you know, the aztecs dealt with this nice sacrificing people blood out of their hearts, the still beating hearts. in medieval times, the christian penitents did it by wearing hair shirts and flagellating themselves. today in the modern green movement, they do it by imposing taxes on flight and forcing everyone to use, flickery yellow light bulbs that give you a headache. .. out.

we were having cabin fever around the house with the wife and the two dogs and the cat. homany people here hav i'd like to ask some questions. how many people here have visited the middle east? do weere? that is a great shame arab any don't have more arabic people need more people understand the language and cultures because it is very difficult. i want to warn you that i'm at that miserable age you can't see with or without the glasses so i will pull them on and off. i'm enthusiastic about what went right and what went wrong where operation iraqi freedom. this country has spent billions and billions of dollars upon defense establishment. we could have found we had rotten eggs and sour apple that

didn't work. we got there and things worked well. i will use words like remarkable and fantastic. that is my general enthusiasm. one of the book reviewers said i'm starry eyed over a gold plate weapons system. here we are in washington d.c., we go crazy if athletes catch a pass. we are really excited. at the same time we have young men and women operating at supersonic speeds, flying in hostile enemy territory, engaging enemies, avoiding collateral damage. they are getting paid maybe $75,000. they don't get the same mass following. in perspective we have a professional team working for us.

i will be enthusiastic and their cheerleader. we're going to talk about what went right and a lot went right. some things went wrong. most of all we are going to talk about the technology and the people. the nation in 1941 reacted strongly to a japanese attack on pearl harbor. we maintained a hot-burning indignation for four years, yet suffered fewer casualties in pearl harbor than 9/11. the terrorists attacked new york and washington d.c. and would have attacked the white house if they had been able to unlike the japanese, the terrorist also issued a deck lar ration of war before and -- declaration of war before and after and sense. there is no doubt about their intenses. they have been explicit. the 9/11 attack brought vulnerability to the people.

i know it is a beautiful building, but we're at ground zero for the next real big terrorist attack. this sense of vulnerability seemed to have a time limit for some people, especially people running for office. they began to ignore it. the most important thing about the terrorist attack on 9/11 is the use of weapons. this is not speculation or not a guess. this is what they told us they will do if they possibly can. this is what we're trying to combat. now as a result of this, we've had to scrap past practices. we've got to move -- we have moved to wars of preenchings. a -- pree.m.s. -- preemp tirks on. there is a lot of criticism of this. we could have a major attack upon us. there are a limited number of

terrorists in the world. not vast in number, not like a soviet union 240 million people that are opposing us, but the terrorists' resources are huge because they are backed passively for the most part but actively by a population of 1.5 billion muslims found in every country in the world. most of those people have no intention of supporting the terrorists, but enough do that we must marshal our resources. terrorism threat is global and we have to marshal our resources to fight it. the military victory in iraqi freedom may have given us perhaps the only key of victory, the demock -- democraticization of iraq and iran. it must be done. success in iraq could lead to a domino effect. we talked about the domino

effect during the vietnam war. this could be positive for the democratic world. iran is right for democraticization. pressure could be apply elsewhere. i want to share with you the war in iraq raised us to a new level of national power. i don't think we understand -- most people don't understand the degree of power we have. the united states has more usable power than ever before. dependent upon nuclear weapons it was vastly powerful, but they were not useful because we had the potential for retaliation by the soviet union. today we have immense power we can use can surgical power question use anywhere in the world. it has never been seen before. it is not like the romans or the british over the french or

germany over poland. it is orders of magnitude difference. there is no allies or enemy that can compete. this causes difficulties. we have to make concessions and adjustments so our coalitions can ormente with us. dn can operate with us. the wealth of technology has taken us to a point that we are only 10% up to the maximum amount of power we can have. it is an incredible situation. it is remarkable these funds channeled into this thing could have produced the results they produced. there has been talk over the years of revolution and military affairs. this is the first true revolution in military affairs in the 20th century and 21st century. and it is absolute. now, there was also established by this revolution something

that without much fanfare has occurred, a revolution in diplomatic affairs. libya is a first example of this. the cur -- colonel can see what will happen. how did we get this demonstration of massive military power? the first was by obtaining complete air dm nance and information dominance. air dominance means you suppress the enemy air force and ground forces. on the first day in today's terms. it is not attrition warfare. we don't shoot down 1,000 of their air plains. we shoot all of theirs down and they don't shoot any of ours

down. information dominance, not quite the same thing. it is more difficult. we are able to do it in iraq because iraq was not well organized and we had been surveying them for 10 years with operation northern watch and southern watch. in other wars in other countries we have to have the same information dominance. but we did have it. now here are some things that made the campaign in iraq unusual. the coalition forces took care to minimize collateral damage. very few times have countries gone to war and attempts to safeguard the enemy people and infrastructure. this might have been a mistake. we might have been given ainedcation we were weak. i hope this is not the case. damage was done to an already

fragile infrastructure. the campaign was executed quickly and efficiently. there were more risks, had the iraqis been better led, some things might have happened. so complete was our confidence in the information dominance that the risks were accepted. we fought an intelligent war, in many ways effects spaced operations. for example, if you are attacking a ground defense system, instead of attacking every radar, missile site and airfield, you take out the command centers that dismantle them so they are not useful. you have fewer aircraft at risk and fewer casualties and do less damage. a very intelligent way to fight a war. fortunately for us, unfortunately for them, perhaps in the long run fortunately for them, the iraqi army was inept.

saddam deliberately would not train them because he fared a powerful army. a well-trained army could have turned against him. there are instances where questions have been asked if iraqi artillery teams may have been given two shells. iraqi infantrymen had one or two rounds of rifle practice. it was dreadful. many of their officers were corrupt. the little money that came for training was diverted into the officers' pockets. there is also much speculation that iraqi army officers were bribed not to fight. that is true. if we could fight every war that way, we should never fire a shot if we can bribe somebody. having said all that, having set the enthusiasm and the background for it, let's see what went right in iraq. some of these are buzz words. you can't avoid it in the

military. jointness, a word that means the efficient operation of the army, the nea, the air force, the marines and the coast guard. we had a good degree of jointness in the persian gulf war. we never had that degree of corporation in vietnam or world war ii or world war i. the colonels and commanders in the gulf war are admirals and generals. we had a decade of training. with will never again fight a war where we don't have this kind of jointness. the joint forces land commander was an army man and a marines underling. it worked and it worked well. we had information disseminated from a combined aero space operations snet. the big room with the electronic boards on the wall ts. -- on the wall.

qatar. information is placed on the wall. they know where the iraqi assets are and our assets are. normally this would have been found only at a command level. in this war the information was disseminated throughout the theater and at low levels. very few commanders didn't have their hands on the vast amount of information. that makes jointness not only easy, but pleasurable. they avoided another buzz word, stove pipes. a private gets information to send it up to the general. it goes up the army stove pipe, to the air force general down the air force stove pipe to the airmen. now there are lateral passages and they have eliminated the stove pipes. the information was accessable at every level of command. the third element is a special operation forces used before the conflict, bribing and

getting information. they are used during the conflict and target in combat designating targets and in the cleanup operations. about 9,000 individuals are employed in the most elite forces in the world. you cannot get as many special operation forces as you would like simply because the training is so long and the requirements are so high you don't have that many people from a base force of 1.5 billion as we have. another factor that went so well even though the media was decrying the slow pace of operations that were bogged down, another vietnam, we'll never get to baghdad, was going faster than anybody thought. they used distributed operations. they would seize an airfield or dam and do it without regard to flank protection or supply lines.

very, very difficult for an ordinary, average guy of my age. they did it because they had absolute confidence in the information. if they got in trouble they knew they could be resupplied. this was done in world war ii with a more limited degree with patton and the tactal air force. this was a rational plan. they would seize what they needed to do and have the forces follow them. another factor is -- i don't know how many of you have followed the publicity and the information about john boid, they followed the idea of getting into the observe, orient, decide and act process. we were a step ahead of them. we eliminated their communications possibilities and unmonitored communication facilities. they did well with cell phones. they stymied us with cell

phones a couple of times. they were never ready and we were always ready. in this display, the marines did a great job. they usually take the beaches, take the casualties, secure the beaches and the army takes over the rest of the job while the marines go to the next beach. the marines went parallel to the army. they are lighter divisions, but fought just as heavy battles. they went from kuwait to baghdad, an equal to camp pendleton to san francisco, in a michigan niff sent style. here are some additional things that went right. we've spent millions of dollars on this, aero space integration. we had more than 50 sattle satellites funneling information down. we had the joint stars. the joint surveillance target attack system.

we had u-2's, been around since 1954, some models. we had unmanned aerial vehicles co lating this information, getting it together, passing to the strike aircraft. we had b-2's and b-1's. the g.p.s. satellites were tweaked so they were more efficient for this particular operation. you have a system of people behind them. when you have a satellite you think, well, the satellite is in the sky, that is the end of it. that is not. it is being monitored as a ground-control facility running it. people know exactly how to make it operate and interpret it. the heavy investments we have made over the years, many that were criticized, work flawlessly and in an integrated manner. we used lots of precision-guided munitions. 68% of the bombs dropped were precision guided.

you avoided collateral damage and got more accuracy and got more targets. airpower in this war provided what has been called the kill chain. it means you find a target, you fix its position, you track it, if it is a moving target, you locate a position with a g.p.s. and pass this information to the bombers. they engage the target and destroy it. then you send a reconnaissance play. the time in the kill chain were 12 minutes between a time a target was sights and a bomb was placed on it. that is an incredible capability. cuts it down from hours and days before. the goal for this kill chain is one minute. in the future they will shoot for one minute. they will shoot for a capability, it sounds ludicrous, but it will come, they will shoot for the capability to attack an individual suicide bomb strapping on a bomb and

crossing a border. it will be that effective. that is what some of the technology has done for us and why i am somewhat starry-eyed. aerial refueling. it was brilliant. we did a magnificent job in aerial refueling. if there was one aerial refueling done per year, it would be a cbs or nbc special and they would have celebrities there and you would interview the pilot and bomber and a fantastic thing where you have 300,000-pound airplane flying 300 miles and hour, 300 knots. 40 feet behind is a 500,000 airplane flying at the same speed and transfering fuel. we don't pay any attention to it because it happens a dozen times a day or hour sometimes. we are so dependent on it it is

so complex and requires such skill, the young men and women, they have all-women tanker crews doing it and nobody thinks about it. we couldn't fight a day in the war without tanker crews. we are fighting with 42-year-old tankers. in this war i should mention the r.e.f. tankers were really good and the navy liked it because when the air force couldn't meet the navy requirements because of their own demands the r.a.f. would step in. another great element was combat search and rescue. america is an unusual country. in vietnam the combat search and rescue was such if somebody was down behind enemy lines the war would stop until we got him back. these young men and women, their motto is so that others may live. they mean it. they sacrifice their lives so

others may live. they had 55 missions and rescued 73 people. in one instance an a-10 went down, he crashed and got out of his airplane and hid. this is sort of symbolic of the american way of life. a bradley fighting vehicle came up with a sergeant running it and yelled out, hey, pilot dude, we're the good guys. come on. get onboard. that is not the official combat search and rescue, but a good rescue. there are reasons for this efficiency and i will be on a soap box. the armed forced showed tremendous foresight in developing these weapons that complemented the this system. that is what they are paid to do, but think about it for a minute. these weapons systems took for many of them 20 years or more to develop. that is five presidential terms. five presidents on your side.

10 congressional terms. it is an immense amount of time. formally you had annual budget cycles you had to come in and make this stick. at the same time you have competing weapons systems coming on. guys are pushing their systems. for people to say, 20 years ago we should have a system that can contact a fighter that will have a prediggs-guided munition it can drop on a target is rally quite remarkable. one single factor alone, software, is enough to stagger you. i don't know if you are like me, but when you get a new something, a new blush from microsoft you have to change software it is a catastrophe. you know nothing will work. all of these systems have dozens and dozens and dozens of types of software. they have to be constantly

intermeshed and made to work. it is a fantastic achievement. it is very difficult to sustain a weapons system over that period particularly now adays because of congressional oversight. any cross growth or failure the experimental sense makes people say, stop it. don't do it. it is too risky. we can't afford to do it. in 1960, the greatest intelligent coup in the history of man, the flight of the discoverer, the corona satellite. the first time we had insight and gathered more information in the one flight than we ever had before about the soviet union. it directly affected the cold war. it may have prevented world war iii because we had enough information to know they were not nearly as dangerous as we thought they were. before that 14th flight, there were 13 failures. any system out there haas 13

failures is not going to go into operation. it is a shame we have this kind of mentality, you must succeed. you must not have failures. you must be free to succeed at some levels. another element i'm high on is the competence of all levels of the military is amaze. you would be amazed at their intelligence, dedication, their almost unwaivering devotion to duty. it is just remarkable. now the problem is the popular opinion that we get from the media is, you know, you've got marlon brando in "apocalypse now." you get all these stupid representations of the military. they make jokes, military intelligence is an oxymoron. it is the most competitive branches you can get in. if you get into the military, you have to work hard or you

are out. up or out. very few professions, even the medical profession is evaluated as often as military people. military pilots get three or four check flights a year, a surprise check flight. you constantly have to show you know the war plan. you have to know the systems backwards and forward. it is intensely demanding, but the image is it is not. if you could get a corporate recruiter to go in he would hire every guy from generals on down because they are product if. the new high-tech systems worked well with the legacy system. legacy is a buzz word. i'm sort of a legacy system myself. it means old. they did work well. the millstar, for example, it is used for command and control. it is not jamable, really. it is parked out there at

23,000 miles in altitude. it was used in this war to help rescue the private first class jessica lynch. used to send information to the tomahawk. it could communicate with the navy. it was condemned as unworkable, unnecessary, too expensive and due to failure. there were other satellites, one of them you may be familiar with, the g.p.s. system, global positioning system. it is 24 satellites parked about 12,600 miles above the earth. an accuracy of a millionth of a second. you get an exact position to 12 feet. they were tweaking to get it down to six feet. if you can imagine. again, i'm saying incredible and remarkable a lot, but it is. we could have spent this money and had it work. how many of us bought nice cars

or new things and found out it is not worth the money. we spent the money and it is worth it. another one that is unusual, this wasn't a service-inspired object. it was forced on the services. the global hawk. unmanned aerial vehicle, 116-foot wingspan, 450 miles an hour. 16-mile plus range. loiters at altitudes of 62,000 feet. it's got all kinds of sensing systems, cameras, infrared. sends back information. they used one in iraq. they have more than one, but only used one in iraq. it provided intelligence and led to the destruction of 13 sam sites and 300 tanks. one piece of admittedly expensive equipment, but expensive equipment that works. many civil applications for

this. probably border patrol. this is an old warrior, boeing e-3 a, command and control ve sell. it takes airplanes and directs them. sort of like the british had radar to direct their fighter to a certain area. this does that on a grand scale. in 1960 it came into being. by the press it was called a mushroom with elephantitis. a billion-dollar blunder. i will say that for all of these. patsy schroeder led the fight against it. you can make 15 fighters do the work of 150 fighters. 31 are in existence. after 9/11 we called upon our european allies to send us five to protect our cities because they were that effective and we didn't have them. they were already applied elsewhere.

another one that has taken a lot of heat. northrup-gummondjstars. they are airlines that have been renovated and have equipment stuffed in them. they can detect the difference between a track vehicle and a wheel vehicle. if a tank starts to move it comes on their screen and they can follow it as if it is broad daylight. there is no way to evade the joint stars. the command chief wanted 40. he got eight. we may fwoiled 17 and 33. they are invaluable. there is no question they are expensive, but there is no substitute. even after an enemy tank stops and shuts down, its heat signature is picked up by this vehicle for hours. here is one i have a fondness

for because i got to fly it a couple of times and four hours and a refueling and a couple of landings. officially the lancer. because it is b-1, the pilots call it the bone. it was canceled by jimmy carter in favor of the air launch cruise missile because he knew self-bombers were coming along. every time one crashed, airplanes crashed a combat airplane flying supersonic speeds at low altitudes, they crash. a lot of cries for cancellation. but in iraq, it did a magnificent job. it dropped a large percentage of the bombs and became a close air support weapon. it is difficult to imagine it could be used for close air support. it had done so much surveillance of vietnam -- iraq we knew where the targets were.

they were loaded into the airplane. when it becomes time that the target moves or time to attack it it is already in the airplane and it can be keyed in and the a bomb can be dropped. this was used to try and get saddam in the restaurant in baghdad. we missed him by 30 minutes. it was good fortune because then he got to hide out in a hole. here is another b-2 bomber. northropgrumman. it is $2 billion a piece because they originally planned to buy 120 of them then 20 then used a static version to make it a fleet force of 21. this can fly 35 hours round trip, to iraq, carry 16 precision-guided munitions, hit 16 targets, not just drop them, and go back. they said it couldn't fly in

weather, couldn't fly in the rain. they said it couldn't be maintained in the field. all those things proved wrong. we should have bought more of these things and maybe we will someday. if a threat emerges today, you could put 10 b-2's in the air and in about five years say this happens we'll have the small diameter bombs and they will carry 60 bombs. 10 b-2's can put 600 bombs on a target unseen within hours. just a capacity that is mind boggling. the british used to send a gunboat down to a port and they would lob 2-pound shells in. we go in how and take out key installations, rocket centers, atomic facilities, whatever, with this kind of weaponry. worth every penny we ever paid for it. here is two old guys and a new guy. i'm not refering to the bald

gentleman who is flying the b-52, the 135 into the receptacle of the b-52. the pods are old guys, conventional munitions. the gray jackets are the guidance mechanisms set up to convert them to joint directed attack munitions. the precision-guided munitions are remarkable. they get inertial guidance from the airplane. at the end of their trajectory they get g.p.s. control and become very, very effective. they are going to be purchased in greater and greater supply. another example of a legacy system. the b-52. they said it was way too expensive, $6 million a copy. you are throwing money away. he should take his fleet of b-47's, put new engines on them and they will do the job. if he had done that we would

have a flight that wouldn't fly. he said, no, he wanted an airplane to carry anything you can stuff in it in the future. that is what happened. we have b-52's that can drop nuclear weapons, harpoon anti-shipping missions. they are equipped with the lightning pod. it is made in israel, french-israel combination. a forward looking infrared sensor. brand new system bolted on to this airplane worked like a charm. you have to admire people who can do this. another system intensely criticized is the boeing hornet. used to be the mcdonald-douglas hornet. it is a boeing f-18 now. both the hornet and super hornet have been vastly criticized. in this war it did so well the tanks were fitted to the super hornet to become a tanker and

escort other super hornets in, offload fuel and serve as an attack plane. boeing got a contract for $8 billion for 210 more. there are less demram rouse systems that do well. howitzer. many world war ii veterans would know how this operated. they have wrinkles and radars now. if they detect a projectile in the air the radar relays the information and this gun can lay fire on that site. if the iraqis chose to use artillery, they had to fire and move. as soon as they fired there would be incoming fire from the howitzers. another system that was made fun of, it was too big, it can only go 3/4 of a mile on a gallon of gas, it worked like a

charm. wherever the abrams went, the fight was over. like lennox or someone walk in the room and the fight is over because no one can stand in the room. the other is the bradley fighting system. this thing has been attacked from the day it was porn. it was made the subject of -- the day it was born. it was the subject of the movie "pentagon wars." kelsey frazier plays the part of someone sending a piece of weaponry. both the abe -- abrams and bradley are going to be around, notwithstanding they are going to lighter units. a striker unit is coming along that is lighter. the troops want the abrams and bradley. another place that has really shown where i would have said

five years ago that the navy wouldn't have a chance in a war like this because of anti-shipping missiles. five carriers came down and put tremendous pressure on the iraqis. it was a very, very positive effort. they were launched in 1975, a 6 ,000-man crew. you will see them in the -- a 6,000 man crew. the u.s.s. baatan, carries a bunch of helicopters, depending on the mission. it carries landing craft. the landing craft lead the marines capture an airfield. a wonderful system that is put together. the apache took a lot of criticism in afghanistan and iraq, but when the battlefield is prepared when you used artillery and fixed-win aircraft correctly it is a good system. the chief of staff at the time

-- no -- i'm sorry. i got ahead of myself. the boeing c-17 a. it was held -- it was an object of derision in the product, now boeing. it was held as a product of derision. less aspin called the chief be staffs and demanded he fire five generals because of the system of the truth is we'd be a lot better off today if we'd purchased 360 of them ib instead of the 90 we have. >> combat tailwind is a good example of the old and new. it's got in-flight refueling, it can take or give fuel to another airplane. it can land on an unprepared strip in the middle of nowhere and it's a bargain at the price they paid for it. boeing f-15, same thing. it's been the best fighter in

the world for years and it's still competitive because now at the end of 30 years you can buy the f-15 pretty cheaply and its performance is still pretty good. when you get down to it, there's excellence at every level, from the enlisted ranks to the four-stars. we have a lot of difficulty with single parent families. something like 26% of the families are single mirnte -- parent in the service now. it's extraordinary. we're a nation of 295 million people depending on 1.5 million people to fight our wars, clear our borders, maintain safety at home and we're telling them, ok, we want you to do this for the next 50 years. it's not right. secretary rumsfeld is calling for smaller forces. he's wrong. we've got to stop the misuse of the reserves and national guard. they are intended to be surge

forces, much, not regular forces. if it costs us, we've got to pay for it. here's a personnel recovery system that one of the greatest people in the world, we talked about him earlier, it distinguishes the united states from all other nations in the other. -- amount of effort we put in this. on the left, an f-16 pilot and an excellent attorney in columbia, south carolina. we have about 500 air crew members in the air force and smaller in the navy and i will tell you they are there not because they're women but because they're good. here's another typical story you could have seen in france in 1918 and kosovo more recently. american soldiers giving candy to the boys. the troops have set up a dog

pound so they can care for the iraqi dogs. it's an incredible compassion. well, what went wrong? we talked about what went right and i've run long. fratricide was the worst thing that went wrong. percentages seem high and the reason is because the total casualties are so low. the percentage is 23 -- 2% in world war i and ii and 15% in vietnam and 25% here. two major incidents with the patriot missile, one shooting down a british tornado attack fighter and one shooting down an f-18. two different stories on it. there's a strong body of opinion that believes the british fighter was returning without iss -- its full identification on and the patriot shot it down because it

thought it was an incoming missile. you'll probably never see that anywhere because it's a sensitive issue with the r.a.f. and understandly so. the other one, general jumper feels it's possible we have reduced the measures about fratricide to the point we can't reduce them anymore. in the patriot missile battle, for example, if you extend the period for is it friendly or not, you are opening the window for an enemy missile to come in. again, apache helicopter was vulnerable. another area where our helicopters are getting old. we've got a general shortage of tankers, as a mentioned to you. they are largely 42 years old, getting close to their critical lifespan and we had inadequate con stabularry forces as we now

know for the post war period. here's a ch 64 getting a rotor check. if you look at that airplane and the rust, if that was in a carmax lot, i think you'd walk over and see what the subarus look like. to a fixed wing pilot, a chopper say dangerous thing anyway, so many complications, so many parts. helicopter pilots love them but helicopter pilots should have new ones. they shouldn't be forced to fly 40-year-old material. here's a perfect x 30-year-old transport, doing something so dangerous i don't know how it could be done. how do you refuel a helicopter in flight -- flight? think of the hazards. just one touch of the rotors and ats an accident. you shouldn't have to do it

with ancient equipment. lessons learned. we need to shorten the kill psych. we need more and better a.c.m. aircraft. made a big mistake, got rid of the 111 ravens and are now dependent on the navy for their prowlers. one thing we've got to think about, we've got to improve and replace our satellite systems. tremendous -- tremendously expensive. and it's absolutely necessary. they're talking about starting a new bomber. here we are the rutch -- richest country in the world and we'll be flying he's planes that by that time, 2037, would be 80 years old. it's an absurdity. here's a great opportunity. the united states and coalition

nations have demonstrated their military prowements we now -- prowess. we now have to demonstrate moral prowess by regenerating iraq. if you take the gross domestic product of 18 muslim nations of the world it's less than that of spain. every day when dawn comes the muslim world loses 50% of the its capability because it doesn't adequately utilize the capabilities of the women it has. it's just tragic. there could be a domino effect. if we can stay the course, if we can establish even a fragile democracy in iraq, it's possible iran may even simultaneously become a democratic state and this will crack the middle east wide open. there will be pressure on other states to democratize, and i

certainly hope saudi arabia would be one of those. it could be the biggest diplomatic coup in history. if not prosperity, we could offer at least hope and give the young men and women a chance to live in a world that isn't just absolutely bleak. those who led operation iraqi freedom must lead and convert its great military victory into -- into a great moral victory. thanks very much. >> all right. we do have some time for questions from the audience. can we get all the lights on in here? yes, sir? >> you mentioned there was a plan to avoid collateral damage. was this to comply with christian just war theory? i did hear charles colson at to

dotest to this on his radio show. was there some opposition if. military shall pg something >> i think there's always opposition from. military guys when you talk about being relaxed. but i don't think it was a religious connotation. there was a deliberate effort to not damage iraq's economy and get them on the road to democracy. it might have been optimistic but it was certainly a deliberate attempt to avoid hurting any iraqi people not in the war and opposing us. i don't think there was a religious connotation to it. i've never seen evidence of that in my knowledge. >> you have a -- about the great opportunity up there, could you pursue thatly -- a little bit? are there resources interested in doing this in certainly there are resources. if you would take the riches of

the arab world and divert it from a few key families and set up a matching fund, the united states, great britain, russia, will put ub -- up $100 billion and the arab world will put up $100 baseline -- billion and put it into jobs? if india can come back from abysmal poverty 25 years ago to be the rich, bustling nation it would be today. certainly there are no smarter people in the world than the arab nations. those people are brilliant. there's no reason, if we could give them hope -- if you're 16 years old and your -- your idea of a big day is just to go to prayers five times a day and get lectured by a guy with a beard, that's just no way to live.

but we need radio free europe and a marshall plan for them. >> to what extent do you think we are in this country interested in that in i would say extraordinarily interested. i would say president bush on -- or if he has a successor in the democratic party, they if he -- they elect to do that they would go down in history as truman and marshall did. >> with the concept of melt sent rik warfare how effective was the information sharing between the u.s. and coalition forces? >> well, it wasn't as effective as the joint operations was but it was still quite effective. the difficulty i'm referring to is if you wish to procure a weapons system in the future, for example, the germ ands and -- germans and the united states were pursuing a radiation, anti-radiation

missile. well, the germans pulled out and we can't go on with it. >> yes, sir. for day after day now our helicopters seem to be shot down by a little bitty thing. are they old things that are stompilede? why can't we find where they are and do something about it? right. most of our helicopters have been rebuilt time and time again. >> no, the weapons. >> oh, the weapons? i suspect there is no shortage of weapons. the harridge -- larger ones are much easier to find. i think what you're going to find is a-10's and apaches riding shotgun on helicopters. the helicopters will be flying different paths and procedures. they will make efforts. they really have to get out and stop the setup of the sophisticated weapons you are talking about.

the sa-14 is the same type that hit the d.h.l. freighter. >> the stidge -- stinger, is that shoulder mounted? >> the stinger say man-fired shoulder-mounted weapon, yes. >>? regards to logistics on aerial refueling, admittedly there say great success but the core ol airy of that is you are shall -- corollay -- corollary is you are flying long routes. does the air force need more shorter range bombers to get there closer? >> i would say it would be the opposite. they need a long range bomber with greater range that doesn't need refuelings. >> big bucks? >> big bucks. there is nothing that is not big bucks, sad lilt >> final question. pen ultimate question, actual -- penultimate question,

actually. >> the silver bullet idea has been looked at from time immemorial. i'm estimating at least 10,000 to one ratio of dollars spent on the u.s. side versus the iraqi side. despite the fact that most of our airplanes didn't run into each other, i don't find the outcome anymore surprising than i could -- would if the nfl took on a tag team paraplegic football team. >> well, you're exactly right and that's the way it should be? but what if your nfl team got beat. by the paraplegiy team? i was take -- make the point that if you spent the money and it works, it's worth it. >> have you seen the film out on robert mcnamara?

it's a lot to chew on but i recommend. >> somehow i had one big lesson from mr. mcnamara in vietnam and i'll eschew the other 10. >> ditto. it was a great movie and lots of lessons to be learned from that. question the i have, with all this wonderful technology and ability to pinpoint people and bombs and satellites, it's beyond me why we can't find bin laden. we know where he is, in northwest pakistan. he's got people, clothing, shelter. it's beyond me why we can't find him. >> i know that the, when you have the president of pakistan and did -- in such a vulnerable position, i suspect that you don't do things in that area that you might do otherwise. >> if it's important to capture him, you got to capture him.

>> all right. i will pass that word along. >> ladies and gentlemen, we're going to fish -- finish up with one question. as you may have noticed in the intro, colonel boyne's been very busy with books. what's next? >> i have signed to do a trillogi on the jet age. -- trilogy on the jet age. >> wonderful. ladies and gentlemen, the book is "operation iraqi test and n

but again, the suspicion wasbutn raised when i realized the back of a car was lower to the groune than the front. little and given the rules ofe engagement, you can't just shoot someone because they look suspicious. well, sir, why did you shoot him? sco >> i got scared.i got >> you got scared so you killedt a man?so youille >> yes, sir. i have a gun. >> you can't do that. like, yo given the rules ofu engagement you can't just shoot someone unless you know they have a just weapon or you know that they've killed someone, and they are in the actions of given the rulesi of engagement i couldn't justes

shoot someone that looksgagemeni suspicious so i knew the best oot so thing to do was to yell at him spicious to. get out his car.s to i was looking over my left shoulder kind of facing him andi i was in the lead stryker vehicle had a metal up to mycle, tape all around me in the stryker standing up. i still had my frames on and isi was looking cool doing i was everything i was supposed to do. looked at him and say get out of your vehicle.looked a and i knew he heard me because he looked over his shoulder ande raised his hands off thehishoule steering wheel and put them bace down then put 'em back down. nothing happened. i was like, okay, well, maybe he understood or maybe he's saying i don't know where i am, i'm lost. i didn't know. so i yelled at him again. he raised his hands up again off

the steering wheel and shook his hands no and let his foot off the brake. i then had to make a decision. so i shot two rounds in front of his vehicle with my m4 and, boom, my world went black. i woke up a week or so laettner walter reed army medical center, my life forever changed. my world went black not only physically, being blind the rest of my life, the shrapnel had cut my left eye in half, entered the frontal lobe on the left side of my brain and metal went through my cornea and taking out my optic nerve. i saw nothing but blackness and was told by the ophthalmologist that you would never be able to see again. so my life went physically black. that day. but it also went spiritually black. i no longer believed in god.

everything that i'd done, everything that i believed in now no longer meant anything to me. i remember one of my best friends, edward, coming into the room. i think it was before one of my surgeries and said, hey, scotty, why don't you say a prayer? i said, no. i don't know how to pray, and i don't know god. and i think it, the room went dead silent. like if there were cockroaches in the room, you would have heard 'em. my wife went back to her room realizing, you know, i'd been married to an awesome man, and i still am, and i'd be fine married to a blind guy, but being married to someone who didn't believe in what he believed in before, that was something different. so she began to pray. friends began to pray all around the world. and for me it was a choice that i had to make. it was a personal choice that i had to make. i knew i had support. friends would come into my room on a daily basis singing

christian songs. i know doctors thought our room was creepy because balloons would be coming out, i thought the room was huge. apparently, it was like a little match boxcar. but it was that support. but again, it still came back to me. i was the one that had to make a choice. i was the one that had to choose to make a difference. my company commander called me every other day to see how i was doing. we were awesome friends. my brigade commander would call me every week to see how i was doing. something that doesn't normally happen in an organization, to have the top leadership call you to see how you're doing? the support that i had was amazing, was awesome. and people like toby keith, country singer, gary sinise, the actor, generals, three-star, four-star would come in and try to see me and i'd say, no, no thank you. and one day my wife said, scotty, andrew wants to see yo