to students and children of immigration, and it allows us to double what our career throughout our school life, and these should be supported, develop, to be widened, it is

very good to develop your own personality fixed to the scholarships. [applause] >> do you have scholarships yourself? very good. very good. >> the good initiative. >> let me thank you all, ladies and gentlemen, very much for your committed discussion. you can applaud yourself. the discussion was really great. a lot of very interesting points. mrs. chancellor, they gave you a lot schools, immigration, cyber set to become a volunteer is on, the people are volunteers or one to be appreciated. anything to add?

i will conclude there is a huge wish for us to live together, live together in the future. we need a good mixture of authorities, governments and personal engagement. every citizen of his own. the different activities that deal with our citizens should be more recognized people stay in their own corner and we should create more enthusiasm for volunteer is some, and also another conclusion to the fact that whenever the age, with a for the handicapped or not he handicap or origin we should all have the same values and also conclude we should do more on

the tolerance side. we should not put people in the box is all the same and i'm encouraged by what i've heard today and we are going to look at every proposal that has been mentioned today, and perhaps what you could not say today you can sell it to us or the incident. really what we are interested in is to learn from you and to feel how we can make germany into a beautiful country. [applause] and how this country can even be a better country. and everybody can bring his own talent. thank you that you came here and participated in it wasn't too

boring thank you mrs. chancellor we have heard a lot. no expression will be lost. thank you. good evening. [applause]

none of them? obama changed the entire dynamic to get speckled in sight of the new movie and best-selling book that gave the inside story on what happened in the 2008 presidential campaign. >> i love those hockey months. they say the difference between a hockey mom and pitbull - lipstick. >> the expectation coming out of the speech is that she was an asset to the campaign and for the week or ten days immediately after that she was on the democratic side there was a lot of concern as the mccain palin ticket cannot of the convention that if barack obama as much as five or six points people on the democratic side were sort of freaking out. >> we will talk about game

change at 6:30 eastern or any time at c-span.org. general james mattocks serves as commander of the u.s. central command he recently spoke at a

canadian security defense conference in ottawa and answer questions about syria, cultural sensitivity training for soldiers and the plan the 2014 transition of power in afghanistan. his hour-long remarks of the courtesy of canada's public affairs channel cpac. >> ladies and gentlemen, let me briefly refresh your memory concerning our next speaker's biography, a copy of which you have in your programs. >> translator: while visiting our conference with the second time since 2009 when he was a supreme commander for transformation, general james is now the commander of the u.s. central command in the u.s. to the estimate a u.s. marine corps general officer who served as the commander of transformation from 2007 to 2009 and which

capacity he increased our speaker's platform at our 2009 annual town meeting. we are delighted to welcome him back in his capacity as commander u.s. central command. ladies and gentlemen please join me in welcoming general mattis to the podium. [applause] >> thank you ladies and gentlemen, general recommend for all of you, it's great to be back here once again. general and all of you, thank you for inviting me back in light of some of my publicized remarks i seldom get invited back to speak in polite company is. so it's really a pleasure. i have to recognize general, my old friend and admiral anderson is also here and ambassador

anderson the stalwart friends who are great advisers for me what seemed like a 17 year assignment to nato was only two years but it would also say that it is an honor to follow the minister i think everyone who ever sat in brussels is very much aware of just how fortunate canada is to have an articulate unapologetic minister of defense who can express what many of us have difficulty putting across in terms of the civilian military that we all have to work to close. i'm not quite sure. i'm not quite sure what is in the north here but i will just tell you that i come often to get very frank and candid advice which is what you'll get from true friends. they don't tell you all the time what you want to hear, what you

need to hear, and that tradition really continues, ladies and gentlemen with commodore and italy and canadian officers that you have assigned to my staff. it's interesting that his predecessor when i was called by the head of state in the middle east to bring in an american planning team had a canadian brigadier walking to the king's audience there and say i'm here to commit the u.s. government to your protection. [laughter] and he did so by the way with our full authority. it shows the level of trust that we have between us come and do to our service together, some of you might be aware of my very proud connections to canada and the canadian forces. i spent many of my summer's most of them on a farm south of winnipeg camping in the canadian rockies and then i had a long

connection as well. my grandfather was wounded serving in the winnipeg rifles and a wonderful outfit called a little black devils of course named as they were by the enemy. you can fast-forward from there to early january 20 o2, the minister spoke about kandahar. my sailors and marines have been fighting around kandahar for only a few weeks in those days alongside your special forces when the princess infantry a right and reminded us on the battlefield of a special bond that we share along this long border at least a special bond that we share since deceased invading your country. i would also tell you that last night in 1951 princess patricia infantry is a part of the common of infantry brigade made contact with the enemy for the first time and the quitted themselves in the finest tradition to the fighting canadians.

i give this to use a you will understand very much aware it didn't start with me and will not end with me, and my deep appreciation because i'm really here to pay my respects to you, your country and your forces. i will tell you that your forces for their ethical high spirited competent performance have earned the admiration and fondness of all of us and the u.s. military. thank you very much. the subject you are discussing today about the sort of forces you will need in the future is one that we have wrestled with down south really since 1991 pity it took awhile to realize we had to wrestle with the problem but it began with some thinkers trying to get the issues in front of us and i thought i would share with you a few words of caution based on the mistakes that we have made to the first of all the foreseeable future is not. that is the first point i would make. i have had a number of very brilliant people come in and

tell me about the forseeable future and then a few years later i felt myself miserable on some hillside as their view of the future didn't match my reality. [laughter] , just tell you i will be a bit modest here. let me give you a short vignette. i got a phone call from the secretary-general back a few years ago when you were the senior military officer in all of nato, and he had actually beaten the president to the phone call. i didn't realize i was going to the job until he called and said you're going to be a supreme allied commander for transformation and i thought i'd ever reach some of this transformation stuff, so i did some studying and was interesting was i tried to put myself in the shoes of other people who knew they had to transform, and i went back from today, let's go back about 201 years. and if i was sitting in washington, d.c. at that time trying to force what we need we

had just come out of our revolution. they are not dumb men sitting around the room, all men at that time. probably would have helped if there were a few women. sitting there by that not one of them said i think the ruling ldp is going to sail right of the river outside of the window and burn this down to the ground. [laughter] i told sir david last night some of my frustrations with d.c. lately that if they decided to do it again please, let me know and i will sign on. [laughter] [applause] however, however, i thought those are old-time folks. let's go back 101 years ago. it's now 1911. what what we think we need it? we've got the u.s. army strung out across the western for keeping an eye on the indians. i tell people in part american indian. had i been the general we would still own the land. [laughter] but if someone said no, i think

we will be fighting in europe with airplanes overhead and men wearing gas masks they would have been laughed out of the room. so take it i thought we are smarter today than those people so let's look at it today. in 2001, june, i'm the senior military assistant to the deputy secretary defense wolfowitz and he and the secretary rumsfeld are getting a brief and a young officer and given the two years of training at park leavenworth were getting frustrated and explain what kind of force is needed in the future to this new secretary of defense and the deputy frustrated he keeps getting these questions he put his hand on the map, june, 2001. let me show you one part of the world we will all be fighting. six months later i was shivering in afghanistan.

the surprise is quite be a very dominant characteristic in the u.k. development and doctrine center supplies will continue to dominate our future forecasting a future punctuated with an accepted events come startling surprises and the pervasive operations of change. that makes us all a little humble as we look towards the future in a conference and yet you and i know we cannot wait on change. we can't wait for it to reveal itself or we are sure to be caught wrong footed. but starting in history, it has helped me when i went to the job to reveal some of the characteristics we are going to have to deal with and we look at the current obligations and then we study past history of transportation efforts that succeeded or failed, and a point i learned from colin gray i think is relevant today, and that is we cannot adopt, we in

the western democracies cannot adopt a cingular pre-close approach to the war because the enemy will generally gravitate to our perceived weakness. so if we decide we are only going to fight counterinsurgency in the future or no more counterinsurgency we are only going to fight conventional war, the any of course will go to the perceived weakness. it's simply the paradox of the war. that said, there are signposts i think from recent campaigns and if you look at bosnia and rwanda, they contradict the western pension for the technological solutions. if you look of the russian georgia conflict, you have a poorly thought conventional fight with significant on conventional aspects, and then if you look at the second lebanon you find largely on conventional fight fought in south lebanon with significant conventional aspects. you are seeing and i don't like putting words like this in front

of the war but a hybrid of the war that we are going to have to accept. these are wars and certainly with iraq and afghanistan, so present in our experience and our database. these are the wars fought among the people, among innocent people. often fought in the urbanized terrain or towns in rural villages that centralize many of our technological lead and ditches and with the west choosing an increasingly legalistic structure to guide our operations what we deem it permissible in the, it is more and more limited. meanwhile our enemies open up apocalyptic the their at pitcher for what constitutes a legitimate target or a legitimate tactic. i am not so sure whether it is a home or we force or mission as you title this conference if it takes a lot of difference. let me explain. no matter what kind of war we find ourselves and in a few years, we are probably going to

have to be polite. today we defend not just a geographic realm. as the lieutenant general of the u.k. forces has explained to me, we also defended the realm of ideas, the human rights and civilization that grew out of the enlightenment, and general sir david commodores presence today reminds us of a shared response that we all have. it's no nation can do this on its own as we protect our shared all use. and i will tell you that canadians in the audience that i have senior soldiers from monk hendee mining operations to kandahar, that, and they represent the very best of our values whether teaching them in the killing fields or hunting down enemies in afghanistan to protect the afghan people from what is a medieval enemy who would deny females and other basic human rights. a few things as you look at

this, this hodgepodge of fights we have been in that have become very clear to me, for the nato forces -- and this is about the deployment peace -- for nato forces, collective defense makes the deployment a reality. if we are going to have collective defense. if we are going to work together, then we are going to the plight of all of us are going to deploy to get there. let me choose italy for an example. it's as far from rome to afghanistan as it is from rome to the baltics the wing by the city which is the way that most military gear those places. so it's the same distance there were for the canadian forces to deploy from the base in halifax to the yukon or the northwest passage or to a humanitarian crisis to the soldier getting on the airplane to the sailor getting under way. it's simply a deployment. and the distance that you go simply changes the number of hours you are in a plane, the number of days you are at sea. deployments our deployments and the future forces must be able to deploy on short notice when the inevitable surprises strike.

and they are going to have to carry out the mission on arrival. it doesn't matter whether it is humanitarian or its combat. and they are going to be under very likely very austere conditions. such agility that the minister spoke about what require well-educated leaders who can take the measure of a specific situation when they get on the ground and then move out smartly. some of the guideposts to remember i think first of all no nation can go it alone today. at the same time, i speak very bluntly that the nation with the most aircraft carriers is not the nation with all of the good ideas come in and we are going to need the ethical canadian forces with canada's beef with particular reputation in the world if we are going to do good in this world. we are going to have to work in collisions and work to recognize that every nation, no matter how small has a role to play. i got a note from the helmand this morning where the marines were commenting about on the and

how the troops are doing a fine job and you think of little town that out in the south pacific providing the trips to the fiercest province at this point and it's a reminder that all these nations have a response ability to turn this world over slightly better to our children and fighting in collisions is absolutely difficult as a former british prime minister put the leading harder than fighting with allies fighting without allies and that's understandable so more attuned to fighting the collisions to many other nations and they bring a certain ethical performance that helps buttress our forces. all of our forces. furthermore while maintaining sufficient conventional forces the nato alliance can dissuade the conventional threats. they cannot be built along the lines using laconic weapons

systems about a number of things we anticipate needing in the future fights. urgent or counter insurgent war is no longer an introduction of the proposal during. counter insurgency must be a core competency of the force as we build for the future as we fight these wars among the people. special operations forces must integrate closely with conventional forces, precision fires will be needed, since that targeting is critical if we are to take out the enemy with the least cost and least danger to the innocent lives on the battlefield. cyber both offense and defense are no longer is it correct luxury's. and intel operations fusion must be achieved in real time, or the enemy will steal the march on us. it too many times we had the people in one room in the past and the other, and it would be to go back and forth with a time sensitive information that we

needed. technology is certainly going to remain important. we want the best possible technology for our folks on the battlefield. but it is especially the technology that helps us to find the enemy in the fine and fixed and finished continuum. if we can find this enemy, our forces have dhaka confidence and the ferocity to close and destroy them. it is finding that enemy that is the challenge. also technology that enables the human interface that creates networks among our own forces that will be critical to us whether it be the air to ground coordination and the display of a actionable data so the commanders and command posts are seeing an icon coming across and tons of e-mails are trying to figure out we have to have the technology that does some of the sorting and displays actionable data. since of today that has not displayed in the will not be acted upon. contrary to the americans

wrongheaded approach to defend transformation in the 90's and the ambassador mentioned earlier about not making the same mistakes of the past i would just pass on to you the technology we learned the hard way in the 90's will not solve all of your problems in the war this kind of conflict will remain a social problem demanding human solutions and war fundamental nature will not change. and i would tell you that we made few if any significant technical mistakes over the last ten years. i can be challenged on that, but the technological mistakes for maw and evil and challenges that we had to get in step with, but we made hundreds perhaps thousands of human factors mistakes. the affect space operations are believe will be left properly in the dustbin of history. that is the american affect operations i recognize that nato trying to maturity and turn it into something useful has a

slightly different definition of what it means. the americans are going to have to leave it behind as far as the way that we bastardize was a very good closed system targeting process, but then we tried to extrapolate it to the overall understanding of the war to limit it didn't work even though it based a lot of its success or anticipated success on technology. our future forces will require military leaders, educated and trained for swift action against enemies who are not completed. leaders are going to use disciplined but very and regimented problem solving. able to exercise mature initiative, relying on the commanders intent, not detailed orders and multicolored powerpoint format. [laughter] i have a friend who runs microsoft by the mechem and he doesn't like when i say that. [laughter] these young leaders are going to

have to leave high performing small units in very harmonious action oftentimes because of cyber attacks they will not have 24/7 connections with a higher headquarters. they are in the networked by technology to be about to restore some of those connections often on, the network primarily i believe by the commanders intend and their own initiative. and as we look forward to words the forces of the future it helps to recognize three types of transformation from and this is what i learned, ladies and gentlemen, when i got a phone call from the secretary-general and began studying how transformation has worked or not worked for the military's in the past. first of all, the first is reactive. you are caught in the middle of a war you got to change and change quickly and you start making those changes. you adjust to those unforeseen challenges and it's not easy.

i will give you an example. some of the civil war greatest generals formations in the face of the muskett. you see how can the noss audit. they reacted eventually. but it was too late. it was not exactly the greatest generalship of its time. if you looked at world war i and the german troops as they realized that the method of offensive attacks isn't working lead in the war triet afton the middle of the war and began using the shock tactics, sharp artillery barrages and children in forces and this sort of thing. they have to add up to their reactive leave. there is a real bloody cost in our line of work and that sort of transformation. the second form of transformation is what i like to call theology. uses the unproved theory of the war often bumper sticker level to what promises to be almost always a highly attractive and

cheaply to fight for fair. you can find it in what we thought the strategic bombing proposed in the inner war period kallur it's been transformation based more recently on hopes to did you heard of it, it's called the evolution military affairs affects based operations shock and all, it always promises something cheap, clean, very fast, that sort of thing. and when the technology doesn't work out, the theologies are based on from the proponents will call it bad luck or have some other rationalization because the war is reality and it didn't permit full use of their theory ignoring such ideas contradicted the fundamental nature of the war. the third and the best way to transform the forces is anticipatory. and what i found in every case and i will give in to a little more detail on this, every case of a maturing successfully modernizing the year based on one of thing: they all did one

thing: the old defined the problem they had to solve. they defined it to adjust its level of satisfaction, and the use of problem definition to buy everything that they did and used experimentation trial and error to get it right. i will give you the example of the germans coming out of world war i recognized the problem was how do you restore the maneuver on the battlefield? and during the inner war period they took the shock tactics they started with the adopted them, as they said the legion, the experiment at home, they sent it to the spanish civil war mike and basically they unleashed hell across europe in 1940 having gotten the formation right. the american naval war in the pacific believe it or not the first about eight years in the 1920's we experimented thinking there was going to be trouble in the pacific for the first eight years the u.s. navy lost its

campaign every year and in those days we ran the games not as expressions of american military might, but you could actually lose the war game and they lost for eight straight years and then they figured they needed the air support and they made the strike forces and the need and for the assault troops and the needed logistics capability and then they began to win the games come and the result was well executed specific campaign. the same navy did not identify the problem of the long-range submarine operations and we lost a lot of ways as a result of the failure so you can see what happens when you anticipate during the failure of the long-range submarine operations we had to add up in the middle of the war. the into supreme message is based on a clear definition of the military problem and its characteristics. einstein once said he had 60 minutes to save the world he would spend 59 minutes defining

the problem and then save the world and one minute. i think that he was a pretty bright fellow. there's very few nations in the world that can match the western democracies because of the freedom of thought and the freedom that we share a long our people as far as adopting. but it's still a pretty bloody way to change your military. but hope and theology also do not work well. so we are less with a third operation, anticipating that it because it rests on that rigorous problem identification and rigorous experimentation. and i would suggest, i'm not sure on this but even if you don't get it exactly right, when you want to do is avoid getting it completely wrong. so if you don't get it all together right you will be adopting along a much narrower line rather than having to cut out to a different approach to warfare that wasn't rigorously figured out in advance, and it's

a lot easier to read up on the margins. you can see an example of this with alexander the great in my studies i went back away and tried to understand this and he gets the percival was and what is now southwestern iran and he is one in open combat and urban warfare, the siege warfare, when the enemy had better technology, the persepolis is despised the stultz comeback because easily to the end of the world to the end of the earth to afghanistan and they tell him what it's like in the tribes were light and he takes the perfect war fighting mission in and changes at and why would a general take something that works perfectly for years now and reorganize its he anticipates he can't have all of his heavy calvary here i am the light infantry there he's got to mix them up in the army's medical combined arms teams.

these teams have got light infantry and heavy infantry come they have got archers and they've got all sorts of different kinds of forces put together, and he's anticipated and now he goes off to fight with the transformed military, and i think more recently i was the recipient of some of the marines that got it right. but in the 1970's the marine corps bought the casey 130 is that can refuel helicopters and jets and in the 1970's they bought the heavy lift helicopters that could be refueled in the air. then they began training during the 1990's for long-range penetration and it is october right after 9/11 and the fleet commander in the middle east calls me and says can you get the marines from the pacific and the mediterranean together?

and he says the enemy is the landaluze sure reef and they can't hold kabul. it's never been held in history. they will fall back on their spirits and kandahar in the city that your forces know well now. can you get the means to gather and land in southern afghanistan and move against kandahar? i said yes i can do that today i can do it because in the 1950's people i never met had figured out with this capability would give us if we could refuel helicopters at long range. we had a, onto in the 1990's said we are going to be fighting the three glock war, not a nice neat war anymore. the training, the helicopters, it all came together to sit there and give a positive reply to the fleet commander when he gives me a job to do. that is anticipatory transformation that unleashes our young officers who know what they are doing against the enemy. so i would just tell you, too that i was a naval task force commander in those days with six

u.s. navy ships and the ship that garbus was the h. nces halifax, she was our guard ship as we closed what we call our shotgun as the key to the pakistani coast to launch might after night more troops and supplies into southern afghanistan. so again, i am reminded that we have to work together in this world and certainly i have been the recipient not just of transformation of friendships between the nations. the last point i want to emphasize, and this goes to the young men and women wearing scarlet coats over here. we are going to have to find a way even in the strategic age of fast communication of strategic communications we are going to have to find a way to trust our young officers to be given the commanders intend and carry it out and not some brittle commanding control system that goes up the general's desk

mother may on your back to the national capitals for the most basic tactical decisions. we are not always lead to have the kind of communications that permit that sort of thing, and our young officers are deserving of the trust and the freedom to execute based on our commanders intend to really wanted to leave plenty of time for questions because i got some great ones from the young people wearing scarlet coats last time, so i'm looking forward to it again this time to see which one of you want to arm wrestle with me. [laughter] thank you very much. [applause] can you hear me? good morning am i naim -- i'm with the media and i work with the economist in the united states. i want to begin by saying that when the doctors diagnose or diagnose a patient to keep their

mouth shut until the diagnosis is made because to do otherwise is unprofessional and dangerous because they are dealing with matters of life. similarly, citizens expect when the leaders of the nations are dealing with other nations, cultures and millions of people, they should do the same. they shouldn't get out in the analysis without the certification. now i say this because on february 1st there was a meeting in washington about the national american council which was attended primarily by hanslick and triet recently testified in congress with propaganda about iran, the former u.n. wmd inspector of iraq lubber kelly and former dod official for obama. and what they went through is that especially the november 2011 report which contains allegations and the fact that those allegations came from intelligence services that

were not verified by the iaea and both kelly and blake said that a lot of intelligence the head of iraq we back in 1990 didn't use it in the u.n. security council because they were unsubstantiated. and also -- >> do you have a question here because i'm chongging to keep up with you? >> one quick point. the point that japan has a lot of stockpile but it hasn't built a weapon. they've been conducting -- >> what's the question? >> my question is where do you stand on iran come on the question of iran? >> on the question of iran? >> yes. >> okay. understand the direction that you were taking. and i think this is absolutely one of -- you go to the very heart of how did we challenge our assumptions, how do we challenge the intelligence, and how do we come to the point of action, irresponsible action and

not be paralyzed by an endless discussion either. you have to always be open to the new data as the bottom line. in the case of iran, they've clearly not been transparent with the united nations, and i think what you have to look towards is are they willing to show those responsible face? i've not seen that today. further, when you look at the various threats that iran has either articulate adored demonstrated, articulated in december they would close the strait of hormuz, demonstrated by trying to murder an arab ambassador to miles from the white house, and they really did that to the it was so stupid at first i couldn't even believe it but i have seen the intel. when you see a nation that is feeding in this reckless way, when you see the republican guard corps and navy that takes officers to be paved and reckless matters and promotes them from the tactical level

where organizations to the beaver the reward to the strategic policy level rebutting the iaea again this last weekend on what would have been an opportunity to show good faith, if you have to take that as indicative of their level of integrity and honesty and candor. i will leave it at that and it's over to the political leadership to decide what we do about it. i present options. >> thank you. >> thank you. [applause] connect general. my name is mark fisher. several times in your speech, and you referred to the ethical canadian forces and you mentioned efiks several times to rely wonder if you could expand a little bit about why you did that. it seemed you were trying to make a point. >> thank you.

>> i am known for being rather blunt and so there was nothing hidden 28. again i observe your course over many years and i am aware of what happened in somalia. it doesn't define your forces. door forces are defined internationally. they can look at your forces and say these or ethical troops. it is an imperfect world. we have to be prepared to use violence. i would like to tell the young folks in the scarlet coats they would never have to do this. it's not insignificant moment the first time you to all down on your fellow man. but i will also tell you that if we don't have ethical troops who can execute violent action, then you lose the very moral basis for what you were doing. and i will just make the point here that there was a french gentleman that wandered about

america some 150 years ago or so and said america is going to be a great country if she is a good country if she ever ceases to be good, she will cease to be great. i think there are times when listening to our closest trusted neighbor and observing some of the political diplomatic and military directions that you are taking we would benefit from it, and i think that your ethical picks sample is something that actually strengthens the western democracy because you have also shown to kandahar that doesn't penalize anyone to pay attention. but that is the only point i was making. thank you. [applause] >> my name is dave associated in larouche internationally, and so my question as it just cannot

recently, the friends of syria, today there is actually meetings on whether excluding russia and china this time with the idea of proposing an ultimatum to the shay assad government for a 72 our chance to actually step down otherwise calling for intervention. now, the question becomes the concern expressed by james clapper when he testified that there is al qaeda involvement. they don't know to what degree it, but in the opposition, considering that everyone is turning a blind eye to the reports by the arab league observers that the opposition has been bombing civilian buses, has been running operations and this is being overlooked with the idea that are we supporting the opposition? if we are supporting the overthrow of the government, who is going to replace them? >> in opposition that's been infiltrated by al qaeda?

what is your stand on this idea that we could intervene this 72 ultimatum. what do you make of all of that? >> general, is this off the record or is there a media presence? [laughter] >> thank you. >> let me just -- it is a very, very complex situation, and i think the longer it goes on, the more that we are to see extremists try to take advantage of the situation that they are predisposed to. the extremists can come from any number of directions. we know that the iranians are working to keep it in power. we know that right now. they've got people in damascus helping them. the opposition is not united. it's gotten many different branches, and i cannot tell you with clear ready model mix of the opposition or its leadership. so we sit here with this

especially on the heels of the regrettable veto in the united nations and the security council we sit here with the urge to do something, but we have to follow the doctor's first rule of do no harm, and it is a very difficult situation to sort out. i think that again you need to really define this problem well, and some of your questions i cannot answer right now. i don't know what would take over right away. but that said, i think, too that the friends of syria, that there are efforts going on to try to address this without turning to the military instrument right away. and i salute those because i fear that bhatia al asad and his family and the minority of them that have actually benefited most live in poverty what we

have to do is recognize that there is a lot of pent-up hatred, and i fear there is going to be a lot more fighting going on here in this very confused state none of us are sitting here on our hands is the point i would make but i don't want to do something that simply adds fuel to the fire without a clear understanding of the outcome and your questions are on target. [applause] >> first, thank you for that very inspiring presentation and the kind words you've given. we very much appreciated. [applause] my question is down more to the operations. it has to do with the war contract which the predecessor general instituted both some 20 years ago. based on the current experiences

and recent experiences we had in afghanistan and iraq do you see that the block war construct as a valid contract to train the troops? understand it is environment where each of the blocks are where they fit the the question has always been our the soldiers and marines the best forces to be trained for all of the blocks of that? in the past we had been working to make the dance that can deal with those but it seems to me that perhaps we should focus more on that third block in the first to and i would like your opinion on >> excellent question. i noted in colin gray's word i've gone to redding university to sit down with him and confronted him to be the most near fault strategist alive today in terms of taking complex issues and raising them to what the marine infantryman can understand. i would just say that the three glock war i think is a very valid contract.

but if you take the view you cannot marry one pre-close of singular form of warfare we are going to have to train for all free and it really goes about, your question really drives the point home of what is the problem that you are trying to solve, and each country with its own culture, its own government on its own way of looking at the world has to decide that for itself. and by injury comfortable with it because no one has a corner on all the wisdom and of the various forces one is put together and the others don't think they need me be the ones that are most needed. right now i am keenly interested by the way in which my countermeasures ships craft and you can understand why. not something the united states but a lot of money into frankly. so as you look at this, the way that i would come back is define the problem and make sure that this construct means what you think you need. let me tell you what i think the problem is for the u.s. military.

it's different for you. it's how do we maintain nuclear superiority and conventional superiority behind which the international community calls a great benefit? but may counter insurgency a core competency of the u.s. military? and i think we can do that, i think we can address that through the education training of our senior in co and junior officers and actually create force that can do those three things. but if you don't get the question right, and i must tell you you are fortunate not having to deal with the nuclear problem to put it bluntly. but i would just say if you don't get that question right then you can start trying to answer it with which of the three blocks to prepare for before you realize just how inclusive the problems it is and how inclusive the solution has got to be. of the best answer i can give you on that one, maj. >> thank you.

>> you're welcome. thank you for the question. spec philip, soldier to the general, first think you very much for coming to see us and for your kind remarks your advice to us delivered with your usual let up on the subtlety is welcome and we certainly need it. and as of the tory side of the problem is why there are a whole lot of problems out there and it is necessary to prepare for the very wide spectrum, but of course in preparing for everything prepared for nothing. can you give us an idea of where you would -- and this perhaps goes to bob's question to ask my way where you would concentrate your approach to the near and middle future, perhaps with you see centcom doing a year from now or ten years from now where

your first concerns and first interests are. >> that is a very difficult question. this is what friends do for each other. we make time for each other, and as you can understand, are responsible for pakistan, our relationship, iraq, syria, yemen, i can go on. you get the idea. i get rather busy. but this is also worth it for me to come up here and say where i stand and see if i can defend it in an open setting like this. i will just tell you that i think that if i were to define my job right now it's how do i keep the peace or what passes for peace in the middle east for one more year, one more month, one more week, one more day sometimes it seems like one more hour sir david come as you know,

the hms iron duke had opened fire last april and with a warning shots in order to keep the irg sea away. things can go wrong very quickly out here. if i was -- i would have to answer your question differently about where on would focus because i can just about guarantee you like the young jet i might put his hand on the matter and said years one place you won't be. but here's what i would do. i would consider what general bald has made very clear to me earlier, this canadian very mature canadian effort to see the training and education of your in ceos and officers as what you are going to have to put your money into. they can move into any situation and they can do problem settings before they do problem settings, and you will be able to adapt to the surprise is the turkoman. i would consider it an investment and not an overhead cost what you put your trips through the best possible

training. i have very modest expectations of being able to see where things are going. that said, i will tell you that the centcom fever if you invite my successor back or his successor to times on the road, he will probably be commanding a more naval theater, and we will probably not be put in large footprints of ground troops ashore except for very short periods. and the effort to keep the peace will also have to take into account the energies that are sweeping through the popular movement sweeping through the middle east, and we are going to have to have troops that can move in a more sensitive way than some recent demonstrations in afghanistan and make certain that we are in a position of reinforcing the stability and not disrupting them. and so it is a more naval fielder putative will be a last

completed situation and your young officers and in ceos are going to have to be able to move out when they get there. we are not going to be able to give them much advanced notice. and i would also tell you that in the coalition's you do not get all of the authority. it's going to come down to your persuasiveness from your force of personality any coaching we come off in a repressive way for the coalition that will come together sometimes with odd bid partners. i have never fought in an all-american formation. i've been in many fights. i've never been in one that was on the americans. and you're going to have to have offices that can adapt to that situation today i would be much more comfortable putting my money in my mouth towards that direction than trying to anticipate where you will be needed in the future. >> thank you very much, sir. thanks. [applause]

>> general, think you very much for being here today in the superlative prescriptions into somalia the prime minister in the first in 20 years and given off the coast of somalia and the piracy mission as well as ethiopia are engaged against the al-shabaab and the british foreign visits specifically not the west is to engage in the country once again and specifically for america after mogadishu '93 and '94 and the u.s. military to engage in once again? >> their role of the u.s. military? anticipated?

>> yes. does the u.s. military have a role in furthering the capacity to take control? >> it's a great question to be by must tell you i'm very happy that the straight, my region stops in somalia is on the other side of that. [laughter] but i don't want to call out of your question to which i talked to several of the leaders who were contributing money. they tried to find ways to give young men, young women jobs in somalia and some little country to give hope for the future i had a very experienced, very capable middle east leader of the country we gave it up nothing pays as good as piracy and these are not the pirates of the caribbean, some hollywood movie. they've brutalized innocent

seamen, held them incommunicado, some have committed suicide, others have died of medical complications. these are innocent men and something has to be done about this. i think that there is a military campaign of the military is trying and to restore the government's authority i salute the u.k. is a list in to try to get a more long-term solution. certainly the military could have a role supporting that but i think they have to come up with some kind of a political way ahead, and the military would be in a supporting role and obviously when it comes down to what is at see the operation of land and by nato and other ships including ones from russia, china, korea, there's a number of nations all their working together on this problem so the military has a role and the policing of the waters i think the shore need to set a

political condition first and the local regional military is the best to provide the solution in the near term. >> thank you paris demint you're welcome. thank you. >> thank you for being with us again. it's a pleasure to see you again. >> question on afghanistan. you haven't talked to much of afghanistan. you talked about your experience in 2001 that the young officer going into kandahar can we fast-forward 11 years and get from you your analysis of where we are now and where we are doing and what do you expect when most of our troops will be all of the country in 2014 as planned? and also, as you know, in most of our western countries, the western world, nato countries,

the question surfaces more and more was this really worth it, our engagement in afghanistan, you know, if you look at the situation i've been a close supporter of the mission for years but sometimes i must admit i've gotten off date. so, can you reassure us that it was worth that? ..

with irreconcilable worldviews, i think we have got to look at this recognized the war is like a radar going back and forth, looking for any in their armor and your tactics, techniques, then your fighting spirit of the troops, country leadership in democracies of the people themselves, that is who we serve. i'm not in the marine corps. i am in the united states moving core. accountability for what were doing for the people of the united states in are just as an accountability to you here in ottawa. the strategy itself is using the nato forces to build around the next troop contributing nations like i said conda, this is the largest wartime coalition and anyone in the stream's history. there has never been more nations united.

their safety out there in afghanistan. united in this effort. our job is to drive the enemy down is something to the preceding violence. our job is to build up the afghan security forces so that they were able to take care of their own country and after 2014 inspector general rasmussen has said there will be there, kate taxpayer, air support, that sort of thing will continue and the detail will be worked out according to business guidance and what happens in chicago at the summit coming up. so i'm the one hand you have our forces providing almost a one break and mentors to the afghan forces coming up out there. we are going to transition to the afghan security forces right now over the half the country is under afghan lead at this point today. we are going to continue to talk

to those elements of the animated art as committed or are losing their hope. and remember, there may be a little over 3000 enemy come over to our side. the enemies -- adversaries don't come over to the losing side. the afghan enemy, the taliban, they know who is winning and who's losing. we know that because we read their mail. as a 3000 young men coming over saying that is it. how many afghan battalions have gone over to the taliban site? zero. how many afghan companies have? hero. how many platoons have? zero. does that mean in a country that has been turned upside down by violence is not treachery, not young men acting out? more afghan boys have died for a afghan troop turned his weapon on the family is than nato troops.

this is a culture that has been through trauma. it is god a kolesnikov culture embedded in it. so it is not a class of cultures with their troops and we are working very, very well together. the spectacular bombing attacks and noticed the enemy has said that their parliament would not deseeded without violence, that the foreign ministers could not come to kabul without violence. they can say what they were going to do. never they're highly bona fide spring offensive. nothing happened, did it? the reason is against the nato troops in the afghan troops fighting together were able to keep them down. so we're going to continue talking to those who can draw over, the normal way all wars eventually and peered we want to end as soon as possible. secretary clinton has been very clear as far as the american this. if they quit using violence, the report al qaeda and agree to live by the afghan constitution they're welcome in the political

process. so i think when you look at that come you see an enemy becoming more and more fragmented and military pressure in the reconciliation efforts. you've got an afghan force getting better and i nato military carrying out a spectacular campaign under the most difficult circumstances and maintaining its moral balance. we are not defined by the occasional very few mistakes that we've made. we are not defined by those. even jesus of nazareth had one out of 12 coach of mud on it. nobody has the perfect outfit. we made up a few human beings. but i think that is the way we see this going and the decisions of what we will look like posts 2014 i've only seen the secretary-general's words to give general guidance from the certainly the president has said we will not abandon afghanistan

after this after 2014 but at that point we do expect the afghan security forces to carry out the security of the nation. they'll still need international support, that they can do it. i hope that answers your question. >> the dumpster, former nato secretary general at the university of ottawa. my question is about cultural sensitivity and cultural intelligence. in terms of leadership company mentioned the need to train people to think and react on the ground and deal with the real issues that the problem to solve the problem. at least two of the three block word our joint operations amongst the people. you learned a lot through your different types about working with different kinds of cultures and different kinds of people. how should we take the cultural knowledge and intelligence and instantiate them into our corner and how should we do that so the next day we are better at

working with the people? >> yeah, it is a great question and thanks for your service layer. like i said i'm still in therapy after my years here i would admire any of you who can come through it. but emigrate higher of nato and i'll even make. let me tell you what i think we need to do in the ground forces. we need to look at what the air force did -- air force's day probably back in the 50s and 60s and increasingly into the 70s and 80s and start using simulators that minister mckay spoke about. the bottom line is in many ways we have not taken advantage of simulators. and if you are to simulate the ethical and tactical dilemmas that show where you can make cultural missteps, you can make those kinds of mistakes and well constructed simulators back here. you know, the u.s. military will

not buy a new airplane without simulators. it's considered part of what they do. it is part of the program. get in many cases the infantry forces, the one closest contact day-to-day, face-to-face, sunglasses off, looking each other in the eye contact with the foreign cultures are the least simulated kinds of interactions on the battlefield. you wouldn't put the pilot in the airplane overhead without putting him to simulators. he wouldn't put ship underway in the case of the u.s. navy ship for the office of the deck has not been on a simulator. so i think that is the way to do it. we know what the cultures are like. we can put that in a simulation and at least very great degree in some of it's virtual, some of the simulated, some of it actually applies. you can have especially in america, canada, the big immigrant populations.

nowhere in the read we can go really can't thank people and our citizenry who can come in and help us put an the simulated examples must make our ethical and cultural mistakes they are, at least most of them before they ever go back into the site. that is the way i would go after this. >> we want marlatt here. >> captain lloyd, i work at.com. the world bank estimates that 97% of afghanistan's gdp comes from foreign aid and military aid as well as in country spending on foreign troops. when you consider 2014 and a reduction in asf by 100,332 to 30 and consider the history of the mujahedeen i am the western budgetary constraints on the horizon, that keeps me up at night. should it? >> yes actually. but if i look so young i get

carded if they wanted to get a somewhere, young man. [laughter] [applause] transplant happier being kept awake by something that night. but let me tell you this is also solvable. before you were born in my day, the american hippies wanted to discover themselves, so they went wandering the world, leaving debris behind them wherever they went, both physical and moral. but one of the great spots along the hippie trail, frankly was afghanistan. it is a place of orchards and friendly people. it was a place where you can move from town to town and always find people willing to take u.n. there is a generosity of spirit bear that has been badly shaken under the distressed as this crushing combat they've been under now for generations, ever

since the soviet union when an internist society upside down. but this is not a country that's been able to sustain itself in the past. there's also extraction industries today and possibilities there that could actually help. they are so going to need international help for some years. i think a nsf, the security forces will need a rather robust hope for a while, but as the country gets back on its feet and part of this is built on faith, yes i have faith we can do this if we were together. i believe you can get the economy going again and that's where dr. gandhi the person is probably doing more than anyone dared in kabul to try to marry this current inflated kind of economy they have too a sustainable future. this is a human problem. it is solvable. there are past time for me to go back and see what the agricultural society and

education at the university of iraq can provide as far as young people who can start making modern industries work there that furthermore you have what we called the silk road initiative, where in order to open from the indian ocean into central asia and emerging markets fair comment has to go on the ring road, something that your lab know well from there in kandahar. and so, i think it is doable. it's going to be a challenge and we have to recognize the problem and i think you summed it up about it specifically as i have heard it. i expect you to have a paper to me by tomorrow night. [applause] >> ladies and gentlemen, it you want to check your watches, we have just gone through an hour

15 minutes. hard to believe, actually. it sounds by so very quickly for the obvious reason that general medicine's presentation has been very interesting and fascinating in every possible way. general, thank you very much for gracing our podium yet again. and this time, i wonder if you would accept this small token of our appreciation. it is the oxford companion or companion rather to the canadian military history. >> thank you very much. [applause] >> u.s. navy secretary ray mabus spoke at the ottawa conference about the shared values between canada and the u.s. and later answered questions from the audience on the defense budget. his remarks are 40 minutes. >> the honorable ray mabus, u.s. secretary of the navy.

ray mabus is the 75th u.s. secretary of the navy. a secretary who these america's navy and marine corps and is responsible for an annual budget in excess of $150 billion almost 900,000 persons. you have copies of his curriculum today. his biography in your packages allow me simply to make a few remarks about his background. prior to joining the administration of president barack obama, mr. made a surge sergent's top posts in government and the private sector. in 1997 he was selected as the youngest governor of the at the age of 39. in more than 100 years at the time of his election and previously as state auditor in 1994 to 1988 and was instrumental in rooting out huge corruption and the superb duration of public funds and

county government in 25 counties. he was also appointed ambassador kingdom of saudi arabia for the clinton ministration in 1984. that man the introduction of our splendid speaker this morning by suggesting that he has served two years, 70 to 72 a surface warfare cruiser on little rock and was offered a fulbright scholarship and woodrow wilson fellowship at the detention, please join me in welcoming to our podium, the honorable ray mabus. [applause] >> mr. chairman, thank you so much for that wonderful introduction. i appreciate the hospitality here and ottawa.

you're far more hospitable to me than your senators for last night to the capitals. [laughter] although, the capitals have evidently -- and on the hunt if you all the all saw the camera to the game, but they have perfect fit the hunk of faith into the net. [laughter] it's really hard to plan that plate. i'm very honored to be here with you. at that to speak for a few minutes and then take whatever questions you have. the united states and canada are allies, friends, neighbors. our trade and military partnerships are strong and enduring as our border is long and the connection between our two countries is far more than

geographical. it encompasses our shared principles, values and security. our formal defense ties were established in a pretty informal session. august 18, 1940, 60 miles or so south of here when prime minister mackenzie king and president franklin roosevelt that in roosevelt's car in the village of wealth to income in new york and agreed in principle to what became known as the ogdensburg agreement. it was a simple five sentence document that established the permanent joint word, focused on the defense of the north had at the western hemisphere. it was so informal that the agreement says that the first meeting of the board would happen and i quote, shortly. [laughter] at the government has gotten much more precise since then.

[laughter] they took shortly too hard because the first meeting of the board was the following monday here in ottawa. and since then, our country and our militaries have shared a lot of things from fighting said a site on the front lines of normandy to the battles of afghanistan where there are no front lines. our successful operations together in places like libya emerged from fully developed training exercises, such as the recently completed both allocated 2012, the largest amphibious exercise in the past decade, which took place after southern coast. and canadian leadership is readily apparent. one of the less true frontiers of the quote, the arctic. so the frontier we shared in a frontier with the maritime

component is becoming increasingly important. i grew up in the american south, governor and mrs. v., but last spring i went to a and the arctic and you couldn't find a much more different place than mississippi to be, but she also couldn't find a much more important place than one that is becoming more and more important as time passes. today, we have to rely on our shared history and our shared values to meet the new things that we face. some people separate the challenges we face as economic and military, but in the bottom the challenge we face is the bride challenge of making the globe have it more secure. for the united states, after he dedicated to ground wars in a

changing and dynamic security environment, it was time for a to take a significant review of our national strategy and defense priorities. at the direction of the president of the united states, the secretary of defense, the three service secretaries and the joint chiefs developed a new strategy that meets the desperate and complicated threats within military that is somewhat smaller, but more flexible, more agile, can answer any call and can provide our national leadership with the fullest range of options possible. and president obama, for the first time in the memory of anybody at the pentagon was personally involved in the formulation of this new strategy. because he knew that in

reshaping our defense priorities, we can not and should not choose between fiscal responsibility and a strong national defense. we have to have both. as he and others have said, economic security is national security. and we have faced some pretty tough budgetary targets under the budget control act passed by or congress. one of the things i want to emphasize is that the defense budget unveiled at the president 10 days ago was stricken by strategy and not by dollars. we navigated by some key principles for this new defense strategy. one was to maintain the worlds finest military and avoid at all costs hollowing out that force. a smaller military capable of a full spectrum of missions is to pair your to a larger force

ill-equipped because resources are not made available for things like training or maintenance of modernization. another key principle that preserves the quality of the all volunteer force in to keep faith with them to let when the battle over the last decade. our fleet assets of ships, aircraft, vehicles and submarines don't sail, flag, drive or dies without the men and women that wear the uniform of the united states. our new strategy has an understandable focus on the western pacific and the arabian gulf, but it does maintain a worldwide partnership and our global presence, using more innovative, low-cost slate

footprint engagements. america and its militaries will remain globally engaged and forward deployed. for my department, the department of the navy, this new strategy requires a navy and marine corps team that is built and ready for any eventuality on land, in the air, under the worlds oceans, on the worlds oceans or in the vast site receives. we see a maritime team playing a critical role in areas of growing demand, things like deterring and defeating aggression from state and nonstate areas, conventional or irregular crypts, projecting power and maintaining presence to assure open ceilings and providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance whenever and wherever they are needed.

my favorite navy recruiting poster says sometimes we follow the storm judiciary. sometimes we are the storm. we do it with the same people. we do it with the same platforms and we do it without taking up an inch of anybody else's sovereign soul. while the security environment that we all face is complex and changing, our shared interests are simple and endearing in the interest of security, prosperity, respect for universal values and international order. those common goals for the basis of our grand strategy reaching that to roosevelt and king and if anything are even more vital today in a globally connected area. future crises and future threat

may and probably will take a lot of different shapes. we can't prepare simultaneously and fully for every possible contingency. so we need to focus on flexibility, on agility, i'm creating a force that is ready for the most likely arrest, the ones that can adapt quickly and affect ugly to the boat. our navy has experienced that to a remarkable degree in just the past year. early last may, a group of sailors as a part of a joint force finally brought osama bin laden to justice. and just last month, we rescued two hostages from pirates in somalia. at the same time we were doing those two things, we at 20,000 marines in combat in afghanistan

and 4000 sailors on the ground in afghanistan doing a variety of missions. on one of my first trips to afghanistan, i went to be kika province, which is down near the pakistan border, very mountainous, very rural providence and a provincial reconstruction team, which was commanded by an american submarine. his top two and listed were submarine chiefs. now i bet you that when he joined the navy and opted for submarine, he did not expect to find himself in the mountains of afghanistan. but he did a superb job as state that entire team and that is the flexibility. that is the agility, that is the ability to take on any sort job

or task or omission and do it well. last spring on the first day of the bolivian operations, two of our submarines and one survey ship shop 122 tomahawk missiles into libya. that same day, we had five ships at the horn of africa fighting piracy and another ship circumnavigating africa and africa partnership station. that same day the ronald reagan's strike group, which had been on its way across the pacific to do combat air support over afghanistan learned out dissing omnipage hit japan and in under two hours, turned and went to help the people of japan that's straight group used exactly the same techniques,

exactly the same things they were going to use and providing combat air over afghanistan to make sure that the right things guide to the right places on the right aircraft going to the right price of japan to help with humanitarian assistance in the wake of that terrible disaster. that same day we had ships in the caribbean and the eastern pacific energy in drugs and other ships going around south america and in the southern pacific doing medical and dental and veterinary work. when our captains leave for the commanders of her strike groups for amphibious ready groups get ready to leave on the planet, one thing that i always tell them before they head out is that the one certainty is uncertainty.

they will say something almost surely that they did not anticipate, but for which they will be prepared while they are training and variability. our sailors and our marines repeatedly have proven that they can meet anything that comes over the horizon. and canada has been there what does advancing security, providing first combat support and training assistance in afghanistan, invest in the future of afghan children and youth, promoting regional diplomacy, operation mobile -- i'm sorry, i'm from the south, mobile, alabama. in libya, fighting piracy at the coast of somalia, providing humanitarian misses since in japan, tahiti and around the

world. your commitment to these operations and so many more -underscore the fundamental point. we passed me the issues of today's global security environment are working together. combating threats to global peace and prosperity is not and should not be the task of any one nation. welding and sustaining strong security partnerships is a central and enduring elements of a national security strategy and remains a key element of the new security strategy we announced recently. and our two nations have demonstrated from building strong security institutions in europe and asia in world war ii to sustain former soviet states in the aftermath of the cold war to our work around the globe today a partnership are actually incredibly vital. nowhere are those partnerships

more important than in the global maritime comments, assuring the free passage of our ceilings is critical to a security, commerce and the free exchange of goodson eight years. we see that exchange every single day and a military where they operate together, train together and are educated together. partnerships like the one between the united states and can do are one way we can maximize our resources and expand our reach in a time of fiscal constraint. another man says to focus on improving our cost effectiveness in reducing our vulnerabilities. and for our navy, that means we have to maintain our aggressive efforts to reduce our dependence on overseas oil from potentially are actually volatile areas of the world to use other sources of our energy more efficiently.

our energy up for severity made us better were fighters. by deploying to afghanistan with solar blankets to charge radios and other chronic items, one marine patrol drop 700 pounds of batteries from ipaqs and they don't need to be resupplied as often. using less fuel and theater can mean fewer fuel convoys, which will save lives. for every 50 convoys to feel we bring into afghanistan, a marine is killed or wounded. that is too high a price to pay for us. being efficient and what we do is part of that and we are doing a lot inefficiencies. everything from u-haul coatings for a shapes to replacing lightbulbs with leds to using

smart grids smart meters. but we've got to get -- we've got to do more than just be more efficient. not thankfully, canada provides more than a quarter of the olio the united states uses. but that still leaves the spine too much from those who may not be our friends and who may not have our best interest at heart. all you have to do is turn on the television the last year and watch the news on emerging threats at multiple threats and energy security. we are too vulnerable in this area. we would never allow these countries to build our ships or aircraft or ground unit, but we give them a say in whether the ships sail, those aircraft fly or the ground vehicles operate.

an even greater vulnerability as to the price spikes and shocks that come from oil. oil is a global commodity and the price is set globally. sometimes the speculation and no more than rumor. but every time the price of oil goes up a dollar a barrel, it costs the united states navy $31 million in additional fuel costs. when libya started last spring, the price of oil went up $38 a barrel almost overnight. libya is an oil producer, but in the global scheme, it is not huge. but that one operation, the one uprising caused the price of oil to shoot up almost $40 a barrel and for us that was a

$1.1 billion bill that we had to pay. and the only place that i or any secretary has to go to get that money is that of operations. so that meant that weise and last, flew last, train blast because of that. even marines mere threat to close the strait of hormuz lose the price of oil. as the people in this room know so well when you run a military organization, you look of vulnerabilities. the look of vulnerabilities and potential at the series, but you also look at vulnerabilities of your own force. when i was nominated for this job and began to be briefed on

the department of the navy, energy dependence jumped out as one of the biggest vulnerabilities we have today. and the reason we are doing what we are doing and energy, the reason we are moving to alternative energy is that it is a matter of security. it's a matter of national security. it makes us a better military force and with canada providing leadership on alternative fuels as well as fossil fuels, we will be better partners with each other and with a world. there is a lot more we can do to improve our defense, stabilize energy sources and create a more secure world. king and roosevelt started us on this course and it remains the right course for us today

together. i think president obama said it best two months ago during a bilateral meeting with prime minister harper. he said perhaps no two nations match at more closely together or are woven together more deeply, economically, culturally than the united states and canada. i believe as long as our course together is guided by our shared values and principles, we will prevail his two partners, to neighbors, to friends in the words of your nationally and am, strong and free. god bless canada, god bless the united states. thank you all very much. [applause]

>> questions. hardy imac >> good morning, mr. secretary. could you talk a little bit more about the partnerships and goal. strategic guidance mandated a shift towards the asia-pacific region, but it also mandated more cooperation with countries on the pacific ocean. so tell me, what exactly i did ministrations expectations of the specific allies? if you could meet your magic wand over the pacific basin, what air and sea capabilities would you like to see her allies acquire and maintain in the years to come? >> well one thing i think it is important to note that while our new strategy cause for a focus on the western pacific and the arabian gulf regions, this is

not new for either of us. this is not new focus for the united states or canada to be in the pacific. in fact, our fleet right now is 55% in the pacific, 45% elsewhere and we are gradually going to miss that to 60% in the pacific. in terms of our allies, we like to keep doing what we're doing and things like surveys and antisubmarine capabilities, and isaiah, the myriad of ways to overcome the tyranny of distance in the pacific. canada participate in impact and have every single time around that the pacific exercise that that has been -- that is the

largest maritime exercise of the world. canada is one of only two countries that has been there every single time the impact is happening. to be interoperable with us, to cry static with our ships and our submarines to cry static with our aircraft in terms of training, in terms of doubt dream, in terms of operations and how we do it, if i could wave my magic wand, i think i'd be pretty much where we are today, which is closely cooperative, which is make sure that we do exercise together. making sure that our platforms are compatible. making sure that both leadership officers, but also our total force knows how each other operates via common education, common training and that we approach the pacific together as

partners and not as two separate nations going into that region alone. >> yes, sir. >> thank you good man is not the era, journalist with the executive intelligence review and i was going to pose my question with regards to some of the military build up that we've been seeing right now across the pacific descent obviously and a various number of leading military officials across china, the most recent wednesday sued for the pla have been warning that they have been seen things that are military bases built north of australia as well as the air and naval applied in the united states in that region as an offensive containment against china. i was a good a chance to speak to the military officials, what

would you say is a response to their can turn? >> for one thing, but we would like us who think engagement with china. would like to approach these issues together. we would like some more transparency in what they are doing, on their military buildup, the things they are buying the capabilities they are acquiring. we would like some more transparency and why they are doing that. we've been very transparent about the fact that we've been in the pacific and we've been in the western pacific now for decades. at least since world war ii we had any continuing a persistent presence there. we are going to insist in freedom of navigation and insist on making sure that goods and ideas can move freely and openly. not only there, but around the world. we can do that better together. the fact that we are in the

western pacific is not new. it is something that is a part of what we have done for decades and will continue to do for decades to come. we are moving our marines from a concentration in okinawa to guam as a rotational force into australia because we have trained with the australians again for decades and we will continue to do that. we also are going to continue to be very act of in the region and doing things like partnership building and humanitarian assistance. our marines get a request for humanitarian assistance or disaster relief on an average of once every three weeks. and many of those are in the pacific and we'll have our

forces where they need to be in order to get those things done. >> good morning, sir. >> military college. thank you for your comments. continued that the asia-pacific, could you identify key american interests in the asia-pacific as it is today and how american naval might be deployed to address this interest and within that burberry, specifically the china sea. >> i think i just mentioned some of the key american interests, not only in the western pacific in the south china sea, but everywhere, which is free movement of ships and goods, frieda navigation, the straits of malacca 40% of the world's trade goes through the straits

annually. we've for the good of the economy, not only of north america, but for the world need to make sure that those things remain open, that they remained free from piracy or any other sort of things that might lock them. we are going -- as i said can we have had a persistent presence. we have had a carrier home ported in japan. we have an amphibious ready group in southern japan. we have marines and air assets in the finale. i think you will see in the future -- i know you'll see in the future of the torah combat ships, are nearly ships being deployed to singapore. you'll see other assets being deployed for left for our marines, which are going to be

rotational period and in australia there be a mix of vocational and permanent and guam and anyplace else that we end up in the western pacific. so i do not think that you will see a big change in where our asset are, but there will be some movement. but the important thing is we will continue to be a very persistent presence in the western pacific. one of the reasons i think that is important is that when we routinely send carrier strike groups are amphibious ready groups or other kinds of ships through whatever bodies of water there are in the world, if there is an incident, if there's a misunderstanding, we don't escalate it is sending in a carrier strike group or an amphibious ready group.

it is already there. it is a part of our normal presents. it's a part of what we do on a day-to-day basis and i think it's important that we had that particularly in the western pacific. >> yes, i'm a retired canadian member of the nation. one of the questions i have is regarding the term comprehensive approach. in your presentation you covered a great deal of ground. or for the past decade to these issues and dealing with problems have in this comprehensive approach involved in instruments of nation and government academic military-industrial and so on. yet that wasn't mentioned anywhere in what you're saying. i wonder if you could tell us why that concept is going. which he said the united states is backing away from the idea of comprehensive approach is an idea does seem to escalate based on current experience has proven not perhaps so effective? is that idea still within the

u.s. concept of operations? >> yes, sir, it is and it's my fault if i didn't articulate that well enough. we have to have partnerships not only with other countries, but also insider of government in terms of how we approach issues, whether it is military or economic or diplomatic issues. and i think this comprehensive approach is certainly one of the keystones of what we'll do in the future. what the thing that our strategy has said we are deemphasizing his long-term stability operations, long-term, and large numbers of ground troops anywhere. and moving more toward a more mobile flexible, agile force to be quicker, to respond to

things. that is the only -- the less than focus on long-term security and stability operations on the ground is one of the big change is that occurred in the security in this new defense strategy, security strategy, but certainly not the comprehensive approach that we need to take. the last thing i will say is one of the things that our sailors have to learn to be is not only good for fighters and good sailors, they have to learn to be diplomats because one of -- most of that -- for a lot of people on earth, the only americans they will at first the our sailors and we have to represent the united states very well when we go into some of these countries. so thank you.

>> secretary, good morning. thank you for image for your presence and your participation. i do miss alex larsson and i represent well-dressed university. in your presentation come you indicated the amount of royal that goes to the united states from canada and we regard that as a very significant part of our tech support program. however, recent events have indicated that perhaps we might not be able in the future to sell as much oil to the united states as we would like and we are now going offshore to look for other customers. would it disturb you, the government and the navy if the united states did not continue to purchase that amount of oil from canada and how would it be if you had to go to other offshore, perhaps more unreliable countries to assure that your ships can sail in your

planes can fly a? >> when number one, as i said, i think i use the word thankfully we get more than a quarter of our oil from canada. and it does disturb me that we are today dependent and could be more dependent on either actually or potentially volatile places on earth for the fossil fuels that we need to run our fleet. and that is the main reason that i've embarked on a very aggressive plan to try to move the navy boats afloat and ashore off fossil fuels to the maximum extent we can. now i'll mention the unspoken thing that you had in your

question. [laughter] i think the president made it very clear that his decision on keystone was because the process and timing. he simply did not think that the state department had enough time to gather the relevant information. it was presented to him in a 60 day requirement by the extension of the tax cut in december and he made it very clear in the statement that it was only process and only timing that it did not and should not have any greater meaning than that. >> all right. again, thank you so much for having me.

[applause] >> mr. secretary, we are extremely grateful for you having come to toledo fire two-day conference here today. as a token of our appreciation, allow me to present to you this small token we have here, the oxford companion for canadian military history. thank you so much. [applause]

>> coming up next on c-span two come and discussion about iran, north korea and nuclear proliferation. chancellor >> even a person who is a senator, even a person now who is president of the united states faces a predicament when they talk about race. they face the fact that their son, and increase the number of americans who are racially prejudiced. they face the fact that a much larger portion of the american populace wants to deny the realities of race even now.

>> louisiana governor bobby jindal skagit to reveal his schedule for revealing the budget $900 million in the red. for a closer right now it's mostly cloudy and sunny at the airport. turgenev barksdale and 39 emend in. you're racing to sharif port is another station 710. >> booktv in american history tv explores the history and literary culture as shreveport, louisiana saturday at noon eastern on booktv in c-span 2.

>> just days after north korea announced it would freeze its nuclear program in exchange for food at the brookings institution hosted a discussion about nuclear proliferation focusing on north korea and iran. panelist discuss the situation after the death of kim jong il and what this week's announcement means for restoring a dialogue. this is an hour and a half.

>> good morning. i'm stephen paper can a senior fellow and director of the proteins and welcome to a panel discussion on counter proliferation, challenges and nuclear goods. if you look back to the end of the cold war since then, the issue of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons has been at the top of washington's agenda. if usc that the bush administration, upon administration or clinton administration to list their top 10 security challenges, you would find in each case nuclear proliferation to be in the top three or four. and in the context of the last decade the two biggest challenges are those posed by north korea and iran. when you look at, for example, the american relationship with russia going back to the 1990s iran has always figured a good big issue and not just has the u.s. relationship with china, north korea's nuclear program is

a major issue for almost 20 years now. u.s. policy is really focused on how can you hinder, slow, stop, prevent these countries are moving forward with the nuclear weapons programs. the case of iran has been success and perhaps following it. i think we have seen those countries move forward. north korea tested a nuclear device in 2006 and again in 2009 although the u.s. government has not yet come to a firm collision weather around in fact seeks to have a ready-made nuclear weapons, there is no doubt that iran has made significant progress in its efforts to acquire the capabilities to produce particularly with regard to enrich me. so this is going to be a challenge. it will be a challenge for the president to everybody's in 2013 and we have an excellent panel today to talk about these questions. you have the programs you have the full bio. i will give a brief introduction

in my plan. we'll start with jonathan pollack, senior fellow here at the port in china center, but a one-time expert on north korea. there's news on wednesday that the north koreans had agreed to a moratorium on testing on enrichment and also of long-range missiles. i think jonathan is going to put this in context of the difficult history we had as well as talk about what the transition from kim jong il to kim junkin might be. next to suzanne maloney in the savon center in middle east studies and she is going to talk about iran and this of course is iran in the news now and a couple of ways. the parliamentary election taking place in iran and of course the last x-ray weeks has been speculation about whether man is reaching the point with the israelis decide that they will go ahead and conduct a military strike against iranian

nuclear facilities. so she will describe what is going on in iran but that nuclear program software. our third as robert gallucci, president of the macarthur foundation and spent a lot of time in u.s. government in the 90s working on these issues including assistant secretary of state for "politico" military affairs was very much involved in working on the current framework of north korea in 1994 and after jonathan and suzanne will have advice on how to fix the bombs in what should the u.s. policy in terms of addressing these questions. ..

so amidst the quiet encouragement of the moment, i thought it would be useful at first to briefly review some of its history, how we find ourselves at this point as we enter frankly for the united states a third decade of negotiations with north korea over the nuclear weapons activities. we can't undo the history but it's very, very important to understand better where we are at and what needs to be done. it's now nearly 20 years since bob first sat down with the north korean counterparts and

indeed today some of the same counterparts are still the negotiators. and many of the issues are very much the same. it's now almost ten years since intelligence community determined that north korea had under way a covert highly enriched uranium program, which led to the breakdown of the agreed framework early in the bush administration and triggered north korea's immediate resumption of its plutonium based nuclear weapons program that was followed soon thereafter by north korea's withdraw from the npt, north korea being the only state that has ever withdrawn from the non-proliferation treaty. it's been eight years since north korea took dr. hecker from stanford university to the reactor and where he was i think able to handle a significant piece of plutonium metal derived

from the reprocessing of nuclear north korea declared that it had manufactured nuclear weapons and a year after that indeed it tested a nuclear device for the first time. it's been almost three years now since north korea in the opening months of the obama administration despite president obama's persistent plea that he would shake and adversaries hand to unclench their fist, north korea determined and stated that it would remade on every denuclearization agreement it has ever signed and it would resume nuclear testing, threaten the launching of an icbm, and is said that it would start a program that it had long insisted it had never done in the first place. and remarkably enough, in the following year again it was shown the results with north korea claimed to be the decision

to undertake the enrichment activities. of course what he saw was a very modern uranium enrichment with about 2,000 fugitives seemingly in operation which does not happen shall we say overnight or even on our short-term. so it's now ten weeks since the death of kim jong il and kim jong il in many ways even more than his father is identified with a formal confirmation that in fact really go back though decades well before the united states ever sat down to negotiate with the north koreans. number three at this time has declared steve noted they would undertake a moratorium on additional nuclear weapons testing long-range missile tests and will also cease enrichment

activities underway provided they were quote on quote product of talks in the river to the united states and north korea. i will slocum said it's a little ambiguous in the statement the would return to the international atomic energy agency inspectors. where they had been absent since 2008. and one of the encouraging signs north korea did ascent in its statement claimed that it would accept the 1953 armistice accord as the interim basis for the peace and stability on the korean peninsula, the cornerstone u.s. and since north karelia over the last five or more years has regularly trust the armistice accord we can take this as something of a positive

signs. so north korea's claim yet again it is prepared to discuss the denuclearization for the process of dialogue and negotiation. but i think it's safe to say that this is a bit like a groundhog day the movie. we've seen the movie before. the question is whether the ending would be any different this time around. we can all concede that with north korea all prices are subject to change without notice and in the context of the power from kim jong il to his son this is at least a small window in to post kim jong il and whether or not on that basis we might see any kind of a revisiting of the strategies and policies. that said, caution is appropriate that north korea has regularly and repeatedly declared that it is a fully develop nuclear weapon state,

that its nuclear missiles, nuclear weapons and missiles or part of kim jong il's legacy that he leaves behind, and that more to the point north korea and expects to be treated on an equal level with a recognition of its standing as a state in possession of nuclear weapons. all of mercury has undertaken in the face of the acute international pressures from its allies, former allies, from its adversaries, the international atomic energy agency, all of this in the face of extreme economic provision in isolation. it's a commitment that they take seriously. now, the united states and other affected powers have no illusions about where the matters stand. number courteous to this state despite decades of negotiation has never for non-any of the

technical or material assets it regards as critical to the standing of the nuclear weapons program. it deems itself and our right nuclear power and expects to be treated as such. it does receive tighten the economic support from china which has diminished the presume it pressure to show to unravel the nuclear weapons activities and despite the statement from two days ago, north korea has had various junctures threatened to test it again presumably this time with a highly enriched uranium device rather than a plutonium device. so, we've read and i think also we find ourselves perhaps under circumstances where we ought to at least sustain discussions with north korea certainly particularly if there is

anything but would delay or impede their additional testing. but ample caution the legitimacy or the permanence of north korea's's nuclear weapons assets. the u.s. has not wavered from its commitment to the cessation of all of the nuclear weapons activities and for their ultimate elimination, without which a normal relationship between north korea and the united states and the outside world is simply not going to be possible. so, all of this is in the face of north korea's efforts to pocket and retain its nuclear advances and to assert any effort as building and improving bilateral relations with north korea must begin with the acceptance of the north as a weapons state outside of the

npt, not unlike india, pakistan and israel. now the obama administration continues to advocate what is called a strategic patients in the north. in the hopes of building a common front among japan, the republic of korea, china, japan and russia, kind of a common framework within which the process of nuclear is asian can be impeded and then pulled back, and indeed without which there cannot be any lasting stability on the peninsula or beyond. now, north korea may believe that the outside world is essentially to the existence of the capabilities it is an hour after all almost six years since the offering it tested a weapon for the first time, and north korea may well believe the opposite will does somehow pre-pairing to live with these capabilities wearing down

through the grim persistence and its attachment to these capabilities. but i think the persistence of their efforts ought to caution us about any kind of expectations for an easy or rapid break through. without engaging in magical thinking, we can look upon wednesday's announcements as a a tentative first step. but whether it really implies or suggests any kind of a near-term cessation of a nuclear weapon activity seems to me is far more problematic. that said, we have to be mindful that not renegotiates for tactical reasons. there are a couple of immediate reasons coming up that in april there will be the national assembly elections and softer reimputed in december there will be a presidential election in south korea from and clearly the north hopes to get a president more to its liking. and i think it is safe to say that if north korea restrains its activities for the near

term, the odds of them getting an outcome that they would like will improve. at the same time, north korea is approaching on april 15th what it hopes will be a grand celebration of the 100th anniversary of the birth of kim il-sung called the father of north korean state. so this might also be a part of what is ongoing right now giving it but i think frankly we can't always understand or shouldn't pretend that we understand north korean motivations, but certainly we should be mindful of the fact that mercury is not for giving its nuclear weapons capabilities and interests simply for the provision of american food assistance. we should delude ourselves it seems to me into thinking that we have a genuine understanding of what animates the decision making in the north, but the tests will have to be in the north korean actions more than in words to see whether there is indeed any longer term way out

of this extraordinary and very troubling nuclear history. the implications of this obviously go well beyond mercury and coming and well beyond the east asian security and with that i will turn over to suzanne. thank you. >> it is a pre-on a glorious spring morning we started with the encouraging case although jonathan has injected i think an appropriate note of caution in whatever the encouragement we may find from the announcement earlier this week. it is of course necessary given the topic at hand to move to the less encouraging case. in fact the case of iran which at this stage i think has reached a state of deep disquiet both here as well as in a number of other allied capitals in particular israel. i wanted to start by saying a few words of the state of play particularly on the nuclear issue and then perhaps raise a few issues for discussion. i think what you'll hear is a certain degree of commonality, as well as important

distinctions between the iranian and the number three in cases and i am looking forward to the comments of the fellow panelists who will need to the cases together in terms of the u.s. strategy. what we know in terms of the program has been once again confirmed by the latest report which is the long history of the lack of transparency on the part of the pyrenean regime with respect to its nuclear activities continues to this day the difficulty in ascertaining with complete certainty the the program does not have military aspects because become greater with every passing month, and the extension and the intensification of iraq's production of the oil enriched uranium, and not increasing stockpile is nearly 20% is proven to be a considerable worry for the international community. with that, the launch of the enrichment activities in the underground fortified sites which may or may not if one reads the "washington post" from

the and vulnerable to even the most powerful busting bombs is a factor which is influencing the timeline and the sense of urgency which seems to have infected the body politic here in washington and of course in israel. add to all this regional environment in which iran is both increasingly under threat and isolated from its neighbors, but also increasingly assertive and testing the opportunities that might be available to it as a result of the changing political dynamics of the arab spring. one has i think the recipe of great attention and urgency within the region which we are seeing on an almost daily basis in the newspapers. of course today in iran it's an important day. it's the first time iranians will go to the polls for the national election since the 2009 presidential election that produced dramatic people both on the streets with sustained protests in response to the dubious declaration of ahmadinejad r. dee election to

the presidency at that time. but also a schism within the conservative political elite along the lines of which i think we haven't seen even in iran's deeply three decades of the post revolutionary history. let me say that in today's elections are tremendously important for your non-'s long-term future. it is a collective globalizing iranians to their political preference is one that has deep meaning. the parliament is at this stage the only will work against this whole self consolidation of power and the auspices of the supreme leader, and it has always served as a real venue for the day-to-day pork-barrel politics in iran that has long term meaning for the space development. but with that caveat i will say i can almost predict the outcome of today's elections and the lack of the impact on the nuclear decision making. the regime will tell the outcome today the respectable levels as a sort of endorsement of the popular mandate and a slap in

the face to use the term phrase of the ayatollah khomeini to the united states in the western states that have been engaged in the increasing program of sanctions that are having to reach into the iranian public. and the fractiousness but among the other men shot and the supreme leader will continue and probably play itself out in a more public fashion as we come closer to the presidential election of next year. ultimately, the regime sees itself and sees its state and its survival as deeply caught up in this nuclear program. and this set of circumstances that we find ourselves in first with the tender of threats and the international community, the fears and the war jitters that are dominating as i sit here and elsewhere and the level of sanctions and the the type of sanctions i think are making it for more difficult to see a sort of functional negotiating process come out the current set of circumstances. let me just raise very quickly five issues that i think are relevant for where we go from here on iran.

the first disestablishing the deterrent with respect to iran's nuclear program as well as its other provocative the activities across the region. there is this sense the pressure works with iran that iran is it feels its survival was at stake and will see itself restrained. and we've seen in fact in the history evidence that this is in fact the case. yet it isn't clear this stage whether it is a threat to sufficiently credible or whether they actually deter the irony in provocative behavior or encourage it. and there is as we hear talk with in the press of possibilities of the preventive but the capri into action as we see a long talk openly of the threat as a potentially carry out those implications on the streets of the various foreign capitals against the israelis and i would suspect eventually the american interest read a real question about how we effectively deter the regime which believes any sort of concession will be read as weakness and which believes that it cannot sit back if it sees

itself under threat. the second issue i wanted to raises red lines. we have had an enormous difficulty of establishing and maintaining red wines with respect to iran's nuclear activities. as a colleague in the state department told me in the bush administration, the bush administration believes the house that iran should have nuclear industry. yet as we have seen iran has a mass of considerable nuclear programs of enrichment and reprocessing and now the enrichment up to 20%, so deeply worrisome. how is it as we know that there is an increasing conversation about establishing and publicly articulating any red wines that we can make these red wines and forcible that we confine ourselves constrained by them and that we are going to get a sufficient level from the international community to in fact support them publicly? the third issue i wanted to raise the efficacy of sanctions which is then of course a part of our policy towards iran, and

we've seen over the past of the two years the most robust and meaningful international coalition in terms of exiting the international economic pressure on iran. a conventional arms and u.n. security council resolution 1929 coming into the agreement by russia and other countries to go above and beyond that. the european decision in 2010 and then more recently with the announcement of a boycott of the crude imports to effectively evacuate the petroleum sector enormous historical importance if one thinks that to the prior crises with iran during which time the european trade with iran actually increased. yet the sanctions are not having the desired impact. the reality is there simply are no knockout punches with respect to the nuclear program and there is certainly nothing that is likely to be low cost and high impact as we often have found the sanctions to be oversold pivoted once again, we are

finding that so long as the international economy is rebounding, the demand for energy will remain robust and the market seems unconvinced that a full-scale production of iran's supply can be observed without direct implication for the price of oeo and the price of gasoline at home. this is the administration here in the catch-22 during that election. increasing implementation of sanctions will have a direct impact on the big u.s. economy and potentially the global economy as well and navigating the balancing act is going to be a very difficult one throughout the course of this year and beyond. the fourth issue i simply wanted to raise is the question of how we approach iran in the nuclear program. we found incrementalism hasn't worked to build the confidence measures that create a process of trust simply isn't effective with the regime that is convinced that we are out to remove the survival and given

some of the statements that have accompanied the sanctions, the steegmans from the hill that have described the intent of the latest sanctions, the collapse of the economy, the paranoia of the leadership may not be wholly on founded. how do we move beyond incrementalism? we know that ultimately the grand bargain is unlikely to be realistic under the current set of circumstances. what kind of approach can refashion? it is the fifth and final issue that is a corollary how we work with our partners? we have had tremendous success over the past three years in maintaining a very robust coalition of the p5 plus one but moving well beyond that to encompass a number of european asian and even african states to try to exert new pressure and have a unanimous international approach to iran. the level of sanctions, the concerns about the military conflict are beginning to factor that coalition.

and i would argue the question dealing with iran is going to be identified in an approach that is viable maintaining the most robust coalition as possible. look forward to this discussion. thanks. petraeus too if it is okay i would like to start by saying i think we got analysis from the two regional experts that was subtle, intelligent, balanced and by as. now for prescription. so i think that these two cases are both difficult, but when we are thinking about what we ought to do going forward in the matter of policy, u.s. foreign policy, i see the brokering and he says substantially and i put this as easier than the a iranian case. that is to say i think the prescription is clear.

it used to and it still does seem to me there are the three blood carries prescription from korea and maybe with other cases as well. one come others engagement for the negotiation. number two, there is a long engagement sometimes called a strategic patients come sometimes called encirclement. so various words for a essentially doing little to nothing and hoping for the best. and then the third is some sort of armed intervention. i don't mean to have that -- the categories in this that's how the discussions have gone. we have not in a very long time it seems to me have gotten to the point of these forcing a forthcoming upcoming and we have

swung back-and-forth between the policy of engagement and a policy that is essentially a standoff with north korea. it seems to me that engagement when we can do it is a better way to go, that this problem or what happens in north korea does not improve from our perspective by leaving it alone. the north koreans build more stuff. the test stuff, they are provocative and their relations with the public of korea. just things do not get better by ignoring north korea. so i would generally think when we can, when it is politically possible, engagement is the way to go, but its details of engagement is another matter. so right now, i am pleased to have become i think that we are heading in the right direction in the sense that the north koreans for whatever their reasons, jonathan leah of a couple of them, which to engage now, and that's good.

this administration, which wishes to engage even in an election near i think that's good that the republic of korea even in an election year is willing to have us engage in the venture will become engaged. i think that's good. generally this is a good news story. it hasn't changed dramatically. it's going to take a long time if we want to get to where we want to get to, but right now we are headed in the right direction. the threat to north korea before we get to more on this prescription analytically again three pieces in man. first kaput card for the most important want to move on this point is a transfer issue i'm most concerned about is they would transfer the material nuclear weapons technology to

another group. that is my principal concern. second is of course the impact of what the of tunnell ready and might do in the future is the plans of others in the region. that is on a domino effect over time a robust nuclear weapons permit north korea with a regime that stays in place and not be tolerable for domestic reasons in tokyo or elsewhere and could change the face of north east asia and ultimately caused the rollback in the norm that's important to the united states and the rest of the world against the proliferation of the weapons so i put that second and third of course is the youth. i would be very concerned about the nuclear weapons by korea. i consider that very unlikely. i do believe that when the national of dealing with nations generally deterrence works, and i think that it will work in

korea but we know that is a psychological phenomena, not a physical phenomena, and as a psychological phenomena we can get that wrong and when you are dealing with regimes that have different kinds of calculations we have to be particularly careful with those are the concerns. for me now there are two things to watch out for with respect to north korea. one is that it understands that this would be a bad time to do anything provocative with respect sinking ships or of the islands is sort of not on the and jonathan pointed out the reasons why they would will understand this, but i would think it would be a good idea for us to undermine that in our discussions with north korea that that would clear the deal from the negotiation for a while

in and go back to another mode. second point, and this is a tad more controversial leges. i think we failed to do something we should have done in 2007, and that is we failed to tell the north koreans that they crossed in old-fashioned red wine, it is a red line that if you cross we pay a consequence for having cost. the new red line is a red line that you cross but nothing happens. so i'm talking about an old red line, and in the old red lion i would like to draw and have drawn now and this is between 2007, is told at a very high and very direct way that the transfer of the nuclear weapons technology and equipment or nuclear weapons anywhere would lead to catastrophic consequences. the construction of a plutonium

reactor in syria was an incredible move. we would talk of whether it was plausible when i was in government of the country transferring the fissile material from one country to another. material that would fit in this glass that could destroy the city. number three was nearing the completion of the reactor. in syria the consequences as best i know for that behavior was they executed their vision of the nonproliferation policy. [laughter] but nothing i know of, and i wasn't in government was said or done to number three of for that, and i think there was a mistake and i think the message

needs to go there was a concern of ours and the rest of the international community and it is not effective so i would put them out there and the final point and then i will go to iran having noted that the administration is prepared to engage in these talks even in an election season, the election season is also called a silly season in the united states, and there's a reason for that. some of you may have noticed. i hope that we can avoid, so we don't expect necessarily to avoid references to the appeasement or naivety or other efforts to undercut the serious national-security initiative. in the interest of making this into a domestic issue in which the back bone or the courage or

thinking or whatever it is wants to be the absence of attributed to one debate or another turns out to be part of the political exchange. and wouldn't be good for the national security i don't think. i don't think it's the high road and i hope we can avoid that. so, iran. the harbor as i seem to the cassette i will make a few points i assume people will accept. the first is there is a nuclear weapons program in iran, there should be no ambiguity. it's a classic nuclear weapons program. there are centrifuges for the purpose of producing enriched uranium and with the capacity to produce highly enriched uranium and move in now to 20 degrees, 20% in 235, so there's an enrichment program. there's a plutonium program with construction of a heavy water

reactor and already a heavy water production facility in iran. fissile material is being pursued. in addition to the next work to construct the triggering package for the material in actual nuclear weapons package. so, this is a nuclear weapons provision in iran and a robust 1i would say at that. a second plant is idled know, and i don't even know whether the irony in leadership knows when they would decide to text in nuclear weapon or build or produce to receive a separate the plutonium or highly enriched uranium. i would suggest to you on .2 though that we may not know that happens and therefore you can't wait for positive confirmation if you wish to do something

before it happens. and the second point is the trigger here in my mind is the production of fissile material. it's not the testing of a nuclear weapon that constructs you, it is the production of fissile material because it's threat al fi laden velt transfer was first, domino was second and i have the same. my principal concern is transferred, but iran which i suppose if you ask the department stayed in the intelligence and the united states which country on the planet is responsible for the transfer of more conventional weapons to the group's we regard as terrorists, the answer would be iran. so is that country with fissile material and you should begin to worry about the transfer of that fiscal material or technology or actual weapons but the start with the material, so i don't

know when it will reproduced. we don't know when it is produced but its production of the economic material but to me is the key issue much more so than what will happen further downstream. the third point here is as we look at what we might do in the situation we go right to the prescription i've been very impressed with the creativity, energy intelligence of the sanctions regime and the political will what has eventually got him implemented in attempting to do something about the program which i regard inconsistent with the undertakings and subject to all kinds of notions. but i have no confidence that

any degree of sanctions will actually stopped the nuclear weapons programs. i think the sanctions are the right policy and i certainly wish they were tougher earlier boeing of no-confidence given the character of the weapons program they will succeed stopping the pergamon iraq. a second come on in tend to think the only way we can be confident of stopping the program short of the change and internally producing the change in the region in iran, not externally imposed but the internal regime change which the new regime decided to go another direction i think of the use of force and repeated use of force as the only way in which we could be confident.

that said i don't know the details of the military calculation. i don't know about the capacity of either of the two air forces to act against the facilities how often, with what degrading impact on the program. i just simply don't know. i don't know whether there are other options to really consumer goods like the special operations forces because everybody knows about the capability in both these countries in the united states and israel obviously. but i just have no way of stepping up the capacity to be successful at that, but i don't think i have much confidence as i said in stopping the program short of the successful use of force. that means all the long term it might be living in managing the situation and that seems to be

very challenging prospect indeed. so i think i will stop there. >> at the suggestion i'm going to offer a few thoughts on the context here. one is the very specific repair of specific problems we are talking out here in the context of the global political order, and the other is to pick up a little bit on what bald has already put onto the table of the context of american politics and policy brough. with regard to the global order come i think we can all recognize and stipulate and welcome not going into much detail on progress that has been made in recent years and in recent decades there's a lot and it's manifested the fact among other things none of the major

power in a plan that are at war met with each other or any likelihood of being at war met with each other and number of institutions expanded and made modifications in some ways. but with regard to the extent of threats to turn this into a really lousy century for us and the remainder of our lives and our children and grandchildren, it's not going very well and i'm referring to the climate change which is another panel and a mother -- and the non-proliferation which to base panel. maybe we can continue over lunch for some of us. there's been a number of references most recently by a blog of course to the non-proliferation treaty. the non-proliferation treaty cannot be said to have failed. in fact accomplished quite a bit

to king upon its origins in the 50's with the white eisenhower's proposal for the peace program. there are a lot of countries in the world today that could be or could have been nuclear weapon powers, and indeed seriously contemplated at. but that takes us back to the out fliers that we now have, india, pakistan, north korea, and presumptively israel. and with iran walking on the door, we have the very real possibility that the npt will fail, and there is a much greater possibility of that than any of the states that i just mentioned coming into the npt as

non-nuclear weapons. and i would baliles the challenge down to the need for a much more concerted, imaginative and urgent effort to come up with what i will call generically or with lower letters a more capacious global non-proliferation regime that would do no harm that in fact would include incentives for countries to remain in the npt and come back and but at the same time dealing with the state's that we are talking about. >> just one more point in that regard. sufficient to the panel a number of rogue states we are talking about i do want to say a word about pakistan which i think is something of a special category. i think steve is absolutely

right not to have included pakistan as a rogue state for purposes of this discussion today. however, it is different and in some ways more dangerous than leaving your kuran aside. india, north korea and israel. those are three very different kinds of states, one is emphatically not. but the one that is emphatically not about the democracy which is not to react is a cohesive state at fault in could say. whether it is sustainable over the long term is another matter but i don't think there's very much control about who controls the nuclear weapons program in north korea and the same is certainly true in india and israel. that is not true however in

pakistan. pakistan is shot through with fisher's, tensions come ambiguities fluff which are very obvious to us from the had land. a good deal of the pakistani territory is not under the government's of islami on or the military headquarters. pakistan is upset with what it thinks its elite still thinks as an existential threat to itself and its india which has not been an existential threat to pakistan. in fact i would say pakistan is a big existential threat to itself. going back in some ways to its very origin. the idea of a secular state india had tensions built in that broke in favor of this as we

know and then there is the role of the military, and the question which is either an open question were question that can be answered alarmingly over the extent to which the military in a scenario that one could imagine in a cohesive way from the top down totally control the nuclear weapons and there is an answered question were placed presumptively answered a question about how much civilian control there is of the nuclear weapons program and what the danger is which i always say is that nuclear technology and materials could get into the hands of the true robe's and that could include rogue states, but it can also include the road non-state actors. so i can somehow in this conversation and others, that special case needs to be taken into account. what i would say with regard to

the american role in all of this is that the stokely we have a lot to be proud of. currently we've had a lot to be concerned about. looking to the future we have a lot to try to avoid. the united states has been far and away -- i keep waiting for bob to advertise -- go ahead, hold it up. i didn't bring it, he did. the title is the world america made, and it's sort of a footnote to that title is that an important part of the world that american aid is the world with an effective global nonproliferation regime. we are losing as a nation our ability to maintain not progress that has already been made and make more progress that is

necessary, and the cardinal examples of that are i would say first and foremost the bizarre and the shameful in a devotee and failure of the united states government to get its act together which is so that it could ratify the comprehensive test entry. we are of to the unlucky number of 13 that's been 13 years since the senate brought great discredit on itself and by the way, it wasn't handled by the executive branch of the time coming and i say that as somebody the was in the executive branch of the time, you bear no responsibility for this. [laughter] but that is really serious. and president obama to his credit if he came in very much hoping to get ratification of the comprehensive test ban treaty which would have strengthened american leadership on the whole range of issues

including the ones you're talking about here, but he simply couldn't. he got the new s.t.a.r.t. treaty proposed and ratified. had he been able to develop the momentum for that we would be in a much better position today on everything that we are talking about here which we do what we do have them later this year. it's really hard to imagine an outcome in the november election that will strengthen the possibility for getting the ct be ratified in 2013. even if president obama is elected to a second term. in fact i suppose on the sorted nixon goes to china principle you could say that the president-elect mitt romney would be in a better position to surprise some people, many of them unpleasantly, by committing himself to the ratification in any event, that is de mullen

coley note the i feel should be struck at the end of this conversation. >> with the first think the panel for all of the enthusiasm they shared with us today and let me know open the questions if you could identify yourself and put a short question. >> we have the microphone coming up. >> i haven't been drinking this morning but i was sobered up by suzanne -- [laughter] and now the situation of iran which are completely shared but it really raises the question which is is their nothing that

can be done on the negotiation front to head off what looks like an inevitable military confrontation? and since then the judge judgment was the only effective way to dealing with iran speak of nuclear weapons programs is to use force in repeatedly so, if we get to that stage, is it better from the u.s. perspective for the israelis to do it or is it better for the united states to do it? >> i tend to be pessimistic with respect to the negotiating process but i think it is our only long-term viable mechanism for dealing with the program which is to say that i do think that we can establish from the international community that we cannot arrive at a solution that is tolerable to both sides although not preferable to

either side they are sufficient as the pyrenean have been able to do that under pressure and there is sufficient evidence in the past of an administration left predisposed toward engagement was willing to contemplate negotiating process with iran. that said the difficulty of the moment is the timeframe and the sense of urgency that's been effective at the discretion. if we are truly in a cluster nine trying to beat the clock with respect to this zone of immunity, i am deeply skeptical that we will be able to bring them to the table in a sufficiently persuasive fashion over the course of the next six months to extract the level of confessions we would need for them to offer anything in terms of reciprocity from this side, and it is this program that we have to navigate moving forward in the negotiations are voluble, they would require painstaking effort on our side. i think they almost at this

stage assistant to the involvement of referred party that can play the same sort of role during the 1980, 1981 a rival of the accords into the hostage crisis and they would require the considerable degree of dialogue with all of our allies in the region and i would expect the extension of the guarantee to the israelis in particular. that in the long term prescription that is simply not viable to the course of the next six months. i worried when i was making my comments that they would be characterized. [laughter] by the way that you characterize them and i didn't mean then that way. so let me try to pull this back. just about 20 years ago i was in the government working for strobe, and i haven't -- [laughter] if i had that irresponsibly now come in other words the

possibility and would be working hard on sanctions on one hand and these creative ideas and i had them in smart and able people to create some sort of option that would meet the needs for fuel. i've been attracted to the idea of just getting a 20 years of fuel assemblies, 20 years worth of fuel assemblies and delivering them to busheir, putting them underground one of those things. so it's all there, it can't be interrupted. how much would that cost compared to the kind of stuff we are talking about crux there it is. make it 30 years and guarantee that you'll field of research reactor that they say they need to produce the uranium for or give up the enrichment schemes with the plant some models of a multinational. the proposition i was saying use as an outsider not responsible

for policy i look at it and i say it's not going to work to read as a weapons program they want to have at least in a clear alliance option and i think more than that. but if i was in government, i would be doing what they are doing now. i think it is the right thing to do. just as an outsider looking at and calculating i can't say that i would have a think the phrase i was looking for was much confidence that's going to work. on the other side, on a -- it's not that i think for sure the best way to go there for is a military strike of some kind conducted repeatedly. i'm very concerned about the consequences. the people involved who died in the course of that act, the reprisals from the iranians, every place they have access, and the third of course we would do for what i hope is a eventually a change in politics

within iran that it may be constructive, but i doubt it. i think the enemy would have been identified and will be less. so really high price to pay for this. but i tried to underline the fact that i actually don't know the degree to the military effectiveness we could have with the strike. it's just that i don't think that there is another course that is open to us and an outsider looking in that i would be confident of really slowing the program down. so it is that kind of a calculation. what did you ask me? [laughter] >> the hypothetical if that was the only alternative to prevent iran from acquiring the nuclear weapons would it be better for the united states --

>> i read a lot, and i have read that we are more capable than israel. [laughter] of putting aircraft over target's if it's an aircraft option to the aircraft over target, sustaining that for various reasons over time, restriking etc., and maybe even with respect to the conditions themselves but i read a lot. i don't know whether it's true. in fact i'm not the right person to answer that question. >> global in sight. i'm going to ask a very unfashionable question picking up on some of the remarks, and i interpreted your opening remarks to be moving very close to a military option and crossing that line basically. i'm old enough to remember what concerns about india and

pakistan and even china. we learn to live with these three countries as nuclear powers. especially through the system of deterrence. every unfashionable word these days, but i would like to pick up on that and that is why is it that we seem to close the option of having iran become a nuclear power, but not supporting the notion that the terrorists might still work in terms of a doing anything. sure, it might consider the saudis and others fundamentally israel, but israel has 80 to 100 nuclear weapons, and ultimately my adjustment, even though it isn't formally written, india has a u.s. guarantee for its existence. this needs to be discussed in much of the discussions in washington these days when they

are moving forward against the military options, but part of that package very often is that we don't include the notion that we can teach your a nuclear iran from doing anything which is fundamentally disastrous for israel with a system. thank you. >> so, [laughter] >> i think we get a lot of that. i get a lot of that. i think i said they tend to work with the states or something like that if we will back the tape. i believe it works with the states that we regard this somewhat fragile than we are. in other words the of interest in leadership. so from my perspective you are quite correct. if we were to look ahead and say there is no strike and they do develop nuclear weapons and say

yes we do have a nuclear weapons program your fine with that. okay. and there it is and they will build the nuclear weapon. what will happen? will world fell apart? in my limited the thing i think about is a persian capability then there are arabs who will not be pleased with and politically putting it in those terms. i believe that some other arab countries have fought about this before, will think about it, acquiring nuclear weapons themselves and the middle east will become a more dangerous place than it is now. we could unfold that out a little bit but i think we know what you're talking about here. so that is the domino issue. i would say also that while we do not believe that iran would launch an attack on its missiles, should it have missiles that can reach the united states, etc., not

terribly worried about that. i do think that israel is in a different circumstance. i do believe there's a certain history, there's a certain character of the discussion which is very troubling to me. i know it is israel. so while i'm on the edge of discounting the use of nuclear weapons, ayaan slightly more guarded in the irony in case and dan of the israel case and the reason why israel would regard this and they use that as a very as word to capture the character of this threat i can understand that, but i am edging up to a point which was my first point. i'm concerned about transfer a billion prepared to embrace but if you don't know who back to you it's hard to