>> in business climate, job creation and so forth. i disagree with some of the numbers that the governor has outlined. in fact, political outlined about a week ago that they've done better in job creation is false to. >> that is false, they did not. that's not true [talking over each other] >> 6.35% times the rate of --

>> rest my case. >> it was only to .3 times the rate of job creation in virginia. and for that i apologize. [laughter] >> and not to me. >> and to you. >> i will rest my case on that. competition is good between states. i like it but it makes us both stronger, and because we are fierce competitors, both of our states do well in job creation and have lower unemployment. but i'm sure he wouldn't in his list of credits talk to you about the governors in california and illinois and new york and connecticut that have horrible ratings when it comes to the climate for business on taxes and everything else. here's the difference. democrat governors believe that increasing taxes and increasing regulation and protection unions is the way to create jobs and encourage the private sector. republicans governors don't. we have a lot more faith in individual liberties and the

beauty and credible power of the entrepreneur and the free enterprise system. we believe the more you unshackle them without government regulation and interference, the better they do. i think time will tell if this obamacare individual mandate that i believe is the largest entry in of the federal government, and individual freedoms and states ability to govern in american history, if it's upheld it will show to be an absolute budget buster. $2.2 billion in virginia alone, unfunded mandates over the next decades. so all i can use go back and say, republican governors have an 11 out of the 15 best states for business, and seven out of 10 lowest on employment rates. you can have all of the other faction want but even though many states have taken steam is money, you're right, and have taken money from the federal government, more money we send to them, i wish they would stay out of the. i would like to of a lot more

devolution of this. let them get out of that. let us keep our money. we can manage our money better. i would much rather have medicaid d block granted in the states and not have the federal government come out with all these rules and mandates that we didn't have to ask for waivers and exemptions. let us run our own programs. this philosophy is why we are going broke at the federal poker to lasting -- >> if this were the oscars, the orchestra would be pulling. >> president obama had two years, the first two years of his administration with him and his party entirely in charge, what did we do for job creation package? nothing but what do we do to do something positive to be a will to reduce the debt, adopt something like simpson-bowles, that's not leadership it now he's blaming things on the republicans, tea party founders. i'm saying that's not leadership it take charge, get results. that's not what this president

isn't doing. >> is this on? do you believe that the great disparities of income and wealth that exists in this country, the disparities between the 1% and 99%, that that is a socially good state of affairs? and if it isn't, what should government be doing about it, if anything? >> who is that to? >> both a dress that. quickly and then we will go over here. >> i just think it's wrong to start dividing people. that's what this president has done with his 1% versus 99%. its traditional class war model that is incredibly divisive. do you know we ought to be doing? we should be celebrating the people who have made in america. l. gates in steve jobs, they dropped out of college, went to the basement, put her god-given house to work and created an incredible products that have

blessed the world and of great hundreds of thousands of jobs and a lot of wealth and opportunity for people. we are to celebrate that. what we have in washington is people attacking it and say we need to tax and regular that were. that is exactly the opposite of what america's stood for for 235 years. those policies divide the country. yes, i'm more worried about the people that don't take full advantage of the opportunities. we need to get everyone that opportunity for the american dream. this is a nation of opportunity but not guarantees. >> the strength, the economic strength, the wages of america's middle class declined for the first time since the second world war due to the disastrous policies of the presidency of george w. bush. the results of those choices have had three primary effects that we're all digging out from still. one of those effects has been

the largest debt ever racked up by an american president. it was racked up by president george w. bush. 55% of the dead, because of tax cuts that he pushed, which benefited primarily the very wealthiest among us under the theory that if they only have more money the cloud would burst and jobs would be created all over the nation. well, that didn't happen. instead, brought about the greatest job loss of any president since the great depression. and it has also led to a severe under capitalizing of the basic investments that had always allowed us to create jobs and expand opportunities in the past. so that income disparity is a symptom of those, of those other three very damaging effects to our country.

what we need to do is restore the strength of america's middle class. we do that by creating jobs. and part of that involves, as tom friedman said, the investments we can only make together, and research and develop them in infrastructure and science, technology, and also provided for our common defense. so, that's what always worked for america before. we went on a bad experiment. the motto of pay less and ledbetter is great for wal-mart, but it's not what builds a great republic. >> over on this side. >> my question is for both governors. it is with respect to immigration. immigration is a federal responsibility, but can the states lead the country to a solution on immigration? >> i hope so. i think, i think -- there's

been, jeb bush, former republican governor, said that the big failing of the current crop of presidential republican candidates, i think he said it just last night or this morning, is that they have gotten away from jobs, instead they're all about fear and trying to see who can one of the other in terms of fear. one of the central fears is fear of the other to whoever the other is. and the call of your question of new americans, of immigrants the president obama has done more to enforce our borders, more to deport people are convicted of crimes and threaten the public safety. but i do think that what we need to have is a deeper and better understanding of one another. we need to turn away from fear, and instead embrace the human dignity that we see in one another, including the children of immigrants who were born

here, to go through our high schools, who want to be, want to be productive citizens in our country. on the referendum this year, will also be a state d.r.e.a.m. act where we said in maryland, the test for whether or not a family pays in state tuition in maryland is whether you're a resident of maryland and whether you pay taxes in maryland. and i think if we can focus on a better future we want for all of our kids, strip away the fear and focus on human dignity, i think we can get back to the country, in the past, had always found a way to welcome talented, hard-working people from across the globe to make our country better. >> we have a couple minutes left. time for another question. i've a question about you guys personally, which we haven't talked that much about. you are a former athlete, governor mcdonnell. governor o'malley, were you an athlete younger? >> let's say i was on the football team.

[laughter] >> the position i played usually was left out. >> you are both fit guys. i'm always concerned about the fitness of politicians. cellmate banquet dinners and whatnot but what do you do to stay in shape? >> i tried to stay with them all starches and jump if i can. but i have a little treadmill in one of the rooms in the governor's residence, and so i try at least couple days a week, situps, push-ups, run a couple miles and watch fox news. [laughter] picu also come you could get political ads while you are working out. >> that's in the car. >> governor? >> i tried to work out everyday. it doesn't always work. i try to work out -- [inaudible] >> this was fun. we should take this on the road. >> i do want to thank politico. try to work out, the older i get the less i do the cards and the other sorts of things, the more acute vegetable. if someone can promise one quick question we can finish up with.

>> i can't believe we're going to end political with a fitness question. >> make it a good one. >> you just talked about how more people of god health coverage in maryland, and also i want to know about what your position was on the future of health care in your states, the future of the individual mandate is to ensure. could you just comment? >> sure, we are looking for to be an early adopter of universal health care, we believe that we an advantage for our businesses, small businesses, startups, entrepreneurial, so we found ourselves into health i.t. the health care exchanges and all of those things. so we think will be a very positive develop and. for us, and we think it will be a competitive advantage as states ms. continue to fight. >> governor mcdonnell, you one. you will get the last word. >> if the federal government can mandate a just a byproduct or a

service, and if you don't you get fined, there's no limit left. we're done as a nation. this is important, more than health care. what we're doing with republican governors have come up with a very broad plan for revising and doing medicaid as a block grant. i sent governor am i the plan which i'm sure he has read entirely as well as the president and the legislator so they can kiss consider it. although we believe just have a better free market, breakdown the barriers about buying insurance state lines, better point of interest and have a stronger segment. that's what we've got in virginia. we are a very healthy population but we look forward to some alternatives to the federal bureaucracy. >> to both governors and to the audience, thank you very much. you guys are terrific. >> we will be on the road, i'm sure. >> take it to vegas. he would sell out the strip. this is great stuff. thank you all very much.

[inaudible conversations] >> governors o'donnell and oman our local governors of virginia and maryland respectively. they are also endeavored and national governors association winter meeting. which we will be coming starting tomorrow morning at 10 a.m. eastern after "washington journal." you can see coverage on c-span to also check our website for our further coverage options. the american enterprise institute hosted a discussion this afternoon on green energy and what could go wrong with it. you can see that conversation live beginning at noon eastern on a companion network, c-span3.

>> one of the tricky thing about writing this book for me was thinking through the way the particularly the international human rights context, rights were both kind of straddled as a moral imperative and aspirational ideal, and more practical than formal mandate it on afterwards from distributing food to the poor in india to sex

trafficking in japan, richard thompson ford defined human rights and how well-meaning western reform can be to increase exploitation saturday night at 10 p.m. also this weekend, saturday at 7 p.m. i look at african-american to serve in congress. is joined by former congressman and at 11, a book party for shooting from the lip. booktv every weekend on c-span2. >> you are watching c-span2 with politics and public affairs weekdays feature live coverage of the u.s. senate, on weeknights watch key public policy defense. and every weekend the latest nonfiction authors and books on booktv. you can see past programs and get our schedules at our website. you can join in on the conversation on social media sites.

>> and a panel discussion on u.s. ballistic missile defense plans and potential threats from iran. you will hear from former different department officials, and an mit professor who disputes the government missile interceptor test results. from university of california at berkeley, about an hour and 15 minutes. >> welcome everyone. as people take seats, we can begin. my name is jack. i'm the director of governmental studies, and which, together with the department of physics, i think it's the first such formal collaboration. we are cosponsoring this fascinating seminar. this seminar is one of the series that we sponsor on the rubric of the harold smith seminar series, which focuses on

u.s. defense policies, with emphasis on the control and management of nuclear weapons. and this is the third year of the series, and we've had numerous distinguished experts come here to speak about vital matters. and the reason that they come is because of person for whom this series is named, doctor harold smith, who i'm going to invite appear in a minute. and harold holds the appointed a visiting scholar with governmental studies, and also i believe distinguish resident scholar at the school of public policy. he has a long history at berkeley. he was professor here and chair of the department nuclear energy for moving on the workforce in the private sector and then within government, where he was the assistant secretary at the department of defense with responsibility in this nuclear proliferation area.

he has many other honors. i'm just going to mention to you. one is fellow of the american physical society, and the second, which i love to announce, is commander in the leeches of honor of france. france. so without further ado, harold. [applause] >> i should say that we had the privilege of being courted by c-span. so i probably wore the wrong color type it anyway, we're going to be on c-span. >> friends and colleagues, the text today is from robert frost poem, then mending wall.

i'm going to quote from it. before i build a wall, i would ask in a what i was bawling in or wall in out, and to whom i would like to give offense. in the poem, frost was already too late. the wall had been built. it would simply being repaired. and we are too late today to ask these questions about today's role, namely, ballistic missile defense. it already exists. the united states has unilaterally withdrawn from the tree. interceptors have been placed in alaska to defend against north korea. the obama administration is negotiating a european missile defense to defend against iran. which indeed is quote, like to give offense, and the quote, to russia. and it already has.

something there is that doesn't love a wall, but that is not the subject today. the subject is where should we go from here? not how or why did we get here. among the pressing questions will be what is the obama ballistic missile defense approach, and how does it differ from the bush policy. is the current u.s. strategy based on sound technical principles? what are the likely international ramifications of the obama administration's approach to missile defense? particularly in europe. to address this question, we have three talented and highly qualified experts. to my immediate left is michael nacht, professor of public policy at the goldman school, recently turned from a post in the obama administration as assistant secretary of defense for global security. on my far right, dean wilkening,

a distinguished member of the staff of the livermore laboratory and the former technical director of stanford sasaki. he has published and spoken widely on bmd. in the middle is professor theodore postol, professor of science, technology and national security. at mit. he has also published and spoken widely on this subject. each will speak for about 15 to 20 minutes. hopefully without interruption, unless there is an absolute fit of brilliance that grips one of us, myself included. this will be followed by 30 minutes clarification among the speakers where the goal, unlike the recent presidential debates, will be in passionate will be to

inform the audience, not to disparage the speaker. then there will be time for q&a, questions and answers from the audience. and i will enumerate the ground rules for that at the appropriate time. with that i turn to michael nacht for the first talk. michael? >> thank you very much, harold. glad again to be back to discuss some of these issues. my assignment this afternoon is to give you an overview of the policy approach of the administration. to missile defense, that led to the publication of the ballistic missile defense review report in early 2010, light advocated what it did, and what am awful bit about what has happened since. and my colleagues provide a lot of detail on the technological

issues, pros and cons of the systems. i was tempted to spend a little time getting a background about the subject, but harold basically said don't do that. just to say that there has always been, well, there has been a debate for decades about the wisdom of missile defense, putting aside feasibility. in the most simple terms, if you and i both had missiles, offense of missiles, that could destroy each other. and each of us was confident our missiles could get through, even if we were struck first, they would have some sort of condition of strategic stability through mutual deterrence. but supposing in that situation i thought to build missile defenses while still retaining my offense if capability. you could plausibly construed

that as anna offensive measure thing i was going to defense to degrade your retaliatory attack, after i struck you first. so in the '60s the u.s. with a long period of trying to explain to our saudi colleagues why would not missile defense was not stabilizing, was de- stabilizing. and the saudis have dealt a missile defense system around moscow, and it is still there. anyway, the treaty was alternately signed as a culmination of that effort which limited both the u.s. and soviet side to two sites. this ultimately went away, as harold said, 32 years later under the bush administration. there is a clause in the supreme national interest clause which permits i decide to withdraw after sufficient notice but we do that.

we didn't legally abrogate the treaty illegally withdrew. but it led to an increase in tensions with russia. and now i will skip further, under reagan, which was a huge effort that was proven to be technologically infeasible. there was a shift under george h.w. bush and then more so under clinton were i served as an arms control negotiator on theater missile defense. we will talk more about that if you like, what happened and why, there wasn't a lot of progress with the russians on the. when president obama came into office, he requested a review of the entire program. the politics, the policy, the technical capabilities, future plans. and we were also under constraints because the congress had basically mandated that it ministration provide them with a report on our approach within a

year. this is actually in the first comprehensive review of all aspects of our programs into a published unclassified open report, and they came out in february 2010. it's on the web, ballistic missile defense review report to anyone can we get. when we came into office, what we inherited was a proposal from the george w. bush administration to put some interceptors, 10 interceptors, in poland, and radars, a sophisticated radar in the czech republic. and other capabilities. and it was basically justified in intense to deter or to degrade an iranian attack on european targets. but it did provoke the russians who saw this as kind of a toe in the water, leading to a

capability that could degrade their strategic retaliatory capability. now, many times under clinton, under george w. bush and under president obama, senior americans have met with the russians, have given detailed powerpoint presentations and of the kind of discussions to demonstrate, i think very persuasively, that there's no way that these systems could seriously degrade a russian attack, not that we want the russians to attack, we want the russians to feel comfortable that they're retaliatory capability is not threatened. remember, if you have 10 interceptors and it works perfectly, if you attacked with 11 missiles to me you're going to win. so you could overwhelm the system. you can confuse the system with decoys of the various kinds. you can blind the radars.

now use cyber against taking vacations systems. there are many things you can do to try to defeat an abm system. and you're going to hear quite a bit about that, i think, by my colleagues. the administration decided come after many meetings, consultations, memos, and other activities, and consulting with many experts of a variety of persuasions, to modify the approach. and what was approved by the president was a european phased-adaptive approach, epa take a european phased-adaptive approach. and what that entailed was a group of interceptors placed in different places, some which were yet to be determined, and some radars that were interconnected that could defeat what we saw as a growing missile

threat, particularly from iran but against other potential threats against european targets. the polls and the checks had never actually approved the bush plan. they are governed anomaly approved it by their legislators had never essential to ratify the agreeance. so there was nothing actually in concrete that would have made clear that we could even implemented the bush plan. but we chose to diversify the portfolio, so to speak. to look at a number of different ways to base these missiles, including at sea, not just on land. and also something like this in northeast asia with our

polling and the czech republic will each play a role. so there's a lot of multilateral support for this among many key u.s. allies. where we run into a problem is that, not that these issues are totally result, it's an ongoing alliance management issue. but i would say it seems quite manageable. and also sent a number of are

based in cnn national waters, we don't need anybody's approval. but what we're going into problem is with the russians and also to some extent with china. by all accounts, but everything we seem to know, the senior analyst of the russian federation have persuaded their leadership that what we are proposing, and particularly what we're proposing down to like them because this is a phase approach, this is a decade-long program with some new systems coming on board by 2020, probably see a lot of this from my colleagues. in the so-called sm3 module to which is quite an advanced interceptor from what we have now but we don't have that now. that the russians extracting to the capabilities they think we're going to have believe it will pose a threat to their deterrence. and we've been engaged with them in missile defense cooperation

talks led by undersecretary of state who used to represent national labs, lawrence livermore. she's been negotiating for quite some time since the spring of 2009 until now. and they haven't reached agreement. and effect and for showing president medvedev said they have not brought for. the russians are very concerned and they feel that if it is not an agreement to share data and more operations, a bit of a problem for us. data could lead them, that the russians themselves would consider withdrawing from the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty that they just signed with obama last year. so we have a lot of work to do with the russian but i should finally add, i think of already gone almost as long as -- that

they're still another dimension to the motivation here, which didn't lead us to withdraw the missiles, the original bush plan, but there is a rush of improvements aspect to this strategy. namely, you may know if you follow this, that as early as the spring of 2009 am a president obama and vice president biden have spoken about the russian we set strategy. when we came in, russia was very bad. they were still invading georgia in the summer of '08. the russians were very upset about the expansion of nato, which actually happened under the clinton administration. they're upset with his wide variety -- they were very upset with the withdrawal of the abm treaty, even if it was legally fine. and part of the obama approach has been to improve relations with russia, not just to be the guy to get along better than both a very concrete objectives. because on the nuclear side, the

american position under obama is proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries and their use by terrorists, nuclear terrorism is but one fact the top threat, topsy-turvy threat to the united states. -- top threat to the united states. it's the fact that nuclear weapons will be acquired by other states, the more hands better on nuclear weapons, the more likely that they will either be used by like in south asia and the middle east, or east asia, or that they will be stolen, obtaining in some way by nongovernment groups, some of whom have, as we saw on 9/11, the willingness to die in support of their goals. so, the obama objective has been to bring the russians and the chinese more closely aligned

with our view that we've got to stop that threat. and in order to do that, we need to have persuasive arguments and tangible measures that we've taken, which would be in their interest. so we want to very much to do and pride of things they would support, sanctions against iran which would've had trouble getting them to support, the chinese case as well there have been issues with them, more cooperation in the united front against north korea, which has also been a challenge. but improving relations with russia has been, at least at the table, in how we sought to deploy, the weapon system and the radars associated capabilities. and yet we are still struggling with that. it's not soft. and with china, they are also making a somewhat similar argument that they have a smaller force, although their actual forces, actually not

known. there's been some very relevant articles in the "washington post" last year rejected they might have 10 times the number of nuclear weapons that the community thinks it housed. their strategy is not known. their plans are not known. their deployment plans are not known. but the chinese are also saying that bringing russia and china with the defense coupled with u.s. nuclear forces and covered with professional global strike capability, these would be new long-range missiles with conventional weapons, but super accurate that could attack point targets like silos and radars and other hard to get targets, that this poses a threat to them as well. that's what in the nuclear posture review we proposed both strategic stability talks with both russia and china to get these issues on the table, has to stand out in discussion with

them, have them present counter arguments, and hopefully reach some agreement. you know if you're a student of the sort of thing, i mean, with russia, with the soviet union going way back to the cold war, there were meetings in nova scotia with scientists in 1960, the first degree we really had with the so being the amount was 1972. so we took 12 years. obama spoke about the stability talks and the nuclear posture review us april 2010, so don't expect, you know, result by the end of this seminar. it takes a long time to exchange views. and not necessary for them to kimura for our view but to be a meeting of the minds sufficiently. if not to have a treaty, then stunned -- and it understand, a rules of the road so we are not in an adversarial position, that we don't seek to be an average of position with russia or china

on any of these military issues. but i hope this gives you an overall flavor for what was motivating the objectives. there has been, finally, controversy over the actual effectiveness of these systems which we talk about as i mentioned, they can be overwhelmed, they can be defeated in various ways. they can be confused. specified in the missile defense review report is the stipulation that before new capabilities are deployed they must undergo testing that enables assessment of the realistic operational conditions. and this is because a number of the tests early on were not of the realistic operational conditions. people said they were kind of rig. they said look, there is the target over there, missile, go over there. unit, the iranians won't be helping us find them. so there has been an effort in the missile defense agency to have more realistic conditions.

this is contentious that you can look at the parameters of the test and say this is not realistic. so it's a work in progress, but the full face isn't expected to be deployed until 2020 or better still nine years away. so we have time to do many, many tests in the iteration of the key pillars, the deployment plans and the rest to build a competent, a high competence system. will be foolproof, would be perfect? no. could it deter potential adversaries? possibly. could it reassure allies? probably. could it possibly improve relations with russia, china? yes. is it doing in my judgment? yes, but i think it is a very thoughtful, carefully constructed approach, and that's basically my set of remarks in sort of how we, why we establish what we did and where we are sort of headed in policy terms. thank you.

>> michael, thank you. that was a very nice setting of the stage. we are going to move more to the technical side, but i don't want anyone here do think that either professor postol or dr. wilkening don't understand the politics of the situation. so you see in a little more technical by people that are skilled in the world of political give-and-take. i really like standing -- just terrific, and i appreciate it, but there is no room for people standing with at least four chairs here. so i wanted to invite professor, ac care for you. -- a seat here for you. >> the speaker is dr. wilkening. he will use slides. i wish you had a laser pointer

but i couldn't get one. >> i've already introduced him so we will move right to the substance. over to you. >> thank you, harold. thanks to the institute for hosting this, and also thanks to the audience for your forbearance as i was formally affiliated with stanford. so i hope you will take that apology. i'm going to go through some slides to give you a flavor for the capability of the phased-adaptive approach. and let me begin by jumping off where michael ended, his comments. in my view, missile defense is a coming technically feasible. we are at the very early stages of exploring this technology and

building systems that are beginning to work. there are still some challenges. it is not a perfect system, but this technology in my mind is good technology. this is not star wars. this is not like the fbi. this is very concrete, potentially quite effective technology. in fact, the 52 interceptors, i don't know if you're familiar with these interceptors, work by maneuvering and physically colliding with their target that actually was developed out of the star wars program. there was an extended called the homing experiment, 1984 which is part of the star wars, or the strategic defense initiative was first demonstrated. that you could actually physically collide, have the guidance accuracy sufficient to collide with a target in outer space. and that experiment has basically sponsored the end to higher set of interceptor-based missile defense assets we have today. i'm going to focus on europe, as

michael said, the phased-adaptive approach really applies to any region, as well as your. most of the discussion these days is about your. so i'm going to focus on that as well. one usually starts with some sense of a threat. and for europe we focus on iran. iran has a fairly active missile program. largely consisting of liquid propellant missiles, but they are doing interesting experiments on solid propellants. today, they have an old soviet era in missile. they have about a 1300-kilometer range missile, liquid missile, the technology probably receive from north korea. this is a north korean nodong missile. and have recently tested a solid propellant missile with a range of anywhere from 2000 to 2500

columbus, somewhere in that range. and some people are suggesting we may see a liquid propellant missile in the range of about 3000 kilometers in the not-too-distant future. so today the threat is really quiet, the missile threat from iran is quite localize in the middle east to obviously israel is very concerned about it because they're within range of the shahab three. turkey could be concerned about it but turkey is a friend of iran. which is one reason why they resisted nato attempt to join the missile defense effort, until very recently. and agreed pashtun agreed to deploy a radar. in the next, say, several years, five years, the missile ranges are starting to encroach on south eastern europe, or it could be southern russia as well, or other regions. the saudis are concerned about

iranian missile capabilities. and then in the out years, let's say within a decade or so, iran probably can have the capability to launch missiles that cover the entire european continent. the bush administration was mostly concerned about icbms, international -- either from north korea or iran. in my view they got the order backwards. it's these medium-range missiles that are proliferating quite widely. intercontinental range missiles are a far term threat. how far, how long will it take before iran gets them? who knows? on the order of a decade, maybe too. so this is the thread that animates the european phase-adaptive approach. now mind you, without a nuclear warhead on these missiles they don't pose much of a threat. that could be a political threat. we saw conventionally armed missiles launched in the middle east in the gulf war. but in my mind, without some

sort of weapon of mass destruction, in particular a nuclear warhead, these missiles are not particularly, i wouldn't be spending billions of dollars to defeat him. but, of course, iran does have a suspect nuclear weapons program, as you've been reading a lot about that in the newspaper recently. and so the concern is, again we don't know the time frame, but they can build a nuclear device to stick on top of a ballistic missile with ranges like this, and they could potentially threaten your. so that's what is animating the european phase-adaptive approach. michael talked about it, emphasis on near-term threats, medium-range, not icbms first. large sizes. they use this language, emphasis on proven technology. that's because the theater, the high areas is a fairly material theater missile defense system

from what we used to go theater system. 11 which is changeable the that standard missile three which is enabled system is quite mature. the ground-based interceptor that's up in alaska that people talk about is the least reliable of the interceptors would have. this is the one that is been fading in several test flights for a host of reasons. not only is it less reliable, it's also more expensive on the order of 7 million, $70 million per interceptor were as these are down in in the say, 6 million, excuse me, nine-day, 10 to 15 and for the standard missile three pics of this architecture don't on these more mature missile defense assets is going to be less expensive. but most people talk about the interceptors, that's what captures the public's imagination. in fact, the most important aspect for the most important technology behind missile defense is the center

architecture and the command-and-control system. the sensors our radars, spy one writer on the aegis cruiser and the forward band greater, or the so-called tv why to. this is associated with the missile defense system to both of these writers are quite mature. tty two in particular is a very sophisticated and very effective radar. they are also optical sensors, airborne infrared and space-based optical systems that are maturing quite rapidly. andy seth figured into the phase-adaptive approach. not only these types of sensors, but they're all going to be supposedly a large number of their and they're all going to be knitted together so the data from anyone since it can be shared with any shooter, any interceptor in the system. and that's actually important acted as i will show you in a second.

there are four phases, gain as michael mentioned. they are based on different barriers of the standard missile three. so the block is out there on ships. at his face when. 2011. that timetable is not. the block one be interceptor, the same interceptor but it has got a different kill vehicle on the into the. a more sophisticated one. that is undergoing flight test right there. that is supposed to be put on ships and in a row many. that's the base michael meacher was negotiated. phase three is the interceptor that was going to develop between the united states and japan. as i said, the japanese are cooperating on this venture as well. and this is a joy designed system. that is supposed to be deployed in poland. finally, the block to be which is supposedly a more advanced version still on ships and on land around europe in 2020.

funny for this missile was just got recently and the 2012 budget because congress was concerned that there are too many concurrent development projects underway, and so they act something for this. then netted sensor architecture, an extremely important aspect of multiple radars, tpy-2, maybe nato radars pick up one gets into the discussion about russian cooperation, there's possible is of russian writers being tied into the school system. infrared tracking, whether airborne and space-based. a command-and-control system to tie all this together as i said. so any shooter can launch off of any particular sensor data contracted. so here is the evolution of the standard missile on these. launched off of these launch tubes and aegis cruiser's.

this is the spy one writer. this is the radar face here. this is the top of the aegis cruiser. you can't quite see a very well. this radar face here, this is a picture of the radar down here. the wing equipment and other things. this is a movable radar, not quite mobile. it is very powerful high-frequency radar. and if you look at europe and i start placing these various radars, one located in israel today. the one in turkey is located about here. and this is a picture of what that raider fan could see, the volume of space they could see against a radar cross-section, tell just sort of how large the object is to the writer. this is a fairly small cross-section but it is sort of

representative of what might be coming off the end of iranian ballistic missile. this also shows the spy one radar coverage. here's a ship in the eastern better trained. this is not quite exact location but the phase one deployment was a aegis ship. so this is ship moves around here, could be deployed down here to help detect israel in the case of conflict. now, there's some debate about whether, this is a land-based site, and the i just said, spy one and sm3 our naval base assets. so the question is, well, operating ships 24/7 very expensive, talk about putting it on land to try to reduce costs. watch the radar that goes with this? i shown on your with a spy one radar. as you can see the range of this radar certainly small, probably

not the best radar. there have been other people talk about using different systems to some extent the jury is still out on exactly what central is coupled with that system. but any case the raider coach is fairly small. this is the infrared system. here's the sensor ball down here. this is the drone that is being used over in afghanistan. the idea is to take this and looked up with it and use it to track ballistic missiles. again, this is sort of an off the shelf system that you could use right away, not in the configuration, not exactly what you want for missile defense. but it's a beginning. and, in fact, if you designed a better airborne infrared system than that picture i just showed you, this shows you sort of the area of space looking down on

the earth that an infrared system could see. if you're for my with infrared systems, it depends on the temperature of the object you're looking at because these things detect black body radiation, heat coming off the object. and so for warmer objects, room temperature come you can see quite a ways, about 1000 kilometers or more with these infrared sensors. for colder objects, 250 calvin, that's minus 50 degrees or so, or minus 30 degrees. centigrade. the detection range, the document is not quite as good. but you can see the three orbits in and around europe. you get substantial coverage. why is that important? if i go back to the radar picture, here's an intermediate range, 4000-kilometer, intermediate range missile launch out of central iran heading toward your. these are those radar pictures.

that forward base radar, the trajectory flies through that fairly reliably. but the problem is these aegis raiders, the overflights greater. the radar doesn't see them. and so this is one of the main roles for the airborne infrared system. infight overlay a 300-degree calvin conger and up at the airborne infrared in the black sea off the coast of romania, now i get good three-dimensional coverage over europe. and this center that starts providing the track information, consummate my engagements. okay, now let me talk a little bit about one way to look at whether the system is affected or not. candidate in an area as large as europe with a handful of interceptor sites? this is a base encapsulation i did at stanford some months back. and i want to introduce three

concepts which are extremely important to the face of that system but is really talked about in the newspaper. and so it's quite easy to misunderstand it. there's several modes of operation for missile defense system. .. >> i have a couple different speeds for these missiles. i'm going to show you the area that you can defend. so here's stand-alone operation.

here's those radar fans associated with the spy i radar assuming that's put in romania. and the turkish radar picks it up, communicates with this radar to look right around this region of the radar coverage because you're going to see something coming in. this radar then starts spanning this portion of the sky, detects the object, tracks it, launches the interceptor and has to carry out this intercept before the object falls too deep into the atmosphere for the interceptor to work properly. when i operate in that mode, i can defend an area on the ground that looks like this yellow patch you can barely see down here. it's a very small defended area, it tends to be behind the interceptor site, but it's, this is sort of a standard mode of operation for defenses. it's also fairly ineffective for

protecting large areas. long-term remote is where i use track data from some other censor, in this case in turkey, and it tracks this object. i send that tracked information to the interceptor here. i launch my interceptor based on this radar's track, but then i consummate the engagement within the field of view of this radar. in other words, this radar has to watch the target, watch the interceptor and tell them how, approximately how close they're getting. that's called launch on remote. you launch the interceptor on remote track data. this mode of operation has been tested in the field, and they've had success so far. but as you can see, this is europe here. the defended area's certainly growing compared to stand alone, but it's still not that large. the real, the most effective mode of operation and the one that the european phase adabtive

approach is -- adabtive approach is heading towards is called engage on remote. an engage on remote, i have some forward censor, this radar here picks up a track. i launch my interceptor based on this track information, and some other sensor, in this case the airborne infrared here, keeps tracking -- tracks the interceptor missile. and the only thing that the radar, in this case the spy i does, is it's a communication link to communicate to the interceptor and say, okay, the abir, the airborne infrared data tells me this is where it's heading, so adjust your track until you have an engagement. this is called engage on remote. so you launch on remote, and you consummate the engagement based on another sensor, and you essentially remove the radar in this case that's co-located with

the interceptor site. that's the most effective mode of operation. okay. so now let me turn to defense of europe. phase one. this is what the defended area looked like. i assume launch on remote would work. we have one ship in the eastern med. here's the kind of threat. this ship could move down to defend israel, move up around greece. you could provide some localized defense in the middle east and eastern mediterranean. you'd probably need two or three ships if there was a real war that broke out, maybe some down here defending other assets. but that's what the defense picture looks like today. we have a forward based radar in turkey, and one ship or a handful of ships using the block 1a interceptor that is out in the field today. phase two, three years from now.

large hi the same -- largely the same picture. now we have the standard missile 1p, an improved interceptor on land, also in the eastern med. maybe you'll have a couple of the ships here. and by now, three years from now, the range of missile threats might extend out to 2,000 kilometers, something like that. so again, fairly localized defense of southeastern europe with two, three, maybe four sites, something like that. things get interesting at phase three, 2018. now we're supposed to have the block 2a interceptor, and it's supposed to be deployed on land in poland. this is where the interceptor site's going to be. one of the issues one gets into is there's not a lot of information in the public domain. all these charts are based on public domain information. we don't know how fast the 2a interceptor flies, and speed

matters in this business. so what i've done is i show a family of curves from three and a half four and a half kilometers, the second, representing the kind of coverage you would get from poland of europe varying the interceptor speed. and, again, maybe the missile threats would extend throughout all of europe, who knows. but i've shown the maximum range that would reach england. and importantly, this assumes engage on remote. so you have to have these sensors, airborne sensors and what not to provide all the track data for this to operate. now you get huge defended areas. just from one site alone you can practically defend all of europe at the higher interceptor speed. engage on remote will also be implemented, now i've shown these airborne infrared platforms implemented. and again, a family of curves. maybe the romanian site will remain with a slower

interceptor, who knows, but if i put these two together, by 2015 let's assume that the speed is four kilometers a second. and i have engage on remote. i have two land-based sites alone, and with engage on remote i can cover the entire continent of europe. in fact, i could get shots from both of these sites for any missile heading in towards the center of europe. i didn't point this out, but it's clear here on this chart. this radar in turkey, the turks only agreed to put a radar there, no interceptors. and unfortunately, it's outside the defended area for most of the other assets. if i went pack, i could show you egypt has a hard time defending it, romania has a hard time defending it. this asset is an extremely important radar location and needs to be defended. if i put a fad battery there,

just the radar that goes with the fad system, so if i just put the whole battery there instead of the radar, this is the kind of defended area you would get. certainly, the radar itself is not central turkey. if i don't have engage on remote and all i have is launch on remote, this is what the picture looks like. here's the polish site, the romanian site. i didn't put any naval interceptors around there. if we don't get engage on remote, the defense, the broad area defense of europe is virtually impossible unless you start proliferating interceptor sites all over the place. so that highlights the importance of that particular aspect of the defense. i was talking earlier with harold about the issue of russia, and i want to at least touch on a little bit of why the russians are concerned. but phase four of the european phase adaptive approach is

really designed to defend the united states, not europe. up through phase three, that's defense of europe. phase four is defending the continental united states. so here i've put interceptors in poland, this is circuit 2020. i assume engage on remote, and i assume a standard missle iii block 2b of different speeds. and this shows the defended footprint going against an iranian icbm, let's assume they have an icbm. this is the maps mum range of the icbm i've assumed here slicing through the united states. if intercept speed is four and a half kilometers per second which is very fast for defending europe, this is it in here. you really cannot protect the united states. if i increase that speed to five kilometers a second, now i can do a good job of defending the eastern part of the united states, but the west coast is a little bit out of the foot print. i haven't shown you the capability of the fort greeley site up here, the gbi, which

actually can defend this whole area. so five kilometers a second, the forward base site could help defend the east coast, fort greeley, the west coast. so that would work. but if you want to cover the entire continental united states from poland, your interceptor speed has to be up around five and a half kilometers a second, much faster than any of the interceptors that are being talked about. much faster. well, at least a kilometer a second faster. now, why are the russians concerned? this chart shows you the footprint of the defended area for russia and icbms of different flavors launched from all the known launch locations in russia. four a five kilometer a second interceptor which is high for any of the sm3 interceptors that are currently being talked about. so if i put that sm3 block 2b and it has a speed as high as

five kilometers a second in poland which has been the source of most of russia's concerns, you really can't protect the united states. here's maine. only the icbs has 27, ss19, you might be able to catch them going to maine, but the rest of the united states and alaska and hawaii you cannot intercept those icbms. to threaten russia's icbms from european launch sites, the interceptor speed has to be up above five kilometers a second, closer to six or something like that. so just to summarize, the kinds of observations i'd like to draw from this, engage on remote is absolutely essential. the sensor architecture and the battle management system to tie all those assets together is key to the system. if you don't have it, the system doesn't work.

phase one, two ships, three ships, decent coverage with launch on remote, same with phase two. phase three is where things get interesting where supposedly engage on remote capability is going to be available. two sites, covers all of europe. turkey is outside that defended area, especially that radar, so you'd need to deploy fad there, so that's the follow-on discussions with the turks is how about accepting a few interceptors. phase four, defense of the united states. you really have to be above five kilometers a second to protect the united states. united states from a european launch location. if you do get above five, five and a half, six kilometers a second even better, still you can do a nice job defending the united states. the problem is now you start potentially posing a threat to russia, so you can't have your cake and eat it too. you cannot defend the united states from europe against iranian icbms without

potentially encroaching on russian capability, though in my mind you don't encroach on it very much. in fact, i think most of the russian concerns are more political in the nature than the sort of military technical. sensor issues are key. airborne infrared, space-based infrared, good sensors. you need more than just one or two tby2 radars and nato radars, by the way, the french are developing radars, the germans, others. hopefully, they'll contribute to the system. multiple radars and that rapid command and control system. and i think that's it. yeah. so that's the kind of capability the system could have, and there are several key pillars that are required to really make this thing work fairly well, which i believe it could. >> thanks, that was very helpful. i'm personally left with the

question of we've given defense every benefit of the doubt and everything work as you said. and yet it doesn't threaten the russians very much until phase four. so i tend to come down where you come down. the russian objections are much more political than technical. now, that's that flash of brilliance i warned you about, and i will stop at that point. ted, would you take it from there? [inaudible conversations] >> where do i begin? um -- >> ted, i'm more concerned about where you will end. we're running -- >> well, i haven't been doing any of the talking so far. [laughter] let me start out by telling you

about a way to protect you. i'm going to put airport security in place to protect you from terrorist attacks on the airplane. however, i'm not going to let anybody x-ray your luggage or anyone else's luggage, i'm not going to let anybody look into the luggage, i'm not going to let dogs sniff the luggage. i'm simply going to let people look at your luggage and decide based on whatever they think matters like color, shape, whatever whether or not it's got a bomb in it. or a gun in it or whatever. this is basically the level of discrimination capability that these missile defenses have today. in fact, you don't even have to

have a suitcase because a suitcase would actually weigh something. but since you would put a decoy in the near vacuum of space and inflate it and there was no air drag, this thing could tumble along, and to a distant radar operating at thousands of kilometers' range or to an infrared sensor operating at hundreds of kilometers' range in some cases it would be an object that potentially does or does not carry a nuclear weapon. period. so this, when i start talking about countermeasures later on, keep in if mind that hitting the target is not the easy task. i mean, it is not the hard task. the hard task is finding the object that's being thrown at you. and if you think decoys are difficult to build, let me give you a general analogy. and before i go into some facts

that is worth contemplating. imagine you have an adversary that has the technical capability to build a long-range ballistic missile or an icbm. they have the ability to build a nuclear weapon and a reentry vehicle with a fuse that would properly detonate the nuclear weapon, but they can't figure out how to inflate a balloon and deploy it along with it. now, if you believe there is such an adversary as that in the world, i've so got some bridgeso sell you along with the missile defense. now, i was a little surprised that mike had worked on the ballistic missile defense review because this is snag's near and dear to my -- something that's near and dear to my heart. i do not see any evidence that the ballistic missile defense review had any technical input

of any kind. i think the document is amazing for the statements it makes. let me just give you some -- i actually wrote a rather elaborate article on it at one point, so i'm -- off the top, i can't remember anything normally, but this one i happen to remember. here's an assertion for you from the ballistic missile defense review. the u.s. is currently defended by the ground-based missile defense system that's deployed in alaska and at van den burg air force base. it's currently defended and will continue to be defended for the, for the foreseeable future, although we should do work to make sure that it stays that way. this is clearly and unambiguously states in the ballistic missile defense review. the last test failure in the missile defense program was an experiment sometimes called the

ftg06 followed by a replication of that experiment, ftg06a. those experiments, those two experiments were set up o as to make it -- so as to make it easier to intercept the warhead. i invite people to ask me questions. i want to give you a little bit of an overview here. and, in fact, in the process of trying to make the warhead easier to hit, they inadvertently spewed out material that caused the x band radar to fail because the material acted much like what is known as radar chaff which, which we know defeats this system. there is no argument about it in a technically-sound community. i want to be career -- clear in this. chaff defeats in the system. the ballistic missile defense review also says that the new

breakthroughs in missile defense technology that allow for ballistic missile defenses, particularly the paa, to have a chance of working. in fact, the president said that in his speech announcing it on september 17, 2009. let me be clear, there are no new technologies in the paa. none. there are no propulse technologies -- propulsion technologies, there are no sensor technologies, there are no police you can missile defense technologies that give this system greater capability. i'll have something more to say about that shortly. the paa is a proven and effective missile defense. the president said that on september 17, 2009. yet if the paa has never been tested against a tumbling target. now, that means something

because in the gulf war of 1991 where, incidentally, the patriot was originally represented as 96% successful and our mit group showed that it was almost certainly 0% successful so we went from pk equal to one to pk equal to zero -- [laughter] um, the -- which should tell you something about this community and its ability to tell the truth. um, there were tumbling targets at high altitude for reasons i can explain again in the question and answer period. thal hussein missile had design features -- not flaws, i say features -- that caused it to tumble at high altitude and behave very irregularly on reentry and thereby completely defeated the patriot.

and incidentally, it would completely defeat the patriot pac 3 as well. we've examined that. we've actually studied it. if a target is cut into pieces, like take a warhead, take a missile, and instead of cutting the missile, you know, like if you have a two-stage missile, you cut the first stage away from the second stage, um, you could just as well cut a single-stage missile into many pieces. the radar infrared sensors are totallyic capable of telling -- incapable of telling which piece is which and whether it is a warhead or not. so, basically, the countermeasure, the countermeasure problems that both the ground-based missile defense and the phase adaptive approach face are the same. the technology, they're different. one has got smaller interceptors and slower interceptors, one has got bigger interceptors, but they're both basically useless if they face very simple

countermeasures of the kind i've already described. now, let me tell you -- now this is, of course, something that i've been talking about for really more than a decade, although new stuff on the paa has been over the last few years. the department of defense just published a report by the defense science board. in fact, the report was asked for by ash carter when he was assistant secretary. now he's deputy secretary. and so ash carter asked for this report. and let me tell you what i think happened. i'm going to be very cynical here, so those -- don't be too shocked. i think the defense science board inadvertently hired some contractors to do the study who actually did a study. because the people who signed these documents when you get up to the pentagon, you know the people who sign these documents have nothing to do with,

actually, what the study is. and they were so careless -- i say careless because i'm ascribing a motive of concealing information from you, the american people -- they were so careless that when the unclassified version of this document was put out, they inadvertently spilled the beans. so let me tell you what this document that the current deputy secretary of defense asked for and is now out there in the open. incidentally, send me an e-mail, i will send you the letters that a colleague and i wrote to the national security adviser just a month ago. we haven't received a reply to it, but there's going to be a newspaper article on it. um, the defense science board report stated the following: none of the radars in the phase adaptive approach, none of them are up to the job of actually supporting the system's

workability. none of them. they're all too short range. i will show you a chart if necessary that will show you that the radar cross-section of rather large and rather typical cone-shaped warhead is at least ten times smaller than what dean showed was the case. at least at x band. at l band it is a tenth of a square meter. if that radar cross-section is even smaller, that means the range of the radar not only determined by the power of the radar, its antenna size, the gain, what's called the gain of the antenna, but the radar cross-section of the object and the reflecttivity of the object which is in control of the adversary is what determines the range of the radar. so if an object is very small radar cross-section and in this case you can typically expect an unsophisticated warhead where there's been no effort to make

it stealthy to be a hundredth of a square meter, then all of these radars have even shorter range than what people are claiming. and i would like to point out that it's not hard to make the radar cross-section thousands of square meters at x band. this is one of the grave problems that radars have. you can easily make a warhead stealthy. now, this department of defense report, again, the department of defense report that the deputy secretary asked for, also made an amazing statement. it said something that i've been saying for more than ten years. see, what i've been saying for ten years is that if you have those suitcases out there and you're just inspecting them with your eyes, you can't tell whether or not there's a bomb in them by just inspecting them with your eyes. you're going to have to sniff them, open up the suitcase and look around. even then you might fail, but

certainly you're not going to be able to identify which suitcase has a bomb by simply looking at it. this is not a very profound statement to say, but there's a lot of technical detail behind this very simple statement which is correct completely in terms of the analogy i'm giving you. the defense science board report actually says that the department of defense has not demonstrated the ability to tell warheads from decoys. this is the report, unclassified report that deputy secretary of defense carter had asked for a couple of years ago. the, it also says that a capability that the missile defense agency has been talking about for a long time called shoot, look, shoot has not been demonstrated. let me just explain this simply.

i have an object, i want to destroy it. if i don't have time to shoot it at, see if i destroyed it and shoot again, i typically would shoot two interceptors simultaneously. well, if i have this problem, it greatly increases the number of interceptors i need and the expense of my defense. so what has happened is there's been a lot of talk about shoot, look, shoot. you need enough what's called battle space. you need to be able to reach out early enough that you can shoot a second interceptor, you have time to shoot a second interceptor if first fails. but the this report states -- and i'm sure it's correct -- that the shoot, look, shoot is not possible because the department of defense has not demonstrated that if they hit a target, they could, they will know they destroyed the warhead or that they will be able to tell the warhead from other

debris that's created if and when they hit a target. that is to say you have lots of pieces of debris, they're coming at you, and if you can't tell that a piece of rocket motor that broke apart in the intercept attempt or something else that is just traveling along with the warhead is a warhead or a piece of debris, you can't execute shoot, look, shoot. this report says that quite clearly, and it makes the important factual statement -- unless they're lying to the deputy secretary of defense -- that the department of defense has not demonstrated in the capability. now, what this report also does is it releases some interesting intelligence. the intelligence shows that adversaries are already testing missiles that release objects that could be decoys within tens of seconds of the end of powered

flight. now, of course, if you can build a rocket and you can deploy a warhead, you should be able to deploy a balloon. so this should be no surprise unless you have that, unless you want to buy that bridge from me. so this is what we're currently facing. now, let me make a general policy statement. i shudder to do so. here's the argument in the ballistic missile defense review. we are going to make it so hard for these people to use ballistic missiles that we are actually going to deter them from using it. we're going to cause them to throw up their hands and give up. now, that could be true. you know, i'm not, i'm not opposed to the use of military force in all situations. i've worked in the, with the military, and i have great admiration for what they do and how they do it.

some things, of course. but you can only deter or an adversary -- deter an adversary if you have a credible capability to do what you claim. if you don't have a credible capability to do what you claim, you may actually encourage the adversary to go ahead and build ballistic missiles and decoys. and if you want to cement relationships with our allies, i think you're going to have some very angry allies if you claim you're defending them and they wind up with a nuclear warhead shoved down their throat. because they've been told that they can deal with them. so these are some general statements that i was not intending to make when i first -- you can stop me at any point. if you think it's getting too violent. [laughter] >> i wouldn't be here. [laughter] >> i don't bite, i just kick. [laughter]

so i want to just make a few points that i had actually planned to stay, and i'll try and cut them short because, obviously, i've taken time on this other matter. um, how does the bush system differ from the phase adapt i have approach -- adaptive approach? well, what the phase adaptive approach does, it substitutes a very large number of smaller and slower interceptors for a very small number of very large interceptors. that's a simple-minded way of stating it, but -- now, these interceptors are on mobile platforms. except, of course, when they're on these few sites in the europe. it is not true that you need a five kilometer or-per-second interceptor to defend the united states with this system, at least in theory. incidentally, i agree -- well, you actually think it would

work, i don't think it would work at all, so why am i concerned about it? which is a question i'd like to address. you only need a four kilometer per second interceptor, you could defend the united states with that, and there's very little uncertainty in the public domain about the speed of this interceptor, it's four and a half kilometers per second. identify talked to numerous -- i've talked to numerous people in the department of defense, the white house, nobody has ever suggested this interceptor's not four-and-a-half kilometers per second. let me make clear, you cannot determine whether this interceptor's four-and-a-half kilometers per second because the nature of its design is that it's a very inefficient rocket system because it's designed mostly for safety. because people in our navy don't like to get blown up by their own missiles if you have an accident on your ship. and i generally agree with them having work with the the navy. i think their strategy on that point is quite food.

quite good. so met me can the question -- ask the question, is the current bmv strategy based on sound fundamentals? i would argue, no be. shot in terms of the -- not in terms of the logical reasoning that somebody who's trying to be a strategist would argue. because strategy ultimately has to be implemented. and if you can't implement a strategy, if you don't have the means to implement a strategy, then having a strategy that's not based on realistic means to implement it is simply crazy. especially when it's a military strategy. technically, the problems are very severe because you have no ability to tell decoys from warheads s and decoys would be extremely effective in reducing the capabilities of this system. let me take you, give you a

couple of quotes from this report that the deputy secretary asked for. this is, actually, out of the report. the successful operations of these defense systems, that's my addition, is predicated on an ability to discriminate in the xl atmosphere -- that means in the vacuum of space -- the missile warheads from other pieces of offensive missile complex such as rocket bodies, miscellaneous hardware and intentional countermeasures. the importance of achieving reliable midcourse discrimination cannot be overemphasized. that's the report's statement. then it goes on to say the department of defense has not demonstrated this. so they have made a statement about what the system requirement is. by that i mean we sit down, we design a system, we say it has to do this well to meet our

objective. then we look at the technological possibilities, and if we're being honest, we say, well, this system cannot be these military objectives, and we throw it out and start over and look for something else or spend our resources on a military enterprise that makes more sense if we're just talking totally military. i'm not getting into the question of whether or not, um, the resources should be spent on other issues. that's a big question, and it deserves discussion, but i won't treat it here. so why are the russians worried about phase three of this system? phase three is important. it's not phase four they're worried about, they're worried about phase three. and i don't think it's political myself. that's my judgment. i could be wrong, though, there is certainly a high political component to this whole game that both the united states and russia is playing.

so, one, you'd have to be deaf, dumb and blind to not realize that this is so political it's hard to believe. in fact, i think it's so political that the people in the white house don't even care whether or not the system works, they're so worried about the republicans calling them cowards that that's what's the concern. and let me tell you, i meet with people in the white house. i don't say who because -- but that's where the fear is. because there are people in the white house who understand exactly the technical facts that i'm describing here. so if system has no capability, why are the russians worried? well, let me just step back for the phase three, why phase three is important. phase three is supposed to come somewhere between 2018 and 2020. it's scheduled for 2018, but it turns out they're so far behind that building the kill vehicle

for the phase three that it probably would be 2020. in 2020 think start comes to an -- new start comes to an end, and the united states begins a new arms reduction negotiation with russia. the russians have said we regard this system as threatening, and we're going to withdraw there all future arms reductions with the united states after new s.t.a.r.t. ends, or we might even withdraw from new s.t.a.r.t. at some point because we are so concerned about this. l -- and i can tell you that people i'm working with, and some of them are big pentagon insiders, are very worried about this. and they should be. because i think the russians are very serious. all right. but why are they worried about this system? because, you know, i just told you it's worthless. it's just, it's just your money,

but, you know, after all, wall street took care of that as well and, of course, the people in the white house are protecting you from wall street just as they're protecting you from these foreign missiles. um, and incidentally, that's not an accident because i used to be sick over this missile defense issue, but then i saw what we did with regard to wall street, and i said if people can't deal with this threat to our country, how can they deal with missile defense if they're not concerned enough about this? and i know a little bit about it right now. i spent some time learning about economics. and by the way, since i've learned about economics -- just to make a point -- i used to tell people that i worked in an lawyer that was distinguished -- worked in this an area that was distinguished by its intellectual policy. [laughter] why does this give you the best -- the worst of both worlds? first of all, the other guy building missile defenses unleashes very powerful bureaucratic forces.

so if i'm in china or russia or, for that matter, in the united states as we saw when we built all these multiple warheads that got us all into so much trouble, i point at the other guy's missile defense, and i say, hey, we need more missiles. and, you know, if you, if you don't give me more missiles, i'm going to go and find a way to make my case to your political adversaries or to the people and point out that you're not doing what you need to do to defend this country. anybody who looks at this obama administration, the way it's behaved when faced with threats should have no trouble understanding that this can occur in other political environments. this is not a unique vulnerability of democratic societies. many people think that mr. putin is going to harden up even more because he wants to show his electorate in russia that he's in charge, and he's going to

build on fears people have. i would be glad to tell you unfounded fears, but we're dealing with a social, technical, political phenomenon here. it's not purely technical, it's not purely social, it's not purely political. um, it's very difficult for political leaders to resist these forces. and can that occurs in the -- and that occurs in all societies no matter what the political system is like. so what does the adversary, adversary's leadership really think? that's a question that you're going to ask if you're the military planner on the other side. so when i see -- i worked in the pentagon, i was a scientific adviser to the chief of naval operations, so i'm highly sensitized to who says what. so when i see general james

cartwright in front of the senate saying that if he -- he was actually asked by, um, i forget the senator now, he was actually asked by a member of the committee if there was a crisis between the united states and north korea, what advice would he give the president of the united states about with regard to the ground-based missile defense system, and he said, oh, i would tell the president that he could have complete confidence in the system. you could see the eye eyebrows raise in the senate among the senators. now, this guy is the second most senior member of our military. i worry, i worked on nuclear war plans, and i really worked on them. i was at the ground zero level. i mean, i really had a lot of access when i was in the pentagon, and i was helping to

integrate trident i into the force when it was just come anything there, so i know what's going on at these plants, and it should make your hair stand on end. what, what these statements of a military leader of that level does is it potentially creates the possibility of a misunderstanding by leadership. when i was in the pentagon, i looked at the moscow abm system. a worthless system. a worthless system. i could go into a lot -- give a lecture on the moscow abm system in one of my courses. i sat and looked at that system, and i said why are they doing this? what do they believe? what might they do in a crisis or a confrontation that could inadvertently get us into a nuclear war because they believe something about this system

that's not true? so from the point of view of the military planner and the fact that the system doesn't have capability doesn't stop them from speculating about the potential for accidents that could lead to nuclear war. let me just end here because i can see harold's getting out the club, and i'm sure my other colleagues here will have clubs to use against me. thanks. >> thank you, ted. thank you very much. [applause] i want to thank all three speakers, of course. [inaudible conversations] >> i had promised, and i will keep that promise that we'll take some time just to let the three speakers clarify what the other speaker may have said or may have not said. i think we'll keep the same order as we had, that is, michael, would you like to just comment on what dean and ted have said? >> yes. let me just, i'll be very brief because we want comments from the floor.

i'll just say a couple of things. first of all, dean has been an adviser to the defense department on thesish -- on these issues. so, you know, recently and currently. so he's very knowledgeable about the strengths and limitations of these systems. he's also done, with walt slocum, a national academy study -- >> it may explain his position. >> it may. [laughter] let me just comment on two points that ted raised. one is was there any technical input to the ballistic missile defense review, or actually i think he said there was no tech -- these were other the details of our systems. and remember, we're talking about systems that are in the process of evolving over a decade. and there's always lots of uncertainty here both in terms of what we're going to find out about our own systems and what

we might find out about the threat. technical groups represented in the review included -- you have to make your own judgment about their capability from the missile defense agency itself, from the navy, from the air force, from the office of science technology policy, from the white house, from the joint staff of the chairmen of the joint chiefs of staff, from several of the national laboratories and others. there were reviews or at least interactions with technical experts in britain, france and other countries in the nato alliance and other allies. these concepts and plans were

briefed to the most senior russians who had many technical experts present. so the notion that the ballistic missile defense review report was completely unrelated to any technical input is factually not correct. >> no, that -- you didn't address the question. the fact that you're appealing to different organizations playing a role, i've been in the pentagon, i've watched these charades put on. finish you go and you talk to a bunch of different people, you select what you want to say, and you say it. now, if you have some facts with regard -- are you willing to say, for example, that the current missile defense system is defending the united states right now? do you believe that? >> that's a different point. >> no, no, what do you mean? that's -- >> no. the first point -- >> we've got to let michael have his say. >> exchange. >> well, you can't get into -- >> well, i'm happy to do it. >> talk about appeals -- >> i'm responding to a couple of

the points you make. if you would like to -- >> well, respond to the factual -- >> i'm responding in the way i'd like to respond, not the way you'd like me to respond. [laughter] so that's the first point. it's factually incorrect. second point was the motivation of the administration solely to appease the republicans. nothing could be further from the truth. when the report was released, it was denounced by senior republican senators intimately familiar with missile defense, members of the armed services committee as a sellout to the russians. that we were appeasing the russians by withdrawing the interceptor from poland. that also was not true. we were developing systems and plans, as i described, which would over a ten-year period make it increasingly difficult

for potential adversaries to use ballistic missiles against targets in europe this any sort of cost-free -- in the any sort of cost-free calculation. it would be increasingly difficult for them. are we aware that they would use decoys? of course we're aware. this is kindergarten-level understanding. we've done a lot of work on decoys, a lot of work, more work than is publicly available. we've done a lot of work on how to defeat decoys. to we have all the answer -- do we have all the answers? no. will we have all the answers in 2020? i don't know, probably not. will we increase the doubt that potential adversaries could be effective in their attacks and, therefore, give them pause, cause them to not attack, in other words, enhance deterrence? i think, yes. do we have the credibility to use these systems?

100%. do we have intent to use them? 100%. if deterrence is about credibility and credibility is about will and capability, we will have substantially more capability tomorrow than we have today, and we will have 100% intent to use it. and i can assure you that the iranian government is fully aware of this. and the north korean government is full hi aware of it. and if -- fully aware of it. and if you think they're more encouraged and more likely to use these systems because of the weaknesses in the systems, that is a misreading of the situation. now, just very briefly on the national missile defense. i didn't talk about that in my talk. others raised it briefly. just on the table we have two systems, modest systems, one in fort greeley, alaska, one in sanden burg air force base that are coupled with other radars

around the world intended to defend the continental united states not against a full-scale attack from russia, but against limbed attacks from -- limited attacks from other adversaries. um, this is a policy that the u.s. has sustained, obama sustained the bush policy. he's chosen not to augment the capability. that also has been attacked by republican senators. so we have a system in place, again, just to demonstrate the willingness to defend the united states against limited attacks, and we have this growth of regional network systems that are intended to make it more difficult for them to attack regional targets. final point. conceptually, missile defense involves three layers of attack. it's sometimes called a layered defense.

artificially, the trajectory of the attacking missile is divided into mid tase and terminal phase, and different elements of the defense are foxed on each -- focused on each phase of the attacking missile. so there's boost phase intercept which is tough, there's recourse intercept and there's terminal intercept. and as these technologies mature and as the networks and the sensor networks mature we have expectations that the ability to degrade the attacking missile in either boost phase, mid course or terminal phase grow so that the likelihood of penetration will be reduced. you know, we say in policy, policy is about prediction. you establish a policy because you expect that if you do it,

it's most likely that the following will result. sometimes you're right, sometimes you're wrong. but i think it's not helpful, it's not constructive although it's often done to impugn the motives purely for grounds other than the technical capability. and dr. carter who we all know very well who was undersecretary of defense at the time of the missile defense report, not assistant secretary and is now deputy secretary who is a noted technology and policy expert, a rhodes scholar, a ph.d. in physics from oxford, a longtime harvard faculty member finish. >> a former close friend of mine. >> ultimately, will now be one of the key figures in the defense department as deputy secretary to oversee and evaluate the progress of the missile defense program. so i think we have the best capability we could have looking

at this. it's a free and fair society, and we're delighted to get the criticisms when they're on particular points. i think the administration -- by the way, i should finally add, sorry i'm going on longer than five minutes there. members of the congress and the congressional committee staffs have some excellent technical experts, and they've looked at these systems too. so, um, a work in progress, but i certainly personally believe that the motivations are sound, they're in defense of this country and that the capability that's been put into it is also quite high, and we're continuing to work the problem, and i think it's a valuable investment. it's about $8 billion a year. >> michael, thank you. dean, just keep the same order and, please, feel free to comment on michael and --

>> okay. very briefly, the thing i like about ted's analysis is he raises one of the most challenging issues for missile defense, and that's mid course discrimination. can you tell decoys and the rest from real warheads. that is the, of course, achilles heel, very challenging problem. in my view while i think the defense science board says the problem has not been solved, we can't do it perfectly, we can do a reasonable job against -- >> they did not say that. they said we do not have the capability -- >> just let him finish. >> no. >> no one interrupted you. you spoke for 25 minutes, no one interrupted you. let them say what that -- >> it ought to be correct, don't you think? >> well, you can correct -- >> i am going to correct some of the facts. >> guess what, ted? i'm going to give you a chance to talk to. >> your diatribe is not necessarily facts, and no one --

[inaudible] >> anytime you want to talk technically with me, please, feel free to do so. >> can we get a statement from you other than appeals to authority? >> okay. so -- >> i think dean was talking. >> yeah, let me try to get out some of these points. the countermeasure debate is a tough one. and i've wrestled with various ways to explain it. in my view, countermeasures decoys are not easy to build credible ones, that is the ones that can fool the kinds of radars and infrared sensors we have today. but it is true that if i define a certain missile defense architecture, i can always come up with a countermeasure to defeat it. i can also once given a countermeasure, i can always design a missile defense system to defeat that countermeasure. both those statements are true. and so missile l defense systems

don't work perfectly. the countermeasure issue is not a binary issue. there are lots of different countermeasures, some of them are easy, almost trivial to defeat, some are very tough to defeat, and there's a probablistic calculation. maybe you'll get 20% of them, maybe you'll get 80% of them, etc. but it is a difficult problem, it's being worked very hard. ted mentioned a couple. tumbling targets. missile defense agency is very aware of tumbling targets. i don't believe that's a showstopper. ted mentioned that if you cut the missile into pieces, that radar and infrared sensors cannot tell the difference between those chunks of a missile body and warheads. that is absolutely technically not true. you can easily -- not easily, but you can tell the difference between the two. the science board report, it's a

very good report i recommend you all if you like to get into technical details, it's downloaded from the web. ted said the report says none of the radars work for -- [inaudible] there's no place in the report that says that. in fact, it says quite the opposite -- >> it says radars don't have adequate range. is that what it says? >> it doesn't say that either. >> are well, you're wrong. >> it says -- >> well -- >> ted, i want you to comment, but all in many turn. >> if you increase the radar by a factor of three, then in the most stressing case the radar is adequate. the defense science board report nowhere says that you cannot discriminate decoys from warheads. that statement is never found in any of these pages. the one place that it says is that the department of defense has not demonstrated that you can do kill assessment, that is

to say once a kill vehicle hits something up there and it gets the splatter of chunks of stuff coming out of it, do i know that the nuclear warhead has been destroyed? and that is a challenging problem as well. it's a very different problem than the decoy discrimination problem, and that's the one statement they say that has not been demonstrated. but they do not say that the discrimination problem is impossible or can't work. nor does it say that adversaries are already testing decoys that could defeat the defense. there's a wonderful chart in there that shows foreign, foreign decoy release times after the boost phase. foreign decoys. that's british, french, russian, chinese and anybody else. it does not say north korean, it does not say iranian. and so one of the open questions is the adversaries for the

system are iran, not russia, not china. maybe the french, i don't know. [laughter] but we don't know, at least there's no information in the open domain about what iran and north korea can do. and so i would submit that their ability to -- >> we're leaving this discussion for a few moments as the u.s. senate is about to gavel in for what's expected to be a brief pro forma session this morning. we'll return or to the final moments of this examination of ballistic missile defense right after this -- the senate. and now to live coverage of the u.s. senate here on c-span2.

the presiding officer: the senate will come to order. the clerk will read a communication to the senate. the clerk: washington, d.c., february 24, 2012. to the senate: under the provisions of rule 1, paragraph 3, of the standing rules of the senate, i hereby appoint the honorable jim webb , a senator from the commonwealth of virginia , to perform the duties of the chair. signed: daniel k. inouye, president pro tempore. the presiding officer: under the previous order, the senate stands adjourned until 2:00 p.m. stands adjourned until 2:00 p.m. >> senators will return for legislative work in monday afternoon at 2 p.m. eastern. they will consider a nomination for u.s. district judge in new york state. later in the weeks senators may work on highway and transit projects for the next five

years. now back to the final moments of a discussion of ballistic missile defense from uc berkeley. >> certainly a possibility at least in principle, and just to argue, that look at this particular military threat but not the other, both of which are within the reach of the technical capacity of the system, is simply to mislead the public. if you tell people from europe, and you also tell them you would have to pull this thread back and use it off the coast of united states but you don't believe this would be the case, that's what i would call a comprehensive argument. if you tell them that they can only be done -- they can't be done from europe and then your misleading them in my judgment. [inaudible] >> well, i'm just saying what -- all right. since the system is currently defending the u.s., according to the study that you're defending,

iraq has weapons of mass destruction so we need to go to war against them. that was vetted all over the place, wasn't it? so you're supposed to believe that because the air force and navy and contractors, who get paid to tell the department of defense what it wants to hear and get used by the department of defense to make misleading statements to the public, this is okay. this is what you should accept as authority. what you should do is go and look at the analysis that's published. all right? three-meter long warhead that i can show you the data for, if we take the trouble to bore you with it, we don't need to, has a radar cross-section below a hundred of a meter.

i have the data, i have it published. i don't know why it is that when you talk about an ex-radar range. that diminishes the range substantial but it means the radar will not be able to acquire the target at long range, and it also means that if there's any chance of discriminating, you will not have what's called a signal to noise to do it. and let me explain very simple notion that you all understand quickly. if i can only dimly the object, because it's at the threshold of what i can see, then even if i have in principle resolution to see it, i still may not be able to identify it relative to other objects that look somewhat similar. only if it's in bright light where i can really see all the details i might be able to actually identify one job object relative to another. and incidentally, i've got to know what i'm looking for.

so when somebody tells me we're going to solve a decoy problem, i have a simple question. if somebody puts a warhead inside a balloon, in space, and they throw out another bunch of balloons with it, and every ball and is designed look different, by forethought, some were painted, summer may different sizes but i'd like to know how you'll tell it apart. that's a technical question. i will stop there. been i want to thank you all. this has not been an easy topic to discuss. but i'm pleased to tell you that it's all going to become clear with a single question from professor of physics, so just hang on for just a few seconds and roger will put it straight. >> i'm not sure that's going -- i'll try. i can stipulate, stipulate that

this is a complex, a hard problem. so i think about it, i think we've got to think about it from a very long-term. where are we going to be in 10, 20 years. i thought about it in three dimensions, and people have addressed two of those. one is the political dimension, can increase global security by pursuing missile defense? and i don't know, i would hope that conversations among the nations we're having conversations with will inform that question about whether it's going to increase global security. second, the technical questions, and i would hope that are indeed on like this would inform that part of the dimension, and we saw in the boost phase chemical laser area. for example, where things didn't pan out but i think programs have been stopped or slowed, or done away with. so r&d isn't an answer to the

technical. the third dimension which is maybe the one that you haven't talked about and maybe we can focus on that, it's a prioritization. we are looking at cuts in dod budget. lots of other things we can do for global security. cost obvious he comes into this, and no one talks about cost. how do you think about prioritizing this versus other things we could do. maybe we could get an answer on that. >> excellent question. i'll take the same or if that's okay with you, michael. >> it's hard, you know. every constituency is claiming that their area has to be the top priority. certainly has to be an area that has to be sacrosanct from cuts. i think that at the moment, and it's been a while and it's going to increase, iran and north korea are the principal nationstate threats to the

trendy, to u.s. security, to our allies security. nuclear weapons states are -- and as ballistic missile producers and deployers, and we have to do everything we can militarily, politically, economically to meet those threats. and if there are deals that can be cut, arms control and other means of restraint, i think we're all for that. but you have to have substantial military assets put against these threats. and that's what we're doing. so i don't think that missile defense against north korea and iran will be cut. certain elements might be cut. there's a facing issue been pointed out that there's some three block iib funding has been cut, you know, down the road.

but i think, you know, this is a priority aerial. >> dean, did you want to address the? >> i wish there was an answer to that question. because it's the $64,000 question, not just in defense area, but in health care, and all public policy arenas. in fact, it's a great subject for the goldman school to work on. how do you allocate resources from competing demands? and i know of no good rational, clear way to do it. in my mind, the liability of missile defense, the issue is not so much the technical issues, it's rather, what's the term of art, the opportunity cost. so i spend 10 billion a year on missile defense. would that be better spent augmenting special forces, augmenting the navy for operations in the pacific, since rapidity to the pacific, what about land forces? what about air force? what about space?

what about cyber. that's all dod stuff. what about our economy? if our economy goes down the tank, all the guns in the world are not going to sure our country out. so you've got guns and butter trade off. i wish i knew a way to make those allegations, but i don't. it's a classic problem, and the way the decision gets made on the hill and in the pentagon i think it's just, you know, hold a finger up and debates, competing interests when a decision gets made. may not be optimal. >> ted, which led to address rogers question? >> first of all, i think if the country feels it needs a missile defense it has to do any realistic way, none of this hand waving appeals to a, the air force and the senate. we all know how the system functions, any of us have been in the pentagon, as i have been it knows you get any answer you want there. as far as the question of

discrimination is concerned, i think that's a simple way to at least think of it from the point of view as a physicist, which i would argue is the easiest way to characterize the problem, and then engine in details which are of course important. you have to ask, are there physical observables associate with the different objects that i can exploit that will allow me to tell the difference between warheads and decoys? and can the adversary develop a strategy to deny even those variables, those physical observables. so for example, the example i gave earlier. yes, you could look at a balloon and if it's in the sun, it might be hotter than if it is not. if it's got something in it it might be cooler or hotter, depending on the thermal exchange with the object inside, but is it plausible that an adversary can't just go ahead, put a warhead in about what other kinds of lives out there and heat them and, or not, and

can you, can you conceive of a set of his variables that you can measure with adequate precision, practical, you're a physicist, that will tell you which of these objects contain a warhead? i submit the answer is no and i worked on this in great detail, this idea that somehow this new science. i worked on the trident ii, not the tried and one. we did a very detailed study projecting 50 years into the future in 1980 looking at, looking at measurable quantities. so somebody wants to talk detail with me, i am all ears. but until i hear to tell other than handwaving and media work, maybe it won't, you know, that's not a way to plan the national security for the country. now, there is a technical potential for building a defense. it is a kind of boost phase defense.

mike said it's not possible. i don't know how he knows that, because i have been studying it in great detail. and you could -- >> i did not say that. >> that's what i understood you to say. >> i said there were three phases. layered defense against all faces in i apologize for misquoting you. >> i know there is extensive work going on. >> there are not. that's one of the problem but that's one of the things i've been trying to do. with incidentally build very. another hippie. and there are things you could do. there are things you do that could allow you to build a defense of some capability. there's no point in getting -- i would be happy to talk to you privately. i've got a lot of work on this, and we are talking to the russians about it, and we're trying to talk to the administration but they always seem to be too busy. i don't know what they're doing, but, you know, it's really

difficult. >> they may not know what they're doing but i know what i am doing. >> i'm finished it and i think they're entitled at least to get their hand up quickly, to ask questions. but you have to give your affiliation. you have to tell me to whom you're addressing the question. so, harry? [inaudible] how do you build a political constituency to reverse direction? us and we decided as a result of this discussion to reverse direction? and how do you do that in the context where the inertia of what you're doing may be creating tensions with the parties who have identified as adversaries? >> thank you. i will leave it to whichever one

of you raises her hand to address that. michael? >> well, by reverse direction, deeming generally like stopping the missile defense program? >> this or any program. >> well, you have to mobilize support. you've got to have experts who can make a technical case that could ultimately to political support where it counts which is on capitol hill to deny budgetary support. that's ultimately how you do. the vietnam war got stopped ultimate because congress stopped funding it. and if the congress funds it, it's going to continue. that's how -- that's and show how you have to solve a bit i don't have an answer but i have a comment that i think could inform it. in 2008 with a financial collapse that threatened not going to bring that our whole

economy but the rest of the world along with it. the reasons for it were really well understood by anybody the lack she sat down and look at the system, although all the people had responsibility claim they didn't see it coming. right now the banks, which are too big to fail before, are even bigger. credit default swaps are still being traded. while the camera is still going on. glass-steagall has not been put back in place, and let me tell you, we are going to have another collapse. now, getting to missile defense, if such a threat to the country as the whole economy is not being addressed by the political leadership, why do you think they will address the missile defense? >> dean, do you want to comment? >> i will agree with what michael said. developing a constituency, vested interests, congress ultimately funds this stuff so you got to get to the hill.

>> that's the way it works. it's like making sausage, i understand. other questions? [inaudible] >> you asked me to identify myself to my name is jackie, the executor of the western states legal foundation in oakland which is a 30 year old advocacy group. i have two questions and a comment. the two questions are, none of you mentioned in your radars are potential radars that maybe station in norway or scandinavia. i wonder if you have any information about that. second, you can do was to comment on what they think is the significance of the fact that anders rasmussen, secretary-general of nato has recently announced that its likely will cancel the joint planned nato-russia summit on the margins of the summit in chicago because of the distance

on the question of missile defense. the comment is, and this is not a sarcastic question. why on earth would iran launch a nuclear weapon, if it had one at europe, knowing that it would be a completely suicidal mission? and second of all, i think it's wrong to call at missile defense because in george bush's past review when he unveiled the new strategic triad, it clearly linked our senses and defenses and swords and shields, and that new strategic triad was not called by the same name in the obama nuclear review, but all the pieces are still there and it is not operating the same way. >> thank you very much. again, you addressed it to all three which doesn't make my job easier. do i have any volunteers? dean, you look like you already.

>> let me pick up on the last point you made. it is true the likelihood of iran ever launching a nuclear tipped missile is very low. in my mind, the problem is there is tremendous source of leverage iran can gain by threatening to do that. they can split coalitions. they can dissuade countries from joining coalitions. they may even dissuade the u.s. and even entering the region, if let's say, let's take the straits of her moves, for example, since that's in the news, that they closed off the street and the u.s. decides to go in and take a threatening nuclear attack against u.s. allies are must -- much less the u.s. homeland. that there is a very potent threat. and in my mind, missile defense gives you a shield that you can rattle to neutralize the saber rattling of the offensive threat. and so missile defense served a

political strategic purpose without anything ever being launched at and that in my mind is a significant virtue. a chance that any state is going to attack the united states with a nuclear weapon is pretty small, although you can worry about ask the launch centers and things like that. they are just events that are disaster if they occur. >> let me visit an assumption in dean statement that is in dispute here, which is defense has any real capability. and adversaries will be so stupid as to believe it does. so there's not, so that's an issue that you need to decide about for you so. i personally believe this is going to sound brutal to you, that the way to make the united states safest from this kind of attack and its allies, is to make it very clear that any country who attacks us in this

way will look like a glass parking lot when we're finished with them. and we would prefer very much not to ever have to do this. but if they do we will not be ambiguous in our reaction at all. the last thing i want to do is to give somebody the idea that they might execute a nuclear attack on the united states or its friends and allies, and get away without a response. and i think must be of the arguments is really not in the interest of stability. on the radar in norway i petacchi about it off-line to eye with disinvited from norway after a show that this writer was an intelligence gathering radar. >> there are radars in different places but there are no missile defense radars currently planned for no way that i will respond briefly to the second and third other questions. on the russian point, as i

mentioned, the talks on missile defense cooperation have not borne fruit. it let the president of russia to make a very tough statement. and i think until we get them back on track it's not going to be discussed in the nato summit. so there's also a presidential election in russia, and a lot of electoral political issues in russia that affect everything they say on all issues, as is true elsewhere. and on the third point, i agree completely with dean's point, but, you know, if you extrapolate your reason further, then what's the point of these countries have nuclear weapons. we should not be at all concerned, and that's just a foolish -- >> that's not right. >> you said why would they do it to? [inaudible] >> so if we don't care, if we think it's fruitless for them to

consider using these weapons politically or militarily, then we should be agnostic or indifferent to the acquisition. which could you're not if you're a disarmament group. [inaudible] >> i just think if you're in a position of real responsibility in government, he had to really make decisions and you're not carving from the outside and you have the weight of response but on your shoulders, part of the weight, of the nation security on your shoulders, then you're going to be more cautious than more cavalier about such -- especially from a regime, such as the regime that is in tehran or in pyongyang next week as a person who carved from the inside, one of the problems -- deck how long ago was that, trying to? how many decades ago speak was 20 years ago. as a matter-of-fact, more than 20 years ago.

do you have a tactical point to make are you going to appeal to authority? >> gentlemen, gentlemen, gentlemen. >> i want to finish. i think that it is astonishing that you would you were trained as an engineer and just nothing technical to say. nothing at all. that's an interesting think. >> that's not my job in this -- >> right. just to call people carpers. >> i had promised a speed i want to make a statement, please. that's okay. >> but you don't want to be interrupted, is that right? >> yes, please interrupt me. please, i would love to the exchange with you. but i think we are having at. >> states get nuclear weapons -- [inaudible] >> looks like we are, that's good. states get nuclear weapons because they want to protect themselves. that's a big motivation. china -- >> is all motivation. >> they want to coerce other

states, that's true too. we can go through hundreds of levels of political scientists. but the reality is that -- [inaudible] >> or in a responsible official pushing lines at other people state for them -- [inaudible] >> i don't hear any deviation, i don't hear any deviation from any spokesperson from the government. you're not even willing to make a clear statement that the gmd system will work as defense. something, when you were part of report that made that claim, and i can show -- [inaudible] i can show with slides i have your that the last two experiments were attempts to rig the experiment. so the administration had to know about those experiments. states try to get nuclear weapons because they want to keep us off their backs. and if utah, for example, after the gulf war of 91, there was prominent indian general arbiter everyone was talking about him,

because he said what he learned from the gulf war in 91 was able to keep you know states off your back, have a nuclear weapon. and the north koreans have learned that, too. so why shouldn't the iranians? >> they may well have. i have to apologize, but the only time for one more question. and it better be a good one. and it better be brief. and it better be addressed to one of the panelists. to i have any takers? raymond. >> raymond, here at uc berkeley. actually i will try to change the nature of this discussion a little bit by making a comment rather than posing a question. and i just want to mention as often of our panelists know that there is -- on at least a part of this problem. i have the privilege of reviewing that report but i don't know when it will be out but it is supposed to be imminent in the next weeks. and i thought as an outside

reviewer that it does a very good job of going into considerable detail of what i think anyone from the outside has to admit is rather and arcane, sophisticated, complicated topic. it's conficker technically but also in non-technical but equally important matters of operations and deployments, many other factors. that report does not go into greater political issues, economics and so on so much. but i really do commend this to you when it comes out. i believe it will be available to the public, and i just thought since at least one of our panelists was an author, not shy about mentioning a lot of work went into it, a very large expert group was put together, and i happen to think that it will contribute to the discussion by clarifying a lot of the concepts and issues without necessarily resolving

the issues to the satisfaction of anyone level or anyone in this room. >> raymond, i -- >> it's a report coming out a national research council on ballistic missile defense. and i believe it's still being vetted for final review right now. >> raymond, i want to thank you for a very fine comic, which break the user ground rules. all q&a have to start with a question. i appreciate the comic. this is a highly complex subject, politically, technically, social logically, international politics, national politics. i think we're very fortunate in having three people willing to inform us and discuss matters between them. on issue that i am fairly certain will be front and center of the american political situations for the next decade. at least i think we got to a

good start today in trying to understand what these issues are and will be. the fact that the three panelists didn't agree should surprise no one at all. with that though i want to thank this review for a very, very fine job. and i -- [applause] >> and i want to thank you all. that was, the way you avoid all those lashes, escapes me. and i thank you very much for coming. >> if it wasn't important a wouldn't be worth fighting about. [inaudible conversations]

republican presidential candidate mitt romney announces his jobs and tax cut plan today. he's making the speech in his home state of michigan where unemployed stood at 9.5% in december. you can see live coverage at 12:15 p.m. eastern on our companion network c-span. >> one of the trick is things that run this book me was thinking through the way the particular the international human rights context, rights were both straddled as a moral imperative and aspirational ideal, and more practical and

formal mandate. >> on afterwards from distributing food to the poor in india to sex trafficking in japan, richard thompson ford defined human rights and how well-meaning western forms can be to increase that. also this week in the booktv, saturday at 7 p.m. >> at the 1960 olympic games, john carlos and tommy smith raised their fists in the black power salute. >> this is black power. they intimidated so many people, white people in particular, by using that phrase, black power. because when they use that word or that phrase black power, it

made many people think that black power meant destruction. the statue of liberty or ground zero, destroying america. wasn't anything about destroying america. it was not rebuilding america and having an american to have a new paradigm in terms of how we can truly be what each and everyone of us did that place was going to elementary school and junior high school about the land of the free and home of the brave. we all want to be great americans, but as young athletes we found it was wrong. something was broke and we want to take our time to evaluate and then take our initiative to fix it. >> discover more about african-american history during black history month on book tv on c-span2. and online at the c-span video library. search and share from over 25 years of c-span programming at c-span.org video library.

>> secretary of state hillary clinton focus of this week on the first state department global business conference. it was focus on international business and strategies to strengthen u.s. economy. after the secretary's remarks we hear from boeing company president and ceo james mcinerney. this is about 40 minutes. >> good afternoon, everyone, and once again, welcome to the department of states global business coffers. thank you very much for joining us, a special welcome to our friend jim mcnerney who's the chairman of the presents board council is going to address you in a few minutes. my name is bob hormats, and then undersecretary of state for economic growth, energy and the environment. and i want to extend a special welcome to all of you who come from all around the world.

with people representing over 120 countries here today. and a special thanks to my colleague, tom, who really was very instrumental in pulling this whole logistical if it together. [applause] >> it's not easy to get people from all around the world to come together, but it's for a very good purpose, and we are deeply appreciative of those of you who come from such long distances. in today's world, america faces more competitors from more countries and more products and sectors than ever before. and we also face new methods and new systems for competing as well. the united states also faces challenges to maintain a fair and open global economic environment that enables our businesses to continue to compete and to thrive. to meet these formidable challenges, secretary clinton has led the effort of all of us

here at the state department. just as you have done in many other companies to innovate, to retool, and to refocus. she is emphasized that america's economic leadership and strengths are critical to advancing our foreign policy objectives. but equally, that it is imperative to globalize all the tools at our disposal, including american diplomacy to support america's economic priorities at home and abroad. high level, ongoing and energetic support for american companies is essential part of that effort. she has done this in all parts of the world herself on the many trips that she has taken, and she has urged all of us to do likewise. today's conference is a major component of the secretaries economic statecraft agenda, into pursuing these goals. her leadership and her

determination have driven our economic engagement forward, and she has mobilize our entire department and all our posts around the world in this effort. it is my great privilege to introduce you this afternoon to secretary clinton, here inspired of this conference and leaves our ongoing efforts to support america's companies in the united states, and all around the world. it's a particular privilege because we've actually just been working on a number of projects in a conference that was held yesterday. she just returned from and loss cobbles in mexico, g24 ministers congress, the first of its kind with these kind of changes of the global economy were discussed, and when she presented a very strong argument for the global system, giving up with the challenges we face today, and ensuring that all of us can compete in a rules-based

global economy. so is my great pleasure and privilege to introduce you today to the secretary of the state of the united states, hillary rodham clinton. thank you very much. [applause] >> well, thank you and welcome to the state department. i want to thank bob hormats for his leadership here in implementing the agenda he just briefly described. and i also want to thank tom for his work polling the conference together. and to all of our friends and colleagues from not on the state department but across our government and the private sector who have been participating over these past two days, coming together on half of our common objective. i particularly want to know secretary bryson from the commerce department, u.s. trade representative ron kirk, mike froman from the white house, tom donohue from the chamber. of course, our friends from

boeing whom you will hear from in a minute, and so many more. and i am particularly pleased that this luncheon is being held in the ben franklin room with ben franklin steering over uzbek because it is named for a man who is both one of america's first diplomats, and also one of our earliest innovators and entrepreneurs. he understood that our country's greatness we depend on both public excellence and private enterprise. and it is in that spirit that we gather today to discuss how americans foreign policy in shaping u.s. businesses abroad and drive recovery here at home, and also help provide a strong foundation and effective economic tools that can strengthen and sustain america's global leadership. now, here at the state department we call this economic statecraft. and we have worked to position ourselves to lead in a changing

world where security is shaped in financial markets and on factory floors as well as in diplomatic negotiations, and on the battlefield. that's why more than 1000 economic officers on six continents are working with american companies, chambers of commerce, local businesses, and local and national governments to open markets and find new customers. at the same time, we are forming new partnerships with companies, universities, ngos, and philanthropies to the private sector ingenuity to work, solving some of our most difficult global challenges and driving sustainable development. now, i think it is fair to say, and i see a lot of my very experienced diplomatic colleagues here in the room, this has not always been a traditional focus for us. so why, you might ask, is the secretary of state now spent as

much time thinking about market swings as missile silos? well, to put it very plainly, americans need jobs. and every $1 billion of goods we export supports more than 5000 jobs here at home. even more, in industries like telecommunications and aerospace. that's what president obama set a goal of doubling america's exports over five years. and i'm very proud that we now expect to hit that target ahead of schedule. thanks in large measure to the passage of the free trade agreements with south korea, colombia and then the, the tireless efforts of our diplomats, trade represents and commercial service officers around the world. and, of course, and most important, the resilience of america's business community. we also understand that america's economic strengths, and our global leadership are a package deal.

you are not going to have one without the other. our power in the 21st century depends not just on the size of our military, but also on what we grow, how will we innovate, what we make, and how effectively we sell. rising powers like china, india and brazil, understand this as well and we can't sit on the sidelines while they put economics at the center of their foreign policies. finally, we fundamentally believe that increasing trade and growing prosperity will benefit not just our own people, but people everywhere. our economies are interdependent as never before, and so are our state. america's economic reality parents were large degree on the strength of the global economy, and the global economy depends on the strength of america. now, i will be the first to admit that in some ways we are

playing catch-up here. let's be honest. we have fallen behind some other countries. some of them friends and allies. when he came to using diplomacy to promote economic interest. american companies haven't always seen the federal government as an ally, and i know the state department has not always been the first call when you're looking for help. so we can and we will, and, in fact, we are doing better. that's what this conference is all about. we do want to hear your concrete suggestions based on your experiences about how we can be better partners. and we want to share with you the steps we're taking here in washington, and around the world. i've made jobs diplomacy a priority mission at the state department with a clear goal. just as our companies are ready to out work, out-innovate, and outcompete their rivals, so we intend to be the most effective diplomatic champion for

prosperity and growth. what's our plan? well, it begins with good people and good partners. we are changing the way we do business to better advance and support the way you do business. we need to see the world like you do, crisscrossed, not just by national borders, but by global supply chains. so we are improving training for diplomats in economic, finance, and markets. and working more closely with colleagues across our government to leverage the best possible skills and resources. i directed all our senior diplomats to conduct business outreach and advocacy when they travel overseas. we have created a new unified undersecretary at for economic growth, energy and environment under bob hormats his leadership. and am also proud to announce that we will name i do better as the first ever chief economist at the state department. she has a deep knowledge of financial and other markets an

extensive experience in both the public and private sectors, and i look forward to her contributions to our team. effective job diplomacy also requires partners on the ground with deep knowledge and extensive networks. that's where all of you coming. american chambers of commerce and other bilateral trade associations are at the heart of our effort. when i was in zambia last summer, i met members of the local chamber, some of whom are here today. one woman told about her job as a local manager for citibank. yes, she is helping on an american from navigating growing mark, but she's also helping her fellow citizens start their own businesses, or buy their first homes. that's the kind of win-win american business support organizations deliver all over the world. so we train our people, we find our partners, but the real question is, can jobs diplomacy

delivered results that make a difference to americans throughout the country, to the bottom line of companies into the daily lives of our citizens? we are pursuing three lines of action to do just that. first, promoting u.s. businesses. second, attracting investment back to the united states. and third, leveling the playing field for fair competition. let's start with how we advocate for u.s. companies trying to win contracts and make sales. let me start by saying this is not about picking winners and losers. it's about helping all american companies put their best foot forward overseas to get a fair shot in every market. when we think about this, of course within but our very large multinational corporations, as you will hear in a minute from jim, he can offer a first hand extends about how this works. the obama administration has gone to bat for boeing and its

workers, and many others all over the world. and as a result, they have hired thousands of new engineers, machinists and factory workers right here at home. and as jim likes to point out, every boeing jet comes with millions of parts produced by more than 10,000 suppliers, many of them american small and medium-sized businesses. that's jobs diplomacy and action. consider russia. from our first days in office we start talking to jim and others at boeing about their interest in doing more business in russia. in october 2009, i, too, would boeing's design center in moscow and press the case with russian officials. our embassy kept at it, arguing that boeing is the global gold standard. and it worked. in late 2010, the russians agreed to buy 57 -- 50, just.

boeing is building tens of thousands of well-paying american jobs. this story has been repeated again and again and again around the world from turkey to brazil to vietnam, with our advocacy. in fact, just this month and indonesian airline officially signed a contract for more than 200 planes, a deal that president obama helped seal on his trip in november. now, i think the truth is that jobs diplomacy that was not just about giants like boeing or ge or caterpillar. we are just as committed, and i want you to be as well, and to helping small and medium-sized businesses. because after all, that is where most of the jobs are, in the united states. for example, when icelandic and looking for help converting its vehicles to electric power, our embassy championed a dynamic startup from loveland ohio that does its work as most anyone in the world.

and in the end they won a contract worth $100 million, and sold 1000 electric suvs. because international trade has to be a two-way street, we're also working to attract direct foreign investment. we called it global investment into american committees. and this is the second focus of our jobs diplomacy. to make this a priority across our government, president obama launched to select u.s.a. initiative last summer, which i'm sure you'll hear more from secretary bryson about later today. the departments of state and commerce are actually working hand-in-hand on this program, and we're already seeing seeing results. for example, last you we brought together american and chinese governors, and to the state and local officials, to discuss investment opportunities. and not long afterwards one of the largest heavy equipment manufacturers in china announced a $60 million investment in peachtree city, georgia, with

plans to add an additional 25 million across the state and higher 300 engineers in the next five years. we are working with local leaders to help them replicate this success. these are important and worthwhile effort, but signing one off deals if it were dozens of airplanes or hundreds of suvs will only get us so far. we need to think bigger and broader, and that's why the third focus of jobs diplomacy is leveling the playing field for all. so american companies can compete and succeed everywhere. we recognize that for all the tantalizing opportunities of foreign markets, there are still significant obstacles that make it harder for american businesses. some of these are familiar hurdles, corruption, red tape, outdated protectionist policies. but we are also confronting new

challenges, like the so-called tollbooths that force unfair terms on companies just to end or expand any market. like forced technology transfers, government abetted by the of intellectual property, and preferential treatment for state-owned or state-supported enterprises. the united states is committed to a global economic system that is open, free, transparent and fair. and we are working to institutionalize those norms in regional and global trade agreements, and institutions. we are pushing for reforms that allow more people in more places to participate in the formal economy, especially women who represent enormous untapped economic potential, but are still marginalized in many markets. and as president obama said in a state of the union, and as vice president biden reinforced at a recent lunch with the chinese vice president, we will not

stand by when our competitors don't play by the same rules. this administration has already brought trade cases against china, at no twice the rate of our predecessors. and now a special new trade enforcement unit has been established to go after unfair trading practices. last friday the president announced that when other nations provide a fair financing for the exports, we will offer matching support to competing u.s. firms. every day, all over the world, our diplomats are pressing governments to comply with international standards and to treat our companies fairly. we stand up for entire industries, like when our team in australia helped beat back unwanted legal action against american pork producers leading to a significant increase in exports last year. and we stand up for small companies, like the producing washington state that faced a

crisis when canadian regulators hit their products with a higher tariff. and after the state department working closely with the canadian embassy intervened, the canadian regulators realized they had made a mistake and reversed their decision. big or small, return effort economic system that benefits everyone, like when our embassy in the know it worked with filipino authorities on new intellectual property protection, or when our negotiators ensure that the new trans-pacific partnership requires that state-owned enterprises compete under the same rules as private companies. so my message is, i hope clear. we are here actually to help. we want to come with you as we open new markets and create new opportunities for jobs and investments. so when you confront unfair regulations, when you need help cutting through red tape, or if you just want advice on local customs, come to us.

to make this even easier in key markets across the world, our ambassadors are now holding monthly conference calls with the u.s. business community. we are standardizing initial information on all of our embassy websites so u.s. companies can find the answers they need in one place, which will complement the newly launched business u.s.a. website, a virtual one stop shop for the services and information companies need to help them grow, hire and export. so these are all the ways in which jobs diplomacy is helping deliver results, and in the days and months ahead, we are going to push even harder. we will not rest until the u.s. government is the most effective champion of business and trade anywhere. and i want to close by asking you to consider how you can help us help you. american companies today have the best, most productive workers in the world. we have the best technology, the most talented innovators, and

many, many are sitting on large cash reserves. foreign leaders often say to me, where are the american businesses? how come they are not here competing for this construction contract, or that mining deal? what are they waiting for? as i've described today, this administration is doing everything we can to help american companies, large and small, compete and succeed. but ultimately we know it's up to you. we can't help you if you're not hungry enough to get out there and compete for the business that is going to be available. so it's up to american business leaders to higher, to train, retrain your employees to invest, to support education in america, all of which are key factors in our future success, our innovation, the kind of economy we agree for the 21st

century. but we also need you to take informed risks that have always been the key to success. and we need to recapture americans dynamism and sustain our global leadership. so we appreciate greatly your traveling from anywhere around the globe to be part of this important work, and joining us here today. we really believe that our best years are ahead of us, if we're willing to do what it takes to grow our own economy and compete for opportunities that may be challenging, but which i have no doubt we can win and succeed in doing. now, it's my pleasure to introduce jim mcinerny of boeing, under his leadership, boeing is stolen, which is only appropriate. last year, orders for commercial aircraft rose by more than 50%, and the company hired 13,000 workers. we talk a lot about boeing because we still eat in the

aerospace industry, and despite some competition from our european friends, we have the best planes and we can produce the best products. and as president obama said on friday at boeing's plant in washington, this company is a good example of what american manufacturing candy in a way that nobody else in the world can do. so we asked jim to come here to talk not only about boeing, but about his leadership of the export council. because we want to send a clear unmistakable message that we are open for business, and we can, together, achieve the results we are seeking. thank you all very much. [applause] >> batted secretary, thank you

very much for a very gracious introduction. and i think i share the sentiment of everyone in the room, thanking you for not only what you're doing individual but from a decade, your service to our country and the leadership your provider, so thank you very much. [applause] >> i would also like to thank deputy secretary be tom nides. tell him i thank him for his leadership and the cost together. i know these things are hard work. and i think the fruit of his efforts is plain for all of us to see. it's just terrific. and i know there are breakout sessions planned, and those of us at boeing are very excited about participating today and tomorrow. i am delighted to be here today to share a perspective from the business community on the important role that economic

statesman craft plays in making america competitive around the world and helping to drive our own domestic economic renewal. in its big picture role, the state department's traditional diplomatic mission to promote geopolitical stability contributes the business confidence and creates an environment which international commerce, international commerce can flourish. but has exports and trade become an evermore important component of the u.s. economy, commercial diplomacy has become an equally vital component of the state department's mission, as the secretary just pointed out. there is no escaping the fact that a strong and sustain competitive u.s. economic base is a fundamental part of our national security and foreign policy strategy. on this score, madam secretary, i want to thank you for your leadership once again that you've shown, and the continued

importance you place on commercial diplomacy. it's like back to the late '80s and early 90s all over again. your organization support of international sales and export control processes are vital to all u.s. exporters. and certainly to boeing. this gathering represents a substantial confluence of interest. and i think it really offers a unique opportunity for learning, and hopefully continued progress on these issues. as your provider of the business perspective, in this session, that would be me, let me start by saying that the fund those of american business remained strong. in my view, and i think in the view of most business leaders, there is clear a line between our nations strategic and economic interests, and interests of business. we all want the united states to retain its global economic

leadership. with that thought in mind, and with full cognizance of and appreciation for all that this administration has already accomplished on commercial diplomacy, i'd like to suggest even greater emphasis on but those of us in business consider three crucial aspects of the state department's economic mission. first, your ongoing and continuing advocacy on behalf of u.s. businesses of all sizes to level the global playing field and help us compete on our own merits. that's all we really want. second, the strengthening and stabilizing of institutional structures, support and policies, such as those provided through the export-import bank, and the trade any government agency, and opec. and third, the need for further streamlining of regulatory processes, such as