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>> general john allen testified about military operations in afghanistan and the 2014 deadline for withdrawing troops. treasury secretary tim geiger told the makers the steps taken by european policymakers. that is later. in march 1979, see syrian began televising the u.s. house of representatives. today, our content of politics and public affairs, nonfiction books, and american history is

available on tv, radio, and online. >> general allen expressed confidence in the military's ability to meet a 2014 deadline for the withdrawal of combat troops. he is joined at this hearing by defense undersecretary james miller. this is just over two and a half hours.

>> [inaudible conversations]the. >> good morning, ladies and gentlemen. the house services committee meets today to receive testimony from the acting underserved secretary of defense, doctor james miller, and the commander

of the international security and assistance force in afghanistan, general john allen. gentlemen, thank you for your distinguished service to our nation, especially during this critical morning in afghanistan. thank you for joining us here today. the last year has been a consequential time for coalition efforts in afghanistan. during this time period, with the surge forces in place and nato forces have conducted major operations to push back the taliban south of afghanistan, stopping aberrations to kill osama bin laden, and disrupt al qaeda, train thousands of afghan security forces so that they can secure their territory from terrorist insurgent groups, and return countless numbers of civilians to school and to work. however, in the last few weeks, the impressive gains in the united states and nato were making afghanistan have been

called into question by some due to the actions of a rogue view. some afghan soldiers have taken up arms against our soldiers, which could manage trusts among forces that are supposed to be partners. the sober assessment, however, shows that partnering is viable and necessary. there are steps that can be taken to minimize such incidents, and that these criminal actions are relatively isolated. moreover, the horrific army sergeant who took up arms against afghan road civilians, is a criminal act that should be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. these exceptional incidents are not relative of the hundreds of thousands of u.s. soldiers, sailors, and marines, who have honorably served in that country of afghanistan, nor are they reflective of the afghan soldiers were being changed and

are helping to secure afghanistan today. additionally, i remain very concerned about the president's decision last summer to speed up withdrawals of the surge troops as well as his original announcement in his speech at west point for a date certain in 2014 to withdraw all u.s. combat forces. these decisions by the president have made it increasingly difficult to build up trust and confidence with the aft grand institutions, that will ultimately ensure security and political gains by u.s. and nato efforts are sustained into the future. moreover, i am uncertain whether we will be able to achieve a key things to the president own strategies, due to the constraints of the president has put in place. for example, it has been reported in the media that the u.s. and afghan governments are tempted to achieve a solution with caliban, and yet the caliban continues to operate

with impunity out of pakistan because they already know when we will be leaving and pakistan has been unwilling or unable to address those safe havens. furthermore, due to the president's decision to begin withdrawing the forces early, a we increase the risk to our forces to effectively address the second part of the afghanistan campaign plan, shifting the main effort to eastern afghanistan and apply military pressure and on the network that is responsible for the most dramatic and lethal attack in afghanistan. what is more, in the absence of sustained public attention opinion to support this mission on down, many have begun to question what we are fighting for. with friend and foe alike known that the u.s. is headed for the exits, our silence is viewed as a preamble to retreat, and in warfare when the mission becomes redeployment rather than mission success, the outcome can quickly become disorderly.

general allen and i have total confidence in your command. the challenge in afghanistan continues to be great, but i am certain that we can achieve the united states core strategic objectives by resolving to provide you with a time and resources you need to be successful. i think this hearing today is extremely timely with the american people needing to hear from you and what is really going on over there on the ground. i look forward to your testimony and the insights into the challenges in afghanistan. thank you,. >> thank you, general allen, doctor miller. i appreciate your leadership and support. i want to agree with the germans opening remarks about the progress that has been made in afghanistan. there has been considerable progress made throughout the country, and i am aware of the

bravery, leadership, and considerable efforts of our troops and partners. we have pushed the caliban back, particularly in the south. the villages that we are able to walk through that were major combat zones just a few months before, is evidence of the hard work in progress that is being made, and perhaps as important as the security gains, you are seeing at the district and provincial level, improvement and governments. one thing i was impressed with was i saw a great deal more of state department people on the judiciary site. the basic building blocks of governments were being put in place, and that gives sustainability. we have made enormous progress in the last couple of years to giving the afghan people to have a stable and lasting government. now, progress should not be -- should not underestimate the challenge that remains. afghan is a difficult country

that is poor with a difficult economy. they have a history of civil war will over 30 years, and insurgent groups are still present. we can't imagine that we are ever going to lead a perfect stable democracy in afghanistan, but progress has been made, and i think the thing we can feel good about is we have a much better chance that when we leave there will be a stable government that will be able to stand and stop the caliban from returning to power. we must always member that that was the goal. we are much further along the road to achieving that goal than we were two years ago, that is due to our troops efforts, and we must thank them for that. the bottom line is we are not going to stay there forever. i don't think anyone should say that we should. we are not going to stay there forever, but we need a plan to lead. and we need to lead responsibly. that is what was first put in

place in 2009 by the president. in 2000 and 10 with nato. i think it is a realistic plan. we cannot say that we are people. the truth is, it also gives them an advantage if we put in the minds of the afghan people that we are never going to leave. the confidence and provincial governments, because they do not look like governments that can stand on their own. they look like governments that will be forever dependent upon foreign forces. it also gives the taliban a very big propaganda argument. that too will fuel the insurgency. we have to balance that out. also, we have to understand that having well over 100,000 foreign troops in a country does cause destabilizing effects. imagine in your own community if you have foreign troops rolling down the streets, we need to get

to the point that we turn this back over to the afghan people as soon as we responsibly can. the progress that we have made gives us the opportunity to do that. to simply say that we are going to stay forever if something goes wrong, it undermines the very good plan. it is my hope general allen and doctor miller, how we are making progress on that. as we go forward, how we are going to make that responsible transition. i think everyone in this room once. we want our troops home, we want the afghan people back in charge of their own security, back in charge of their own government. that is where we want to get. the path is not easy, but it is one we must go down. i commend both of you for the progress that we made, and i look forward to hearing about how we continue complete that mission and bring our troops home. thank you. >> thank you, doctor miller. raking member smith, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. i'm very pleased and honored to

be here. with our outstanding commander general john allen. mr. chairman, i ask that my remarks be entered into the record, and i would like to summarize. >> without objection, so ordered. can you pull the mic closer, please? >> mr. chairman, the united states objectives in afghanistan deny the taliban the ability to overthrow the afghan government. this demonstration is committed to meeting these core objectives, and why we face serious challenges, our six strategies are succeeding. although the job is not finished, there is no doubt that we have depleted al qaeda is capacity. as a result of 2009, we have her first taliban momentum in afghanistan. the afghan national security forces are increasingly capable and increasingly in the lead.

the forces have asked performed extremely well. we are well into a process of transition to a nsf leadership, as agreed at the lisbon summit. in fact, today almost 50% of afghans arty live in areas that have begun the transition process. as an interim milestone, at some point it 2013, the nsf will be in the lead for providing security across afghanistan. but that -- at that time, the u.s. forces will be in a support role, which will take a number of forms. it includes u.s. coalition forces partnered with afghan units, which is arty occurring in many places today. and it will include the smallest footprint associated with u.s. coalition forces in a train advised. by the end of 2013, they will be

responsible for the. the u.s. forces will move to a smaller presence and will supervise tourism. mr. chairman, there is no doubt that the afghanistan war has been a tough fight. in the last several weeks, there have been particularly difficult. the inappropriate handling at the air base that while unintentional, some precisely the wrong signal. this unfortunate accident accident should start contrast to the many years the u.s. forces have shown deep respect for the afghan people and their religious practices. the department of defense is conducting a full convective investigation of this act, and the suspect is at fort

leavenworth kansas. everyone responsible will be held accountable. we have also been challenged in recent weeks by afghan personnel against u.s. coalition forces, so-called green on blue attacks. we will have to work through these incidents and these challenges as president obama and the secretary have discussed. but it is critical that these tragic occurrences not blind to the progress we have made, i would like to give some examples. from 21,022,011, attacks were down 9%. this trend has continued. for january. this year, initiated attacks are down a further 22% from 2011, the save months. in october 2008, there were only 140,000 afghans in the ans. today there are approximately 30,000.

and we expect to reach our goal of 352,000 a mac and sf did today almost 90% of coalition operations in afghanistan are carried out in partnership with the a mac nsf. they are in the league for more than 40% of operations. we are investigating the strategic partnership that will frame our enduring relationship. this strategic partnership will demonstrate that we have learned lessons from 1989 when our abrupt departure left our friends confused and our enemies emboldened. the partnership with president of the afghan government, we have recently completed an milestone. we also are working with the afghans on understanding special operations, which when completed will further strengthen our partnership. concluding our strategic

partnership will send a signal that the united states remains and will remain to add afghan security. as obama -- as president obama said in the state of the union address, we will build an enduring partnership with afghanistan so that it is never again a source of attacks against america. the need for long-term commitment extends to our coalition partners as well. as nato secretary-general said in december, our commitment does not end with transition. we will finish the job. we will help create a secure afghanistan and shared security. achieving eight durable peace in afghanistan with will require reconciliation among afghans. it is by no means certain that this effort will bear fruit in the near term, but it is very much in our national security interest to try. as secretary clinton has said, any negotiated outcome with

insurgents must meet the redline with reconciliation. insurgents must renounce violence, too, great all ties with al qaeda, and three abide by the constitution by afghanistan. afghanistan's neighbor's, particularly taxes, pakistan has legitimate interest that should be understood and must be addressed. pakistan also has response abilities. most of currently, it needs to take further steps to ensure that no -- military groups cannot divine safe haven in pakistani territory. in 2011 alone, some 2000 attacks in pakistan resulted in about 2400 deaths, mostly from improvised expose of devices. mr. chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify here today. we embark on this fight a decade ago to ensure that terrorists networks that struck in new

york, washington dc, and in the skies of pennsylvania, will never be able to use afghanistan as their sanctuary. thanks to the great courage and skill of the u.s. armed forces ends personnel and our coalition partners and to our afghan partners, our strategy is working. while success of warfare is never guaranteed, we are on a path to meet our objectives and to deny the taliban the ability to overthrow the afghan government. i would like to conclude by thanking the committee for the continued support of our effort in afghanistan and the strong support of the great men and women of the u.s. armed forces, mr. chairman, thank you, and i look forward to the committee's questions. >> thank you doctor. general allen, welcome to your first hearing since you assumed this command. we appreciate having you here today. the time is now yours. >> thank you, chairman. it is an honor to be here today. breaking over smith, distinct

members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss our operations in afghanistan. it is a pleasure to be here with my friend, doctor miller comedy acting under such or carry out depends for policy, and i ask that my verbal remarks be entered into the record. >> abjection so ordered. >> thank you. me express my gratitude to all of you on the committee. for the support you provide our men and women in uniform every day. but they are well equipped, well-trained, and well led is a great testament to the efforts of this committee and to the great work of this congress. on behalf of those troops, and on behalf of their families, i want to thank you for that. in the past eight months i have walked the ground of afghanistan with many of those troops. along with my friend and partner, ambassador ryan

crocker, and my nato compay trick, the sooner civilian representative, sir simon gass, i have met with the leaders of most of those other nations that serve alongside us in the international security assistance force. and all through this, i had have been in close consultation with the afghan civilian and military leadership, most of whom have experienced the years of soviet occupation, the civil war, the darkness of the taliban, in short, they have been unmatched in their country's conflict for over three decades. and from all of this, i can tell you unequivocally three things. first, we remain on track to ensure that afghanistan will no longer be a safe haven for al qaeda. and will no longer be terrorized by the taliban. second, the collation, the largest in recent history, we are well aware and well alarmed on the progress to meet our 2010

listing commitments, to transition security to the national security forces by december 2014. and third, our troops know the difference that they are making everyday. they know it, and the enemy feels that everyday. to be sure the last couple months have been trying, in the wake of the revelations that american troops have mishandled religious texts, some of them violent protests, occurred in some but very few regions in afghanistan. thirty-two afghans lost their lives in these riots, and even more were hurt. just since the first of january, the coalition has lost 60 brave troops in action from six different nations. thirteen of them were killed at the hands of what appeared to have been afghan security forces, some of whom were motivated we believe in part by the mishandling of religious

materials. just as tragic, as doctor miller mentioned, we are investigating what appears to be the murder of 16 innocent afghan civilians at the hand of the u.s. servicemen. each of these events is heart-wrenching, and my thoughts and my prayers go out to all of those affected by this violence. coalition and afghan like. but i assure you, the relationship between the coalition and our afghan security forces remain strong. just two weeks ago i was down in the helmand area, visiting with marines and the afghan commanders. this was in the wake of the koran burning incident when violence was at its peak. the younger a near marcia said they were told by the demonstrations about their afghan counterparts. the afghan troops told them let us patrol outside the wire for a couple of days. we have this for you. understanding the gravity of the risk, the afghans had assumed

for these rains, this particular marines continue our afghan brothers were trying to protect us. this one statement, spoken by a young marine, conveyed the power of this brotherhood that has been forged in battle throughout the years. it speaks to the trust that we have built with the afghans, and the shock absorbency of this relationship. and yet, we know that there is much hard and deadly work that remains to be done. but the progress is real. and in portly, that progress is sustainable. we have severely degraded the insurgency, is one afghan commander told me in the south in the latter part of 2011, this time around, the afghan taliban were the only thing. on top of that success, is a result of the winter operations. we have degraded the taliban's

ability to spring offensively on their own. this spring they will come back to find many of their caches empty. their former strongholds on tenable. indeed, in kandahar back in december, 54 the former taliban members decided to go back into the afghan society. when they asked why they lay down their arms, they complained of the unrelenting pressure that they feel. they said they found themselves up against capable afghan forces in greater numbers with greater frequency, and while they were willing to fight foreigners, they were unwilling to fight their afghan brothers, especially afghans who fought back with kurds and with skill because of the training that we had provided them. the training that we provide them is critical to our mission. throughout history, insurgencies

have seldom been defeated by foreign forces. indeed, they have been beaten by indigenous forces. in the long run, our goals can only be achieved and then secured by afghan forces. transition, then, is part of our strategy. not merely the way out. during the past 12 months, afghan security forces have expanded from 200,000 to 300 30,000. he will reach their full strength ahead of schedule, the deadline having been october 1. expansion and the professionalization of the afghan security forces allows us to recover the meaning 20,000 u.s. surge forces this fall, enables us to continue to pressure the taliban to reconcile, and makes possible security transition to the afghans in accordance with our listing commitments and on time. security conditions remain good.

i can tell you they want to lead and they want to respond to believe that comes with it. for the first time our joint coalition afghan operational campaign plan for january, 2012 through july of 2013 was conceived, developed and planned with afghans in the lead. they are truly emerging as the real defeat mechanism of this insurgency and increasingly as an emblem of national unity, and this is essential for the long term security of afghanistan. but none of us harbor illusions. we know that we face longer-term challenges as well. we know that al qaeda and other extremist networks, the same networks that cal elfgin and coalition troops every day still operate with impunity across the border in pakistan. we know that allow them remain a resilient and determined enemy and that many of them will try

to regain their lost ground this spring through assassination, intimidation, high-profile attacks and the placement of ied is. we know that iran continues to support the insurgency and fuels often the flame of violence. we know that corruption still rob's afghan citizens of their faith in their government and that poor governance itself often advance insurgent messages. the campaign has been long, it has been difficult, and it has been costly. there have been setbacks to be sure, and we are experiencing them now, and there will be setbacks ahead. i wish i could tell you the war was symbol and progress could easily be measured, but that isn't the way of counterinsurgency. they are fraught with both successes and setbacks which can exist in the same space and in the same time but each must be seen in the larger context of the cultural campaign, and i believe the campaign is on

track. we are making a difference. i know this and there were troops know this and i would like to take another moment of your time today, mr. chairman, to end where i began this morning with our troops and the thousands of american and coalition partner troops that are bearing the weight of the conflict and those that will never return to their families. no this, they are central to my every decision and my every word to this committee. in one of them a marine who was laid to rest tuesday at an arlington cemetery was a hero. he knew what he stood for and he knew his mission and he knew the risks, she knew he might have to give his life for the cause for which we fight. so sergeant william stacey prepared a letter to be read in the event of his death and in it he said there will be a child who will live because men who left the security they enjoyed in their home country to come to

his, and this child will learn in schools that have been built she will walk his streets not worried about whether or not some leader will come and kidnap him and he will grow into a fine man who will pursue every opportunity his heart could desire, and he will have the gift of freedom, which i have enjoyed for so long. if my life i is the safety of a child who will one day change the world, then i know that it was all worth it. i can only add that i'm confident that americans are safer today because of the service of members like william stacey and i am confident that we will prevail in this endeavor will. thank you again for the opportunity today, for the extraordinary support that you and the committee provide everyday to our magnificent young men and women in uniform.

i am privileged and honor to lead. thank you, chairman and ranking member. >> thank you very much, general. general, we hear conflicting accounts in the press about what our goals in afghanistan and the means to achieve those goals. i am hoping that you can clarify the current thinking and what you are being told. first, can you tell the american people what our mission in afghanistan is coming in are weak succeeding? >> chairman, our mission is to keep the taliban from overthrowing the government of afghanistan and to provide the capacity for the afghan national security forces to provide to the government over the long term but it's also to the my al qaeda safe haven in afghanistan. >> thank you. i have a series of questions to further clarify what you just told us. following the security gains made in the south by the surge forces last year, does your

campaign plan still calls for the coalition operations to shift the focus to the regional command east? >> chairman, this particular juncture we plan to consolidate our hold on the population centers in the south, ensuring that we have it is my intention to examine the shift of the main effort to the east at this point. i've not made a final decision in that regard. we anticipate shifting resources to the east in any case because it remains there that the principle counterinsurgency fight will ultimately shape, be shaped in 2012. >> does your plan calls for a continued counter insurgency is in? >> yes it does, sir. >> to your knowledge is the administration committed to this plan and sustaining a counter insurgency mission? >> yes it does, sir. >> in your best professional military judgment, what level of

forces do you require for the end of the 2013 fighting season, and what are the associated objectives he would want to achieve with those forces? >> the answer to that question is a bit more complicated. we are in the process now of making decisions with respect to the recovery of the second phase of the serb forces and anticipate those decisions to have been made for my submission of that recommendation sometime in early april. we are going to spend the preponderance of the high up tempo per gough of the summer of 2012 both continuing to fight the counter insurgency as i said to consolidate the gains in the south to expand the security zone around kabul and at the same time, we will be recovering the second phase of the search forces, the 23,000. in october we will have approximately 68,000 u.s. forces

remaining. somewhere around 40,000 isf forces, and probably within 352,000 ansf. because of the nature of the recovery of the force, because of the progress of that i anticipate, it's my intention to take the time following the recovery of the search forces to examine the insurgency, to examine the progress that we've made in the development of the ansf to see the posture of the battles base that has developed throughout the fighting season of 2012, and then before the end of 2012i intend to provide for my chain of command of the president the recommendations on the kind of combat power that i will need for 2013 and 2014. i don't have a decision at this point, chairman coming and it's not my intention to be able to make that decision today. it's going to require some analysis after the conclusion of the fighting season and the recovery of the 23,000 troops

and phase two of the surge draw down. >> thank you. have you been given assurances by the white house that you can have the forces that you believe you need through the end of the 2013 fighting season and? >> i've been given assurances by the white house that we are in a strategic conversation, chairman. there has been known member mentioned. there has been unknown number that has been with specifically and plight. there is an excellent i believe strategic conversation that's going on that will account for my recommendation, the theater commander in the joint staff in this process and i am very pleased frankly with where we are in that conversation now, sir. >> has the white house always followed your best military judgment? >> as a commander in afghanistan, it has, sir. >> "the new york times" reported last week that there's a growing belief within the white house that the mission in afghanistan has now reached the point of

diminishing returns. do you agree that the mission has reported the missions, if not, why come and is the progress that you are making sustainable? >> i don't agree with the article. i read the article and in fact i knew that the article was disavowed by people who were recorded in the article. as dr. mother had indicated for example just in the last 12 weeks of the enemy initiated violence across the country as 25% less than it was in the same period of advice in the last year and in the same period of 12 meek weeks. during the same period of last year the growth of the ansf has been dramatic and the ansf special offer readers has been dramatic. has the ansf continues to move to the floor in full partnership with us in this comprehensive counter insurgency campaign, i believe there is great potential

for us to accomplish all of these objectives and i remain committed to the campaign and i remain optimistic that with the right kind of resource in from the country inns of campaign, a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign continuing as we currently envision it that we would be successful. >> thank you very much. ranking mayor smith? >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to follow-up on that piece there and i think it is just a misunderstanding and that the mission of where it's going. we are transitioning. that is the whole point to bring in other forces. it's not a matter that the mission is reaching a point of diminishing return or reaching a point of reasonable success and for it to continue to succeed, we need to make that transition. it seems like there is always an argument for more troops on our side of things are going well that is evidence we can't leave because it's working and we have to stay there. if anything goes wrong that is evidence we have to stay longer and in greater numbers because it isn't going well.

that is the point of the mission. as i said in the outset, nobody in this commission, nobody in the country wants a permanent presence in afghanistan. so you have to take a step back and say okay. if we don't want that and if we want to succeed in the mission that general allen clearly describe it to make sure that the taliban do not return to power and al qaeda does not find safe haven then how we do that? logically we build up a force of afghans who can make sure that does not happen, and that is literally the only option. it's not an option for us to stay there forever to make sure the taliban and al qaeda don't come back and therefore we need to build up a local partner that can do that. and what we've described this morning even some of the comments and the chairman show that we are making enormous progress on that. but we don't succeed until we make that transition. general, you mentioned some of the members a couple of times, but if you could lay out for us the progress that has been made in terms of the ansf, all

security forces both in terms of the national military, local police, i think it will give us some ideas. we have drawn down from a relative number of i don't know exactly what the numbers are, they're the u.s. troops coming down to the mid 60's i think by october, nato has drawn down a little bit. give an idea how that compares with a the ansf and the domestic security forces have grown if you could give those numbers that's the key part of the transition. >> thank you for the comments because i agree that transition to the ansf is the key to the success of the mission over the long term. in january 2011, there were 155 battalion for missions in the ansf. 101 of those were ranked in the top three of the categories have measure for capability

effective, independent with advisers and effective with partnership. in the years since then that number has grown to the italians that have grown independent with advisers, he effective -- >> to and from 101 to 138 faugh. from 150 fifer patients when hundred 68 battalion so that the force has grown significantly in just a year but it's also grown in its capabilities in just a year coming and we have seen that not just in the army but also in the afghan national police as well. we have seen the emergence of the afghan special operations capabilities also dramatically enhanced over the purpose of the last few years in the per scope of the last year as well the mine commando won't, the 72 special forces operational dawa if you will, the emergence of

the special police units within the general director of the special police units in the ministry of interior for this has been dramatic progress and those units at various levels of capability fourth advisers were partners with continue to make progress and as i said earlier, 89% of our operations are partner operations today. there are operations on the ground as we speak right now in afghanistan where afghan units are in and the lead run with partnership partner operations with a soft forces so we have seen the process and we continue to pursue that process. among the priorities that i gave to my commanders the day they took command and those i believe we're still operative, weigel we will continue with my first priority with this pressure, the insurgency and a comprehensive counter insurgency campaign the second priority which is only slightly behind it is to do all we can to accelerate the

movement of the ansf into the four and we will continue to pursue that aggressively mr. smith. >> one more question. estimate the number of comments to be concerned about the u.s. troops talking about returning to the base is ending the night raids. by and large it seems the comments reflected the domestic pressure. they reflect the afghan constituents that the president is responsible to and being concerned with for another three pressure and while president karzai is aware of the importance of us being there he is also aware that most of the people in afghanistan look forward to the day when we are not, so in fact an accurate reflection in your view of what president karzai and other domestic politicians and afghanistan are reflecting and number two this is for both dr. miller county were gup relationship and make sure that transition continues to happen in a responsible way and not in a rush to play defense of that domestic political pressure.

president karzai and others in the afghan governor are feeling reflect the lower in the strategy that says if things are not going well it should stay there forever. there's the reality of dealing with the afghan population of how are you managing the relationship to get to the responsible transition given the pressures? there is no part of our strategy which intends to stay afghanistan forever with. effective strategy which is a part of the larger isf strategy which was agreed to ultimately with me to come i7 afghanistan was been conference room in november of 2010 and called for us to to work for the business of transition moving the ibm -- ansf gradually and to secure the across the country and a process will be completed by the end of 2014 the campaign accounts for that and ultimately for the drawdown of the u.s. and i sat forces as the ansf moves to the

floor in the gains its full to bolivia's field in the battlefield. and that process is on track and in fact in the reduction of u.s. numbers and the reduction of ice after forces under support of our isaf transition goals, 31 of december, 2014. with regard to the voices that we here in the afghan government the arana path toward sovereignty. this is the process we are talking about with respect to the lisbon convention of anticipating security lead by 2014. and we should encourage the voices of sovereignty. we should enforce actions that seek sovereignty mou i recently signed with the minister is one of the great acknowledgements of afghan sovereignty as a partner increasingly with us in a comprehensive counterinsurgency. they will take responsibility

ultimately for the administrative detention of insurgents in the battle space, and american forces will cease the tanning afghans for long periods of time and they will pick up that responsibility. it is appropriate and it's a great indicator of it is a long-term conversation of the afghan government and that record i believe in the last three months we have some, very long way will and create greater capacity among the afghans to conduct the night operations and a very credible way. we are still heavily partnered with them and we will be for some period of time. not only do our operations now, all of our night operations are partnered with afghan partner unit forces which are very good commandos of the year in the process now is building 12 afghans strike forces of their own that operate under the control ultimately jsoc and

those are the forces that and as for the success of allied operations that have been enormous and successful and shredding the enemies network that is another step toward sovereignty and better steps towards the strategic partnership for afghanistan with to have completed before very shortly the heads of state of the 50 nations meet in chicago hosted by the president of the united states we are on track tataris bin domestic rhetoric en on part in the villages early etc and our president and president karzai had an extended conversation the of your day and in fact they have spoken three times just recently when both of them are in full agreement that the lisbon peace process and formulation of transition is on track and they both support and which calls for the complete

ansf lead by the close of business on december 24th. >> we've gone all but over time to think you. >> let me just say this theologist want to reiterate three points her with the commitment to continue the transition process across all the elements that the general talk about, the second is the relationships and we have let our finest commanders and diplomats in the country with general allan fi and ambassador crocker in addition to that the secretary defense and the president have been in contact with president karzai full-time season in the last couple of weeks. i want to emphasize also that the contacts on the next level down if you will with minister, the defense minister for interior with the national security advisor doing it up to the context is also important to improve our mutual understanding and resilience of the

relationship in the third and finally, let me say that long-term strategic partnership is calling to be vital, not just 2015 and forward but an understanding us having that kind that is important to sustaining this relationship in the meantime. -- before to be appreciated. i know that neither of you have an easy job. i think you were doing it well and there are no guarantees that we have to transition to the afghan sovereignty as quickly and responsibly as we can. thank you. >> thank you, mr. bartlett. >> thank you very much for your service to the country. i know that everything that we read and hear is not necessarily true and stories get worked up there are a series of events that give me some pause if they are true. i would like for the moment for you to imagine that you are a

fighter and this is what you have heard. a number of months ago the president of the united states says that we are pulling out of afghanistan in 2014. several months ago the secretary of defense says that in 2013 we are going to stop the combat operations and just continue with security and training of the afghan forces and that is corroborated by the white house a few weeks ago i heard of a program will give me 125 to $150 a week if i stop fighting and i can still keep my gun. now i'm irrational taliban fighter. what do you think might be a rational position as i would take with those facts in mind?

>> mr. bartlett, let me insert into parts. first, i want to be absolutely clear that the lisbon transition strategy is still in this administration's's policy and is still the direction in which we are headed, and that includes the transition to the afghan leadership for about afghanistan by the end of 2014 and the afghan responsibility for security throughout the country by the end of 2014. the u.s. and coalition at that time we would expect would still provide some support including trimming advisement and in putting the capacity for the counterterrorism operations. at that point in time. when secretary defense and others have talked about the 2013 time frame, is a milestone on the path and in 2014, we expect that each of the charges of transitions to the afghan

leader that announced of lisbon would have the guns of the final staunch would have begun sometime 2013. at that time, there will be afghans in the lead for security throughout the country, but they will not have full responsibility throughout the country in 2014. in 2013, it will be very much of the next model. in some cases it would be partnered units as is occurring very much today and in some cases would be trained and advise and assist in some cases we may have moved the coalition forces may have moved to the strategic overwatch. but in other cases, it would be much more significant for the u.s. and coalition forces in the intervening period. so this is a part of that, this is part of that transition process and sometime in 2013 we will see that milestone with the start of the final trauner but that begins that additional round of transition by 2014.

>> in the meantime we are offering of the taliban fighter 125 to $150 a month if you just stop fighting you can keep this done. do you think that he might stop fighting and keep his gun knowing that believe in in 2014 and that then he can pick up the site and we won't even be there? >> mr. bartlett, i don't reject that possibility, but i wanted to offer to contrary points if you will. the first is that if a fighter wants to pick up his gun at any point in time in afghanistan, that is likely to be a possibility, and if you look at the availability of 1847 this is a country that has a significant number for long periods of time. second, a critically important,

with secretary clinton stipulated for the fighters that come off and the taliban come off and others in the outcome need to sever their ties with al qaeda and need to renounce violence and need to agree to the constitution. if they do those things in the gun will be silent and in many cases may come to fight on the other side to become a part of the forces over time. it is a commitment not just between now and 2014 or 2015 but an enduring commitment to see increasingly capable ansf general allan has talked in detail about, and what they're seeing is that they were going to lose and they have an opportunity to be part of the solution and not a part of the problem that the ansf of the

coalition will solve. >> mrs. davis? >> thank you very much. general allan, think you for your dedicated service. i wanted to just follow on those numbers for a minute and sustaining that effort on the part of the afghan army. it's my understanding that as you are speaking about the size of the battalion's we're looking at a force of about three ander 52,000 existing until about 2014 but after that deutsch the budgetary reasons and certainly our own investment in that we're looking at about 230,000. is that the correct number that we are downsizing to that level? de went savitt we will be going to that level? >> at this time the only figure that is taking is given the three injured 52,000 that's the

target for the size, the combined size of the afghan national army and the afghan national police for the ansf overhaul. we expect that at some point in time and that point hasn't been determined, it's been a topic of conversation, both in the united states and with a coalition at some point in time it will make sense to reduce that level to a long-term sustainable level. but the point of time that makes sense will depend fundamentally on the conditions on the ground. so if in some of the calculations you have heard and several have been in the process and frankly some accurately and some not so accurately are looking at a point in time in which the tel dan is significantly reduced and when the scale of the afghan forces are required to cope with that would also be lowered. >> okay. estimates of that is -- neither the in the number or any point

in time is determined at this point. some people have talked about numbers, people talk about time lines. none of that is decided, and indeed we haven't heard recommendations. >> thank you, dr. miller to rely want to clarify that because there is a concern that if it is downsized to that level, obviously the budget plays a role but we would also have a lot of former afghan soldiers in the country perhaps without a job. is that something we are also looking at in that transition and what happens after that? >> the general would add to this as well as a sign of success down the road, and it's not immediate, but down the road would be the taliban was significantly smaller, the afghan national security forces therefore could be smaller, and then the challenge associated with be reintroducing the forces back into the economy, and the good news is that because what

they would have gone through to become a part of the ansf would be trained with respect to literacy and more capable of contributing to the economy, but that demobilization process is something the would need to unfold over time and we would need to have an explosive plan. 64. certainly literacy is a big concern to read we talking about the first grade levels for many of the troops and whether or not that is sustainable to have them continue to be doubled to be felt that the economy. general? >> we have continued to emphasize literacy, and the soldiers that goes through and the police that goes through the training and obtain the first grade level will be given the opportunity to continue the literacy training. we require that certain stories have a minimum standard of literacy so as you correctly point out, should there be and

there will be a drawdown at some point of de ansf from 352 to some number in the post 2014 period there are options now for those soldiers that there wouldn't have been before, and i would imagine in a managed force reduction plan remains to be developed but pretty soon we are going to have to start to think about it. there will be such aspects of that plan such as vocational training. >> i agree, general, could i just quickly in the remaining time just asked about the martelle. you come day i think quite eloquently the feelings of troops and think and how they see their mission but clearly these kind of setbacks can be devastating. and i wondered if you could speak more to that and also whether or not we are doing anything differently as we've redeploy troops and looking at

records and deployments and is obvious something that bares on everybody's responsibility. >> general, the time is expired. can you please answer that for the record? >> i will, sir. specs before, mr. thornberry. 64. general, my understanding from people who should know, and it's been written about in the press was the original search, the military commanders asked for the floor of 45 trips for the original surgeon afghanistan. they said the best would be if we could get 80,000, but the act of god approved was 30,000 which was a 25% cut from what they said the floor should be commended there are some people who believe it has cost us, added lives and times because that request was not agreed to.

but i noticed in yesterday's wall street journal it says the plans and the results of that 25% cut was that the campaigns have to be done sequentially. you couldn't do the east and south of the same time, you had to do the south first and the plan was to move to the east. yesterday "the wall street journal" said that it is delayed to make that transition from the south to the east because things were not wrapping up in the south as was planned, and i take it from your answer to the chairman's question that that is true that we are going to have to stay in the south longer than anticipated before we make the trips to the east to deal with that region. is that right? >> we have to consolidate the hold on the population centers in the self. it is the spiritual heartland of the taliban, and those forces

that he had in conjunction with the ansf and the flood of the local left and local police etc has in many respects permitted us to be successful and exacting the taliban from the key terrain on their own as the human terrain. so we need to ensure that as we develop the ansf that those forces were able to consolidate the hold on the population to prevent the reentry by the taliban and the forces and to those areas. that is essential to read we do intend to conduct comprehensive counterinsurgency operations in the east and east will be well resources and we will do both of them simultaneously. so any suggestion that we are going to hold in the east while we conduct operations in the south is not in fact correct. the potential difference is whether i ultimately declared that eisel be the main effort which permits me to shift other resources like the ideas are and

some rotary wing assets to the east i will tell you the commander is fully capable of conducting aggressive operations against the insurgency and its resources to do so but a number one goal will be to continue to deny the enemy access back into the key terrain of this insurgency which is the population in the south, sir. >> let me briefly, success in the east is going to be essential for the overall success of the mission ultimately because the proximity with pakistan. >> success in the south. estimate i agree with you on the south. i'm asking about the east. skype we have to conduct comprehension for some time there. just by virtue of the proximity of the border, the lines of movement are much closer. so we will anticipate the continued operations for some time. >> you talked a lot about the growth in the afghan security forces, he and i among others

have been incredibly impressed by the village study operations and often local police. but it's also my understanding that that takes time tuthill diprete hid there is a clear time wondering which the special operations team may be augmented by the forces has to live in that village in order to conduct the training and get the afghan local police off on the same, on the right path. to stabilize the area that you have been describing. i am a little concerned that we are too focused on the members particularly tremendous growth that will make it hard to stick. how do you ensure the quality stays as we've had a tremendous increase in numbers? >> ne get a clarification, quality of the alt? >> the troops and the ability to stabilize as we described in the

south how they've got to hold their own to prevent taliban from coming back so that it's more than just a numbers game. >> will be important that we continue as you have correctly pointed out of a deliberate process of creating the village stability platform which ultimately creates a community mobilization for the development of the afghan local police. we have 99 sites that have been approved ultimately for the location of the afghan local police, and we will on the way over 50% of that in terms of the creation of those afghan local police garrisons, and most of those, vast majority support the campaign and many of the village of stokely locations began operations in them months ago so that progress is continuing. we are using our special offer readers now to be the core allin for the creation of the stability platform to create the

community mobilization to ultimately embrace their own security to be the trainers and ultimately the mentors for the afghan police and as time goes on, it is our intention to use afghan special operators ultimately to just as we are in other areas to transition our operators out of those garrisons and move them on to other areas where they will continue the mission. 64. mr. larsen? >> thank you, mr. chairman. dr. miller in that chair in that position i was seeing down here at the time in 2002 and 2003 military at that time stilling as in afghanistan we need to train 70,000 folks in afghanistan and deutsch and thousand year for seven years or

7,000 a year for ten years or something on those lines. those increases to 52,000 what can you tell me is going to ensure in july you aren't going to come back or even say after may in chicago to say we net 400,000. what we met was 450,000 security forces needed to train. >> mr. larsen there is pretty in-depth analysis behind the number three injured 52 zealous. i can't tell you that it shouldn't be 351 or 353,000, but very good analysis in terms of the requirement for the afghan police and of course it is also about the afghan local police and other elements that could

provide security. i guess i would turn it around and say that if we had a recommendation from the general allan if we had analysis showing the number should be different i would want to hear that from general allan and bring that forward to the secretary of defense and then to the white house. a lot of analysis behind the current assessment is based on not just an assessment of the situation is afghanistan and where it may go, but on a pretty good in that analysis of past counter insurgency efforts so why don't expect there's going to be a large delta but i put say that if there were i would feel obligated to ask general allen for his assessment and i would feel obligated to take that assessment forward. >> eop would feel obligated to come to us as well. >> i'm satisfied with the 352 members. as we have seen this year's campaign unfolds, we believe

that the partnership relationship but we have now with isaf and the emerging ansf come ultimately our drawdown as they continue to grow to their full strength of 352i think that is an adequate number. the issue is in the number. i think over the long term the issue will be the disposition of the force on the ground in the goes back to mr. thornberry's comments on the operations in the south versus operations in the east. we may well see that we have to sit in the defense is in the east over the long term if the safe haven situation doesn't change so it's less about the number than it is about the longer-term disposition of the forces on the ground to defend the key population centers. in the next question i don't get too much into the weeds on the bills incident because this could be indicative elsewhere but with regards to the investigations related to

command in afghanistan and the situation on the ground that he was operating in and the situation of the command structure in a can stand are there separate investigations going on separate from the criminal case of afghanistan this will conduct an of administrative investigation as well as criminal. can you explain what an administration investigation is? >> above the entire command and control process and who he was assigned, why he was assigned. it will look at the command relationships associated with his involvement in his combat outpost tikrit >> as he then assigned to do that? >> it's a sign for u.s. forces afghanistan, yes. >> finally, general, can you just delete could discuss the attrition rate for the afghan national army has mounted that the goal is 1.4, the current is 2% attrition rate and it sounds

like a lot but when you're talking three and 52,000 people it starts to get to be a lot. >> the latest number we had this 2.0, you said 1.9. that is only one-tenth over a year that's not an and insignificant number. we are figuring out the number for attrition and a variety of the reasons are issues of pay, quality-of-life, leadership, the mission's in which the forces have been involved and to their credit the ansf has embraced many of these issues and in fact, studying them with great detail and removing incompetent or corrupt commanders and the quality-of-life of their troops and ensuring they get on you which is an important condition of the morrell. all of those things i think that pushed down attrition and very shortly with the expiration of a

presidential decree those individuals that go in and of an offer of dust absence or a wall status are going to start being held accountable as opposed to being able to come and go as they had previously done. it is all part of a disciplined force and professional force and we are seeing all of that improved on a regular basis. thank you for that question. >> thank you. mr. jones. >> mr. chairman, thank you very much. general allan the last three years a former boss of yours has been advising me on afghanistan. i cannot say his name, but i will say that he has great respect for you. i'd like to use a couple of words he has used recently in an e-mail. a brilliant soldier statesman, talking about you, general allan, and as honest as the day is long and i think those qualities no matter who you are, uniform or out of uniform you can't say anything nice about an individual than that. spec over the past ten years i've been hearing from the

administration and those who were in your possession prior to you being here today, the ki and dr. miller, your comments and general allan -- i've been here for ten years. everything is sustainable but there will be setbacks. we are making progress, but it's fragile. going to walter reed in the bethesda recently i had a young marine lance corporal who lost a leg and said to me that his mother sitting in the room,,, may i ask a question? surgeon you may, sir. my question is clear we still there? a look at this e-mail from your former boss and by but like to read a portion of it. a true military answer to the problems of afghanistan would take decades, decades, not years and train the nation of precious resources with the most precious

being our sons and daughters. simply put, the united states cannot stop the afghan problem the matter how brave and determined our troops are and that gets me to the point what is the metric, what does the event that the administration and general allan, you, sir, are going to be candid with the united states congress and more important than the congress, the american people as we are spending $10 billion a month that we can't even pay for, the chinese for lending us the money that we're spending in afghanistan. when does the congress have the testimony that someone will say we have done all that we can do? bin laden instead. hundreds of tribes and afghanistan and everyone has their own mission talking about tribes. i hope that sometime between now

and 2014 like the arnall someone will come to the congress and say the military has sacrificed enough, the american people have paid enough and somebody will shoot straight with the american people our troops have done everything we can declare victory now but there's one thing we cannot do because of that is they've never changed since they've been existing and i will yield to you one minute 21 seconds to you both. >> that's a very important question coming and as you have come on and fight and visited the wounded in bethesda owls fallujah there are many of those young troops as the lance corporal you talk to the other day that are very dedicated to

this mission. they want to see to be successful. the one their sacrifice to have meaning and i think that this campaign is when to give the sacrifice meaning. we are on track to have the ansf move to leave. that is what we want success to be in afghanistan. >> if i may interrupt you for one moment. if we get into 2014 and see president obama were a republican president and the afghans are not trained where the need to be and we are spending money and losing lives will you be honest with the next administration and say to the next administration you need to stay to the timetable because we have done all that we can do. you are not going to change history. >> i will be honest with you now in the next administration. it's my obligation to ensure the force is resource and committed to a strategy that i think will work and i believe the strategy will work. it's not about american forces

or isaf fighting to the end of 2014 and bearing the burden of the campaign. the candian very clearly envisions the the ansf will move to the front and will have the lead, the ansf will secure the population of afghanistan. and if i think that is coming off the rails, congressman, i will let you know that. >> thank you, sir. >> thank you. ms. bordallo. >> thank you mr. chairman, mr. miller congenital alan, thank you for your testimony today. general, many have noted that the corruption is endemic to afghanistan and that this corruption feed predatory brokers and the mafia that have coopted the state. over the years we have made occasional efforts at combating corruption like setting up a task force transparency. judging from recent news stories about billions of dollars of cash being flown out of afghanistan a three-year, the

former head of the bank going free and afghan national army helicopters possibly being used to smuggle drugs it doesn't seem like we are making much progress three what can you tell us and do you believe these efforts will actually address corruption and especially the kind of predatory corruption that feeds on common people to allow the afghan government to function after 2014? >> that is the really important question. and we should not be surprised that there is corruption in afghanistan. after 30 years virtually every institution in that country having been destroyed in some form or another whether it is the communist coup or the soviet invasion of the civil war or the taliban darkness come an awful lot for little deadly on the wiles of the patronage networks which became criminalize overtime. the question isn't whether they exist or not but it's whether we

can ultimately oppose the influence of those criminal patronage networks and restore a system of the rule of law and credibility and integrity to the government of afghanistan and i have no illusions on how this and to make a difficult that will be and the efforts that we undertake to address those efforts to those influences has begun to take shape in the important and meaningful ways. since i have been in afghanistan through the use of the task force transparency come through taskforce 2010, which is done a great deal about contracting and ensuring transparency and contracting, and in direct conversation with president karzai we have taken steps, and president karzai has appointed a presidential commitment to partner with us, for example to begin the process of removing the organized crime from borders

inland custom si pos and airports. the process of being able to do that will recoup substantial amounts of revenue to afghan government covers. and will reduce the jury thing that you mentioned about the fleeing of cash out of afghanistan and the president karzai that talks publicly and often about the culture of impunity has in fact commissioned a presidential commission to partner with us in that process, and we are starting that process now. i think important as well, both of the security ministries, the ministry of defence and the minister of interior led by the ministry of defence has just completed something called a truce prince account of the working group to read this has been a complete inventory of all of the functions in the ministry defines all the way from the systems acquisition to the personnel assignment, and they are looking to remove criminal capture in the criminal influence from those of the security ministries and that is a very important step now.

spec general, has a follow-up question to the general petraeus cited this exact case of a success story over a year ago. as the afghan general been tried yet or have any high-profile senior officials that have been protected or members of the criminal patronage networks been tried? you didn't specifically mention this, but this was an afghan army surgeon general. >> the short answer is no man. the longer answer is on a went to see the minister and i wrote a letter to the president. i presented the evidence of this case to the palace, and there is not a comprehensive investigation underway about the national military hospital which we hope will ultimately result in an irrefutable evidence for the prosecution of the commander of the hospital. we need to be tried for the

attorney general's office or through the military jurisprudence, that is a technical outcome and the investigation is underway at this time. that is a great step forward. the investigation has been underway for months and i'm glad to see that it is, ma'am. >> thank you very much. i yield back. >> thank you. >> thank you mr. chairman. dr. miller, thank you for being here. general, we appreciate you being here and i support what to do. the only thing is sometimes appear we talk about winning and losing and we are asking questions that the american people will say that's not really the question i wanted to ask, and one of the things, the reality that we deal with is that the congress spends $825 million of stimulus package and we are spending 345 billion for the interest on back, and we are not taking almost the exact sum at the national defence and the country. and as a result, we are hearing of the carriers are going to be postponed, we are taking the

ships out of the commission. we are reducing the weapons systems and the force structure and everybody that comes up since we have to do that because of the budget we are dealing with. estimates of the question that i hear from a lot of the folks around when i talk about afghanistan is this you said earlier that the actions we have had made american saver. you are the best person we have to articulate how that has happened. how would you tell the average american that what we have done in afghanistan has made them safer, and then how would you justify that we would continue spending money as opposed to the ships, weapons, the force structure that we see being reduced year, and then the final - what assurances do you see or what are your projections as far as the economy in afghanistan after 24, 2014, to be able to sustain the investments that

we've put? and i'm going to give you the rest of my time to respond to that. >> i may call upon my wingman to give me a bit of assistance on the policy side of this. we remain a hot political hot pursuits in any member of al qaeda and dennis ting, and there is some al qaeda in afghanistan but we want them on the back heels and they know we're in pursuit and aggressively looking for them and when we find then we will deal with them. that is the first way that americans are going to be cut saver could second as we are going to pressure the insurgents and continue to create the art kennedy for the afghan security forces to be the defeat mechanism of this insurgency because our goal beyond ensuring that al qaeda cannot use afghanistan as a launching pad for international terrorism is to provide the security for the space institutions ultimately economic opportunity, so for a stable often stem, americans are

safer. with us in hot pursuit of al qaeda, americans are safer. so i believe that americans can see that the results of the sacrifices that have been made by the american people to resource the war have in many respects a direct line relationship to a 11th of september, 2001, where unimpeded the taliban provided a safe haven to al qaeda which plotted and ultimately executed the attack upon the united states on that day from the safety of afghanistan. it's been difficult for that to occur today, and will be our hope that in the and the stables afghanistan guarded by the credible ansf will make it impossible for it to happen in the future but that is in the future and we will continue to work at that. you asked about money for the support of the campaign versus the potential decisions for the program trade-offs. clearly those are decisions will be made by the secretary of

defense and the consultation with the service chiefs and joint chiefs, the same people in most cases. but we have to think you will, have to think the congress of the united states and for you as the representatives of the american people for having so we sourced this campaign. we really need nothing. we want for nothing further great support that you have given us some support that we have received the program and for the afghan infrastructure program, the great support that we have received in the armor that has been provided to us through the systems. we've been very well provided for, and i know the service chiefs remain in their way committed to pursuing to provide us the weapons systems, the capabilities and the well-trained troops necessary ultimately. estimate estimate of about 40 seconds. can you hit the last part about what is your forecast on the economy and afghanistan and whether you feel that that is going to be sufficient in 2014

to be able to continue and to be able to continue the investment we put their. specifically to watch this very closely. as you know, there will be a conference that follows the chicago conference. it will be in tokyo that will be an international conference that will look to gain money for the long term. ..

>> as far as accomplishing the transition to the afghan national army?

>> the 10,000 that came out last year have not -- i'm still the process of making the decision with respect to the 23,000 that will come out. i will be balancing in those decisions the amount of the combat power versus the headquarters and the general manning in some of the attack a task forces. those will be difficult decisions. but i believe we can make them. in the 10,000, which again, is a beta copy, was that concentrated more on the headquarters. >> many of them were. that is correct. they were gone by the end of 2011. >> when we talk about the leadership that you said is so critical for the afghan military, one way that you stimulate leadership is with carrots and sticks. and certainly, as we saw in iraq, having it a timeline can be a very healthy thing in terms

of when you are trying to accomplish a transition -- again, you are telling people that they can't be dependent or cal not count on the u.s. to be there to provide their own security goals. and i guess i wonder if you could talk about that a little bit, about whether or not having a timeline is also provided incentive for the afghan people to step up their game. >> it has, indeed, sir. the value of the lisbon transition process is that it is a process. it is something that is measurable. as you know, the lisbon transition process occurs over five charges of turning that comes off the map and ultimately goes into afghan sovereignty. each one of those is a company accompanied by detailed conversations and conferences

between art ansi partners to ensure the security forces in those areas are fostered and ready to take over the lead for security, not to be finished in terms of security, but to leave for security in those areas. it has, i believe, a very seriously focused conversations in terms of the development of the nsf and the resourcing. in that sense it has been positive. thank you. >> i would like to turn to another topic which i visited with u.s. law. we talked about a group that was the issue of safe havens in pakistan. the challenge that that poses with all the good intent and great success in terms of training afghans. if the taliban can operate with impunity in and out of pakistan. that really provides, you know, a weakness in terms of accomplishing the goal of

denying the taliban and the ability to overthrow the afghan government. i was wondering if you could update us in terms of what you are seeing right now in terms of trying to plug that hole. >> it continues to be a threat to the campaign. as you know, the nature of the taliban and those safe havens dippers varies according to where they are geographically. i believe in the south the southern taliban elements have been successfully -- their momentum has been successfully thwarted by forces and forces of the ansi. it is in the east where i spent a great deal of my time focusing on the hook on a network and

onto the taliban elements, the commander of the air group. the constant network in the north. i spent a lot of my time dealing with that. as i said before, with respect to the numbers associated of the ansi, i think it is less of a function or then it will be their posture over the long-term >> if we don't see pakistani action to address the safe havens, and ultimately we are going to have to thicken the defenses of the afghan people to provide as much friction as possible to protect its strategic center of gravity and

the security around kabul. that is going to have to be an outcome. we will watch the campaign unfold this year and next year to determine in consultation with our afghan partners how they will dispose of their forces in the end, but the chances are very good that it issues in the pakistani safe havens do not resolve in our favor one way or the other, we will probably have to have a larger presence of the nsf, which will require us to then be a nsf and other places. the committee will recess for five minutes. when we return, mr. wilson will be on for questioning. inc. you.

[inaudible conversations] >> please come to order, mr. wasn't. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and general allen, doctor miller. we sincerely appreciate you being here today. i am very grateful that in my home state of south carolina, my former national guard unit, i served for a year in nat afghanistan. they were working with afghan brothers, they were truly making a difference. they were helping train the

security forces of afghanistan to protect themselves. additionally, this past weekend i was honored to be at a deployment of personnel from the army national guard, they will be going as an agricultural team to help the people of afghanistan develop their economy. to see the military families there, the dedication, service members, the veterans who came, it truly is the greatest generation. with that in mind, i am very concerned that the wall street journal last night reported that the administration is offering a compromise regarding night raids in afghanistan, specifically that would subject operations to transpire afghan judges, one option under discussions, can you comment on the accuracy of

your report, white it is such a compromise in the interest of the united states? >> first, sir, thank you very much for your comments on your troops. they are magnificent and bob livingston is one of the great soldiers i have had the honor to serve with over time. thank you for those service of those troops in afghanistan. sir, i would like to decline answering the specifics of that question, because we are in very sensitive negotiations now on night operations. we do intend that night operations alternately acknowledge the afghan constitution and afghan law, but the process specifically of the execution of night operations has yet to be negotiated. it is not my intention that night operations lose their momentum, which is really what gives them their effectiveness.

any specific conversation about the issuance of warrants or prior review of mission folders by judges, it is very premature at this point, and in fact i have not been involved in any negotiations specifically at this point, sir. >> i am always reminded that it is mutually beneficial for the protection of the people of afghanistan. dust wishes on trying to get that point across. they are the primary beneficiaries of having improved security. >> and they do know that sir,. >> i hope they do. >> when i read about it, it is appalling. but they were actually giving a green light to the other side. additionally, your test indicate that orion continues to support the insurgency, particularly the iranian influence on training of weapons, which groups are they working with, wherein the

country, what is around school? >> they have operated primarily or work by merrily with taliban elements in the west, that is the only area in which we have seen a presence of support to the taliban. our sense is that iran could do more if they chose to. but they have not. we watched activity and the relationships very closely. there is an ancient relationship between the persian people of iran and the afghan people. today at the beginning of the persian new year -- and there is real potential common ground between our objectives and iranian objectives with respect to counter narcotics, arms smuggling, human trafficking, there are a large number of afghan refugees in iran. there is the potential for

common ground for us to cooperate, ultimately, in the long-term benefit of iran -- of afghanistan, excuse me. but i know that iran and afghanistan have a long relationship -- it's a national relationship that president cars i have in fact pointed to on a number of occasions. the troubling part right now is that there is some assistance that is going to the taliban from iran. we seek to check that thank you, mr. chairman, it's a pleasure to have you with us. i wanted to address the status of the women and the impact on their lives as we transition to the afghan national security forces, and in time come out of afghanistan. in november i met with several female afghan parliamentarians who were here in washington. all were members of the opposition, and while they ignore it progress had been made

towards female equality in the post taliban area, particularly with regards to education, they also express a number of concerns with roadblocks toward further reform. so the decision made earlier this month by afghan president mr. karzai to introduce a code of conduct that term prohibits women to travel alone in public, permits husbands to beat their wives, it is an outrageous affront to afghan women and i think greatly undermined the significant progress that this brave group has made in the last decade. the decision to align himself with the council of clerics and their code really does cause great concern about the same values -- it's the same values we have fought and fought so hard to displace, they are being put forward as the future of afghanistan. during the recent bipartisan delegation to afghanistan, i visited with a number of my

colleagues with afghan girls who hope one day to be come doctors, teachers, and entrepreneurs, and with afghan women who are training to become helicopter pilots in the afghan military. it really was an extraordinary trip, it highlighted so well the expenses that are being made for women. they wanted nothing more if than to help provide for their families and contribute to the future success of their country. but consigning these women to the status of second-class women, mr. karzai has turned her your back on those who are still emerging from decades of abuse of the taliban, and i think threatens the future ability of afghanistan to function as a stable democracy and an american ally. i am pleased that the administration has taken some steps to deter some of the most egregious abuses of the afghan government, such as temporarily cutting off financing of a present at the edge of kabul which has rejected female

visitors to body cavity searches, as recently reported by the new york times. this is an issue that has not yet been resolved. as my question states, as we draw down from afghan over the next several years, what can we do to make sure that we don't lose the hard fought rights of afghan women, 50% of the population? and what, if any, leverageable behalf as we go through this process and after our withdrawal is complete, and how do you see congress being able to help the administration and keep the gains that have been made? >> it seems that we are simply walking away from those gains that we have done not just that afghan women, but just ourselves a great disservice. i ask doctor miller's. >> senator, thank you. ma'am, let me answer in three parts, if i can. the first astute knowledge of the government of afghanistan

will not always do exactly what we prefer and wish. at the same time, we have and we continue to make clear our view that this is an important issue, just as he said. that has been a consistent message from this administration. it is often more effective to do less, it has been more visibly -- second, as you noted, over the course of this campaign, and, in fact, over the course of this surge, there are substantial gains that have occurred for women and that includes education. when i was regional command south a couple of weeks ago, just one relatively small, but important fact, now 40,000 women have received an education where they were not just a few years

ago in kandahar. third, i would say that while our fundamental national interest is to prevent the reemergence of safe havens for al qaeda and to prevent the taliban from coming back, especially afghanistan government, over the long-term and in the intermediate period, period, this will recoup remain a continuing conversation. >> you express a bright line in your conversation for some of these issues so that it becomes very clear? >> ma'am, the time is expired. you will take that one for the record. >> mr. tarik. >> thank you, mr. chairman, doctor miller, mr. allen. general allen, over the past several years i have focused my attention on the afghan narcotics trade is a major

source of funding for the insurgents. in 2006, general james jones, then the supreme allied commander of europe, stated the achilles' heel of afghanistan is the narcotics problem. he went on to say, i think the uncontrolled rise of the spread of narcotics, the business that it brings in, the money that it generates, is being used to fund the insurgency. the criminal element of anything to bring chaos and disorder. in 2010, the united nation's of office of drugs and crime show that opium production rapidly increased from the period of 21,622,000 and 10 >> i'm fond of holding the start of folding in half because i folded in half you can see during the period of the surge, if you will, of production, it nearly doubled over what the historical levels were prior.

in a recent correspondence, you told me, the narcotics trade and its linkage to the insurgency contributes to regional insecurity, corruption, volatility in the rule of law, and degradation of economic development. the general has agreed that it is a serious problem that the trade finance, roughly one third of the taliban's funding. the number was confirmed two weeks ago before this committee. the attempt to confront this issue or discuss this issue with you, president karzai, just to name a few, and in response to my question, it was stated that the u.s. government and other international partners, including the afghans, are reducing cultivation and opium production in afghanistan, supports a comprehensive set of actions to reduce opium production. the strategy includes numerous initiatives, aching pain, and joint clever asian efforts. i want to problem that you and

your leadership on these efforts and on the apparent success. the united nations office of drugs and crime on their assessment for april 2011, the mistreated 82,011 opium production decrease. general betray us last year, he told me that his forces had seen 848% decrease in opium production, and enforced first quarter of 2011, we sought 341% increase in drug seekers nationwide than a period ago, and i want to continue with the charts, this is the one had been has been updated to show the fall. as you can see, we are back down to levels that represent historical levels. while i find these trends reassuring, i am concerned that the premature withdrawal of u.s. and forces in afghanistan might reverse this trend, and allow the insurgents to regain this lucrative source of funding, the

fact is that two weeks ago, it was stated that we will create an afghan national army that has an ability to create a track that we are on right now. your test many before the committee today shows your capacity as commander, he stated that the progress in afghanistan is real, sustainable, and that we have severely greeted the insurgency. general allen, are we still pushing the programs to the degree that you stated earlier in response received in september in receiving similar positive responses and decreased levels of opium productions, do you anticipate that these positive results will continue as we draw down our forces, and does the afghan army have the capacity to address these counterpart efforts, and if the administration ignores his advice of the combat commanders to accelerate withdrawals, what do you think will happen to the efforts in afghanistan in the future? one last question.

it is my understanding that this issue of narcotics in afghanistan will not be on the nato summit agenda, although the agenda is described as an afghanistan agenda. it seems with all the references in understanding about how this contributes to the insurgency and taliban instability, -- >> general? >> it is my intention to preserve to the maximum extent that we can be gains that we have made in both the interagency approach to counter narcotics, both on the u.s. side, but all both on the inert agency capabilities that have been but built on the afghan side as well. the candor are not the counter narcotics police, a high-end special police units within -- there are a variety of units

that are gaining both in capabilities and in skills that have grown as a direct result of our advisory capacity and our partnership capacity with them as well. operations such as inaudible, we intend to take on a similar operation this year. it is my intention to remain committed to use both the resources in country and close partnership with the u.s. embassy, and with other international partners there to continue to develop the capabilities of the afghan people themselves, both to promote the -- curb the production of drug products and shipment and movement of those, it is my intention to remain on track in that regard. there is no signal to me that there is going to be an

accelerated drawdown of the forces necessary to continue to support those processes as well. and i will have to check into the nato summit agenda to see if there might be some points which could, in fact, be the opportunity to discuss these issues. >> thank you, very much. >> mr. johnson. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you gentlemen for being here today. in the aftermath of the mistaken burning of muslim holy books by american military forces, followed by the massacre of 16 innocent civilians, nine if you were children, apparently at the hands of the -- an american soldier, americans as well as afghans are outraged. this climate of facility can lead to bad things happening. insofar as the amendment -- the

american soldier accused of committing this massacre is concerned, it should be kept in mind that america has asked much from our american soldiers in the field. this particular gentleman who has been accused of -- i understand, has been deployed for times to afghanistan and iraq. i would imagine that his state of mind would be a question that will have to be answered by the factfinders when the trial comes up. and so i would simply ask that we not yield to the instinct to throw the soldier under the bus, and wash our hands of the fact that he has been put in a

situation that many people would snap under. that would be my statement as far as that is concerned. i think he deserves the presumption of innocence that the constitution entitles him as well as his -- as well as on us as we are gradually drawing down u.s. forces and transitioning responsibility to afghan forces. you have stated that progress is being made in terms of the development of the afghan security forces, the security gains that have been made. economic development occurring on the ground, largely due to u.s. aid, government is

improving, and you also commented that the acts that i just talked about, the two recent acts are really not -- they do not accurately characterize the overall impact of the united states involvement it has also been alleged that president obama made a key blunder, for lack of a better word, in setting forth a date that american troops -- that american combat troops would be withdrawn, the last of them. so we have about 18 months before that happens. do you think that that has been a good thing, the announcement,

has that been a good thing or a bad thing in terms of on the ground in afghanistan? >> well, thank you for that question. and thank you for your comment on sergeant bales. i assert you the investigation will be thorough. we do operate from a presumption of innocence. it is the nature of who we are, it is the nature of our constitution. think you for that comment, congressman. we would have combat forces in afghanistan to the end of art appointment, to the end of 2014. we fully anticipate, though, that in 2013 as the ansf continues to transition to the lead and the fifth of transition occurs which occurs in the lisbon conference.

i think it is all but the afghans to focus on their need to become proficient and to move on to the floor and on hole in the end i think it has been beneficial. it's not just in a unilateral decision it's been isaf, 49 other countries have joined us in this.

>> thank you. mr. conaway. specs before mr. chairman and for being here. i don't think my colleague from georgia intentionally left off the outrage we feel of the 13 men killed as a result of the litany of things that went wrong in putting a specialist in texas. general allan, there are those in this committee and on both sides of the building openly calling for a quicker drawdown of troops out of afghanistan quicker than what is currently planned and all of the other agreements. i've never seen anybody say us staying in iraq or against them forever was even a remote option so my colleagues have that and i'm not sure where they got that idea but back to my point. on the understand that we will do an assessment of how to

handle the 58,000 there and the mission to the end of suddenly of the administration announces without your input that they're going to change the parameters with which the number of people you are working with your the capacity that you have in place during the the transition what impact would that have on our ability to be successful with those reduced resources or a different model that's remarkably different than what you are coming to use? >> first, there is no indication the administration is planning to give -- >> those are those on the legislative branch and sometimes that has an impact connaughton. >> would be a function of what the number would be. but the nature of the relationship that we have right now is the conversation about what combat power is necessary,

what the structure not look like is a strategic conversation. i've been given no indications that there's a number that will ultimately be detailed to build a strategy around. so while -- is different than the lisbon agreement. >> that's correct. at the end of the recovery of the fees to surge forces as i mentioned, and as you correctly stated a moment ago, i will give the president my best military advice with regard to the combat power that we need to accomplish this mission probably in 2013, and i'm not sure that i would be able to see out to 14 at that point the fiber have a pretty good feel for it but it isn't just a function of u.s. forces because i will be given a similar recommendation of the nato change to the supreme allied commander in europe, the admiral but also to the secretary general said it will be a combined recommendation. >> the proposed budget drops the financial support for the training from some 11 million to five. is that a reflection of the fact

you're coming to the end of the work and we need less resources, or is that budget as opposed to what is happening on the ground we need less resources? >> much has already been purchased by them and so we are really feeling the equipment more sodium volume of equipment. >> dr. miller, can you give us some indication of what the impact on the afghan economy has been from the forces being in place and what is going to replace that in the economy when that number is dramatically less after 2014? >> but the first ad to the comments on the funding in addition to us having reached a certain point with respect the purchasing equipment, general allan is supported by the joint staff and the office of the

psychiatry defense they've done a hard scrubbing and looked at as we transition what is not just the number but the size and type of equipment that's necessary as the afghans begin to take leadership so a very in-depth scrub and credited to general amin and his staff for leading that effort. with respect to the specific impact of the u.s. presence on the economy, i would like to take that for the record and give you the best estimate. i don't have a good number that would take account or that would be done. sprigg the general pointed out rightly so this is the international effort so it is the forces and total the will be leaving at some point in time, so obviously this ten year plan to strengthen or to support the afghans after this transition is going to be really important because i don't think that the

current level of funding for whatever reason is going much beyond the near future. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you,, mr. sherman and for your service. i missed the point mr. turner asked about poppy growth. can you give me a specific as to how much less growth there is going on in afghanistan now as compared to when it was at its peak? >> let me take that question and i will give you a definitive answer which gives you some of the history on where we are today and incorporates both for mr. turner and for you the sense of where we think we will be doing both in terms of afghan security development that supports the counternarcotics. can you tell me what has replaced the poppy growth in the places we know that it's been the eradicate it? >> there's been a number. wheat, pomegranate, what we

would consider to be the normal and cultural cash crops. estimate and a stand pomegranate there's a lot of infrastructure needed. is the infrastructure in place? >> it's going to be a long term development for them. >> meaning -- >> years. >> five, ten -- >> i can't tell you. i will add that into the question. >> i also will contribute to adding more detail for the record, but it's absolutely very long-term prospect, and it is expected to be ten years plus. if i could come white got this issue i think the committee for its support of the task force on the business and still the operations. that's $150 million this year the department of defense money that is going to help economic development in afghanistan in close partnership with usaid but in fact, looking at both

long-term prospects, for example, for minerals that could help turn the corner or help improve the posture long term but also looking at some of these agricultural enterprises and how to encourage them to move forward and how to bring them capital that will help them be sustainable over time. >> thank you. okay. well, talking about sustainability brings me to my next point. as i noticed in the reporting that the ansf is keen to be about 352,000 people at some point being 195 and about 157, general, in your estimation or expert analysis the girls and the development of the non-commission officers within the nsf and the growth and expertise in the junior officer corps are the numbers there to support the force that is this large, and then going forward is the economy and afghanistan strong enough to support?

>> i want to know about what you see within the military itself, the expertise and the capabilities and then from an economic standpoint as well. >> it's an important question and the answer is at this juncture we are still building and that is going to be for some time to read the good news is the schools are in place now. the trick above are coming on line coming and we are building a noncommissioned officer and a junior officer that is steeped in the kind of capability that we need, and i believe we all recognize the afghan economy is going to for some period of time required assistance, international community assistance to sustain the ansf. there is as we all know the task force operation has done a great work in this regard. there are substantial resources underground in afghanistan. it's going to take a number of years before the process ultimately of the extractive

industry coming on line can produce a kind of revenue to support and ansf capability. at this point, nobody international community is indicated a desire to continue to support over the long term. >> that builds to my next question which is 2014 as the next presidential election, and we've been talking about corruption, patronage networks. is the central government of afghanistan at a point now as we begin the drawdown towards 2014, or as we set up the process, is the central government strong enough to sustain the infrastructure needed? i mean, obviously we are doing a coin of the vision throughout afghanistan. so this is not one big army that marches across the country. this is a series of different little fiefdoms for lack of a better term that feeds right and the patronage and corruption. so is the central government

strong enough cohesively told the altogether? i see the almost out of time, as if we want to answer that for the record, that would be fine. >> we will take it for the record. >> thank you. i yield back. >> mr. wittman. >> mr. chairman, general allan, thank you for joining us today and for your service to the nation and your leadership. a month ago to you and pick up some of the words in your testimony. you stated that throughout history, insurgency has seldom been defeated and instead they've been ultimately defeated by indigenous forces and then secured by the forces in the country and in the long run the goals can only be achieved and secured by the afghan forces and transition and then is the linchpin of the strategy not merely the way out. let me ask this, how do you make sure that the linchpin doesn't break and as you stated this is been a long and difficult and

costly campaign hell do we make sure in the transition that there is enough time and space for the ansf, the afghan local police, the government in fact to make sure that they stood up and that they can actually have a chance of being successful in pushing things forward, and then as a follow-on to that, as you are looking at conditions on the ground what will you be considering as far as capabilities in the afghan national security for scott capability of the enemy as you plan for the drawdown of the troops? >> the process of transition as you know occurs across several different charge as, and each one of the trenches before they are announced to go to significant levels of detail of planning both on the isaf side and on partnership on the afghan

coordinator for the transition. he has done frankly magnificent work in the process of weeding transition but also significantly we spend a great deal of time with the director of the national security with the general of defense and the minister of interior, and we look very, very carefully at those areas that are transitioning to ensure that the ansf elements within those areas have the capacity to handle the security environment that they would ultimately have to face as that particular area transitions for example in the drongen number one, it was the very first one we chose areas that were relatively secure the time where the ansf seemed to be in pretty good shape because this was the first one. this was all new. what we've discovered is that in fact all of those areas are

actually in very good shape right now. it is in the process of transition now and we are in the process of formulating the trauner is looking very carefully to ensure we don't overburdened the corps command with regional areas in one particular area. we are looking closely to see there is a coherent partnership with the forces to be a safety net if necessary to ensure there is no regression when the time comes, so we watch very closely coming and then we monitor the area's once we have begun transition to ensure that is an irreversible process and we are going to do that for all five trenches. with regards to the conditions on the ground, obviously i am in constant contact with our intelligence organizations. we are watching very closely the state of the insurgency inside

afghanistan looking closely at the state of the insurgency inside pakistan. i think we've had very important indicators just of this year on the first of january, 2011 there were only 600 of the taliban at had free integrated on january 2,012th boilover 3,000 head reintegrated and today there's over 3600 with another 400 in the pipeline ultimately seeking to integrate. that says something about the insurgency at the grass-roots level, and because so much of the insurgency is not an idealistic and surgeons who are religious insurgency so much as an insurgency that reflects dissatisfaction locally that tells us a number of things to the foot soldiers in many respects are just tired of the fight and want to go home and they're going home and assimilating back into the communities. it also tells us that the nature of who it is they have to oppose which is an increasingly capable and pervasive afghan national security force is the force they

don't want to have to fight so they are going home and they've got opportunities with improved local governments and improve economic opportunities of the local level. it's not the same all across the country and there have been setbacks in some places of the country, but many of the grievances that ultimately sent these insurgents to join the taliban and the insurgency i think we can take some positive indicators away the conditions of changed in some respects that prompt both of the advent of the local police, very quickly in many of these populations but also the large numbers of the counterinsurgency to have reintegrated. >> thank you, mr. chairman. first of all, dr. miller, when you look at the end state in terms of let's say our conventional ground units gone from the country i suspect we

saw after 2014 may be some advisory presence and maybe some special operations personnel to do counterterrorism operations. would you estimate the cost back to be? >> your sense of the mission appears right to me including counterterrorism. at this point, it's impossible. >> i am referring to the cost of the u.s. taxpayer for the cost of the international support to the afghan government to sustain the security forces and what support they would expect after 2014. >> we've had a discussion about what appropriate and necessary sustained level of contribution is for the afghan national security forces overtime. as we have discussed new can think of it as a sense of what

is the approximate cost to sustain the three injured 52,000 which is where we are which is where the 30,000 today and growing debt three and a 52,000 for the ansf. there is a cost associated with that and we are looking the international community to begin to pay a portion of that to be starting to the estimate is it $4 billion less in that figure is it $4 billion? >> shiastan three to 52,000 we suspect would be more than that. >> to sustain at a lower number, it will be further down the road at a point in time when the insurgency have been further degraded and smaller the number of $4 billion or a little lower has been a part of the conversation, but i don't believe that that is, certainly at this point the final answer for the cost of the given force

nor do i think it reflects a final answer on the implicit side at a given point in time. so i would say that the number that we know today is we're going to treated 52,000 for the afghan security forces that at some point we expect that that will come down. we don't know the timing of that and because we don't know the timing of that more the level that will go beyond 2014i can't give you a good estimate of the cost of the people are certainly making various estimates and some of those estimates have accurately and inaccurately appeared. estimate general allen, would you define our security objectives in afghanistan as keeping al qaeda out, keeping the taliban in the country, and having some type of a base of

operation whereby we can launch a the counterterrorism strikes such as the one we did recently taking out osama bin laden? >> i would be very careful about the third as an articulation at this juncture first of all there has been no discussion about the afghan government per say the u.s. presence post 2014. we anticipate concluding the strategic partnership accord in the not distant future, and in conjunction with that conversation we will begin to have the discussions with the afghans about what a force might look like. at this juncture it is largely about the of roles and functions that might be undertaken. there will probably be a counterterrorism presence, but will not be to operate in the region. it will be counterterrorism

presence to prevent al qaeda within afghanistan for finding itself operationally irrelevant safe haven which it does not have now. >> let me just say i am torn on this mission having served in the marine corps i've been in meetings where we had to convince the tribal leaders were convinced tribal leaders to cooperate with us knowing that if we let them down they would be dead, that al qaeda would come back, the insurgents would come back and would kill them, and i believe we have a moral obligation here even though i believe was a wrong path for america. spread without giving them structural governments that doesn't fit the culture of the country without trying to change the entire culture and without trying to give them the economy they never had the u.s. taxpayer

expense yield bac. >> mr. space? >> thank you, mr. chairman. general, at the start of the meeting one of the statements that you made is that our goal is to keep the taliban from overflowing to the government into my al qaeda sue payton. those are the very distinctly different goals. i but like to focus if you will on envy overthrowing the afghan government committed the ties of the afghan government is making with china and many reports of their suggest that china has supported a peace process according to the taliban and the afghanistan government, and if you look at the amount of the foreign aid that the government has sent to afghanistan somewhere around 40 billion where china has approximately

58 million there is approximately a trillion dollars worth of natural resources and afghanistan, the contract seems to be signed with china for china to actually receive the contracts and the financial benefits that are quite honestly a loss of life and the blood and money from the u.s. taxpayer, and i guess my question is if china and is the one that has set themselves up to reap a windfall and the rewards from the natural resources of afghanistan and the united states is not going to have the trade ties if you will for anything other than the essentially trinkets and rugs, why shouldn't china would bear

the cost of ensuring of the taliban doesn't overflow -- overturn the afghan government instead of the u.s. taxpayer? >> well, that's 10% question and i wouldn't disagree that china ought to be asked to provide some of that support in the long term. but of course there are other countries that are involved ultimately afghanistan's future, and afghanistan is choosing to have relationships with them as well. the indian government for example is whom we have very strong relations and appears to be policed, ultimately not just to have a substantial the economic interest or perhaps even eclipsing the chinese interest, but a stronger economic interest in afghanistan but also has long-term ties, very healthy and friendly ties with afghanistan, and in fact it is offering to support the development of the afghan national security forces.

so, i think it's not just a matter of china, i think that they're going to be other international factors that are at play in afghanistan. it's been a general, if i may come you said that india has offered, i assume there's a financial number that they have offered to help with the afghan forces which is has china offered a significant dollar figure or is it -- >> i will have to do the research on that and i will take that question >> if i could just add that obviously we want the afghan economy to improve over time, we want it over time to be self-sufficient and we talk about that being a long road. what we expect for the united states is we are able to compete on a level playing field, and that our companies can go in for the industries and all the industries not just the localized small-scale once, and we've made that expectation

clear and our companies have had an opportunity to compete, but part of helping afghanistan take the next steps to get on its feet economically over a long period of time is in fact going to help it create those opportunities internationally not just for the united states but other countries as well and i believe that will compete effectively over time. >> from my standpoint i'm not talking about exploiting afghanistan, and talking about the fact that china is essentially exploiting our men and women in the military and the united states taxpayer by having us to the burden in both blood and money for quite honestly is an area where china is going to be the one that reaps the windfall benefits of stability in afghanistan, and if they are not willing -- i don't understand where the benefit for the u.s. citizen comes and

spending $10 billion a month if 21 months from now the end result is going to be the same we are going to be out of there and we will have lost more men and women and have spent more money and yet china is going to step in and is capable of stepping in right now. >> thank you mr. chairman. estimate the time has expired. >> think all of you for being here. general, appreciate your team being here. i know you put on that uniform you do a great deal for the cause of freedom. i have to point out a special greeting here to the commander who has been a friend of mine for a very long time ever since he was a little boy. no, that isn't quite right but thank you for being here coming and i wanted to suggest first of all that it is my opinion and there is the context for the question here that the date certain and the drawdown has articulated by the administration in my judgment has had a determined cultic on

our overall mission and other commanders in the ground in a difficult position. but i wanted to follow-up with the representative willson's question regarding malignant influence in afghanistan. you responded that there's a potential for the common ground between us and iran to a cooperative for the long-term benefits of afghanistan coming and you stated that you are seeking to check the - assistance between iran and afghanistan. and i guess my first thought is to you think this is possible or this common ground between us and iran as possible given the leadership in the current iranian regime, and how does the long history between iran and afghanistan provide any sort of a basis for leveraging the evens in favor of the national security come and do you know

for certain that we are effectively checking fun need assistance why iran to the insurgency, and the question is is it why is in your opinion to proceed with current drawdown given the government support to this insurgency in afghanistan? >> la questions their come sorry >> we are seeking to understand exactly what iran is doing in afghanistan. but we also understand that iran and afghanistan have their own bilateral relationship and that is an ancient and in many respects productive relationship for afghanistan, so i will not take issue with the fact that the afghan government has a relationship with iran. my issue is primarily in the area of the security, and what we understand to be the iranian assistance to certain elements of the taliban.

it hasn't been dramatic. it hasn't been pervasive, but we seek to understand it and we have interdicted that assistance, and number of occasions so we will continue to watch it very closely, and we will see if it is modulated, if it is increased when it becomes more pervasive and will have to take actions as necessary with afghanistan to check that process. >> dr. ellerbe, did you want to weigh in on that? >> if i can say very briefly, as you know, the government has also provided not only rhetorical but subjugate could support the afghan government, so what we see is in many instances a positive influence, but just as general allen talked about, if that same time in another part of the country we have seen the support for the insurgency, so what we would obviously like to do is encourage the continued support for the government in kabul and various means including the

introduction general allen talked about to eliminate any incentives for supporting the insurgency. is my guess it just occurred to me given the history of making the ied to blow up the troops iraq shouldn't engender a great deal of trust on our part for the potential of using the relationship in afghanistan to the benefit. i'm not sure that there is a basis for that to the people on the ground i suggest that there seems to be a general pattern here and i am just wondering what the drawdown, and the date certainly has done to the overall at least the psychological array of our enemies attitude towards continuing to resist the efforts of freedom in afghanistan.

general, if you have any other. >> we haven't seen the signature weapons in afghanistan that we saw frequently in southern iraq and the would be a clear indicator that things have changed dramatically. >> thank you. mr. sherman, thank you que we get to committees of the same time, so i have to bring together one. thank you very much. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and of course i would like to thank our distinguished guests for being here today and for your service to the country. i was just wondering if the general had a screw bubble above that we just can't see because he ran out of uniform for all of his prestigious ribbons and medals. estimate your kind to ask why try to stay above the water most of the time. >> , an arab leader. estimate i perfectly understand. i would like to say, you know, it's kind of fascinating that we are talking about afghanistan the subject in china comes up. we go to the pacific region and

of course you expect to hear china and a free country the subject comes up. this morning i was talking about the arctic and china can about how they are building the icebreakers to begin i guess going out there to try to lay claim some the arctic ocean or wherever for the resources because we know they are definitely a resource driven country comes of that is just something i guess this committee is going to be hearing lots of but i'm glad you're all here today. i have been hearing some questions and i guess it is related to a lot of the incidents that have been taking place in afghanistan by some of our american service members, one is the kuran burning and by a member of the military and other things, and our concern is immediately in this 24 slash fax seven - cycle and the internet and things of this nature people

are thinking we are going to turn over american service members to the afghan government to be tried, and to possibly be punished. of course personally i would hope that you would validate what i'm thinking that that is never going to happen. it's not going to happen in these cases. but could you just elaborate on that, anyone? >> the current relationship that we have with afghanistan permits us at this juncture to prosecute the cases under the u.s. law, and we intend to do so. >> and that is based on the status of forces agreement? said, is it a possibility that this administration can say that's great, turn them over to the afghan government? >> i'm not the one to ask stan mcconaughy intend to work closely with the united states army and to prosecute this case

and we will do it under the u.s. law and i was clear in that discussion with president karzai >> i would just confirm that we have no such plan to do so. >> that could be an option if so chosen. i mean, just there's nothing barring turning over u.s. service member to the afghan government to be tried. clearly our men and women have some some form of protection from -- so as the general mentioned there is the status of forces agreement which is understood that we have that right, and we have given every indication that that is the way that we will proceed. >> okay. i am not trying to go anywhere with that. i was just curious because i hear that and there are some concerns but as of now we are not going to let that happen and that's good and we need to make sure that never happens, period

and if we have to do something legislatively to codify that. next question, what is the mood of our young in co serving in afghanistan in light of, you know, the decade or i know some of them may be on their second or third tour, some on the first, some of them trying to get into the action before it's over. i understand how a young military minds think. shiastan overall short opinion. >> i asked my sergeant major his view and his view is that the small is high. the troops are focused on a mission. ten years into this conflict they are as professional as we have ever seen. the noncommissioned officers of our armed forces in particular the u.s. army and the united states marine corps who have on a day-to-day basis been in close contact with the enemy where the

benefits for the event to ultimately occurs in the counterinsurgency is a small unit noncommissioned officer and a junior officer leadership and they are magnificent frankly. and after this long in this conflict to see the morale as high as it is, the professionalism as high as it is, and as you said, the desire to continue to serve speaks well for the young men and women of the united states. >> thank you. my time is expired. >> thank you, general. there are one final question to the there are many detainee's currently held in the u.s. detention facilities in afghanistan whom the u.s. forces have identified as enduring security threats to the united states. some of these detainees are afghans and some are a third country nationals. the recent understanding regarding the transition of the detention operations in afghanistan does not provide a separate plan for the afghan

detainees who pose an extraordinarily high threat. it requires the united states to transition all afghan detainee's to the custody of afghanistan within six months. the state of afghanistan will consider favorably the u.s. input regarding whether to release a particular detainee, but given the current posture of the afghan government, this is not very reassuring. i'm concerned about history repeating itself here. and iraq we waited until the last minute to deal with this issue and that particular example is not one that we should be seeking to repeat. in light of the new, what is your plan regarding the handling of the high value detainees both afghans and third country nationals to ensure that these individuals will not pose a threat to the united states in the future? >> i will defer to dr. miller in a moment. but should there be a disagreement with the afghans,

should there be an intention expressed to release one of the detainees that they control we express our desire that they not -- they will give favorable consideration, if in fact they continue to design your to release the detainee that question will then go to a bilateral commission which has been established within the memorandum of understanding. the chair on the u.s. side and a share on the afghan side of the bilateral commission is commander of isaf and the minister of defense where we will have the conversation ultimately whether the individual should be released or not. so i believe we will ultimately be able to resolve this to our benefit within the bilateral commission if they don't take our initial desire to be their decision alternately. with respect to the third country nationals, the remains to be determined. we have not yet addressed that

and we will do that in the future. >> mr. chairman, could i add just everything that general allen said is right. i just want to add to it, and that is in addition to the transition effort that is underway and being led by general allan there's an interagency task force that is focused on the question including the third country nationals held to deal with high-value detainees, and we are working very closely with the team in a theater and we understand these issues need to be addressed and we need to have a conversation to get started with you and your colleagues as well. it's relatively at the front end, but we know that six months is not that much time so we look forward to having that conversation as it progresses. islamic the concern that we have is the detainee is that have been released have returned to

the fight to me and we find that they have fairly high percentage of gone back to killing americans can't we want to make sure that we avoid that. >> thank you for being here. i think that we have cleared up a lot of questions and i hope that this is beneficial. i hope it will be because the american people understand more clearly what is happening in afghanistan and the progress we are making. thank you very much. the committee stands adjourned. [applause] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations]

treasury secretary to jim guy tar told lawmakers that steps taken by european policymakers have helped the global financial market but more needs to be done to stabilize the european economy. psychiatry geithner testified before the house financial services committee for two and a half hours. congressman john hensarling is the acting chairman for the

hearing. >> [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] >> this hearing will come to order. the purpose of the hearing today is to receive the annual

testimony of the secretary of treasury on the state of the international financial system. the chair would note the very notable absence of our chairman to become chairman baucus who is undergoing minor surgical procedure. he is expected to rejoin us tomorrow. he regrets his absence. pursuant to rule 3f to of the committees on financial services for the 112th congress the commerce announces the recognition of opening statements will be limited to the chair and ranking minority member of the full committee. and the chair and the ranking minority member of the subcommittee on international monetary policy and trade or the respective designees to a. not to exceed 16 minutes evenly divided between the majority in the minority. all members written statements will be made a part of the record. the chair now recognizes himself

for five minutes for an opening statement. clearly our economy is linked and intertwined with many others as a special year-end. almost all agree that your's failure to adequately address its debt crisis can adversely affect our domestic economy. the president has gone as far as to say, quote, the biggest headwind the american economy is facing is uncertainty in europe. i respectfully disagree. given the current domestic exposures to european debt, the strategies and plans and current account balances i do not believe europe's problems are as threatening to us as they once were. the greater threat to our economy is not well confront the debt crisis and we will not successfully cut for mars. although it remains the world's current currency we are beginning to see some changes in the armor although the economy still remains the flight to safety, the question is for how long. interest rates remain historically low due to the

fed's troubling balance sheets this massive intervention is just masking true market interest rates. the making it easier for the administration to service the debt on the nation's first, second and third trillion dollar plus deficit. everyone knows our debt is unsustainable, and as economist perlstein famously observed, something cannot go on forever it will stop. the unsustainable that the administration's stated that there is encouraging signs in our economic recovery, and i agree. but after three years, they're continues to be too many discouraging signs. unemployment has now exceeded 8% for 47 straight months, the longest span of high unemployment since the great depression. when one ads in the people have simply given up and left the labour force, those who have part-time work yet seek full-time, the true unemployment rate should actually be considered to be 15.2%. according to the world bank, the ease of starting a business in

the u.s. has not fallen from fourth in the world to 14th. according to the bureau almost half the nation is now classified as either low-income or living in poverty. gas prices have doubled. if this too slow and too weak recovery had achieved the average growth rate in the previous postwar recessions, gdp per person would be $4,528 higher and 13.7 million more americans will be working today. the american people know we can do better. perhaps more importantly, as they see europe grappling with their debt crisis they see no evidence that we are confronting our unknown. the president took office the national debt has increased 45%. from 10.6 to 15.4 trillion debt held by the public. a gross debt rather, the administration just released a few weeks ago they would add another 11 trillion on top of that. what is most ironic is we convened a hearing that was

largely focused on the european debt crisis that when you look at the numbers the u.s. is the worst debt to gdp ratio than those to your autozone to read there's no greater threat to our recovery than our own fiscal trajectory. unfortunately the president's approach to europe appears to be to house i say but not as i do. the president knows what the cause is. the major driver of our long-term debt is medicare, medicaid and the health care spending nothing comes close. i agree there's nothing in the budget to reform the programs and i'm not the only one to take note. the "los angeles times" editorialist quote as it's past time for the administration to lay out a plan for bringing the deficit and debt under control. sadly obama's budget proposal shows he would rather wait until after the reelection to have that reckoning. the boston herald editorial, quote, barack obama has apparently decided that he is not going to be part of the

solution to the nation's enormous deficit, which would make him, yes, part of the problem. as we discuss issues facing the year goes on i want to make two things clear. one, we cannot continue to ignore our own unconscionable and unsustainable debt. second, u.s. taxpayers should not be expected to and cannot afford to bail out foreign countries. i'm encouraged that the administration stated it does not plan to seek additional funding for the imf. the imf announced its intention to expand its lending activity through bilateral loans and when it does the u.s. tax payers will be increasingly exposed to greater risk as the u.s. has a 17.5% equity stake in all of the imf loan operations. on the amex is venturing into uncharted territory. never before has it lent money to countries on the scale that it has to greece, ireland and portugal. in our discussion today the

secretary will shed light on what we can expect the administration to oppose on a long-term plan that will prevent the united states from bringing on the road to becoming the next greece. mr. secretary, i look for which your testimony and i will yield back the balance of my time. at this time the chair recognizes the ranking minority member for five minutes. >> atacama supplies to that in the last 30 seconds of his statement the chairman managed to talk about the subject of this hearing but most of the fighting was an inaccurate part of an attack on the general fiscal policy of the united states, and i remember a time when there were people on the conservative side who accused liberals of taking a blame america first strategy saying everything was america's fault. apparently that practice has switched sides, because we have a situation in which mr. bernanke said people sometimes forget ben bernanke was the single most important economic appointee to president george w. bush for the council

of economic advisers and federal reserve and mr. bernanke has agreed with president obama that the european situation is one of the major threats to our being able to continue our recovery and at a time when it is generally recognized by economic analysts that america did a better job of dealing with the crisis in europe where america has been helpful to try to get to move the there was still serious problems the germans as know it's america's fault europe should be apparently the example for us even though if you look at the developed world economies today, america is performing far better than any other european economy. the european economies are not doing here as well when economic growth as we are the chairman would rather make a partisan attack on the administration. what he does get to into the international situation it does seem to me he gets it very from. he does acknowledge that there is some impact from the european debt crisis, but he is somewhat

critical of our effort to deal with a particularly the imf, the notion that we should use our voting power of the international monetary fund to keep them from participating in a tripartite effort to deal with the european crisis is economics of destruction. the fact is the volume that is playing a very important role. it has been somewhat successful so far in helping and in the decision to the americas and to prevent any imf purchase a pigeon in an effort to stabilize the situation in europe would have a disastrous effect on the american economy. a disaster effect would also have a negative effect on the president's reelection and perhaps that mitigates in some people's mind the negative economic effect. but the notion that we should try to stop the idf from the constructive participation is economic mindlessness. but then we did talk about the deficit and then the chairman seems to be blaming america

first in the european view on debt and their actions to our we welcome the europeans have one great advantage with regard to trying to cut their debt. the different source to their defense to the united states taxpayer. if the european nations, our nato allies, the e.u. members were spending a percentage of their gdp comparable to ours, their debt would be far greater and conversely if we were being able to reduce our gdp spending on defense to being able only twice the average european allies, we would be making greater progress. the german courts the presidency in medicare and medicaid for the greatest drivers. i don't recall what president said that but i think that is wrong. i think that the excessive military spending which in some cases is donilon and which is increasingly at insuring to be few in afghanistan, the united

states taking over as it has since world war to the defense for japan, the defense for germany and for other wealthy nations, that is a major factor, so to talk about the europeans as models of how to deal with their debt and denounce america for how your dad and ignore the fact that the major part of that is that we are carrying the the defense, let's join in cutting it and i would say on that i'm having a hard time reconciling my republican colleagues professions but it's important to cut the deficit and keep the taxes the same with a decision to get more military involved in iran, with a criticism of the president to talk about withdrawing from afghanistan and getting out of iraq. i do not understand how the republicans were critical of the president for not spending tens and tens and perhaps hundreds of billions over the next few years and he is predicting a reconciling that with the notion we must cut the deficit and now

like the chairman i will close by getting to the subject, we have a very important issue here. there is a debt crisis and you're not that is threatening america. we get the best performing of the economy but it isn't giving good enough. one of the major threats of that would be the crisis in europe. i support with the administration and the federal reserve has done to deal with that and that includes support for the imf. some of the chair now recognizes the chairman of the subcommittee on international monetary policy and trade for three minutes. the gentleman from california >> 63 it's good to have you here. it's been awhile since we have seen you and then very available to us and very informative of helping us with issues to be the there's just a concern. i know when we went through our crisis it was very cautious staying over there and that was an american problem. we are very cautious and not become too. the imf has been very good in giving advice and direction, they should do to resolve their

exposure to the european crisis, but we are concerned that it is not transported over to us. now, we understand the nexus between the trade and the financial-services sector that we have between the countries, this hearing today is very important because we need to really understand where we are going and where the administration is doing and where we end up, and we don't want to end up with their debt in our lap and american taxpayers are concerned and that is in the accusation that is a general concern. i have said all along the european problem is a european problem. now, no doubt at all that we are connected with them, but we need to inflate the u.s. taxpayers and the problem is it is being exported to us. there's a huge interconnectedness between the trade and the financial markets and that is a good reason for this hearing today. and i hope he can give us your objectives and your insight on where you think we are going on that. there's a serious concern in the resources are going to be used in the zone and if that happens the largest shareholder in on

emf is and be used as a bailout and is going to be falling back on us and i hope that in your comment to you can address that because that is a huge concern to us. we are trying to come out of our crisis and i'm going to restate again when we were going through are used to be coerced time commune of -- and your involvement was very concerned about not being a european crisis but a u.s. problem, and we need to resolve it ourselves, and this committee has the same beliefs. yes, we are concerned about your wpm yes, concerned about the crisis to we want to assist them any way we can put the financial burden should not fall back on this country to resolve their problems over there. ..