>> satellite era of media broke the national barrier, and broke the regimes hold on what people listen to and what people watch. suddenly with every satellite dish on every rooftop, on every refugee camp, and every village

in the arab world, made it possible for people to start materializing that collective political grammar, that collective package. suddenly the so-called perverse globalization, meaning regionalization, meaning peoples region no longer necessary listen to michael jackson at the time, no longer have to watch american television or american series, but started watching arab series or turkish series. but they start watching their own. something happened since the mid '90s, where people start shedding the public fear. the public fear of the world became the satellite networks, where everyone came together as listeners or as participants. and as television improved, some

200, 300, now six, seven of them made it possible for the arabs to start having deepening more and more their collective consciousness, not only in terms of the history but in terms of their presence. which takes me to the third. the promise. i start the book by sharing with the readers a note i wrote to the board of al-jazeera. what we call the planning for network. in november i wrote my note about the upcoming season, and it was titled hot winter. it wasn't the hot winter, not what the arab spring came about.

from the perspective of 2010, and i share my notes, my memoranda if you will with the al-jazeera editorial board, basically looking at the region, everything looked so dark in november. lebanon was breaking up. saddam was breaking a. iraq was breaking up again. iran, the u.s., the tensions, the gulf was almost on the verge of something new. the whole promise of mutual respect and mutual interest was really going down the drain. palestine was again, israel, that was flaring up. everybody looked in the arab region, things were getting worse. thinks never looked as star trek i actually was so, after finishing the know, i was so distressed i went to china. i actually traveled to china.

and japan. so it actually in december i was in china and japan. the new year i was in china and japan. china throughout january and february, and i followed afterwards, there wasn't a word about the arab spring. there wasn't a word about what was going on in tunisia. but anyway, and again as the saying goes, the brightest, i mean, light comes after the darkest moment of the night. just when everything looks so dark, a new horizon opened up. the new horizon opened up by a generation that everyone, and here i mean everyone almost, was considering a burden, a demographic burden. everyone thought that. even the enlightened ones were

answering the racist remarks, were saying unit, which are doing is your building a wall of extremist or even those trying to defend ever use were saying you're making them into a reservoir of extremists. a whole sociology was built within an ideological framework that those young arabs are demographic threat, they are a political threat, they are a strategic threat to their own people into the west. and most of the sociological studies done were with him that within that ideological posture. i mean, i'm sure in some universities there was some good work being done. there's absolutely no doubt about that, but i'm thinking the over all, the general view was that the youth was a burden.

they serve a surprise us. they certainly surprise themselves. it turned out not all were extreme is a. if anymore, therefore more enlightened than their elders prevent far more interesting things to say about the present, about their future, and they had far more will and the capacity to affect change in anything that we had seen before. but again, that promise was somehow distilled into, please take no, take what i'm saying in a very innocent way, if that's possible, that somehow it was distilled here in the city, which is amazing. i asked several hundred people i met in egypt. i made a point of this, i made a

point asking several hundred people if they knew what anyone does among the youth movement in egypt. no one knew. the only thing we knew, there was a google executive. i don't know why. president obama make sure to mention it in his speech. and secretary clinton nature to mention it in her several speeches. all of a sudden, this wonderful young man, 28 year-old wonderful, i'm not being patronizing, a wonderful activist became genetically the google executive. everything that we've seen from new times and "washington post" and cnn of the world was this wonderful western eyes, youth, produce a google executive, and couldn't see why this was powerless to, this was diverse,

this is part of a bigger picture of a people with a history of an older generation that made it to prison, that was tortured and was part of the people's revolution. not in the construct of the youth being projected from london, paris and washington. so anyway. that, a promise, has brought everyone's hopes up. made it almost impossible, and i was one of those really for several months come i wasn't myself. really optimistic. about everything that was going on. because when you saw the youth in what they're doing in yemen, i mean, a country with 6 million pieces of weapons, arms, personal arms, could go on for

several months in a people, and the revolution -- in an upheaval, in a revolution, peaceful. when you saw the people of egypt, the same thing, peaceful, in tunisia, even in libya until the major threats were made. in morocco. at a whole revolution have been done peacefully. by a generation that was insisting on liberating themselves, broke this barrier of fear with regime. would no longer be deterred. anyway, that opened up into a picture that was far more complex. a reality that was not as creamy, was not as hostages, not as rosy as the youth, the miracle generation of the regi

region. as much as what i've described so far, the common to the region as every arab country at something specific to it, and the peril begins of course in libya. no, where he very stubborn regime was almost going to make major crimes against the people, opening the door to international convention of sorts, and leading to armed conflict and, of course, complicating the picture, and begin that process so that something similar happening almost in yemen were 2000 were killed, but certainly syria where many of you have been watching, the country could break down. so any chapter which i call fasten your seatbelt, it of course would look at the citizens of each country, and the capacity of the regimes to

inflict pain on their people, the so-called me or the flood really being practiced by a number of the regimes. and then to further the picture, even in countries where that more or less relatively peaceful transition, where the transition to democracy, the transition to a different system, of course opens up a pandora's box of bad era. a pandora's box where but those who were in prison, those who resisted, those who opened up to the more impoverished society, seeing them, and even those among them who did not participate in the arab revolution, making major inroads in egypt, and to lesser degree we are by seymour but in yemen. we've seen more of that in

morocco. it's also complicated the picture. and making the transition to so-called constitutional liberal between big brackets, democracy and freedom becoming of course more complicated. all of which takes me to the bit about the revolution, why someone asked me in cairo on tv, a program a couple days ago, bike you call it the revolution in the center and not the plural, and why revolution in first place? going to leave that to the discussion because i just couple words about that. we have a major discussion colleges here, blue-collar revolution, to recall it upheaval, awakening, arab spring? wherever i go somehow, you know what i mean. they are our colleagues, academics. i'm not concerned what's going on but they just want to define it because for important to get the definitions right.

why are you saying spring. what you mean for wakening? there was an awakening before but this is an evolving for a while. it's not an awakening. if you lose contact, you lose track of what's going on because you're so busy with definition instead of looking at what's going on, studying what's going on, and then projecting your own definitions on it. but anyway, i chose the very beginning web discussions on al-jazeera i was one of those. as many of you know, someday you might teach me something about this, in arab history, mostly arab history, revolutions are not exactly conversations. revolting against a road is not exactly commendable. so the whole idea of revolution

wasn't exactly of a positive thing in islamic history until the a ring of revolution which was sort of, of course, has its own shiite revolution in iran, yeah, took on a more positive connotation of change against a ruler that was considered anything but islamic. they were never excited about the revolution, and those who turned out to be majority, egyptian parliament, not exactly majority but major part of the tunisian parliament, these islamists mean islamic parting being political islam. we'll get to that. they were not excited about revolution. they were always about reform. i sat down just the last two weeks with the head of the

tunisian party, the strongman and i asked them specifically about that. and even though the revolution to have happened and they benefited tremendously, but they still consider themselves -- not a revolution in spirit i'm guessing to make that exception. but i've still was thinking of the revolution because for me, that's what i started to what's in common with the arab world, it hadn't been trade. there was no this marketing arab world although the saddam's in the world thought of themselves as this market. a stupid and destructive way, but nobody really united the arabs physically or through arms or to constitutional sort or through federation or consideration. no one united and free trade, economy, and specific ways that we know united nations.

the arabs, if united at all, they have to find a consciousness, and the revolution that we have seen across the arab world today, 2011, is the revolution of consciousness. how that translates in the arab world we will see, eventually will happen, we shall see. but i think unbreakable the past has happened in the revolution. it's a question of time for to reach each and every country. but the consciousness of a popular movement for major change, for major break with the past has happened in the collective arab countries. some people might have in their mind the totalitarian revolution, say, of the bolsheviks or the mouse or whatever, or the arenas. others might have friends in their mind.

and how you going to find revolution, which part, has selected the you'll be in your history. and certainly you can be doing that in the arab history. so my approach to this, and that's what i think, and, that's i think, that's what i wanted to write because i wanted to say that there aren't commonalities in the arab region, as much as there are specifics. but, of course, i say much more, and for that i turn you to oliver stones get go. have you seen wall street? he says i have three words for you. read my book. thank you. [applause] >> thank you, marwan. this was great. does a very engaging talk, answered transport me onto the set of empire.

i am about to open this up for questions but i will note that i'm one of the available -- but marwan will be unveiled outside for a book signing session. i will ask you to identify yourself as you ask the question. go ahead. >> i am from jordan national movement. there is very, facing very important. we have too much about what make the revolution or enterprising. first of all, there is al-jazeera, big critic. because whiteout year, only al-jazeera? we have to stay on the out year, because they have new needed an out of country. only al-jazeera have bigger critics. the second thing, we have to make difference between poverty

and hungry. we have to mention -- why? he has bachelor degree come he doesn't have job. the guy doesn't give them license. this is hungry, difference between hungry and poverty. when i'm hungry, i can do anything i want. but there is difference between poverty. poverty you can each day by day, or you know, we can stick in arabic language or arabic culture, they call it antiquity. when everett has accommodations, you don't make antiquity. and these accommodations in arab culture, because i am there, you know, make the things important. also we have to blame the media here. western media this way out should -- why, because when president mubarak of president of tunisia or king abdullah of

jordan come here, what is the? we have to tell the truth. this is very why seen in our other news media was flipped. this is last time we saw hillary clinton, president, like 10 years later the president about your your why? because it was too late. this is a lot of things. hungry, poverty, and the accommodations. and now even today, this morning, in jordan 10,000, 15,000 around teacher. when you go to the trashcan you eat from the factual. when they see the corrupt king, he take millions of dollars from jordan, you know, from the people. $5 million, then people doesn't care. if i'm hungry, i must care.

thank you very much. >> at the end of the table. >> hi. i am a student here at the center. i the question the role of al-jazeera in not supporting the revolution per se, but supporting some revolution. you know, i was wondering what your thoughts were on al-jazeera's coverage, on syrian crisis, and you know, lack of coverage, what's going on in bahrain. thank you.

[inaudible] >> you close by saying this is the revolution of consciousness, that has been a breakthrough the past. but right now it doesn't seem to be such a fragile situation, certainly in each. what you think is going to happen in the long-term? will these young idealists prevent? will their in fact be democracy, or in their ruling? >> okay, in the book i do, i start of course with tunisia and egypt because there something specific about how the revolution started there. and there's also something more specific about them vis-à-vis the uzbek and why was relevant in tunisia and egypt and the others. but in both countries, or in

tunisia and egypt, what we saw is what started -- that's very interesting because he we have two young people who died, killed, one for political reasons, the need for political freedoms. i don't know if he read this story, a young blogger of course, again, unemployed, uneducated, and he was arrested. not arrested, he was asked for his papers, people were actually looking for them. two security people.

in an internet café in cairo. and when he refused asking for the work, so and so forth and he knew of course are coming them, they beat him to death. the details are quite gruesome, but what's interesting about it, interesting at of killing a young man, is that the arrogance was as such is they would kill a young man in an internet café. you don't do that. because the words get out of there were too many bloggers watching their own college being beaten to death. in tunisia, a young man and his own anger and frustration being

unemployed and his fruit cart being confiscated, and there was a story about being hit or not, exposed the true pillars of the arab revolution of why they happen. political freedom and freedom from want. freedom of expression, freedom of movement, and freedom from want. those were the two pillars of the upheaval in the arab region. but they are the two pillars of what defines the commonality among the arab regimes. whether they are too totalitarian or authoritarian, and that we can get to if you want. what's important about them is that if there in the post era,

they became oppressive regimes, and the last decades they became more exposed, if you will, to a new liberal agenda, that turned into not wonderful open globalization, the corruption in their own country. so you had at the same time, the total destruction of anything called welfare state in the arab world, and more and more oppressive regimes. at me, i start to describe in the book something of a quality of the washington consensus policy with beijing consensus tie policy. meaning quite repressive and quite liberalized in a way that only allows for repression. al-jazeera, so we are all, i'm not just speaking for

al-jazeera. al-jazeera had its policies and then part of a discussion that goes on in al-jazeera. now, and here i'm going to be sharing with you some insight stories on television. we have meetings every day, every morning. and with weekly meetings and monthly, so when and so forth. and different voices are out on those meetings. my own experience for the last six years is that, of course, either from the top on our meetings on what we put on the air. but we do have disagreements constantly. and sometimes i myself had to come out on the minority side of a decision that has been taken. on whether we called this that

or whether we cover this, how much we cover. but it is a fluid and open and changing discussion among the people of al-jazeera. why would we will cover a situation different than others, sometimes it is -- were not allowed in bahrain. of course, as you know our offices will close in so many arab countries, i can't even pretend to remember them all. we were closing to wait just two months before uprising, or three months before the uprising started. and will close in morocco just six weeks i things before. but anyway, we were serving not allowed in syria and the rain and so on and so forth. of course, there was a big thing made out of whether we will win that one, on the web whether we covered bahrain or not. i don't know what the hoopla is coming from except.

especially al-jazeera english has been winning awards for its documentary in bahrain. al-jazeera was suddenly made, was known, has become known as the international festivals of television and documentaries because it's a documentary on bahrain that the bahraini government threatened to sever relations with them. so do we pay enough attention to the 59th egyptians or 80 million egyptians as we did to the 3000 iranians? probably not. probably we did much more. did we have access to bahrain like with access to egypt? no, we didn't. was there something taken on more of a sectarian by default, not by design, or by design from the outside, not the inside, from saudi arabia, iran perhaps, i'm not sure. was a iran taking a different path than what we've seen just before that in yemen? perhaps.

did we not cover a? sure. did recovered as much as i said before as others? no, we didn't. was every decision we made in the way we covered bahrain the correct one? i hope not, otherwise we would be fined. serving a. i think we've made a lot of mistakes but i'm not going to tell you which mistakes, but i think we made mistakes. it is a 24 hour beast, and it's not easy to fulfill all requirements for everybody. but anyway, long-term, by the way, short term i will be -- long-term question for egypt. you know, i came back from egypt. i spent the last 10 days in egypt. and as i was saying earlier, i sort of, i sat down for about an hour with the main islamist

brotherhood leader. i sat down also with a number of leaders. and i sat down with three, what i would like to think of as serious intellectuals and i sat down with three sort of hands-on activists. my impression is egypt is going in the right direction. my impression is, and they keep telling that egyptian, some of them who are quite pessimistic sometimes about how things are handled, so and so forth, because of the which the supreme leader council is dealing with this situation, as if there was a revolution. or sometimes how certain ultraconservative islamists lead with the situation.

the general impression i have is that there are many challenges, that egypt faces today that has to do with forces that are hardly democratic. such as the generals, to a lesser degree the old conservative, islamists. but i think they are on the defensive, and the people in general, and i would say the democrats in particular, the youth, enemy the youth, the ones who really want to break with the past in serious way forward are on the offensive. and i just want to give you an example i keep sharing, thanks to the book i had a chance to share some of my views with egyptian viewers on television networks. and what i was saying, people perhaps don't think of it that way, is either the generals and

the ultraconservative are sincere in saying we want democracy, we want civic revolution and we support civic states. even if they are, or the like. i'm comfortable with both. because in today's arab world but in today's egypt and tunisia, if you must schmooze democracy, if you must live that you really, really support democracy, if you must peddle the ideas of democracy because make you more popular, it's a good thing. if they are insincere that means they think of democracy, freedom, constitution, said the constitution and civic state is bigger than them. even though if you combine them together they do something like

70%, for example, of the voting egypt, but if they need to peddle of questions of freedom and democracy and they continue to defend themselves on the questions of democracy and freedom and pacific states, that means they feel that the collective consciousness of the people on the question of democracy and freedom is bigger than their electoral number. and i think that is a process that we see in the arab world. so if you look at the graphic, if you look at, if you look at the revolution of how things happen over the last year or so, what you see is the military council losing power. what you see is the general security, losing power. even today the demonstration, three days ago in tahrir square

were down with ahead of the scots, general 10 how we. the insults against the head of the military in egypt have gone into such communal, such unacceptable levels that the whole idea of the respectability of a certain aura over political leaders and middle east leaders is gone. people just don't care. are not afraid. to express themselves and to what these people to be just transitional and they do want to move towards a 60. no one islamist party in the military general is going to build to govern egypt from now on. it's not. and how it will happen, i don't think at all that we're going to do anything of a theological state. at all. i think egypt and the new generation of egypt has made a

break with the past and will not accept an oppressive regime, no matter how you refer to are what you call it under whose name is. >> why can't we watch al's is the english satellite dish? >> i like very, very much your television. probably you have your to this audience, are you looking forward, not backwards. but this is what i agree with you, i mean, it is -- the genie is out of the bottle now and i don't think you can put it back. my other site, which is history. this is the fourth attempt --

[inaudible] the first was mohammed. the second was after world war i,. [inaudible] this seems ending. and. [inaudible] now, why this one? i can mention a few reasons why it is different. the new generation is detachment of the old. it has to technology, in my

belief. they were saying well, you know, the tv is breaking the young generation from the old. so why this, in your view, would not assume the fate for the first three attempts? i have a question, but this matters much. >> i had a quick question if i might. [inaudible] different than her question, i don't want to know about the connection with al-jazeera. i had a wonderful expense with

al-jazeera. i love shouting in the dark, i believe, was the documentary. but i was like your thoughts, the protests are peaceful in bahrain so why was their voice, there's peace in the middle east. why would they cut out? there's lots of threats going on as to why that occurred. the west intervention, all that kind of stuff, but i would appreciate your thoughts. >> i heard robin wright the other day talk about egypt, and she was referring, saying that it was not a revolution yet here it was a coup d'état. and that seems to be quite persuasive to me at this point because the army is still, seems to me, in control of the ultimate power. you touched a bit on it but if you could expand on that.

>> why isn't aje on the satellite? why isn't? on your guest here. why isn't aje in america? i think probably cnn and fox are lobbying against it because probably takeover, maybe. we will certainly become more popular. there was an idea before that al-jazeera is too hot to touch by cable networks. maybe some of them have monetary interest in it, i'm not sure. but all that i know is, again, you know, i am not myself these days but i'm pretty optimistic. we will be on the air in america. will already in washington and now india. i think our biggest assets is not how much promos we do. it's when people watch us. and when people watch us, as they do in america, so get the

likes of hillary clinton saying, you know, the real journalism is in al-jazeera and america needs to catch a. so i think if you here, i'm not exactly flattered that the secretary of state likes out years, but i think certainly it will help. and i hope we will be on air soon in america. you know, are we familiar with -- he has a book called them for of you because it book called the optimist. saeed means happy. is optimist is pessimist optimist. so it's this, it's this tale of a kind of dramatic character of sorts, whereby, i mean, the idea

in the collective consciousness of the arab world, because of some of the stuff we touched on, good news are always pregnant with bad news. and that could development are more likely to lead to bad results. there's always this idea that, you know, even when things get better but somehow in this middle east realities in the most most optimistic of all people, the arabs know deep in their heart something wrong is going to come. because of their experience, because of the consciousness. i think maybe it's time to put the optimists to rest. ic 1805, at, and they see waiting at the end of the 19 such as being the 20th century. and i see the '50s, i actually

see them as positive developments. then again, you see, it's like i was using my slight antidote example. i don't think, you know, we think and terms of departure and arrival in terms of the revolution. but i can see that there was a constructive development. what happened in the early part of the 18th century and what happened in the wake of the late this 20 center, these are important construction blocks. and just as the postcolonial, the '50s generation of liberated the land and they did liberate the land.

this new generation has liberated the human being. in between there was a defeated generation and a lost generation. so we have the liberation generation of the 1940s and '50s, the defeated generation of the '60s and '70s, and the lost generation of the '90s, the last, and since the post-cold war ever. i see the in development of history. as i said earlier, who is that, i cannot mention but it is in the book, in the 1850s what he thought of the french revolution and he said, it remains to be seen. that was 100 years later. that's perhaps a joke, i'm not sure, but certainly he said -- [inaudible] >> yes. but i probably said he said a chuckling.

we don't know, right? [inaudible] i am optimistic by the way about what's happening but although i am worried about the content, especially the protection. we say when you protect those who will protect the future, through crystal balls will end pursue regrets. so, you know, i'm not worried about this. but mainly, the four tiers of libya, egypt, syria, as indeed -- [inaudible]

there is no greed. no colors. so this is worry about the presence of the elite. and what worries me more, i will tell you about the al-jazeera. [inaudible] >> okay, that's fine. that's fine. >> we are in agreement. but, i mean, we're in agreement in the sense i do see, and as i said, i don't end with, you know, roses and strawberry fields. i do in with fasten your seatbelts. i see that it's going to be, speaking with a flight, this is going to be a lot of perturbatent's up in the air in the arab revolution. and yes, i see how the end of the political life, and how that

this country is on scratch and putting together political parties, creating a civil society of sorts. i see that. but what i also see is that for the first time there on the right track. we must give that. and i have a lot of hope the id of the new generation. i've been speaking to so many young people. i say that in open, in tunisia and egypt, yemen, so and so forth. they really have a lot to offer, and even amazing how you call it the new media or the satellite media, whatever it is, but i think this new generation has different ideas, and it's not accepting more of the same shortcomings of the past. now, that does not mean that because, you know, their good intentions things will happen. all i'm saying is that at least the region has broken with the

past, broken the barriers of fear, and that is going to start. let me share with you, very important part of democracy. i've been working on this for years and i just want to share with you just a quick, quick note about that. because there's a bit of a patronizing discourse in general. democracy, since we know that democracy cannot be exported or transported on tanks, and since we also know that there is no such a thing as waiting until democracy happens, then when everyone is ready we conduct actions effort to get the constitution, so forth and so on. that just doesn't happen. what we know for a fact is that democracy happens on the job, meaning democracy is a process.

democrats through democracy, or do you need to great democracy to democrats? we need to do this both at the same time. we cannot wait for democracy to create democrats because it's not going to come from nowhere. and we cannot create democrats out of some sort of democratic framework. so if we can start by making sure that we do have at a minimum civic democratic constitution, we start of the tour processes. we allow political parties to take place and then, of course, i'll come in, none democrats come democrats, religious, the secular, the marxist, is, the liberals, they all come in. but we are running on the job. democracy is a process. it's a learning curve, and we just started it. and i think that is better than waiting for democrats to put democracy, when it doesn't exist. so i like this so called process

of establishing democracy and grooming democrats in irbil. there is no better time to do it than now, exploiting the energy that is coming out from the arab spring. on the question of bahrain again, what i was saying earlier was that from what i've seen, i think we covered it like we covered other situations. we are very careful about that. and i think perhaps we should be even more careful when we cover syria. how we cover, what does it mean, how much is the revolution touching the question on minorities and so on and so forth. because this cannot just be, and, we are a news network. we are not an ngo. we shouldn't be an ngo.

there are developments in bahrain and our development in libya and in syria. is not a question of being with the revolution or against the regimes. because if you are, cuba, you should become an ngo television. we are not. i don't think we are. by default we might appear to be with the revolution there is. because as soon as you show the image of a child standing on a 10, the viewer immediately from that image concludes that well, you know, can be very happy with the tank. right? by default. when you cover correctly repressive regimes, oppression, dictate, bombardment of cities, and when you lay out these images and you report that news, you are by default on the side of the people. but in cases where some succinct earlier like, for example, syria, or for example, bahrain,

major players, by design. where the united states is a major player by design. by the presence of its fleet. you cannot discover that, okay, you know, how much are we at peace with bahrain? because i don't think we ask ourselves that question. are we covering the story, how are we covering the story. and these are new story. doesn't necessary have good and bad and they happy ending. so i think al-jazeera i think we cover them, but as i said again, i don't speak for al-jazeera. so from within al-jazeera let me tell you. we make mistakes. a lot of them. and the way we cover news, but that's normal. as long as there are mistakes and not policy. okay.

i was just actually with her on tv, a radio program at one point. things happen in egypt i think. a revolution, and in the midst of the revolution that's what the situation is so complicated today. we had the revolution in a country where by, unlike syria and libya, family, regime, state and society is not one and the same. or at least family regime and state is not one and the same. so when the military in egypt fell like in tunisia, the people's power was so over

sweeping this couldn't stay with the ruling family. they switched. they turned against mubarak, but that's why in the midst of a revolution that was clearly was going to sweep the party. so i put it that did not happen out of the blue. it happen within the context of the revolution. so it's a consultative revolution. so if you remember at the beginning people were saying these are our soldiers, this is a great military, the military is defending the revolution. so the military gain sometimes some credit for a short time, and that's over. i tell you, it's over. here is another new and. egypt is a sovereign country. it's a country of revolutions. egypt is not going to let go. egypt is not going to give up

its army and military establishment. it's a seven country -- sovereign country. the question is, how can he wants or how distinct between the military establishment as "the guardian" of the sovereignty of the country and the generals that are associated and are not able to -- that's what the egyptians are dabbling. how to make sure they can guard the military establishment, because they need that for the future for their own sovereignty. so that they won't be the slaves of others. at the same time being able to move beyond the generals come put the generals back in where they belong in the military and military bases, so when it's over. the arab economy and the public

life. my sense is, the military is on the defensive in such a way that it keeps explaining why, it just needs some privileges, if the people in the future pensions guarantee, dinner, freedom from prosecution, if they can just keep maybe some parts of economy would have some a region for retired generals. now they can't even get -- the government will go away and anyone will come out. and they had to, you know, open the way to congratulations ahead of the schedule. i agree. it was within the revolution and i now think the revolution will overcome the generals.

[inaudible] >> i will thank you all for attending. [applause] >> [inaudible conversations] >> we would like to hear from you. tweet us your feedback, tweeter.com/booktv. >> go back to last 10 years and draw three lessons. one, the most important lesson is that the most important thing to happen in a safe in last 10 years was nothing. the last 10 years never saw another successful terrorist attack in the united states. and i think the most important question to ask is why, and whether it was worth it. to me, the most important decision was one that president

bush made as commander in chief and chief executive, on the very night of 9/11 which was to treat the 9/11 attacks as an act of war. i think the way we thought about in the justice department at that time was that if any country had attacked us in the same way on september 11 as al qaeda did, no one would've had any doubt that we were at war. the only difference was that al qaeda was not a nationstate. and the important legal and constitutional issue was could we be at war with a non-nationstate? and i think president bush made that decision for the country that night. and it was an important decision because once you make that call, then the united states can turn to the laws and rules of warfare to do with al qaeda and the threat of terrorism. all of those i think were on display not just in our invasion in afghanistan, the use of troops and drones to wipe out

much of al qaeda's existing leadership at the time 9/11, but also was put fully on display i think in the successful operation to kill osama bin saad and passion osama bin laden. here you saw intelligence provided by people who have been detained under the laws of war, electronic surveillance producing more intelligence, all put together to look at where osama bin laden had been hiding, and then the use of military force to go out and kill him or under the rules of the criminal justice system, which administrations of both political parties had used in their approach to terrorism before 9/11, we would have instead indicted osama bin laden and sit people down to try to arrest him, after he had committed a crime. they switched to the approach of war made our policy for looking,

to try to stop people like osama bin laden and terrorist groups from attacking the united states before they could attack. the second lesson i would draw from the last 10 years, and also helps us to look forward, is that after 9/11 we treated intelligence and information differently. we tried to broaden the scope of intelligence available, and to deepen it. so to take one example before 9/11, because of civil liberties concerns which i think were quite valid other time that they're put into place, we intentionally prohibited our intelligence agencies are in our law enforcement agencies from sharing and communicating information. if you read the 9/11 commission report carefully, some of the commissioners believed that that wall was actually instrumental in preventing us from identifying the identity of two hijackers who were known by the cia could be in the country before 9/11. things like the patriot act, enhanced interrogation of