gather? that statue. and where do you think they do their general assembly from? that silver medal stand. so that is peter's legacy. [applause] >> it wasn't that simple about peter norman. when they called me and asked me about the statue and i thought, the first thing i said is i don't want no bronze statue turquoise or pigeon poop running down the side and he said no, john cummins going to be a uniques statute. it's going to be like something you've never seen before. i said okay. i got when they were building the statue but then someone called me and said they are just building you and tommie. i said let me get my car and drive up to san jose. when i got there it was just like they said. they built a statue and they were putting the pieces together. i said what's going on? how come peter's statue isn't there? welcome he didn't go to san jose. you and tommie graduated san

jose so we are raising the money on the student body and we are just concerned about tommie and you. i said no, man, and happening. if peter doesn't go here i'm not going here. and one of them cannot and said john, peter preferred not to be there. so i said wait a second. so straight to the office and said we need to make a phone call. i said we need to make a phone call. he said where? i said to australia. we need to call peter norman ..

now, let me tell you something. thomas ricks. i love tommy, but knowing tommy, tommy would never do that. [laughter] neither would he have done that. so i'm telling you, that i have the utmost respect, admiration, long after our leaders ran because he is a true man. in like 10 years, since the

symposia. i owe you dinner. i'm really impressed that you did the book. i loved it. and you know who i am now. so after this, i'll talk with you. >> guidon. how many people in line? one, two, three people. >> dr. carlos, a real pleasure and must respect for everything you did. [inaudible] >> you said you're a time with? >> euratom that -- i was 10 at the time. >> i look like i'm your age. >> is the youngest sibling in my family and my older brother and father -- i grew up in d.c. and i felt like i was part of it because they told me everything was going on. and so he and fast loading athletics and being aware of the

civil rights movement, you know, i was finely attuned to that moment and the way you said dr. king described throwing a rock into a pond, that is really signified her to take a me, like a metaphorical and punctuation point the whole civil rights movement. it was so impactful and meaningful. i just want to say that. and also, a question. one of the things you guys did getting the ioc to reject burgee shia from south africa, participating in the olympics, and i don't mean to sound sarcastic, but why did you command that to the united states at the same time? why did you demand the united states not go to participate in the united states games for the same reason rhodesia and south africa? >> he actually was -- first of all is a concrete demand for in

the african people struggled and rhodesia and south africa, so it was an international solidarity at the internationalist and african demand kerry do with them coming from united states they would disapprove of rhodesia and south africa. it is identified with the real movement in those countries. that's the first thing. the second thing is of course we know it's not a level playing field in any country this image on carlos was allowed to compete in swimming as we talked about in the book. you south africa and rhodesia in particular you'd racialized and handle segments of the population who participate in athletics and with the best jumpers, what have you not allowed to be part of the virulent detritus of those countries. so what is not to say there's some worse than the united states at that time the united states is simply a nonreporting all kinds of things absolutely had turning in terms of how terrible it was, but responding to their real and from those countries and very real segregated injustices in terms

of how they participated in how they contributed to the olympic movement. [inaudible] [laughter] >> , and appear, queen. >> is the son? my name is maria and i am a citizen journalist and a digital connector and i was wondering how it has changed since 1960. >> come over here. come over here. >> great question. everyone should hear it. [inaudible] >> how do i feel about how the media has changed since 1968. that's a great question. first of all, we were totally

against the right wing media. anything we did, they changed the course of a weekly. they told lies to the people, put out propaganda for years, probably 85% of my matter was taken away. lied about the media of the time. why did they say that for 42 years like this young lady decided i want to be an olympic champion and at the same time i have the compassion for humanity and i'm concerned about humanity come but they trained her to go for that carriage, that metal. and she says anything outside the circle, i've got to be careful because they took a subtle way, they took tommie smith middleweight to hold you in check by propaganda. but yet still, 43 years later why i was on cnbc -- cnn this

morning. i [inaudible] nostrand to say to this young lady here is the media bilby has not changed much if they think if you stand on your own two legs and i say to your brother earlier i am a man with my own eyes. when i stand on my own two feet to express who i am i have no fear for expressing what i feel to be the true peer they can whitewash you know more because they've got my tv now, that they can still pull the plug. but it's already. you can continue to pull the plug. i menifee, kitschy note to msm that. a lot of people wait for that. my philosophy is on the grass the to be it.

[applause] [inaudible] >> hatter feel about how they talk about it? >> i am flabbergasted. i wish i could be your age again so i could live another 50, 60 years. i think i am one of the most blessed guys in the world to live the life that i live in than to have a book written about my life into that so many people excited about the story to be written about my life. so yes, i am truly blessed in a thank you for asking the question. what's your name again? [inaudible] what is your best subject in school? math? i thought she was in journalism. so both. i wish you nothing but the best, baby girl.

[applause] >> we want to know if you go back to cnn -- [inaudible] >> that's a question you need to have cnn. [laughter] i didn't pull the plug. faded. >> haile sledge or something. i don't know. but the main point is yes, john will be back on cnn and yes they will show more respect. if they don't, there's going to be thousands upon thousands of people poisoned and ready to say it proves you did it again. >> i don't have any misgivings about cnn because there is many years before cnn called me to get on their show. if i do a fine, if i don't, fine. i don't have to reach the masses

in one shot. because i will reach the masses one time and you only have to do a one time. if they take pictures, can you picture fess up? i tell them no, i don't put my fist up no more. when it should do that no more? i said you picture is that they're not point to appear that my viewpoint you point to a? [laughter] [applause] in a wide point to a? i point to it to illustrate that it's in the past. [applause] >> i'm going to put myself out for the second time. >> right on, right on. [applause] >> i love that. >> feel free to raise your fist at any point this evening. >> ray. -- right.

[inaudible] >> -- all of us had situations where we know what happened to us and that we hold onto those things. so you're not really bitter. >> is contrary to what she said. my life hasn't changed. it changed about me. i've been the same johnny carlos today as i was when i was a little way. i'm the same guy. when they give recognition,

redheaded. man, i love people. i like to laugh. i like to have a good time. i like to make people feel good. but when it's time for me to kick and take names, i like to do that, too. but i like to do anything more than that my father raised me to be. who are you quite since i never want to be any more than carlos assigned here that's all i wanted to be with my father's son. if certain times, you know you have to step out. i'll be stepping up from the time i was a little kid. we had a situation in my project. i talk about this? >> you didn't talk about it. >> he said when he started talking he said man, those caterpillars menuhin onto another subject. you want to hear about the caterpillars before we go? it's a good story.

>> i went to my weather one day and i say mother, mom, we live on the sixth floor. our apartment was the own apartment up there and my mom would come in from work and she worked nights and come in the morning and she would never, ever come to tears. my mom was like on the clock to do to counter every day in that window. all the other pants would be downstairs talking. one day i took note of that and i went to my mother and said mom, how come you never go downstairs and hang out with the mothers down there and talk to them? on that link to my mother has said are you stuck up? [laughter] and why looked at my mother, she said what did you say it? are you stuck up, mom? and my mother looked at me with tears in her eyes and said, son, i have never ever thought i was better than anyone and i would

never raise my kids to think i was better. i said mom, how come you don't go downstairs? should i work in a hospital in operating room. every summer into god's truth, at night the jazz station return it off and you can hear didn't even believe that the night. so that shows you how many wives. she said no i can't go into the operating room with the rash on my mac or on my arm because she said do you remember when the caterpillar pulls out of the tree and how fragile they are. you've got a take it off, no matter how fragile are going to boston by the time you get your hand to your site you've got a rash on your net. so i said, that's right, mom, okay. so i took it upon myself. i must've been about 14 i went

to the project. i don't waste no time. but the manager and i said, we've got a problem. you looked at me. what you mean to have a problem? what do you do the math this? without a prolific caterpillars. what do you appear but we never sprayed the streets? i'm busy. i want to know about these caterpillars. he pushed the panic button on this task. you could take them out of here. [inaudible] i went down and said mr. governor come my father sent me to get some gas. at the big ten, so that instead where's the money? [inaudible] i asked for a match. there were four trees in the

project may be 25 yards, two on each side. so i took the free scan and did you guys move down there in the projects and told the guys and they said krazy john is getting ready to do something crazy. i took the gascon, took the stick match, knocked me back. i said okay. i took everything and turn on the tree. by the time i got to the third, they are called to the. the police came down and running up and by the time they came to me, i get the third tree. when i went to get the fort street, details on me. now, i thought i might embarrass my mother. i knew i embarrassed my family. and then the judge gave me a

rest to come to court. i remember grandmother saint earl, are you going down the court with that boy. he's going to embarrass me. i get to court in the first thing the guy looks and says he just doesn't have any inter-deficiency. my father said no, not to my knowledge. and so maybe you can explain to me, why bashir signed do that to those trees? have you heard about the welfare of these projects? that's a real good question. i'd like to figa dancer myself. she looked at me and said well, young man, you have to explain. my mother and i had a conversation about why she doesn't come downstairs. my mother explained why she doesn't come down because of the caterpillars. i got thinking i would go up to the school every now and then and every summer i go up there

and they slay the white folks trees because there's people of color down here that osprey are trees? dancers my mother she has to stay upstairs because they aren't doing their job. my father says when is the last time they sprayed? when johnny was a little boy. that's the last time they sprayed. they said, appeared. do you have your records but do you? if it now, i don't have them. when she calmed down and take the recess. when you come back from lunch cumin mixture you bring your records back with you. the judge is a smart judge because he said what i want you to do is call the new york city housing authority and have someone bring the records downham piercy came back from lunch and said do you have your father requeue? he had a thin piece of paper. he said that's all you have? he said there's added csma

housing authority. now this dude comes up in the sky at a big one and they looked at them and said well, how does the project received money? you look in the last 15 years he receives facings. in the last 15 years. he said well, how often have they sprayed in the last 15 years? the man looked at me and said 15 years. they wrote that they sprayed every year for the last 15 and took that money. so now johnny carlos has been the fool of the neighborhood and now switching over like i'm getting ready to be the hero of the neighborhood. and the judge looked at and and guide her downtown site, to me. they went right in the corner. my father looked at me and the judge the nittany i said well, you should be really proud of your son.

he had concern for the people at heart that he got out the way and be really proud of him based on the fact that he tipped off for your mom and for your wife and his mother. he said okay, now we're leaving the courtroom. he said okay, now we're leaving the courtroom. you've done a lot of things leaving the courtroom. you've done a lot of things in your life and i got past a lot of days. but i'll tell you one thing i've never seen you back down. i've never seen you. i've seen you never change. i remember how i ripped you when you became amused because they give me so much with being. but every time i with to you, come to find out that she was right all the time. now here you can't hear anyone at the the most egregious things in our family history, but the

judge told you what you did was right. signed, i could never tell you how proud he was dear the judge say that, but i want to apologize for the whoopi and i gave you that i have the utmost respect for you. united is is for a kid 14 useful to have a daddy say i respect you? you open a long ways. that type it in the field and the locomotive. everybody have to watch out now. it's about making it bright. i could tell you a story about chicken. [inaudible] [laughter] thank you all so much. we're going to do a signing out there.

[inaudible conversations]

>> desire cause to dispel dominion which appoints our decisions in the delusion that a relative conflict will somehow mysteriously resolve itself into a world of harmony if we just don't route the boat for irritate the forces of aggression and this hogwash. the mac campaign for president this year be the back of 14 men who ran for the office and lost. go to her website, c-span.org/contenders to see video who had a lasting impact on american politics. >> this is also the time to turn away from excessive preoccupation overseas to the rebuilding of our own nation. america must be restored to her proper role in the world like if we can do that, only through the recovery of confidence in

ourselves. >> next, a forum on iran's nuke program and what policy options are open to the u.s. the center for strategic and international studies along with the tcu shia school of journalism hosted this hour-long event. panelists include former joint chiefs of staff vice chairman james cartwright. [inaudible conversations] >> good neighbor welcome to bed international studies. thank you for being here. vander schwartz, senior vice president for external relations. we have nature of the grant united thank you for coming out on behalf of csi s. and a subset of school of journalism at act the university. this week we lost a couple great journalist and i want to remember them. anthony should a particular had

a relationship with csi s. and denise kaizen work here is a young man, just such a guy with business school. there is a great, great essay that csis.org via middle east program director, john aldrin who is a friend of anthony's for 20 years and i urge all of you to watch it. this was to be treated like tonight, csis -underscore word with the hash sign. i will give it to bob schieffer. >> well, thank you very much come and are on behalf of tcu and the journalists what they are. boy have we got a good one today. we try to stay on top of the news and we are right on top of it. we are going to talk today about what could be done if we should be done about it, what does the future old banner. jim cartwright come the, united states pariente corey retired cs

cart right chair and commander u.s. strategic command before being nominated and appointed as the eighth vice chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, serve a four-year tenure as the nation's second highest military officer across two presidential administrations. admiral william fallon on my right, former commander at the u.s. command has served as commander in the u.s. pacific command, u.s. police forces command and the u.s. atlantic command. and down here, general david sanger -- who knows a lot about everything. he's the chief washington correspondent for "the new york times," one of the newspaper's senior writers and for those of you today, he really is a general. i forget in this day of the internet there are no jokes. [laughter] and more than 25 years in the paper, he has reported from new

york, tokyo and washington and islam. the book the inheritance, the world obama confronts, challenging the american tower. he is in the process of writing another boat. so what is this new book going to be about? the the new book is a look at the obama administration national security policy with afghanistan and pakistan that killed to let with iran as you would imagine and i think with the spring in china. but mostly, it is an effort to try to explore what is new and different about the business administration versus the bush administration and how do you prepare what is actually happening and the robust than a little busy since the president was inaugurated. >> we will all be waiting for it. >> she start out with a spirit

like to ask you a few things. if president obama calls you and your still imac to duty and said, what do i do about iran, what would you tell them? >> how do you spell that? >> were going to start with easy question. >> give us a rundown on where you think things are now and what the situations look like. >> my concern with iran is here to get one of those telephone calls is that we have as a nation for several administrations now on a negotiating diplomatic approach along with delaying strategy to stretch out the timelines and have the opportunity for a diplomatic solution. there're those around the world and certainly in the united states that believe the clock is ticking and starting to run out of time.

and so what are the logical next steps you want to worry about in a curator, not necessarily because you execute them, but she want to have them. and so, the clock process as several presidents now has said none on my watch, no way would we ever allow that to happen. we said that about korea, too. what does it mean? how do you want to handle that? are you going to do something more provocative, more overt to expose the timeline down? which most people are thinking along the lines of a military strike. is that a possibility if you're going to do that? authentications beat and a likely counter bt think your way through that? if they were negotiating that can be done or sanctions and delaying strategies that may be successful and fruitful. and then it because the ukrainians get a vote in this,

if they decide that they want to go ahead and announce that they are moving in this way, what are the implications to something like that? in the context you have to worry about 10 years of work, the country and a world in financial discourse that the speaker challenged the likelihood strategy that worked in i.t. rain and this probably requires an invasion and administration in iran. the likelihood that it's going to occur in the same year he took it in the chinese and french government and the united states whatever, you know, that stacks up pretty hard again some sort of a connecticut done our part. so those are the things on the table, the likelihood is something in the year of 2012 occur and that would challenge that is pretty high. >> as well, let me ask you how close do you think iran as to

achieving meaningful liberty? >> i don't know and i don't know that many people outside of iran, what did the iranians are or a lot of opinion out there or exactly what their intentions are, how far they've gone, whether they would actually -- if they had the means to recognize nuclear capabilities i think remains to be seen. right now but i'm keeping things ambiguous, i guess that's actually fairly clever, particularly if the real intention is to precede. but what really strikes me now is again we are stretching this crescendo of talk, wisconsin border, the black-and-white at

beating the job on the county season the check is on, certainly not very helpful at all. there's a lot involved right now. certainly ticked off a part of double dozen right here. all of these things make this extremely complex. the sound waves that we see in the media will be simplified and it's not at all. what i think about this is a couple of fundamentals is that the iranian regime, which has been in place now for several decades in the united states is that virtually no dialect which is talk and let's go have a discussion, but they really haven't seen any meaningful dialogue and it's a pretty nasty history here, which a lot of people are aware of.

forgetting anything started by way of dialect is a challenge. particularly with the regime and pillories with the u.s. in support to demonize all the more challenging. >> david, tell us where you think. are they closed, what are their sources. the deeper you get into it, the more uncertain you be kind ambiguity is really a friend. in many ways have been a capability or near capability is as useful as more useful to them

than having a weapon. if you think that we actually had a weapon, they know what would happen the way against israel, united states, for that is unlikely. if they are just as in the weapon, deep interest in the region. and they would get that influence for almost as much of an influence by having a world out that they have the capability to build the weapon in a matter of weeks or months and keep them within the u.s. intelligence agencies to be able to say they have said as recently as this past week that there is still no evidence that they made a political decision to go ahead with the weapons. but would you make a political decision when you could get many of the same benefit and be just short of. all sides have learned the lessons of north korea and on

the one hand one of the lessons of north korea was that the united states says you can keep saying we won't tolerate it, but one day the country says you don't have a lot of choices in matches where we are. >> iranians look at north koreans say now, maybe we set it to fire. >> so question about north korea, exactly what they detest? what do they have? the business of trying redlines is the challenge. so you draw a red line and someone is perceived to have crested. now what are you going to do? this is a challenge right now. >> leon panetta says there is a line. when he says that, what do you interpret that to be? what is the red light like?

>> i know professionally inside his head, i think that they are -- i agree that it's very difficult to draw a red line here with the lack of knowledge you have, inside knowledge. so in my mind right now i think what the administration is saying is that if there is any kind of evidence that there is weaponization going on, any external signature to that effect or if the iaea inspectors are thrown out and not allowed to return, that those are steps that are over and could be used as redlines. whether that is that they are going to use or not, i don't know. but those could be steps you could actually see and draw a line against. >> this is not something i no agree to a battle, but correct me if i'm wrong. is one iran seems to be moving towards something about the

situation where they don't have a nuclear weapon, but they could build one in very short order? >> you have a fuel cycle that takes you to an enrichment at tbd. an enrichment activity gets cut off at a very low percentage. but the iranians have done now is go to the next higher percentage under the guise potentially realistically so using for a reactor to do research, medical research. that is the house was set to weaponization models of enrichment and the technology associated with enrichment is understood. taking it to the next level may take a little time, but the basic technology is now understood. >> so we have the sanctions and we've added new sanctions. iran says they now want to talk. does that function work?

>> i am not sure those two statements could connect to it. but the sanctions or have an effect i think doubt they are on the country. >> variability to conduct business. i felt for some time one of the more effect is if you're going to try for someone in iron and getting a pocketbook is the way people pay attention. i've seen a lot of evidence and have more of this than i see that in the economic sphere is extremely getting very, very difficult to simplify and even get food because nobody will deal in dollars and their currency is not worth too much

now. >> somebody said something. people are saying things and then there's like a follow-up were things that actually back up. so who knows. maybe there is in effect, but at the end of the day, the supreme leaders are more slightly going to be making decisions and calling the shots here. i think one of the additional challenges we have in the country is understanding how they make decisions. who has got influence, what areas, how did they go through whatever steps they go through to actually reach a decision of the strategy. >> there have been sanctions in the u.s. and the united nations put on iran for many years. at the sanctions you seen happen in the past six months have been the person would've really gotten the attention. why use that? the first thing is very central bank and that is how the clear

revenue for their oil. for the first time where even indirectly going after their oil revenue, the result is their currency has fallen in value against the dollar by about half. that is panicking a lot of people who have been operating in the currency and make it very difficult for them to sell oil in dollars but they're beginning to think about trade agreement, barter agreements back and forth. so, can sanctions alone leave the iranians to come to the conclusion that the nuclear occasion is different. you cannot send people in the administration who may be sailor, iranians always say we will never give in to pressure. until that magic day when they give in to pressure. you get others to say, you know, the sanctions may weaken the

regime and there's hold on power, but in the end it is not likely to revert the nuclear program because the nuclear program is pretty popular, even among the opposites. so we have to ask the question, what are you really accomplishing? >> i think they're the examples of sanctions. we have an embargo against cuba for many decades in north korea certainly doesn't exactly enjoy the free trade agreements, but i think in recent weeks and months, there have been a number of things that add up here with, so the countries that were flaunting the entire barcodes and payouts of the sanctions are now beginning to come in the line. i think it's very, very difficult for these guys to get things done. >> my senses all of that is

accurate. but she don't know at the end is that really gets hard. which way is it going to go? is sick and he convinced them not to proceed or galvanize them to proceed? that is the unknown. >> is there anything we could do short of military action to convince them it is not a good idea or is that just something they've decided they've got to have it? >> i am not sure that they've decided yet or at least that the leader has decided yet. the likelihood that there is something, a single act that will all of a sudden flip the switch is probably pretty low. it could be to stack up of several activities, sanctions, ability to do business locally now, loss of their ability to work with both the airline and shipping line and give safe harbor and refueling rights and things like that. all of these things could stack

up and away. that should have the same problem if you decide to take kinetic action. are you actually going to steal their resolve to go ahead and do this? or are you going to delay for a few years and get back in negotiation? the likelihood -- my thought process as it is more likely to galvanize the thought process. yet the libyan example sitting out there. this is the country we got to agree to abandon their nuclear aspirations that we replaced the leadership. that is not a good question for opinions looking. >> there has been a middle range option since the obama administration. the president came in saying he wanted to open up the issues and data broadcast on the new year. and i think there's a lot of debate among the iranians but

how sincere opening less. but when you read the wikileaks documents, what you discover is they started working on different sanctions right away, assuming the diplomacy would work. and their other things happening at increasing pace is. five scientists assassinated. wives believe no one has proved that is the work of israel intelligence, but maybe it's not in some of the cases. you see the big missile plant a lap so much spontaneously. remarkable coincidence. we've had missile plans to appear, too, so could have been accidental, but sure raises a lot of suspicion. use a computer worm that ended up hitting the athenians and for a while slowing down ability to produce. this all comes back to the question that general cartwright

presents, which is when the rain and see this, does it reek of old determination to move ahead? or does that make them think this is a working? i haven't seen any evidence yet that it's really slow their program, just grabbed the amount of uranium enriched at activity that about. you know, it's got some ups and downs, but fundamentally it's on a pretty steady. >> let me just ask you whether it's the right thing to do with the wrong thing to do. here israel seems to be drawing a line in the sand on this. how credible is their posture towards iran? i guess what i guess whatever satanist u.k. saying is do they have the case to take out iran development if they decided to do that? >> no. they can slow it down. they can delay it two to five

years, but that does not take away the intellectual capital, does not take lability of the iranians and proliferate sites in which they do business. so no, you're not going to do that. it's a delaying tactic, not a change type it. >> would you agree that? >> shorey. one of the challenges his folks have taken a historical advantage, lakes the iraqi street and possibly the strike in syria here couple years ago. they acted, had resolve, took her the problem then it went away. but it's a very different issue here. this is not a pinpoint a single target, one strike and its owner. they've been pretty clever but disturbing stuff.

in fact, general cartwright indicated in his opening statement, to really take care of the problem, it is going to require quite a few of them probably are not likely to happen. >> is going to cost tyvek. >> it may just an example if this credit spread out over wide area. it's a deep? why there's such a hard thing to do? >> this is part of the calculus of redlines, but for a long time, most of the activity occurred in one site, which was somewhat underground, but certainly strike a blow. but they have over the past two or three years talked about alternative sites. we know of one that is pretty well understood, which is deep enough underground that there

really are weapons to penetrate that kind of the dvd. so when you get to the point researcher franchise out to fewer strike on distributor on the country and you have an understanding of enrichment, the number of pieces he put that far exceed our knowledge about their discovery in a home. even if you could again come to you will not kill the capital to rebuild a centrifuge summerhouse and continue on. so this is a will issue at that point if they have the will to do it, they will produce. >> what happens if israel does decide what >> do well, bob? take the military action? >> my guess is the united states would advise, but israel does all the advice. >> countries and governments are going to do what they do, what

they perceive to be in their best interest or as they feel are back into a corner, may be the least of noxious choice given the options. so they make a strike at something very difficult i think he can set the of efforts likely to require given what they think we understand not plugged into the intel anymore. but this is not a one-time shot. so for one site to lash out and take a whack at some thing could probably inflict some damage, but then what happens? what do we do? i mean, let's say that we find out we've got the call that the planes are in the air and this is what we are going to do, we would let you know about it. but obviously you are in the government now, but what do you think the u.s. reaction would

be? >> it is a real conundrum. if they are in the air, there's not likely much will be able to do to get between them at whatever target they perceive they have. and at that point, the government is facing -- our government is faced with, do you disembowel it? do you say it's a bad idea? you kind of passively watch it happen or do you aggressively and? that is the range of matrix of things you might be a well-to-do. which one you do is probably going to be a decision as far likely to occur proximate with their lunch in other words, the situation will dictate that the art of the posh areas. being ready for that in having to force the posh in such a way that the choice is the method there must concerned about right now. >> kind of the by extension, given at least the rain and rhetoric, the link the two of us, israel and u.s. a matter

what happens. so we would be prepared to protect air force xmp full for whatever might happen. a cup of thoughts here. one, not a lot of things in common were often portrayed as yes, no, yes, no, but we share a lot in this region, not the least of which is getting to some long-term state of better stability and some security. and so, we will certainly cooperate to the max extent we can. we're certainly going to share intelligence because we think any weaponization is not in either of our best interests at the end of the day, you try to come up with ways to deal with this that might actually result in a better sunrise and something ugly at the end of the

day. >> well, the issue of how the united states would respond was when the bush administration took a bit to fascinate when the israelis administration asked for the bomb before the refueling capability that david need to be able to do this more effectively. and they were turned down by the bush administration as we go back in the memoirs we discovered a pretty active debate inside the administration on that issue. but one of the questions that came up as if they went out for the iraqi airspace would be the most direct way in, which is the united states would be u.s. and the answer they came to us probably not. the bigger concern that i hear in the administration now is not just what happened that day, admiral fallon said there would be an assumption by the iranians that the u.s. and israel worked

together to sharing intelligence. among the question is, does the u.s. get in to whatever happens as a foul? and i've only seen the unclassified working of this, when donna perkins a few years ago and when donna harper. in almost every scenario i have seen it, the u.s. does get down sooner or later because somebody tried to close them it's a sunny takes out the american ships and then you're off to the races. i think that it's a bit concerned the administration has right now. >> turkey's foreign minister spoke. csi is earlier this month. he said military action sheeran would be a disaster that complicate developments in the middle east at a crucial juncture. at the nato ally, does turkey stance complicate u.s. options on iran?

>> it is reflecting reality certain as he perceives it in certainly the bananas going to kind of take us back to the output of this equation versus the input. so yes there is a strike and all that happens. you know, the net and am excited this will be no matter how effective are in effect that the strike is will be significant, both in the revenue side of the allelic dvds, but then globally in the instability that that will cause and the markets. so that is a piece of it that i ensure turkey is very concerned about at a minimum. and then they lie on an obvious path to and from israel to iran. and they have a neighbor, iran who is going to be effective and is probably going to want to lash out. so there is a lot in the region that is at stake here, that is

far beyond the weaponization issue. >> no one that i'm aware of thinks that there's any real positive outcome of a military strike or some kind of conflict, no telling what do anything, boeing has a hard time conjuring up the positives out of something like this. so what does that mean for us? it seems to me that this is one of these, you never know what instrument actually gets the job done in these situations than you never know how things start to because you are not in their. so as a kind of lurched on the road here, it seems to me that we had to be doing a couple of things. one, making very clear that we're trying to come up with some kind of a negotiated end to

this weaponization drop if that is what they are about. and frankly, it is bigger than that. it is the whole region. there needs to be stability. but at the same time, we are not just going to stand by, you're certainly not going to stand by if they decide to take a whack at us for some reason. so you know, just not going to happen. so these are not good outcomes, so therefore let's not precipitate them. they're going to be some other things, too. it seems to me if you look down the road and what is this. so what if iran turns out to come out one day and say say hey, and if they, we've got one. what if they or not, where do we want to be in that situation? slithers other country that nuclear weapons right now it seems to me one day when i consider here is some kind of a declaratory policy, by which we make very clear publicly by a

nuclear weapon from ourselves or are certain specified allies, with not only the response in kind and we certainly done this before. we have arrangements. they are not likely and of course this is a very touchy region with lots of things moving parts. ..

at the time or where are the forces i think they have a right we better be careful of something like this. this isn't a flat. the of pretty limited capability when all is said and done. there are things we need to be concerned about and we would be very sensitive to the posture we put our forces in the there's not a lot of comparison between what they have and what we could bring to bear. >> did they have the ability -- we talk about iran posing a threat to the united states. to the in fact pose a threat to the united states or to develop a warhead to this country? they don't, why? >> not in a normal sense of a

ballistic missile, something like that. they are working in that direction and start working for the technology like in the fuel cycle the more worrisome activity, number one, for them to develop a nuclear weapon anyplace having one or two isn't going to make a lot of sense. it's more worrisome that a weapon or the technology could be proliferated to somebody that is anonymous and brings something like that some place in the world and whether they take it there and say do the following, the so-called black male -- blackmail to attack the united states at home is pretty low on their calculus. the closing of the streets,

people argue that is detrimental to iran, but you have to remember what they put them through with the financial sanctions and everything else the question is when do they come to the point that it says one way or the other we have to change the game. that is the worrisome side of that activity, and i think that we generally average about 14 ships and about 17 million barrels a day through the street and so if that is the case that is about 20% of what happens every day, so just a few days is a pretty significant activity to the dni. these are the things you have to sit down and work your way through. like the admiral said, we are not in their head. we don't know how they are looking at these problems, and so it's difficult to say this is what we are going to do and this is what they are going to do. >> this is a different situation for israel and that's why i'm sure this thing is superseded or seems to be getting that way and

they can range as i've seen if they have in the past two weeks you've seen the two israeli officials, one that's a military official and in the finance industry yesterday both make the claim the iranians would have the ability to reach the united states within five years or so. maybe they are and usually these things take longer than one would think to say this publicly i read that as trying to get iran moved in categories in the obama administration from a general threat to one specific to the united states or have some hopes that that would change the way the u.s. would be issued. i don't think that that will succeed, but general cartwright said the concern is a weapon

that comes in on conventionally. this is what you saw the policy against north korea and president bush after the nuclear test said it was in the most successful ever seen issued the dicker tory policy and said basically if we find your material anyplace around the world, we are going to prepare for an attack and treated as a direct attack. we've not seen that kind of policy yet about kuran. >> let's take some questions from the audience right here. right there. within the change of regime and syria sort of be a better policy because syria there is the wmd in syria wouldn't that be lots

of space for mahmoud ahmadinejad -- >> who would like to take that? >> i will start and let anybody jump in. it would have an affect to tell that it would be and how quickly it would manifest itself as difficult. it's the stack up of activities, meetings on together its the blind man approaching the cliff. you don't know quite where the cliff is and where it will change. syria is clearly important to iran, clearly important to iran and that regime is clearly important, but with the effect would be and over time how that would manifest itself is hard to forecast. >> there are very few countries that are standing tall or short with syria these days. kuran happens to be one of the few. john?

>> covered jongh from csis. i want to take david's notion that maybe iran would be a screwdriver away from having a bomb and it could be very successful for a long time doing that forces the notion that maybe there is an israeli attack and a whole series of things to come from that which may involve us. if those are the possible scenarios, what does the middle east look like in five years' time if that's where we are either the iranians move towards having some sort of ambiguous weapons capability in five years' time, or there is an israeli strike a somehow involves us and what ever secondary things come from that, where is the middle east then taking general cartwright's notion you can slow down the

bomb, but you can't stop one forever. >> well, the first scenario which is if they have an ambiguous capability i think you already see a number of states in the region thinking about an ambiguous capability of their own a few years ago, the key devotee in the council announced they were all interested in the uranium enrichment also. of course it's for people's power production purposes. but they wanted to make it clear that they could also get the capability going. it's not clear that they've made very much progress on that. but i'm not what most clearly is saudi arabia, which is again from wikileaks the king that said a cut off the head of the snake and the king of bahrain

had settled the place. presumably, they could go out and buy the capability from pakistan and some other place. whether or not they would want to risk buying the full capability or just try to assemble all of the component parts they knew they were a screwdriver a way that could be the life of it. hard to predict what the middle east would look like after an israeli strike six months after the five years after. i don't know how much the region could sort of readjust to normal if you could call anything in the region normal five years out. but when you talk to the israeli officials about this and say look you don't want to be delaying your capability as general cartwright said. their answer is, well, if we get two or three years that is two or three years and maybe we can go back and do it again.

sort of mowing the lawn kind of approach to the issue. i am doubtful they could actually do this multiple times. >> right here in the front row. >> thank you >> if you could elaborate on something that was briefly touched upon before, namely that even the internal opposition looks favorably that the nuclear weapons at least the nuclear program, is your sense, gentlemen, that should there be one day the real regime change is internally generated in iran that there is more secular, whatever, force that comes and we will be dealing with the same situation in other words still and iranian leadership and in

the weapons program or would they be more inclined to give in the guidelines of the am pt and in compliance etc., etc.? >> good question. what do you think? >> i'm not sure about some of the data. what i have seen is some significant support within the population for their ability being able to have a domestic nuclear capability, not weapons, not bombs. i think that is again a lot fuzziness, so let's be a little precise. i think there's -- i haven't seen anything at all that would tell me the general population has this great idea to have a nuclear weapon. >> i think the reality is the claim may be running against the regime. so, they can play the game of ambiguity and the drag it out

and maybe they are stalling to build the capability, but would that get them? meanwhile, it plays out they would probably continue to be nervous and they are going to do with the deutsch. but meanwhile, what else is going on. there is a lot happening. as a, as the sanctions begin and the we'll stick its end up being closed as people are not buying, the other countries around the region are scrambling to figure out how they can take this market away from the iranians, and we have a -- we have something that is in the wings and iraq for a sample where their output has been pretty but stagnated for years. there are a lot of oil exports that have been working inside that country to change the ground and the potential is huge. the other countries are working hard on a pipeline to bypass

this. pipeline comes back the the other way and on and on and on so there are a lot of things going on and meanwhile, inside iran, times are getting tough pretty clearly, so it seems to me that in their calculus come in their understanding of kind of where they are, china is not on their side, so they are going to have to start doing something other than just yakking and it doesn't mean they are going to go blow something up. i think if you think about the consequences that is a pretty tough thing to choose. >> just real quickly i can't guess what's going to happen in five years, but i think the trend is that the intellectual capital to create a nuclear weapon is out there, and this problem that we are experiencing right now with north korea and iran is nothing. -- even if you take those it's

just with the proliferation of knowledge that's out there and engineering this is not undoable. we think of this activity like we thought about it in the 50's when we did the eisenhower build up and all those things that we are going to make this exquisite weapon. there is no reason to do that. there is no reason to go to the deliveries and things. there is no reason for that, and that kind of knowledge is out there so this isn't a problem that we are -- that we will solve by having iran to change their mind. it is more of a problem that we are going to have to handle as a global community. >> bigger proliferation. >> yes, ma'am. >> thank you. from the atlantic council and trying to understand the ramifications of iran. would it affect the u.s. willingness and ability to keep the street open to traffic, and

admiral, you said even if they get one or two it isn't necessarily going to do anything for them. and how do they convince israel that in iran without the weapons is not an existential threat to israel or a weapon that iran would use against israel would be suicidal it seems for them to do that? >> the israelis are going to convince themselves what they want to do and based on the perception of how this is the situation. iran, again, with nuclear weapons would make it clear if these things were used this probably one of the things the leaders would get to do, we have a lot of national interests and so do other countries, and one of these things provide you the

tide running against these things is there are a lot of other things going on in the world. just stop for a second and hold the clock back nine months or so and it seems to me that for six or nine months there was very little we heard about iran. why? other things were going on. the arab spurring, everybody's attention went to other things, as we were in the heightened season right now. must be slow. baseball season hasn't begun or something. >> let me just ask you both this question. you are both lifetime in the military. you know what is going on in the military community. you know what military people are thinking. is there any school of thought among the military that we ought to take military action that this poses such a danger that if we find out they have a nuclear weapon we ought to go in there and attack and take them out?

>> welcome that is a difficult question because if the leadership tells us to go it doesn't matter -- [laughter] >> understand that and that's why i'm trying to get at this question. i'm trying to figure out what the military thinking is before the decision has to be made. >> as a former military person? [laughter] >> i don't see a lot of value in going in. >> do you know anybody that does, i guess that's what i'm saying. >> fox myett. [laughter] >> i think there is a proportion to those that have that experience in life really happens in the war and what happens to people with those that have an awful lot to say. it's not, certainly not a preferred option, not anything that somebody that has any real sense of happens in these conference would wish to have happened. sometimes you can force them into the situations but it's

certainly not one -- >> what about you, david? >> certainly i've never interviewed any american current or former military officials that have an opinion any different from what you have just heard here, that in fact what many of them say is the believe that other methods, whether it is sanctions or covert action or whatever could probably buy as much time me even more time than the military action. that said, the israeli view of this from the officials that i have talked to in recent times is that unless they believe that there is a significant military option not there then they have got no leverage on the diplomacy, they've got no leverage elsewhere. so they're sort of in the style of where they have to talk up the military option and have a credible military option if they hope to getting a leverage to use it as the american service

while they would happily build that up from the administration's would quite clearly concerned the good chance they would go off and use it if iran enters what the defense minister calls the zone of immunity which is basically the point at which the program is buried so deep or spread out so far they believe there's no way that a military action would. >> back in the back or right there. that's right. go ahead. >> the reading signals in or made a few minutes ago history is full of examples of misleading signals particularly whether they are cultural differences and the political discourse and the rhetoric down the gun flapping as he pointed out. >> shut up. [laughter]

>> actually i think i read last week that the comment was made by netanyahu in israel. exactly those words. just turn it off. we how do we get people to understand our intentions often a challenge when you have lots of preconceived notions in the 44 years of that history. rhode being consistent, getting support from friends and allies in the region is helpful. having a demonstrated capability , i was never one to like to brag on our terrific people and what they can do, what we can sure demonstrate and we certainly have demonstrated our ability. we have plenty of kigali. shouldn't even an issue >> we've been talking about those israel actually have the capability to do this, do we

have the capability? to use nuclear weapons. >> you mean to stop it? >> no. if they have the intent all the weapons of the world are not going to change that because the knowledge is there and they just build it back. estimates before. my name is nathaniel markowitz and my question is closer related to what mr. sankar was saying. my conundrum is given that the course of the policy requires the credible threat of force, the problem is on the one hand the rigorous debate about policy is important for the democracy, but on the other hand of the opposition to the strike may be passes if a certain threshold that they start to feel that threat is no longer credible, is it possible that even having the discussion publicly is limiting the options that might even

increase the likelihood that people think we have to make an attack. >> - 2 cents would be that certainly possible that that is the case but possibly unlikely they don't know what is in our had any more than we know what is in their head, and that ambiguity tends to work in our favor. you always told your anniversary up to be 10 feet tall because you have to. you don't want to take the risk of underestimating the adversary and so with isn't likely that it's going to diminish the threat of a strike, but i think falling on the same threat is that while you want to tone down the rhetoric you want to try to make sure and work hard to have an officials channel that is really open for dialogue so that the ambiguity at least can be addressed whether you believe on the other side of the table is

an issue that least that there is a dialogue and an official channel that is available so that when something goes awry whether it is from the gulf between shipping or some other way that there is a way to diffuse it as clearly as possible, and the back to the demonstrated to the escalation and the estate below the threshold that would precipitate the counterattack. >> just to add if i could to what general cartwright said, it's important that at the end of the day these are people, 70 million of them, they have aspirations and desires, and their needs to be for the demonstrated cooperation and willingness to walk away from the mr. detrimental to the region that there is something in this for them and so having

some light at the end of the tunnel not closing off all options but we are willing to have you play a role in the region. you've got a lot of capability, a lot of things. >> david? >> when you think of how the iranians think about this, their view is that they have indicated many moments over the past decade and openness to talk about the united states in 2001 after 9/11 of the offer that got sort of facts in to the state department in 2003 and no one was quite sure what it meant that it never went anywhere in the bush administration, again, at one point in the discussion to the europeans when the iranians said that they were willing to not to give up the iranian richmond, but only enrich an accord with their capability, with their needs for

energy which would have put a significant one that on it and they believe that every one of these options has been ignored, and that is what president obama tried to reverse with his early outreach. the problem is the outreach happened just a few months before the fire iranian elections in june 2005 and that sort of froze all of that discussion, and it's never really recovered from that. this will be our last question. i'm sorry. >> thank you. what you discussed the role of china and the big picture and how what the effect influences of the policy and the u.s. national interest in the asia-pacific and also in the indian ocean. >> why don't we just go around

here and what will be our last question. >> i think what you are asking is in relation to iran, the chinese obviously need, feel they are customers to the oil production with iran and other agreements that go on so the year and a very difficult position here of how to the support not having a weapon be developed and not undermine their need for the energy resources, and trying to do the calculation of the cost-benefit. right now has with other countries, what they would like to see happen is a diplomatic solution to this activity probably even if it included some sort of nuclear capability but it'd be for energy or more. if that dance for closed, then

they have a very hard decision and then they are going to have to think their way through that and to the extent they have to go somewhere else for that energy in the future if that were to happen now would put pressure in the south pacific. >> they clearly have a need for energy sources are very high on the list. they have another issue and that is the aversion to activity by nations that could be meddlesome with internal affairs, so they certainly want to maintain the status quo inside of china and one of the things that is clearly on selling to them as activity that is destabilizing to the population. so, if they see or perceive that people are ganging up to instigate similar trouble in

iran, iran today, maybe china tomorrow, who knows, but i think that is a drag, a brake on activity that we would like to see move forward to be more cooperative and helpful and china decided okay we will get our oil somewhere else in the additional term whether they are willing to do that or not i think this probably up in the air. >> the obama administration tried pretty hard and 29, 2010 to come up with some alternative energy supplies for china. they went and talked with the saudis and some other suppliers. obviously iraq now weighs giving up to the production and libya as it comes back in. but it's not clear that any of that is going to lean the chinese of this oil in fact the chinese now see a great opportunity because they believe that the irony and are going to have to sell their oil at a

significant discount given the sanctions, and so a lot of the behind-the-scenes diplomacy and we saw some of this happened when he was your last week was to try to get the chinese brought to buy the oil that the u.s. and the european allies sort of cut off elsewhere and that is going to be the big struggle of the next few months. spec one thought here and i will shut up. there are different ways to approach this. one is to grab the alleged grab it by the neck and beat on them, which is sort of taken their rhetorical screening today and doing it that way. another is to look around and see how many tools you can bear, so things are changing. there are more options and more things we can do with other countries to help out in their economic needs, the availability of natural gas. in this country a lot of things are in play, and emphasizing

those things as things that could be helpful in the situation rather than just we are going to beat them or not, they're going to blow it up or not, it seems to me that would be more useful. >> thank you for a much and thank you on behalf of csis. [applause] >> [inaudible conversations]

up next a forum on ballistic missile defense from the university of california at berkeley. panelists include several former defense department officials. this is a little more than two hours. >> welcome, everyone. if people could take seats, we could begin. my name is jack, and the director of the governmental studies, which together with the department of physics i think is the first such formal collaboration we are cosponsoring this fascinating seminar. this seminar is one of the series that we sponsor on the harold smith seminar series which focuses on u.s. defense policies with emphasis on the

control and management of nuclear weapons, and this is the third year of the series, and we've had numerous distinguished experts coming here to speak about the vital manner. and the reason that they come is because of the person for whom the series is named, dr. harold smith who we want to invite in a minute, and harold holds the appointment of the visiting scholar with the governmental studies, and also i believe the distinguished resident scholar at the school of public policy. he has a long history at berkeley. he was the professor here and the chair of the department of nuclear energy before moving on to work first in the private sector and then within the government where he was the assistant secretary in the department of defense with responsibilities in this nuclear proliferation area.

he has many other honors. i'm just going to mention the two. one is the fellow of the american physical society, and the second, which i love to announce his commander in the legion of honor of france. so without further the, harold. [applause] >> i should say that we are -- have the privilege of being recorded by c-span which is probably why were the wrong color tie but we are going to be on c-span. >> friends and colleagues today is from robert frost' poem.

i'm going to quote from it. before i build a wall i would ask what i was walling and or walling owls and who i was like to give offense to read in the poem, frost was already too late. the wall had been built but it was simply being repaired. and we are too late today to ask these questions about today's wall manly ballistic missile defense. it already exists. the united states has unilaterally withdrawn from the treaty. the interceptors have been placed in alaska to defending the north korea. the obama administration is negotiating in a vince to defend against iran, which is like to give offense, end of quote to russia, and already has. something there is that doesn't

love the wall, but that is not the subject today. the subject today is where should we go from here. not how or why did we get here. among the pressing questions would be what is the obama ballistic missile defense approach and how does it differ from the bush policy? is the current u.s. strategy based on sound technical principles? what are the likely international ramifications of the obama administration's approach to missile defense, particularly in europe? to address this question, we have three talented and highly qualified experts. to my immediate left is the professor of public policy at the goldman school, recently returned from the post in the obama administration as assistant secretary of defense for global security. on my far right, dean wilkening

a distinguished member of the stuff of the livermore laboratory and the for our technical director of the stanford. dr. wilkening has published and has spoken widely. and in the middle is professor theodor postol, professor of science, technology and national security at mit. he has also published in spoken widely on this subject. each will speak for about 15 to 20 minutes. hopefully without interruption unless there is an absolute of brilliance that grips one of us, myself included. this will be followed by 40 minutes of clarification among the speakers with a goal and like the recent presidential debates would be to inform the audience not to disparage the

speaker. then there will be time for q&a questions and answers from the audience, and i will enumerate the ground rules for that at the appropriate time. with that, i turn to michael for the first talk. michael? >> thank you very much and the light to begin to be back at igs to discuss some of these issues. my assignment this afternoon is to give you a bit of an overview of the policy approach of the administration to the missile defense that led to the publication of the ballistic missile defense review report in the early 2010 why it advocated what it did, and a little bit about what has happened since and my colleagues provide a lot of detail on the technological issues, the pro and con of the

systems. i was tempted to spend a little time given the background of the subject but harold basically said don't do that. so this is to say that there has always been a debate for decades about the wisdom of missile defense, putting aside its technical feasibility. in the most simple terms, if you and i both had missiles, offensive missiles that could destroy each other and each of us was confident on missiles could get through even if we were struck first then we would have some sort of condition for the strategic stability through the mutual deterrence. but supposing in that situation i started to build missile defenses while still maintaining my offensive capability you could plausibly construe that as

an offensive measure thinking i was building the missile defenses to degrade your retaliatory attack after i struck you first. so in the 60's the u.s. went through a long period trying to explain to our colleagues why we fought missile defense was not stables, it was destabilizing, and the soviets had build a missile defense system around moscow and it still is there. anyway, the abm treaty was signed as a culmination of the effort which limited both of the u.s. and the soviet sides to the two sites. this ultimately went away as herald said 30 years later under the bush administration. there is a clause in the supreme court national interest which permits either side to withdraw after sufficient notice. we did that and then aggregate

the treaty we illegally withdrew but it led to the tensions with the russians. now i will skip further. there was the effort that was proven to be technologically feasible. there was a shift under george h. w. bush and the more so under clinton and served as the arms control negotiator on of missile defense. we can talk more about that if you like and what happened and why there wasn't a lot of progress with the russians on that. when president obama came into office he requested a review of the entire program, the politics, the policy, the technical capabilities, future plans, and the congress had basically mandated that the administration provide them with report on our approach with an year. this was actually then the first

comprehensive review of all aspects of our programs into a published unclassified open report, and that came out in february, 2010. it's on the web, ballistic missile defense report. anybody can read it. when we came into office, what we inherited was a proposal from the george w. bush administration to put some interceptors, ten interceptors in poland, and a radar, sophisticated radar in the czech republic, and sort of other capabilities. and it was basically justified as an attempt to detour or degrade the attack on the european targets. but it did provoke the russians who saw this as a kind of toe in the water leading to a capability that can degrade

their strategic retaliatory capability. now, many times under clinton and over george w. bush and under president obama, senior americans have met with the russians, have given detailed powerpoint presentations and other kinds of discussions to demonstrate i think very persuasively that there is no way that these systems could seriously degrade the russian attack, not that we want to take the russians attacked but we want the rest to feel comfortable that there retaliatory capability is not threatened. remember if you have ten interceptors and it works perfectly if you attack with 11 missiles, you're going to win so you could overwhelm the system. you can confuse the system with the decrees of various kinds and blind the radar. you can now use cyber against

the communication systems. there are many things you can do to try to defeat the system can you are going to hear quite a bit about that i think by my colleagues. the administration decided after many meetings and consultations and memos and other activities and consulting with many experts of a variety of prescriptions to modify the approach and what was proven by the president was the european adopted the approach, the european phase adapt its approach and what that entailed was a group of interceptors placed in different places some of which were yet to be determined, and some radars that were interconnected that could defeat what we saw as a growing

missile threat particularly from iran but against other potential threats against european targets the polls and the checks had never actually approved the bush plan. the government had not only prove to the legislators had never ratify the agreements because there was never anything actually concrete that would have made clear that we could have even implemented the bush plan. but we chose to diversify their portfolios to speak to look at a number of different ways to base these including and to do something like this in northeast asia with our japanese and south corrine and colleagues to meet the north korean threat. and i should add that there wasn't just a military and sort

of technical objective involved in this decision. there were other aspects to other dimensions, other motivations for the decisions. one was hopefully to be essentially deutsch for the anniversary. we didn't want to use this stuff, we didn't want to just have it there so when the war started we could use it. in fact we hope never to use it. the plan was to demonstrate credibly to other militaries that they would pay a high price for launching such an effort and it wasn't likely to achieve the military objectives, so it was the key policy motivation. at the same time, there was a motivation of insurance and reinsurance of allies. you know, nato was now 28 members. i remember as a kid it was 12 come 16, now it's 28 and i had

the privilege and opportunity to chair de groot weigel was in government which is a group that oversees the nato nuclear weapons policy so i met a number of times in brussels with representatives of every member except the french who do not participate in the high level so 27 of 28 and as you can imagine anyone with 28 is a tremendous heterogeneity. if you are in poland on the edge of the russian border, with the history they have had with russia you have one view about the need for some of the systems and if you are in spain on the beach, you have a different view and it's not easy to come to a kind of consensus on what to do. but overall there was strong support in the members to go

forward with the u.s. proposed to the thought it was important to reassure the public and their government officials that the u.s. wasn't going to be there especially at the time president obama was advocating the reduction and elimination of the nuclear weapons command of the nuclear security guarantee has been the cornerstone of the nato alliance since 1949. so here there is in a way forward ankle in the defense policy motivating the switch this is a non-nuclear to mention to the alliance cohesion that's fully consistent with the president's approach to reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons without in any way leading to the unravelling of the alliance with nato or the japanese or the koreans, whatever, and there's also been although it isn't in the treaty, a sense of collaboration with israel and

they haven't grown the sophisticated defense system intended to deal with threats and a neighborhood and there's a lot of collaboration with the israelis and terms of the technology radar interfaces strategy, intelligence gathering and so forth. turkey which was originally not that interested in supporting this project ultimately now has agreed romania is going to be the base for some interceptors. poland and the czech republic will each play a role so there is a lot of multilateral support for this among many key u.s. allies. we have run into a problem that not that these issues are totally resolved. it's an ongoing management issue but i would say it seems quite manageable and also in

international waters we don't need anybody is approval but when we've run into problems with the russians and also to some extent with china. by all accounts by everything we seem to know, but senior analysts in the strategic rocket forces of russian federation have persuaded the leadership that what we are proposing and particularly down the line because this is the phased approach, this is a decade long program with some new systems coming on board by 2020 and the so-called s m three pitches quite advanced from what we have now, we don't have that now. but the russians extrapolate to keep the what they think we're going to have, believe it will pose a threat, and we have been engaged with them in the missile defense cooperation talks led by the secretary of state dillinger

sure that used to represent the national labs here in the county she's been negotiating for quite some time since the spring of 2009, until now and the haven't reached agreement and in fact unfortunately the president medvedev made a statement not long ago saying the haven't borne fruit, but they're very concerned and feel if there is an agreement to share the that can't share operational capabilities which is a bit of a problem for us. that it could lead them to -- the russians themselves could consider withdrawing from the treaty of the just fine with obama last years we have a lot of work to do with russia, and i should finally had there's another dimension to the motivation here.

which didn't leave us to withdraw the original bush plan, but there is a russia improvement aspect to the strategy, namely you may know if you follow this that as early as the spring of 2009, president obama and vice president biden have spoken about the russia reset strategy and when we came in their relations were very bad. they had invaded georgia in the summer of 08. the russians were very upset about the expansion of nato which actually happened in the clinton administration. they were upset. they were very upset with the u.s. withdrawal from whether it was legally fine. and part of the obama approach has been to improve relations with russia not just to be the guy to get along better, but for the real concrete objectives because on the nuclear side, the

american position under obama is the proliferation of nuclear weapons for other countries, and they are used by terrorists. nuclear terrorism is now the top threat, top security threat to the united states. it's not the threat of a 3,000 entry vehicle exchange with the russians. it's the fact that they will be acquired by other states. the more hands on the nuclear weapons are allowed to be used like in south asia and the middle east or east asia there will be stolen obtained and in some way the non-government groups and to die in support of their goals. so the obama objective has been to bring the russians and the chinese more closely aligned with our view that we have to stop that threat we have

persuasive arguments and tangible measures that we've taken which would be in their interests. as we want to do a variety of things they would support sanctions against iran if we've had trouble landing them to support. the chinese case house welfare spending issues with them, more cooperation in the united front against north korea which has also been a challenge. but improving relations with russia has been at least at that table and how we sought to deploy the weapons systems and the radar associated capabilities so we are still struggling with that. it's not resolved. and with china, there are also making it a somewhat similar argument that they have a smaller force, although actually the force is largely not known and there's been some.

revelatory articles in the washington post at the end of last year that rejected that they may have ten times the number of nuclear weapons the community thinks it has. the strategy is not known and the chinese are also saying that bringing russia or china with the missile defenses coupled with the nuclear forces and coupled with conventional global strike capabilities these would be new long-range missiles with conventional weapons but so were accurate and that could attack the point targets like the silos and a radar and other hard to get target's but this poses a threat to them as well. that's why in the nuclear posture review we propose the strategic stability talks with both russia and china to get these issues on the table and have sustained the discussion with them, present datacom have

them present the counter arguments and hopefully reach some agreement. if you're a student of this sort of thing with the soviet russia burr to the cold war, there were meetings in nova scotia with scientists in 1960. the first agreement we really have in the soviet main union that mattered was 1972 so it took 12 years so, obama spoke about these to the talks and the nuclear posture review as april, 2010. so don't expect, you know, the results by the end of the seminar. it takes a long time to exchange views and not necessarily for them to come around to our view but ultimately to be efficient if not to have a treaty but to have an understanding on a common understanding and agreement, code of conduct and rules of the road so you're not in an adversarial position we don't seek to be in the adversarial position with russia or china on any of these

military issues. but i hope that this gives you an overall flavor for what was motivating. there has been finally controversy over the actual effectiveness of the systems which we can talk about. as i mentioned they can be overwhelmed, they can be defeated, they can get confused. specified in the missile defense review report is the stipulation for the keep these are deployed they must undergo testing that enables the assessment under the realistic operational conditions and this is because a number of the tests early on were not on the realistic operations conditions and people said they were kind of raid, they were easy, there's the target over there and the missile over there. they won't be helping us find them. so there has been an effort in the missile defense agency to establish more realistic conditions. this i would say is contentious.

you can look at the parameters and say this is not realistic. so, it is a work in progress, but the full phase of an active approach to be deployed until 2020 but is still eight or nine years away. so there is time to do many tests and the capabilities and the deployment plans and the rest to build a high confidence system. would it be foolproof or perfect? no. could it detour the potential lever serious? possibly. could it reassure allies? probably. could it possibly improve relations with russia and china? yes. is it worth doing in my judgment? yes. i think it is a very thoughtful, carefully constructed approach, and that is basically my said remarks how we established what we did and hitting in policy terms. thank you.

>> michael, thank you. there was a nice sitting of the stage. we are going to move to a technical side but i don't want anyone here to think that the professor or dr. wilkening don't understand the politics of the situation. so it will seem a little more technical but by people under skilled in the world of political give-and-take. i really like standing-room-only tickets just terrific. but there's no need for people to be standing with at least four chairs here. our next speaker is dean wilkening. he will use slides.

>> with >> i've already introduced the been so we will move right over. >> thank you, harold. thanks to the institute for hosting us and also thanks to the audience for your forbearance since i was formerly affiliated with stanford, so i hope he will take that apology. i'm going to go through some slides to give you a flavor for the cable the of the phased at active approach, and let me begin by jumping off where michael and his comments. in my view, missile defense is becoming technically feasible. we are at the very early stages of exploring this technology and building systems that are beginning to work.

there are still some challenges. it is not a perfect system, but this technology in my mind is good technology. this is not star wars, this is not like the sdi. this is very concrete, potentially very effective technology. .. missile defense assets we have today. i'm going to focus on your. as michael said that it stays active approach really applies

to any region, northeast asia in particular but as well as your eye. most of the discussion these days is about europe, so i'm going to focus on that as well. one usually start some sense of it right. and for europe, we focus on a rant. i wrong with a barely active missile programs, largely consisting of liquid or post missiles, but they are doing some interesting experiments on solid propellants. today they have scads seas, most soviet era missile. they have a shot hog three, but a 1300 on the range missile, liquid missile, but now she probably received from north korea. this is the north korean no missile and they have recently tested a purported missile with a range of anywhere from 202,500 kilometers, somewhere in that range and some people are suggesting they may see a liquid

propellant missile with a range of about 3000 kilometers in the not-too-distant future. so today, the threat is really quite. the missile threat is quite localized in the middle east. obviously israel is very concerned because they are with in range. turkey could be concerned, but turkey is a friend of iran, which is one reason why they resisted nato attempts to join the missile defense effort until very recently when they agree to play radar, which shows and feature maps maps right about here in turkey. in the next several years, five years, the missile range as they start to encroach on southeastern europe or could be southern russia as well or other regions, the saudi's are concerned about uranian missile capabilities and none in the out years, let's say with any decade or so, iran probably can have

the capability to launch missiles that covered the entire european, and it. the bush administration was mostly concerned about icbms, intercontinental ticket to u.s. homeland from north korea or iran. in my view they got the router backwards. as these medium-range missiles that are proliferating quite widely. intercontinental range missiles are a far term threat. how far? how long it will take for him and gets them. on the order of the decade. maybe two. so this is that the inmates the act of approach. now, 90 without a nuclear warhead on this missiles they don't pose much of a threat. they could be a political threat could be soccer match their missiles launched in the middle east and the goal for, but in my mind, without some sort of weapon of mass destruction or a

nuclear warhead, these missiles are particularly -- i wouldn't be spending billions of dollars to defeat them. but of course iran does have a suspect nuclear weapons program and you have been reading a lot about it that in the newspapers recently, so the concern is again we don't know the timeframe, but they can build a nuclear device to stick on top of a ballistic missile with ranges like this and potentially threaten your appearance to that effect animating animating the european phase active approach. michael talked about it. emphasis on near-term threats coming medium-range can intermediate-range, not icbms first. the theater the terminal high-altitude areas are fairly mature theater missile systems, the language has changed a little bit. the standard missile three, enable system is quite mature.

the ground-based chair in alaska that people talk about is the least reliable of the interceptors we have. this is the one that has been failing in several test flights for a host of reasons. not only is it less reliable. it's also more expensive than the order of 7 million -- 70 millions per interceptor, whereas the other one third down and that may be 6 million -- excuse me, 9 million. 10 to 15 million. this architecture built on these more mature missile defense will be less expensive. but most people talk about the interceptors. that's it captures the public imagination. the most important asset for the most important technology behind missile defense is the sensors from a sensor architecture and command-and-control system. sensors are radars, despite one

radar, the cruiser and i'll put forward base expiate radar or the so-called tty two. this is the radar that is associated with the missile defense system. both writers are quite mature. the tty tty two in particular is a very sophisticated and affect his radar. they're also optical sensors, airborne infrared and space-based systems that are maturing quite rapidly and these are figured into the phase of active approach. not only these types of sensors, but they are all to be supposedly a large number netted together since the data from any sensor can be shared with any shooter, any intercept during that is an extremely important attribute is socially in a second. there are four phases as michael mentioned. they are based on different variants of the standard missile

three. the block is out there today on ships. that is phase 12011. the timetable was nigh. the block one be intercept their is the same interceptor at a different vehicle in the end of it come a more sophisticated one undergoing flight test right now. that is supposed to be deployed on ships and in romania to base that michael mentioned was negotiated. phase three is the block intercept various that were jointly developed between the united states and japan. as i said the japanese are collaborating on this venture as well and this is the jointly define system. that is supposed to be deployed in poland and finally the block to be, which was supposed to be a more advanced versions still on ships and on land around europe in 2020. funding for this missile was just cut recently in the 2012

budget because congress was concerned there were too many concurrent development projects underway and said they hacked the funding for this. the netted sensor architecture, an extremely important aspect. multiple radars come espy wide, and maybe nato radars. if one gets into the discussion about russian cooperation, possibility for russian radars being tied into the full system. infrared tracking, whether it's airborne or space-based and the command-and-control system to tie all this together so any shooter can launch off of any particular sensor data. so here is the evolution of the standard missile. launched off of these vertical longitudes and aegis cruisers. this is the spider and radar, the radar here.

you can't quite see it. this is a picture of the fat radar, defeat our data here, the power bands and other things. but this is a movable radar. not quite mobile. very powerful high-frequency radar. and if you look at europe and i start placing these various radars, there's one located in israel today, the one in turkey is located about here and this is the picture but that radar fan could see the volume of space against the cross-section that tells you how large the object is, a fairly small cross-section, but a reference entered a slow. might be coming off beyond other rainy and holistic missile. this also shows one radar

coverage has four phases. this actually was not quite the exact location, but the phase one deployment was to ship in the eastern med. and so, this ship moves around here and could be deployed down here to help her shake israel and the case conflict. now there has been some debate about whether -- this is a land-based site and as i said come espy one an asset to your navel-based assets. so the question is, operating ships 24 cents income of certain expenses i talked about putting on land to reduce cost, what's the radar that goes at this? i've shown here with this by one radar. as you can see, the range is certainly small, probably not the best radar. there've been other people talked about using radars are

different systems and to some extent it's out on but essential with that system. in any case the radar coverage is fairly small. this is the infrared system, here is the sensor ball down here. this is the drone being used over afghanistan. dhea is to take the sensor ball and look up with it and use it to track ballistic missiles. this is an off-the-shelf system you can use right away. that configuration is not what she wanted her missile defense but it is the beginning. and in fact, if you do find a better airborne infrared system in the picture he just showed you, this shows the area of space looking on the air but an infrared system familiar with

every system on the temperature you look at because these can detect black body radiation, the heat coming off the object and so for warmer objects that is turned temperature you can see about a thousand kilometers supply these infrared send yours burkholder object 250 kelvin minus 50 degrees to minus 30 degrees centigrade. the detection range not quite as good. but you can see through your bids in and around europe you get substantial coverage. why is that important? if i go back to the radar, here is a notional intermediate-range ballistic missiles launched at a central iran having toured europe and these are those radar pictures. the forward-based radar, trajectory flies through that fairly reliably.

but the problem is the radars, the target overflights to radar and it does need the time. and so this is one of the main roles for the airborne infrared system if i overlay the 300-degree kelvin contouring put the airborne infrared and the black sea off the coast of romania and now i get good three-dimensional coverage over europe and the sensor starts providing the track information to consummate my engagements. okay, let me talk a little bit about the defended area. this is one way to look at whether the system is affected or not. can you defend an area as large as europe with the handful of interceptor sites. this is based on calculations they did at stanford some months back. and i want to introduce three concepts, which are extremely important to this season after september really talked about in the newspapers so you can -- it

is quite easy to misunderstand. there's several modes of operation for missile defense system. when a stand-alone operation, where the radar that is associated with the interceptor carries out on the tracking, guidance and communicates with the interceptor and consummate engagement by itself. no external sensor helps him in the process. stand-alone operation. long-term remote is a mode where -- actually i can show you here. i am going to show you some maps of how wide of an area a standard missile see light system, kind of a notional standard missile on it a couple of different feed for these missiles. i will show you the area goodness that can offend. you're a stand-alone operation looking at the vessel. here is those radar fans

associate with espy one radar, seeming at espy one put in romania and here is the missile trajectory and communicates at this radar to look right around this region of the radar coverage because you will see something coming and carried it to use this radar look. this radar then start scanning the portion and detects the object, track set, once this the interceptor and has the karaoke intercept before the object falls too deep into the atmosphere for the interceptor to work properly. when i operate in that mode, i can defended area on the ground that looks like this yellow patch you can barely see down here. it is a very small defended area that tends to be behind the interceptor site, but this is sort of a standard mode of operation and also fairly and affect you for protecting large areas.

long john remote is right track data from other sensor in this case the x-band return turkey and attracts the object and i send the track information to the intercept her year based on the radars track. but then i can't send me an within the field of view of this radar. this has to watch the target in the interceptor and tell them how approximately close thickening. you launch the interceptor a remote track data. this has been tested on the field and they've had success so far. but if you can see the defended area is drink compared to stand-alone but still not out of lurch. the most effective mode of operation and the adaptive approach is heading towards this: engage on remote and engage on remo i have some

forward since then this radar here to pick set the track. a lunch may interceptor based on this track information and a second sensor, the airborne infrared keeps tracking this, tracks the interceptor nacelle and the only thing that the radar, despite one does is the communication link to communicate to the intercept to say okay, the abi are coming to airborne infrared data tells me this is very exciting so just your track until you have an engagement. this is a remote so you launch the remote based on another sensor and you essentially remove the radar in this case that is co-located with the interceptor site. that is the most effect this mode of operation.

so now let me turn to the defense of europe. phase one, this is at the defended area looked like. we have one ship in the eastern avenue is the kind of threat that shall have three that could move down to defend israel and over greece and provide some localized events in the middle east. you probably need two or three ships that there was a real war that broke out. maybe send down here defending other half that. that is that the defense picture looks like today. one ship for a handful of ships using the block one intercept your out in the field today. phase two, three years from now. largely the same picture. now we have the standard missile

one b., and improved interceptor on land. also in the eastern med, maybe a couple of the ships here and by now, three years from now, the range of missile threats might extend out to 2000 kilometers, something like that. severely localized defense of southeastern europe with two, three, maybe four site, something like that. things get interesting if these three, 2018. now we are supposed to have the block to any interceptor and it's supposed to be deployed on land and poland. this is for the interceptor site is going to be. one of the issues one gets into his there's not a lot of information the public domain. all the charts are based on public domain information. we don't know how fast the interceptor size and speed matters in this business. so what i've done a show at family occur from three nafta

for not co-owners representing the coverage you would get from poland of europe. the interceptor speed. and again, maybe the missile threats that extend throughout all of europe, who knows. but i have shown the maximum rate to reach england. importantly, this is since engage on remo. to provide other track data for this to operate. now you get practically defending europe in a higher speed. remote will also be implemented. now i've shown these airborne platforms orbiting in a family of curves may be the romanian site with a slower interceptor, maybe a faster one, who knows. but if i put these two together

by 2015, let's assume it is four kilometers per second and i have engaged. i have to lambaste i alone and with engage on remo i can get shots from both of these sides and many missile heading in words the center of europe. i didn't point this out, that is clear in this chart that this radar in turkey, the church only agreed to put every out there, no interceptors. unfortunately it is outside the defended area for most of the other assets. if i went back i could show you it has a hard time defending it. this asset is an extremely important radar location they needs to be defended. if i put a battery thereafter other radar that goes with the sad system, the terminal high

altitude. so they put the whole battery there instead of just the radar, this is the defended area you would get chemists to start defending radar itself. if i don't have engage on remote and all i have this want john remote, this is what the picture looks like. here is a public site, no receptors around there. if we don't get engage a remote, the defense -- the broad area it as a sense of europe is virtually impossible unless these are proliferating interceptor sites all over the place. so that highlights the importance of that particular aspect of the defense. i was talking earlier with herald about the issue of rashad and i want to at least touch on a little bit of why the russians are concerned, but phase four of the european phase approach is really designed to defend the united states, not europe.

after for a serious defense of your were as his united states. so here i put interceptors in poland as a circa 2020. i seem engage on remote and nice in a standard missile three block to be at different speeds and it shows the defended footprint going against an iranian icbm. let's assume they have an icbm at the maximum range is assumed here, slicing through the united states. if the interceptor speed is four and have kilometers per second, which is very fast for defending europe, this is the defended area in here. you really cannot protect the united states. if i increase, now i can do a good job at defending the eastern part of the united states, but the west coast is a little bit out of the footprint. i have not shown you capability of the fork release had appeared, which actually can defend missile area. so five kilometers per second,

the forward site helps us in the east coast, fort greeley, west coast and so that would work. but he went to cover the entire united states from poland come your interceptor speed has to be five and a half quarters per second, much faster than any three interceptors being taught about. now, why are russians concerned? this chart shows you the footprints in the defended area for a russian icbms launched from all the known launch locations in russia for a five climber a second intercept hair, which is high for any of the sm three interceptors currently being taught about. so if i put that lock that has the speed as high as five kilometers per second and poland, which has been the source of much of russia's

concern, you really cannot protect united states. it remains at 27 attaché though you might catch them going to name, but the rest of the united states, alaska and hawaii you cannot intercept those icbms. to threaten russia's icbms from european launch sites on the interceptor speed has to be out about five kilometers per second closer to six or seven. so just to summarize, transit observations i would like to draw from this. engage on remote is absolutely essential. the sensor architecture and battle management system to tie assets together is key to the system. if you don't have it, system doesn't work. phase one, two ships, three

tips, decent coverage. same with phase two. phase three is where things get interesting, were supposed to engage on remote capability will be available. two sites covers all of europe. turkey is outside the defended area, especially the radar so you need to deploy there, so that's fun discussions this how about discussing a few interceptors. a sense of the states really have to be five kilometers to protect the united states from european launch location. if you do get about five, five and a half, six come you can do a nice job defending. the problem is nice to a potentially posing a threat to russia's cu cannot have your cake and eat it too. you cannot defend the united states from europe against uranian icbms without potentially encroaching on russian capabilities though in

my mind you don't encourage very much. in fact most of the russian concerns are more political in nature than military technical sensor issues are key. airborne infrared, space-based infrared, good sensors. you need more than just one or two tv way readers enable radar is badly the french radars, hopefully will contribute to the system. multiple radars and that rapid command-and-control system and i think that is it. so that is the kind of capability the system could have been there a several key pillars required to really make this thing work fairly well, which i believe it could. >> thank you, that was very helpful. and personally left left with the question of we are giving defense every benefit of the

doubt and everywhere casey said convicted doesn't threaten the russians very much until phase for. so i tend to come down where you come down with the russian objections are much more political than technical. about is that flash of brilliance i warned you about and i will stop that point. would you take it up from there? >> where do i begin? >> pam were concerned about where you will end. let me start out by telling you about a way to protect you.

i am going to bed airport security employees to protect you from terrorist attacks on the airplane. however, i am not going to let anybody x-ray your luggage or anyone else's luggage. i am not going to let anybody look into the luggage. i am not going to let dogs still engage. i am simply going to let people look your luggage and decide based on whatever they think matters, like colors, shapes, whatever whether or not it has a bomb in it. or god or whatever. this is basically a level of discrimination capability that is missile missile defenses defenses have today. in fact come you don't even have to even have to have the suitcase because they suitcase

would actually weigh something. but since you put a decoy and 80 vacuum of space and inflated and there is not bureaucratic, this thing could tumble along into the distant radar operating at thousands of onlookers range or to an infrared sensor operating at hundreds of kilometers range in some cases. it would be an object potentially does or does not carry a nuclear weapon. so when i start tacking on a counter visions later on, keep in mind that hitting the target is not the easy task. i mean, it is not a hard task. the hard task is finding the object being thrown at you. if you think decoys are difficult to build, let me give you a general analogy and before i go and do some facts that is worth contemplating. imagine you have an adversary

that has the technical capability to build a long-range ballistic missile order an icbm. they have the ability to build a nuclear weapon and in the reentry vehicle with a fuse that would properly detonate the nuclear weapon, but they can't figure out how to inflated to pollute and to play with it. if you believe there is such an adversary like that in the world, i've got some bridges to sell you a lot with missile defense. now, i was a little surprised that might have worked on the ballistic missile defense review because this is something near and dear to my heart. i do not see any evidence that the ballistic missile defense review had any technical input of any kind. editing a document is amazing

for the statements he makes. i actually wrote a rather elaborate article on at one point, so i am -- i can't remember anything normally, but this one i happen to remember. here is an assertion for you from the ballistic missile defense. the u.s. is currently defended by the ground-based missile defense system that is deployed in alaska and brandenburg air force base. it is currently defended and will continue to be defended for the foreseeable future, although we should do or to make sure it stays that way. this is clearly and unambiguously stated in the ballistic missile-defense review. the last test failure and the missile defense program was an experiment sometimes called the ftc the ftc followed by replication followed by replication of that experiment, the ft g 06a.

those two experiments were set up so as to make it easier to interceptor warhead. i invite people to essay questions. i want to give you a bit of an overhead year. in fact in the process of trying to make the warhead easier to hack, they inadvertently spewed out material that caused the ex-pat radar to fail because material acted much like what is known as radar chaff, which rainout defeats the system. there is no argument about it in a technically sound committee. i want to be clear on this. chastity is the system. the ballistic missile defense also says that the new reactors in missile defense technologies that allow for the ballistic missile defense is particularly

good paa to have a chance of working. in fact, the president said that in his speech, announcing on september 17, 2009. let me be clear. there are no new technologies, none. there are no propulsion technology he, no sensor technologies. there are no material ballistic missile defense technologies that give this system greater capability. i'll have something more to say about that shortly. the paa is a proven and effective missile defense. the president said that december 15, 2009, yet if the paa has never been tested against a tumbling target. now that he's staying because of the gulf war of 1991 per

incident land appeared was represented as 96% successful in her m.i.t. group showed that it went almost certainly 0% successful for equal to one to pkt quoted zero, which should tell you something about this community and its ability to tell the truth, they're a tumbling targets of high altitude for reasons i can explain again in the question-and-answer period, the same missile had design features, not flaws. i see features that caused it tumble at high altitude and behave very irregularly on reentry. and incidentally it would completely defeat the patriot act three as well. we have examined not and have

actually studied it. if the target is cut into pieces they take a warhead and a missile and instead of cutting the missile -- if you have a two-stage missile you put the third stage away from the second. you can just to soak up a single into many pieces. the radar is a totally incapable of telling which pieces such as whether there's a warhead or not. so, basically the countermeasure problems that both the ground-based missile defense and the adaptive approach these are the same. one has smaller intercept jerry's come one is bigger interceptors, but they are both basically useless if they face very simple countermeasures that the kind riccardi described.

now let me tell you -- this is of course something that i've been talking about for really more than a decade. although the new stuff on the paa has been over the last few years. the department of defense just published a report by the defense. in fact the report was asked for by ash carter when he was assistant secretary, value deputy secretary. so i asked carter to ask for this report. a money till you what i think happy. i'm going to be very cynical here. so don't be too shocked. i think the defense science board inadvertently hired some contract or seduce eddie who actually did a study because the people who sign these documents when you get to the pentagon unit that that people are saying these documents have nothing to do with actually what the study

is. and they were so careless. icq is because i am describing the motive of concealing information from you the american people. they were so careless that one the unclassified version of this document was put out, the inadvertently spilled the beans. so i tell you what this document that the deputy secretary of defense is not out there in the open and shut recipient e-mail i will send you the letters that her colleague and i wrote to national security adviser just a month ago. we have received a reply to a guy, but there'll be a newspaper article on it. the defense science board report stated the following. none of the raiders in the a tough to pull approach, none of them are up to the job of actually supporting the systems workability. none of them. they are all too short range.

i will show you a chart if necessary to show you that the radar cross-section of the rather large and rather typical cone shaped warhead is at least 10 times smaller than would be in showed was the case, at least at x-band. at lpn it is the 10th of a square meter. if every are cross-section is even smaller, that means the range of the reader not only determined by the power of the radar, intended size, gain at the intent that the radar cross-section the radar reflectivity, which is in control of the adversary is what determines the range of the radar cross-section and in this case you'd typically expect an unsophisticated warhead furthers no effort to make a stealthy to be 130 square meter and all of these readers even shorter range

than what people are claiming. and i would like to point out that it is not hired to make the radar cross-section thousands of square meters at x-band. this is on the grave problems that ex-pat readers have. you could easily make a warhead histology. now the department of defense report, get the department of defense to order the deputy secretary asked for also made an amazing statement. it says something i've been saying for more than 10 years. but i've been saying for 10 years, if he is the suitcases out there and just inspecting with your eyes, you can't tell whether or not there's a bomb in the budget. you have to set them, open up the suitcase and look around and even then you might fail, that certainly won't go to attend a fire when the suitcase is a bomb

they simply it. this is not a profound statement to say, but a lot of technical details behind this very simple statement, which is correct completely in terms of the analogy is doing it. the defense science board resize the department of defense has not demonstrated the ability to tell warheads from decoys. this is the report, unclassified report to deputy secretary of defense carter had asked for a couple of years ago. it also says that a capability that the missile defense agency has been talking about for a long time called to shoot, look, shoot. let me just explain this simply. i have an object. i want to destroy you. if i don't have time to shoot

and see if i destroyed it and shoot again that typically would shoot to scepters simultaneously. well, if i have this problem, it greatly increases the number of interceptors they need in my defense. so what has happened is a lot of talk about shoot, look, shoot. you need to host these to look out early enough that you can shoot a second interceptor and your time to shoot a speck in first fails. but this report stated that i am sure it is correct, that it is not possible because it is not demonstrated that they will know they destroy the warhead or will be able to tell the warhead that is created that a target.

if you can't tell a piece of rocket motor and the intercepted sound or something now is traveling along with the warhead is a warhead or a piece of debris. you can't execute here this report says that quite clearly and it makes the important factual statement unless they are lying to the deputy secretary of defense at the department of defense is not demonstrated this capability. now, what this report does is release his interesting intelligence. the intelligence shows that adversaries are already testing missiles they release objects that could be decoys but the end of powered flight. now, of course if you could build a rocket and deploy a

warhead, you should be able to deployable and pearce of the should be no surprise unless you want to buy that bridge from me. so this is what we are currently facing. now that they make a general policy statement. i shudder to do so. here is the argument that the ballistic missile defense review. there are actually going to deter them and cause them to throw up their hands and give up. that could be true. i'm not opposed to all situations and i've worked in the military and i have great admiration for what they do and how they do it. but you can only deter an

adversary if you have a credible capability to do what you claim. if you don't have a credible capability to do what you claim come you may actually encourage the adversary to go ahead for decoys. and if you want to cement relationships with our allies, i think it has been very good allies if you claim you are defending them and they wind up with a nuclear warhead shoved down their throat. because they have been told that they can deal with it. so these are some general statements that i was not in ending to make when they first -- you can stop me at any point. if you think it's getting too violent. [laughter] i don't bite. i just kick. so i want to just make a few points i'd actually planned to

say and i'll try to cut them short because obviously i've taken time on this other matter. how does the bush system differ from the phase adaptive approach? at the face adaptive approach does is substitute the very large number of smaller and slower interceptors for a very small number of very large dinners appears. that's a simpleminded way of stating it. now, these interceptors are mobile platforms. except of course when they hear on faith in europe. it is not true that within a five-kilometer per second here to defend the united states at this system, at least in erie. you actually think it would work. i don't think it will work at all, so why am i concerned about it.

but you will need a four-kilometer per second columnar to defend the united states at that. it gets even better and there's very little uncertainty in the public domain about the speed of this interceptor. it's one house per second. attack to numerous people in the department of defense. the white house, congress who have access. nobody's ever suggested this interceptor is not foreign of kilometers per second. but they make clear you cannot determine whether this interceptor is foreign of kilometers per second because the nature of its design is that it is a very inefficient rocket system because it is designed mostly for safety, because people in our navy don't like to get blown up by their own missiles if they have an accident or should. and i generally resent having worked with vb and i think that is quite good. so, let us the question.

is the current strategy based on sound fundamentals? i would argue no. not in terms of the logical reasoning is somebody who is trained to be a strategist would argue because strategy ultimately has to be implemented and if you can't implement a strategy, if you don't have the means to implement a strategy, than having a strategy that is not based on realistic means to implement it, it is simply crazy, especially when it is a military strategy. technically, the problems are very severe because you have no ability to tell decoys from warhead in decoys with the extremely effective in reducing the capabilities of the system. let me give you a couple quotes from this report at the deputy secretary asked for.

this is actually out of the report. successful operations at these defense systems is predicated on an ability to discriminate in the xo atmospheric, and the vacuum of space. the missile warheads discriminate the missile warheads from other pieces of offensive missile complex such as rocket bodies, miscellaneous hardware and intentional countermeasures. the importance of achieving reliable but horse termination cannot be overemphasized. that is the report statement. it goes on to say the department of defense is not demonstrated this. so they have made a statement about what the system require minutes. we sit down, design the system and see it has to do this well to meet our objectives. we look at the technological

possibilities and if we are being honest come with it well, cannot eat these military object is that we throw it out and start over and look for something else or spend our resources in the military enterprise that makes moore's and. i'm not getting into the question of whether or not the resources should be spent on other issues. that's a good question and it deserves discussion, but i won't treated here. so, why are the russians worried about phase three of the system? phase three is important. it is not faced for they are worried about. it's phase three. i do not think it is political myself. i could be wrong. there is certainly high political component to this whole team to both the united states and russia is playing. so you'd have to be, and blind

to not realize that this is so political it's hard to believe. in fact, they think it is so political that the people in the white house don't even don't even care what if system works. they're so worried about the republicans calling them cowards but that is what's the concern. the money tell you, i meet with people in the white house. i don't say who because -- but that is for the fear is because there were people in the white house who understand exactly the type of facts i'm describing here. so if the system has no capability, where the russians worried? let me just step back for phase three, why phase three is important. phase three is supposed to calm summer between 2018 and 2020. it is scheduled for 201810 turns out they are so far behind in the kill vehicle for phase three

data will probably be 2020. in 2020, new start comes to an end in the united state beach is the new arms reduction negotiation with russia. the russians have said, we regard this system is threatening and we're going to withdraw from all future arms reductions with the united states after new start and are we might even withdraw from the start at some point because we are so concerned about this. and i can tell you that people i am working with and some of are big pentagon insiders are very worried about this and they should be because i think the russians are very serious. all right. but why are they worried about this? i just told you is worthless. it's just your money, but after all, wall street took, wall

street two keratitis well and of course the people in the white house or protect you from wall street, just as they are from these foreign missiles. and incidentally that a sudden accident because they used to be sick over this issue come but then i saw what they did with regard to wall street and i said people can't do it this threat to our country, how can they do with missile to an? where they're not concerned enough about this? has spent some time learning about economics. by the way, since i learned about economics, let me just make a point. it is to tell people they worked in the air those distinguished intellectual poverty. but now that i do something about economics i don't say anything about it. [laughter] so what does this give you the worst of both worlds? first of all, the other guy building missile defense is unleashes very bureaucratic forces. so if i'm in china or russia or for that matter the united states as we saw when murphy and

occurred when we built all these multiple that got us onto so much trouble, i point at the edit as missile defense and say hey, we need more missiles. and you know, if you don't get me more missiles and going to find a way to make my case to your political adversaries or to the people in pointing out to you are not doing that you need to do to defend this country. anybody who looks at the soap on a the a administration that we've behaved when faced with that should have no trouble understanding this can occur another political environments. this is not a unique vulnerability of democratic societies. many people think mr. putin is going to harden up even more because he wants to show his electorate in russia that he is in charge and he's going to build on fears people have. i would be glad to tell you

unfounded fears, but we are dealing with the social, technical, political phenomenon here. it's not purely technical, not purely social, not purely political. it's very difficult for leaders to resist these forces. and that's all societies the matter with the system is like. so, what does the adversaries leadership really? that it's a question you ask if for the planner on the other side. so when i see general -- i worked in the pentagon. it is a scientific advisor to the chief of naval operations who says what? so, when i see general james cartwright in front of the senate saying that -- he was

actually asked by patrick at the senator now. he was asked a member of the committee if there is a crisis between the united states and north korea, what advice would you give the president of the united states with regard to the ground missile defense system? and he said, i would tell the president that he could have complete confidence in the system. you could see the eyebrows raised in the senate among senators. now this guy is the second most senior bill member of our military. i worked in nuclear war plan for an early work on them. i was at the ground zero's level. i really have a lot of access to the pentagon's and i was hoping to integrate the force that is just coming in there.

so i know what goes on in these plans. and it should make your hair stand on that. what the statements of a military leader of that level does is it potentially creates the possibility of a misunderstanding by leadership. when i was at the pentagon, i look at the moscow abm system, a worthless system. i give a lecture on the moscow abm system in one of the course is. i sat and looked at that system then i set, why are they doing this? what do they believe? what might they do in a crisis for a concentration that could inadvertently get us into nuclear war because they believe something about the system that's not true?

serving the point of view of the military planner that the system doesn't capability doesn't stop them from speculating about the potential accidents that could lead to nuclear war. let me just end here because i can see harold is getting out the club and i'm sure my other colleagues here will have their own clubs to use against me. thanks. >> thank you. thank you very much. [applause] >> i want to thank all three speakers of course. >> i had promised and i will keep that promise that we will take some time just to let the three speakers clarify what the other speaker may have said or may have not said. i think we'll keep the same order we had. that is michael, would you like to just comment on what the intent headset. >> yes, i will be very brief because we want comments from the floor. i will just say a couple of things. first of all, dean has been an

advisor to the defense department on these issues. so recently and currently he's very knowledgeable about the strengths and limitations of the system is also national academy. >> may explain his position. let me just comment on two-point to raise. one is for sparing technical input to the missile defense review? are actually i think he said there was no technical input. these are some of the technical group support over the details of our systems. ..