>> wait until the state courts have adjudicated the state claims before they step in and adjudicate the federal claims on top of that, leaving aside section 5 for the moment which is an immediate -- an immediate injunction. and so i would predict that especially when you come to a lot of local issues, you're going to see a lot of people going into state court rather

than in federal court even on -- even on laws that could have been on the federal law on the grounds that it's two bites of the apple. >> i'm trying to think what's happening around the country. 34 states are in litigation. >> and that's low. >> when i was in the federal court 10 years ago and there was several proceedings in the state court and i'll say i guess it's being taped but what the hell. you know, they took basically the plan we drew and then did the little two weeks here and there and you see what they built from that. they often will have habeas proceedings in state and federal court but the -- [inaudible]

>> looking 64 which is really when the reapportion revolution got its steam up and those who are thinking of looking for some form of redistricting other than having the politicians draw their own districts. for many years we've been saying that, you know, the kind of public face of democracy in the united states is every two years people go into the voting booth to select their representative but the private face is every 10 years the representatives went into back rooms and selected their voters. that has changed in some states because they have moved to independent redistricting commissions but the variety here to go back to point that was made earlier, the variation in

how those commissions are set up, how they're selected, what happens to their plans is kind of staggering so that some of the commissions have been really quite successful and others of them -- it's hard to think of any difference in the outcomes from what would have happened if it had been a purely political process. >> one commission during one redistricting cycle will behave differently than the other and face different types of criticisms. that's what we've seen on arizona. we'll talk more on the panel on moderating later on in the day, arizona was held out even though it was in litigation for five years. it was a nonpartisan partner in the 2005 and they were found where they impeached the independent head of the commission and then reinstated about it supreme court. i want -- unless we have more legal -- >> no. >> i want to put on my political scientist hat just for two minutes. i know we're over time. >> no, we're not over time yet. >> oh, to give just a sense of

just the large seams that i see in the redistricting cycle. you can think of them in race, party and region. and that while we talked about the particular legal claims, a lot of -- redistricting can be a window on demographic change in the united states that we take account every 10 years. we do it with the census but this is in many ways the time when we really get a sense of changing political geography. so if there's a theme in this redistricting i think it's the meteoric rise in the latino population. and people tend to think about it in classic areas like texas and california, maybe florida but it's really throughout not just the south but in northern cities as well, where i live, in harlem which has historically

been seen a majority black area is now plurality latino and the harlem district is plurality latino. there's a similar theme which is that the african-american population has not been as -- keeping up with the pace and so that it becomes a little more challenging to draw some of these districts as we talked about before. but also not as necessary because success of certain african-american incumbents and others in getting crossover voters. relevance of the obama election is in the background in a lot of the discussion of these issues even though it doesn't really come up in court. i'll be interested to see if it does lead the supreme court to think about section 5 in one way or another. but even though, you know, with a presidential election might be one of the most irrelevant pieces of information if you're trying to figure out racial

polarization in a election. and i think there's some sort of cast people think of the voting rights act. and as a bridge between thinking about race and party, it was often thought as pam was describing in the 1990s that the voting rights act and restrictions on minority votes dilution was a hinderrance to democratic parties. i think now in this cycle we're seeing the voting rights act being constraint republicans maximizing based on what they got in the 2010 election. so you see that in texas, you see that in louisiana, an area which is very interesting given the demographic changes given katrina where the majority african-american district in new orleans is one if you're really being a partisan in gender mander you might want to split up so as a result that district is safe under the bra. with respect to parties, republicans have more state legislative seats since any time

in 1928 and they also have total control of the redistricting process and twice as many states as they did in the 2000 round and particularly in a lot of the battleground states. and so a lot of that has meant that, you know, this high watermark of republican dominance is then transferred to them trying to protect their incumbents in much of the -- in much of the country; whereas, in the 2000 round a lot of it was trying to extend their advantages. they certainly have triad to do -- tried to do that in texas but if you look at what's happening in a different time in 2000-2010 it's trying to preserve the gains of the 2010 race. last, on party, i think in talking about commissions, it's clear, i think, given the criticisms of both california and arizona that republicans now believe commissions are not in their interest. it wasn't always that way. it wasn't always thought that nonpartisan redistricting would

have that kind of effect but it seems pretty clear to me that they believe that as an institutional form they have more to lose. a lot of that is they control so many state legislative houses so anything taking redistricting away from those state legislatures might be seen against their interest. finally, just regionally, the shift of congressional seats from the northeast and the midwest to the south and southwest, obviously, have a huge effect on congressional district. texas has four more districts to play with while the sunbelt does as well. as we're coming up this time demographic shifts with louisiana losing a congressional district as a result of katrina, all of the interesting cases that are occurring in texas we have as mentioned before the arizona chaos to study in the coming years. there's a new initiative that

says the state brand may not intentionally favor or disfavor an incumbent or political party. and so just this week the florida legislature has proposed their maps and it will go to the supreme court next week. it has to be approved, i think, by the following week or something like that. so this is -- it feels like we're in the middle of this redistricting cycle but one thing -- those of us in this field seem to -- what might have been a once a decade phenomenon now it's about 3 to 4 years per decade, i guess, given the litigation that results from it. so we're just at the beginning of it. >> yeah, you know, this panel is, obviously, called introduction to redistricting in the 2010 inelective state and we talked about what's at stake to the international process what will the section 5 rules be or the political gender mandering rules will be? but i think it's ending our remarks and we'll have a little bit of time for questions from the floor here on what's at

stake is, of course, who controls the legislatures determines the nature of policy in the succeeding decade. and so one of the things that elections are supposed to do is to enable a kind of nimbleness and response to changes that people see in their situation. but if you have the kind of redistricting that we often have in the united states, once the districts are set in stone, it's predictable who's going to win those districts for the next 10 years. you can predict that without knowing anything about who the candidates are going to be or about what the issues are going to be and the like and i think there's a lot at stake in how the districts are drawn beyond the interests of the particular candidates in a particular round of elections and it's worthwhile to remember that as we talk about what sorts of constraints there should be. we have time for questions and comments and please keep those short and come to one of the microphones or have of the microphones brought to you and

just a reminder for everybody, you are being taped so by talking, you're consenting to being taped. so please give your name, home address and social security number. [laughter] >> my name is ken agle. i live in portola valley which is nearby for those who are not from this area. my question is about the concept of race. is it a legitimate situational concept in the sense that race is a predictor of social disadvantage? and if that's the case, then the concept of race in 50 years may be no longer important as a determinant of voting policy. so my general questions about the concept of race as a factor and its future. >> all right. so there are a couple of

different answers for that question. one is, how is race in the political process? and there i think the starting point is constitutionally race is treated differently from some other criteria. that is the 15th amendment to the constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of race or color in voting. and the 14th amendment has been interpreted, although it doesn't use the word "race" to contain additional prohibitions. now, the border line uses the term "rate "without defining it but contains protections from what is performed by the act of minority language. that is asian-americans, spanished surnamed americans which is a little bit of a misnomer, alaskan natives, and native americans, that is american indians and these groups are protected not by the act as members of racial groups but as members of language

minority groups i think because congress was struggling to come up with a way of explaining who it was trying to reach and protect. i don't think this is mostly about social disadvantage as much as political disadvantage people who were identified by the state as members of racial groups and then the state acted in ways that diminished their political participation. i've written that -- when it comes to section 2 cases, if race no longer has an important meaning in people's lives, in 50 years from now we reach that kind of assimilationist nirvana in which -- if you ask somebody to describe somebody else, their race would never come up then the voting rights act will have nothing to say about race because at that point there will no longer be racialally polarized voting and there won't -- there won't be restrictions on people's ability to elect preferred candidates because of race. for example, right now, left handness versus right handness.

there isn't politicalized voting on those linings and people don't have distinctive needs that they feel the political process ought to be responding to. so in the long run, if race stops meaning what it has meant in american history for the last 400 years, the voting rights act will kind of -- i hate to ever quote karl marx especially on television but the withering of the state that traditional marxism there will be a withering of the traditional voting rights act. there will be no meaning. it will be on the books but it won't play any operative role. >> i would just add one thing to that which is the -- it varies between different groups. how we measure race and how you identify populations so that in the first time individuals were allowed to check off more than one race on the census form. and for some groups, the

variance which is that, you know, the maximizing categorization and the minimizing categorization makes a difference. if you count people who merely check off native american alone or plus some other race, the numbers will -- will increase by over a third. asians in some parts of the country, you will get sacramento actually is in many ways the area that has a very high rate of asian multiracial identification so it really makes a difference. for african-americans, it's not -- you don't see much of a shift. you get some small differences but it doesn't -- you just don't have identification that is as broadly multiracial as it was with some of the other groups. the area where you do get some of that is in new york. it's very interesting looking at different groups and how they differentiate themselves african-american groups, or i

should say black groups in how they define themselves in multiracialality and ken bruit who was the director of the 2012 census has a book on this question. his feeling outside of the redistricting realm, you know, pay attention to the census of the racial categories and see how that will alter people's conceptualization. but with respect to the redistricting and the voting rights act, yeah, if there's no difference in voting behavior, then there's no claim and so we don't even need to account for i it. >> thank you. my name is jeff schwartz. i live in saratoga, my key computer passwords -- [laughter] >> could you comment generally on the interaction and challenges, if there have been some, of district determination and the primary process and particularly here in california approaching the first open primary where it would seem that

might either add to or undo some of the court imposed restrictions and some of the statutory restrictions in the voting rights act? >> i'm positive i get that. i think that -- so there was a lot of ways to talk about that topic. depending on whether you have a closed or an open primary, it is sometimes the case that certain groups, racial groups also, will do better under one type of primary system or another. this is actually the issue in the kingston case, that north carolina case where the department of justice said that the move to nonpartisan elections makes it less likely for minority -- african-americans to elect their preferred candidate of choice so they denied it under the voting rights act so that's an interesting area where that's

happening. you know, a lot of what -- i'll tell you some research i've done in that case and in north carolina which is that depending on whether there's parties on the ballot and depending whether it's a partisan primary it will affect turnout in different groups so that if you don't know, if someone is a democrat or a republican, there are groups that will not vote in that election and so there's a racialally disparate impact not just in voter turnout but in rolloff the likely event they will vote for nonpartisan votes when they go out. on the general council on kind of the interaction between race and primary and depending on the primary system, it really started depends. there are different areas when you look at louisiana where it was often thought that the nonpartisan primary -- well, similar to what you're going to have here, but the fact that

they have basically a runoff from a general election was thought that that advantaged david duke when he was trying to run for office. but i think there's a lot of variables that you have to sort of look at in these things and they're hard to keep them out. >> the other thing that i think is going on is people's frustration with the redistricting system often leads them to try to tinker with how primaries are done. i think that's part of the motivation in california is if you have districts that are drawn largely to create safe seats, what those districts tend to be overwhelmingly one party controls the district so the general election is kind of meaningless because whoever gets nominated in the dominant party's primary controls how that election will come out. the results of that is people who don't like that, say, well, is there anything we could do to create more moderate representatives that was kind of the impetus between tom

campbell's primary elect and this is something worth kind of thinking about more generally which is that the entire system is an ecosystem in which other pieces affect other people. why has there been such a push for term limits in almost every state that has initiatives. there are term limits on legislators now. in part because thought well, we can't vote them out of office they draw it a way to vote them out of office so the only way to vote them out of office is put term limits on them. the supreme court has made it impossible to have meaningful campaign finance reform in a variety ways. it pushes money in the process that leads people to say we have to do something about incumbents because otherwise they can raise this money. part of what you're talking about in your question the effect what do open primaries have people have or top two

primaries or blanket primaries or like -- they change the salience of the political party label in the more meaningful election. we don't know exactly how yet and it will vary from place to place. the turnout. they may change who get nominated in these seats that are safe for one political party than others and they may change voters sense of their own party identification. >> and just to get out what i think sort of the political strategic issue often is here which is depending on the primary system, do you have to create districts for minorities to select their preferred candidates of choice? for example, if you have a nonpartisan election where the top two candidates in a general election, is it the case where you need to have over 50% african-american for that district for them to election

their candidate of choice. whereas, can you count on some white crossover voting in the general election for whoever the general candidate would be so if african-americans can dominate the primary and their candidate event says well, will there be some white democrats and others who would vote for that candidate? that was the issue in the social science. there's a piece that's right on point with this. and there was nonblanket party rights and racial vote dilution, you know, and it's an interesting area and the courts have been reluctant to get into it. i would say the supreme court has been reluctant to get into it because once you go down the road they worry about race and party. >> we have time for one last question.

mike? >> my time mike. i practice law from oakland. i would like to hear how reapportionment commissions have performed in the two different in the cities confirm this round that had been created by legislation for popular votes through the political process compared to other reapportionment commissions or referees that have been appointed by courts in the past as part of a judicial redistricting process. both ostensively for the same purpose of doing political neutral reapportionment process but with very different reporting structures and authority basis. >> well, i've now worked i think four courts. i'm currently the special master during the congressional districts in connecticut but i'm under a gag order so i'm not

talking about that. i join in new york, maryland and georgia and then also advise the commission in puerto rico and then also drew the districts in prince georges county, maryland, recently. it's interesting there, i worked for the commission for months and months and months and i worked with the city council that then drew their own plan. bernie has a piece that compares commissions and courts and legislatures the courts get involved on a really expedited time frame so they can't do what our commission does. and angela is here and the amount of time and connor mcdonald was here. just the amount of time they spent in california gathering testimony. i mean, you know, they each should get ph.d.s if they didn't have them already for what they

had to put together on this. and the level of involvement. now, when i've done hearings as for the court, you probably have one hearing maybe two where you gather testimony and another where you will enact your plan and for states like new york in a congressional district to have one plan is an anemic process even though it brings out interesting people and can be very fun. but the -- it's, you know, the court is trying to get a plan done in time for the election; whereas, the commissions tend to really be trying to, you know, gather information that will make for a rational plan according to the criteria that adopt them. and we should say the obvious which is not all commissions are created equal and there are, you know, places like arizona and california, citizen commission here and then you have commissions that are basically the outgrowths of the political parties you have commissions that are the only person you

care about is the tiebreaker appointed by the state chief justice or something like that. and my view -- based on what's happened this cycle in comparing it to the last is that i've been impressed and surprised by the success of the california system. i don't know whether now that we've had it, whether it's going to be as successful the next time around and maybe that's part of the lesson of what happened in arizona, which is that once partisans see how the system works, they figure out ways to get more involved. but at a minimum you can say these commissions are at least one stepped removed from the legislature. and so that has its benefits and costs. >> well, thank you all very much. we'll take a very brief break now, five minutes and come back with the second panel which is going to be on changing demographics emerging unity in redistricting. thanks. [applause] [inaudible conversations]

>> we'll have more from this discussion in just a moment but first a look at some of the upcoming programming coming up on the c-span networks. this afternoon on c-span2 starting at 5:30 eastern, the future of the u.s. space program with remarks from florida, senator marco rubio calling for a renewed effort at space exploration. at 5:40 that is ohio senator sherrod brown honors the 50th anniversary of john glenn becoming the first american to orbit the earth. at 5:50 this afternoon, newt gingrich campaigning in florida where he called for a permanent u.s. colony on the moon. and at 6:00 eastern stewart powell on the houston chronicle on the obama's administration plan for nasa and what republican presidential candidates are saying about the space agency. and coming up at 6:40 this afternoon nasa administrator charles bolden outlines the administration's budget proposal

for his agency. a look at space policy begins again at 5:30 eastern right here on c-span2. and with the house and senate on break this week, we're featuring booktv programming in prime time here on c-span2. tonight, books highlighting african-american lives. starting at 8:00 eastern, henry lewis gates, jr., with life upon these shores. looking at african-american history 1513-2008. at 8:40 connie rice who is the cousin of former secretary of state condoleezza rice on her book, power concedes nothing, one woman's quest for social justice in america. and at 9:45, john karr los and dave zi-ron and the john karr los story the sports moment that changed the world. booktv in prime time all this week starting at 8:00 prime minister on c-span2. >> from the world economic forum in dazzlos switzerland and other

leaders as they talk about the future of the world economy. >> no one is immune in the current situation. it's not just a eurozone crisis. it's a crisis that could have collateral effects, spillover effects around the world and, you know, we'll -- we'll hear from others but what i have seen and what we've seen in numbers and at forecast is that no country is immune and everybody has an interest in making sure that this crisis is resolved adequately. >> i have been in public service most of which involved in public finance for over four decades. let me share with you, i've never been as scared as now about the world. what is happening in europe, looking what our experience was in haiti, the crisis -- the '80s and the crisis we had in the 1990s.

first of all, i agree entirely with christine nobody is immune. we're all connected with each other. >> and you can see this whole discussion tonight at 8:00 pm eastern on c-span. and we'll have more from the world economic forum tomorrow including the panel on the political and economic future of african-american. plus, the ceos of several major corporations talk about the role their companies are playing in the global economic recovery. >> and back now to stanford's law school conference looking at what's ahead for political redistricting in the coming decade. up next, political scientists, authors and law professors discuss changing demographics and voting laws. this is about an hour 25 minute minutes. >> thank you back. my name is diane chin. and a frightening fan of the redistricting process. i go to hearings all the time

and look at maps way too much. what this panel is really going to be exploring, i would say is the heart of the region that many of us who are obsessed with redistricting and the ability to exercise the franchise get so hooked. so as you all know, establishing a right to vote that was meaningful was a long-fought battle. and what we will be looking at in many ways with this panel is the why of that battle. as our body politic continues to change and shift in myriad ways as we've seen through census data and american community survey data, at the heart of many of our communities' conversations are the same ideas that motivated those who fought for the voting rights act itself. the concept of fairness, aspirations toward actual representation by those whom we elect. and self-identity is this thing

we call being an american. full membership is defined as this ideal for the right to vote and to be heard, being the one person who could actually exercise their one vote. so before we move in the future panels to the specifics of the voting rights act, the section 5 entry clearance and all of that, we are through this panel going to explore some of the issues that we think again are kind of at the heart of this discussion. i'm going to introduce everybody all at once in the order that they'll be speaking and we're going to ask people to save their questions for later. we have a really remarkable group of folks with us to help us explore this. kim gatti is a professor of political science at the university of oklahoma. he joined the faculty in 1996 after four years on the faculty at tulane and the school of public health in topical medicine in new orleans. he's the author of many, many books and articles on elections

and southern politics. and he is going to explicate for us this whole concept of citizen voting. and the way those arguments have emerged and the potential impact of that argument. lisa garcia is an associate professor of education and political science and the chair for center for latino politics at us berkeley. she taught at irvine and long beach. the research interest is around civic engagement, community activity and political incorporation of racial and ethnic groups in the united states. and lisa will be talking with us specifically about her research on latino research participation in california elections and some of the emerging issues for that community. danny is director of the demographic research project at the asian pacific legal center

of southern california in los angeles. the drp informs community programs and advocacy through data collection and analysis and empowers community groups to utilize research in grant-making, program-planning and advocacy. dan is going to talk about his most recent experience in california really running a state-wide program through which community input was solicited that informed the maps, the legal center with their consortium community-based groups through and submitted during this california latest redistricting process and then our wrap-up will be provided by keisha gastons who is part of the democracy program. she was executive director for the league of women voters in minnesota where she worked on a wide range of voting rights and civil rights issues. ms. gaston's portfolio was within the voting rights and elections with a particular

focus of voter suppression and voter identification and proof of citizenship laws and she is going to close us out with an overview of what is going on nationally and emerging issues regarding voter suppression on some of the national litigation. thank you. >> first of all, it's a pleasure to be here. the invitation to come out and speak at stanford on these issues, both opportune and appreciated. my colleagues justin and chuck and i graphed what is a 30 page article for the forthcoming issue of the slipper on titled votes citizens on the one person one vote problem. and endeavored to try to boil this 40-page article to a convenient 10 minutes for you through more of a storytelling approach. i do work as an expert witness, as a litigation consultant helping jurisdictions develop

redistricting plans or helping them defend them or working with plaintiffs who attempt to overturn redistricting plans. most of my clients have been republicans, some have been democrats. many of my clients have been jurisdiction, some have been minority groups both in a variety of areas and my interest in this question arose when i was contacted to work in what has already been termed a frivolous lawsuit in the city of irving. i will speak to the limitation of my testimony which will endear the lawyer who cross-examined me and i will not in any way contradict my testimony at that time. [laughter] >> i'm his favorite opposition expert, she tells me. the expert witnesses like me we count things and we draw them and color them in.

my kid says that's fine, dad as long as you don't color the facts and we'll endeavor to that. but the issue was whether or not steve generation in the citizen voting age population created a lack of distortion that created one person one vote. there was a wonderful job on laying the one person one vote-related issues which will save me time but there are three preliminary questions that i want to make note of and tell you briefly the answer before i move on to discussing the conclusions we reached about issues and citizen apportionment and citizen redistricting. there are three empirical questions that come up that lead us to examine this issue whether or not political powers should be apportioned based upon citizenship. the first is to what extent is the use of one person one vote, the equalizing of district populations an empirical truth

in terms of creating one person one vote in terms of turnout? the second question is are there political consequences in participation variations across districts in congressional and state legislative elections? and the third question is, what factors exist that structure variations of participation rates among the several states of the union? well, first and foremost, one person one vote is to a certain extent a legal fiction, much like the census as deemed accurate. before the real apportionment revolution, in most states we would see variations in the level of turnout between the lowest turnout congressional district and the highest turnout congressional district between 3 and 5 to 1 with most extreme instances being turnout ratios with as much as 16 to 1. so you would have a district that would have 16 times as many

people voting in the most populace district compared to the least populace district. one person one vote was supposed to knock down these ratios. and to a certain extent it did. by the end of the 1960s through the 1970s turnout ratios, in comparison to the highest turnout in a district in the state compared to the lowest turnout in another district in the stated been substantially reduced. but we still saw variations in some states where you had a 4 to 1 turnout in the high turnout district compared to the low turnout district. all the data is in the paper so there's discussion about this. but one thing we did not see -- and we have seen the continuation of this through time. we get to the '90s we get to the previous decade we still see variations in most states of anywhere from 1.5 to 1 to 3 to 1 of turnout ratios across the various districts. so even though we're equalizing the population of the single person we saw a various

participation of rates against the districts. now, this wasn't particularly news to the political scientists in the room. back in 1996, a political scientist jim campbell now at sunni buffalo published a book called cheap seats in which jim observed there is a relationship between rates of turnout in congressional districts and who wins and puts democrats with low turnout seats republicans have high turnout seats and if you go to south texas and the south valley you might find a turnout of 120,000 district in a two-party contest that will be won by the democrat and then you go to suburban dallas and you would 375,000 voters turning out in a equal district population so campbell concludes there's a bias in congressional apportionment that it cost republicans more elections for republicans than democrats.

that seats are somehow wasted. constituent research shows similar variations in contests around the states. some of the scholarship is footnoted in the article and i can direct you to it. and there's a political correlations to the variation in turnout. well, what's interesting in the last two decades there is a structure to these turnout ratios that if we look across the 50 states across elections in each state, since 1992, there are two predictor variables that are very power in explaining states that have large ratios of turnout, that have very high turnout districts and very low turnout districts. the first one is the growth of resident noncitizen populations. this relationship didn't exist before the 1990s. but it has emerged in the 1990s in moving forward. and the second one is the scope

of coverage of the state under section 5 of the voting rights act. voting rights act section 5 which professor persily and dean karlan talked about this morning that it seems to be nondiscrimary either by the dc court or by the doj and the trigger for coverage is based in part upon historic turnout. this variable didn't explain turnout variations before 1992. but it does subsequently and it's since 1992 we've seen the expansion of minority opportunities in section 5 states so part of what we may be seeing here is an intervention effect of the more aggressive authority by the department of justice in 1990 and 1992. so we have a relationship between noncitizen population and variations of one person one vote outcomes among congressional districts in the

u.s. we have a and we have value protection on the basis of race. how does it is based on the apportion. the citizen apportion argument has two dimensions. the first is that in apportions seats among the states apportionment should occur on the basis of citizen populations rather than based upon the apportionment of total population. if you're going to pursue this what would happen in states like california, and texas they would lose seats that would go predominantly to the midwest and to the northeast. so there is a consequence to the apportion of political power and it results in the move of not insignificant number of seats. four or five from texas. as many as seven in california. if you're to adjust apportionment on the basis of citizenship. second, actually, a former

congressman from oklahoma offered an apportionment bill in 2003 or 2005 i believe that would have argued for apportionment. and the congressman nearly lost his seat in reapportionment and redistricting in 2001 so he has some personal motives because oklahoma would have picked up one seat under citizen apportionment. but with regard with seats there are tremendous consequences. is i see apportionment when you attempt to equalize citizen population or the citizen voting age population will result in a tremendous movement of seats inside many states, especially, california, texas, florida, arizona, new york, areas of tremendous population but not necessarily tremendous citizen population would become much more populace to equalize citizen population. now, the effort in lepac is a

test case to see if it could be done. and the way the argument works is that the right to vote is tested in the individual. and if we look at the states of the united states, voting rights are vested in citizens and the right to vote for congress is for eligibility to vote for the more numerous legislative seat in a state -- more numerous legislative body in the state legislature. so because all states require citizens -- citizenship is a condition for voting, the argument for citizen apportionment is in part based on the assumption that this is an individual vote. it's vested only in the individual. it's recognized by the legislatures as being a precondition to vote so apportion schemes that dilute that vote based on where someone lives in the state makes some votes worth more than others based upon the districts someone lives in but this violates equal protection. that's the sum of the argument. the flip side argument, though,

and this can be a zufseductive argument for some people, in the light of day and sober, there are problems with this argument and some of these are practical in terms of policy and some are legal issues. among the first and foremost is if you look at other cases subsequently and if you look at the actual 14th amendment and the reframing of the constitution and the reconstruction period, voting was not seen as just being an individual activity. the vote had to have other value. and there are other concepts of representation that enter into the decision to guarantee equal access to the vote the ability to get access in representation. the ability for the actual right of representation all of which we delineate in the text and this approach to reapportionment where we apply citizenship can

result in an encumbrance of representation for individuals who are not citizens but who are sole residents of the united states and who enjoy a tremendous scope of rights and liberties even if they don't enjoy the right to vote. there are practical problems implementing citizen apportionment. as was indicated in the previous break, there are tremendous data issues with regard to determining citizen population, but we have made themselves evident in this apportionment cycle. the elimination of long-form citizenship data and the movement to the use of the american community survey. it leads us with larger predictive errors. determining citizenship allocation. we didn't realize how bad it was until we got the data and started drawing districts. also citizenship data was not readily available to states when they went to draw districts. they weren't able to readily access it and make use to it compared 10 years when they worked off the long form so it is -- we have less confidence in our data about citizenship to

make precise determinations of citizen apportionment. and these are very real and practical concerns in terms of implementing this as policy. and then finally there's one tremendous legal issue here that we elaborate in tax, citizenship apportionment is going to interaction with section 2 and section 5. section 5 assumes that you will not change the voting -- the equal access to the ballot and it allows you to have minority voters relative to the case is quo. if you move from a total population apportionment to a citizen-based apportionment one consequence is going to be that because you're expanding the size of minority districts, also by necessary in the latino populations, you're going to have greater difficulty making your baseline under section 5, okay? so the application of citizen data could very well be

retroagreesive and this hasn't been discussed but i think merits further conversation. the second issue is because you need citizens of equal numbers or roughly equal numbers to make districts it, makes it harder to craft section 2 voting acts remedies because you need to have a generally compact majority to vote cohesively and who is capable of -- in order to have an equal opportunity to elect a candidate, you're going to have to reach farther to get these populations if you're using only citizen data and equalizing it across all districts regardless whether it's a remedy or not. so there are very real encumbrances to implementing law designed to protect equal access that arrives under equal apportionment. this effort, as i indicated, it is very seduckitive and it begi

with the individual voting right but it appoints to a larger political issue when we talk about rights and liberties in the united states in the context invoked, which is that the argument for the representative model, which is what we currently using in apportions political power articulated by judge garza -- by judge cozinski, this approach assumes that there are inherent rights to access the political process. the assumption of the individual right to vote in equalizing on the basis of citizenship turns representation into a privilege. it turns it into the assumption that the vote is a privilege. and in the political environment in the united states, this notion of rights is an ailable and inherent versus privileges earned is one of the principal divisions in the united states.

i'm not speaking as a legal scholar. i'm a political scientist. i think of this in the context of a democratic theory. this seems to be the big difference that defines where people and their politics come down and support their opposition to this approach. and it is only where the debate will be held because until the court engages this ambiguity those individuals who seek to define voting is a privilege will have concepts of qualification for power and based on the notion of earned privilege rather than inherent right rights. >> so thank you. i also wanted to thank diane and stanford law school for having me here today. what i would like to talk about is more what in the first panel was talked about who are the

voters are and who are the people we're drawing these lines around and particularly, in the state of california, how -- what those folks look like from the standpoint of their ethnoracial identification. so i'm just going to provide you some simple slides to help you visualize some of what was just alluded to in terms of issues of who votes in the state of california and to the extent to which -- who votes actually looks like the population of the state of california. so the first one i summarize the likely voter population. these data are from the public policy institute of california which defines likely voters not just as people who say they're likely to vote because most people lie when they answer that question. but also they do an index of questions so people who express political interests and people who say they who they been following the election and voted in the past and plan to vote in

the future. as you can see, when you look at these numbers and there's a tune of 25% and i thought with the likely voter in the category these are not the ones likely to turn out but these are the most likely to be polled by polling organizations. many polling organizations focus their polling not only during election years but in other years on those people who are comprising the lord and so if you're not a likely voter you're less likely to be called by those polling organizations. and, therefore, representatives are less likely to hear about what your interests or needs are and so this is an important category of voters within the american political system. and non-latino whites are more wealthy and more educated than the rest of the voting age population in the state of california. you can see african-americans are, in fact, more or less at parity in the population. what we know from 50 years of

political behavior research and political science is that socioeconomic status is the greatest predictor of how you're going to vote. that doesn't actually completely work among african-americans. they actually vote at a higher rate one would expect given their socioeconomic experience. many could read this from the history of the fight for voting rights and the ways that community voting has different value attached to it and, therefore, people vote more than you would expect given other structural constraints. latinos and asian-americans as you can see are significantly underrepresented in this population. some of that underrepresented is because of the large noncitizen population in those groups so among latinos it's about 40% among asian-americans, more or less 50% of folks who are of voting age otherwise ineligible and ineligible to participate in politics. among latinos you have a large under 18 population because latinos tend to be younger than other ethnoracial groups in the state of california and a larger

latino population that is under 18 and, therefore, ineligible to vote. you have a combination of factors that are driving these differences but there's also a gap. a significant gap in regulation rates particularly among latinos and asian-americans that keep them from having a voice in the electorate at the same level that they would, you know, given their population numbers. and so and in these ways and the way i would like folks to think about, the electorate is a political product. so we've been talking about the structures it was alluded to in the first panel how the redistricting process makes people be on the legislature and how it's led to term limits and other things and then it also does lead people to not engage in the process and we have that disengagement affecting different groups of people differently which, of course, then affects the qualities of the decisions that policymakers are making. and so to say that -- i think sometimes when we talk about redistricting it's almost -- the voting population is kind of static and it's bare and we have

to draw lines around it but, in fact, part of what you're doing with that process is, in fact, creating that voting population through our politics. so i just want to go through and point out so in frequent voters, the nice thing about this poll is that they actually interview infrequent voters and people who are not registered which is usually not the case in polling and, again, this is just for the state of california, these are 2011 numbers compared to census data from 2010. we see them among infrequent voters you have infrequent representation of non-latino whites. you have latinos still among infrequent voters not voting at the population rate and asian-americans and you see that we have many african-americans who are not likely voters. they vote but they vote infrequently and finally when we look at the nonregistered in california, it's almost flip from what we saw in the first slide. the unregistered in california

tend to be latino and asian-american disproportionately either to non-latino white or african-americans. and then finally i wanted to just talk about what are the political -- potential political implications of this. why should we care whether or not people are actually voting at the rate that they should given their proportion of the population? one of my colleagues, eric schiffler and others have written at least at the national level if everybody voted, in fact, elections wouldn't be very different. but there there was a book that talked about local elections and talking about if you were to change especially at the local and state level, if we were thinking about changing the electorate, that it would have a very strong impact on the types of policies that happen because you have a large enough number of people to actually impact the policy-making process and we get some sense of that from this slide if we look at just party identification among likely voters and infrequent voters who is a likely voter is in this

context. we have more democratic identification among frequent voters and less republican among those votes and much higher independents and for those of you who aren't from california these are the don't claim a political party. in fact, independents is the fastest growing party identification among latinos in the state of california and nationally. and that is a really important factor that i think much of the redistricting conversation doesn't capture when we think about partisanship versus gerrymandering, when we think about racial gerrymandering and there's a huge part of the electorate that's not identifying with the structure and what it's affecting part of their turnout and partisanship is a strong impact on turnout and how strong and engaged they feel on the system and so that's a reflection. when we talk about independent voters in the national race again, there was a book that

came out why americans don't join the party where they talk about where they appear to be of color than white although i think the perception in the national media sort of soccer moms and the idea that you have middle class white folks that are in the middle in terms of being centrist when, in fact, you have a lot of voters of color who, in fact, either are centrists or just don't feel tremendously attached to either party because the parties aren't necessarily speaking to their interests and so there's the cycleal process where you're not identified and you're not voting, therefore, policymakers aren't responding to your knees and, therefore, you remain detached. ..

>> we found that half of the mexicans in the united states eligible for citizenship, legal firm innocent residents for five years or greater and could apply for citizenship if they felt choice, 1.4 million people live in the state of california 689 think about the scale of the problem in terms of the number of folks who are out of the citizens basically because they have not submitted themselves to the $675 charge and all the legal requirements it takes, but if they were to naturalize, there would be changes if you look the the central valley in california on the ratio of 15% or 20% increase in the electorat. it's not at all reflective of the people who live here, who use government services, and, in fact, have an interest in what

government does. i just want to spend a couple minutes talking about what we can do about it, and i have privilege of being part of a really unique project which i was one of, and the foundation in 2004 launched which was called the california votes initiative designed to change the electorat in the state of california. they hired three academics, i was among them, to evaluate the work of the community organizations in california and central valley. they tend to be low income multiracial voters and come up with a set of best practices as to what works with the populations. these are folks that political campaigns -- it's a presumption it's a waste of money, and they will not vote anyway. at a time when the project was launched, it was not clear of the efforts because the things we know work with other voters would, in fact, work in these communities. what we found is, yes, if you, in fact, invite somebody in

person by phone or on their dupe step to participate in the process, even if you're a local voter, they'll vote. that's important just to know for campaigns that this is something that needs to happen. we have some really interesting findings that if you run phone banks, they run them in nine languages. they deserve a tremendous round of applause for the difficulty of doing that. we have to seal the borders in nine languages, and it's difficult to find all the speakers. it's complicated, and so they did, and if you ask people in the first round whether or not they're going to vote and they say yes, and you call back who say yes. if you focus on the people who said yes, which one means they have a disposition towards voting, that, in fact, you can get double digit increase turnout, and that's important if you're an organization targeting language minority voters or who can't steal the capacity

door-to-door campaign, or getting voters not geographically con concentrated it a very important finding. to close, the important things to think about in terms of what the electorat looks like is in places like california that are post-progressive, there's not any entities doing that ant ground work on the scale needed to, in fact, change the numbers i've shown you in these places, and that part of what's going on with the idea of, you know, how many votes does it take to win a district, but the fact of the matter you only need 51.1% of the vote. what matters to them is winning. expanding the electorat, we tend to believe political parties is something they'll do. the fact of the matter, they have little incentives to do so, and it's expensive to do so, and the other concern is they don't

know how they vote; right? in the state of california, we have hundreds of thousands of new voters in the system. neither the democrats or republicans want to touch them because they don't know if they will actually vote for them, and that's what matters to a political party. i think thinking about how do we build structures into the system so that when we have redistricting an the potential for meaningful representation, we work to create an elector that's reflective of the creation that the lines are drawn around, if that helps. >> okay. thank you so much. so i'm going to start with a brief presentation of the demographic characteristics and

then discuss how the dynamics shape our involvement in the past statewide redistricting process. as of the 2010 census, there were nearly 5.6 million asian-americans, about 290,000 pacific islanders in the state of california making up 15% and 1% of the state's population respectively. asian american communities in california are growing disproportionally between 2000 and 2010, the population grew by 34%, pacific islanders grew 29%. by comparison, latinos at 28%, and native americans at 15%, and african-americans at 7%. while asian-americans are geographically disspersed throughout the state, they are more concentrated in urban centers.

over one quarter of californians asian-american population, nearly 1.5 million folks, live in los angeles county alone. asian-americans in other counties grow at much faster rates. among the ten counties with the largest asian-american population is asian americans grow fastest in places like riverside, sacramento, orange, and san diego county, and while the communities in los angeles and san fransisco continue to grow, those -- these urban centers grow at faster rates. okay. historically growth is tiew to immigration. okay. this means that disproportioned numbers of asian-americans are foreign born. asian-americans are the only racial group whose population is majority immigrant. 39% of latinos and 21% of pacific islanders were born

outside the united states. in contrast, only 10% of native americans, 9% of non-his panic whites, and 6% of african-americans were foreign born. okay. asian-americans are ethnically diverse and filipinos and chinese make up half of all asian-american living in california. it includes a multitude of ethnic groups speaking dozens of languages while rates of growth are high. nearly every ethnic group, the fastest growing is south asian and growing dramatically. okay. with that ethnic diversity coming social and economic diversity. poverty is one of many indicators that illustrate that diversity. you can see from this chart looking at ecf data.

filipino, indian, and japanese-american have poverty rates lower or equal to non- hispanic rates. this is a quick demographic overview of the api community. how did these demographic features impact our involvement in california statewide redistricting process? because most asian-american and pacific islander communities engaged in redistricting statewide couldn't rely on a legal hammer, organizing was a critical tool. given the concentration of the pacific islander communities in several centers throughout the state, it was necessary to develop a statewide network to organize the community's involvement. we call that the coalition of asian pacific americans for fair redistricting. it was the network of ten

organizations active in san fransisco, santa clara county, the east bay, fresno, further south of this area of los angeles, metro l.a., orange county, and san diego. we serve as the lead agency providing legal research, mapping, and organizing. okay, in each region, a local partner is coalition of community stake holders to establish priorities and testify before the citizens redistricting commission. they were representatives from community based organizations and interested in community members and some elected local officials participated, members of congress, state senate, assembly, staff, and those closesly tied to politics were prohitted from participating.

each held four meetings to educate stake holders about redistricting, identify communities of interest, explore mapping scenarios, and decide on a map they also identified members to present testimony regarding their priorities to the commission. the geographic dispersion of an ethnic diversity communities presented challenges. often, you know, regional meetings failed to draw stake holders from more remote areas and it still meant stake holders from different parts of the region didn't see each other face-to-face as much as we would have liked. they tried to solicit input from ethnic groups and targeted outreach and communication between leaders with no prior

relationships. okay. so clearly, these demographically driven community die dynamics impacted organization and lost the ability to protect the asian pacifickic islanders communities. i'll discuss the ability to drawing the districts and how it affected communitied and racially polarized voting. growth in the asian-american community, dramatic, resulted in california's first asian-american district in the valley of los angeles, district 49 on your screen, and this area is home to the main land of the united states, its first majority. asian american city, monteray park and surrounding near ma -- majority cities of san gabriel. this reason of l.a. is very latino. in fact, 8049 is cradled by

latino districts. you can see by the screen, state assembly districts 51 to the west and 58 and 57 to the south and 48 to the east. establishing 8049 section two protected district and demonstrating how it can be drawn while respecting the voting rights of la tee knows was a major achievement. growth in latino population prevented new opportunities for greater latino influence. one area in which advocated explored possibilities was in the central valley where you see on the screen where adjacent section two and five for latinos were already in place. while advocates here were looking to protect voting rights of growing latino communities, americans in fresno wanted to maintain the integrity of their community, outlined in green

there. sorry, it's rather small. i want to ensure you have the big picture here. the community argued they shared much in common with the community, similar poverty rates, rates of unemployment, common language barriers, and the two should be drawn into a majority latino district. ultimately, neither latinos nor pacific americans got what they wanted. the community was divided into two districts. i should emphasize these are the new lines that the commission adopted. demographic changes here in the valley created the potential for conflict between ha tee knows and asians which is something that they were largely able to resolve in our organization. okay. those are two examples how demographic changes shaped dynamics in areas where they both live in large numbers.

obviously, racially polarized voting has to be proven to trigger section two protection. here diverse communities can pose challenges to demonstrating that political cohesion. we commissioned one in 80-49 where an asian district could be drawn and the asian-american community was more ethnically ho mogenous. the analysis shows significant polarization with asian-americans voting for -- yet the question is wouldn't that be the case in areas like freidmont where they are

diverse, and it's a question as we move into 2021. given the use of race, redistricting, and the fact we can draw one reasonably majority asian-american district statewide, demonstrating dmiewnts of interest was particularly important. obviously, you know, the question is isn't this difficult when you have a community of communities with so much social and economic diversity? to identify communities of interest, we convened stake hold everies in each region going through an exercise talking about the problems facing their communities and the ties that bind them. in every region, stake holders talked about the immigrant character of their communities, about language barriers, about educating learners in schools. certainly, there were regional differences. folks in fresno talked about extreme poverty facing the

community and while folks in santa clara county talked about the high-tech industry. more than not, social and economic diversity was equivalent in continuous areas that can reasonably be drawn into the same district. finish -- a type of the data we presented, and this is in support of the testimony in san diego which included population characteristics that reflected areas of interest, identified in the regional meetings there. folks in san diego were concerned with immigrant issues, problems with language access in particular. there were those in the north county concerned about the power that wealthier folks in fair banks range and santa fe felt they were in the same district with moderate and middle income communities that they represented.

here's -- well, san fransisco is a great example how one of the coalitions chose communities of otherwise over the possibility of drawing on a majority american state assembly district in san fransisco. here you can see the purple area in the eastern part of the peninsula is that kind of low income community of interest. asian-american in parts, latino in the mission, and to the west we've got a side of richmond, and to the south, the bay area is south san fransisco where there's a large number of filipinos. certainly, in some courses, there's pressure to create and try to maximize the asian-american population in the district, and certainly, you know, coalitions recognize the limits of the law, but also

really, i think, work with informed by the kinds of priorities that they had and we're doing where folks really felt like low income asian-american imgrants would be better serve by being include the in the district, so this was -- these were districts adopted that more or less resemble the proposal we submitted to the commission. hopefully that gives you a sense as to what we did and how changing demographics impacted our work. as we look to 2021, you know, we expect -- i don't know if i'll be here, but we expect greater geographic dispersion, greater

majority in san fransisco and the areas i mentioned earlier, and hopefully greater influence. certainly more opportunities and challenges working to ensure fair representation for occupants. [inaudible conversations] >> good morning. i'm going to try this again. good morning. >> good morning. >> right on. thank you so much. i've been asked to comment on the different tracks. a lot of my comments will be centered around a lot of the particular trends in the law, some of the suppression laws we're seeing since 2011 and

2012. i'll have a few framing comments around that and harken back to other comments and looking at the information on the voter suppressive activity, and then kind of circle back to the cords to tie it out to redistricting to some degree and see some of the other comments we started out that mirroredded, and so i'm a lawyer by training and organizer by birth. that's kind of where it came from, where it started as my father took my to organizing meetings when i was too young to know what was going on and i had my dolls and blocks, but it stuck. it is something that is incredibly important to the communities, and so as we think about maximizing fairness within the practical application of power i think is a lot of

pegging the redistricting and voting work enough to put it into a practice call frame, and so, you know, as part of that, the center and myself will be litigating, and i'll be waiting for south carolina to file and intervening in that case. our mystified by mississippi section five submission, although they have not passed enabling legislation that goes with it, and so we're seeking to comment, but don't know if eel have anything to truly comment on, so on that cryptic note, let's talk about the vote in talking about 012. what am i pointing out? >> it's the other one. >> some of the registering poor people, it's profoundly anti-social and un-american to destroy the country, precisely

why president obama supports welfare recipients to vote. these comments really go to the idea of the privileged that were really elevating voting as a privilege, it's not a right, and the battle in new hampshire, voting of the liberal, you know, that's what kids do. they don't have experience. they just vote their feelings. this had a lot to do with the legislative debate in terms of what laws are being passed and really concentrating on student voting, and we see the attacks in those areas. my favorite is an endless cheer leading the rock concerts and register the kids. not saying we shouldn't have get out the vote campaigns, but if you're not paying attention, it's your duty to not vote. that's kind of the frame that we're seeing 5 lot of legislation using that approach and mentality that we think about voting rights, and very

quickly look at demographic shifts. we know 10,000 people per day will be 65 years of age, and for persons 80 and over, the population growth rate is twice of that of those 65 and over for four times the total population. this is important to think about framing these comments going forward. looking at new voting restrictions, look at photo id restrictions. so far seven laws passed with additionally constitutional amendment in mississippi, three documented proof of citizenships, making voteing -- voting harder. we talk about the voter id laws, and in most cases it's the know photo, no vote requirement. we saw 34 states introducing

laws requiring some form of government issued photo id in order to vote. i will note now that some of these states have included affidavit exceptions or other applications around photo id admissibility, however, most are fairly illusory, and there's the example of texas' affidavit exception that says that if your id was lost in a natural disaster declared by the state or federal government, within 45 days of action, you may then at that time execute an affidavit and be excused from the voting requirement. these exceptions exist, but let's be honest, they are not far reaching, and they are not doing anything in a meaningful way to change the impact of these laws. the laws are pending, still, and let me note that these states are only a fraction of the state's where they are

technically still pending. the states identified here is where we actually see a likelihood of additional passage. in minnesota, we saw a veto, the constitutional amendment process does not require the government's, and there's a republican legislature in the state, very likely to see the question of photo id hitting the ballot in minnesota in 2012. new hampshire, that's, of course, where we saw the voting sting come down with apparently zombies voting and that sort of thing, targeting and putting pressure to avoid another veto in new hampshire. pennsylvania, tennessee -- tennessee has a whole group of introduced legislation in response to the photo id law about what was passed. one of the most interesting things apparently overlooked by the drafters of legislation was that seniors in tennessee, if you're over 60, you're not required to have your photo on

the driver's license, and now it's requiring seniors to have their photo taken, once again, making it harder to campaigns says the polls, and then in 2012, there's a constitutional amendment on the ballot for missouri. proof of citizenship for registration, 13 states introduced law passed in three additional states. south carolina, apparently single effort to ensure there are republicans to demonstrate the need for section 5 is introducing more restrictions on the vote, and now saying perfect citizenship laws are very concerned about the passing of those laws. as we think about proof of identity and rates of citizenship. who doesn't have the proof? we know that 11% of american citizens lack photo id, 18% of americans over 65 lack current photo government issued id, 18% of young people 18-24, 7% of

americans lack proof of citizenship, and 34% of women lack proof of citizenship with their current legal name. so then as we go on, we also look at restrictions on voter registration. texas and florida passed legislation starkly restricting third party registration drives with more laws pending in south carolina and also in michigan. we saw additional laws in wisconsin and ohio reducing abilities of voters to move within county and remain registered, and so we look at restrictions on voter registration, we have to note that hundreds of thousands of voters registered in voter drives in florida in 2004 and 2008, and we know that african-american and hispanic voters are twice as likely to register through community registration drives as white voters. restrictions of access to the ballot, and in those cases, what we're talking about is changes to absentee voting procedures,

and talking about restrictions so we saw reductions in early voting signed into law in five states, florida, georgia, ohio, tennessee, and west virginia. georgia, tennessee, west virginia are what we primarily see is a reduction in days for early voting. west virginia did add saturdays in. what we saw stark changes was the elimination of golden week in ohio, and that was the week if people do work, that was the week where there was overlap between the ability to register and vote on the same day. that week is now gone. in-person voting went from 35 days to 11 days eliminating saturday afternoon and all sundays entirely. elimination of the polls on sunday, and that was the sunday before election day to reduce the period from two weeks to one week in florida. i think florida really demonstrates what the impact of

what just one day. look at african-american voters. we see over 30%, about 33% of the people who voted on the sunday before election day were african-american, even though african-americans represent about 12%-13% of the voting population in florida. hispanic voters have similar numbers well representing 16% of the voting age population, and the days have a real impact on the voting in these communities. also work to make it harder to restore voting rights. there's e erroneous reversals of these orders in florida and iowa making it next to impossible. in iowa, not only most felony convictions apply after they finish -- once their off state supervision, they have to have paid back everything associated

with the penalties and the cost cornetted with incarceration, court fees, and ul -- all of that is erroneous if not precollusive. .. it sort of goes without saying that the intention here was to disenfranchise voters than the one thing that is important to

note as we think of this reversal in trend that we haven't seen since jim-crow, these lots inflate jim crow. they are the same laws put in place in the 1890s targeting specific african-americans. when we look at students, we certainly have -- specifically -- and arizona -- typically exclude student ids and fairly eliminating with a gun license but you can't id that university of texas id. so certainly this raised concerns. and the integrity of elections. oftentimes put on the floor. already talked about the quote in mid hampshire. the secretary of state talked-about out-of-state

tuition or natural disaster. even went to the land of half to a registered voters explaining that if they vote their likely breaking the law. we're seeing organized opportunities. if we look at the laws that were passed and the ones we expect to go through in the next few weeks targeting virginia because we are certain those will pass. the electoral vote, 79% of the 270 needed to elect the next president. when we think about demographic shifts and democrat power we are seeing demographic population growth, restrictive voting laws. demographics are going the other

way. and inverse proportion where power is concentrated in voting laws. with respect to raise i wanted to bring us back to redistricting and one of the things that struck me most notably was these redistricting patterns demonstrate reinforcement of the patterns resulting in real impact in the ability of population to create and develop -- what do we mean by that? it can be said that a lot of people -- serves the interests of minority voters. no matter how closely aligned african-american voters in particular you see alignment of political parties. the comment that struck me was black people as political hamburger helper, actually using them as fodder to advance a

political -- the interests of a political party but it is unclear anything is put in place even when they are in power. do anything to advance social and economic positions of this voting population. when we have these structures that make it more difficult for populations to engage, political infrastructure entirely on reactive measures. there is no development infrastructure and political power to move these forward. talk about losing that for a decade is huge. we are not talking about just saying the lines will change so people will go vote. right now the only political infrastructure that exists is

that of the party which means all of the political power is coopted within a system that doesn't necessarily serve the population. we talk about the inversion of power we are also talking about the ability of these populations to develop political infrastructure to engage in a way out side of the two party process. to really talk about real advancement. i am not going to dally on the masters school of master health. i think it is important to think about as long as populations are shoehorned into the same process and we think about that, could never dismantle the house have can you talk about shifts in geopolitical power? not just numbers. not just how populations fit into the structure but changing power dynamics when populations

are better served. that is what we're talking about when we talk about when the entire democratic structure is served and undermined. >> we have time for some questions. >> i think this goes first to -- one thing we found is the gender gap among minorities is so enormous that it even consumed the gap between racial groups so black women in the 2008 elections are voting at levels almost comparable to white men. that is something i don't think political scientists have paid attention to. >> in general we don't. >> a different way of thinking

about the social capital available to different groups and target reforms. particularly african-americans -- i have a question for dan. one could create a majority voting age population district for the senate in the south bay. drew it like -- and not terribly. whether you think the community -- in the south bay and the east bay emblematic of what you are talking about in terms of their

diversity. the their socioeconomic we or countries they're coming from. >> we were hesitant to submit proposals on the voting age population. >> leaving us -- in terms of advancing asian-americans, maybe one of the arguments is disadvantages -- either the communities are so diverse, either chinese -- >> the local coalition in that area preferred that so while we didn't treat it as -- in the

fremont area and asian americans, certainly saw similarities between their communities no matter how many included that link. we recognize those similarities in the community, felt like there was the commonalities that might mean the community would benefit. we didn't treat it. >> national data we have -- i would predict in the next generation you're going to have a different -- going to have to be brought in. that top question, problems of how to conceptualize, to study women and race and it is a huge areas that we know little about

and the fact that not only voting among latinos entering african-american -- more across national origin and elected office. much more successful in getting elected and congressional delegation in california and latino leaders and almost all women. if we are thinking how to bring in the process, the secret weapon. they would organize and get everybody to go and women talk about dragging their sons by the years and setting up to feed their families. and it works. we don't study this. we do a disservice to these communities thinking about the reasons we have these patterns and what it tells us. >> the gender difference with regard to office holding candidacy is historic. bob ericson, about 25 years ago the african-american community

and his theory was it went to the higher level of participation. and social capital created those institutions for female candidacies. we can pursue that. >> and it decreases so latinas don't have a clear story. >> i don't know if those were around permanent disenfranchisement of effort and latino men. >> when i first saw this it was relevant that it goes into north carolina. both registration and voting. you immediately think of disenfranchising whatever you see that agenda. that there will be a gender gap. if you look across states it seems to be disenfranchisement

laws. >> definitely historic. when you look particularly around when women were trying to get the vote. the issue is you give black men the vote and give a black woman the vote and there really was -- the understanding going back for a long time. >> back to nashville around 1910, republican women organizations, in pursuit of the franchise. so you find it gets more episodic that people -- >> to the point of the amendment actually came and there was a huge flood -- if you actually take it out. [talking over each other]

>> i graduated from law school four years after the voting rights act of '64. you mentioned there were a million latinos in california who qualify for citizenship and one of the barriers is the $675 fee which sounds like a soul -- poll tax. at wonder if that was challenged in. >> i would defer to -- to my knowledge -- relatively recent. basically quadrupled. the $1.5 million is just in the state of california. if you think about it, you need pictures and other costs involved. as many advocates have been saying progress in late reintegration program for immigrants if we understand part

of american society, in fact you should provide that service for free but the separation of the enforcement and service with the organization, basically pay for itself. that is the current model. if you have citizens, the amount of money, how do you decide who is the one we put forward? just the cost of protecting yourself to the test, tremendously high. is that another barrier we are putting if we don't want them? that is expected only to go up. >> the poll tax was addressed in crawford and simply said even and $18 vs certificate you must get to get a driver's license in

order to vote even if license is free it is not considered a poll tax. >> it is not a latino issues. they are have seen -- $1 million nationwide. the same situation. >> basically a ton of background documentation must be acquired whether it is senior citizenship and the court has not recognized any costs associated with that to qualify. >> question over here? >> i am -- acquistion primarily about florida. he showed us some numbers before about the impact of the legislature restricting early voting on black and latino voters. it may have a bearing on other states as well. florida strikes me as an anomaly in that it has a large cuban american population that is more

conservative, better off and tends to support republican candidates and clearly they have done very well in elected office in florida. do you think built in to the legislature's restriction was expectation or assumption that it would not have a negative impact on cuban-americans and is there any similar expectation among other state legislatures in crafting restricting voting laws? >> when you look at the assumptions, exceptions are carved out. so you see wisconsin where we know the voters tend to be more conservative. they have exceptions so there's no question in my mind that legislatures were very

purposeful in terms of how these were crafted. there is not some analysis in terms of what populations would be impacted more than others but i can't speak to what is in hearts and minds of legislators when they're doing what they do. >> i can't say it is understood. there is a powerful organized machine to turn out the cuban-american vote in miami dade county. once it and imagine cuban-american legislators saying it is not going to affect us necessarily because that is not where cuban voters necessarily are going to be voting. that said i think there's a perception that cuban-americans are powerful. the social issue is not conservative. they vote for republicans -- they are democrats. they form policy. kind of a little different from what people think but you are

getting a diversification so they're no longer the majority population and they are not necessarily -- on all issues. they may not have had the power of it happening in the broader sense. >> i have a question for dan. i will take off my commissioner had. i used to work in your office as an attorney in the 90s. you emphasize the state level based -- redistricting. the most attention in california and nationally but given the small size of the population in many parts of california, local they redistricting efforts,

board of education where there are districts, might seem an area where you want more advocacy. there is manageability to resource the funds that we actually do. if you're going to focus on levels of impairment at the local level, where it might be more fruitful given what we're seeing now. >> it was exclusively at the state assembly level. recognize what communities have the opportunity for. normally we segue into the l.a. city council that we are engaged in now and we recognize the importance of working at the local level. there are foundation representatives in the crowd.

certainly more money to address -- >> local redistricting efforts. that is how people think about politics. people from quebec government needs and how many teachers are in the school and police, roads and all these sorts of things that are meaningful let the local level so helping people get their heads around and what it means can be ready at the local level. in most states -- comes after. dan you have to hold the interest for another decade which isn't easy. >> i am a student at the law school and i have a question that is a follow-up on the earlier question about a poll tax. you are talking about

informative and scary overview of what is going on in terms of restrictions on voting rights. there are some different strategies people might want to play against those restrictions. one would be to mobilize people in the legislative arena as voters against these initiatives. the other which i am curious about is a sense of legal strategies that were effective or ineffective. sounds like some strategies in the constitution would be ineffective. looking to other -- >> certainly. to take your questions in order, there have been lot of legislative efforts on the

ground. people have been looking very hard and as a result people were successful in the legislature and nebraska and a couple smaller areas where we saw people being able to push back in ohio and the elimination of election day registration. in ohio actually blocked implementation of all those laws. there is a lot of citizen response to at. the challenge that the vote is primarily with the inception primarily along party lines and where the legislature had the vote that is more difficult to mound in response where there isn't a mechanism like maine or ohio where there's a way to get out. we have legal strategies all the time. we are seeing strict facial challenges and we won't work

anymore. crawford precluded that possibility with the exception of some of the laws that are so much more restrictive than indiana which was the law considered in crawford that there were possibilities that the card for s&p balloting as well as no manageable affidavit system and those laws may be constitutionally infirm based on the analysis in crawford. there are a whole set of legal ideas and one that has been thrown around lately is a first amendment right of association. that is going to be with ids. the idea that a person with id is being challenged because they can organize for work without id. that is very mushy. in number of questions on that

one. that one is very real. and may not work but there are -- we continue to come up with new theories other than straight up. this is the poll tax. certainly where it has been made so restrictive that the burden test we are really trying to find that balance. is a real challenge. >> you will need a creative judge looking at the first amendment. plaintiffs in illinois. and we may have looked at this district decision already. gerrymandering challenge and the district court argued that the first amendment guarantees you have the right to association, the right to political speech but don't have a right to

success. success of getting proportion is not guaranteed so you're going back to political tools for a mobilization is the question -- the first principles differences in the american public with regard to culture and religion and assumptions made about how one approaches citizenship and liberties whether they are earned in the context of the protestant work ethic where there's a larger social gift that comes from liberties so you are back on the fundamentals of political organizations in this country right now. >> time for one more question. no? thank you, everyone. [applause] >> we are going to take ten

minutes to have lunch outside. [inaudible conversations] >> coming up more on this forum on political redistricting. in this panel a discussion on the california law of 2008 that create citizens redistricting commission. the speaker is angelo ancheta, one of california's commissioners. this is 15 minutes. >> thank you. good afternoon. i am the executive director of the levin center. i want to thank you for participating in the symposium and we are delighted to have angelo ancheta as our keynote speaker. a member of the california

citizens redistricting commission. we are excited to hear about how the process has gone. and the unique perspective, and constitutional law and clinical education as well as long times of rights and legal services attorney. just yesterday the california supreme court ruled the senate drawn by the commission, despite pending referendum to overturn them. there's a lot of exciting developments happening and we look forward to this talk. >> is this coming through? i am on a wireless mike. good afternoon and thank you for inviting me to speak to you today. this is a great symposium. in my normal life where i do clinical teaching and occasional

writing a conference like this, i am here to talk about my extracurricular activity on the commission so i would like to highlight those activities over the next few minutes. still active. produced final maps and august. took a break from the exit. you start reflecting on what you actually did. it is important how redistricting is but when you are in a different setting i spent the holidays with my in-laws and a lot of relatives, you realize not everybody is interested in redistricting as we are. my wife who is very proud of my

membership, the redistricting commissioner, it is all relative and they seem impressed by that but there's also the very blank stare that pops up. that is great but what is the redistricting commission do? what does the commission actually do? that is a challenge because when you think of the technicalities and software, not easy explaining it. i come down to one minute version every now and then. as you might know the legislature and congress are elected from districts. people elected to office and every ten years because of sense as we do the lines. and the commission works on a brand new thing and i talk a little about input and public sharing and testimony and putting drafts together and a lot of times a lot of traveling around the state and we produce the maps in august. ..

>> shiftedded to legislate, and the congressional delegation to the house of representatives, and as we know, a big change in the power structure, who draws the lines in california? to the extent that california, through its initiative process, often good or bad, leads the nation in some, you know, novel policymaking. i think it's an important development. i think it's one that's worth the study. i had to live it for the past year or so, and i think it's worth talking about how all of that came about and what resulted or how the process resulted in a set of good policies that came out several months ago. now, as some of you may know, there was a very extensive

selection project. like it took over a year for the commissioners to be picked. 30,000 people filed to be on the commission. only 4500 people submitted application with essays, provide financial disclosures, any possible relations to the legislature, to lobbyists, background checks done, and the bureau of state audits, in charge of actually narrowing the pool, went to over 4500 applications down to 120. you can imagine it was a very hard process for them, but, you know, one that really wind led down and got a good qualifies group of people together. even with the one under 20, there were a set of interviews, talked to them for an hour and a half in the summer. they got it down to 120 down to 60, and after 60, the legislative leaders had basically a veto booth, and they

were able to narrow that down to 36, and from the 36, it was broken into the pools of democrats, republicans, and those affiliated with neither party, and it was a lottery system, okay, it's all the stuff you see on television with ping-pong balls and wire baskets spinning around, and you pick, at that point, the first eight commissioners, and after that, those commissioners pick the remaining six. you ended up with 14 people at the end of the process who were in theory, and practice actually, were supposed to represent a good cross section of california. now, i have to say, i was not picked in the first 14, okay? i didn't get picked -- i was in and out lucky. mu number department -- my number didn't come up. look at the group of eight, i was not going to add to the diversity to the pool. an asian-american democrat from

san fransisco was already in the pool. [laughter] it was unlikely, and i understand that. they wanted the panel to be diversified on many dimensions. that's understood. one of the commissioners stepped down no january, and despite my not so great demographic set of characteristics, they decided to pick me. i became the replacement commissioner in february of last year. the process itself took over a year, and if you look at the actual time line, one year to pick the commissioners, seven and a half months from january to august 15th was the time to draw the lines, okay? you can imagine that that was a very thorough process, and, you know, we have a great team of people, attorneys, urban planners, germings, a lot of -- engineers, a lot of professional folks, well-educated, talented

groups of people that all work tremendously well in group settings, very mission driven in doing our work. no question for us this is a really good group of people. i think that's what led to that. if you think about how much work you have to do to redistrict in the state of california for its legislative boundaries and congressional boundaries, seven and a half months is a short at that particular amount of time. we had to pull together a staff, find office space, get consultants, attorneys, deal with the contracting process, which in sacramento, it's not a very first time process. we pulled that off, we did it, had a great team of consultants, mcdonald is here, head of that consulting team, great team of attorneys as well, an we set about to have what is a very ambitious process. there were a lot of expectations that came out of proposition 11

and prop 20, that the process would be more open, more transparent, that you could remove as much as possible, the politics from the process. can't eliminate it entirely. get the partisanship and remove incumbency production and those influences and all the horse trading that might occur with the legislatively based redistricting process. try to get that out of the process as much as you could. we were very ambitious. we set up a process for initial -- got close to 50 hearings done in that period, produced two draft maps before august 15th, we didn't get all the way there. we ran out of time in some instances, but we did over 30 hearings, received over 20,000 comments with the maps or districts or e-mails and faxes and postal mail. hundreds of people often came to our hearings. it was a very extensive and i

think a very effective process to try to at least get some segments of the population of california interested in redistricting to do it. i think it was a good process. could have been done better, certainly, but did well given the time constraints. now, if you think about what you have to do to redistrict, some of you obviously have done redistricting yourselves. you know it is a time consuming process. you can't just sort of slap it all together. it's not all done by computer. you have to look at all the things you have to put together whether it's public testimony, census data, demographic data, all of those things come into play, and, of course, it is an inherently political process. okay. a commission is an attempt to try to remove as much as possible legislative interests, direct legislative interest, but it is impossible to remove politics from the process. individuals, groups, and organizations, and the public have interests. they want to see certain districts and alignments, and if

you think about the power structure within the legislature who have power and who does not have power, who would like to get more power, you know that people will try to change anything, obviously. if you look at the structure of the commission, divided five democrat, five republican, and four other, nonpartisan or minor party afghanistans, -- affiliations, that doesn't necessarily reflect all of california. democrats are 50% higher than the republican representation so there's a little imbalance there. i am a democratic member, so i'll note that, but our friends. on the republican side certainly were expecting something different in the process as reflected in prop 11. republicans supported prop 11.

that continues in the process, and at this point, it's the republicans who are suing us, largely in state and federal courts. we had a very expensive process, a lot of sharing, we produced one draft map in mid-june. reran out of time trying to produce a second one, but we had an open process to ensure people could see what we were doing, why we were doing it. we made a few, you know, missteps every now and then. i think one lesson in particular we learned is if you're going to have a draft map in june, you better make sure you've done your voting rights act and voting analysis before you release a draft. if you don't before you release the draft, and if you're not lucky enough to hit the lines where they are probably going to fall, you're going to get criticized. we were. we were criticized. we set certain deadlines, had a lot of testimony already, but we had not put together the

complete data set, and that's something we had to learn from experience, but as we moved forward, we addressed those concerns, and we revised drafts as well, and so i think there were imperfections in the process and given the time constraints, i think we did the best that we could. now, we ended up, i think, with a process that's no doubt in my mind far more open, far more transparent, far more accessible to the public than way we saw in years prior. we had individuals running from all over -- coming in from all over the states, multiple languages, english certainly, but spanish, asian languages, a number of european languages, had three teens testifying, folks in their 90s testifying, and some drove hundreds of miles to go to the hearings. it was amazingly encouraging what we saw, and as we put the

maps together, and we had a number of criteria to follow, follow the one person, one vote rule, the voting right act, continuity requirement, geographic requirements, compactness requirements, nesting, putting two districts in an assembly districts. we were not allowed to look at candidacy or look at party registration. now, if you think about how redistricting is normally done, how can that be? how can you take out the interests? that's part of how the law was structured, to try to remove considerations. is that the best way to go? that's something to think about. now, as we put our maps together, we had to make a lot of choices. as you know, redistricting is essentially a zero-sum game. you can't just go to the next

put of arizona or poll oregon and create a solution. you deal with what you're dealt with, and we had tough choices to make, and a lot of the state testimony was consistent. it led us to very clear solutions, but in many parts of the state, we had very difficult choices to make. we had to try to reconcile different points of view, two or three ways of drawing maps, multiple communities, advocating for different interests, probably no more tougher than southern california. we were looking at the core of los angeles, in particular, minority populations, looking at what was a relative decline in the african-american population in many parts of central l.a., trying to reconcile different interests, hearing different kinds of testimony, and if any of you followed the hearings or looked back at the transcripts and tapes, it became emotional.

the issue of race, which is an inherent part of redistricting came really up to the four, during some of those meetings, and tears were shed trying to figure out what to do in l.a.. if you think redistricts is just about maps and lines on the computer screen, there's a lot more to it. it's how people identify themselves. it's how people think about communities, how they think about power within the state. that all comes to play, it's not just the technical side to it. it was a great process in putting it together. i think all of us, for the most part, other than the section five count, looking at existing districts to ensure there was not retrogression, i think we all thought we could start from a blank slate, and i think that's what we did. we didn't look at incumbency, the alignment of states generally worth it, and other than the section five counties, we said, well, we don't have to stick to the prior mess. let's look at something new and

look at the testimony, how people define themselves, what do you think is the best way to put lines together, and i think that was a very effective process. now, we were successful. our maps came down to a vote at the end of july to produce them for an august 15th deadline. i think a lot of us were concerned going into it, well, can we get the votes? given the voting vur of the commission where you have to have a certain number of each subgroup voting in favor of a map. well, if we lose a couple people, can we get a map out? okay. all this work, all these hundreds of hours we spent listening to people, going through testimony, working on this, we lose that if we didn't get the votes. fortunately, we did get a vote. on the state map, we had a 13-1 vote, and on the congressional map it was a 11-2 vote.

there's structured bipartisan divisions among the commissioners, it was clear it was a multipartisan effort, and all of us felt the mission was accomplished when we produced the maps in mid-august. now, our job's not done, and those of you who have been following the developments around the commission, you know, there's been some lawsuits. a couple of state lawsuits were filed in the state supreme court back in september. the court ultimately dismissed the petition in both cases, challenging the senate maps and congressional maps on both state and federal grounds. those were dismissed. there is a federal lawsuit still pending. that's focusing on congressional districts in southern california primarily looking at federal and voting rights act claims. we have, at this point, a potential referendum that may be appearing on the ballot. the senate map is being

challengedded via referendum, and the signature count is not in yet. we'll know probably by the end of february whether there's a referendum appearing on the november ballot this year. as was previously mentioned, the supreme court ruled yesterday that even if the referendum qualifies, and by law, the maps have to be stayed pending the resolution of the vote, the court, as an intrerm -- interim measure, the states have to use our maps. i think we're confident regardless of whatever format happens to be, whether it's litigation or through a referendum process, that we'll see the maps upheld and we're confident about that. now, again, i have a 10-year term. i'll be commissioner at least until the next commission is picked in 2020 or 2021, and there's a lot of work we're doing. we are looking at what went

right and wrong in the process, evaluating ways of improving the process. there's no question we looked at the timing and calendaring of all of these activities and if it was too tight, the schedule we were dealt was much too compressed, not that we would have done maps differently necessarily, but we had to put in a lot of data gathering, a lot of work with a far too tight time line. we'll recommend the lobby change at least, give us the next commission more time to do that. it would be great to have a higher budget. at this point, legal fees is defending the maps than we are in drawing the maps, but, as you know, that's the nature of the redistricting process. somebody's going to sue. somebody has to pay lawyers to defend the map. that's an issue. is this system one that other places ought to adopt?

that's one of the big questions we look at. this has been a grand experimentment i think it's been a successful one, but is this the kind of system you ought to adopt? now, whether you can adopt one in the first place is a tough one. this is a product of direct democracy, a set of initiatives put together, the legislature didn't initiate this process, and trying to get a legislature to change the process that they give up the power they might possess and put it in the hands of the commission is a daunting one. i don't know if you can do that in places where there's not validated procedures, but it's worth trying. in those states that do, could you put together an initiative to create a commission like our commission? i think you could. do you want to do it the way california has done it? well, that's a really good question; right? 14 the right number? okay, can you remit an entire state among 14 people? 14 people too many?

can you get work done? we got work done. we did a lot of good work with that number, very effective, and it was consensus driven. that may not be the case for every state. is that the right number? the party balance the way you want to go? also, if you have a minority party, you love to have the same number of states for the majority party, but if you're the majority party, maybe that's not the case. that's a structural question to think about. how do you divide that up? how do you divide the legislature, if at all? they had a veto essentially over the part of the pool. we don't know why they did or why they removed who they removed. they could have told us why they did it. they didn't. maybe you want to know. maybe that's something to mandate, but in any case, the legislature did play some role, and somebody may want a larger and lesser roles. that's something to think about. a lot of combination, a lot of

ways to go. one thing that i think we ought to be of special concern, particularly given the theme of this symposium is is the commission necessarily a good thing for racial and ethnic minority rights? okay? does a commission system work better in terms of voting rights enforcement, in terms of guarantees political empowerment of minority groups, and i think the answer is yes, but i don't think it's necessarily so even though in this case, we did a good job of satisfying concerns raised by many civil rights groups. some of you may remember, most of the major civil rights groups in california did not support proposition 11 back in 2008. there were concerns about the composition of the panel, whether the commission would be representative of the minority interests, whether the outcomes would reflect sufficient input by minority interests, and i

think given how the law was written and what occurred in practice, the concerns were relayed. if you look at the actual membership of the commission, 7 out of 14 members are people of color, okay? there's latinos and asian-americans. if you look at descriptive representation, that's not bad. if you think about what the outcomes are, what the policies that come out of commission, will you necessarily get a good outcome? well, again, i think we did a very good job. i think we complied fully with the constitution, with section 5, with section 2, and i have no problem saying we did the right thing. we can defend the maps against all challenges. does that guaranteed by the commission?

commissions, after all, like legislatures, are majority bodies, okay? they are the ma senior -- majority body. even if california is labeled a minority state, that's not the case looking at the electorat. okay? it's not the same looking at who votes in california. to the extent that a commission might not lead you to the results that you would like to see given minority interests, i think that is a very legitimate concern. we have the court system, of course. we have the voting act to try to check those potential problems, but it's not necessarily a guarantee. i think p if you look at the process that we went through, all of the outreach, input, and the commission in and of itself was not sufficient to ensure that minority communities got or received the outreach they needed to receive in order to participate in the process. the james irvine foundation poured in well over a million dollars to local community and

civil rights organizations to ensure that minority communities in the state received the right information, that they were able to participate in the process, and as we've seen and heard earlier, there was very good participation, i think. that's not guaranteed if you don't have sufficient funding, and when a private foundation injects that much money, over half the budget for all of our work, the initial stages, that tells you a commission might not be a enough, that you need partnerships or you have to fund it at a higher level, so to ensure minority interests are protected, i think you have to make sure there's sufficient resources. given all of this, and this is a question i was often asked in august and september after, again, having spent hundreds of hours working on commission work, of given all you've done, the time sacrificed and time spent away from your family --

and, by the way, i owe my wife several months of time spent away. i was gone a long time. i'll probably take the next ten years making that up to her for the lost summer. given all of that, would you want to do it again? the answer is yes. i would always want to do this again. this been an amazing experience. again, as someone who was -- or still continues to be an advocate on civil rights issues, i know how important it is to be involved in redistricting. all of us in the room understand that. is it worth the sacrifice? again, absolutely. okay. when you think about who is on the commission, the great team you work with, you know, q2, we nicknamed them the women in black because of the dresses when she comes to the meeting. just an extraordinary group of people, great staff, great

consultants, and really a joy to work with, just a joy to work with in terms of the process, and the traveling throughout the state to hear people testify, to talk about their communities, to share their stories, that was an unbelievable experience. i learned so much about the state. i lived in the state for most of my life. i didn't know that so many small towns in northern california even existed, and learning about neighborhoods and different communities was absolutely fascinating to me, and so would i do it again? i don't know if i'll do it in 20, but i'd go through the process again and it works and provides a service to the state. ultimately, i think a commission system works. i think it does. i think in this case it worked. i think in the future it will work. we may see challenges to the system again. okay? last time it was democrats. it could be republicans challenging it this time, but regardless of how it works out politically, i think this grand

experiment was a successful one, that what we did here in california can be a model for other states, for local communities, and that when people actually do get an opportunity to engage in the political process, they will do so. they will do so. thousands of people came out, and i think that shows the strength of the state, and i'm very proud to serve on this commission so thank you very much. [applause] >> i'm talkative today. it seems to me at the middle level that the maps reflect reasonably and accurately reflect, a shift in political party strings in california.

the republican party now being around 31%. the democratic party being around 41%, and independents being around 21%. if that is a reasonable criteria to judge the new lines, it seems you guys have been successful in accurately reflecting the overall state shift in party ore yepation. would you agree with that? >> good question. that's why in terms of how you look at the maps and how they align with current partisan affiliation. there's a number of republicans disagreeing with that. they they they've been given short strip, and there is not full agreement on that statement, but one thing that's interesting about the process is we were prohibited from looking

at all the data. we were not to look at party registration or incumbency, and we didn't. i didn't look at it. when we put together the maps, i was like, oh, i put them in the same district. the san jose area, and you think, hey, that's interesting. that's not the only place we did it. it was a lot of places. that was just a product of what we did; right? there's a few people in the legislature and in congress who decided not to run again because they might be competing against fellow incumbents. that's an interesting development. you can't change the demographics of a state that much in redistricts. you're not going to create a republican district in san fransisco or a democratic district in riverside county. even with a wild jerri --

gerrymandered set of rules, and we were not required by law to create competitive districts. arizona, for example, has that in the criteria. we do not have that, even though voters thought that was part of what we did. we were not supposed to, and we didn't do that intentionally. did we produce more competitive districts? we did in a lot of areas, but, again, california is what it is in terms of numbers, demographics, and its party affiliations, and that's evolving, and the republican party base is declining and maybe in ten years there's decline of states and non-major party voters being outnumbering republicans and maybe rivalling numbers of the democrats. that could be an interesting development. the structure of the commission given the changes might not be in alignment with what the lock --

electorat looks like in 20 years let's say. >> you mentioned and relied a lot on testimony and comments from people around the state. i was curious to what extent you relied on more comprehensive statistical data on drawing districts and you looked at racial demographics around the state, but what other data did you look at? income, profession, housing, ect.. >> good question. we also had to look at were there areas of potential sections of -- well, the racial data is there, it's the census data. we relied on the core census data produced or at least in part to produce lines, and there's the population equal across the district. you know, could we have looked at empirical data, social science data in terms of how we look at communities of interest or how neighborhoods are defined? i think we could have done more of that. i think partly because of the concern to ensure we had a lot

of good public testimony, we emphasized that. i think if we had more time, we might have been able to go through more data. we talked about this in the commission as well because we tried to figure out, well, given what the public says does that line with the demographics? some of the perceptions of the community could differ greatly from the numbers you see in the census or the data. it was a concern we had, and i hate to say this, but we didn't have the time we wanted to do that. we are encouraging to extend this out a little bit longer. now, i don't -- we don't have a binding effect on the next commission. the constitutional provisions that are in existence, statute, existing regulations which we can change a little bit, but for the most part, the law gives a lot of leeway to the commission, and if the next set of commissioners wants to look heavily at data, i think they can do that. again, that was a concern we had, and we just looked at what

we have got, just a few more weeks left, let's just keep going. >> so there were two big changes in the last round of redistricting and the commission round, and i wondered if you could speculate about the relative effect. one change, of course, is who did the redistricting? it was a move to the legislature to the commission. the other, of course, is the formal listing of a set of criteria and rank ordering, and i wonder, do you think a commission without that rank ordering would have done as well? do you think a legislature, if given the rank ordering, being judicially enforceable? that is, what's the relative contribution of the two changes to the outcomes, and if i could just ask one last piece of that which is, of course; what

constitutionalizing this has done as it's in stone making it hard to change on how the commission is picked or what the criteria should be, and so i wonder if you could speculate on the third piece as well. >> you're absolutely right. both factors are critical. you know, what is more important, and i'll leave that to the ph.d.es in the room. all had an effect, and commissioners agree, it was easier to reconcile all the different interests by saying, well, we've got to comply with the voting rights act. that's number two, okay? we understand there's a community of interests here and we might be splitting a neighborhood. we'd love to keep the city in tact. you know, it's wonderful, but, if we don't do what we do, we'll violate the voting rights act. looking at this as a model, other states might want to do it

differentliment you can't get rid of the one person, one vote. it still applies. you can't be rid of the criteria, but when you're given a ranking, and you have to choose and make hard decisions, there's some easy ones, but always a lot of hard decisions, and having the rank criteria helped a lot. i think we consistently turned to the criteria to figure out the problems we were trying to solve. now, you know, if you started with onek;

competitiveness is tough to work with. i'm glad we didn't have to deal with it. that's a tough one if you have to consider it. you know, we were supposed to try to nest districts if we could. we nested a few. we combined a couple assembly districts into senate districts, but for the most part, we just said, well, we have to look at the other criteria. we might be splitting a city if we nest. if you look at the draft maps, we nested a bunch. we got tired frankly putting that first draft to together. we ran out of time at the end, nested a few districts, and that's did not work. we change it for the final map. i think the effects are accumulative certainly, but,

yeah, i don't know. it's worth speculation. it's a very, very important point to raise. >> i had a question that follows up on what nate said this morning about the commission going forward, and i'm worried about the commissions that the partisans find a way to influence it at some point whether it's an expert commission or whatever, and the sort of interesting thing about both your experience and the british columbia citizens assembly, and the first round, they had not figured out how to influence what's going on. they had not mastered it yet, but i'll say, one of my students who has extensive political experience and now writing a paper on the commission turned to me cackling with glee saying i can figure out so many ways to influence these guys. do you have a worry that as time goes on, the partisans who will be interested in the result of this in every possible way and have more interest than

everybody else find a way to game the system or are you isolated enough from it that they are not the decision makers and you can do a good job going forward? >> that's a real concern. we had conversations about that over dinner. we thought this is a great experience, and it's never going to be like this ever again because -- it's not to say, again, you can't take the politics -- however you do it, there's politics involved and there's a number of politics on the commission. there are checks, we think good checks, in terms of disclosures, financial contributions, affiliations, you know, can you come up with a partisan and sort of turn them into a non-partisan over the course of ten years? that's possible. you know, what can you do about that i think is a good question. there's been media reports talking about whether the democratic party conspired to try to fool the commission and

put folks into the testimony who were not who they said they were. i don't know if that's true or not, but we knew early on that a lot of the groups we're hearing from were where did the groups come from? i never heard of the group. not to say they were front groups, but if you're trying to do the process, you're going to try to say i'm, well, i represent this coalition, even though, by the way, i might be running for the office at some point, but i represent a koalation, or i'm with this community, so we figured that out early that not everybody was being up front about who they were affiliated with. to say we were hoodwinked by the democratic party was not accurate, but if that happenedded, so what? if it was a good suggestion making sense relative to the problem solving, if that came from a source, fine, we'll take it. it could help us figure out how the puzzle pieces could be put together, but, yeah, i think if

you're a democratic or republican leader, you be thinking about that. we have ten years to figure this out and get our people on the commission. i don't know that you -- you know, you can completely insulate the process from that kind of, you know, infiltration, but that from happening, and i think, you know, those -- it's composed mostly of accountants, but they investigate. they dug into people's backgrounds thoroughly so i trusted they did a good job vetting people, but there's no question given the system and how it currently works you want to change it if you don't like what you get or work with it and game it a little. not to point fingers, but i suspect that's what's going to happen in the future. >> [inaudible]

one question relating to what you were saying is how you evaluate community of interest arguments and so much is factual, but literally how you balance out logistics, communities of interest, and i hope you write a book, actually, about your experience. it would be wonderful to have someone on the inside. [inaudible] >> not while in litigation. >> no, no, no. [laughter] lessons for the process and also increase knowledge, but i've

been in situations where, you know, the arguments about the communities of interest, and then you had to deal with other colleagues, and so i'm interested in giving us a sense of how those kinds of arguments were dealt with by the commission and how you mediated between them. >> yeah. >> [inaudible] >> and community of interest is a slippery concept. we have at least one of our panel presenters trying to give it more flesh this afternoon. there's a more specific language that came into being because of prop 20, in terms of trying to define a community of interest. that was a very interesting phrase. still is an interesting phrase. a lot of my colleagues on the commission, i think, interpreted it more broadly than what the constitution said. i was pushing for it, local communities of interest, local, and here are the examples. now, there may be various ways

of defining community, and that's fine to do that. i don't think we had to lock into a single fixed definition. this is a community and this is not a community, but when you look at what the testimony, look how the public looked at the term, how the commissioners looked at the term at the time, very broad. you know, the san gabriel community of interest, you know, spans hundreds of miles. the coastal community of interest. the northern california community of interest. those are common interests, and i think that's not the same common interest or related interest is not the same thing as local community of interest as defined by the law, and so there was inprecision in doing that, and there was certainly conflicting system, and there's always going to be some level of conflict with any definition. well, my community goes from this street to this street, and some say, no, no, it's that street to that street. if you butt them up together,

that's a disservice to bothment pick one or the other. where's the line drawn? whatever, pick it. there's a level that you often get to so that was probably the most slippery of the criteria to deal with. you know, i personal pushed to ensure we had good definitions for neighborhoods, and i pushed for saying we have the los angeles neighborhood boundaries and defined them, and let's use the maps. that's helpful, and same with san fransisco and san jose, try to rely on some additional data, and i think that was helpful with those definitions. community of interest was very slippery. for us, and i think there could be more precision. i will not guess how other commissions looked at it, and we got to the same place once it came down to drawing the final

maps, but it's not easy. again, could you rely on more empirical data rather than testimony? sure, you can. this commission went out of its way. if you think of what we set out to do, an i was skeptical when i heard the plans because i came on late in the process, and people talked about 50, and 60 here, and i thought, are you nuts? 60 hearings? that's a lot. i bought into it eventually. well, we better do a lot. maybe just 20. i'm going to get shot down; right? that's not going to command enough votes to do this number or just one good meeting. it was not going to go that direction given the way we were going, and when you try it for the first time, and it's a really radically different system trying to up it up, it may go overboard, and that's okay. that was find for the system. if it was more democratic, all

the better at this point, but ultimately, still got to draw the map, and that's what is always tough. >> actually, nate just totally stole my question, but i have a follow-up along the same lines that i wondered if i could ask you about. community interest, fascinated with how you approached that. what you said is really interesting, but i wonder about one specific question which is one way of defining community's interest is to say we're going to look at demographic data and identify a group with underlying similarity, and we don't care about what the political preampses are. they may vote for other candidates, but they are similar in an important way and we define that as a community, and that's where we start. another is political preference saying these people prefer the same candidates and there's

geographic difference among them, but they are a political community. i wonder which you favor, what you learned about that process, what's more important? >> yes, i'll think about it more as i'm talking, but, you know, there's an explicit prohibition looking at incumbency and party data, and i suspect if we started getting into that discussion, there would be -- it makes sense on how does this collective, lack of a better term, actually sort of express its preferences; right? that might be along party lines. that might be along, say, a line based on race or ethnicity or pick your criteria. it might be something different, and i think that's worth looking at, and, again, i think with the luxury of time, i think we might have -- with the caveat that we might not have looked at partisan data specifically. i think that would have been taboo for us to look at that at

that point, but would we have done more analysis, have a demographer on staff to do that? you know, we had a lot of data in the data base. our team was, you know, very, very thorough in putting the data sets together, but no shortage of other data, and so could we looked at other things? how do you vet the information? what if it conflicts with the testimony. again, we were trying as much as possible to have a people's process. i think that normative interest in opening it up to the public dominated our consideration. good or bad; right? so i think the question is really one that i think in the future ought to be dealt with more squarely, and we're going into the evaluation process right now. i've been raising a little didn't and i'll continue to raise it because we have the luxury if they won't, well, ten

years ago, maybe it's good to have this data available to the commission, and that's how once they figure out what they're going to do, that's how maybe they ought to do it. thank you. [applause] >> taking a five minute break, and we'll start the other panel. [inaudible conversations]

>> see the heads of the world bank and international monetary fund along with other global leaders at they talk about the future of the world economy. >> just three comments. number one, no one is immune in the current situation. it's not just a eurozone crisis. it's a crisis that could have collateral effects, spillover effects around the world, and, you know, we'll hear from others, but what i have seen and what we've seen in numbers and in forecasts is that no country is immune, and everybody has an interest in making sure this crisis is resolved adequately. >> i have been in public service, most of which involved in public finance for over four decades. let me share with you, i've never been as scared now about the world. what is happening in europe.

look at what experiences not in any crisis we've had, and the crisis we had? in the 1990s, this is really an issue. fist of all, i agree entirely with christine that nobody's immune. we are all connected to each other. >> you can see this whole discussion tonight at 8 p.m. eastern on c-span. more from the world economic forum tomorrow including a panel on the political and economic future of africa. plus, the ceos of several major corporations talk about the role their companies play in the global economic recovery. >> a panel of former security officials and current congressional staffers met yesterday to discuss pending security legislation. a bipartisan group of senators introduced a bill aiming at creating a public-private partnership to address cyber

threats. speakers include former director of national intelligence mike mcconnell both serving during the second bush administration. >> good morning. distinguished members of the washington community, trustees, students, faculty, and staff at the george washington university, it's a pleasure to welcome you to today's homeland security policy institute forum entitled "a conversation on cyber security legislation with mike mcconnell, michael chertoff, and staff." it's a pleasure to welcome you here, and former directer of national intelligence, also former director of the national security agency and the george washington alummists, and the george washington honory degree

recipients, mike mcconnell. they have been addressing the growing cyber threat to the international and economic security. they'll be joined by senior congressional staff to discuss pending legislation designed to shore up the nation's cyber defenses. here at the george washington university, we're in the process of rolling out a university wide cyber security initiative bringing together research, education, and training. mng the results of the effort that are already far advanced are the creation of a new mayser of science and cyberrer security based in our department of computer science, and the launching of an executive mba bringing to the our school of business and our law school. it's now my pleasure to give the podium to frank, associate vice president of homeland security and director of george washington's homeland security

policy's institute and the moderator of today's discussion which i hope you will all enjoy and profit from. thank you very much. >> thank you. [applause] thank you, president knapp, and let me echo your welcome here today not only in the audience, but viewers on c-span, and those watching our live web stream as well. as you can temperature, we have a good sized panel here, reflective, i think, of the significance and importance of the various issues we're going to discuss today. one would argue it's taken quite some time to get to the point as i think senator lieberman put it, perhaps our system is blinking red in a domain similar to the system that was blinking red pre-9/11 in terms of counterterrorism, but in this case, with respect to cyber threats and cyber related issues. i think everyone here before we

begin can agree we have to do more in this space. we have to ensure that our ability to protect networks as much as possible keep pace with the advances in networks. i'm not sure we can all agree as to how we best get there. i'm reminded to some extent of i've got four daughters, and reminded to some extent of the goal -- goal -- goldielocks story with some say it's too hot or too cold. some say it's too reaching, not reaching enough, and hopefully some say it's just right, but hopefully we can drill down on what the issues are. i think in a simple way, we all know the cyberthreat is significant, and the scope and scale ranges from foreign nations, admiral mcconnell and

secretary chertoff wrote an interesting piece in the "wall street journal" with the peoples republic of china involved in and the exploit, and there's high actors like the people's republic of china, russia, actors like iran and north korea increasingly engaging in the space all the way down to the sorts of issues that affect us as individuals, our privacy, role as consumers and the ability to have confidence in the system, we are all increasingly using in this cyberdomain, and so i think this is something that touches just about everything we as a society do, we as individuals do, and where the tools may change, the technology may change, human nature does not. it also affects warfare, diplomacy, security, finance, business, and down to the individual sets of issues. without going any further, i

already spoke too much. we have two wonderful mentors of mine and people i've of the utmost respect for to frame the big issues. first, we hear from admiral mike mcconnell, a gw alum, former directer of the national security agency, long term naval intelligence officer, as well as the second director of national intelligence, and he left that role to become vice chairman at hamilton, following admiral mcconnell is a colleague, friend, and mentor of mine is michael chertoff, former judge, ran the criminal division when it became a most significant division at the department of justice before and shortly after 9/11, gave up, perhaps, the greatest job in the world to

take on perhaps one of the most difficult jobs in the world with a judge and assume the role as the second secretary of the department of homeland security, and following these wise men, we're going to hear from various number of staffers driving, come to the issue with real expertise, but also driving various legislation that is before the senate in the house as we speak. first, there's tommy ross, the intelligence lead and defense lead and cyber lead for the senate leader, and is the driving force behind the cyber security act of 2012. next we'll hear from nick raussi working for senator collins, the director in driving those issues as well as jeff who works for senator lieberman, and i think it's fair to say the legislation

we look at builds on the lieberman-collin's bill. we'll hear from chairman roger's on the house side as well as from kevin to hear from mr. lund gren's bill on the homeland security committee. a lot to get out there. we want to have a robust conversation. admiral, the floor is yours. >> thank you. i appreciate the kind words and remarks. i've actually been focused on a topic that's become topical in the last year or so for about 20 years. i was asked of me or privilege to serve as national security agency just after the cold war in the 1990s, and my worry, when i checked on board there, was thinking about a wonderful agency, great contributions, the

contributions of the cold war, but back before world war ii as an example. we were breaking and reading nazi germany codes in wartime, and reading them before the german field commanders, and that's a tremendous, tremendous advantage. ..

>> the volume, the global communications flow would be inside fiber optic pipes and today we're testing a terra bite a second and think before that volume in the way i sort of imagine it as a nontechnical person if the path between washington and richmond is a cow path, that's wireless. imagine a 6,000 lane highway. that's wire. that's the way to think about the difference. so i'm starting to think about this early. the first idea how would we exploit in the nation's exploit. it doesn't mean you destroy. it means you read the other guy's mail. you want to exploit and the first it's so easy.

it's really how easy it is. well, nsa has code making and code breaking which everyone knows up and code making which is to protect our secrets. and as soon as you start thinking, wow, this is so easy in a networked world we have nothing to worry about us as a country and how independent we are. and we are truly truly dependent on the digital age. so let me just jump of a statement that i think may be debatable. and the panel the panel wants to talk about. there isn't a corporation in the nation that could successfully defend itself, not one. the most sophisticated monday those who would protect themselves have been penetrated to the point of capturing source code or business plans or innovation or research and development. every one of them. i remember going back to my

experience at the nsa in the early '90s. if you're in the wireless world it's data in motion. everything has to be right. if you're in the wired world it could be data motion but it could be data risk because the difference is in the wireless world you would print it, put it in a piece of paper and lock it in a safe. it's hard to get to. so the whole paradigm shifted pretty dramatically. so i want to make a couple of comments about the debates on the hill. thanks to the senators who had the courage to put this forward. it's over time in my view and i want to say thanks to the gentleman to my left and right because they do the heavy lifting. members can do set the trend but something has got to lay it down. when i look at the bills, in my

view they're absolutely necessary but both of them in the house and one working in the joint in the house and are insufficient both necessary but insufficient. there are two framing arguments for concern, there's privacy concerns, oh, my goodness we can't let the government look at domestic networks and it's a concern and it should be captured in the legislation that eventually comes out that that is a violation of the law and i think that would provide adequate protections. on the other side of the coin we don't want to touch industry with regulation. well, let me just use as an example the cold war. i would submit that we're not adequate market forces in the cold war the process the abilities in the cold war. it was larger the contribution

of the private sector because they can build faster, cheaper and better and more productive and so on but it had to be harnessed that hard decisions had to be made. now, we had a national consensus. both parties were in agreement. we want to contain communism and so we did that over a period of 50 years. in my view we are facing something that is as dramatic, as significant but there's no forcing function to cause us to do the things that we do. here's my example. there's unique things the government can do and we need to capture it. nsa can see the globe see it at network speed. tokyo to new york is about 30 milliseconds. so if you see it it has to be seen with machines.

if you see a penetration you have to block it at network speed and while the drafts and why we need them and the concerns about privacy and the concerns about regulation that might touch industry are not allowing us yet to get to the point where we do the things in legislation to set the legislative framework to allow us to harness the best of government, what's needed from government, what's needed from the private sector in a way that we share the information and move at network speed. there's information about the post drafts about information-sharing. having to be an observer and a partnership on the government side and the private sector side particularly focused on information-sharing i submit that unless it's required by law or it's an incent vices in a

very significant way you will not have information-sharing. it will not happen. and i know it from firsthand experience in my time in the military when i agencies with similar missions that perceive themselves to be in competition and they absolutely refuse to cooperate or share information. i hope didn't go on too long. >> thank you. i want to thank president knapp for setting this up. it's an opportune time to talk about this issue. i want -- in addition to agreeing with everyone everything with mike mcconnell said, i would like to underscore the importance of the fact is take this up.

we're at a time where much not gets done in washington but there's an urgent need and it's good to see something is getting done. it may not be that the bills that are being discussed are the endpoint but they're a good starting point and i wouldn't want to lose a good start by making the perfect enemy of the good. so let me cover three points in a relatively brief way. is this a serious problem? probably for the people sitting in the room and maybe many watching on c-span that's an obvious yes, this is a serious problem. i will still tell you that you will find significant pockets of people who will say it's overblown. it's not that big of a problem. it's a little hard for me to understand that because when i open the newspaper every day, i see stories about, for example, nortel which was reported in the journal a few weeks ago who had an advanced persistent threat

basically wholesale theft of its business system and data for over a decade. going to another country. and that's in the "wall street journal." that is a serious issue. many of us read about it. now, i might think to myself, the outcome of what i read is a good outcome but it certainly raises the question, could that be done to us? and even at a less level the right of hackist like anonymous and by penetrating them and releasing popritary information is a priority for them. you either have to have your head in the stand to think it's not an among serious economic and security issue or you have to simply view those as not being serious concerns and i have to say at a time when we worry about whether we're losing jobs and losing competitively in the globe at a minimum we should

insist on a fair fight meaning that we don't get our stuff stolen from us. so i think the problem is very real. now, here's the challenge. unlike other security problems we dealt with, in the world of cyberspace it's much more complicated. first of all, the battlefield is not just at the border, at the perimeter. or overseas. the battlefield is here at home and it takes place in the private sector's own networks. most of the targeting here and most of the impact is not by government agencies necessary but by the private sector which means that unlike the traditional notion of security where the government owns the whole thing and, you know, unless you have private bodyguards and you're basically a bystander in the area of cyber, whether we're dealing with exploitation or attack, the private sector is very much a combatant. it's very much in the middle of the problem its assets of the

private sector that are being taken and it is ultimately the private sector's operations. its control systems that are some of the highest value targets in this area. another challenge, and this is the issue of interdependence. i'm going to talk a little bit about that in a moment but basically unlike what we've seen in terrorist attacks where people die, it's a horrible thing, things get destroyed, but that is essentially the target. that is essentially where the impact is felt, in the area of cyber, particularly when you're dealing with attacks rather than exploitation, the collateral consequences and the interdependent cisiinterdepend ent -- interdependentcies cascade. and when i watch my own little enterprise and i can take care of myself really misses the fact that everybody's enterprise whether it's a government enterprise or a private enterprise is dependent on the act and omissions of everybody

else on the network. and that makes it much more complicated. the last challenge and complication in dealing with this is the very nature of what the internet is culturally. you know, the internet grew up with the assumption that those people participating in the network would be trusted people would have a commonality of interest and so the fundamental architecture of the internet is a presumption of openness and a presumption of accessibility. you get to any data anywhere as long as it's connected in some way to a network through wire or wirelessly. if you think about it from a security standpoint, that is the exact opposite of what we have accepted as the premise of security in prior centuries where you lock things up if they were valuable. you put them in a safe as mike mcconnell said or you, you know, put them in your desk drawer and somebody had to get into your space physically in order to see

what you had and perhaps steal it or destroy it. so that presumption of openness which is a good thing challenges us in terms of how our security operates. so as that as a background, let me talk about the bills for a couple minutes. and i'm not going to get into the weeds. i'm going to -- i have three fundamental elements that i think is important to any bill that has to present a good start in dealing with this problem and that's not to say there aren't other good things like fisma reform and research in other things but i think the three core elements are these. first it does to be information-sharing and second there has to be liability protection and liability-based incentives to drive information-sharing and third and i think this is probably going to be the controversial piece or the most controversial there does have to be some standard setting and some requirement for those standards for critical infrastructure and let me tell you briefly why i think these are three fundamental pillars.

first, the way you learn about problems in cyberspace is getting experience by what those problems are. if everybody fights alone everybody is at their weakest. when you're dealing with network threats, the ability to observe them, analyze them and disseminate the information is critical to avoid replication of the threat elsewhere. basically, the more you see and the more you know, the better you are in defending yourself. that's why if we are isolated in our response to threats, if we stovepipe ourselves we are simply giving the adversary the ability to repeat the same technique over and over again in the next stovepipe. so information-sharing is foundational. and here i would agree you've got to create incentives. many companies understand that there's value in sharing but they're concerned about they wonder what they get in concern

and they are concerned that they are creating liability and, therefore, that can see to my second point. you got to use the rules of incentives, both liability protection, liability imposition and data-sharing and i think there's some interesting approaches taken in the various bills about information exchanges. i think what is critical is information has to be confidential. it had to be anonymousized and for those who don't share there's got to be some kind of liability disincentive. and that gets me to my last piece, you got the information now what do you do on the structure of defense. but we're talking mostly about the private sector and the government is going to do what is required to do by law and by

executive order. we don't want to have more regulation. the market can take care of itself and we need innovation. and i believe the market and innovation are important tools but i can tell you that it's my belief that in this area the market will fail to do an adequate job. and if i own an enterprise and it's worth a million dollars, i'm not going to spend $10 million to secure it. but if that fails and the consequences are a billion dollars in loss, then i've got a cost of failure that far exceeds what i'll do to protect it. sloojsz we rely on critical infrastructure and people get in the business of critical of structure to invest appropriate

and secondly there's a level playing field that the people who are lazy or want to underinvest can't hide in the weeds with those who do invest. and, three, we got to invest a system that incent vices appropriate standards without being micromanagement or overly intrusive or overbearing or costly and that's why i think the approach taken -- modeled on what dhs did in the chemistry saying here's some general standards and general requirements. if you meet them and you can show you meet them, god bless you, have a nice life, keep it up. if you don't, then you need to raise your game. and, again, flexibility, innovation all kinds of different ways to skin the cat but in the end you do have to show you achieved the result and i think that balances between the harnessing the energy of american innovation but also making sure we're not -- we're not underinvesting. the last thing i would say

before this before i conclude on the issue of standard-setting. the irony is that when i talk to people in business who are opposed to any kind of standard-setting, i often think they don't realize how much it is in their interest to have standards set because without standards being set i will tell you you will get standards but they will not be thoughtful and debated and considered in regulation. it will be plaintiffs' attorneys who go of in of juries and they'll set the standards and having spent a lot of years in a courtroom, business people will not like the way those standards are set. any more they like with with respect to to a whole host of tort injuries now. i will argue intelligent, standard-based regulation with ample room for innovation and credit for what you've done in the long run will serve business interests as much as it serves

the national security. >> mr. secretary, thank you. i think you put an awful lot on the table and i know the bills touch to one extent or another both philosophically as well as very specifically some of these issues. i've always been of the school of thought mitigate before litigate or regulate. we don't want this to become a secret rap in asbestos but there are areas where market will not be enough to ensure we get to that point. what i'd be curious is some of these bills address these issues maybe 3 to 5 minutes on some of the substance of the bills and specifically looking to sort of that business case as to what's going on. what are the key components in that? what are the enablers to incentivize or disincentivize information-sharing and then sort of go from there into a conversation. tommy, you've been driving a lot

of it. if you want to give us and the audience a sense of where things stand right now in the current bill, the cybersecurity bill and where you see things going? >> sure, i'll be happy about that and i want to spend some time specifically about the areas where the market, i think, is inadequate and pick up on what secretary chertoff said because i think it's a very important part of our legislation that we're considering in the senate. first, some brief background, senator reid has been working with chairs of 6 or 7 or 8 depending on the day different committees to bring together a range of different proposals spanning across a number of different committee jurisdictions on cybersecurity legislation and, you know, i actually really liked the sort of goldilocks analogy because, first of all, it's sort of the supreme compliment you can give a legislator when half the people think it's too much and half the people think it's too late because that's a compromise.

and i think that's where we're moving. but i also think that as admiral mcconnell was sort of suggesting there's really three polls that we've tried to navigate, a security poll, a poll with regard to business concerns and a pull with security and liberty concerns and trying to find a balance that, you know, carefully takes into consideration each of those concerns has been really tricky and has really been delicate and it's taken us three years to do and i think, you know, we've worked to pull in a number of different elements into the bill that include, you know, critical infrastructure, regulation, or performance standards that include information-sharing, fisma reform, research and development, but also that include privacy protections and also that include, you know, addressing with the concerns of the business community, clearly, in mind as we do so in trying to calibrate each thing we do so that all three of those pulls

are in balance. i think the as has been noted one of the issues that has been most controversial is the critical infrastructure regulatory framework, which provides dhs the authority to on a targeted basis set performance standards for critical infrastructure which meets a certain threshold. a threshold which means these entities control networks that are critical to national security either because their disruption will cause a huge loss of life or a systemic economic disruption or will damage national security capabilities of the united states. the concept of letting the market drive security here is really important because that's one of the ongoing conversations we've had with the business community and, you know, for a lot of people involved in the bill, where the market is able

to drive security and drive innovation, that's what we want to see and that's absolutely right and i don't think anybody wants to letting to get in the way of that. but there are areas within the critical infrastructures that we're looking at where the market is unable to drive security and innovation and here i wanted to pick up a little bit on what secretary chertoff had said because there's a few reasons that are important to understand. one is that, though, when you're looking at private sector innovation towards security -- when there's competition in place there's a real incentive to innovate towards security, you know, for me when i go home and i make a decision about what -- where to get my internet service, i don't have to use comcast. i can use verizon and i can use other sorts of -- other different providers. so, you know, when i look at comcast and they provide, you know, some extra security with my service and i know my service, therefore, is going to be more reliable.

i may go with them or i may go with verizon if they are able to show their reliability over their competitors so there's a built-in incentive to innovate towards ensuring that reliability for their customers and that leads to better security. in places like the electricity sector, you know, as many of you who live around here i don't have a choice. i buy my electricity from pepko and that's the only option and so they lack the same sort of competitive incentive to innovate towards security and i think that's a really important area where the market does not have the same sorts of incentives for pushing security. and, you know, that is a case with a lot of the different security that we're looking at the electricity sector, nuclear facilities, the transportation sector and things like that. the second area that i think that is also important to understand there's a range of different threats that we face and you can chart them out and

there are incidents of attacks and there's sort of a range where the probability probability goes down and the consequence of the risk goes up and it's at that far end of that chart where you have the low probability but high consequence attacks. those are the ones that are really important to our national security. it's a pretty low probability at this point that a sophisticated actor will enter into a nuclear facility's escape system and caused a nuclear meltdown. it's not possible but it's a not probability attack however, if it happens it is a major event for our national security and that's exactly the kind of issue that we're concerned with here. and it's one -- you know, because it's low probability there's not as much of an incentive to invest. you invest your resources towards the high probability attacks or the high probability penetrations that you're dealing with on a daily basis which require fewer resources but, you

know, the notion of putting in as secretary chertoff was talking about, putting in a huge amount of resources for events that are unlikely to happen doesn't make as much business sense and so the market fails to incentivize, you know, driving toward security and i think, you know, there's an article yesterday -- a couple of articles yet talking about how the nsa is now warning that within a couple of years, the hackvist group anonymous will be able to take down significant portions of the power grid. frankly, i was surprised that they assessed it would take a couple of years 'cause i would have assumed it's something they were moving towards more quickly but the article was interesting to me because, you know, down towards the end of this article it was sort of talking about how the electricity sector has made investments in cybersecurity but has not necessarily put in all the safeguards to prevent against somebody taking down the power grid but because there's

not a match-up between capability and intent. there are actors out there, iran, north korea, the article mentioned that had the intent but don't now have the capability. and then there are actors that have the capability, russia and china but people don't believe they have the intent. this to me is, you know -- we can go back to the cold war metaphor, you know, right now i think russia has, you know, however many thousands of nuclear warheads pointed at the united states. they have no intent to attack us but it would be absolutely negligent for us to not defend ourselves against the possibility of that threat. it's the same thing in cyberexcept i think arguably worse where you not only have a bunch of cyberweapons pointed at us but i think most security experts would assess that there are already cybertools, trojan horses just waiting for the

switch to be flipped for an attack to be carried out. it would be getting for us not to address those threats. and to do so be the government needs to be able to work with critical infrastructure to ensure that they achieve a certain level of security. so that's really what our bill tries to do and i think the market doesn't work is so important. >> tommy, one thing i want to underscore before jumping into questions and, nick and jeff, i would love to hear your views before we go to some of the bills on the house side that are very information-sharing-focused, but one of the things i'm not sure people fully realize is your last statement, the flip the switch from computer network exploit to attack is merely one of attack. in other words, if you demonstrate a capability to exploit, if your intent is to attack it can be a debilitating attack mechanism either independent or in concert with other physical or other sorts of means. so i think that's worth underscoring because when we hear we haven't seen these

attacks, what we have seen is the exploit capability that could easily be tuned in to an attack unless anyone disagrees on that. nick, jeff, quickly any other components on the senate bill? >> well, first off, i guess i would echo what tommy had said probably one of the more controversial elements of the bill that we're trying to deal with is protection of critical infrastructure but there are a lot of things in the bill where i think there's broad agreement, information-sharing is one of those. i think everybody agrees we need to address. senator collins has been working on this issue for years now. we're very fortunate in that senator collins and senator lieberman have the kind of working relationship where they've been teamed up to address this problem for a couple congresses now. they introduced a bill last congress that was reported by the homeland security committee. they reintroduced that bill with

some additional protections at the beginning of this congress and then just last week, they introduced a bill along with chairman rockefeller and chairman feinstein that we hope will be the basis for the senate debate on this issue. and if there are three things that are driving us on this, the first is to try to prioritize the greatest risk. that's why we're focusing on critical infrastructure and that's why we're focusing not on critical infrastructure writ large but those systems and assets within the critical infrastructure that if damaged could cause truly catastrophic harm. we're trying to focus on the highest risk. the second thing we're trying to do is to take full advantage of existing structures and relationships. we're trying to take advantage of existing regulatory regimes where they currently serve a purpose. we're trying to take advantage of best practices that currently exist within the private sector. we're trying to take advantage of existing relationships

between the department of homeland security and various critical elements and then lastly we're trying to take advantage of the expertise where it resides. so we're trying to leverage the expertise of the nsa rather than recreating it. we're trying to leverage the expertise of the private sector by making sure that when best practices and performance requirements are developed, they are first identified by the private sector and put forward by the private sector and it's only sort of through an iterative process and collaboration with the private sector that we sort of identify the best practices that really should be the standards for the most critical infrastructure. and so those are the things that we're trying to do through legislation. sometimes it's hard to get language perfect but as we've heard, the perfect shouldn't be the enemy of the good here. there is consensus on the need to act. and our hope is that that action will occur soon and that it will address the sort of areas of

highest risk. >> and nick did a great job of describing some of the points of our bill and i'll just add to that briefly, but -- and i think secretary chertoff really described the bill quite well when he talked about some of the flexibilities in the chemical facility regulation. and as nick said we're focusing on the most critical and the way we define it are those that if disrupted or damaged could reasonably lead to mass casualties, mass evacuations, catastrophic economic damage and a severe thing of deg ration of national security and within that we're focusing on those where the market forces haven't driven security. so you are waived out if you can demonstrate that you are sufficiently secure, additionally there's a provision that would give the president authority to exempt a sector or a portion of a sector if they--

there are already regulatory controls in place. and as nick said, we want to give the owners and operators the flexibility to meet any performance requirements, how they think is best. they know their systems best. and we don't want to be in the process of telling them how to do about doing that. i also will just add quickly on information-sharing and there are obviously some other proposals out there and we think they're very serious efforts at trying to address some of the problems out there. but the information-sharing provisions in our bill take down some of the legal barriers that hinder the sharing of cybersecurity threat information between the government and the private sector and within the private sector and we also try to incentivize that by providing some liability protections, narrowly focused on that sharing

of cybersecurity threat indicators. and that's actually one of the -- i'll highlight last, the cybersecurity threat indicator in our bill which we basically permit private entities together and which basically is defined by two prongs and the first is that a cyberthreat security indicator indicates an attribute of a malicious attack and that's kind of spelled out in the bill a little more and also the secretary problem it has to be -- reasonable efforts have to be activated to scrub personal identifiable information. and while we're talking about a narrow slice that would really help companies and help the government know the risks that are out there and share information in real time to prevent them. and with that i'll turn it over. >> i understand that chairman rogers and mr. rothesberger has

passed through committee that heavily focuses on the information we talked about here and some incentives, and maybe some disincentives to not share information. can you give us is quick snapshot in terms of the status and some of the meat around the bills in terms of the bill itself. >> it's good to be back. great to be here. over on the house side better boehner asked representative thornberry to on the task force the policy objectives for the house and each individual chairman is supposed to work within their jurisdictions in what's their jurisdiction inside that framework so chairman rogers asked us to take at what the intelligence committee could do to contribute -- to solving this problem but it could make an important contribution and really on our examination of the issue we came out with the industrial based pilot as a

model that handwrittenises the unique value-added in the intelligence committee. and that information they're gathering on advanced threats and it's a very narrow pilot but we think it scales very well and we based our bill on that structure. we provide profit authorities to provide classified information to competent entities and as everybody discussed we have a go in trying to knock down those barriers to information-sharing as they were pilot they found the information going outbound to the companies was going pretty well not a lot of information of value was going back and companies have a lot of disincentives -- i would say both real and imagined but there's imagined become real as people share information. we talk about 130 folks, probably more than that actually out in the private sector and talked about the issues that stopped them or incentivized them for information-sharing and we tried to knock down those

barriers down in that process and i think what's great about the pilot model if you scale up the committee is that it's harnessing positive driving innovation to solve some of our more serious problems. this is going after the advanced cyberthreat like china stealing our intellectual property every day. chairman rogers talked about the historic transfer of wealth going on between the united states and china right now as folks are chinese actors are going into our company and stealing our it and to create jobs innovation in the market, the chinese are stealing that wholesale and we need to do a better job of helping companies defend themselves against those attacks. we believe the private sector is already doing some great job out there. you know, they are already making for that great work that goes on in places like the nsa to collect that sensitive data and they should get the benefit of that data in defending their

networks. i think as you heard there's a pretty good consensus that this is a good model for going forward. there's some important disagreements in the details about how to get that done but i think it's encouraging that there's so much similar thinking between the house and the senate on both sides of the aisle about this narrow slice of the problem. our bill as i said is bipartisan. it's fairly narrow. 13 pages. we tried to achieve that in plain english and i think we got that done. [laughter] >> terrific. i would like to pick up on some of those points later on sort of to get a sense of the defense industrial base pilot project, it's strengths/weaknesseses and problems that still continue today to stimy the sharing from the federal government to various entities 'cause i hear the same. we've got some defense defense

industrial base folks in the audience. i'm sure they'll have some questions. kevin -- i mean, one of the, mr. lungren has dropped his bill. i know it's out of subcommittee, can you give folks a sense of what's in the bill, maybe some of the differences 'cause i think some of the bellybutton questions vis-a-vis the department of homeland security or other entities are addressed there. and go from there. >> so essentially, building on what tom talked about with the thornberry task force, they took it upon themselves within its jurisdiction it's not to be comprehensive in any manner but strictly within the jurisdiction of our committee. and it was essentially three big pieces. first, the roles and responsibility of the department of homeland security with regard to its cybersecurity mission -- i know the security is well

familiar with the lack of legislative authorities that dhs has with its mission. but it's been doing an admirable job with based upon executive order and public expectation but we want to codify the current mission of dhs and make sure they have the roles and responsibilities clear to protect critical infrastructure in this country. the second piece does touch upon the various aspects of what we heard. that includes the protection of critical infrastructure. we do take a bit of a different approach to it. the thornberry task force found while regulation is not our first choice, there is not a role for the government in protecting the most critical of critical. in trying to determine what was regulated, how it was regulated and who did the regulating was

the task was what we had to determine in the committee. and what we tried to do is build upon the department's definition of cover critical infrastructure that was also used in the senate bill. a facility or a function of critical infrastructure that would if damaged or misused would cause death, massive evacuations, systemic problems in economic markets or severely degrade or national security. but that is just one ticket that we have in order for this regulatory authority to come down. in our conversations with critical infrastructure we've heard quite a bit of, yes, we opened the page. we see these problems but what are the risks to me and to my sector, to my critical infrastructure? there are many companies out there that don't have a -- have -- are in constant contact with the fbi or dhs or nsa or

their level of knowledge of these risks, they know it's out there but they can't put their finger on it. so we authorized the government in the form of dhs to engage with the private sector and actually identify risks on a sector by sector basis. the government coming with intelligence and operational knowledge, the private sector coming in with their knowledge with their own networks. and they can come to the same table and agree upon a list of identified risks to their sector. and that information is then made available to the sector as a whole so that people who don't have washington presence or constant contact with the fbi are put on the same playing field that do and can address those as appropriate in their networks. the second step is to collect existing performance standards. we're not about going out and creating new ones.

but identifying existing identifiable recognized international performance standards and collecting them and putting them in one spot and then evaluating them against the risk so you have a rack and stack provision of this performance standard does mitigate this particular risk better than this particular standard if implemented appropriately. for the mast majority of the economy, that's where this ends. private sector can then look at the risks, they can look at the collective standards and they can and make their choices according to their business sense as to how best to protect their interest. this is on the assumption that even if you aren't going out to protect your clients or your partners you will act in best interest of protecting your investment in critical infrastructure. then there is that one element that we believe there is a government role and that is for those that are currently

regulated. i think the nuclear sector, the water treatment facilities, financial services and those that do fall under this, quote-unquote, covered critical infrastructure so the very top end, the most critical of the critical. only if you are currently regulated and only if you fall within this covered critical infrastructure do you work with your regulator to review existing regulation to match up against those identified risks. if there is a gap amongst current regulation and identified risks, then the regulator then chooses a performance standard from the collection to fill in any particular gap. and we believe this one -- this builds upon the expertise on the relationship of current regulators and cuts down on any potential conflicting regulation by introducing another organization as a regulator on top of existing regulators. so this is the first pieces.

the final piece we talked about is trying to improve information-sharing and in the course of our meetings on this legislative meeting i always try to ask folks, are current information-sharing mechanisms in this country working as sufficiently and efficiently as possible? i've yet come across someone who has the status quo is acceptable. and so what we've tried to do is create, one, get rid of those legal barriers that inhibit information-sharing much like tom and the senate bill have tried to do but we tried to essentially band together like you mentioned, mr. secretary, how we need to work together and pool information and expertise and so what we do is we establish a national information-sharing organization that is a voluntary nongovernment third-party not-for-profit organization that stands up an information exchange facility -- information

exchange facilitator. within that, members can view the charter, understand what information is shared, what psychiatrist is not shared, who it will be shared with, who it won't be shared with and make the evaluation of whether this imbibed in this charter brings value to their enterprise. we're hoping not only exchanging of information, having -- having membership come to the table and say, hey, i just saw this on my network. i don't exactly know what to do with this. has anyone else seen it? that facilitation, that technical assistance will be available and anonymousization will be involved and government participation is a key to this bringing intelligence and again operational information. and beyond just the information exchange we anticipate facilitating pong its most sophisticated of members. bringing together a whole pot of information that they wouldn't

ordinary have that would include government information and those sophisticated members can then monetize that and build that back into their products and services to better innovate upon that information that they wouldn't ordinarily have. we've done away with many of the legal barriers for information-sharing. tried to put in as many liability protections and liability limitations as possible. shield it from foia and from state and local disclosure but making sure that the idea of this niso is share cybersecurity information for cybersecurity purposes. if a member fails to use the information appropriately. there are provisions in the law that would make sure that is taken care of over a malicious actor and that sort of thing. we're trying to create a

structure over information-sharing one to provide appropriate oversight because these are my sensitive issues that we're dealing with and we want to make sure that we're dealing with the appropriate information is getting to the right people and the right span of time. so putting a structure around it enables proper oversight and it provides people a one stop shop. they can -- they don't to have worry, do i need to go to the fbi? do i need to go to dhs or nsa today. i can go one place and go to a one stop shop. our bill does not -- is not a silver bullet. it will not solve all problems but we believe it does put a framework together that will solve some of our issues. >> thank you, kevin. as you can see, a number of areas are covered with the various bills. i'm going to open it up to a couple lightning round questions here and then turn it to the audience. now, one of the things -- and

let's hone in first on information-sharing. i think it's fair to say that there are some differences the permanent house intelligence and homeland security and maybe between homeland security and government affairs and house homeland in terms of who's the real bellybutton here and i want all of your quick thoughts. i think it's fair to say that the national security facility has the capability and the wherewithal. the department of homeland security has the authorities, the statutes to be able to engage in this. is the current memorandum of understanding between dod and dhs sufficient or do we really need to enable that activity? i would argue yes, but i would be curious what some of your thoughts are. what other impediments if any from making that a reality? secondly, a philosophical question to built on that.

it can no longer be a case of government lead private sector follow. the private sector as we all know owns and operate the infrastructures. they are the engine of innovation. they are the backbone of creativi creativity. it's not all big industry, small and medium size businesses are the ones that propel us forward. what are any of the legislation that induce changes in behavior vis-a-vis, insurance, reinsurance sector or anything to have self-initiated standards and best practices? and finally, my last question, is -- is one that's more philosophical in nature. before i ask you all to put on your -- look in your crystal balls to see where the legislation is going to go. looking forward. is the 80% solution enough -- i would argue we can't firewall our way out of this problem.

when i read the op-eds these two gentlemen read that is written on the significance of chinese russian cne capacities we're not going to firewall our way out of that problem but if we get to by the way we have that 80% solutions we can tailor our efforts to more sophisticated actors, perpetrators based on tactics and techniques, would these bills get us to that point 'cause that's what keeps me up at night? and i don't -- i don't know. i'd be curious what -- what all of your thoughts are 'cause ultimately do we really need to demonstrate an offensive capacity? do we need the cyberequivalent of nuclear tests to demonstrate a determinative compelent that may cause actors to think twice because now we acknowledge it. it's in official government reporting. what disincentives does china and russia have today after we said they're doing it so i would

be curious what all of your thoughts are on those three points and then turn it over to the audience. so why don't we start with you, jeff. >> forgive me, can you read your first question again. >> first question was specifically looking at nsa/dhs. i mean, we all know who has capacities. who has authorities, what's the best way around it? >> you know, i think senator lieberman is very harnessing the expertise and the capabilities at nsa, and i think part of the bill, some of the dhs authorities we include and also in the information-sharing title we think that dhs has been playing the intermediary roll for some time and we think it's probably best housed in dhs or a civilian agency but to leverage the capabilities of nsa through dhs and to push out that as much as possible. >> insurance, reinsurance,

anything there to induce that secto sector? >> i haven't considered that myself. the network of cybersecurity exchanges sets up and this may kind of reach out to more sectors, but we basically want to build on existing capabilities on the financial sectors and isacs around the country and who are eligible to be cybersecurity exchanges and we share information with federal or not federal. and to link this network of exchanges will really facilitate the sharing of information. and i think that's just an important point that we wanted to make. >> and finally, threat actors, some of the higher-end of the

threat spectrum, do you feel that this piece of legislation would impede some of their capacities and capabilities? >> i mean, i think -- >> provide strategy to push back? >> right, i think from a defensive nature on the critical infrastructure side, yes. and i think, obviously, there are advanced persistent threats out there which are difficult to defend against but i think but i think by setting some standards we can really get to that point and i also think on the economic side, the information-sharing is really key. >> tommy? >> sure. on information-sharing there's a lot of different types of information-sharing that you need to allow for. there's the type of information-sharing that you have like in the dib where you have a bunch of companies, you know, that are engaged in similar activities, faced similar and share information with each other to protect themselves as an industry and i think that's really important. for me the big -- the really big fish in this is when you look at

the companies and entities that are involved in running the networks, running the internet. you know, the top five or six telcos in the united states see like 80% of the internet traffic or the network traffic in the world pass through their pipes and if you're able to add that -- to what nsa sees and develop that common operation -- common operating picture, that's a game-changer in terms of the threats that you're able to see all across the world and the way that you're able to collaborate and share information on how to stop those threats. so, you know, i think the answer on information-sharing is that, you know, the dod/dhs mou that allows them to collaborate is important and models like the dib pilot are really important. potentially an organization like a national information-sharing organization could be important

but all of them, you know, to harken back to what admiral mcconnell said, all of them are necessary but not sufficient. you need to be, you know, pushing information-sharing at all sorts of different levels and with the number of different points of interest -- or excuse me. points of entry so that it's easy for companies and the government to share information, you know, across-the-board. i will leave the insurance question to others that have wrestled with it -- >> what about just small and medium size businesses 'cause we're talking largely about the owners and operators of the vast majority of the critical industry -- >> you're right. i think the legislation -- you know, since they've written the legislation, they should get into the details more than i should but i think you see a lot of things in both, you know, kevin's bill and jeff and nick's bill -- i mean, first of all, i think the information-sharing bill is huge for, you know, entities from small, medium, large. but i think in some of the other

bills that you see, you know, pushing forward research and development, pushing forth workforce development, you know, national cyberscholarship programs, that kind of thing, putting out performance standards more broadly not just for critical information entities and then also working on, you know, international standards, all those things are present within the legislation. >> one more thing that i'm going to point toward you before opening -- the carvout for i.t. can you explain that very briefly in your bill? >> i can. i mean, again, it's a lieberman/collins bill so i don't want to take ownership for it. i sort of challenge the notion that this is an i.t. carvout. i think what these guys have done -- the philosophy with which they embarked on this process working with critical infrastructure to set performance standards should be an outcome-based process. and when you're talking about outcomes, you talk about not saying you need to have this particular technology or you

need to configure this particular technology this way in order to get security. it's rather you need to look at the entire ecology of your network, find the points of vulnerability and address those from a system-wide standpoint. and sort of the example i give is that, you know, if you're talking about an electricity utility, you know, you can put in all the latest and greatest technology to stand between the public-facing internet and the skate system that operates the electrical grid. you can put in, you know, firewalls. you can put an intrusion detection system you can spend millions of dollars on that technology to make sure no one can penetrate from the public-facing internet to the skate system or you can do all that radio shack technology and error-gate that system. both of those approaches leads you to an outcome that is more secure but the approach that we tried to put in place in this legislation, you know, allows for a company or an entity to make the choices that work for

them in order to get to that outcome and so the provisions you talk about that say, no, you cannot regulate, you know, specific -- you know, the design and development of specific technologies, that's -- that's been the philosophical approach to this all along. i think the problem is over three years as we tried to explain that philosophy to people, you know, there was some concern that there may be overreach within the agencies in implementing those -- that philosophical approach and we decided -- or the bill drafters i should say decided, you know, it would be a good idea to make it clear, make it, you know, apparent to everyone that we weren't just talking philosophically. we were really, you know, true to that approach and wanted to make sure that it was implemented that way. ..

>> i think we have a 95% solution, but we are, we're building fences around embracing it. what do i mean by that? where in the world do we have the best understanding of what's out there? what's bad, what's happening, who's doing what, who's talking to whom and what might they do to infiltrate or cause some harm or whatever? it's in nsa. it exists today. so the way i think about this, why don't we task nsa to establish an all-source, total information awareness center. now, what we will push back, you have to have clearances.

clearances are an artifact of what we created. world war ii, loose lips sink ships. you've got to protect secrets. okay. the world's changed. clear 'em, clear the internet service providers and all the players and put them in the facility. the way i think about the facility, top floor, all-source information, everybody sees everything. now, you have authorities to do things. in this nation, nation of laws, you have authorities to conduct law enforcement activities, homeland security -- whatever your authorities stipulate you do. once you're informed of everything, you go to your floor to execute your authorities. that's when secretary chertoff and i tried to frame this in a way it would be easier to understand. eight-story building. top floor's got all the information. anybody who needs to do something can go down to the other floors of the building and execute their authorities. i had one other comment i wanted to make. the way the bills are framed is for critical infrastructure to prevent massive casualties. who gets to decide massive?

who gets to define that? was 9/11 massive casualties? was katrina massive evacuation? so i think you'll wind up now in a debate of what's massive and what's not. i have a more fundamental worry. we're now focused on massive casualties and critical infrastructure. the chinese today are bleeding us of our intellectual capital. they are sucking the life's blood out of this country in terms of innovation, research and development, business plans, source code. it's going on unabated. now, at one level it's a national security issue and people die and so on. that's one worry. but what about this competitive disadvantage we have because the chinese have a policy or economic espionage? we do not. the united states does not engage in economic espionage. if we even did, who would pick the winners and losers? we don't have a way to do that, so we don't choose companies to reward information we've gained

in the intelligence context. so nation-states, primarily china and russia, have this policy -- others do also. so we're going to be bled our intellectual capital because we are worried about the massive casualties or protecting a clearance rather than harnessing the information and sharing it in a way that we could do the maximum benefit for the nation. i think it's a national security issue, i think it's a national economic issue, and we're not fully embracing it. these bills are necessary, but they're insufficient. >> until we respond there's no disincentive for that activity to occur. one thing i'm sure there will be questions on the national security agency assuming what could be perceived as a greater role not only overseas, but nestically -- >> overseas there's not much pushback. >> overseas there shouldn't -- >> the question is if it moves at network speeds and goes from one side to the globe in less than a second, do we want to

empower nsa to look at domestic networks to find bad things? now, you could -- wait a minute, that's monitoring. or you could say, well, scanning, scanning for malware. you can find this lots of ways. you can also make it illegal to look at con tend. and i think -- content. and i think if you investigate and understand the behavior of these agencies, they do not violate law. so make it, that part illegal, make scanning for malware legal. that's another way to address this issue. >> not passing judgment, i'm just sure there'll be some questions on that. now, one other thing on that side that is, i think, worth looking at and, mr. secretary, perhaps you can touch on that specifically as well. you know, at the end of the day we're talking technology. it's really about the convergence of human intelligence and technical means when you're dealing with the most sophisticated actors. i mean, wouldn't you rather have a source inside one of these organizations than perhaps all the technology to make that

happen? fair to say that our adversaries have already done that if you're to believe as i do the ncix report. >> well, i think what you're pointing out, frank, is that it's not just a technology issue, but a lot of it is what i would call a counterintelligence issue. >> absolutely. >> and it's about, you know, really how do we look holistically at how we preserve intellectual property against people who are taking it without our knowledge or covertly? sometimes they do it because they can connect up over networks, sometimes they do it because they can insert somebody. often it's a combination of the two. it's giving somebody a subdrive that they want to put into a laptop, or it's carelessness on the human operators on the machines who decide they're going to, you know, bring their home device in which is riddled with, you know, malware, and they're going to stick it in because they want to hear music and play it on their headphones.

so you've got to look at this as a series of problems. one of the big mistakes, i think, we've made historically is to think there's one solution here. if we can just find the right tool, our problems are over. you're never going to find that tool. it's going to be a lot of different tools. and by the way, at every enterprise whether it be government or private, it's going to be facing somewhat different threats and consequences. so what works or is important in one area will not be very important in another area. the second part i'd like to make is the 80% solution, and here i would say remember this: it's the natural tendency of people who are trying to penetrate your network or steal something to use the cheapest, least effective tool they can and still get away with it. and then if they have to, they'll escalate to the more sophisticated tools but, frankly, they'd like to keep the really best tools in the box until they really need them. when you drive security up to a

higher level, you're forcing the adversary to play with the most valuable tools. and remember to go back to my earlier point, once you see a tool, now these added shifts -- because now you know what you're looking for. so essentially if you recognize it's a managing risk process, driving the adversary to have to do more and more complicated and sophisticated things to get by are admittedly imperfect defenses. actually, generally raises the level of security across the board. and also enables the people who are looking at what's going on in the network to catch more stuff. >> i want to make an analogy just so the audience can appreciate this. in the cold war when we were faced off against the soviet union, the soviet union could not think about design, field tests or put into operational context any military equipment that we didn't know about, understand and had countermeasures built before they put it in an operational context. so now let's take this to the

cyber or world. if community that i came from really does its job, to go to the secretary's point, you know that malware before it's ever useed. so harnessing the community and the interest of the nation in that context is just like looking at an advanced fighter or a new submarine or whatever might be coming our way in terms of a kinetic issue. we can similar capabilities in the digital world to defend ourselves. so it's harnessing the capabilities that exist and doing it in a way that's consistent with our values and our privacy concerns. >> great point. and i would almost say do we need a check mate equivalent in terms of terminology in the cyber domain as we did in the physical domain? i actually think there are some wonderful initiatives that have, unfortunately, been mothballed from the cold war that do have real value here. the tyranny of time requires i be a bit of a tyrant, so if we can be quick because i want to get some audience questions quickly. >> i guess what i would say to

follow on the comments that have been made is the way we've tried to do in our legislation is to think about the cyber issue as sort of a three-legged stool with one leg being information sharing, another being sort of the protection of critical infrastructure, and then the third that we've talked less about today is reform of the federal information security management act or fisma to improve the government's own security. and if it's working properly, all three of these things should informer one another. so you ask about so what do you do for those small and medium-sized businesses that may not be picked up in any of these? well, if information sharing is working correctly and we're identifying the threats to our critical infrastructure or vulnerabilities and threats to our government infrastructure or government agencies and all three are sort of communicating as they must and should, that kind of information will then be shared more broadly and benefit all those who are not sort of directly implicated in sort of the legislation itself. and while i would defer on the question of insurance, i would say that there are incentives

built into this. not only the liability protection, but also the ability for companies to demonstrate that they are sufficiently secure to avoid any requirements. that's an incentive for them to go out and continue to innovation so that they can essentially escape any government requirements. and then lastly, keeping in mind the time -- >> nick, we're okay. i thought we were at a different time. we've got time, i'm sorry. >> okay. well n response to your earlier question about the information technology piece, we have heard from everybody we've spoken to that there's no way for us to sort of keep pace with the technological change. and so what we've tried to do is to take that to heart and also to be consistent with what we've said from the beginning which is that owners and operators should choose their security measures in order to meet the outcomes that we are asking them to meet. and so we are trying to make clear that the government is not directly regulating the design, innovation, product development of our i.t. products, particularly our commercial i.t.

products while at the same time setting sort of these performance be requirements that should be the targets that folks are him aiming to meet. >> i agree with secretary chertoff -- >> let me ask one other point because it does effect your committee's jurisdiction. anything in these bills stymy our ability to do what we need to do offensively? >> that's a complicated policy question. and i think in many cases the best offense is a good defense, you know? the we're protecting our networks, you're also immunizing against those kinetic attacks. you know, i'll leave -- >> yeah, i can't get -- not expecting that. >> best offense is a good offense. [laughter] >> i would agree with that. and the best defense might sometimes be a very good offense. >> i agree with secretary cher tough that there is no silver bullet out there. with all the latest bells and whistles and techniques, the net doesn't stand still. it's a cat and mouse game, and we have to keep working.

you know, your work is never done as a cybersecurity guy, but we are mindful of that problem as we were drafting our language in that if we word the language too narrowly to today's technology and today's practice, it will get left behind because it innovates at mach 3 and things are innovating so fast. we saw this back in the '70s. i think as we go through this, we think this bill needs to last 10, 20, 30 years. we can't be too narrow in our focus. in terms of incentives, you know, when we talk to folks out in industry about why they do or don't cooperate, you know, it's the disincentives information sharing. i think if you knock those down, i think folks want to cooperate. they do want to find out what's out there, they do want to talk to the government, their peers out in industry. there's disincentives that stop them, and i think if you knock down those barriers, there's already a lot of good strategy

that i think can be leveraged for folks to talk and cooperate. >> what about the prc threats? your chairman has also been very eloquent in voicing. any of these bills going to help us there? >> that's exactly what our bill is shooting at, you know? we're not so much worried about that kid in his basement, you know, trying to hack into the school server and change his grade. you know, the sort of drive-by shootings on the information highway. this is about, you know, chinese hackers using all the resources of the state and their intelligence agencies to hack? and steal our intellectual property, and that's a tough threat to defend against if you're an american company. the things we know to defend ourselves. >> you often hear that the chinese and the russians have the capability to do these things, but they wouldn't. they wouldn't be incentivized for i. the argument is china holds u.s. debt both in new york and beijing. and that's probably true, but they are building the capability. what happens when the capability leaks, gets away, gets sold to a terrorist?

let me just frame it from economics 101. the world will not work without banking, without the flow of money to lubricate the process for transfer of goods and services and so on. the two wangs in new york that -- banks in new york that clear money clear somewhere around 7-8 trillion a day, and our economy's 14 trillion in a year. what backs up those transactions in new york city? nothing. there's no gold, there's no printed money. it's just the -- it's the electronic transactions. what happens when someone contaminates that database? what happens is banking will freeze. it will cascade in a cascading waterfall, and global commerce will stop. that will have devastating consequences to the country. >> in a footnote to that, my biggest nightmare doesn't have to be if you erode trust. >> economics 101. >> that's all, unfortunately, the adversary needs to do. >> you have a banking crisis as soon as people realize my money

might be at risk, i must get it. because it's not there. they loan it out, they balance the process, everybody's confident it works. if you can threaten that confidence as attacking the reconciliation system by contaminating the data, you wouldn't have to do it for very long, you would have a major crisis. so those are the kinds of things that i worry about. we talk about nation-states and information. well, they wouldn't do that, they wouldn't do this. well, they are building the tools, and the tools are not necessarily locked up in a way that couldn't leak out to a criminal or a terrorist group, somebody who wanted to change the world order. so those are the things i worry about. >> kevin, and just one thing on it because i see chevan gore in the audience who wrote a phenomenal piece, frightening piece on some of the alleged chinese activity, mapping, what i'd call the cyber equivalent of intelligence preparation of the battlefield. in this case, electric power and the like. i mean, what could the incentive

be other than to map out potential targets? so i just put that on the table for what it's worth. but i'll let you not answer that question. >> yeah. [laughter] um, getting back to the dhs/nsa relationship, there has to be a relationship. the capability is tremendous. nsa has a tremendous capability. dhs in the views of my chairman and the members of my committee need to play an appropriate role for domestic activity. um, with regard to insurance, um, i am not an insurance guru, i do not work for the financial services committee. but we have talked with insurance providers, and how do we increase the marketability of cyber insurance. and the answer that we usually get back is we're going to get there. we're going to get there, the market will take care of itself. but we've also heard that

actuarial data is extremely hard to get with, in this area of, within this issue because people are loathe to share information on -- that's why there is a provision this our language with regard to the charter that says information on, um, incidents shared iraq anonymized and collected and made available to -- the provisions will be -- the organization should make provisions for providing that information for study, academic study, information, actuarial data, that sort of thing. so is that going to create this insurance market? no. but hopefully, it will kind of increase that, fill that apparent need. and finally, the 80% solution, again, our bill is not comprehensive. it will not solve this problem as soon as it's passed. but it does build a framework in which we can build into the future.

um, the important thing with, when you hit, say, 80% in this issue, it's usually 85% of critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector and also 80-90% of all cyber attacks can be taken care of with good cyber hygiene, right? and so if we can incentiveize improving computer hygiene across the board both in the private sector through identifying risks and identifying workable standards, um, that they can then go and put in place as well as improving the federal information security management act and raising the level of hygiene across the government, we can free up -- theoretically, we can free up some resources to actually go about that 15, that apt, that advanced persistent threat, those nation-states, those really bad actors that -- um, so we don't have to worry about this low buzz of activity. we can raise the game and increase the price of entry. so hopefully, that's where we'll

move. >> precisely my view -- >> before we go out to open questions, just two other things we haven't touched on which i do think, um, for completeness we ought to put on the the table. one is the supply chain. how do we deal with the fact that hardware, software's manufactured globally, and we have difficulty this ascertaining and certifying the integrity of hardware and software particularly in a world of multiple mobile devices, plus you have vulnerables with wireless transmission. the second issue less well focused on but i also think has a security dimension, i believe next week there's going to be a meeting somewhere overseas on efforts to address again the question of internet governance and how to we deal with the issue of internet traffic flow, in particular do we move from the current system of ican which

is really chartered by the u.s. government into where the u.n. would play a larger role in laying out the rules of the road. the chinese, the russians want to do this. i don't want to speculate too wildly here, but just in light of what we've talked about in terms of cybersecurity, consider what the implications are of movie, some of the basic laying out of the rules of the road into a domain like the united nations or a u.n. organization. that has serious economic implications for us. it also has freedom implications because there are some countries that view the ability to get anywhere globally on the internet as a bad thing, and they'd like to be able to stop that. and be there are security dimensions. so part of the challenge of this is, as admiral mcconnell said, this is a good start. there are so many more pieces in this. this is like, you know, ten-dimension chess, and the problem is it moves very quickly. >> absolutely right. and i will speculate china and russia have been focused on this

approach for quite some time. the arms control argument works, as reagan said, trust but verify. but attribution is still difficult. and when we have it, they may precisely want us to show the card so they can compromise other capables. so that, to me, would be debilitating economically and for national security. let's -- please. >> can i just make a comment about information sharing because i feel so strongly about this issue. if it's not required, it won't happen. it sounds like a nice idea, but information will not be put into the system whether they're forced to do so or incentivized by that. what do i mean by that? i grew up in the navy. 30 years, loved the navy, had a great time. the navy's view of the world was we have a home ground force, we have all these ships, why do we need the army or the air force? [laughter] so our whole mental attitude was we were not going to cooperate with those guys because they're competing with funding we want

to build ships. that was our argument. we went to great extremes not to participate in anything joint. well, the legislature led by senator goldwater and nichols said, you know, this is just not right. we need a joint fighting force, not a navy and an air force and an army. so after years of debate -- i think it took six years -- goldwater-nichols was passed. every service chief testified under oath, you pass this, it will be the elimination of the department of defense capabilities. every secretary service same. it was passed, and president reagan -- yeah, president reagan signed it in 1986. we had a little dust-up called desert shield, desert or storm. i got to be a front row observer. first of all, when the law was passed, it said if you fight, you only fight in a joint force. second f if you all aspire to be generals and admirals, you cannot be a general or admiral until you have joint

certification. everything changed. okay, we had the dust-up called the first gulf war. because that was -- i was a firsthand observer, i got to go on the hill under oath, goldwater-nichols was the best thing that happened to the department of defense. it forced collaboration, information sharing, and it changed attitudes and behavior. so for me, i think information sharing is absolutely the key. but the current drafts, while i applaud them, we need them, they don't go far enough to require it in two dimensions. require it in law, you have no choice, and incentivize your reward because you engaged in information sharing. >> and nothing like promotion tabs being tie today what here has to get beyond the traditional national security to include our economic security for lack of a better term even beyond u.s. government to include the private sector, csos and others. >> and department of defense today you cannot be an admiral

or general unless you are certified in joint warfare. >> absolutely. >> you've got that experience and that way that makes you qualified for a promotion. that's the incentive. >> we've got time for a few questions. please identify yourself before your question, and let me -- marcus, i'd be curious. as we, you heard a lot about the backbones and telecommunications in particular. since you drive policy for verizon, where do you guys sit on some of these issues? >> thank you, frank, for putting me on the spot. >> putting you on the spot. >> and, gentlemen, thanks so much for your current and past service. it's important that we all collaborate on this, private sector and public sector. yeah, we do, obviously, own and operate quite a lot of infrastructure and the sharing with the federal government is extremely important. and, admiral, i think you're right on the money there, this is the focus that we need to move forward. so two quick points. role of government as setting the example, and for many of the staffers, we've talked about

this before. it is key here, the government is critical infrastructure just as the power sector, just as chemical, just as electric, just as others. we need the government in this game as a player, as a peer and as an equal, not just as a regulator, overseer, that type of world. we also need to think in terms of the law enforcement angle, something we haven't talked about here. much of what we see online is criminal in nature while espionage and nation-state warfare is a national instinct, criminal aspects is what we all fight with. that's the day-to-day problem we're facing. we neat crime prevention as much as we need a national security/espionage type of piece. so i'd love to see additional talk there as well, and thanks for the opportunity to make the comment, frank. >> does anyone want to respond to any of those? >> well, actually, that makes a point that i tried to make earlier which is it's not just one problem. there are, there's a lot of, um, there's a lot of criminality, there's fraud, there are things that erode trust.

and one of the things to avoid doing is for every agency to take the particular problems that happens to fit its skill set and wake that what cybersecurity's about. it's not. it's going to require -- it's like physical security. you've got everything from full-scale land war to, you know, making sure you can walk down the street without being mugged. and you've got to look at this as an entire spectrum. >> a couple comments. one on your first point, i think you're exactly right about the government needing to be a better partner here. and, you know, i think we've talked to a lot of folks, a lot of folks in the private sector, you know, who have been breached or have had some sort of sign or incident, and they've called the government and been looking for help, and the response they've gotten has never been one that has been adequate, right? whether it's nsa, dhs, fbi, whoever it is. it's never been exactly what the private sector's looking for. and we've got to get better at

that. secretary cher tough mentioned three pillars for legislation, but i think the fourth is the government really has to get better, and that's why we're looking at things like fisma reform, the work force development and personnel authorities that will allow for hiring more qualified and competitive candidates not just to, you know, entities like dod and nsa that already have those authorities and can do that, but to dhs where, you know, there needs to be a domestic center of expertise but right now they don't have the expertise that they need to fully realize that. so i think that's really, really important. you know, i think just to sort of get into the procedural weeds of our legislation on the criminal stuff, you know, we do hope to add some additional pieces to the legislation as we get to the floor and have an amendment process. the criminal code proposals from the administration are ones that we view as very important. we'd hoped to add them into the base bill. there's still some sort of minor disagreements between the chairman and ranking member of the judiciary committee that

rereally ought -- we really ought to be able to work out, so i'm hopeful we might be able to add that piece and maybe some additional pieces on the law enforcement side which, i agree, is very important. >> fundamentally do what you ask, lead by example, get your own house in order -- >> and i'll just add to that. >> the principle? >> and kevin can correct me if i'm wrong, but both of our bills have provisions that allow the sharing of threat information that pertains to a crime that is happening, about to happen or has happened to law enforcement. and that's, obviously, a delicate balance, and that's something we want to continue to work on. but i believe, kevin, you have the same -- you have some similar provisions. >> we have a similar provision, not exactly the same. but the house process is, is a bit more fragmented than that process chosen by the senate. again, the speaker had mac

thornberry start up the task force, and that included members from, i think, i want to say nine different committees. and so tom and i only represent two of those committees, and so there was -- there will be other action by other committees. we're anticipating something from the judiciary committee, we're anticipating something from oversight and government reform and other committees will probably operate within their jurisdiction as well. so that's -- >> i'd like to just offer a quick comment on government activity and so on. when it's the -- i have a very high regard for the government work force having been a part of it and observed it over the years. when it's very specific what their mission is, they'll do it, and they'll do it well. let me just use dod because that's my background. anywhere, anytime war or rescue globally, you call, they will deliver. that's the whole mindset of readiness and being prepared. if i think about law enforcement, fbi, i work with the fbi quite a bit.

when it is a specific mission of the agency and then you are professionalized and rewarded in the performance of that mission, you'll do exceptional work. i think that's one of the things we have to grapple with here, having the agencies that are responsible for information sharing or cooperation with the private sector. i'll just use my example of nsa again. nsa is frightened to death of ever crossing any line that might reach to the private sector. they're not authorized to do so. so if they see something coming in today's context, what they're authorized to do is to write a report and put it out. then we'll call a meeting and start to discuss -- too late. so it's how do we get to the point of moving with the speed with which we need to and the specific mission of these players. >> ron, it's -- can you wait for a mic? >> [inaudible] >> no, you can wait. it's coming. >> hi, ron marx, i'm a senior fellow here. this is for mike mcconnell.

this is a couple of old intel guys talking to each other, and maybe i've been around this thing too long, but, mike, one of the things that spared us a lot in the cold war was having a doctrine. you know, when i listen to this today, it's fascinating. a lot of hard working people up here, but if i'm sitting in nebraska, it looks like a bunch of kids playing soccer on the field, a bunch of 5-year-olds. everybody's got their own lane here. so the question i would have for you at this point looking forward here, have we or are we in the process of developing some kind of doctrine that approaches the youth, the enforcement, our superb national -- international, our domestic use of cyber? because in the cold war that allowed us to inform our national security strategy, it allowed us to inform to some extent our law enforcement strategy with the fbi, our military and intelligence strategy. and frankly i'm not seeing, or at least i don't think i'm seeing this right now. >> my view is your observation's exactly right, we don't. there's something sort of

impressive about a mushroom cloud and a shock wave and reports of the radioactivity that sort of galvanized this one, right? so in the early '50s we had a big project, solarium, i think it was called, where we worked through a lot of that and determined our document for nuclear policy and assured destruction, all those things that we worked through. and there are many aspects of that in the context of doctrine in the military services. we haven't had that debate as a nation for signer and cyber defense and so on. and the reason is it's so insidious, it's just sort of crept up on us, and it's not broadly understood the magnitude of this issue in terms of how dependent we are on the digital infrastructure. so my own view is we'll do the things we're doing now, we have these kind of informed political or public discussions and debates. but a forcing function will come. we will have something that will cause us to galvanize just like 9/11 caused us to get focused on

the terrorism issue. we mentioned law enforcement earlier. remember the cold bombing in the '90s. we made a policy decision, you could say political decision, to interpret the coal bombing in yemen as a crime. and we reacted to it as a criminal activity. how should we react to the chinese capturing the research and development of a company that maybe invested a billion dollars to develop a new tool or technique or capability? is that a violation of law, or is it a national security issue? we haven't had that debate yet. >> yeah. i think that's important. i do think there's been a lack of doctrine. one of the challenges is this: in the cold war, the nuclear bomb issue was remote from most people. it would effect them if there was a war, but they were not involved on a day-to-day basis. it was a small number of experts. here this problem is intimate to

everybody, and when you discuss the doctrine, what you do touch is everybody from the most sophisticated actors in cyber to, you know, the kid at home on the pc. so people become much more alarmed about it. so it doesn't mean we don't have to do it. we do need to sit down and i would actually argue the right way to do it is to figure out the doctrine first and then build the legal authorities around the doctrine that permitted you what you've decided you need to do. >> powerful and well said. i mean, i don't think we can still to this day answer concretely what an act of war in cyberspace is, based on perpetrator action. fundamentals. lot of strategy, pandemic of plans, but what's pulling it all together? >> and we just haven't gone that far yet. >> i think we need to. >> just to add real quickly, i think all that is absolutely right. i will say that i think it's important, you know, to sort of distinguish what we can accomplish through legislation

and what we can't, and i think in this case doctrine and strategy and the answers to these big picture questions are not ones that we can answer in legislation. however, i will say that those questions have been of very intense interest on, within congress and that we are working very hard to try to move the ball forward within the executive branch to answering those questions. an example is, you know, when general alexander was up for his nomination as commander of central command, the armed services committee sort of slowed down his nomination until he and the department would answer a whole range of questions including, you know, to begin to give answers about, you know, what cyber warfare is, what deterrence is in this context and, you know, whether, you know, we ought to be looking at a declaratory policy and those kinds of questions. so we're working very much to push the executive branch forward, but those answers do have to come from the executive branch. >> we have time for two more quick questions. i want to make sure we have a student be able to ask one

question. any students there with a question? going once, going twice. come on, gw students, okay. [laughter] we'll have chevan, and then we'll go right to lynn. chevan's in the back, sorry. >> hi, i was just looking for, to get a little more reaction on the panel because admiral mcconnell made a very interesting suggestion in his points when he said, well, why can't you just task nsa to scan the domestic networks for malware and make it illegal for them to look at content. and i was just wondering if given that this whole panel has spent a lot of time looking at these questions and come up with a somewhat different solution just what your, what your take is on that suggestion. because it certainly is very direct. >> i'd love to jump in there

and, hopefully, my colleagues can help me out. i think the answer is that, um, you know, it needs to be sort of a sophisticated approach that recognizes there's a lot of different types of activity we need to be involved in and a lot of different ways for nsa to be involved and for dhs and other agencies to do so. so i think there's not going to be a sort of clear authority within the bill for nsa to take ownership of monitoring private networks. that said, you know, our or intelligent is that nsa can work through its memorandum of understanding with dhs to, you know, lend its expertise and resources and technology both to dhs and to the private sector on a voluntary basis which admittedly is problematic because it is voluntary. but it's a matter of, again, going back and walking that balance between those three poles of security, business concerns and sieve liberties and privacy concerns. -- civil liberties and privacy concerns.

i'd also say we've looked real close hi at sort of defining what's content and what's not for the purposes of information sharing, and eventually we moved away from making that distinction because there are a lot of things that really sad l that line and are not easily defined as either content or noncontent. so, you know, we may want to get -- we may want to track, you know, ip addresses for the purposes of sort of uncovering a bot net network or that kind of thing. we're not reading e-mails, but for a lot of people an ip address is considered content information. that's shot the kind of thing that we want -- that's not the kind of thing that we want to be out of bounds for specific purposes with regard to cybersecurity, but it is something that's sort of difficult to define. and the types of information given the changes, you know, within the networks to the technology, the types of information and how they might be categorized change as well. so we sort of tried to stay away from making that distinction. but i do think there's an important role for nsa, and i

think, you know, we need to be creative in harnessing that as we move forward. >> tom, i saw concern. >> yeah. there's no question that nsa has uniquvalue to provide, but how to do that that doesn't trigger those privacy concerns, and here's where that elegant solution of that problem. nsa goes overseas and collects the threat information, brings it back home and gives it to folks out in the private sector that can handle that information in a bay, they can use it operationally, but they can also protect it while they're doing it. folks like verizon, they have very advanced capabilities when it comes to defending their networks, they just need more threat information, and i think a good pilot sort of leads the way on this. >> anyone else want to jump in on that one? >> i'll just say quickly i agree with that, and the intent of the bill is really to harness the capabilities of nsa. but it's also a testament, i think, that senator rockefeller, former chairman of the intelligence committee, and senator feinstein, the current chair of the intelligence committee, have all, you know --

[audio difficulty] on the issue. and i think that the outcome was that it should be twn secretary of homeland security's jurisdiction to be the prime facilitator. and i think that's, you know, a testament to quite a lot of discussion and debate. >> there's a method for getting nsa support. it's called tsr, technical support request, and it's been used for years. when the fbi needs something they don't have, they submit a request that gets approved by the attorney general, and it happens. this could happen with the nsa supporting dhs, but i go back to my story about the department of defense when we had the army, air force and navy before goldwater-nichols bill. it wasn't required or incentivized, so it didn't happen very well. so we're going to have to wrestle through that issue. how do we capture this in a way where you don't have any choice, you have to do the things necessary to provide an adequate

level of protection for the company. >> last question, because i'm not going to let the panel have my last what will we see political forecasting question. quick question. >> thank you. lynn, fellow with gw here. one of the things we've seen over the years is that the goth's been very -- government's been very resistant to sharing information, as you pointed out, admiral mcconnell. and the issues of classification we've seen issue after issue get classified simply because the government knows it. sources and methods have been debated for years. taking methods and putting them out so that people can then defend themselves against them also raises the bar and makes people have to use the more sophisticated equipment as the secretary pointed out, and they've got to pull all their tool out of the tool box. if we can back off the classification issues, we can get a long way down the road. they fixed this problem significantly in canada and a few other countries where the

isps now are required by the government working with the government to block malware as they see it running across their networks. and so they've reduced a lot of the significant issues in these ways. one of the other things that we've seen is that from a standpoint of the government, you know, we've never been able to adopt an industrial policy in this country. when we had the year of the spy, the response of the government was to create an assistant attorney general for national security. we created a national security division, and then we created national security courts so we'd have a situation where we didn't have some disparate federal district course -- court making national security law. so why don't we have an economic security, assistant attorney general, where we start using economic sanctions back against the chinas and the russias even though they own a lot of our debt. it doesn't matter. if they're going to be attacking us, let's use these sanctions

back against them. >> i've got to -- >> yep, right now. what i'd like to see is a thought process of how do we get beyond some of those barriers and change the mentality so that we can focus on these things and get the structure in place that we need to address these issues? >> very quickly. lightning round on that. >> i'll give you a quick answer. i don't think we should have any industrial policies picking winners and losers. i do think where we have been -- this goes beyond cyber. where we've lagged behind the chinese, and i think this is clearly chinese have done this is we are not strategic in the broad sense about our security including economic security. chinese go around the world, they identify where the critical resources are, they invest money, they cultivate the local governments, sometimes they do it in ways that we would consider illegal. and it's all in the service of a greater vision about protecting their economic base. we are at best intermittent in

doing that, and i think that's a broader issue than cybersecurity. it goes to the very heart of what the government ought to be doing from an economic and national security standpoint. >> might also note it's not just china, but iran, others who have other asymmetric means that may not have the same calculus, i think we have to be cognizant of. i'm going to ask that last lightning round. i mean, it's been said since the end of the cold war, political forecasting has made astrolly look respectable, so i'm not expecting you to have the crystal balls, but it's a political year. bills are there. what's going to get passed? start with you, kevin. real fast. [laughter] tom. >> i'm a big fan of roger's bill. [laughter] you know, i think as kevin said earlier, a number of committees are still doing work in the house, so we're going to have to see that play out. and then, of course, a lot of, you know, gears in motion over in the senate as well.

so a lot of variables. >> nick? >> well -- >> and you can see bicameral support. nick? >> i think that, you know, we expect and hope that our bill will form the basis of the upcoming senate debate, and we look forward to sort of negotiating with others who have different ideas. i think there are lots of things that folks can agree on, but we think whatever passes needs to be bipartisan and needs to have -- as the secretary said -- protections for critical infrastructure. >> one, i think we're really encouraged that we do see a lot of common ground between the house and the senate. two, you know, the way we're working on this in the senate is we're going to come to the floor, and we're going to have a fair amendment process where everyone has a chance to offer amendments that will allow us to figure out where the majority of the senate really is. and so with that kind of process, you know, there's no substantive reason we shouldn't be able to pass the bill. the only reason would be political. >> jack. last quick word. >> and i'll echo what everyone said, but i think, you know, there are potentially other

proposals coming out, and i think we encourage them, and we look forward to debating them on the floor. >> thank you. let me before we thank our many panelists, i think we covered an awful lot of territory. let me also say a quick thanks to my staff who always do the heavy lifting and to chris in many particular at booz allen and hamilton for making this happen. so thank you, all of you, for speaking today. [applause] [inaudible conversations] ♪ [inaudible conversations] >> coming up this afternoon here on c-span2, a look at the future of the u.s. space program. it starts at 5:30 eastern with florida senator marco rubio calling for a renewed effort at

space exploration. at 5:40 ohio senator sherrod brown honors the 50th ans verse ri of john glenn becoming the first american to orbit the earth. at 5:50, newt gingrich campaign anything florida where he called for a permanent u.s. colony on the moon. at 6 eastern, stuart powell from the houston chronicle on the obama administration's plans for nasa and what republican presidential candidates are saying about the space agency. and then at 6:40, nasa administrator charles bolden outlining the administration's budget proposal for his agency. c-span's look at u.s. space policy gets underway today at 5:30 p.m. eastern. and with congress on break this week, we're featuring booktv's weekend programs in prime time here on c-span2. tonight books highlighting african-american lives. starting at 8 eastern, henry louis gates jr. with life upon these shores, looking at african-american history

1513-2008. at 8:40, connie rice, the cousin of former secretary of state condoleezza rice, on "power concedes nothing: one woman's quest for social justice in america." and at 9:45, john carlos and dave psi run and the john carlos story, the sports moment that changed the world. booktv in prime time all this week beginning at 8 p.m. eastern here on c-span2. tonight on c-span, from this year's world economic forum in davos, switzerland, see the heads of the world bank and international monetary fund along with other global leaders as they talk about the future of the world economy. >> number one, no one is immune in the current situation. it's not just the eurozone crisis, it's a crisis that could have collateral effects, spillover effects around the world, and, you know, we'll hear from others. but what i have seen and what we're seeing in numbers and in forecasts is that no country is

immune, and everybody has an interest in making sure that this crisis is resolved adequately. >> i have been in public service most of it involved in public finance for over four decades. let me share with you, i've never been as scared as now about the world. what is happening in europe, looking at what our experience was in 1980, the crisis we have, we had, and the crisis we had in the 1990s. this is, this is very big issue. first of all, um, i agree entirely that nobody's immune. we are all connected to each other. >> and you can see this whole discussion tonight at 8 p.m. eastern on c-span. and we'll have more from the world economic forum tomorrow including a panel on the political and economic future of africa. plus, the ceos of several major corporations talk about the role their companies are playing in

the global economic recovery. at the 1968 olympic games, john carlos and tommy smith raised their fists in the black power salute. >> this is black power. they intimidated so many people, white people in particular by using that phrase, black power. because when they hear that word or that phrase, black power, it made many people think that black power meant destruction. blowing up the statue or liberty or ground zero, destroying america. it wasn't anything about destroying america. it was about rebuilding america and having an american to have a new paradigm in terms of how we could truly be with each and every one of us did that pledge when we was going to elementary l school and junior high school about the land of the free, the home of the brave. we all wanted to be great americans. but as young athletes we found that something was wrong. something was broke, and we wanted to take our time to

evaluate and then take our initiative to fix it. >> discover more about african-american history during black history month on booktv on c-span2 and online at the c-span video library. search and share from over 20 years of c-span programming at c-span.org/videolibrary. >> which avoids hard decisions in the delusion that a world of conflict will somehow mysteriously resolve itself into a world of harmony if we just don't rock the boat or irritate the forces of aggression, and this is hogwash. [applause] >> as candidates campaign for president this year, we look back at 14 men who ran for the office and lost. go to our web site, c-span.org/thecontenders to see video of the contenders who had

a lasting impact on american politics. >> this is also the time to turn away from excessive preoccupation overseas to the rebuilding of our own nation. america must be restored to her proper role in the world, but we can do that only through the recovery of confidence in ourselves. >> c-span.org/thecontenders. the obama administration today outlined a consumer internet privacy bill of rights. the white house says the proposal would give people more control over how their personal information is used on the internet. commerce secretary john pryson announce -- bryson announced the start of a public/private partnership to define the rules dealing with issues such as advertising online. [cheers and applause] >> good afternoon, everyone. we couldn't start until it was

really afternoon. i hope by now you have memorized the consumer privacy bill of rights and you've internalized it completely and that we can just go home. [laughter] so i just want to thank you all for coming. we have a really extraordinary and distinguished lineup of speakers we're going to hear, first, from the director of the national economic council, gene sperling. from the secretary of commerce, john bryson. from the counsel to the digital advertising alliance, from the chair of the federal trade commission, jon leibowitz and then, finally, from the federal policy director of the consumers union. we're thrilled to have them all, and i'm going to turn it right over to gene so we can get started. thanks. ms. . [applause] >> thank you very much. thanks for being here. obviously, i want to thank a few people. i want to thank our great

science adviser, john holdren, our former cto there, iowa niece chopra. i want to thank secretary bryson and, for his leadership on this and so many things since he's came. and i hope i'm not breaching the independence of the ftc to thank chairman leibowitz too. [laughter] but you can find ways to stick it to us if you think -- [laughter] you know? compromised you in any way with that thank you. and i'd like to thank congresswoman mary bono mack for being here and her leadership and are looking forward to working with her on advancing this blueprint. and, of course, i'd like to thank some of the people who really were driving forces behind it. dan weitzer in at the white house, larry strickland and particularly cam kerry for their leadership and driving this through.

um, and, obviously, the industry leaders and consumer groups who made this kind of cooperative, voluntary announcement possible. we got a few speakers just make, i think, some of the basic point, point, which is, one, when we ask ourselves as we should economically what can we do that lays the foundation for growth and shared prosperity in our country, you ask what you can do to lay the foundation for the private sector and citizens to create this -- that type of growth and prosperity. and one of the things that you, is fitting for the role of government beyond trying to lay the foundations of an excellent infrastructure and skills of our people is trust. it is trust in engaging in commerce, trust in the ways that we communicate.

it is that trust in the quality of products, the in the reliability of the currency, the trust of the banking system. all of these things are part of the things that gives, that makes us take for granted that we exchange the exchanges that we take place, the interaction, the commerce that helps drive our economy. and there's no question that a critical part of that trust is the trust of flow of information between, between any of us and the intended recipient of our communication. we have taken for granted that we have laws that protect our communication through the mail, through the phone. you're not allowed to open someone with else's mail. and those laws that protect the privacy of those communications we take for granted, but the

confidentiality is fundamental to the trust that helps drive not only our participation in democracy, our ability -- our desire to weigh in on public, on matters and personal communications, but also in economic commerce and exchange. and i think it just, of course, makes sense that as we move forward, as technology moves forward ha we insure that that basic sense of trust is part of the technologies of the future and the present. this is not a group that one needs to tell how critical now the internet is not only to our personal communications, to our democratic communications, but to our economic communications. i could read no shortage of

statistics that danny gave me. [laughter] of the 15% of g,dp created by te internet fro'04-'09, of the importance of internet revenue even to small companies starting up now, of the hundreds of thousands of people involved in an app innovation that are part of our economy and driving our economy. and so, um, it is not only appropriate, it is necessary for us to build in that level of trust into the internet as quickly as we can. the president said as part of this announcement, quote, never has privacy been more important than today in the age of the internet. the worldwide web and smartphones. in just the last decad the internet has enabled the renewal

of engagement by citizens around the globe and an explosion of commerce, creating jobs for the future. much of this innovation is enabled by novel uses of personal information, so it is incumbent upon us to do what we have done throughout history; apply our timeless privacy values to the new technologies and circumstances of our times. now, this is an area like many areas where legislation is appropriate, is needed, is fitting. but it is also an area or like so many where we do not have to wait for legislation, where we as citizens have an ability with government and industry and consumer groups to come together and make progress on our own. and this is a terrific example, i believe, of that. the, um, the -- what we're doing today is a, for us, a