because -- [laughter] i will never forget when i went campaigning 2-cd institutes i asked i said what is a polymer if he gave me an illuminating answer and said it is a repeating molecule. agreed. [laughter] what does that have to do with anything? of course it is the heart of the composite industry, and we have a composite center now associated with the defense industry of the mississippi gulf coast. to do such things is pete that old bird or smoke when you have a naval vessel the ability to keep from having a smoke down in the ship is obvious once you

think about it. well, that is a company that was spun off by the university. they went from research and development to application to the commercialization that is what you need in the research universities to. we have the universities in the last eight years to have begun more and more and more to go on past research and development and application in the commercialization and she is a great beneficiary of that as well and proud to say is a great benefactor because they help invest in the polymer institute which allows us to focus state efforts on of its manufacturing with advanced materials. the composites that are used to make the family believes and assemble these are just an example of that.

we focus not exclusively by any stretch, but we focus on the three clusters for the manufacturing side. the aerospace, automotive and energy. prt of all of the above energy state. today they have a coal-fired generation facility in mississippi, two and a half billion dollars that will burn late nada colquitt it is a low-grade coal that when i was your weep people had on the land and felt it was a nuisance. we learned how to burn it well enough to generate electricity and now this will be the first power plant in the united states

that will have carbon capture and sequestration of the commercial scale, and it will commit at the rate of a national gas-fired power plant. but that is the kind of advanced manufacturing we are trying to do in the industry. jeff and i were talking about we have the new solar panel manufacturers like ge has one in colorado. we have a couple of them in mississippi. we make the dynamic. what is this i would ask? you know how you can buy glasses give some turn into dark glasses but when you are in delight they are clear? you can make windows out of that except you can design them and control them so it's like it is today, 30 degrees and sunny you need to keep them clear to take

in the heat but it's like it usually is in mississippi, sunni and 95, then they can be darkened simply by the way that you set the glass. to use technology to say ten, 11, 12% of the energy bill. we make petroleum out of what. obviously it is a petroleum substitute. it's not a greater petroleum, but we make motor fuel out of lead and fedex has an agreement to put in their trucks were both refined into gasoline that can be dropped in to your gas tank to be used with regular gasoline. one of our agreements with the company said we would not give them any state support unless a major company agreed they would refine this product with regular

petroleum which they do. so we are in some a pretty sophisticated and advanced manufacturing of different types in a state that's never been known for manufacturing. the big russian steel company has a steel mill in mississippi. it is a bill on the front end. uses a big furnace to melt down the steel but it is a pretty sophisticated bill on the back end for all the different products they do. for the 600 some people that worked here for about 550 of us it is the first that the ever saw yet it was the most sufficient steel mill in north america for the last two years, and we are very proud of it and also called the first year was open before the recession started to beat the average was

$92,000 a year. not for the executives but for everybody that worked there primarily because of all of the overtime. i mention that because manufacturing jobs is the highest paying job in my state, and we have a lot of different kinds of manufacturing. the car from seattle washington, the maker of the peter built his the engine manufacturing plant in columbus mississippi. for years anybody that has been in the trucking business, you ask for the caterpillar engine they make their own engines. they decided to do that after they bought the european truck and when they cited the first, again, columbus mississippi. where the european aerospace systems build helicopters for the united states army. just up the road for the mrap,

though protected vehicle that has replaced the humvee in the middle east, as i say we are not a state with a history of manufacturing like a midwestern states, but as she e. will tell you, we are a great place of manufacturing. we have succeeded in replacing thousands of low-skilled low-paying jobs with high skilled high-paying jobs witnessed in the year 2010 of the per capita income in seven years that got up 30% even though there were fewer people that were working in employment was down about 2%. but incoming was up 40% and it's

largely because of repaying the manufacturing jobs was toyota, nissan with more shipbuilding, aerospace and so on. i was the mississippi state university and a professor said to me you know, our businesses have three choices. they can innovate, in a great war and evaporate. that is a pretty cold way of telling the truth. if you are going to stay competitive in the global marketplace, you have to innovate. but innovation requires people, work force that can deploy technology and make the

integration work. one of the perverse facts about that is generally innovation destroys jobs. generally innovation means it takes fewer people to produce the same about or even more units of what ever it is to produce and that is just the fact. however, that is how you stay competitive in the global marketplace. if you want to talk about america's staying competitive, we have got to use more innovation. we have got to keep going but that we have to learn how do we create other jobs? how do we create things that we were not doing before? that's not easy. but i can tell you essentials to it is to have a quality work force. let me just close by saying something to every governor

that's been involved in the economic development today, the first thing the customer wants to the first thing the company is looking for is a quality work force. when leota chose mississippi in 2007 for its eight north american assembly plants in the economic toll of that project in the united states out here, the first thing out of their mouth was we think this goes to the quality of the work force. i think general electric will tell you they like mississippi and continue to expand in mississippi because of the quality of the work force. obviously education is the underpinning to the quality work force. but don't let that confuse you into thinking everybody has got to go to the university. everybody has to be on the back of the track because that isn't true and it's wrong.

i don't know what percentage but the small percentage of those in the university today need to do that to perform their job. what they go there for us because they need to go there so they can get an interview for their job. but the diploma is the certificate that this person is considering for the job. even though most of the time very little relationship what you learned the university in my case drinking and chasing very little relationship. i am a lawyer so maybe i have more relationship than i thought the fact is we don't hire people to learn that the need to do but we are millions of people in the united states to do what they learned in the work force training.

yet we of stigmatized work-force training and work force development training in the united states that it is almost shown the in our high schools. i can tell you how you got to be in the shop to the kershaw bid is too high in 1964 when i was there. you know who was in shock? you smoked. if you got caught smoking they sent you to shop because bad kids went to shop. the average auto mechanic was five years experience in jackson mississippi twice as much as the average income for the person of works in mississippi. how many of you think got sent if they learned to do that by their accounts vernon high school? i think about my own family, my son is 32, 15 years ago my bride

of 40 years said you know he's decided he's not the way to go to old miss, he's going to go to the community college and learned trade. what they have said that the beauty parlor? what's wrong with you? [laughter] that is literally what they would have said, what is wrong with you? we have to be stigmatized in this country if we are going to take it vantage of what we can have for the american competitiveness because it is essential if you do not have a workforce that can deploy the technology and put in place the innovation you cannot get productivity increases that are required to stay competitive, i will close with that thought. if we are going to be a country competitive in manufacturing, we have to remember to focus on

that, not the exclusion all else but we have to focus on that. my old friend in mississippi fred smith, the ceo and founder has a saying. he says the main thing is to keep the main thing the main the thing. the main thing is to keep the main thing the main thing. if we expect to remain competitive in manufacturing, the main thing is for us to invest smartly in the workforce that companies like general electric will be proud to have working in manufacturing in the united states to stick with the main thing. thank you all. [applause] >> it's more fun to hear speeches like that when you're out of office, isn't it? [laughter]

it's more fun giving them when they are out of office, too. i have a couple of questions. first, you know, we talk about big business like ge but there is a lot of small businesses in mississippi and round the country in the growth. how do you keep small business competitive and what you have to think about that may be different in that regard? >> first of all most of our jobs are created on small business. we shouldn't forget the tide between the small business and bigger business because a lot of the small businesses that exist on the bigger customer race is we shouldn't forget that but we have a tax system that isn't fair to the small businesses because most small business in the united states get taxed on the individual rate. they are partnerships, corporations or proprietorships right now it's what 38.9%, and

then you add what is we did he added colin for the health care program. they take too high of the rate of taxes and it needs to be reduced. they suffer morning you for a regulation. ge -- you have 3,000 people the deal with regulation. it can be the difference between the profitability and non-profitability. when you run off the cost of health insurance, and we are talking about today health insurance cost goes up 10% it's a whole lot easier for a great big business to spread the cost than it is for a small business. how does the small businessman higher more people when he is being threatened with a $1.5 trillion tax increases, largest in history on the employers and he doesn't know

the cost of the health of insurance to provide it and then finally with the government is going to do to the credit we are kind of guessing as we go along so they have a harder time getting credit and the have a harder time keeping more of what they are. >> i can tell you the university of mississippi is one of the great high-tech schools. when you look at only when you have to do mississippi but other governor cecil with budgets and things like that how can we manage our streets and still preserve this great college system that's been the source of competitiveness for a long time? spent a lot of people don't like my saying it but florida university today has about $5,000 a year for the basic cost of going and that's got seven times in the last eight years

because state spending has not, it's actually gone down in the last eight years we have federal and state money for programs a majority of the college students in mississippi to the get some form of student aid. some of our students are a very high percentage so it is still a bargain and we need to keep it a bargain. ..

two or three things you would be pounding in terms of how do we get the economy going and get people unified behind that task? >> trent lott used to be the republican leader. we went to college together. he was a third-year law student when i was a freshman. we were students together. the difference between governors and senators. senators talk about doing things and governors do things.

a democratic governor was here of a purple state and i am a blood-red governor. and i'm far right in that circumstance. you can't imagine how much we agree on. because we're both results-oriented. people elected me to get things done. we had a huge budget surplus, the part -- i mean huge budget deficit. the worst state in the nation with lawsuits. we have a very anemic recovery. it is just caught my totally by surprise, the january unemployment numbers have been haled as if this is some great surge. if you read the data, about 250,000 people got a job in january. and the obama labor department says, in the same month, more

than 450,000 people, almost twice as many, quit looking for a job because they became so discouraged with their inability to find one. what kind of recovery is that? what kind of recovery is when 1.2 million people dropped out of the work force last year, that three million people dropped out of the work fours in the last three years? there are two million more unemployed today, but that's because you don't count the other three million that quit looking. to me, one of the most encouraging things in my governorship is when the labor participation rate -- that is, the rate, the percentage of adults who are looking for a job or have one -- went from 60% to 64% during my eight years. that's because some people thought i might can get one. i might can get a job. it keeps our unemployment rate

higher than it would be otherwise. but nationally, the country's come down to meet us. from 67% of people in the work force, to, again, about up to 63.7%. just incredibly low by historical standards because people can't find a job. i spoke the other day at washington, and 2,000 college students, and i told them they need to be concerned about old people like my age are clinging to their job. the percentage of people 55 and older who are working is historically very high. and that means the jobs are not opening for young people, and sure enough, the percentage of people who are under 30 years old who have a job, is historically low. and those are -- the ones who do

have a job are not going up because they're being blocked out. why? because the 64-year-olds are scared to death. they're scared of this -- i would say rotten economy, anemic economy. weak in the. it's growing a little bit. it's better than it was two years ago. but main street, it's very hard to tell the difference between the recovery and the recession in shreveport, louisiana, or jackson, mississippi, or particularly a small town where i live. >> you came out of the crisis called hurricane katrina with your reputation -- went up. right? so what's the one thing we can all learn about leadership you learned during hurricane katrina? >> well, the think i would say is, be lucky enough to represent a strong, resellent, self-reliant bunch of people, us because they were the real heroes of katrina.

the courageous, compassionat people of our state. they weren't whining or hoping or looking for a handout or nobody to blame they got knocked down flat. and the next day they got up and hitched up their britches and went to work, and importantly, they went to work not only helping themselves, they went to work helping their neighborsment the stories of selflessness and putting other people before themselves are so myriad on the mississippi gulf coast, and remember, this hurricane had hurricane force winds 240 miles inland in mississippi. we had 102,000 homes that were uninhabitable and fewer than 60,000 of them are on the coast. more than 40,000 of them were inland. a third of the fatilities were inland. it was not just the coastal cal

okay -- calamity. people were grateful for the help. that's the most important thing. my job was to help people have confidence that if they return to their community, their communities could be rebuilt. that meant open schools, housing, even if it was a fema trailer -- don't think a fema trailer is what we call a trailer. it's not a mobile home. it's a camper like you go hunting in. we had families that lived in enemy for -- lived in them for three years. 600 square feet. my wife made denny hastert come in one to prove to him a grown man, particularly one my size or his -- a grown man could not turn around in the bathroom of a

fema trailer with the door closed. so we needed a new housing crew. our job was to make people feel like if i go home, biloxi is going to be normal again, or better than it was. that's all these people needed was some hope. >> last question. what are the outers of a brokered g.o.p. convention and what would it be like? >> of course, the odds are enormously against it. but the fact it's even in our conversation is unusual. i was at the last contested republican convention in 1976. but it was a convention where there were only two candidates, and neither reagan nor ford had the votes when we got there. they were within 100. this would be different. if we have a contested

convention this time -- and i think, we republicans would rather it be called a contested convention than a brokered convention. no offense. but i we have a contested convention this time it won't be two people. it will be three or four, possibly, and depending on what happened, it could even be five. if there continues to be no apparent winner, you have the possibility of a late entrant-somebody y'all remember jerry brown in 1976. jimmy carter lost eight of the last 15 primaries in 1976. and there are a lot of people that think he was in trouble with his nomination until mayor daly, after the illinois primary -- after the end of the primaries came out and say, this guy won fair and square, it's over, and he had the juice to

make it stick. you could get a late entrant, which would be the first sort of indicator that there could end up being a contested convention. all that is interesting to talk about but is very unlikely. >> help me again say thanks to governor haley barbour. thanks very much. >> thank you. ♪

>> they will correspondingly say what they observed during this period of time. the two teams get together and write a report of that, and then submit the report, very, very detailed for us. periodically, there may be an ambiguity that arises as to precisely what went on during

that process. and the inspection team within right down in some detail what they believe the ambiguity was. the u.s. as will respond to that what they observe and what they believe, if they are able, to give a response to the russian team at that time, what the situation is our what the clarifying information is. for those things that they're not able to work out on site, they may ultimately end up in this bilateral consultative commission in which we work through whatever the issue was. and sometimes simply procedures, we need to be able to stand in a different place to see the item of inspection more clearly, or it wasn't absolutely clear because the lighting conditions, what was there or something like that. each one of these things is not unusual. it's almost always worked through in a very short period of time. jump now to submarines. difference is it's a float.

they take first when they arrive at that pace, contact the tco which something of the sub range on the base they would like to inspect. then briefed on the configuration of that particular submarine and then they're given an opportunity to again designate a which they go through basically the same process your it's just loaded into a different position since they are at your site. if they are an empty launch when the sub would also an opportunity to look at that empty launcher. it's a little different. both sides understood that since the early 90s that the bombers of both sides no longer sit on over and so there wasn't an exact similar situation on declaring how many weapons were in each one of those and then going out and inspecting those numbers of bombers taken from the. the reality is even if they're not loaded, zero is a number.

so through this process we declare the numbers of bombers there and that there are no weapons on those bombers, would be the normal condition. the russian federation then gets to go to a selection of three of those navy bombers and, in fact, confirm there are no weapons on those particular bombers through that process. the same procedures in terms of ambiguities is carried through, and the same process taking you back to the point of entry and returning to their home country. in reverse, the u.s. military which populates inspection teams with the defense threat reduction agency goes through a reciprocal process with the russian federation in which we go to each one of their facilities and go through basically the same process. and with that, steve, i will turn it back to you. >> ted, do you want to operate couple comments on the bilateral commission, but also as rose

mentioned, the president described new s.t.a.r.t. as a stepping talk about another step coming. would you like to tell us about what the u.s. government is doing with regards to what policy is starting? >> thanks, steve. i welcome the opportunity to see my colleagues again. i see mike in the pentagon perhaps all too often. so that's not so unusual, but rose and i, our paths cross less frequently. i just came back on wednesday from a bilateral consultative position meeting, about two weeks in duration. the treaty says that you should meet generate just the standard of two times per year. if you don't want to meet you can sort of agree on one another to do less, and you can also through a notification process decide to do more. we met twice during 2011, and once here in the calendar of

2012, though i guess we were actually still in session between, at the time of the birthday of the year of defense and -- just a couple things, probably about 20 or 25 people from both sides. we had representation from all the interested opponents on both sides. the ministry of defense, the ministry of foreign affairs, ross adams going to be the worry about the nuclear weapons themselves on the russian site. on the u.s. side we had representatives from the department of state, from various portions of the department of defense, from the joint staff, sometimes from strategic command, which is the overall operational command that has oversight of all these strategic nuclear systems. from the office of the secretary of defense. we often have representatives from the services or we will have other specialists. a couple of examples of what things we can do with industry

meetings. and there were some things that rose made reference to the treaty said that within the first year it was up to the bilateral consultative commission to fill out some details to get ready to do this exchange of information. telemetry information is this radio signal that monitors the performance of a missile during test launch, telemetry here is this information that is made, it is used by the testing party to monitor the performance of the missile that's why it they've done the test launch to see it is performing the way it's supposed to. and it's an opportunity from the other side to get insight into the capabilities of those missiles. well, we had to reach a couple of enabling agreements. would hold demonstrations, playback equipment and recording media that was going to be used. those demonstrations were held in midsummer.

in the wake of that the russians said we would like, we would like to get agreement about how the procedures for future demonstrations might be. we worked through that in one session in mid fall, and we completed that in the session that was completed earlier this week. the other thing we had to do, we have to agree with great precision about the portion of the flight for which telemetry would be exchange, and there was a process concert to say we will go from point x. to point y., and you'll see that if you are interested in going to the state department website come you can see the actual agreement with a carefully crafted language on precisely what portion of the flight for which telemetry will be provided. and, finally, at the beginning of each year you have to make an agreement now on the calendar year previous of which number of like you're going to exchange. and that was also a process that we went through and completed. the decision on the exchange, we

concluded the agreement here in early 2012. it was about flights that were conducted during 2011. the one other thing i would say about the bcc is that we end up with these ambiguities, particularly in the first year of the application of a new treaty. we were building on the experience on this whole inspection process the mic outlined. we were very much building on 15 years of experience of implementing start one. i was in charge with the help of some people that are in the room here of negotiating painstakingly not so much what's in the treaty because the treaty is only 15 pages long or so. there's one page, i guess 17 pages, one pajon inspections that we had 80 some pages in the protocol and another 90 pages in the annex. and ready to step by step step.

i think wincing as i heard the description of a we have to go through because we had to get through that very detail. one new thing that we did industry he is with these things called unique identifiers. so every missile that falls within the scope of the treaty has to have a single unique alphanumeric indicator. this is a submarine launched missile or slbm, intercontinental range missile, icbm. and have a lower start quicker nuclear armament. one of the things we've done on both sides, we had painstakingly set in the protocol where precisely must you put these unique identifier. sure enough, when it came to implementation on both sides there were minor mess up spirit summit put on the second stage of missile instead of the first stage of the missile. someone put it beside you when you're supposed to put on the missile. so this kind of thing, which is

natural when you have implementation over many, many different bases and all this. so this thing, the other issue that he talked about is when you're holding an inspection, where do you stand? can you make sure your continuous observation of this, this and this. we've had to work through those kind of things. again, we work through and i think with a highly productive manner. many of the people who negotiated the treaty are involved in this process of implementation, and you could tell even by the third meeting of the bcc that just the man in which, just parsed the work, got to work on win two working groups, figured it out, settled most things, others would say we're not quite there yet, let's work on it, we can exchange drafts of this solution, and we may solve a during that or we will do at the next time we meet. let me talk a little bit about what we are doing now, what lies ahead. there's no doubt that president

obama made clear at the time of the signing of the treaty that he looked forward to at least one more round of strategic arms, nuclear arms reduction with russia. he did make, as rose, i will repeat the point. we want to broaden the scope, the strategic arms limitation process beginning in the late '60s and running up until around 1980, the strategic arms reduction process, renamed by president reagan, and now directed not just toward limiting the buildup but actually driving down the strategic offensive inventories. we really are at a stage where we need to broaden the scope from the strategic nuclear weapons to the non-strategic nuclear weapons. most of those are what we would not as tactical nuclear weapons. that is, they are delivered by shorter range systems but they are delivered by artillery pieces. they could be delivered by fire bomb or erika. they could be delivered on

submarines and nuclear torpedoes, or the like. the russians have tended to even have come to have a nuclear tipped anti-ballistic missile defense system around moscow, surface-to-air missiles systems. so what the president said is is time for next time we look at this we really ought to look at the total operational inventory, the nuclear stockpile of operational weapons. and that would be strategic and nonstrategic, and both deployed and nondeployed. on deployed weapon, and again there's a little bit repetition, is one that is literally located on its delivery vehicle. in other words, or in the case of comment inside its launcher, its silo-based logic, mobile transporter for a land mobilize icbm for his ballistic missile

something. but the vast majority of nuclear weapons held by both sides are not in this sort of operational ready status. the vast majority of them are in nuclear storage sites. those nuclear storage sites may be located very closely operating base. they may be located more on a regional basis, or they could be a large sort of central stockpile of such systems. the united states almost two years ago in the spring of 2010 announced that our total stockpile was 5113 nuclear weapons. these are both strategic and nonstrategic deployed and nondeployed. the russians have not revealed a number for theirs, though the numbers you hear and approximations are at least in shouting distance of that in what the russians have. though the distribution of our weapons in this are really quite

different. but president obama said next time we conclude a treaty at least the objective would be to bring under control the treaty in -- there are for his ideas had been routed about about this paper is not yet gotten close enough to the negotiations to be now in the u.s. government trying to precisely decide on the men in which we are going to attack this problem. we are doing, it's interesting how this award is got to the way we talk about the bcc. we keep talking to each other about doing our homework, and russia, we talk about whose assignment is to do the work. but we're doing a couple important homework assignments, if you will, in the u.s. government and in the nato alliance. in the u.s. government, we are

doing the nuclear posture review implementation, or follow one study, which has been underway since about summertime and continues and will be completed in the months ahead. and that is a very important study to provide a basis, and ultimately this study will come through the interagency process after high level and go to the president himself into allow the president to then add top his direction and guidance that he will provide back to the department of defense and back to the strategic command on the nuclear planning, and it will also influence the course of what's possible in terms of our future force posture and force structure. so that important homework is going to provide the basis what is an acceptable nuclear posture for unisys, nuclear core structure for the united states

for the deterrence and defense and protection of innocents and its allies. and i will also provide the basis for sort of how much is enough and how much can we reduce. at the same time that we're doing this internal homework, looking head towards our construction and posture, in nato's they are doing a deterrence and defense posture review. and that's important because the u.s. nuclear capability and parts of it in particular that those nonstrategic weapons that are located within europe are a very much constituent and important critical part of nato's overall nuclear posture. nato did his own strategic concept in which you continue to endorse the need for having a nuclear compliment of its overall defense posture. that concept was adopted at a lisbon nato summit in november

of 2010. in the wake of that, the addition -- decision was made to do this deterrence of defense posture review which is to look at the nuclear and conventional and missile defense forces that nato needs in order to look toward deterrence and defense out through the rest of this decade, and onwards. that work began last summer. it is due to be completed come to the north atlantic council, and he basically endorsed by heads of state when they meet at the next major nato summit, which is to happen in chicago in may. so the ddp are, everything has to have an acronym of course, deterrence and defense posture review will influence some of these issues. and within nato have also talked about a final thing i will talk about. the next step in arms control are not merely this question of a negotiated agreement.

the russians do not appear right at this moment to be that interested come and take it with presidential elections there, presidential elections here, to getting underway a new negotiation of a challenging nature as i laid out. so as we look forward to perhaps starting those negotiations within a year or two, we are also looking at different sort of intermediate steps that could be taken. transparency and confidence building measures like information exchange, could we exchange information on both sides about those total nuclear weapons stockpiles, maybe even more granular information about some of the strategic versus nonstrategic, about possibly the locations. these are the kinds of things were thinking about, nato is thinking about the more into your atlantic context and nato

and european russian context. so there are steps that can be taken there. finally, the last point i would make is that rose's former boss who recently just step aside, alan boucher, had been chairing and continue to be a special envoy and have responsibilities to help chair a running dialogue or conversation as we often call it these days with her counterpart, deputy foreign minister. they have been looking at a series of issues. the russians have made clear before going to want to further nuclear reductions that are set issues that need to be addressed at least in parallel. as this goes along. the most controversial of those has been the question of missile defense, and has gotten very much connected to the potential for russian and nato cooperation on territorial missile defense in europe. the two sides are working on that problem.

there are other issues like long range conventionally armed strike systems. the russians are concerned about what they believe may well be the weaponization of space if they talk about the need to address conventional arms control issues in europe, as the cfd treaty seems to be having run its course in many ways what is, the next kinds of steps for conventional arms control. so ellen tauscher, then under secretary couch her and her counterpart, have been meeting periodically, and they are now committed during this year to meet and what are called strategic stability talks. that macro term has been used to cover such conversations in the past as well. in this case it's supposed to be a running set of discussions about some of those neuralgic issues, if you will, and to probably discuss the potential for moving forward and building

basically the basis. so if we have sorted unilateral homework, we have alliance homework, the kind of homework where doing with the russians themselves in this step-by-step process, is a state of strategic dialogue. we had a first such sort of expanded meeting on the matter in december. we look forward to next meeting in march, and i can say whole series of these meetings are likely to run through the rest of the year. let me stop at that and i would be happy to answer your questions. thank you, ted. let's go ahead and opened the floor for questions. if i could ask, if you could stage a name and affiliation and try to keep your question short. we have about 25 minutes for the q&a session. [inaudible] >> the microphone is not on.

>> just speak up. i think you can do it. >> nuclear deterrence is based on -- what are the targets you are threatening to destroy with our 1700 deployed strategic warheads? >> certainly won't go into any detail, let me talk a little bit about the overall philosophy there. the philosophy that's been articulated since the late 1970s and onward, was called at that time the countervailing strategy, has been that one out to hold at risk a series of targets that the other side values most. and that has been a wide range of targets but i really can't

get into them, the specifics on that much. >> the georgetown professor said -- [inaudible] do we really know how big china's arsenal is? any idea of this magnitude? >> i've seen some of, i actually know the individual in question. i won't name him but i did business with them. he was a longtime student of soviet military affairs. we worked together on some issues. they are stir controversy associated with the question of his whole study and instead he and his group of students did, using a lot of open and internet sources. i was working on the problem

with the chinese to the arsenal just today. i don't know what its unclassified number is on that at this time. hide like to give it to you. it certainly is considerably smaller than both the u.s. and russian. i think in unclassified numbers you'll see numbers in the 50, 100, 150, something in that neighborhood, perhaps 200. but think about it compared to the u.s. number given almost two years ago of 5000, and the russians are at least at a level where we are, and probably a bit more. so again, the chinese nuclear arsenal is certainly at least an order and magnitude smaller than those numbers pick the other point i would like to stress, in terms of the nuclear doctrine, the chinese have pursued a much different course from the cold war doctrines that were worked out by soviet union and the united states, and the legacy with which we are dealing with

today. so i think it's important to bear in mind that the whole premise for the way the chinese think about nuclear weapons and their doctrinal approaches is very different, and it leads to, i would say, a requirement for smaller overall core structure. >> and i would add one thing to that. one of the things the u.s. would welcome is a chinese revelation, the number as united states has done with the number they have as we would encourage the russian federation. and the chinese has characterized their doctrine, rose point is, lean but effective. so-called minimal or minimal deterrence, but they clearly want to be able to hold at risk, and certain chinese major figures have made different comments about what they might hold at risk to do that. but they certainly haven't had them ever since valve seats on committeecommittees and being ar

capability in the late '50s on into the '60s, they said that certain approach of a lean but effective deterrence that can hold at risk probably urban industrial complex. [inaudible] >> i'm not in a position to comment on the. i know there are differences of opinion by those who study those what it is, i'm not in a position to be a spokesman on that issue. >> my name is jack siegel. first a comment to all four people on the stage that they should be complemented for your accomplishments. this is very tough going, and i recall talking about warhead accounting rules, making no progress at all a long time ago. so you've come a very long way when we're talking a telemetry.

my question does go to the question of the number of weapons we are still retaining, the 5000 or so on each side, and the 1700 or whatever exactly is deployed in the idea that the chinese feel secure enough with a much smaller number of deployed warheads. maybe, i don't know the facts about china i'm not involve now. but is there a move in this process that gets us down to much lower numbers? when you look at the cost of these 5000 warheads and, yeah, if we're really never going to use that size of arsenal, do we need to maintain it the? only because the soviets -- excuse me, the russians are still maintaining it, can we agree that there's a more sufficiently to do this? >> perhaps i'll start in my colleagues might like to add in. president obama from the very

beginning of his administration was very intent on moving in the direction of total elimination of nuclear weapons. in 2009 was all about, april 2009, but he really brought that mission into the administration come into his presidency from the campaign. he was working those issues even when you still innocent and i think became convinced of the necessity of moving steadily to lower and lower numbers and eventually to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. the president is not impractical about this, and he said this is going to take a long, long time. he said it's not something to expect to happen in my lifetime, but he is nevertheless we must be prepared to move forward in a step-by-step way to steadily eliminate the number of weapons in our arsenal through negotiated reductions, and also to work to eliminate nuclear warheads over all.

in the meantime, maintain as he says a safe, secure and effective arsenal. so those two things go hand in hand, and it is i think an inherent part of this administration's overall approach to the nuclear enterprise, the nuclear doctrine and policy, and the force structure. >> i would add that the military job is to meet the objectives that were placed before them i president and the secretary of defense. it's easy to think in terms of the large number of weapons we have today, or even the larger numbers we had 15 years ago. but i would remind everyone this isn't the first time that we're going to be at 1500. we were at the number on the way up, and it doesn't suggest that there are other numbers we can go to. important in having continuing

that journey is the transparency, in this case, this treaty of wards both sides to have more confidence and with the strategic environment is they face, and it's going to become important for others in the world to do the same thing to help with that journey. but again, it depends on the environment and the instructions we're giving. >> without breaking our arms, patting ourselves on the back, it's worth noting, i've been interested, i've studied this issue for many decades, the figures i've seen in the last few years have said that at one point we had 31,000, 35,000 nuclear weapons, the united states, and the russians i've seen one number might of been as high as 40,000. so we get the sense we've come down a dramatic way. our high water mark in the strategic world was probably 11 to 12,000 weapons associate with

a long range intercontinental type strike systems. so the remainder must of been in the tactical, just by logic here. so we've come a very long way. how far can we go down among other things, i do think it is, there's an issue of reciprocity here. we still believe that there ought to be something, approximating rough parity between ourselves and the russians. but it's a very good question. i've the feeling that some of your speakers later have opinions on that issue. it's sort of how fast you can go. i think there certainly is an agreement. the president is very clear that he has an objective in mind, that very long-term objective, and i'm sure, my hunch is he would like to go as far as the traffic will bear, and that's why we need to get his homework done, look at it, and then work with the russians and see if we can, in fact, take this next that downward, and broadened the scope it because this will be

the first time that we would've taken on the nondeployed tactical world or the non-deployed strategic world. so we have, its ambitious. the one other point i was going to say, if we have a treaty on this, remember what might explain on inspections, the big new challenge would be you have to open to inspections the nuclear weapons storage sites. that's a very sensitive issue, and how would you do it, some sort of sampling process or others, but one of the major figures in the white house on this matter, gave an interview on this a year or so ago, and he was talking about the challenges of verification that will go with this come and particularly, not just declaring these, it's trying to inspections that try to see that people are living up to their declared data. so that's another thing that is going to make broadening the scope that is going to have real

challenges in this area. but we need to go lower, and and i think the president, i know the president is a much committed to do so. we need to been work out a pragmatic set of steps that we can, in fact, undertake with the russians. >> just to be clear, i think you said when you mentioned the nuclear posture review and follow along study, as a result, the president will say this is my want to go to do with my nuclear weapons and that can lead to a number, correct? >> no, the two are interrelated. it's how much do what needs to be held at risk, how do you in fact serve all the interest in the united states, the only adversary is not potential adversary is russia. there are other potential adversaries. this hole calculus will have to go in. >> i have one small vignette i want to edit you might've noticed mike's had we been here before. we came up from these numbers, now we're going back down again.

just an interesting vignette. today we conclude negotiation of the treaty i asked our colleagues at d.o.e. to provide me some a historic day because i wanted to see when that moment was. so they luckily had a chart together and they give to me and i look at it, and 1550 deployed strategic warheads, last time that number was in our arsenal was in the late 1950s, 1956, 57, i can remove the year off the top of my head. you may have noticed the talking point out there that this treaty will bring our deployed nuclear warheads to numbers that we haven't seen since the 1950s, and the first full decade of the nuclear age and that's where that comes from. we did go back and look to see when was the time when we last had this smaller number of strategic nuclear warheads deployed. we still have work to do but i think we have managed to move this thing along the neck we

have time for two more questions. david hoffman and david called here together. >> i would just like to ask about the strategic nondeployed. you talk about this homework, transparency on the russian side. secretary perry, 18 years ago when he created what he called the hedge, said part of it was due to geopolitical uncertainty about russia. it's 18 years later, we know a lot more about what happened in russia. does the administration, do we still need a hedge for geopolitical uncertainty, or just for spares? if we don't need for uncertainty is that something we can go lower on? >> hold that thought. >> congratulations to the three of you for negotiating and more important for getting the treaty ratified. not all treaties get ratified. somewhat similar to the previous question. have you and the russians all

have discussion about speeding up the implementation of the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty? currently it is stretched out over seven years but certainly there people in the pentagon that question while you're spending money to maintain a system you already agreed to get rid of. is there any chance that the russians would want to speed up the implementation? >> i'll take the last one. let me talk to your question. the guidance that we have been given is to think through this carefully. these are, in fact, nuclear weapons, and we don't do anything without thinking real hard about what it is. the policy community is going three process of determining what's the appropriate mix is as we move forward, and in parallel with that we're looking at what steps would have to be taken. but i can tell you that while there is some room for acceleration, clearly we give ourselves enough room during the

negotiation on both sides seven years after implementation to get to those levels. there isn't a lot of room in there. simply because it just takes time, environmental impact statements have to be done, for example. eliminating icbm launchers, the mechanics associated with alternate a sobering ballistic seven for example. this is a finely tuned into in the system. so it just takes time. i'm sure that we will notify the secretary of what that minimum time we can do it is in, and ready to go but i'm not sure there's a lot of room in there. >> on the issue of the strategic weapons hedge, the hedge issue is usually linked to two issues. one issue is geopolitical uncertainty but the other one is tactical, the potential for technical failures within the fairies components of the triad, known as try of many icbms, as

obedience, and i believe they talk about the fact that they think that there still are both of those dimensions are relevant. i think the technical hedge tends to be the more deterministic issue on what the size of it. it is one of the issues that is clearly being looked at within the current review. because the size of the hedge that is required is part of that cat just about how low can you go. >> and i would just add on that point, there are different ways that you can address the issue of technological hedge. one way that we have been considering and looking at very seriously, and developing a budget for is to have a modernized weapons infrastructure, so-called responsive infrastructure that would be more capable of responding to technological surprise and that our current weapons infrastructure. that's one of the reasons we been placing emphasis on

modernizing the weapons infrastructure and making it more responsive to those kinds of problems. >> yes, that modernization, however, even with the very considerable investment has been committed to that over the next 10 years will only kick in that aspect in the 2020s. >> okay, please join me in thanking our panel. [applause] >> there's coffee and some cookies right over in the hallway here. but if you'd please be back in your seats and about 10 attendance we will start the second panel promptly at 2:30. >> in a few moments the turkish foreign affairs minister on his country's foreign policy priorities. and in an hour several of yesterday's briefings on the administration's proposed budget for the next fiscal year. we'll hear from army officials

and energy secretary steven chu. >> a couple live events to tell you about. the senate armed services committee will hold a hearing on defense programs with secretary of defense leon panetta, and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff general martin dempsey. that's on c-span at 9:30 a.m. eastern. >> there's been on his conventions, spirited disagreements, and i believe considerable hot arguments. but don't let anybody this misled by that. you have given here in this hall a moving and dramatic roof of how americans who honestly differ close ranks and move forward for the nation's well being, shoulder to shoulder.

>> as candidates campaign for president this year we look back at 14 men who ran for the office, and lost to go to our website at c-span.org/thecontenders to see video of the contenders got a lasting impact on american politics. >> and what about you? are you now out of debt? do you have a comfortable backlog in the bank? are you paying less for the things that you buy? or more? do you really think things can't be better? of course they can. working together, we can and will make them better. >> c-span.org/thecontenders. >> now the turkish foreign affairs minister on his country's foreign policy objectives, including what might be done about the violence in syria. his comments at the center for strategic and international studies are an hour.

>> okay, ladies and gentlemen, thank you all. thank you all for coming. my name is john henry, president of the csis, and i said to the foreign minister the last time we had a crowd like this was when ill gates was here, before he gave his money away. [laughter] it was quite a crowd, and, of course, this was probably the most important, sort of the most important thing i'm going to do this week. and exceptionally grateful that the foreign minister has come to csis and made as part of his visit to washington. we had a chance to develop a very fine working relationship with the foreign minister. i first met him back in 2008, and at the time felt this was an exceptional intellect in a very

remarkable position. what most impressed me was something that sounds so simple. when he started talking about zero problems with neighbors. isn't that a nice idea? wouldn't that be good if every country kind of thought about that as their strategy, you know? unfortunately not all his neighbors have zero problems. he lives in a very complicated neighborhood, and he keeps being drawn in to that neighborhood, partly because of the depth of his intellect, his energy. to make a real difference in the world. and he is making enormous difference in the world. you all know that. that's why there are so many people here. so i don't want to take anytime a way. i have a lovely, long speech i was going to give. and, of course, that would only irritate you at this stage, so could i ask you to warm receive the foreign minister of turkey, foreign minister ahmet davutoglu.

[applause] >> thank you very much for the excellent introduction. thanks for this, fortunate for me to meet with the distinguished audience. since you made reference to our previous meetings, i will make reference to some of my previous statements here before. because i think maybe because of being student of relations and teaching for many years, i prefer always personal analysis rather than picture of analysis. maybe some of you want to listen more, might assessment about the existing pictures, focused on

syria. but i will still insist on process analysis from where we are coming, where we are now, and where we are going. in one of my conferences this year i made reference to modern history, and i said after all the wars there was some sort of a new adjustment of world order through a conference or new organizations, or organization by after 30s, we had peace, we had order. after napoleonic wars we had congress of vienna. after first world war we had laid of nations. after second world war we had united nations. and a system which was very much complicated, compared to the previous experiences, economic

political. at a time when i came to, i said cold war was a long, big work, great work, lasting almost half a century. but after the cold war, still there is no new set of marks reflecting the needs of the post-cold war situation but there is no congress like congress of vienna. uus..

>> since there was no new set of morals, since there was no reformation of the existing international organizations, i can tell you there were three big earthquakes in the last 20 years. earthquake is a good analogy for turks, maybe for americans who came from los angeles. maybe, i don't know, it was not good for washington until last year. [laughter] so that you can at least understand the psychology of earthquake. earthquake means the existing nature of status quo is shifting. when i say political earthquake or international earthquake, it means international system is

changing, and the main attitudes of the actors are changing. during cold war we could predict all the assumptions, actions or attitudes of the main actors. but after cold war during this transformation it was difficult to predict, and today it is very difficult to predict the reactions. three earthquakes i mentioned. first earth quake was in 1991. started the previous, the indications of this earthquake came with the fall of berlin wall, and in 1991 soviet union collapsed. it was a geopolitical earthquake. indications were changing of geowith political structure, and the -- geopolitical structure, and the result of this earthquake emergence of new states and transformation of the states in eastern europe. and the basic slogan of this

earthquake was freedom and democracy. i am sure all remember the end of -- [inaudible] and you knew i the concept of the new world order. now, we can ask do we have a new world order around disorder. from that time we for almost ten years we had observed democratic transitions in eastern europe this is important because whenever in you are turkey not a minister of foreign affairs, but as an intellectual, the main cry criteria in my decisions is we want to be on the right side of history. i will come to that point. today this is the main difference between the actors, those who are understanding the flow of history, those who are trying to resist the flow of history. in the first decade after the cold war from 1991 until 2001,

the earthquake was a geopolitical earthquake, the value was freedom and democracy. as turkey at that time, we were on the winning side of the cold war. we were supposed to win something because we spent a significant part of our budget to national defense as a member of nato. but, to be frank, when we look at those years, turkey did not win much. we face many difficulties, many challenges. we had to take new responsibilities in bosnia, in kosovo, in many other events. but at the end of the, of ten years just to give one indication, our per capita income in 1991 was around 2,500, in 2001 it was around 2,800 for spending all the budget on

defense throughout cold war and the increase of income around $200 or $300 is not much to gain. but the issue was because of the security risks around, turkey was more sacred-oriented policy. in 2001 the second earthquake was security earthquake. the concept of security has changed because of 9/11. so before the security was seen as a security among the nations. if you, when you refer to security and defense, means you are defending your country against aggression of another state or another bloc. but this time 9/11 showed that there is a vulnerability of security everywhere in the world, even in new york and in washington. so that changed the concept, this mindset of the international system from freedom to security-oriented

approach. deregulations were done, new regulations, domestic regulations, migration regulations starting from there coming to all conferences, international conventions after 9/11, after 2001 or presentations were most security-oriented operations. operation in cose sew or -- kosovo or bosnia was freedom, liberating, but operation to afghanistan later was more security needs against terrorism. in this tenure until 2011, and this is the era of our government in turkey, we acted differently. we didn't want to have a security-oriented policy. we wanted to have freedom and democracy-oriented politics. and what we did, we tried to implement new policies, which

one of them was reflected, used by the doctor. we tried to define new priorities of turkish domestic and foreign policy. in domestic fields the main concept was democratization, democratization packages. several democratization packages. then there were restrictive regulations being implemented in europe, in u.s., in other parts of the world, turkey in 2002, 2004, 2006, tried to extend democratic area, democratization process. at that time we declared five principles, new assumptions of turkish foreign policy. in order to understand our foreign policy today vis-a-vis syria and tunisia, egypt, we need to refer to this reference.

the first principle was the balance between security and freedom. first time in a tv interview i used this concept, security and freedom, just to change the mindset of turkish psyche. turkey for throughout cold war and after the cold war in 1990s thought that the main need of our society is security. security against soviet expansion, security against the tension between greece or turkey, or security against pkk terrorism, but all security references. what we said, that now there is a need of a new set of norms based on more freedom but equal security. because, again, today we have this position.

l -- why? because if you sacrifice security for freedom, you will have a cause. if you sacrifice freedom for security, you will have a regime like mubarak regime before. regimes were told they need to sacrifice from their freedom because there is a security net for others. -- threat for others. similar what we were told throughout the cold war. this winter communism will come, another winter radical islam will come. another day, separation will come, division will come. if you have so many fears, you cannot tell a logical analyst. in order to become a government there should be a logical approach between security and

freedom. and a government -- [inaudible] if he says to his people, to its people that the government will provide maximum freedom without risking security and maximum security without limiting freedom. so this is still our -- [inaudible] now in our region the regimes are facing this challenge. they all prefer security, and they tell their people wait for freedom. maybe another time. maybe another spring. second principle was, as the doctor mentioned -- i was not planning to refer to this, but i want to be well understood here -- zero problems with neighbors, yes. still we have this principle. why? we wanted to change the mindset and set of norms of turkish foreign policy. before we were feeling that we are problematic relations with

all neighbors. but in last nine years during this second earthquake, we have proven that turkish neighbor relations could be improved. and today if you go to turkish people and ask do you feel any threat from any neighbor or how do you see the future of our relations with neighbors, there will be no such psychological fear like cold war that russians are the arch enemy. like afterwards greeks are our arch enemy or iran is our main competitor or bulgaria is former soviet -- no. today this concept has achieved a success that turkish mindset has changed. everybody today agrees that we need to have much more integration with our neighbors. yes, we have a problem with

syria, but it is not because of our choice, it is because of their domestic program. here is the key, for us is we want to have zero problems with the people. therefore, i said process analysis. not picture analysis. if you have a picture today, you may think that turkey has some problems with syria. no. we have problem, yes, with syrian administration, but with syrian people, syrian people and in the future after a process, i am sure we will be having excellent relations with the new syria published by the people of syria -- established by the people of syria by the free choice of syria. in order to avoid the existing crisis, we cannot sacrifice for our future relations with syria. it was a risk when prime minister err done made a major statement from turkish grand national assembly against mubarak when 1.5 million

egyptian people gathered in tahrir and asking mubarak to leave, now it is time to leave. it was a big risk. and we were criticized at the time by main p opposition. if mubarak continues, what will you be doing? and it was interesting. a letter was sent to me by my former dear colleague expressing, praising turkish relation and expressing disappointment or at least very polite disappointment about the statement. i responded next day. i said, we trust egyptian people because egyptian people created one of the most impressive civilization of humanity. egyptian people know the best for their own. and because of our trust in egyptian people, prime minister

err done made this call that egyptian people should be given chance for their own future. and the history will show who is wrong, who is right. and after one week mubarak left. if at that time we were reluctant and we were not sure about our values and we tried to praise or keep good relations with ben ali or mubarak, today turkish prime minister wouldn't be welcomed by around 20,000 egyptians when he went to cairo last year in september. or thousands, tens of thousands of people in libya wouldn't welcome him in four cities waiting hours and hours for his arrival with thousands of turkish flags. here our main reference is values, and zero problems with our neighbors means excellent relations with the maximum -- [inaudible] and excellent relations with the people of our regions.

then we declared other principles like active foreign policy for regional stability, regional reordering surrounding region, central asia, middle east. then active foreign policy, forty principle, in u.n -- fourth principle, in u.n., etc. so we made an adjustment in foreign policy, in domestic politics. and be i can say in -- and i can say in last nine years, after nine years in power turkey is one of the country's which effectively used the new post-- the aftershock of security earthquake in 2001. we were not trapped by security paranoia. we were, we tried to -- and we were not trapped by crisis. we tried to provide a horizon, a new horizon, a new vision to our

region and to the world. we became member of u.n. security council, you know how we acted efficiently there. and we have today even in last three years we opened 30 new embassies in different part of the world. in two years only, we opened 22 embassies in africa, five embassies in latin america, three new embassies in east asia, one that is a huge economic -- when there is a huge economic crisis. why? we want to make turkey a country, a center of stability in surrounding regions and a country providing new vision, new horizon for the international relations. coming to the third earthquake, third earthquake started in 2000 -- the first shocks started 2009-2010, but the real earthquake happened in 2011.

this earthquake is economic/political earthquake. and be in this earthquake we have a global economic crisis and its reflection to europe on one hand, and we have a region of political crisis transformation, historic transformation on the other hand. now, sitting in ankara, capital of turkey, every day morning when we wake up and start to work, usually i wake up in other countries, but still assume that i am in ankara -- [laughter] when we turn our eyes to our west, to europe, from greece up to spain there is a zone of economic crisis. democratic governments being replaced by technocratic governments in some countries. and there is a worry about the

future of europe. european union. and we, as turkey, we want to be in european union, and we are following every event in europe, european economy, for our own future. when we turn our eyes to east and south from iran, from syria especially up to morocco, there is a political turmoil, political change. and in the middle of these two crisis zone, there is a country having a stable democratic process. we had elections last year. one of the fastest growing economy. last year we were in two quarters we were the first, in the other two quarters we were the second biggest growing country. and there is a country with a very active foreign policy.

when the arab uprising started this year, it was a big challenge. it was a big challenge for the region, it was a big challenge for turkey. the same day when the protests started in tunisia, we made statements, and we had a special cabinet meeting. and there we took a strategic decision. our assessment was that this tunisian revolt is not a national revolt, is not a revolt of one country. it is a widespread, regional revolt because now it is time for change. and we asked what should be our foreign policy, how should we approach to this process? and we said we will be supporting the demands of the arab people, whatever they are.

whatever they demand, it is a right to demand. and why? because we thought this is the flow of history. in one of the, my speech in last year, march, i said this is the normalization of history. because 20th century there were two abnormal structures in the region. one was colonialism which separated cities, societies from each other like french and british colonies in iraq and syria or british colony in egypt, eyal a yang colony in -- italian colony in libya, french colony in tunisia. so all these countries and societies were separated from each other. the second abnormality was during cold war because south and north. south union was communist, so countries were wided. --

divided. now it is time to have one central awareness. and throughout the cold war because of the soviet type of forth governance -- type of governance, there was an absence of legitimacy link between the leaders and the people. and we said it was a risky decision. it is always -- now, some people are surprised as a former academician how we have to take such critical decisions. usually academicians are long-thinking, slow-acting people. that's the image of the academicians. or you taupic that they claim to me about some of our foreign policies of turkey. but you need to, if you make an assessment and you trust your values, you have to make

courageous decisions. and the leadership should show these decisions. yes, turkish foreign policy took a risk last year. today it is easy to say, oh, it was normal to say go to mubarak, or it was normal to say go to ben ali. you remember in tunisia some democratic western countries sided with ben ali in early days of the revolt. we took risks. why? because we have a vision for our region. that vision for our region is new regime, new political systems based on the demands of the people and a new regime, fully integrated to each other around the values and through economic interdependence. that was our policy before when we had good relations with the

existing authorities because at that time there was no war between these authorities and their people, and this is our policy today. second principle was if we are on the side of the people, then how could we hurt this process? we said we will use all the means of diplomacy until the end in order to prevent bloodshed, massacres, bloody transition. and every case in the middle east and north africa are unique in itself. the demands are the same. the process is same. but the character of the countries, the existing countries, are different. egypt is, e egypt, libya, tunisia, they are almost all

sunni/arab people while in iraq or syria you have much more diversified, cosmopolitan societies. the army structures are different. egyptian army has different tradition than syrian army or libyan army. each case is unique, but the demands of the arab young generation is same and relevant for all. and our foreign -- our approach to this transformation, the values are same, but in each case we had different diplomatic methods to this process. today in syria what we tried to do is unique as compared to egypt and libya or tunisia because of knowing the special characteristics of syria. first of all, let me say last month when i went to tehran,

before going there i gave in press conference i give a statement, and i said we don't want to have cold war structures in our region. cold war tensions. a new cold war polarization in our region. and last week in munich the day when the resolution was vetoed, i repeated the same; we don't want to see new cold war logic rising regarding to our region. what did i mean? i meant in the region, inside the region new polarizations such as shiite/sunni countries as two poles, and these countries are making cold war against each other. or we don't want, we don't want strategic-oriented and revolutionary countries. there was accommodations camp or this type of separations.

no. or pro-west, anti--west countries. in our region today there is one and single difference. those who are trying to keep cold war structures and those who are trying to understand the flow, the logic of the flow of history and try to respond to the demands of the people accordingly. what to i mean this? mubarak was pro-west. assad was pro-soviet in cold war and anti-west afterwards. mubarak was or gadhafi was sunni sunni -- [inaudible] close to shiite approach but not shiite at all. but our attitude against mubarak, ben ali, gadhafi and

assad is same. and the demands of the young people in tahrir and the demands today of the people of humus are same. they don't look at this is pro-west, this is pro-east or this is sunni, this is shiite. they have the same demands. what people in tahrir square, young people wanted is free and fair election, transparency, accountability. and what people in humus today want is same; rule of law, accountability, free and fair election. so it means it is not an issue of shiite and sunni or strategic and revolutionary or pro-west, anti-west issue. we have to have one consistent approach. turkey has a consistent approach. we are against any oppression in our region.

we don't want to see autocratic tendencies. we don't want any regime seeing the -- any country as if it is their own personal property or property of one -- [inaudible] but it belongs to the people of that nation. and turkey in principle is against any foreign intervention. we show this many times. but at the same time, if there is an oppression by an autocratic leader against the people, nobody can expect us or international community to be silent. two weeks ago i was in moscow, i was asked the question that assad was, had good relations before, but you have some problems now. how do you deal with it? i said before he was not

fighting against his own people. now he's fighting against his own people. when i went last time to damascus last august, i made it very clear to him, i said, mr. president, if there is any foreign attack against you, we will be siding with you. but if you fight against your own people and force us to decide either with you or with the people, we will think not even one more minute, we will be with the people. we want president bashar assad to transform the system. to end up after the cold war structures. but he prefer to be like milosevic. it was his choice. and today we are siding with the people of humus like we sided with the people of sarajevo, like we sided with the people of -- [inaudible] against israel or --

[inaudible] for us one of these to press sores from this religious background, another one is -- one is jew, another one is christian. it is not different. oppression so presentation. and turkey will be against any oppression in our region. we want to have a new vision for our region, i said. today when we look at our region, there are three subregions. one is north africa. if we had this meeting last year, i think many of us wouldn't imagine that in one year that it would be free and fair elections in tunisia in morocco, in egypt. but in one year we are optimistic, and we are hopeful because there were free and fair elections in these three countries, and there is a transitional process going on in libya. we have many challenges. we should not forget, we should

not forget that in the first earthquake, geopolitical earthquake, it started in 1991, but even in 1999 we had kosovo war. it is a long process. in fact, all this transition should have been achieved in middle east in 1990 peace, but unfortunately at that time the preference was much more on stability rather than democracy in the region. in this north africa, now all international organizations, actors, ngos, all regional powers should be having full solidarity with the new government in tunisia which is a success, which is a good coalition of three big parties. the prime minister is from nafta , president is from a leftist nationalist party and speaker of the parol isn't a social democrat. -- parliament

is a social democrat. this is a good combination. we have to be siding with the new parliament. we should not look at the composition and think there was some worries. i know even in washington, what would be happening to the security of israel if there is a conservative muslim brotherhood government comes to power in egypt? this should not be the concern. for the egypt there is only one authority to this side, egyptian people. no other concerns should lead us or should lead international politics. if there is a democratic government, that democratic government will decide what is good or what is bad for their own people. if that people is not happy with that government, the next day, the next election they will change. not us. the process with libya, and we have to create success stories

other than creating new images, negative images regarding middle east. the second zone is more gulf countries, less populated, more income. and they are managing -- in kuwait this was an election, in bahrain despite of several difficulties last year, there is a report at that time also i went to bahrain to discuss with both sides in order to open -- [inaudible] but at the end of the day, more stable. but the more challenging, more challenging for the subregion is the third which is from iraq, syria, lebanon. very challenging neighborhood. and the backbone of this is, today, syria. regarding syria, last year we

had three-stage diplomacy. the first stage was bilateral engagement with the administration. we did it. we worked very hard eight months until september. unfortunately, we weren't able to convince the administration to stop the violence and to go directly to reforms. then we started after september we started regional -- [inaudible] with arab league. we supported all arab league plans, arab league observers. when arab league came to a point that there is a need of international support, we had the third stage, international stage, and arab league supported the resolution to u.n. security council. and turkey supported this resolution. unfortunately, there was a veto. now at this stage we cannot just wait and see. we have to create a new

international awareness regarding the sufferings of syrian people. therefore, in these days we are talking and consulting with all the concerned parties and actors in order to create such an international awareness. so in short, the economic political earthquake, the aftershocks will continue to come. we cannot be day dreaming. there will be many challenging risks in front of us. but two things, two references will make us strong. one, the values we are defending, we will continue to defend these same values everywhere in the world. second, activity foreign policy diplomacy and active diplomacy to revolve these issues through peaceful means. if we can achieve these

economic, manage this economic and political earthquake, economic and political earth quake in an appropriate manner, then a new convention, a new conference, a new restructuring of international organizations will come as the new challenge in front of us because we need now a new global order. a real, inclusive global order. and a political order based on dialogue, multilateralism and economic order based on justice and a cultural order based on inclusiveness and accommodation. all the regional issues should be referred to this new global order. thank you very much. [applause]

>> um, probably one of the meatiest presentations i think we've heard in quite a while. thank you, foreign minister. i've asked the doctor to be the moderator for the questions. we only have about ten minutes, i'm afraid to say, because he has to get someplace else. please. >> yes. there's a whole bunch of hands. let me start right at the end. i saw your hand. right at the end, please. can you identify yourself? >> my name is -- [inaudible] newspaper publish inside jerusalem. sir, i wanted to ask you about the southern part of syria, the palestinian/arab conflict. what role will turkey play in that round? do you see any -- >> sorry. since the agenda was more on syria, i focused there. but whatever happens this our region cannot be understood without making a reference to

palestine and to cudus. now there is a new middle east emerging. at the core of this crisis was palestinian question. therefore, in this new era there should be a new initiative, there should be a new approach to the palestinian/israel issue. first of all, our first should be reconstitution of palestinian groups. in last five, six months together we egypt, we are working very hard to unite -- [inaudible] and hamas and to have one, single authority in west bank and gaza. because without having one authority even if one side makes a deal, a peace, it will be

difficult to implement. and i am happy to say that there are some positive developments and, as you know, last week there was an agreement signed between abbas and -- [inaudible] in doha. before that, haqqani came to turkey. we had meetings to encourage them. this is something, good news. and we have to support this nation reck sill saying. -- reconciliation. without it, there cannot be a meaningful peace process. and in this nation of conciliation, the critical term is both sides accepted peaceful resistance. this is a clear indication that hamas is now adopting a peaceful method of politics. but at the same time, mahmoud abbas is accepting a resistance. if a country is, if a people is under occupation for so many

decades, it is their right to defend themselves, to resist but in a peaceful manner and null a peace being achieved -- until a peace being achieved. this is good news on the palestinian side. we expect good news from israeli side. unfortunately, until now israel didn't give positive messages neither to the region, nor even to american administration or international community. the second activity is continuing. the provocative statements regarding palestine is continuing. and a two-state solution is not being defended openly by all members of israeli government. now it is time to decide; what

is the future of palestine? nobody can expect this to continue. palestinians deserve their state. i have to be very frank here. russian -- [inaudible] was wrong regarding syria. american -- [inaudible] was wrong regarding recognition of palestinian state. if a policy is consistent with the human conscious, with the human wisdom, then that politics is sustainable. today real global society wherever you go if you make a poll wherever you want, all human beings, humanity is behind the recognition of palestinian state. and all human beings except some dogmatic people are behind the demands of people in syria. and these are not contradictory. as turkey, we will support recognition of palestinian state, if possible tomorrow, if

possible today, this hour was -- because this nation deserves to have their own state. if there is a need of negotiation for this, then must come to the table without making a prejudgment such as settlements. enough is enough. the people of our region, including turkey, they are paying for this because of the prolonging of palestinian/israeli crisis. israelis must decide what do they want. do they want one state? they are afraid of the demographic rise of palestinians. they don't want one state. do they want the two states based on 1967 borders? not less? and east jerusalem is the capital city of palestine. this is the consensus of this u.n. security resolution, this is con seven is us of all of

us -- consensus of all of us. two with-state resolution, then they must come the table instead of building settlements in the palestinian zone according to 1967 borders. if they say that there be no state, then they have to say this openly so that we will know who are peaceful and who do not want to have peace. this new regional environment creates a new hope for a middle eastern peace process. i hope everybody will understand this new logic of history, flow of the history and act accordingly for having a two-state solution where palestinians and israelis live together with mutual respect but full independence and serenity of palestinian state. >> yeah. i think we may have time for only one more question. can i ask you to stand up, please? >> [inaudible]

>> we have a microphone. >> [inaudible] >> sorry. i'm -- [inaudible] from the wilson center. many minister, you have had a lot of dealing with the iranian government. what is your take on the iranian attitude? how seriously do they take the possibility of an military intervention by israel, number one. and number two, what kind of incentives will bring them back to the negotiation table with the p5+1 and, finally, how do they scuff -- justify, explain their attitudes toward syria? >> regarding nuclear issue, as someone who dealt with this issue last five, almost six years and especially, you know, in 2010 we work very hard for idea with brazil, i can say i am

very sorry, in fact, because the failure of all these negotiations. because i know technical details. through all these negotiations, i became like a nuclear expert. because even for the last day of negotiations before tehran agreement was done, we negotiated nonstop 18 hours around the table, all the details. last year we had the last round of talks in istanbul, and last month i went to tehran, i encourage and call for another round of talk. they said they are accepting. i spoke with cathy ashton, and she accepted we are now working for a time waiting for the next round of talk. knowing all the details, i can tell you the problem is not a technical problem. the technicalities of nuclear

issue could be resolved in a few days. because it is clear what iran wants is right for peaceful nuclear technology. we will tell them, you will have that right like other nations. but you will comply with finish pt and iaea regulations, and they will check. what we want, and p5+1 want is there should not be a nuclear military technology. so there should be certain assurances of both sides to be given to each other. for turkey our position is clear: we don't want to have any nuclear military power neither in our region, nor in the world. but at the same time we don't want any limitation against, regarding the development of peaceful nuclear technology. technical details are so easy to

be solved. the problem is there is no strong political will, and there is no -- there is an absence of mature trust and confidence. on one side jalili is coming, of course, to negotiate, but there is a huge discussion inside iran because it became a national issue, so a possible deal should satisfy iranian domestic, public opinion. on the other side, cathy ashton, she is working very hard with good intentions, but she has to satisfy the parameters of six other countries x these -- and these countries sometimes may have different positions. i can say if two negotiators come together with full mandate, it could be resolved. and mutual trust. in 2010 through tehran deal, what we want to achieve was

confidence bidding and mutual trust -- building and mutual trust. if that deal was implemented, 1800kg of iranian-enriched uranium would have been taken to turkey. the number of amount of leu somin mall so that there wouldn't be any -- somin mall to saw there wouldn't be any possible of enrichment, and iran promised freezing 20% enrichment. if it's two conditions is being achieved, in fact, this is a full guarantee and assurance that there cannot be a military technology to develop. these issues could be discussed if there is a strong political view and mature trust, as i said. so there are three options. negotiates, i think that that is the -- negotiations, i think that this is the only meaningful option which can create a result, but genuine and concentric negotiation.

not negotiation this month and after six months you come again. i talk to both sides. stay in -- stay in one room. discuss everything, then you can go. [laughter] otherwise in the six months some other regional parameters are coming, new tensions are emerging, new acquisitions emerging. one session, put everything on the table, full mandate. i can assure you, in a few days they are solved because i know both sides' concerns and assumptions. second option, sanctions. for in 2010 instead of implementing that deal, sanctions were imposed. what happened? in two years iran produce much more leu, started enrichment of meu. sanctions being imposed. why turkey's so interesting?

because we are the losing party because of the sanctions and because of this tension. and third military strike i am telling here, military strike is a disaster. it is, should not be an option especially in this his to histoc turning point in our region. we don't want to see another huge tension because it is not just a regional tension. we don't want to see such a military strike. it is not reasonable, it is not feasible, nobody would think -- there was one place, one attack. even that was wrong. but from israeli perspective, i am seeing. in this case it is unfeasible, not reasonable, and we with will be against it as turkey. we will never, never endorse any military strike or any military tension, another military tension in our region. regarding syria, it is a big -- [inaudible] i spoke be with them very

frankly, very frankly. even the terminology is interesting. bashar assad once said this is a fight between arab nationalist and islamist. it was a dynamic statement. -- where is iran? where is arab league, the ultimate union of arabs? arab league is supporting people, iran is supporting an arab nationalist. so this type of ideological orientation is wrong. at the end of the day, including iran, all countries should be showing solidarity with the people of syria. i hope they will understand that it is better to be on the right side of history and on the right side of the demand of the syrian people rather than opposing this

demand. those who are opposing against -- those who are resisting or trying to prevent these demands of the people, they will be losing in the future because, as i said from the very beginning, this is a difference between those who are understanding the flow of history and human conscious and those who are trying to resist against the flow of history. whoever is resisting, iran or other countries are the same, they will be losing if they resist against these demands. thank you very much. >> thank you very much. [applause] please let the foreign minister get out because we've got to get him out of -- >> apologies to all of those who

had your hands up, we've just run out of time. [inaudible conversations] >> president obama released his new budget proposal yesterday n. a few moments, several of monday's briefings on the specifics of the plan. you'll hear first from army officials, then in 40 minutes energy secretary stephen chu. and the senate's in session at 10 eastern to resume consideration of the transportation bill. a couple of live events to tell you about this morning. the senate armed services committee will hold a hearing on defense programs with secretary of defense leon panetta and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, general martin dempsey. that's on c-span at 9:30

eastern. at 10 eastern on c-span3, treasury secretary timothy biter in will testify before the senate finance committee on the president's proposed budget for next year. now online at the c-span video library, speeches from last weekend's conservative political action conference. >> we must outsmart the liberals! we must outsmart the stupid people that are trying to ruin america! [cheers and applause] >> it's about one country united under god, we aren't red americans, we're not blue americans, we're red, white and blue, and president obama, we are true with you! [cheers and applause] >> around the last table they can get along and come at our throat as long as we're foolish enough to raise taxes and be throw money in the center of the table, and then they can get along like the scene in the movie after the bank robbery, one for grow, one for you, one for you, and they're all happy. >> search for cpac, and you can

also clip videos and share them at c-span.org/videolibrary. army officials briefed reporters on their 2013 budget proposal yesterday. the pentagon plans to cut more than 80,000 soldiers and marines over the next five years. part of a plan to save $487 billion over a decade. this is 40 minutes. >> well, good afternoon and thanks for the opportunity to brief the army's fy-13 budget. this is going to be the first budget request that we've developed that addresses the reductions in defense spending over the next ten years but takes into account and support it is new defense strategy and takes into account the budget control act. the major change for the army is the acting component reduction, and we know there are questions, there were discussions early on

about it. beginning this fy with a portion of the initial 27,000 reduction announced in the fy-12 president's budget. and then it accelerates, increases until we get the 57,000 by the end of fy-17. so both the department of defense and the army leadership have directed the army staff, um, to go ahead and put a comprehensive review together and determine what is the right force structure for the army. that's both in the operating force and the generating force. so we're not able to provide you with any information on the force structure at this time until that work is done, and that will be a while. what we'd like to do now is turn to our presentation of the fy-13 pb, and we're going to try and get through this as quickly as we can so there's as much time as possible for questions. we'll go to the next slide, please. this request really reflects the results of some very hard and

difficult choices that we had, but i will tell you now that the army will remain the best-led, the best-trained, the best equipped ground force in the world. we are prepared as all the army forces to win both the current fight, and it maintains the readiness that we have, it support it is all-volunteer force, specifically cares for both our soldiers, our families and our civilian employees. we do invest wisely in modernization programs, but i'll tell you, there are some terminations out there, and there are some program restructures. and ms. bonessa will talk about that as we get into the investments themselves. it fully funds operations and support for our forces in the afghanistan. in addition to that, it will go ahead and does start to reset the force and the equipment that's redeployed from iraq over a period of time and those forces and equipment that's coming back now from afghanistan. it also improves stewardship of our resources, and we'll talk about it later about investing in a range of enterprise-wide

initiatives. can we go to the next slide, please? so we look at the army's fy-13 budget request, it totals $184.6 billion. $134.6 of that is in the base, and there's another 50 billion that's in oco. the army is people. we've heard that over and other again. this is the largest cost driver that the army has. so if i can draw your attention to that large pie on the top right-hand side, military personnel account for 42% of the army's base budget. it's followed by operations and maintenance at 35%, and then our resource development and acquisition at 19%, and then we have about 4% in other, and that includes mil-con, the army family housing accounts, and everything mail. we look at the smaller pie that's down there, that's the overseas contingency operations request. it is primarily for military

operations and sustainment in support of operation enduring freedom. the major cost driver, as it's always been, has been the operations and maintenance which takes up about 58%. we have the military personnel account which takes up about 20%, we have pass-throughs, and those pass-throughs are the accounts, afghan security forces and the afghan infrastructure fund at about 16%. and then we have our resource development acquisition about 6%. next we'll compare the fy-12 appropriation with the request. if i can draw your attention to the column on the far left, that is the army's fy-12- enacted budget. it's $203 billion for fy-12. that's 135 billion in the base program and another 168 billion in oco. and as we discussed earlier, on the earlier brief from secretary hill, congress realigned significant, and i mean significant fy-1 funding from

the base at oco which really reversed the efforts we've been working on for a while to migrate and bring oco over to the base program. but it's okay because it did help the army preserve its buying power for fy-12 even to it did exasperate the fy-12, 13 growth that's out there. the fy-13 request is about $18 billion less or about 9% than it was for fy-12. but again, that's driven by the oco request, complete drawdown from iraq and the beginning of our force drawdowns in afghanistan. can we go to the next slide, please? this chart reflects the army's funding level since 2001, but it does not take into account inflation. you can see here that the highest funding level for the army over this period was really in 2008. that was the height of the surge in iraq. and so it included significant oco which was then gy both for

the iraqi surge, and i remember when we were building the army at that time or growing the army, and so we were both growing and equipping all the additional brigade combat teams to meet those demands in theater. so our current total request is down about 27% from that high mark in 2008, and oco is down almost 59% from that high mark in 2008. and so we look at the height of military operations in the 2008, oco represented almost half of the army's budget. now that's less than 25% as we continue to dune. draw down. next slide, please. on the military personnel appropriation on the budget request funds, the total end strength of almost 1.1 million soldiers, that's 552,100 that are enacted on active duty, and there's another 563,200 that are in the reserve component. in fy-13, the active component

rate is going to be funded in three ways, and mr. hale had touched on those. one is the enduring part, 490,000 will be paid for on the base. 490,000 that we're going to end up with by the time we get to the end of fy-17. we also have a nonenduring part that we're going to pay for in oco -- [inaudible] we also have a new category of the temporary end strength, t called the temporary army end strength medical, and that will fund almost 12,400 soldiers who are processing through the integrated disability evaluation system. there is no end strength associate with the the oco temporary end strength increase. you remember tesse from last year and the year prior for deployments, that program will end as scheduled at the end of fy-13. and for the rc, the base request also includes about $83 million for additional training days to enhance the role of the army national guard and the reserves as operational forces. and oco, the active component

will fail the -- [inaudible] as it has been for the rc who are on active duty, and then a special pace for all soldiers who are deployed in theater. and then the rc funds all the predeployment, all the post, and all the post-requirements that are out there. next slide, please. our next appropriation is the operations and maintenance appropriation. there is a decrease of $7 billion from fy-12 to '13. the net effect of the growth, this is a net effect of a growth base of almost $6.3 billion, and then oco is what's actually reduced by 13.7 billion. so reduction in oco of 13.7, an increase of the base of 6.3 billion. half of that base increase is due to the understated fy-12 start point that included over $3 billion relied on by the congress. we have an additional $660 million for price growth from

inflation, fuel rates and our federal civilian pay raise, and then the balance, of course, our number one objective to of providing those trained and ready forces to win the current fight and sustain a high level of readiness. for example, funding for ground increases by almost $3 billion across the compost. that's to get at the readiness part of it. it also funds additional training seats and a professional military education because we have so many soldiers who are at home station now and available to train. the commitments to care for our soldiers and families, and we put -- as we did last year and the year prior -- another $1.7 billion into those family programs to reinforce fitness, mitigate risk and build resilience, and that includes the comprehensive soldier fitness, sexual harassment/sexual response program and the army's substance abuse program. it includes funding for recruitment, support and training and education, and that

will continue to attract, develop and retain both our high-quality soldiers and our civilian work force. we are committed to improving, um, through our business practices and resource stewardship, and we put money against audit readiness, energy efficiencies and key technology efforts. can we go to the next slide, please? we also have the operations and maintenance oco. again, as i said earlier, it does fully fund our operation, sustainability and support of operation enduring freedom in theater. our planning numbers include force levels decreases of 25.4,000 for the army personnel, 33,000 of all services, but 25.4 for army personnel in fy-12. by september o 201 -- 2012. for fy-13, we're planning on a steady state of 41,000 soldiers, 68,000 of all the services. there are going to be no changeses in the nine bcts

that we're planning and budgeting for for the program. our major cost drivers for oco have and continue to be log cap, transportation and intel. rcom continues to fund all the training that's going on, all the personnel readiness and all the postdeployment and the reintegration of the soldier with his family and his work. what we'd like to do now is turn our attention over to ms. bonessa. >> as we turn to investments, i'd like to first note as you know and as general mcgheee has alluded to, the army had to make a lot of tough choices about how to continue to sustain the readiness and capability of our force while facing this era of declining resources. what i'd like to start with is telling you about the programs that are not included in this budget. we are announcing eight program terminations, many of these have already been addressed in the media, but i'm just going to mention a few key ones that have

major savings over the program years, we're estimating just under $5 billion in total. that include the emars reconnaissance aircraft which will generate a savings of about 1.2 billion. the base-funded humvee recap program. we will continue to sport humvee recap in the oco request, but what you know as the medium hispanic program is being terminate with the this budget. tactical vehicles, fmtv will generate about 1.4 billion in cost avoidance or savings over these five years, it's actually been significantly restructured this year with termination in fy inform 14. the mounted soldier system is being terminated and the joint precision approach and landing system will generate another $400 million over the fife-year program -- five-year program. there are a significant number of programs that have been restructured as part of this bill. there are some accelerations out

of about the 100 or so that we can count as having been restructured, but by far the hurt of them -- majority of them were changing the scope or in many cases extending the procurement out over multiple years, longer period of time in order to generate savings. that includes, um, most of our major airframes, although those remain critical to us, and i'll talk about that in just a moment. the joint air to ground missile and stryker mods, the mrap and our joint life tactical vehicle, one of our modernization priority, have also been restructured. we recognize that there's some special risk to the industrial base with these terminations and restructuring. we believe at this point that it's manageable, but those are business decisions that will rest with the private sector, and we won't be able to address any of them with certainty right now. now i'd like to talk about what's included in the budget and beginning overall with our procurement appropriations.

and on this summary page which totals $19.6 billion in procurement in combined base and oco, that's down about 1.9 billion from our fy-12 request. you see some of our key systems highlighted on this page, but as we turn to the individual appropriations, we'll show you for all the key systems in that, each appropriation the dollars invested by system and the quantities invested by system, and i'll just highlight a few of them as we go through in the interest of time. training to aircraft pro procurement, 6.3 billion in total for fy-13, that is only down 158 million from fy-12, and that reflects the predemand on aviation assets which is greater now than it's been since any time since 2001. we've remained committed to our iowa craft modernization, and i'll highlight three of our key aviation platforms in which we have major investments. we have $1.4 billion for the

ch-47 chinook. it is now an fy-12 in the last year of a five-year procurement program, we are begin agnew program begin anything fy-13. that will provide for 25 new and 19 remanufactured airframes. we're asking for $1.2 billion for the blackhawk which, um, which is in a new multiyear program this year. sorry, i said chinook, chinook ends a multiyear program in '12, we begin a new year in '13. the blackhawk did begin anew in '12, so we're in the second year of that one, we're asking for 59 new blackhawk associate with the that. we're also asking for $1.3 billion for apache procurement, we are stretching out over a longer period of time, but we remain completely committed to that very critical heavy-lift asset, and we're asking for ten new and 40 remanufactured black

3 apaches. sorry. combat aircraft. we're asking for $518 million for procurement of 19 additional gray eagle unmanned systems with support equipment that will enable us to equip two more companies, that will give us a total of 17 companies in the army, 15 in the active component and two in our special operating forces. and then we're asking for $486 million in oco for replacement of two apaches, six chinooks and 16 kiowa warriors, and those were lost or significantly damage inside the current war effort. turning now to missiles procurement, the total of appropriations is 2.4 billion, down about 230 million from the f uric-12 enacted in missiles. almost half of our request is for continued investment in the pac 3.

we're asking for 38 launchers. we're also continuing investment in our other key missile programs including patriot mods, the gmlrs missiles and the javelin. turning to ammo, one thing i would like to highlight is that the request for production modernization and quality work environment enhancements is for our ammunition plants in tennessee, lake city, missouri, virginia, iowa and scranton, pennsylvania. there is $400 million included in the request if in oco, and that's for replenishment of ammunition and missiles in the current war fight. the weapons and combat vehicles, our request in fy-13 is 1.5 billion, that's down 590 million from our fy-12 request. our major wtc investment is almost $380 million for the initial procurement of the stryker nbc recon vehicle with associated c4isr equipment.

that vehicle is intended to replace the fox recon vehicle. the program you know as pim is one of our most critical modernization efforts. in the budget asks for $206 million for 17 self-propelled howitzers and 17 carriers. it addresses some significant capability p gaps and allows us, will allow us to keep pace with -- sorry, abrams tank and the bradley fighting vehicle on the battlefield. the bradley request of $184 million funds engineering change proposals for continued improvement of that vehicle and also allows for fielding the ods-sa variant to the army national forward. there's only a small request include inside oco, it's just $15 million, and that's for approximately 51,000 improved cleaning kits for the m-16. turning to other procurement, our request for fy-13 is 8.3 billion down 916 million from the fy-request, and i want to

highlight, first of all, the network which i know you've heard from our senior army leaders is the army's number one investment priority. it's major -- its major components are outlined on the chart before you, i want to highlight the $893 million request for the network tactical, that's for increment two full rate production for seven brigade combat teams. when combined with the fy-12 low rate initial production, that will allow us to field to a lot of 13 bcts. the joint tactical radio system which is our mobile communication on the battlefield, the $556 million requested includes 5900 riflemen radios, 4600 two-channel man pack radios and 110 airborne and maritime fixed station or amf radios to support our ongoing network modernization. looking next to tactical