>> from distributing food to the poor in india to sex trafficking in japan, richard thompson ford defines human rights and how well-meaning western reforms can lead to increased exploitation tonight at 10 eastern. also this weekend on booktv, today at 7 p.m., a house historian looks at the african-americans who have seven inside congress. -- who have served in congress. and at 11, the life of senator al simpson written by donald

hardy. booktv every weekend on c-span2. coming up next on booktv, author joseph sassoon presents a history of saddam hussein's regime using internal documentstured by coalition -- documented captured by coalition forces following the 2003 invasion. this is about an hour, ten minutes. >> hello, good evening. my name is samra, i teach here at georgetown university, and it is my pleasure to welcome you to tonight's event. today we are very fortunate to have our colleague and a friend, professor joseph sassoon, discussing release of his new book. there are few occasions in academic life that are more worthy of celebration than the publication of a book, and

certainly none more so than the publication of a major book, and that's what this is likely to be. professor sassoon is an adjunct professor at georgetown university, he is also a senior associate member at st. anthony's college in oxford. during the 2010-2011 academic year, he was a public policy scholar at the woodrow wilson center for international scholars here in washington d.c. during the spring term, he is a visiting fellow at all souls college in oxford. professor sassoon was born in baghdad and completed his ph.d. at st. anthony's college, oxford. he has published extensively on iraq and its economy and on the middle east including two previous books, "economic policy in iraq: 1932-1950," published in 1987, and "the iraqi refugees: the new crisis in the

middle east," published in 2009 in addition to numerous book chapters and other publications. his new book based on baath documents was published by cambridge university press in mid december 2011. professor sassoon will speak for 25, 30 minutes, as long as he'd like, and then that will be followed by a few brief remarks on my part as a discuss santa, and then we will open up the session to questions and this kind introduction and thank you for the center for arranging everything and special thanks to

marina who did all the work. my book is an attempt to understand the inner workings of a modern arab state from its own meticulous records rather than secondary sources. for the first time, we have able to delve into the functioning of a one-party arab state in the grip of a powerful authoritarian ideology. it is the study of the party's activities and modus operandi when it ruled the country between 1968 and 2003. my research relied primarily on the massive archive of government documents captured by the united states after the fall of saddam hussein in april 2003. these contain the records of the baath party, the intelligence services, mainly the special security organization, the d1 which is the presidential offices and the ministry of

information as well as add yo tapes of the meetings -- audiotapes of the revolutionary command councillal shot provide -- altogether provide structure into saddam hussein's regime. where the documents reveal the decisions made, the tapes capture the spontaneity of private discussions among the country's leaders. these archives illustrate how the different arms of the state functioned, how the intelligence services gathered information, recruited informers, carried out their surveillance of society. reports were filed by all levels of the party hierarchy and were he meticulously cross-referenced. from these records and countless memos, we can build a unique picture of the regime. i also researched documents taken out by the kurds in 991

and -- 1991 and handed to the u.s. human rights watch published a selection of these reports on its web site and graphically described the bureaucracy of repression portrayed this these documents. the description of these documents of the '80s is applicable to the majority of the documents, and let me quote: the language is numbingly dry, the format highly formalistic. written thus, the documents bespeak the daily tedium of career civil servants to establish bureaucratic procedure. the all-pervasive iraqi bureaucracy manifested itself in another fashion through the simple mechanism of referencing. the documents are linked to one another in a vast and complex administrative web. official decrees are issued from high and passed down the ranks in a fashion.

the me meticulous cross-refereng that is characteristic of the iraqi documents simply reflects the complexity of daily life in a sophisticated, modern state. end of quote. although the regime led strong emphasis on filing, we do not have much information about the filing system they used. we do know that filing continued uninterrupted during the gulf war, and even for a couple of weeks after the invasion of 2003. the regime created its own terminology and expanded it over time. for example, the trusted one became the term for an informer. the bride of all revolution was the coup d'etat february 8, is the -- 1963, which catapulted

the baath into power for the first time. celebrations and organization such as -- [inaudible] the organizing for party veterans which actually was nothing but an organization for retired senior baathists. let me start first with discussing the durability of the regime. there are many ways to interpret the durability of the regime. some argue that a dictatorship could not run by one man alone, however unrestricted his power is. there is a recognition that dictatorships flourish on wide complicity, fueled by idealism to fear, and that makes great sense of their durability. in iraq the baath party was one of three pillars of governance, together with the military and the bureaucracy.

but it was more important than the other two. this differed from the baath regime in syria and the first asset where the army was far more central because of the military background of the party's leaders. of in iraq saddam hussein deliberately weakened the military as part of his coup proofing, and the party became the essential core of the political system's command and control of the country. the baath ideological domination of the armed forces began immediately after the party seized power on july 30, 1968, and the party machinery soon operated across all military ranks. historically, iraqs has developed a competent civil service that managed day-to-day administration, but the party slowly but surely crept into the bureaucracy and succeeded in this bending it to serve its

open political ends. remarkably, the state bureaucracy continued to function during the decades of instability even though the senior management of every ministry fell into the hands of baathists. centralization of power was a key strategy. every major party decision was centralized through the politboro or the party secretary which was, in essence, the party's board of directors. its functions were drawn up in a clear and meticulous way, and its hierarchy was clearly outlined. the secretary oversaw the running of every party branch which in turn controlled and collected information about every aspect of civil and military lives trout the country. throughout the country. gathering information was a formidable task.

the transmission of information to the leadership was often imperfect because of its sheer volume. but it was also sometimes deliberately inaccurate or embellished to hide inefficiencies or overstated promises made by the local leadership. for iraqi citizens negotiating the bureaucracy's hierarchical structure was a long and arduous experience. needless to say, decision making was cumbersome and inefficient, but at the same time it allowed saddam hussein to govern without having to fear that too much power would fall in the hands of rivals. the regime's success lies also in its ability to attract large thurm of supporters and make -- large number of supporters and make them feel vested in the system. enrollment of new recruits was a major element of baathist

occasion. in its recruitment policy, the party was particularly concerned to achieve a good percentage of woman members, and more importantly to overcome the aging of the party's cadre. a great deal of pressure was brought to bear on citizens to join the party, and some became members under duress, but many joined voluntarily through conviction or from a desire to benefit from being a baathist. the documents abound with evidence of citizens applying to join or rejoin the party. the vast majority of party affiliates, however, played little active role because of the party's rigid hierarchy. only the top three levels of memberships were effectively involved in executing policies. active members were subjected to

frequent evaluation, promotion required passing special training courses, immersion in the cultural aspects of the party and demonstrating the potential to serve in a more senior rank. even so, a complex web of checks and counterchecks insured that the privileged few could not become too powerful. the number of party cardholders reached about four million by the end of 2002. thus, out of an estimated population of 25 million in 2002 those affiliated with the party constituted about 16.5%, a very high number indeed. but a closer look at the statistics show us a fundamentally different conclusion. the upper echelons of the party represented only 14.5% of the

overall affiliates and about 2.4% of the overall population in 2002. if you look at this, the sympathizers and supporters which were the lowest and the least active constituted almost about 60% of the party affiliates. another reason for the durability of the regime is saddam hussein. his role in shaping the history of iraq over three and a half decades was with paramount. one of my chapters discusses his personality cult and modus operandi. saddam's personality was very complex, and any attempt to generalize about it in one sentence is bound to fail. while he was ruthless and determined to uproot any opposition, many of those who worked with him said he was also caring and attentive.

the revolutionary council meetings and those of the party leadership are truly insightful. he was in complete control of all meetings without exception. all attendees respected and feared him, and yet he was polite, rarely interrupted anyone, and if he did, would immediately apologize. at the beginning of each meeting, one could immediately sense his mood. and no one dared to contradict him or say anything that might infuriate him if he were in a gloomy mood. on the other hand, he often sounded jovial, loved to tell stories and anecdotes prompting other attendees to join in and joke or tell stories. sometimes he would dwell on an issue in detail and then suddenly become bored, and the summit was immediately changed finish the subject was immediately changed or dropped.

saddam hussein unquestionably viewed himself not only as the leader, but also as the father of the nation and of the baath family. he was convinced that no one understood the iraqi people as he did or knew their deep aspirations. while this was true to a certain extent because he mastered the art of manipulating different groups within society and around the country as a personal fiefdom, his instincts sometimes betrayed him as witnessed by the unexpected uprising that took mace at the end of the first gulf war. let me turn now to the topic of control. control was based on a clear system, a parallel system of rewards and punishment. while using extreme violence and terror against its citizens, the regime created a notable parallel system of rewards for its supporters and succeeded in

underscoring the necessity and importance for every individual to support it. i will discuss these two issues, first, by focusing on an important mechanism of control which was the security services and then talk about the reward system. the survival of the baath party and its leadership under saddam hussein can be largely attributed to the party's ability to expand and control its security apparatus. this system was established long before 1968, but saddam hussein perfected it and utilized it in ways previously unknown in the history of iraq. the security agencies were designed to overlap and were structured is so as to insure that no one agency would become strong enough to threaten the region.

the securities organization's main task was to gather information through monitoring, surveillance and by using an extensive network of informers. the baath held copies of the four main security agencies that were sent on a normal basis to the baath regional command or its branches. the archives, however, have a special section of almost 2,000 files relating to the special security organization sso that are truly incredible, and i will focus on this organization given its importance. sorry this is not clear in here. the sso was the most powerful security agency in iraq from 1980 until the u.s.-led invasion in 2003 and was run from early

1990s by saddam's second son. apart from being responsible for the safety of the president and the palaces, many of the departments within the sso had the task of monitoring the loyalty of officers and employees working in various organizations affiliated with the party or the army. for example, the directors of republican guard security focused on the loyalty of military commanders within the republican guard. the surveillance and information branch had the responsibility of watching senior iraqi officials and preparing files on any official prior to his or her being promoted or assigned to a new senior job. protecting the president was by far the sso's most significant function, and everything else in the working of the organization

was subordinated to that responsibility. on one occasion the director of the sso told his employees that, and i quote, the duty of the s is so is not -- sso is not simply guarding the president, but the underlying security concept means that protecting the president leader, may god protect him, is protecting great iraq. and just to let you know that under no circumstances anyone was allowed to ride in any document -- write in any document or memo the name of the president without having between pacts, "may god protect him." among the close circles to the leader that the sso was responsible for were workers in the presidential palaces such as electricians, butchers, tailors, a special group that ironed the clothes of the president and his family, drivers and photographers. surveillance took many forms of

these employees. ip stalling secret listening -- installing secret listening devices in their homes, telephone tapping at work and hope, personal monitoring of after-work activities and continual gathering of information about those in the inner circles and their families. one problem that faced the security branch and was referred to time and again in the documents was that most of the workers in the presidential palaces who totaled more than 1300 in 1995 were christians. because these employees spoke among themselves and with their families in the syrian or jordanian languages, it was very hard for the sso to monitor their telephone calls or to understand conversations that went on at their bugged homes. in one intriguing case, the sso found out through its informers that the wife of saddam

hussein's personal chef -- also a christian -- was addicted to gambling, and in one evening lost the sum of almost $300 which, obviously, was a very large sum at the time, and that made her a security risk. saddam hussein was unhappy with the way the sso wanted to deal with the issue which was by immediately arresting the chef and his wife. in one of his rare handwritten comments in the margins of the memo, he sated, quote: shouldn't you be more patient and instead of just arresting them, you should plant one of your employees or informers to play cards at the chef's house so he could report on what is being discussed during those meetings, question mark, end of quote. of -- a week later a report to the president indicated that one of the sso's employees had, indeed, begun playing cards with

the wife, but no security issues were raised. one might assume that the matter was closed, but the chef and his wife were kept under even more vigilant observation. it should be emphasized here that the practice of hiring ethnic minorities in palaces and security organizations was not an invention of saddam hussein. stalin realized that ethnic minorities even in senior positions couldn't constitute a threat for the regime given their lack of a power base. in iraq the asyrians have the reputation of being very tidy and punctual and having no political ambitions, and thus, they were a natural group to employ. the real concern for the country's leadership, however, was the people who were on the inside whether in the army or the security organizations including the sso, and this

applied to those in senior positions as well. thus, the insecurity of the masses was sup mr. supplementedy the insecurity of the government elite who surrounded the dictator. the files of the sso are rife with example of sso employees being monitored, arrested and punished. many had their telephone tapped and their families were closely watched. controlling these employees of the sso took many shapes and forms. like army officers, officials had to apply for approval to get married. this obviously gave the organization a free hand to collect information on perspective spouses. numerous files indicate multiple requests for information about employees, mostly without giving the reason why these officials

become suspect. but many of them were put under surveillance if a member of their family fled abroad or was arrested for an activity against the regime. the most potent source of information was an employee's personal file. a very detailed 16-page questionnaire was given to applicants, requested exhaustive personal and family details. in addition to the usual personal questions, each applicant was asked in depth about his political beliefs and activities, hobbies, trips abroad, assets and loans outstanding. furthermore, there were questions such as the following: do you smoke? if you do, state two kinds of cigarettes you smoke. do you do? if you do, state the brand of alcohol you consume, quantity and its impact on you. do you attend nightclubs? do you have enemies?

questions about relatives spanned the entire extended family of the spouse, uncles, aunts and cousins of the candidate and their political affiliation. some candidates, however, knew how to manipulate the system. in one file in an answer to the question of whether the applicant had any enemies, the candidate replied, quote: yes, i do. the enemies of the baath party are my personal enemies, end of quote. [laughter] in a report prepared by an sso employee, the writer put forward two reasons for the success of the sso operation. total loyalty based on kinship and the substantial reward enjoyed by employees. this frank analysis was based on the fact clearly indicated by the origins of the directors of the different departments and many of their employees that

belonging to a limited number of trusted families and tribes was paramount in test of loyalty. the nine heads of the important departments together with the director of hussein's office belonged to five different tribes and extended families. although a reliance on families and clans close to the regime was essential for the preservation of power, sometimes it could be a double-edged sword as once a particular clan was considered too powerful or dangerous. the authorities then had to purge the system of all its member. for example, in 1996 an order was issued to single out all those from a clan. as a result, 18 members of the special republican guard, 71 members of the republican

guard -- there is special republican guard or and republican guards -- and more than a dozen from the sso were earmarked by the authorities, but the records do not tell us what happened to them. the report of the directorate of security affairs was also important in terms of reward to the organization's success. first and foremost, many employees were granted land and offered loans to build houses, others that had apartments that were fully paid or subsidized by the organization with the represent directly deducted from the official salaries. removing these property benefits was among the punishments imposed by the sso if an employee was sentenced to five or more years in prison. there were a lot of other benefits and fringe benefits including paying for their education at the universities.

let me turn now to discuss the system of rewards. medals and rewards were the cornerstone of corruption. saddam hussein's regime, like stalin's, secured the loyalty of its elite by offering economic grants. indeed, the baath managed to corrupt a large number of individuals by making it advantageous both to those who became part of the organization and even for those who were outside it to continue supporting the regime. this system co-opted a large portion of the population into dependence on rewards. tens of thousands of iraqis were the recipients of different medals, badges, certificates, insignias during the baath rule, all signified status and privilege which in turn corresponded towards whatever medals or badges the recipient already had, and the more medals

accumulated, the higher the rewards. the most coveted medal, however, or identity card was called, quote, identity card of the friends of mr. president leader saddam hussein, may got protect him. may god protect him. the front of the card was no different from any driving license, and it displayed the holder's personal details. but intriguingly, the back of the card featured the headline called privileges followed by seven items which are here, and be i will read the translation. five points to be added to the final average for the holder and his wife and children for applications to schools, academies and universities during the iran/iraq war and for five years after etc. end. two, acceptance of the holder's sons in militaries, colleges and

academies during the war and five years after its end without regard to their grades or ages. three, the honor of meeting his excellency, the president, at least once a year. four, grants and holiday bonuses to be awarded on the same basis as those granted to employees of the presidential -- [inaudible] five, priority over other citizens in meetings with government officials. six, each holder or his family to have a personal contact with the secretary, the secretary of the headquarters of military forces, the president's senior special assistant and the minister of defense secretary this arranging a meeting for any purpose. seven and last but not least, an annual gift of two summer suits and two winter suits to be made available from the presidency of the republic. this card was originally

launched during the war with iran, and its holders benefited from these privileges then and for five subsequent years. however, as the country entered another war and had to contend with a popular uprise anything '91, the validity of the card kept being extended and continued to be effective until the regime fell in 2003. like other authoritarian regimes, the baath system was pa termistic to its -- paternalistic to its supporters offering opportunities and rewards in every sphere. jobs, financial bonuses and pensions were all part of the reward system and without one of the medals or badges, it was difficult to get into the compensation structure. to system up this reward, saddam hussein's baath party controlled iraq for 35 years based on this dual system of rewards and punishment.

systems that were extensive in range and a justice to the circumstances of the period. let me finish by briefly discussing the issue of sectarianism that is having significant implications on daily lives in current iraq. as i mentioned, the baath party was obsessive about collecting information on every citizen, and yet there was one question that was never asked on any form, and that was about the sect. forms tended to ask two questions; religion and nationality. so you could be a muslim and kurd or christian and arab. i think that it is important to understand that saddam hussein's regime defined iraqis not as much by their religion, but more by their support and loyalty to the party and like the situation after 2003. kurds, shiites and christians

were all part of the system and were involved in its operation and intelligence service. i think that the other important aspect to remember that in spite of saddam hussein launching a faith campaign during the late '80s, the regime was basically secular and religious activities of any kind were considered dangerous, and all mosques were kept under surveillance. both sunni and shia mosques. ironically, saddam hussein and the united states were natural allies in that they shared the same enemies; religious fanaticism and iran. documents predating the 9/11 attack clearly indicate the regime's concern about islamic fundamentalism and its potential impact on iraqi youth. [inaudible] was banned in the early 1990s

and the death penalty imposed on its followers from the mid '90s. therefore, while sectarianism existed under hussein's regime particularly after 1991, it never became part and parcel of the day-to-day life as it is currently for iraq. thank you very much. [applause] >> i'll just say a few words points for the book. i mean, the book is, i've had the pleasure of reading it, and it is, you know, extremely well written which is quite a feat to find pleasure, as i did n reading over 280 pages of a text about such a horrific regime. it is a fascinating story, and its telling is extremely well executed by professor sassoon.

what is remarkable about this book is that it really is the first account and analysis based on a staggering number of official internal documents and audio recordings of the workings, the operation, the processes and the procedures of an arab authoritarian regime. previously in terms of how we tried to go about understanding, analyzing the workings of regimes in this region and in many other regions has been by trying to closely read in between the lines the official statements and government pay ors that have been put -- papers that have been put out. by looking at who sits next to who in government meetings. by trying to decipher a policy because we've had very little session to this kind of insider information official documents systematically. so this is what's truly

remarkable about the book, because it delves into the intestines of the baath party, the inner workings, and what we find is remarkably little magic in terms of answering the question of how it stay inside power for so long. we find a tremendous amount of paper, a vast bureaucracy and incredible tedium. the regime relied, of course, on a ruling party, on the military, on the bureaucracy, on information gathering and its dissemination in the bureaucracy -- sometimes efficiently, sometimes not -- and on this system of fear and rewards. and this is how this book, one of the reasons why this book is different than much of the other very important literature that's been written about saddam hussein's iraq which has focused on violence and coercion and fear. and professor sassoon makes it very clear that peer was important -- fear was important, but it was not simply a republic of fear.

it was much, much more than that. it was an organization, a bureaucracy, and this system of incentives and rewards. the book will become, in my view, the book for understanding saddam's iraq. it'll become essential reading. it'll become the first text that one goes to. there are some things that are somewhat surprising. in addition to the curious details and interesting things that we learn about saddam, the peculiarities of the regime, saddam's idea that it was bad and not appropriate to sit cross-legged, for example, his obsession with personal cleanliness and hygiene, his high regard for scientists, natural scientists who he was in awe of, it seems. and, of course, something that we did know but professor sassoon, you know, sheds further light on this, his self-fashioning as a writer, as an accomplished writer of

fiction and so on. but there are some things that are surprising on first glance but possibly, possibly understandable. and professor sassoon mentioned the one that comes out immediately to he is the idea -- to me is the idea that this regime was nonsectarian in character, right? because when we think of iraq today, of course, we think of the sectarianism that has so, unfortunately, unfortunately marked the last six or seven or eight years of the regime. but we are told that nowhere on any of the documents is there any indication that the regime tried to decipher or whether one was sunni or shia. so it's surprising, but in one sense it is understandable, right? because this was a baathist regime, this was a secular ideology that placed little regard in its framing of the

world on religion, on these kinds of differences. it didn't hook at religion as a -- look at religion as a legitimate difference. it was an arab ideology. and that's what makes understandable the idea in the documents not asking people whether they're shia or sunni, but whether one is originally iranian descent which seems to be -- [laughter] which seems to have been a crucial factor in determining one's ability to move up in the party bureaucracy, gain positions and so on. and this was asked, whether one was originally of iranian descent and so on. and, you know, this gets to other pointses and so on with regard to the understanding the character of the regime. and this, my next point gets to to what extent can we learn about other regimes in the arab world from this remarkable

analysis of the baath can party and saddam's regime. t not only -- it's not only an academic question to ask to what extent was this regime a totalitarian regime, a regime that really wanted much more than to simply maintain power and the passivity of the population, but a regime that wanted to refashion iraqi society in its image. and there are examples in which that seems to have been the case. and, of course, this dichotomy, you know, isn't necessarily a binary, but it would seem to me then that many of the other regimes in the arab world, the gruesome and horrific ones like baathist syria and so on do not approach the level that, um, that saddam's iraq did. and that's really a question. i mean, to what extent can we learn about the world view, the

workings, the processes of moammar gadhafi's libya or next door, a supposedly, ostensibly a regime guided by a similar ideology first be under -- [inaudible] and then, unfortunately, as a son. the other things that, you know, strike me and that i, you know, would like to have some answers for is the question of corruption, right? because it's not clear, i mean, we know kind of intuitively that there must have been tremendous amounts of corruption, but on reading the book it does not -- we know about the corruption of the oil for food program and the accounts of extravagance and so on. but on reading the text it does not seem that the level of corruption in iraq -- and i hope that i'm mistaken in some senses -- reached the level that it did in hosni mubarak's egypt or in ben ali's tunisia and so

on. and i'd like to kind of, you know, learn a little bit more about that. and i also want to ask whether any of the documents that you've looked at or possibly the documents that are there -- because i think there are, you know, over a million, two million or so -- would tell us anything, would reveal anything about some of the specific, major decisions and the decision making process of the regime, whether it was the decision to invade kuwait on august 2, 1990, or the decision to lie to the international community or deceive the international community about the absence of wmd and so on which, of course, tragically or one of the things that tragically led to the invasion of iraq in 2003. the last thing i'll ask about, and there are many questions that, you know, fascinating questions that come to mind after reading the book, has to do with to what extent was this

regime based on a familial system, right? and to what extent was it really based on party and a kind of more institutional system. and that's something that, you know, is curious and something that i kind of wanted to learn more about after i read it. again, a remark remarkable book. i think it'll become the book, the first source on iraq under saddam hussein, so congratulations, and it's a wonderful occasion to be celebrating this publication. >> thank you very much for these comments. let me just deal with the two, three questions you have raised. corruption existed, correctly as you pointed out, especially during the oil for food program in the '90s given how the sanctions devastated the whole economy and the society.

but there is, are differences in corruption. the corruption that existed was there but was really under more constrained and control. one of the things that people told me that i interviewed, some senior baathists, that saddam would have a one-to-one meeting with people to do their annual review, and one of the questions is how much did you earn last year. well, that was a tough question because no one knew what saddam knows. and, of course, he knew quite a lot. because, you see for example reports by the sso that the son of this minister has just now been conducting an embezzlement of an italian company against

all rules, and he writes in the margins to be kept for further, for the future in case, i guess, he needs it. and he never says anything. this never comes up in any follow up. that's it. it gets filed, and he knows he could use it with the minister if he needs it for further reference. i think that there was so much fear of saddam himself that it was very, very difficult to take the corruption to the level that happened after 2003. if you look at some of the ministers in 2004 who embezzled 40 million, 100 million and just run away and went to jordan, that cannot happen under saddam hussein, just impossible. and it existed but never to this level. the documents do reveal about major decisions, and it is very

interesting. if you look at the iran/iraq war, you could see that the machine went into action long before the war. there was a lot of preparations, there were meetings of the chief of staff, there were internal senior party committees meeting. when it finished and because of the way it finished and given the fact that it was so long, when it came to the kuwait invasion, there were very, very few involved. and you don't really see any purview to it. what you see is a lot of analysis that takes place after wards. why did it go wrong, what happened, how come people went on an intifada in the south, an uprising? that happens. i think there were, for example,

in the tapes there were a lot of discussions about the weapons of mass destruction. this was a decision that was made never to declare it, to say that we didn't have it and, therefore, everyone was playing cat and mouse with these committees, and there is no fact why it happened, but i think if you really read everything and you realize that saddam was absolutely obsessed to literally his last day in prison about iran, there is a book by his lawyer who defended him, there is the trial. he was obsessed and convinced that iran is going to take over iraq, and it's taking over iraq in an ideological way and, therefore, he cannot allow them to see iraq from a weak point of

view. the answer to the last question about familial or party, i think the answer is really both. if you look at the quartet that stuck with him, one of them was half a kurd, one was a christian and one was a sunni from his area but not directly related. later on there were intermarriages. i think the family and the tribes played a very important, but it really at the end of the day for saddam was are you 120% loyal. that was the litmus test. everything else is really -- i mean, he punished as we know many of his families and tribes and close kin because he suspected them of being not 120%

loyal to him. >> okay, thank you very much. so maybe we'll take some questions now from the audience if that's okay. >> sure. >> okay. yes. >> of course, as you alluded to -- thank you very much, by the way. i'm really looking forward to reading the book. you have allude today, the baath doesn't start, after all, as an ideological party. social justice, in, you know, classless society or something approaching it and, you know, imperialism, anti-colonialism, secularism. i mean, it was ideology with a vision. so i think my question is, how -- have you looked at all at how and when this unraveled, and are there any shreds of -- is

there anything remaining from this? are there any flag ms, is there anybody who believes in this ideological mission anymore, or does et just disintegrate according to these documents into this reward and fear sort of maelstrom without any reference to, you know, ideology? and do we have any sense of kind of when that happened? is there a timeline here that we can establish? >> thank you. i think that's really an important issue, the ideology. in the beginning, as you point out, there were a lot of publications. it was in the party. there is something called the party preparatory school which that's how people were educated and culturally prepared to become full members, and even

members had to go through these courses to go to the next level. if you look at the '70s and late '70s, it was a lot about the ideology of the baath, and i'dologists were writing a lot. there were problems from the beginning. saddam never really believed in arab unity. for him it was, he didn't even talk about it a lot. i mean, it's very interesting because he felt he's not going to give the keys to anyone else. and then there was the animosity, the ideological animosity from day one with syria which was really a problem. but i think your point is critical. it began to unravel, i think, sometimes in the '80s through the war.

the freedom, he decided that freedom is you want freedom, you p want democracy -- you want democracy, you vote in the party. if you're not in the party, then you don't get your freedom. i mean, he really said something almost along those lines. socialism was important, but again, in '87 he decided the economy has to change because it's not responding to the war. and there should be more encouragement of entrepreneurship. and what does he do? he abolishes all labor unions. he says from now on the party will represent you. there is no need for labor unions in an equal and fair society like iraq. and, of course, actually iraq becomes even more capitalist from that point on because the labor truly do not have anyone to defend them on issues given

the fact in the '90s was even worth with the depreciation of the currency and the inflation. by the '90s there is absolutely no reference to ideology. the ideology becomes the cult of personality. you look at the curricula of these schools, you look at the curricula of the cultural courses that were being, taking place in every small branch, and you don't see anything about the three mottos of the party. freedom, unity and socialism. what it is about, it's all about saddam. saddam's role in the history, saddam's role in military victory, saddam's philosophy, saddam's interpretation of the religious things. they created the institute of

saddam for the interpretation of the holy quran and so on and so forth. and that becomes really the ideology, and no one talks about the old ideology. >> i would like to know what's the role of aziz in the government exactly. and i want to know also what motivated the u.s. invasion in 1903 -- i mean 2003. okay. is this to introduce a democracy as they said? because if they did, the rulers who came as a result of that invasion, al-maliki, is not any less democratic.

he prevented the family of saddam hussein to visit -- [inaudible] >> thank you. um, the role of aziz is very, very important. he actually was up with of the people who really -- one of the people who really believed in the ideology of the baath. he was a true baathist from the beginning. he knew how to survive, and he kept his distance, yet saddam knew he can rely on him 120% and on his loyalty. and there was no doubt about this at any point, that he was very, very supportive of saddam and the regime. he's very active in all the revolutionary council meetings, he writes on behalf of the regime, he, you know, he lobbied on behalf of the regime. so his role is very, very important. yet like all others, not many

could stand up to saddam. i mean, even when he knew that saddam is saying or making the wrong decision, he might say it once, and you hear it in the audiotapes, but if saddam rebeet peats it and say -- repeats it and says just figure it out, there is no upside, let's get on with it, and that's really what happened to all of them. the inner, the quartet that was around him was never really a consultancy group. it never said to him, don't do this, or we don't think this is a good idea or how about this totally new idea. why the u.s. invaded iraq in 2003, well, that's a, a tough question. i think that there are a lot of reasons, some of it eyedology -- ideology, some of it is geopolitical, economic, oil,

9/11, you know, wanted to invade an arab country to show some kind of force. but, you know, you can -- any guess, any one of those is -- democracy maybe was one of the issues, but i don't know how much really it was the essential aspect of it. >> enough talk about the -- [inaudible] >> well, i think you, there is, there are a lot of reports that the new, current government is being almost quasi-authoritarian and slowly but surely building up to becoming authoritarian. maybe they're not using the same way the system that saddam used or the security services, but the signs are not encouraging at all, and i tend to agree with you that there really are very

worrying signs. >> yes. >> thanks again for your presentation. i wanted to ask if they got all these medals, awards, you mentioned in your presentation, how much, if any, of that has carried forward into the present? i'm pretty sure the military still -- [inaudible] 1921. is there any controversy that you know of in terms of, you know, what awards are sort of baathist, saddam awards and what awards are sort of iraqi or more foreign nationalist? represent legitimate military service, is that something that you have a sense of at all? >> um, i mean, i think it really depends because the new government, i mean, a lot of people who participated in the iran/iraq war feared for their

lives. i mean, there were reports which i don't know how true that they were that a lot of the officers in the air force who participated in bombing iran had to escape or some were killed, so i don't think people are walking in iraq today saying i participated in this or that. i don't think, you know, the current government is very, very anti-baathist, is anti, you know, anti-saddam. p.m.

1! >> five or six years. i did qr. foupf.o

hoover institute. there is an aguhpq. government and the u.s. return of the physical. >> what the justification for the invasion of iraq? any revelations or anything that might substantiate that? >> that is my personal conclusion. nothing in the documents about any contact.

if you really look at the documents you understand how and why it islamic fanatics in the sense of really harassing, there is a wonderful tape that they discuss the muslim brotherhood, in the arab world, these people we can't ever live with them. we can't agree with them. they will never accept us as a muslim country. i can't tell my people in iraq they can't watch a belly dancer on television or a coffee shop. but the order was given to the church services to tell them we are your friends, we are going to coordinate with you and secured services infiltrate if

you can. he was so against any religious activity, hard to imagine having this kind of relationship that he was accused of. >> thank you very much. east germany there's a direct correlation with what you are saying about iran, as the party doctrine begins to open up, more regressive which i think says interesting things about the archaeology, the question -- the description of this incentive program, question about what exactly is matched -- simply a question of replacing the rewards with others, what is the

classification? >> definitely one of the mistakes by the cpa in iraq. i presented that pyramid. these top three represented only 2.4%. even among those that does not mean that every one of them without exception was involved in security upstairs or did something wrong. the problem is it was really misguided. i don't think the cpa at the time understood how the system worked. the same way they disbanded the army. what happened was very simple.

they took away the middle management of the country. you had to be a party member in order to progress from one job to another. you can be a professor at the university but you cannot be the head of the department and definitely not a dean or something like that if you do not have an affiliation with the party. just to go on punishing these people was an extreme case of misunderstanding iraq, similar to many other missteps that the u.s. took in iraq. >> after 1991, it was set to

increase. and fight to induce -- the convergence of islam. was it totally about the occult personality? or something like that? >> the face campaign that was launched in the 80s and intensified in the 90s. for example, reciting the koran during ramadan became three hours more religious programs, and as i said the institute -- interpretation of the holy koran was set up in academic

institution, first in baghdad and then in bosnia, something like 25% of the student for active members -- encouraged to go, how to interpret the holy koran from that point of view. fascinating to look at the essays and seminar paper is that these children had to write and everything gets filed after these topics. there was a lot of lip service -- in reality, there was really

-- anti religious attitudes. >> grateful for the presentation. in 2003, and the support on each of these in the future and i can see -- with a u.s. army. into the regime, in the u.s. army? >> this question is important, what we said about the decisionmaking process and the fascinating things, there is no doubt that people lied to him through the hole period leading to that, one of the very few documents after the invasion where one of his aides goes to

the south and rights for report that he went to check on the popular army and all those. and he arrived -- he is in shell shock because two weeks before the visit, before the war began, head of the branch told the president he has something like 40,000 people ready to fight to an end. when his aid goes to check why nothing is happening he sees in the courtyard something like 600 mostly elderly men sitting. and he said where is the 40,000? this is written -- there are no 40,000. i had to say that. that gives you the idea. imagine if everyone was giving

something of that level of information, there is also a little bit of delusional state. his personal translator who did his arabic grammar was told three or four nights before the invasion at that time for a palace was disbanded, no one was working there and everyone working from secret places was told to wait for a very important package that will arrive at 10:00 at night and not to leave the house. he says in his book that he was convinced that this was a major speech of saddam hussein to the world. some kind of deal or something. the package does arrive at 10:00 at night and it is 65 pages of

story he was riding and in it, he writes i need this by 8:00 tomorrow morning. please review the grammar. >> on that note. and also congratulate -- [applause] >> is very non-fiction author or book you would like to see featured on booktv? send us an e-mail at booktv@c-span.org or tweak us at twitter.com/booktv. live today on american history tv on c-span3 five civil war historians make their case for 1862's person of the year. the forum from museum of the

confederacy and end the day with audience vote. live saturday. >> the morality of capitalism is the name of the book. what your professors won't tell you. it is put out by students for liberty. megan roberts is the communications director. what won't our professors tell us? >> the book project we did this year with an expansion of the book project we do every year. we published selective works of frederick bossy on, when your professors won't tell you. this year we did the morality of capitalism project and gave 1,000 copies a way to student groups all over the country to distribute on college campuseses. the morality of capitalism is focused on the ideas of capitalism and capitalism and the moral argument, not just an

economic one. is collected essays from writers all over the world with the viewpoint of capitalism. ? >> the founder of whole foods. >> what does he write about? >> capitalism again as a moral argument. we have the moral high ground. we are saying to people they have the freedom to decide how to live their lives. we won't dictate that to them. it is my opinion a very moral argument to make. >> what is students for liberty? >> a nonprofit run for students and by students. we provide resources for student groups all over the world. we have leaders in europe, africa and all across -- promoting ideas of liberty on college campuses. >> when was it found and where? >> it was founded in 2008 by a group of interns in the d.c. area, have a rou