the aviation

spectrum is prohibited and that other users cannot be permitted to encroach into the aviation spectrum. domestically, the most obvious place to begin to strengthen governmental policy against gps interference is the international committee for space-based navigation and timing. the pnt is established by presidential directive to advise and coordinate federal departments and agencies on manners concerning gps. the pnt is chaired jointly by the secretaries of defense and transportation and includes equivalent-level officials from the departments of homeland security, state, interior, agriculture and commerce. the federal communications chairman participates as ally yeason. at the very least, the fcc should be require today consult with the pnt.

must reflect the importance of protecting the gps spectrum throughout the world. we appreciate the subcommittee's interest, we're prepared to assist you in any way we can, and i'd be happy to take any questions you might have. >> thank you. >> good morning, mr. chairman, ranking member costello, craig fuller, president and ceo of the aircraft owners and pilots' association. it's always a pleasure to be before the committee. i'm going to start with a statement i don't always get to make, and that is we are in absolute, full agreement with the obama administration on the question before you today. i thought the statements by deputy, the deputy secretary of transportation were right to the point. we agree with every point that was made there. indeed, the other members of the administration, other departments and agencies that have looked at this are of the same view.

there's only one somewhat reluctant regulator out there that seems not to have gotten this message, but perhaps today's hearing will help, although i know that's a topic maybe for another day. i have a statement i've filed for the record, it makes many of the points that have been made. i thought i'd give just a couple of comments of a different perspective. we all say gps is extremely important, we certainly believe that. but in a way gps is pretty simple. i took off yesterday from frederick, yabd, in an aircraft, and as soon as it was airborne, in fact even before it was airborne, a small box in the plane received multiple signals from gps transmitters in space. all that did initially was determine precisely where the. that's gps. the genius of gps is what it enables. the fact that gps has been around for a long time as a technology that can determine precisely where something is in space doesn't mean that this is

somehow old and not exciting because the excitement of gps is what it enables. the fact that that box as i traveled kept determining exactly where that airplane was in space, you now have two points. the box calculated my air speed. the box calculated my heading. the box calculated that there's towers on hills near frederick, maryland, that i was within 500 neat of. if i had an emergency of some kind, the box would tell me exactly what the nearest airport was, the route to it, how long it would take me to get there simply because it could receive this very small signal from space, from the gps transmitter. and i guess i would submit that while some may say, well, it's time to look to new technology for greater benefits, we've just begun to tap this genius of gps and what it can enable. and as you've heard today, it is absolutely at the center of nextgen technology.

we have 5200 public use airports in this country. we couldn't possibly afford to put instrument landing systems in all those airports with equipment on the ground. and yet every one of those airports can have a precision approach to every runway using gps capabilities. that's what it enables. it enables emergency helicopters to go precisely to the scene of a crime, to a mountain climber that needs to be rescued. i know exactly what the closest landing site is for the helicopter. all these things are enabled by the gps signal. i guess from where we sit my 400,000 members see this as absolutely essential. by the way, you've heard from two very respected members of the industry who fly large airplanes. the airplane i was in was a two-seater, and it has this same gps capability that airliners have.

um, you know, i think when we talked about this issue before, i said there's nothing wrong with a government agency looking forward and seeing an opportunity and letting it be explored. and, indeed, the food and drug administration does that all the time with miracle cures in medicines. but sometimes they don't work. and i think what the agencies of the federal government have said as we embrace the concept that was being considered, but the approach simply doesn't work. and be it puts at risk all that xps enable -- gps enables which is not what we've experienced for the last 20 years, but the promise it holds for the future. so we very much appreciate the committee's interest in this, we embrace the statements made by the administration. we strongly urge that the federal communications commission rescind waivers that keep this cloud over us on this important topic until further

research can be done. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. mr. foley. >> i'm grateful for the opportunity to participate in this important hearing. i'm john foley, credibilitier of aviation -- director of aviation at garmin. we're devoted to designing and building gps devices for millions of users worldwide improving their lives and safety. the gps industry in this country alone accounts for over 130,000 direct jobs. what was once a government-only technology is now fully woven into the fabric of our infrastructure. that did not happen overnight. it has taken two decades of hard work to mature it from a fledgling technology into a reliable force for safety and efficiency. yet, unbelievably, what we have built together is now threatened. today virtually all types of

aircraft utilize gps for navigation and approaches. loss of even a fraction of gps reliability would pose significant danger to air vegas safety -- aviation safety. loss of gps while on approach would unsafely increase pilot workload during a critical phase of flight. loss of gps would deny coverage at hundreds of airports. without gps the terrain awareness and warning system would not work. loss of gps means a loss of situational awareness for cockpit displays of traffic and weather information including on the ground to prevent runway incursions. last but not least, reliable gps is essential for the faa's proposed nextgen system. we can sum up the last year in four words: grant first, test later. grant first, test later seems to stand the process of public

decision making on its head. this approach placed a severe burden be on everyone's time, attention and resources, a burden that should have been placed on those seeking something from the fcc. everyone concerned about gps reliability had to devote six months last spring and millions of dollars to test the effects of constantly changing proposals. the tests revealed extensive interference. anyone aware of the tremendous difference in signal strength could have predicted this result. yet despite all this another round of extensive government testing occurred last fall. the pnt again concluded in a recent letter to the ntia that various plans for a high-powered broadband network would cause harmful interference to many gps receivers. the faa's separate analysis simply concluded that such proposals are not compatible with several gps-dependent aircraft safety systems and that no practical solutions exist to

prevent significant interference to gps. the ex-com stated that no further testing was necessary. garmin has found many developments over the last year to be troubling. why did the fcc make a far-reaching decisions without spending time to run its own tests? should an applicant have the burden of demonstrating market readiness? why were objections from the department of transportation and defense ignored? we hope you are asking these same questions too. where do we go now? we believe that the pnt has the right structure, the right stakeholders including a a liaison role and on paper should be effective. however, coordination must be improved. the fcc must on -- obtain sign-off. going forward if pnt believes that the creation of a post of

something akin to a national chief gps officer would help inshire that coordination -- insure that coordination, we could support that. we think such an officer should alternately come from the d.s of defense and transportation. in their recent letter to ntia, a draft was proposed for new gps interference standards. in response we simply note that in the last year parts of our government seemed unaware that gps devices, the faa and department of defense standards already address interference. any analysis in the future should recognize and build upon that work. in short, garmin and other manufacturers have had their businesses greatly disrupted by the failure of government to effectively coordinate. it has cost us millions of dollars that could have been better spent improving gps products. if anything, for businesses, consumers in the nation this year has, in essence, been a trial run. we've learned a lot, but the threat is still there, and we need your continued vigilance to

help. thank you, and i look forward to answering your questions. >> thank you. dr. pace. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you to this committee for an opportunity to discuss this topic. as you've heard, gps is a global utility that's important to all modes of our nation's transportation infrastructure. what i'd like to do is provide maybe a little historical or policy perspective because some of these issues of threats to gps are, actually, not new. there have been and continue to be many policy and legal risks for gps from funding constraints, the transition to modernized signals and domestic regulations. the most serious threats, however, are not to be gps itself, but to the spectrum environment upon which it depends, if you will, the foundation upon which all these applications reside. every type of threat from band sharing, segmentation, out of banding missions, reallocation of adjacent bands have been attempted other the past 15

years. to date, all such threated have been removed or mitigated through bipartisan support from multiple congresses and administrations who sought to protect the spectrum in which gps operates. four presidents -- two republican, two democratic -- have issued policy statements regarding gps. these statements have recognized the dual use nature as more than a military system crucial to a broad range of u.s. interests. congress has passed numerous bills related trot protection of g -- to the protection of gps. regulatory processes for rule manging are -- making are well defined. i would say the united states has sufficient law and policy on the books to protect gps. what has been missing at times has been a willingness to follow the basics of good government. given the high stakes involved in preventing risks to gps, it's attempting to look for a special policy fence that would automatically prevent problems

from arising. given the fcc is an independent regulatory commission, however, that does not report to the president, any special policies will require congressional action in a very complex area. receiver standards have been mentioned as a possible way of allowing higher-power emissions in bands adjacent to the gps spectrum or at least creating a more predictable regulatory environment for new entrants. i do no not believe this would be a useful approach and would focus on finding criteria, an important difference. the creation of government-driven design standards outside of those necessary for national security and public safety can stifle innovation. regulatory means of sacrificing some categories of users and their applications in rapidly-evolving markets. on the other hand, transparent protection for the gps spectrum environment can provide better predictability for new entrants while not constraining gps applications. finally, i would like to mention

two areas of risk not related to spectrum. in today's fiscal environment, it may be tempting to slow or cancel the acquisition of gps iii satellites. this is a very dangerous idea given our nation's reliance on gps and the lack of demonstrated reliability of foreign systems. a second risk area would be disruptions to existing gps users as an unintended result of modernization. there is a need to explicitly confirm that changes to gps are backwards compatible with the installed base. if not, there could be a transition plan that is developed -- there needs to be a transition plan developed with a relevant stakeholders in government, industry and even nongovernment organizations such as advisory committees and scientific societies. we have a precious resource in that installed base that needs to be protected. finally, the spectrum neighborhood in which gps resides should should be preser. as gps modernization proceeds, the u.s. government should insure that the install base suffers no disruptions as new

gps capabilities come online, and for the aviation community, it is not an overstatement to say that eternal vigilance is, in fact, the price for safety. i'd be happy to answer any questions you might have. >> thank you. thank the entire panel for your contribution. craig fuller talked about the simple technology with a thousand and more, anymore permutations and advantages? i'm thinking in my own area we have a boat manufacturer now that has a boat hook, it's a gps. you push a button, and the boat will stay perfectly still without an anchor in the ocean. and, of course, john deere and these people now can do, apply fertilizers to fields based on the characteristics at that spot on the field. and increase, have a huge return

for additional investment, making ature more productive, less wasteful and all the rest. and it's all gps, and this is only the beginning of how we can refine the application of technology for changes and circumstances on a practically 6-inch by 6-inch basis across our country. you heard the testimony of the previous panel, and i really wonder if, particularly mr. foley and mr. pace, would you care to comment on it. you have in your prepared remarks, but with we've found ourselves in a rather we peculir situation in that i'm sure good-meaning people who see a business opportunity spent some billions of dollars to help achieve a national objective which is a good one of making broadband more available, high-speed broadband across our country.

and yet we had a gps system set up and elaborated for a number of years that needed to be in if a quiet area as was the testimony before, was well known. evidently, the price of that spectrum reflected that to some excan't. extent. and yet that spectrum was acquired, and the previous purpose was broadened at the staff level, at the fcc. evidently, leading people to think they could do something. and that's going to ruin a lot of savings of people who have invested in all this technology. so is this, is this a staff failure, or are people leading someone down the prim rose path? i mean, how -- we need clearer fences here, explain people why -- evidently, the spectrum price reflected a sum knowledge at the investor level as to what

was going on, but was it in a failure of the technical advisers of these investors? do you have any -- i guess it's speculation, but it may looking forward how can we avoid this waste of resources in the future or rescue the situation that we find ourselves in? do either of you have any ideas? >> well, thank you. i think the main thing, and i think we've all kind of highlighted on that is that we need to make sure that we protect the spectrum that we have, and looking kind of backwards i think at least from my perspective as a gps receiver manufacturer there are some standards for interference that have been in place for quite some time back to 1996, i believe. so it was a bit of a surprise for us to see that when this new proposed system came up, it was

actually putting out signals far in excess of those receiver interference protection limits. so any future plans we'd want to build on those exist being limits, and i think that's what the pnt has said and d.o.t. has said. so to the extent that we do that, i think that's the best way to move forward and just more generally as i stated in my testimony, improve coordination between the pnt and the fcc and the rest of the government to make sure that all the stakeholders get represented when new policy decisions are made. >> i think, mr. sherman, looking back at it i think the fundamental error was in not really applying maybe the intent or the past practices of the administrative procedures act, notices of proposed rule makings that involved reallocation of spectrum. an argument was made that this was not a reallocation from mobile satellite services to a high-powered broadband terrestrial mobile service but this was, in fact, simply a

relaxation of maybe some outdated constraints and some waivers could be applied and maybe new efficiencies could be found. i think in retrospect that was too kleopfer by half, that -- clever by half, that a notice of proposed rulemaking should have been done. the notice would have generated the technical data necessary to understand what was involved, and that one would have fairly quickly seen that this was a nonstarter. when this originally started back in about 2003, the idea of an ancillary terrestrial component to mobile satellite service was considered a kind of a fill-in, a gap filler, a relatively low power system. no one was talking about 40,000, you know, high-powered cell towers blanketing the country. nobody was talking about having an independent terrestrial service separate from the satellite services. the fcc was very clear over the years that they would not allow a separate stand-alone service that, in fact, it always had to be tied to the satellite

service, and no interference with the satellite service. i mean, these terrestrial broadband systems would interfear with mobile satellite services in their own band, what they call co-channel interference which is a really big sin. so i think that the position of people at the time was to try to find some way to make these ancillary systems work. i think there was good faith technical effort. there was really no technical data offered, and then people gradually, gradually got into trying to change it into something else, a reallocation. and they did not do a notice of proposed rulemaking and, hence, i think people were surprised when they found out that when they actually got the data, that it was a much different situation than what they had intended. so i don't know what to say as to how do you prevent people from making bad decisions. i don't know that that's really possible. i do think we have rules and procedures that, if followed, would have protected us. >> any other comments? >> mr. chairman, i just have a quick one.

one of the reasons, seriously, for my enthusiasm about the clarity of the obama administration's statement today is that it should send a very clear signal to any agency, even an independent agency. and we really don't have to speculate. there is no one, no one who's done the work, the hard work -- there are plenty of people who have issued press releases, plenty of representatives making cases, but no one's done the hard work of testing that's come to any other con clowtion than this -- conclusion than this won't work. and so i would hope that the administration who had to clear the testimony today out of omb at the executive office of the president, i would hope the administration would provide an equally clear message to its appointees and an independent agency to say if you have some special knowledge that none of us have been able to uncover, then bring it forward. bring it to the congress. bring it to the industry. but so far it, literally, we've

had press releases, but we've had not nearly the kind of certainty that experts, technical experts in this field have. and i think the process that led to the testimony today is sound and solid and represents the best clear thinking of this administration that the project should not go forward as proposed. >> mr. cravat? >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for the great testimony. there was so much information that you just are given us, i really appreciate it. one of the things you said, mr. fuller, i don't want to -- i want to make sure that the committee understands it. with the gps system, there needs to be no terrestrial navigational systems at an airport. so you could be flying, and if you have an emergency just as you, just as you alluded to, you could create a cratered approach to go into an airport, to fly

into it that would not have any other navigational devices to it. so if you could expand upon that, that would be very helpful. and also talk about the minimums that you could bring this aircraft down to if you needed to. >> getting into dangerous ground because i can talk about flying all afternoon. yeah, the interesting thing is that -- and they'll speak for themselves, but i think this is a topic on which we are in absolute agreement throughout the aviation community. the general aviation community has equipped with gps avionics for years. the commercial aircraft industry has equipped with this technology for years and is equipping more with the prospect of the nextgen technology being more fully utilized. and all of it gives us the ability whether i'm in the two-seater husky or the citation jet or these gentlemen are flying a commercial airline, that we have the technology to take us from the altitude, our

enroute altitude down to a couple of hundred feet above the center line of the runway using nothing but the satellite-based technology above the earth and the gps box and the related computers in the aircraft. furthermore, it allows them to know where i'm at and me to know where they're at, so it provides separation of aircraft, and that's going to be an increasingly important feature with this technology. and it makes it possible to do this whether you're flying to your destination airport that you go to all the time, or you have an emergency and you have to suddenly find a suitable runway nearby. so as i said, the, this basic principle of being able to define precisely where you are in space continuously over time provides all kinds of enhancements. mr. chairman, i'm a little slower, so i have a sailboat,

but believe it or not, it also helps us in case the anchor is slipping. an alarm goes off because it shows the boat is moving, so there's all kinds of possibilities. >> thank you. and, captain cassidy, as a pilot can you tell me in regards to nextgen and some of the interference -- what's your nightmare scenario? what do you see that the effects of you flying your commercial aircraft with lightsquared that could effect you as a pilot navigationing -- navigating down that gulf there? >> well, i suppose a nightmare scenario would be that i anticipated that i was putting myself back up in juneau that had a very highly reliable, highly effective navigation system and suddenly somebody flipped a switch on it, and then i had to go back to the old procedures. it would make me much more concerned about the safe conduct

of the flight because now i'd be, have a lot less ability to have a very good estimate at what my arrival fuel would need to be at my missed approach point in order to get to my divert. and that kind of tailors on what mr. fuller just said. i think one of the big safety aspects of gps technology is it allows you to be more proactive and anticipate contingency situations further down the road. in this case, i would -- based upon what the arrival weather would be, i would estimate what a safe arrival fuel would be that would allow me to divert and go to an alternate and also have the coordinates of that alternate and have the approaches built into that alternate in my flight management system so it's all there, and i have a one-stop shop. and that is an incredible safety benefit that is clearly purely at the benefit of satellite-based navigation. >> thank you. mr. chairman, could i have indulgence of just a little more

time? thank you. mr. foley, in regards to lightsquared, obviously, they're trying to get on the lower end of the spectrum. that's their initial business plan. their going to -- they're going to try to get in, i see them trying to start working into the higher end of the spectrum as well. is their current proposal any different than past proposals, and if they do try to get into the higher spectrum, what does that mean to you as your business model? >> let me say i think lightsquared proposals have changed numerous time over the past year or so, but primarily operating on that upper 10 megahertz of frequency closest to gps, all of the testing that's been done so far, all of the analysis has shown that would be just catastrophic. you will have widespread outages of gps. the majority of the receivers that we tested just did not work at those types of power levels that close. moving to the lower ten helped somewhat, but all of the analysis we've done so far says that doesn't get a clean bill of

health either. there's still significant problems with that proposal as well, you know, specifically the terrain awareness and warning systems. we talked about adsb operations at low altitude. it poses a lot of problems for aviation. >> thank you, sir. and with that, i'll yield back. thanks for the chair's indulgence. >> thank you, gentlemen. thank you all for the effort that went into your prepared testimony and for your being here and for your enlightening testimony today. and this hearing is adjourned. [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] >> this morning the conservative political action conference continues. we'll hear from presidential candidates rick santorum and mitt romney, governor bob mcdonnell, and later author and political analyst ann coulter. live coverage gets under way at 10:10 eastern on c-span. and on c-span3, the turkish foreign affairs minister is in to talk about his country's foreign policy objectives. live coverage is at the center for strategic and international studies at 10 a.m. eastern. >> just the way i'll remember here is that wonderful moment when senator lott revealed his nostalgia for the states' rights

segregationist south. take a look. >> when strom thurmond ran for president, we voted for him. we're proud of it! >> talking points memo.com publisher josh marshall on the internet and his web site's emergence into the breaking news business. >> the media ecosystem is such a different world today than it was, it's hard to believe that's ten years ago. i think things like that happen all the time now. i mean, i know that there's certainly many big stories that tpm has had over the last decade, you know, more and more. now we have an editorial staff of 20 people, so we're, you know, breaking stories right and left. um, i think the thing is it's almost become, it's almost become common place, and it's not, it's not nearly as surprising today as it was back then. >> more about tpm and josh marshall sunday night at 8 eastern and pacific on c-span's q&a.

>> shouldn't your president have the highest moral and ethical standards and be an example to our children and young people in this country? ask yourself that question, please. shouldn't his life make him a role model for your future children? shouldn't anyone you elect to this office always keep his promises? >> as candidates campaign for president this year, we look back at 14 men who ran for the office and lost. go to our web site, c-span.org/the contenders to see video of of the contenders who d a lasting impact on american politics. >> do they not have the right to protest and revolt against a government that they feel does not serve their interest? who appointed us to sacrifice the lives of young americans trying to weigh in on the side of a government that represents, perhaps, 15% of the people of lebanon and has little or no apparent support from the other

85%? >> c-span.org/thecontenders. >> customs officials estimate that more than 95% of shipments on the way to the u.s. are not scanned prior to reaching a u.s. port. next, a house homeland security subcommittee examines maritime safety and trade issues. this is two hours. [inaudible conversations] >> good morning, everybody. the committee on homeland security, the subcommittee on border and maritime security will come to order. and the subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony from congressman jerry nadler, from assistant secretary david heym land, acting assistant commissioner kevin mcclay yang, rear admiral paul zuknuf,

i know i'm never pronouncing that correctly. the u.s. coast guard and of mr. steve caldwell who's a director of maritime security from gao. and today our very importantriti topic is the global supplyod chain, and i would recognizec is myself for an opening statement. this hearing is really the first of a two-part series.nt. we're going to have another follow-on hearing as well, and we're going to examine the nation's maritime and global supply chain security measures. last year the subcommittee focused on security at the southern and northern border, both at and between the ports of entry. after september 11th we in the congress rightly recognized the importance of secure canning the cargo that transits from overseas to our stores and our shops here on a daily basis. i've actually had the

opportunity recently really toct visit some of our nation's largest ports and see firsthand the hard work that the memberrd and women of customs and borderr protection and the united states coast guard do to help secure our nation.otec however, it's certainly cleared that more work needs to be done. it's clear more work has to be done. whether it's coming into the ports or travels by trucks coming through el paso or what have you or coming from train from the canadian border, we have to ensure we understand the risks posed by shipments in order to secure the entire global supply chain. the logistics involved are incredibly complex. security solutions we propose should cognizant of the reality. in today's hear, we'll examine how we balance maritime security and the needs to facilitate trade and not place a burden to the flow of goods that are vital to our life. delays in shipping can cost millions to our economy and facilitating commerce is not

easy, but risk based systems and trusted bissed programs help companies who play by the rules and make extra efforts allowing the border protections to focus on less secure shipments. we have to ensure we push the borders outside by conducting as much as cbp's cargo section and screening work before potentially dangerous cargo arrives on the shores. we have to do a better job of rev of leveraging work of our trusted allies to help screen and if necessary scan high risk cargo. it's no secret the nation faces a difficult financial situation. we have limited taxpayer dollars requiring that the government make smart decisions to use those resources in the most effective and efficient possible manner. we should be under no illusion that we can eliminate every single risk certainly that there wases pose to the nation, and that all we need to do is just to spend more to make the risk completely disappear. a clear eyed assessment of risk should inform how we allocate scarce homeland security dollars

as well. i think this is an especially important to remember when considering the 9/11 agent mandating 100% scanning of cargo prior to it arriving in america. certainly, that is a very, very worthwhile goal and should be the goal; however, we have to look at the -- how we implement this law, whether it's possible, the potential costs and benefits as well, and we currently scan 4% to 5% of all containerized cargo entering in the country based on the data screening system and the current threat environment. it certainly is far from clear that the investment required to scan the rest of the 95% of the cargo is possible and again we'll talk about based on risk, is it grounded in a proper understanding of a threat posed by containerized cargo. the secretary, herself, department of homeland security, mentioned on numerous occasions

including in front of this committee and a number of times that she wants to work with the congress to modify this requirement. i would say certainly i stand, and i know this committee stands ready to work with her, and we are waiting for her legislative proposal that will help move the country into a more risk-based system as the secretary has been saying now for over two years. as part of the discussion today, i'm eager to hear the witnesses' thoughts on the custom trade partnership against terrorism, the pack program, the private sector has a role to play in helping secure their supply chains, and it's important to spend customs and border protection officers' times on shippers of concern rather than on trusted and vetted companies willing to make security enhancements, and that, you know, i think is a wonderful example, that program of of how government and the private sector can partner together to help increase security and ensure the smooth flow of goods, and we want to explore ways to improve and explore the program

to additional companies willing to improve the security of the supply chain and finally, i'd like to note the safe port acts of 2006 calls for a strategy to be released, and it was due in october of 2009, but it was not released until just a few weeks ago. i think it's interesting to note that many times this subcommittee has been having hearings on particular issues, and then the agency, the department responds, which i think is a very good thing. in fact, we had a hearing in july on maritime cooperation, and then the department released their maritime coordination plans right at that time. then we held a hearing on visa security in september, and the department released an announcement on visa security on the day of our subcommittee hearing. i don't know if it's intended or what, but it's great. the congress is doing its job as oversight, and the agencies respond, and i think that tells us to subcommittee is focused on

the right issues, matters of security for our nation as well. however, i will mention as well that even though we just received this a couple of weeks ago, the document that was produced by the white house was only six pages long, and the first page was the management executive's summary, so i'm looking forward to hearing the department here's plans an implementation details with a complete strategy to better secure the supply chain. with that, i recognize now the ranking member of the subcommittee, gentleman from texas for his opening remarks. >> thank you so much, madam chair, for holding this meeting and also i'd like to recognize our ranking member of the full committee, and, again, thank you for holding this meeting. madam chair, before i move forward with the statement, i'd ask for unanimous consent to allow the gentle lady ms. richardson and ms. con to sit in.

>> without objection. >> thank you so much. as you know, this subcommittee has previously examined cargo security and facilitation issues at our land borders. some of the busiest land port entries are located in my district making facilitation legitimate commerce a key issue for me and my constituents. they are great importance to the lady from michigan given her location on the northern border, and i appreciate all the work she's done there facilitating the balance between security and, of course, commerce moving as quickly as possible. today, we're examining another important part, which is the maritime cargo security that has certain parallels. indeed, the fundamental issue is the same. how can we have legitimate cargo while keeping instruments of contraband from terrorists entering the united states. given the amount of cargo

entering and crossing the country every day, it's no easy task. we were hearing testimony today regarding dhs programs and initiatives to secure maritime cargo through programs such as the container security initiative, secure freight initiative, and the ct pap. i had the opportunity to visit a csi port with mr. thompson, and i've also been to the national targeting center where the customs for protection cargo security work is done. while i appreciate the hard work of the men and women of cbp and dhs colleagues on this challenging issue, more remaining to be done. many of the cargo security programs have grown stagnant in recent years in part due to lack of adequate funding, and many of these programs are carried out by cbp officers who are in short supply. we have greatly expanded the ranks of the border patrol, the men and women in green since september 11, 2001, but we have

not kept base with cbp officers, the men and women in blue, and we have to do better to ensure we get the men and women in blue because also the ones that man our airports, our sea ports, and our land ports. without adequate personnel, our sea and land and airport security and facilitation will both suffer. finally, i'd like to bring also the issue that madam chair also brought up which is my dismay at the recently released long overdue national security and supply chain security. this was due in 2009. 2009. it just got released this last month in january, and, again, not that weight counts or number of pages counts, but six pages is, i think, is not sufficient for such a very important issue that we have here, and i'm hoping that we'll get a little more substance from the administration on the path forward for supply chain security and facilitation.

i know we can do better than this. it is my hope that the witnesses today will be able to speak to dhs mission for its role in this very important mission. i thank the witnesses for joining us here today. i look forward to your testimony. with that, madam chair, i yield back the balance of my time. >> i thank the gentleman. the chair recognizes the ranking member of the full committee, the gentleman from mississippi, mr. thompson. >> thank you very much, madam chair, i appreciate you calling this hearing, and i appreciate our witnesses for their participation also. today's hearing comes as a critical juncture in a department of homeland security's efforts to secure maritime cargo entering our nation's ports. later this year, july 12, 2012, marks the deadline for achieving 100% scanning of maritime cargo before it arrives in the u.s.. pursuant to the implementation recommendations of the 9/11 commission act of 2007.

in other words, the law requires all u.s. bound cargo be scanned either through non-intrusive scanning machines or receive a physical examination. today, it is widely acknowledged that dhs will not meet this deadline. i'm a person, and i understand fulfilling these requirements are no easy task. those of us who supported the precision hope to spur cargo security at this point even if the initial 2012 deadline was not met. instead, the end of nearly five years since the law was enacted, dhs failed to make an honest effort to implement the mandate. we've heard a litany of reasons that 100% scanning cannot or should not be done.

in testimony before this committee, secretary napolitan expressed opposition to the mandate saying 100% requirement is not achievable by 20 # 12 instead advocated for a risk-based support to maritime cargo security. of course, the sure surest way to fail is not to try at all. equally troubling is the fact that in recent years some of dhs's existing cargo security programs have become stagnant, have been scaled back. for example, the container security initiative, csi, is operational in the same 58 ports that were active before the enactment of the 9/11 act. over the past five years, csi has not been expanded despite the fact that at least 700 ports ship goods to the united states, and a number of overseas

personnel deployed to the 58 ports has plummeted. specifically, in 2009, there were 167csi officers in overseas ports. today, there's only 79. similarly, while a few years ago, the secure freight initiative included six ports, today, the program has reduced to a single low volume port. last month, the administration released a long awaited national strategy for global supply chain security. you've heard my ranking member talk about the size of the six page document. it's hard to see how this document can offer a comprehensive blueprint for enhancing the security of the supply chain especially given the enormity of the task and the number of stake holders involved. nevertheless, i expect to hear testimony today from dhs

witnesses about how successful the department has been at creating programs to ensure that shippers can be trusted, manifest or analyzed, and ports are protected. these programs play an important role in maritime security; however, they do not take the place of having an active partnership where cbp personnel work with overseas counterparts in ports to examine high risk cargo containers before they arrive in u.s. ports. after all, what good is identifying a high risk container if it does not get examined until it's arrived in the ports of new york, houston, los angeles, new orleans, or any of the other hundreds of ports across america? by then, it very well may be too late. i hope to hear from our witnesses today, not only about

the successes, but also about what remains to be done to secure maritime cargo and how we can get there. meaningful homeland security will only be achieved when we know who and what is coming into this country, not only by air and land, but also by sea. i thank the witnesses for joining us today. madam chair, i look forward to their testimony. >> i thank the gentleman. i remind all the other committee members as well that opens statements you may have can be submitted for the record, and we're pleased to have two distinguished panel, but first a congressman jerry nadler who represents the 8th district of new york including the west side of manhattan, financial district, and neighborhoods in southwestern brooklyn. began the political career serving for 16 years, and then in 1992, elected to the u.s. house of representatives in a

special election, and he's been here ever since. with that, the floor is yours, sir, and, again, we appreciate you taking time to give us your testimony and up sight on this issue today. >> thank you very much, chairwoman miller, ranking members, members of the cube committee. thank you for inviting me to testify today on the issue of maritime security and trade facilitation. i speak today not as a cargo security expert, but as a member of whong long advocated we, as a nation, have to do a better job of ensuring cargo arrives safely every day. i have the honor of representing manhattan and brooklyn. the world trade center site is in my district is as of many of the ports in new york and new jersey. i believe my district is an example of why we have to secure our nation including our ports and waterways while also ensuring the flow of legitimate commerce. as you might recall, i was the author of many of the port

provisions of the implementing recommendations of the 9/11 commission act of 2007. i worked closely with chairman thompson and representatives to push for inclusion of the 100% scanning provision into the measure, and we were successful. section 17.01 of that act states by july 12, 2012, all cargoes have to be scanned by detection technology before being loaded on a vessel bound for the u.s. unless the secretary of homeland security extends the deadline by certifying it is not currently feasible. in short, this requires scanning up all maritime cargo containers before they arrive in this country. we understood we must not wait to impose security measures until containers reach the united states. scanning containers in the u.s. port is not sufficient. if there is a nuclear bomb inside a container, and it is detected by radiation port monitors in newark or miami or los angeles, it may very well be

too late. leading the cargo manifest is not enough. trusting shippers is not enough. we've to verify the contents in the containers at the point of origin before bound on a ship to america. the law is designed to do just that. when i sphwro deuced the free -- introduced the bill on this topic pushing for inclusion on the 9/11 act, i understood achieving the 100% scanning mandate would be neither easy nor cheap. i was told of a potential terrorist attack on our soil. the area is home to approximately 19 million people and the effects of a weapon of mass destruction or dirty bomb would be catastrophic. similarly, several of the nation's other major ports are located -- in fact, all of them located near population centers that could make attractive targets for terrorists. the threat is not exclusive to major city areas however. there's approximately 160 sea

and river ports throughout the u.s. making the issue of concern to communities across the country. aside from the potential human cost, the economic cost of maritime terrorist attack would be devastating. ports are a vital component of the supply chain moving the overwhelming majority of cargo into and out of the u.s.. 99.4% by weight and 64% by value, and a value of $3.8 billion each day. in 2010, the dollar value of cargo that moved through the port of new york and new jersey alone is worth more than $175 billion. anything that threatens this commerce would not just affect the ports themselves but disrupt the supply chain with widespread effects across the country and around the world. i might adhere that when i first introduced this legislation, someone said to me that demanding 100% scanning might slow the flow of commerce. i replied that one nuclear bomb going off in an american port would eliminate the flow of

commerce for a good long time. given the very serious nature of the threat we face, i'm dismayed that the department of homeland security has not made a realistic effort to implement the 100% scanning mandate, nor offered alternative proposal to achieve the same ends. i'm aware that department opposed the original legislation has never thought this was a good idea, but it must make a realistic attempt to implement the will of congress. i urge dhs to aggressively move forward on implementing the 100% cargo scanning mandate. it's one thing to say we can't achieve it this year, but another to say it's not worth pursuing, which is something i heard said. that would be a huge mistake. we have to continue to take steps towards 100% scanning as the ultimate goal and not relent in the pursuit of security. we must not allow gaping holes in the system to be unaddressed. remember what's at stake here. it seems absurd we would entertain the notion we'd allow

a nuclear weapon to be smuggled into the country in a container that's never been scanned and if detonated in o city, it would kill millions of people in a flash. however, we can and must make progress to ultimately get us to the 100% standard while making cargo, ports, and waterways more secure. we owe the american people no less. i thank the subcommittee for inviting the people to participate in today's hearing and i look forward to continue to work with the colleague, the department of homeland security and other state and local agencies and private stake holders on this very important issue. >> thank you very much, congressman. we appreciate, again, you taking the time, and we're going to dismiss you and ask for the next panel to come, but i talked to you before we started, and i recognize your passion on the issue, and that's going to be -- that was the imptous and crux of the questions here today of how we can either achieve the mandate of congress or if not, as you say, a realistic way to

implement and where we go with all of this as well. it will be an interesting hearing. >> well, thank you very much. >> thank you. >> also, mr. nadler -- >> certainly. >> just want to have no questions, but i know you worked hard with mr. thompson on this, and i appreciate the hard work you put in on this. i appreciate your good work. >> thank you too. >> thank you. we'll ask the second panel to come forward. [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [background sounds] >> okay. we're going t a >> okay. you're all suited up, ready to

go here. i think what i'll do for our panel, we're looking forward to all your testimony. all sort of at once, and then we'll start with mr. hayman, but i'll read your bios a bit here. first, delighted to have david hayman, the assistant secretary for policy at the united states department of homeland security. previously, he served as the senior fellow and director at the csis, homeland security program, leading the research and program activity and homeland security focusing on developing strategy and policies to help build and transform federal, state, private, and local sector institutions. kevin -- how do you pronounce that? >> [inaudible] >> got it. the acting assistant commissioner at the office of field administrations, customs and border protection. he's responsible for overseeing kbp's antiterrorism, immigration, anti-smuggling,

trade compliance, and agricultural protection operations at 20 major field officers, 331 ports of entry, and over 70 locations in over 40 countries internationally with the a staff of 28,000 employees and an operationing budget of $28 million. responsible for developing national marine safety, security, and environmental protection doctrine and policy and regulations as well as ensuring policy alignment through the federal government and with international maritime partners recently serving as the federal on-scene coordinator for the deepwater horizon incident in the gulf, and we appreciate your service for that horrific incident in our nation as well. while there, he directed federal, state, local agencies in their response efforts as well. mr. steve caldwell is the director and maritime security coast guard government

accountability office, the gao, with recent reports and testimony covering issues relating to protecting critical infrastructure, the implementation of the maritime security transportation act and the safe port act, port security exercises, maritime threat information sharing, maritime domain awareness, container programs, and risk management for critical maritime infrastructure as well. the chair would now recognize mr. heyman for his testimony. >> thank you, chairwoman miller, ranking members, and other distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear here today. i'm pleased to highlight the department's work in the area of supply chain security in maritime security. this is an issue of great importance to us. international trade is the engine that has now has the power of economies all around the world, billions of dollars of commodities and merchandises move between trading partners every month by land, sea, and air, and the modern international trading system, or

the global supply chain that undergirds the exchange of goods between countries is a system that's evolved over decades, and we experienced a dramatic transformation over the past import of a century with the interconnection of buyers, sellers, supplier, and manufacturers all over the world. information and communication technologies enabled this transformation creating jobs, wealth, and opportunity. today, that supply chain provides food, medicine, energy, and a myriad of other products that sustain our daily lives. this is true around the world. it is a model of economic efficiency enabling just in time deliverly, but it also means the economies are more interdependent. the expansive nature of the global supply chain system leads it vulnerable to disruption. we saw this in terrorist acts, a volcano in iceland and recent tsunami in japan. disruptions impact our national economies, and as such, governments and businesses around the world have a vital interest in transforming the old

model of efficiency adopting a new model on the integrity and relittle of supply chain. that is precisely what we seek to achieve with the administration's new national strategy for global supply chain security. two weeks ago, secretary napolitano announced the strategy to have the resilience global supply chain seeing the importance to the economy and the security for the approach to foster a transformation from just in time to just in case. this country's safety and security will always remain paramount concern of the department and the supply chain is an integral component. we strengthened the chain that we talked about today and specifically on the administration strategy incorporates and builds upon prior to efforts. there's two goals promoting the flow of legitimate commerce with

protecting the supply chain from exploitation and two, fostering the global supply chain system prepared for and can withstand evolving threats and hazards and recover rapidly. the strategy aligns international security resilience efforts to foster systems to resolve threats early, improve verification and detection and reduce as a rule inerts. we do this by having a all of nation approach in managing risk by utilizing layered defenses. we'd like to especially thank the congress for its foresight in this committee in particular for the need of the work that form the basis of a strategy under the safe port act of 2006. again, safety and security of the american people paramount importance to the department, the strategy is a significant step forward in the process and evolution. over the next six months, significant outreach will be conducted to foreign and domestic stake holders as part of the implementation efforts building on ongoing efforts.

in particular, worth noting that as a result of secretary napolitano's supply chain security initiative last year, we made progress in implementing the strategy through new efforts and in some cases new partnerships such as with the world customs organization, the international maritime organization, international civil and aviation organization, and the universal postal union. we are leading efforts to help improve the security of operations across the global supply chain, to raise international standards, and foster systems for trade recovery globally. the written testimony outlines these efforts in greater detail. let me close with the final thought. the global supply chain system is an interconnected multisystem highly complex. it encompasses foreign and domestic ports, transportation systems, conveyances, and infrastructure. its stength is its ability to deliver goods and sustain our daily lives on a near realtime

basis. that system continues to grow in scale and importance, and so we must recognize today that without a doubt disruptions to this system will happen, and we must think anew on how to best build in not just efficiency, but security and resilience as well. our new national strategy for global supply chain security presents a blueprint for change while building on efforts and infrastructure that's been in place for some time. we encourage other countries and organizations to adopt similar efforts. we thank you again for the opportunity to testify and look forward to answering the questions you may have. >> thank you very much, appreciate that testimony. the chair now recognizes for his testimony. >> rnging member, members of the subcommittee, it's a privilege and honor to appear before you today to discuss border protections work to balance maritime facility and trade

facilitation to protect the country from dangerous shipments and enhance the global supply chain. customs and border protection or cbp is charged with managing the physical access to our economy and our nation at ports of entry. at the core of the responsibility, we're on the front lines to protect threats including those that could be in cargo shipments. just as importantly, cbp is on the front line to protect the economic future by facilitating trade through the ports by the use of better information, technology, partnerships, we've been able to form the most effective supply chain security structure in the world helping to reduce transaction costs for u.s. business and provide an environment where u.s. security and vision interests can work together towards our common mission. to meet our responsibilities, we work to identify and address potential threats before they arrive at our ports. this requires we secure the flow of cargo at each stage of the supply chain, theoi