problem it requires different actors. in some cases you need judges translating the existing text in light of the technologies. the jones case is such a heartening example of the court's willingness to do that, to take technology that the ferris could not have anticipated and protect the same amount of privacy in the 21st century as they would have demanded the 18th. in other cases the constitution does not speak and we need new regulations and statutes. it is that federal trade communication investigation of google, exemplary and some suggest that you will should be regulated like a public utility or facebook should be nationalized or there should be at the very least new electronic privacy statutes that prohibit year location of data from being shared without consent. does the bill pending in congress and the state's. and in yet other cases political activism is crucial. i have to adjust tell the inspiring story because i think

it's such a hopeful one. the body scanning machines at the airports. i began a book in 2004 with this example that was then science fiction. imagine that the government installs and airports body scanning machines that can reveal plastics and contraband, anything concealed under clothing, but also show you completely naked. at the same time the government does not have to install these machines because it is just been presented with an alternative called the blog machine. takes the contraband and plans to the narrow that takes the naked body and scrambles into a blob like 67 talk. back then i said given the choice between the naked machine in the blood you think it would be a no-brainer. in fact, things turned out very differently. science-fiction hypothetical came to pass a few years later. instead of picking the blob the u.s. government insisted on the naked machine.

and it took a political protest galvanized by the immortal cry of patrick henry in the privacy movement, the gel men who stand don't touch my junk. [laughter] that led an alleged citizenry to rise up and to demand a greater degree of privacy. officially embarrassed to told the security to go back to the drawing board to be shocked to discover that they could, in fact and retrofit the machines to create the same machine technology that they had been presented with nearly a decade earlier, so i think it was a terrible regulatory failure, but it just shows in the end when people have -- we citizens have to care enough about privacy to demand it, and when we do the government will respond. >> modern-day rosa parks. [laughter] you have written a lot of bipartisan judicial restraint, and worrying about the court's getting too far front on issues

and a kind of judicial unilateralism. one opinion they you have focused on as plunking that test is a form of unilateralism that got too far out ahead of american opinion and compromise the court's sense of being a neutral institutions. so of course it's more about casey. but many think we are one vote away from possibly and doing it. as there is an ardent privacy person and somebody who has rightly so, i think, talk about privacy as not something that you would be hooked to, antiquated notions of physical and vases of the sort, but more autonomy and maybe not dignity, but autonomy. would you reconsider in 2012 where there was a good idea and perhaps a good bull work of

other liberties or put another way, if it goes what happens to privacy law? >> the fascinating question. i have long been the art and pro-choice skeptic, the fierce supporter of the right to choose, but i thought that when it was decided in 1973 it left dead -- leapt ahead of public opinion, not as protection of relief, but in its refusal to allow the regulation of later term abortion. i do say in the book you read that the decision in 1992 more precisely expressed the sentiment of the modern majority of the country. fiercely protecting early term choice but allowing the restriction of later turned choice, and that, since then they have suggested about two-thirds of the country supports the right to choose early on. seventy and 80% report support restrictions.

so you're absolutely right. there have been a lot of alarm is about the supreme court and presidents of elections for a long time. just naturally we can say, there will be a difference of opinion about what the right answer is, but if the republicans won the white house's time it is very likely to be overturned. the votes are there. things ranging from affirmative action to campaign finance and so forth. at this point i very much believe that this decision has been reaffirmed so many times that the country has come to depend on it in so many ways that it will be a gross act of judicial activism. i hope the court doesn't, but then you ask, could is applied to other minor issues involving privacy in the economy? and the irony has become really interesting. so the decision of upholding famously said that the core of liberty is the right to find one's own conception and meaning

of the universe, mystery of human life. justice scalia ridiculed this as a sweet mystery of life. but it was to purple, but the truth is that the sweet mystery of life notion of autonomy could be a great way of regulating gps tracking. if i have a basic way to define myself i control my identity and to be free from coercive pressures to behave in a certain way in the government should not be able to use the facebook system to track me 24 / seven. almost a more natural way of regulating gps tracking and property rights. here is an even more surprising irony. one of the briefs in the health care challenge that the supreme court is about to hear at the end of march focused not on the idea of congress having limited powers under the commerce clause to regulate the economy because after all, many libertarians believe that neither congress nor the state should have the right to pass a health care mandate to force you to buy health care or as i like to say

eat broccoli or go to health clubs. there is that wonderful moment in the presidential republican debate where mitt romney was trying to defend his health care mandate say what we did in massachusetts was okay, but the federal version doesn't. what's the difference said michele bachmann. well, massachusetts is a state. the states to do with it want. bachmann said i think that the states nor congress should be able to do this, and she invoked this basic notion of autonomy which is spelled out in one of the briefs in the health care case which cites none other than roe v. wade. justice kennedy's opinion in the sweet mystery case where they say the right to define your own consumption of the meaning of life should prevent the government from telling you to buy health care. that is the completely intellectually coherent position my friends at the cato institute, a libertarian think tank in washington, are fiercely pro-choice, pro gay marriage and anti health care mandate. they want to restrict the government from making as by health care or telling us we can

mario will begin do with the bodies. justice kennedy is the only justice on the supreme court who has some sympathy for those views. do i expect you would cited to strike down the mandate, no. he would not go that far. as with the other conservatives, scalia and collegial and roberts, this is bound to make their heads bowed to refer them it is the root of all constitutional evil. who says it must, the case involving economic freedom of contract. robert bork. it won't have any of it. that's why we're talking about other subjects. i've gotten out of the prediction business when it comes to this. but given the fact that scalia, roberts, and alito have embraced a rather broad vision of congress' power allowing the federal government, for example, to overturn medical marijuana laws, i was surprised when two of the most respected conservatives upheld the health

care mandate under the commerce clause without any trouble. they just dismissed summarily a challenge. as long as the supreme court sticks to the commerce clause challenge in doesn't invoke these privacy issues, which i don't expect them to, then a decision upholding health care by a comfortable margin would not be a surprise. >> it's not just a comparison, but he has compared dread scott. so i have one final question because i want to give the audience a chance. the new publisher and editor in chief who looks like a four year-old, very young person. he got a letter to the new republic leaders, and he said nearly a century after the inaugural issue of the new republic people, once again skeptical that quality journalism can flourish, technology destruction of traditional forms of media has

led many to believe that independent thoughtful media institutions are on the decline and there are not enough readers to support serious reporting and analysis. obviously this young man we are all grateful for putting his money down on the contrary point of view. my sense is of all the forms of writing that are so spectacularly good, this kind of green tea s.a. for highly motivated readers seem to be in the sweet spot of what your best that. and they're getting everything. what do you think? is he right? is this campbell a good one, are we not going to have the new republic which is almost 100 years old 15 years from now? >> absolutely thrilled. i missed the meeting workers used to lay out his vision because i was coming in here, but people live absolutely delighted. suddenly it feels like this destitution which has been my home for 20 years, and just nurtured, everything that i've loved about writing, but before

this and not sure i would have said that it would have continued and 100 years. suddenly there is a great sense of optimism because chris hughes combines obviously the resources and familiarity with social media tell allow journalism to flourish but also an understanding that it's not supposed to be the huffington post and is not all about money. he was clarifying and refreshing candor, no. he understands that the magazines have never made money. the new republic has been heavily subsidized ever since it was founded in 1914. the idea that he is willing to use his resources to support this in bottled public good and which is slowed a former journalism which takes time and a lot of commitment and he wants to both pay writers to do and how best to get out there is really exciting. godspeed and i hope to public

before deciding what happens. >> so are we. we have time for maybe two questions. if you come to the microphone and pitch them to mr. rosen, but we have to be out of the room promptly at 1230. professor? >> thank you. you have said that the jones case was heartening as an example. yet it seems to me the true opinions take diametrically opposed approaches to and to bring the constitution. embodying the debate that has been going on between regionalism and a living constitution. so are you saying both the pen is heartening example? if not, which? >> i think they both are. i prefer alito, and i was surprised that the justice did not join the decision rather than. she said since begin decided nearly all go away, but they're both heartening because she took

the loss of property, not a feeling, but a floor. saying that it's true that there might be protections for data that gives access, but at the very least whenever there is a physical invasion before the men and is triggered. the same spirit that led scully it said that when there inside the house and move a stereo a tiny bit. or formal imaging to -- imaging technology that reveals how much he was being emitted from the onset of the house had to have a war because it could reveal intimate information inside the house by the hour of the day the lady was having a daily some of. so i think scully is attempting within the constraints of his original list methodology to transit the constitution. i don't think it's going to give him all the way to saving us from 24 / seven surveillance which i think is why his approach. but i found it incurred in that all the justices rejected the simplistic in the domestic notion that there is no expectation of privacy in public

and all struggled to try a chance to the constitution. >> is that really true or is it just my imagination? second, if it is true, why? and secondly, interesting that this seemed to be happening at the same time when you have all this decline of moderate republicans and democrats and everybody being polarized. all happening on the same courser is this something different? what is your opinion? >> really interesting question. again, i am torn in different directions. so when john roberts first took office as chief justice and get to interview him. he expressed distress with the partisanship and said he was going to try to a encourage his

colleagues to converge around there unanimous opinions and felt this would be good for the court. was very impressed. some people thought to impressed. my wife decided that developed a man crushed. definitely not. you know, i was kind of rooting for an. i was surprised to see how many polarized back-and-forth is is is there were priestesses united, affirmative action, all of these could support your suggestion that the court is like congress, that the left and right have gotten so far apart that there we will compromise and that the metal has disappeared. on the other hand, there are some surprising examples. the jones case is one. i would not have expected that nine justices, liberal and conservative when all will against a democratic administration position when it comes to surveillance. and if my and gently offered thought that the court mineable health care by a bipartisan majority, if it does robert

should get some credit for that. whether he gets creditor not, the supreme court should get credit for having avoided a narrow division. on the other hand, you know, the affirmative-action case. i think that the truth is that the court is being pushed in a direction that we are seeing. so destructive. but occasionally philosophy trump's over ideology, and that's why we see it happening in cases like that i want to celebrate it as much possible. >> i apologize. i've been instructed we have to stop. please join me in thanking mr. rosen. [applause] >> up next, a panel discussion of president obama's foreign policy successes and failures. taking part in discussion or three co-authors of bending

history. this is about an hour and 20 minutes. >> good morning and welcome to the brookings institution. i appreciate your all here on time despite the time change. that's impressive. it's my great pleasure to be moderating i guess introducing these three gentlemen here who have produced a fascinating book called bending history, barack obama's foreign policy. there's nothing more difficult than trying to write what is in effect contemporary history to analyze and administration while it is still in place. such an action, endeavor must be taken with a bit of modesty and humility. and the children have all displayed that i think that

everyone knows that things are going to be seen differently in the future than they have been, then they may be now. high reminded of the book that i recall from breaking years called landslide, and it was written sort of right at the height of the iran-contra crisis. it's under the basis of the book was when his finish is going to go down in history as a total disaster, and i was look back on that as one of the perils of trying to predict the future based on what is happening at exactly this moment. but i think all these authors are aware of that issue as they have approached this. let me just introduce the authors. no, right is martin indyk, vice president, director foreign policy program at brookings. my boss, all of our bosses. ken lieberthal, director of the

center, senior fellow of foreign policy, global economy and development at brookings. and from the far right is michael o'hanlon, senior fellow and where he specialized in u.s. defense strategy. all of these gentlemen are highly experienced. they have been practitioners as well as scholars, and bring a wealth of understanding i think, and particularly in dealing with an issue like this, trying to evaluate a president foreign policy, bring a lot of historical and comparative understanding. i think it's very easy to look at a presidency either in isolation our own in comparison to the last presidency. but, of course, there was a broader historical context in which we have to look at the obama administration, and this

book really does put into that context. so i thought i would just ask, try to start a discussion here, talk about some of the issues that are raised and then i'm simply open it up to you for your questions as well. i wanted to start with the basic concept and martin, maybe i'll ask you to describe the concept. i think you described obama as a pragmatic progressive, a progressive pragmatic, which is at? is that different from a pragmatic progressive? will have to explore that. the answer is no. okay. i'm always, i have to say i'm always suspicious when i hear the word pragmatic. because in the first place people generally think that whatever they're doing is pragmatic and whatever people disagree with them is doing is not pragmatic. but more generally i always want

to know, pragmatic into what and? what is the purpose of pragmatism? it seems to me a tactic rather than a doctrine. it seems to be that pragmatism in some direction. in the book i often see the definition of pragmatism seems to be maintain good relations with dictators. that's described as a pragmatic policy on several occasions in this book. but having said that, i would love to hear your definition of that phrase is. >> first of all, the title of the book "bending history" is taken from an adaptation of president obama's favorite quotation, which is a quote from martin luther king, jr., his favorite speech in alabama and

he was asked how long, how long will it take? not long, because the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends towards justice. and the fact that this was a famous quote and he uses it on several very important occasions, like when president mubarak step down as president of egypt, it's i think emblematic of the view of what he's trying to change. that's the progressive side. as mike can explain in greater detail, he spent a lot of time on the campaign trail. not just establishing himself from george w. bush, but laying out a vision, a broad and

dramatic vision, changing the world. improving the world. and this is barack obama's progressive decision, which he sees a more humble united states, changing of the balance of power so that you is so much better. but we do so in the process of shaping it that involves new powers, in particular china, but others as well, india and turkey. but in the process, maintains a limited national order and bins it towards justice and freedom and progress and prosperity. and that's a vision, which he sold to the american people, he

sold too much of the world as well, not surprisingly, was not that easy to implement, especially when he faced day one, the great recession, and had to focus on that necessarily. but all the time, all along the way we see him looking for the opportunities to advance his vision. but doing it in a way that is pragmatic. mike coined a term reluctant realistic, so it is pragmatic in the sense of being a realist in his approach, but he's not just adjusting to events and trying to the best he can. we do feel that he has a strong sense of where he wants to take america and the world, and what

has emerged in his first three years is that there is a considerable gap between the vision and the result. and that's partly because of who he is, because he's not just a progressive, not just a liberal. he is a compromiser. we see that so much in the way that he handled politics to receive very clear in the way he handles foreign policy. you can make the argument that that's good, that's been good for the country and we do argue that, in terms of bottom line, the nation's interest has been fairly well protected. but there's no breakthrough. there's no inspirational transformational events under the presidency. what there is, and i think he would accept this, is kind of

slow progress where he can make it towards the overall objective of improving the world. spill my, you want to jump in, but let me pose this. in theory isn't possible that ultimately the the pragmatism overwhelms the progressivism, or the progressivism undoes the pragmatism? it's a very nice so postulated perfect balance between pragmatism and progressivism but in the real world of course they may clash, and i think it might even -- do you want to take a crack at that and expand on what martin said? >> i will add over there. i think on broader issues the grand strategy envisioned he really has been too ambitious, that to some extent the world intervened and had to deal with crises and the immediate

challenge is that in some cases were greater than he could have possibly until spring when he began his campaign as president and other cases, what any president does with an inbox. but if you think that having sold the big visions about dramatically reducing global poverty and dublin for a don't do that, about repairing the breach with the united states and the islamic world, pursuing nuclear disarmament, not just proliferation but disarmament as a goal. indian global warming, or lacemaking a major dent on that. having all the big ideas on his campaign in a way that frankly was so good as a rhetoric that people found him believable and who's going to try to do all these things. he created an expectation staff and attest that the challenge for him, and if he wins reelection about what will his final big priority be. and it's a time not to try to emphasize one of those big goals as opposed to just using the five or six dramatic visions as the cornerstone of speeches, but

not really using them in governance very much. and of all those things we now have to add one more, which is, and this is where we in the book, which is the severity of the american financial crisis. because without making headway on that, it's not just a problem for him, it's a problem how washington works and the country work. without doing that he can't do anything else ultimately in terms of pursuing his big vision. ken lieberthal has ken lieberthal haswell empathizes push and talk about east asia in the book, we are perceived as the big financial power despite all this rebalancing, despite a lot of the tactical moves that jeff and others have very well carried out, we are still in a funnily perilous position at a time when the trillion dollar deficits. that's not compatible in the end with a strong foreign policy record. we are generally favorable or i'm generally favor on obama and what is done so far but when he raised the question of the big visions and where he wants to go does have the fundamental

challenge that continues to face him. >> all presidents whenever and for office let big visions that they don't carry out. let's turn to ken. ken, i read all, the whole book carefully but i've looked throughout your chapter in particular on china looking for the word pragmatic, and i really only found at once. i didn't have a computer search. i was actually reading the book and i found it in relation to the economic strategy of secretary of the treasury geithner. i did not find any use of the word pragmatic entrance of the overall strategy for china, particularly on the geopolitical level, particularly with regard -- the major point you make it seems to me is that there is a gap and potentially a big gap between what the administration has promised in the region and what it is capable of delivering. that would suit to me to be a highly un-pragmatic approach.

do you want to expand on that point? >> no. >> no. [laughter] that i'll continue expressing your view. >> sosa, the pragmatism conduct, you're right, i don't use the term constantly -- >> or at all. >> or at all. pragmatism comes in, as you look at the entire analysis of what he did toward china. eking and hoping to bring china oncolab -- on global issues. china's rapid acceleration with big powers with interest around the world, he felt that we had to move from the oregon primary on bilateral issues and issues right around the periphery getting with him on major global issues, the financial crisis, nuclear nonproliferation, climate change, et cetera. then you see an evolution of his dealing with china as a chinese

basically prove not sufficiently responsive on the global issues. and then became more assertive in asia as the region. so you see him begin to build, put greater emphasis on stitching together a nationwide strategy, including china but also with enormous attention to india, indonesia, to japan, south korea, et cetera. so i think it's an evolution of his thinking about china issues the any pragmatism. we conclude with his articulation of this asian strategy which is highlighted most clearly in his november 2011 trip to honolulu, indonesia and australia. and they're that concerned is, on the one hand he laid out a set of initiatives relative integrated set of initiatives that were diplomatic, security, economic, and also democracy but

it was really impressive, it kind of highlighted that despite some skepticism in the region, america can walk and chew gum at the same time. we can get our mojo back, right? the soft underbelly of that is a question of credibility. are we going to be able to pull that off? and the assessment in the book is ultimately probably the biggest single factor there will be whether we can get our domestic house in order. everyone in the region as people in the united states and also around the world appreciate that america has never been outstanding for avoiding domestic problems and domestic missteps. our unique capability has been making the adjustments necessary to confront domestic crises, resolve the crisis, and emerge stronger than we were before. because the justice we made is the nature of our system to be able to do that unusually well. the big question is if we have

lost that capability, whether it has eroded or not. or when we get it back, bounce back, in which case everything he's trying to do on asia is perfectly credible. so we conclude sank effectively this whole book is about foreign policy, rightly so, but let's not forget at the end of the day, you can't have a robust strategic foreign policy and much of domestic credibility and your domestic house in order. >> the chapter also talks about, i think it's critical, the administration of these explicit into a kind of feedback loop where the chinese are worried about the united states trying to him them in. the administration is worried about china overplaying its hand. the administration responds to my feeds chinese concerns which the chinese behavior. you refer to it as a closed loop. so it seems to me if you add bad

idea that i think you're effectively saying that the administrations more recent policies are increasing tension in relations, including the increasing emphasis on democracy which is particularly and around checkpoint for the chinese regime is increasing attention while at the same time not necessary having the resources to back up a situation of increasing tension. that seems to me i would say that's a pretty strong indictment of china policy. if you think about even recent presidents. >> i guess life is complicated, you know? the democracy side of this came in, you know, obama has not had that a sinner of his foreign policy for most of his administration. it's there but not a central focus. some might say the george w. bush administration was all about democracy promotion in the arab spring. and then in asia developments in

burma drew the administration into democracy in asia where the rhetoric of that and the actual efforts vis-à-vis burma. you're right, this is especially neuralgic. obama has not pressed this. is racy constantly but not by any means the center of this policy towards china, but it worries the chinese when america has democracy high on its agenda. they see that as regime change in china. let me say as obama's tried to put together an asian strategy, with a more activist china in the region, and one that harbors deep structural distrust about american long-term intentions, they fundamentally think that america is number one, china is number two. it is an article of faith at number one is going to try to prevent number two from ever becoming number one. that casts everything we do any kind of a suspicious light in their minds. he has worked very hard on

building personal bridges with the leadership of china, trying to engage the chinese across the board. but i will say at the end of the day i think this trust over long-term intentions has grown the last few years. i think something that really much need more attention that has gotten today, create more tension on both sides are where potentially headed for very serious problems a decade from now. >> let's talk about the increasing emphasis on democracy that has occurred in the administration and i think it makes sense that is possibly responsible in terms of the arab spring. martin, i wonder if you'd like -- [inaudible] that's right. might ability to influence administration is overwhelming. but would you like to take, give us your thoughts because i know it's a complex picture in a book. one of the really good things

about this book which i commend everyone, it's actually a very meticulous walking through of what happens. it is the best kind of contemporary diplomatic and strategic history, and i found, this is true in all the chapters but i was particularly struck by the way the book walks through the various stages of the administrations response to the air spring, and a surprising because i think it is common, it would be odd if it were not true but the response has been a kind of mixed picture in terms of how the administration has approached the arab spring. i wonder if you'd like to give us a bit of an outline of how it looks to you? >> well, as ken has already said, it's complicated. barack obama did not make democracy promotions, especially in the middle east, and objective of his foreign policy. in fact, democracy promotion more generally is not something

that he saw as important, particularly because he was trying to distinction self from the, what he saw i think as a disastrous end of bush to promote democracy in the middle east. and so you see it in the national security strategy paper that the white house put out. it's kind of refer to on page 35, and it really basically made the justification for how to work with authoritarian regimes rather than overthrow them. and so it certainly wasn't on his agenda for at least in particular his first priority was resolving the israeli-palestinian conflict, which we can get back to, but is the clearest failure of foreign policy.

i think here at that particular moment, the president made a strategic judgment that was correct in my view and critically important. it had several elements. first was this is not about us. this is arabs demanding change in their governments. and we need to get out of the way. and that i think was critically important, that we not become the story because it could easily have been that way. we need to be on the side of the

people, we need to be on the right side of history. and the critical way of manifesting that strategy was to push mubarak out the door. to help the egyptian people push mubarak out the door. and that was not just in terms of how -- in the face of the revolution that is going on in the arab world. but also was important to egyptian communities, because in the process, this requires some detail, i don't think it's very well understood that he also made a judgment that it was critically important in terms of our strategic interests in the region that we helped to

preserve the role of the egyptian military, as it were, the midwives of the democratic transition. now, it didn't quite work out that well, but he at least did actively engaged with the military and get them not to fire on the people. and to preserve the role as the agents for change. and so, yeah, why do i say egypt is most important? because it's the largest most powerful culturally important geostrategic late most centrally located country in the arab world. one in four arabs is an egyptian, and it's the cornerstone of our whole strategy for maintaining stability and a vital part of the world. so what happens in egypt is really important, and he, at the outset, he basically got that

right. now, it didn't work out so well because the egyptian military turned out to be the feckless and useless and counterproductive and not a lot we been able to do down there, but the theory of the case was right, and i think he deserves credit for that. but across the region he became also a lot more complicated. in bahrain, where you had a good, one quarter of the population of the country in the streets occupying that circle, he took the other approach, which was to back the king and the royal family against the demonstrators. and that kind of tension between, on the one hand,

promoting our values in egypt, and on the other hand, protecting our interests in the oil-rich persian gulf, allow, not standing up to the saudis when they send their forces in to suppress the demonstrators was, you know, i think in a way you could justify it was the right judgment at the time, but it really did create this kind of tension between our values and our interests. which we can get away from. it's always been a problem. we were totally focused on protecting our interests and in bed with all the autocratic regimes. now we couldn't do anymore so we had to find a way to balance values with interests. and in a case of bahrain, it was all about the oil to protect our interests. in the case of libya, which was a strategic sideshow for the

united states, he could preserve, promote our values by helping the living people, helping to overthrow gadhafi. in syria, which is the issue du jour, our interests and our values coincide in terms of helping the syrian people overthrow a horrendously brutal regime. but on the other hand, or i should say on the same hand, strategically this would deal a devastating blow to iran because assad has influence in the arab-israeli plan. so our strategic and our values coincide in supporting the people of syria if they decide

to overthrow the regime. and yet, the president has been reticent in terms, first of all, calling for the overthrow in terms of actively engaging in the effort. and i've already been too long, but i think that that's a mistake. i think it comes from an awareness on his part within the white house of the fact that we point to the gap between, is his vision or his rhetoric as the ability which results in the case of libya, he called for the overthrow of gadhafi and he achieved a in the the case of syria, he does, you know, he does not want to put forward the means to actually achieve that.

military intervention from his point of view is off the table. it's difficult to see without some kind of military intervention, it will be possible to achieve the clear objective. so in a sense we have done as best we can, and i think he deserves credit for that. in a very complicated, fast-moving situation, which we don't have a lot of control over. the story on syria is unfinished, and i, for one, would like to see him be a lot more assertive than he is. >> maybe we can get to the in the second. as i was reading that section of the book where the book again marches very methodically through the various phases of president obama's policy towards syria, including what i would've characterized as a very

pragmatic decision not to get too far out front for several months. but then, of course, he does call for assad, last august but he does call for assad to depart, which is not been followed up by any particular decide a safe strategy against that. i don't know, where does that fall under continuum between pragmatism and progressivism. i think i know what the answer is, but -- i think i will go to mike for a second, let me give it over to mike. which does not imply leaving you in any way. >> and mike has always been you. we have never laughed. >> i want to add another element, because i have to say if i had one peak of this excellent book, i would say there's not enough politics in it. there's not enough president obama as a political figure and a political actor, as well as

decision-maker at a strategic thinker. and i want to pick up on the point that you just me. the president walked himself out rhetorically, as far as you can go in syria, but the white house, and i was a particularly in an election year, contemplate under the military action. mike, you talk a lot about, i make him you have in this book addressed come you all addresses at great lengths, the wars that the president has tried to wind down, and yet the president did order an intervention in libya which i think most people were so prized. i'm not going to tell the john mccain joked again, but those kind of a surprise. where is the president now on the whole idea with the use of force? james traub wrote in the near times recently that at the end of intervention is not going to be any more interventions. but where do you think the president actually is as a theoretical matter, as a matter

of principle of theory on the idea of using force? >> thanks, bob. of course, this does get to the crux of the dilemma you pointed out earlier of a contemporary history because i sense that the president use has evolved during the time in office and i think that's part of what he is reluctant to, before leaving on say, i think he is more tired of for now that he was three years ago just as the country is. that's not a reason to say this engage if you meet security threats run the line, then with regard to his iran stands lately has been more clear i think that if certain actions were to take place i interpret them as being can make it more likely the united states would militarily intervene. so it is a mixed thing. i think is a realist, and the george h. to be can't some ways that will make a call about what he sees an interest as final or not, and his military thinking will be adjusted appropriately and accordingly. >> we can count on two more major intervention in his term

it is like george h. w. bush. >> in that case, yes. but i think people doubt, a lot of people doubt whether he still has got the willingness to use force. he talks tough on iran. he still has 90,000 troops in afghanistan. despite the accelerated drawdown, which last june when it was announced i was against, i thought it is too fast, it's still worth pointing out we will have roughly twice as many troops at the end of his first term in afghanistan as we did at the beginning of his first term in afghanistan. and on iraq, even though a lot of iraq watchers wanted united states to find wood to keep forces longer than 32011, and i was hoping we would, too. at the end of the barack obama get u.s. forces in iraq 20 months longer than he originally promised on the campaign trail and the only left when the iraqis themselves and we are not going to give you a law giving

immunity to your troops. some people think he might've found a way to stay in hell, and perhaps a third term george w. bush would have. but it's worth pointing of the george w. bush and prime minister maliki are the one designed the original deal that would affect u.s. forces lead by the end of 2011. we give obama some credit, even though myself at least i think in the book reflect the was the logic of trying to stay. once the iraqis said no, thank you. , we were right to leave. so again, obama i think makes the call case-by-case. there is a sense of which enters our father, which ones are secondary. but there's also a pragmatism. the last point, this quick overview on afghanistan, i don't know how to predict his next move because the past three years would suggest he's going to be hawkish. but i think is constantly assessing the new build of the mission and he also knows that al qaeda has been largely decimated on his watch. to some extent to his credit, to some extent to the credit of our broader intelligence.

and, therefore, frankly mistakes in afghanistan maybe a notch below what he thought them what we all fought for years ago. so i think you will continue to assess not just where we have been on afghanistan and where he has been, but what is doable in the future. sorry, very pragmatic. >> can i just address the politics point, which the other side of the question, that clearly as he prepared to move into election mode again, he wanted to be able to be the president in being wars, not starting new worse. and i think that was a very lyrical judgment. he also made a political judgment that he wasn't going to keep on pushing the israeli-palestinian issue because that's bad politics. he just dropped it like a hot

potato, turned his back on it. but, and you could say that afghanistan is exactly as mike suggested, an indication, his realism and his willingness to use force, and in particular a willingness to go after al qaeda in a very tough and effective way. and we give them credit for that. but it's also, afghanistan is also a story of going in to get out. and the policy, the effectiveness of the policy was affected by his desire on the one hand to be tough and to be seen to be tough, to give him kind of political -- it's not going anywhere. but on the one hand, for his own base to be seen as him being

wars rather than prolonging the. so i think it was affected by the political decision. >> let me add a decision under and passionate let me add a dimension to this. in terms of his november trip last year, we articulated its asian strategy was no part to highlight that this administration is now delivering, not only exiting from what we now have our attention were our biggest opportunities are, and we know we're doing and we are very forward leaning and dynamic. also on china i think from the start, the president has had a very, very jaundiced view of china's economic trade policy. this is been an area that had been very neuralgic. rhetoric has gotten knocked up a notch because a, he thinks those policies are reducing his capacity to generate jobs that he feels he needs for america to

be reelected. and b, he wants to be seen preclude a strongly defending american trade interest here. so he is at it full bore this year. >> let's do all of it a prediction, because you guys have now been seeped into obama's brain. as well as anyone i would say you know what he has been, watched him and bald. let's for the sake of argument say he is elected and has a second term. my referee on history is that often the case that presidents wind up to find a foreign policy legacy more in a second term than he did in the first. i would say that was true of the clinton administration. i would say that was true of the reagan administration. sometimes what they started in the first term bear fruit in the second, sometimes events change, let's look ahead to a second term and let me ask you, martin, some very bold questions. will barack obama use force

against iran in a second term? >> yes. >> okay, good. moving on. >> i'm not sure. >> domeback off your own witness. >> i have thought for a long time that barack obama will end up using force in a preventive strike on iran's nuclear facility. and it's not to do with politics. it's very much to do with his progressive vision of the role of the united states in shaping the global order. nonproliferation is a fundamental pillar of that order, and he, as president in his second term, is not going to be the one to preside the

collapse of that pillar, which he sees and just laid it out in this interview he did last week, he sees a threat there. he explains it. that would, the iranian move towards nuclear weapons capability trigger a nuclear arms race. it would be the case of a signatory to the nonproliferation treaty, actually acquiring nuclear weapons. and in that context i think he is not prepared to tolerate that. he's trying to make that very clear to the iranians now by taking containment off the table as yet he did last week. is basically saying look, you guys have a choice.

you either give up their nuclear weapons aspirations, or if you keep on going down that road, we'll probably use force against you. and so that's why, i say that's the direction we're moving. and, of course, in terms of second term were, it's deeply ironic because in effect, this is what we said in the book, what's emerging out of his progressive reluctant realism is a strategy to rebalance and focus u.s. interest upon asia, east asia in particular, and the way ken has described a strategy that is fairly coherent and could work, and it's described in some quarters of the administration the pivot. if you pivot towards something you're pivoting away from something. and what he is pivoting away from is the middle east.

and he is indian to wars in the greater middle east. eavesdropping the effort to resolve the palestinian problem, and i don't see them picking it up again. and the underlying little secret that people kind of our waking up to is that in his second term we will no longer need the middle eastern oil. really import 10% from the middle east today. china and india will be highly dependent, and, of course, we'll still have an interest in the free flow of oil, but the idea of in effect turning his back on the middle east and focusing on our interest in asia is i think where he wants to take the united states in his second term. and that's what i say it would be ironic, indeed, for the sake

of preserving nonproliferation pillar, he ends up starting a third war in the middle east. >> and will not be ironic it would be disruptive of his strategy. i don't see exactly how a special at a time when our military resources are constrained he can undertake a war, an income it's not just a quick war and it doesn't end when we finished shooting, so that will be a major recommitment to that region and then at the same time maintain this allegedly exalts, increased position in east asia. you wanted to jump in. ..

when things might actually become a major problem. but the chinese are certainly worried about it. if they do trip up, a lot of the current expectations about the politics of the region will have to be recalibrated quite seriously. >> mike, afghanistan in the second term, get out as quickly

as possible? recalibrate? tried to stay in and achieve some acceptable outcome, especially in the wake of the shootings and the koran burning and the rising polls in the united states would show americans have tired long since tired of this conflict. what does barack obama to in his second term in afghanistan? >> i think he would've made his big decision before such a term because i think they will be made primarily, not exclusively, in the next two to four months as he decides what happens after september when you get down to the 68,000 u.s. troop number. but the question is, i think it's no particular secret among leaders in afghanistan that they would like to see a bit of plateauing. there's a lot of work left to do. there is a campaign plane in afghanistan. there's a sequence of events

that is being carried out, as you know. a big part of the focus is the east of the country were we have never had the resources we really wanted. stan mcchrystal didn't get his full array of forces as he requested, and after that last spring, president obama et cetera the drawdown in the east remained deprived of the forces originally intended for. so the plan requires us to do some work in the east and then the highway. and then, of course, keep up the afghan army and police. that implies frankly a fair amount of hard work through 2013 and into 2014. i think the president is going to essentially decide the next you must what a state police in that plane. i think at the moment we can't be sure. commanders in the field, ambassadors and still don't get to make these decisions. presidents do, and i think obama at this moment is sorted through how he feels about these questions. >> i must say i'm somewhat surprised at the answer because it seems to me, i extend the

president running for reelection has one view how they feel about a conflict they are in. .. >> no, i don't. i think if he has decided to cut forces below 68,000 he does it during baseball's big big election campaign season, there is no putting humpty dumpty back

together again. you will have essentially leave the bases and 10 afghans to message you do not partner in the field as previously intended. in theory, sure. if he really wanted to fool us for six weeks he probably could then immediately pull back as the day after reelection. as a practical matter, if he decides he has lost eight of the strategy, with the evidence. further tests will begin in a sober and i don't think he will reassess that. it does to me because 10 to zero, but it does me because two primary -- >> one final question on this. you think he faces a helicopter -- if i were a journalist to be asking a helicopter off the roof moments in his second term? >> is a chance afghanistan could fail. i do think it's likely to feel quite that way. i think it's quite likely that

large swaths of the south would go first. the second terms are long and there's a lot of time and a lot of things can happen between now and then. i don't think it is likely. i think even if we get to a poor outcome, it is more likely when weathers elements still hope that the government but an increasing sense that the big swaths of territory row qaeda and lashkar-e-taiba could find sanctuary beyond the control under control as a two d. mediocre to poor outcome which has the afghan territory by kabul with most prognostications. >> we can move on and ultimately good questions. >> martin, if every correctly, i look at a middle east in a second term that includes a preemptive a pink is the first strike against iran. without a u.n. security council

authorization obviously because the russians and chinese are in the two proven military straight. with whatever follow comes for that attack in the region. they completely stalled middle east peace process i think you are suggesting you don't appease the tape then picking up that hot potato anytime soon. and i suppose given that you don't think he is going to use force in sudan i imagine preppie because he may have use force in iran is possibly an ongoing, bloody at least for the first. of his term by the outcome in syria, very uncertain situation in egypt. i will leave it there, but we could go on. that is not very pretty picture for the president's second term. >> while you describe the middle east. that is the middle east. i mean, given that he came in --

>> at night to start the terms? >> we know in the middle east some always comes up but it's usually bad. but sometimes it's not. and you never know what currents and conflicts are going to produce what kind of opportunities. i.t. is yanked that is the basic strategy to presidents, both republicans and democrats have employed for the last four decades no longer applies. the most obvious is that each at just no longer stable ally. the egyptian parliament is debating whether to pronounce the american military

assistance. i don't think it ought to go along with that, but it shows you where things are going. we no longer have an ejection or we can base strategy. so a repeat of -- saudi arabia remains a pillar. so what should have been politically in places like bahrain and other kingdoms. we think we need to get on the road to political friends and safe bet to be kidding me. and on the peace process, you know, we haven't really talked about that. >> you can talk about it now. i don't want to kill your opportunity to talk about the peace process. >> i think the audience has questions. the audience has been so burned by his experience they are, and experience that if much of his

own making, but i find it hard to imagine he's going to go back to it unless something dramatic changes, unless you have the leadership and the israeli palestinian site that are really prepared to take the risks necessary to make peace and then they can come in and support the previous one he had the circumstances. but looking out there today, that this will very likely. and so, i think that inevitably feel practical carries many of you have heard in the middle east if you're not pedaling forward and we are not pedaling forward and so, one thing or another, whether it's iran oil flare up in the israeli-palestinian conflict, something will drag us back. but will their trackback, we are going to be more awkwardly

placed for a long time in terms of strategy preserver and chase and try to make progress. >> imsa, listening to your talk about potential second term and where things stand and given the general approach of the book is to say that obama has done pretty well, i'm reminded of the scene in the diner, remember that movie are the guy is about to get married and he asks the guy who is married but married life is light and the guy basically says, it's really terrible. you know, we have nothing to talk about it we really don't get along. there's more fun before we were married. at the end gutenberg says it's nice, right? because yes, yes. it's nice. let's face it. but he is coping with setting aside the israeli peace process,

but he is coping with in the middle east is that the bush administration sought to see occurred, which is pro-democracy movement from the bottom up. the problem of business you never know what they are are going to head. and the forces of reaction and the middle east are extremely powerful, deeply rooted in the fact tyrian issues are very tough issues. so with this having started, you know, you are riding a tiger. >> one final thing and that we will pineda. i get to be in this role now. i love it. i want you to give two grades to two different presidents and no come you don't get to grade george w. bush. [laughter] and your particular areas, grade though clinton's presidency in barack obama's presidency. we will start with mike. >> do i do it in the first three years are the eight years of

clinton? >> the full clinton picture. you can give term grades if you want. >> obama has been much better than clinton in his first three years a national policy. >> grade. >> i know. over the years i think clinton increasingly did well and i would say on balance i would give him a eve plus and that is the ballpark of 4:00 a.m. on obama. >> frankly make one a day is too great upon great upon adamant the one they refuse to do it so it's book because i don't believe in that. i give them both an a. >> you're grading yourself here. >> in his first term betrayed over himself so much in his own campaign rhetoric he couldn't get china. >> an a+ and then average down.

you are grading yourself, too. >> on the middle east he has to say that -- i think that obama deserves pretty much an eight to an a- i did pretty well in terms of protecting our interest in promoting our values. on the peace process, there is no way away from it. it is a mess. i think obama would agree with that. >> will thank you. looking forward to all of your questions now. >> a quick question for martin and mike first. i never heard mentioned pakistan. i wonder what role that might play in a second term for obama

in for ken, for which i prefer a romney president or second term obama? >> i was a preferred in pakistan. obviously very challenging. i think afghanistan policy to some extent could fail because of pakistan's role. ductless ballistics in kabul in the future of karzai are the key threats of the mission a thing. in terms of the u.s.-pakistan partnership they get this administration reasonably decent grade and nothing is working. on afghanistan and they are messaging and team records supposedly mediocre. by contrast was pakistan's strategic dialogue in our reach is pretty good in the two issues are nearly so mistakes on messaging in afghanistan affected pakistan policy so i don't want to completely establish a distinction between the two. the administration is extremely mature and disciplined and realists on pakistan. we don't have any choice in the relationship. there have been things up and

down along the way. bruce rydell has some great ideas i'm working on the future. they've got to keep trying and that's what they're doing. >> well, on obama versus romney and china, chinese clearly prefer obama. that is for two reasons. that is because they always prefer the person they know if they have a reasonably good relationship in obama has worked very hard on that relationship. second, romney has moved in his position the same place where clinton moved and has made a bunch of comments by which he would do, all of which are real sources of trouble with china if he moved ahead and did then. so you don't know whether you try to back off here but when you get specific and campaign promises, they can come back to bite you. so romney has said he will declare china currency at day

one. he actually doesn't have the authority to do that if he were president, but setting that aside, it is a potential problem. so i think i balanced it rather stick with the guy they know. >> right there in the cream. >> in-house, diana negroponte. are we getting tired it or will he keep up the effort? >> one of the big issues and multilateralism is not only in the global level, the regional level and one of the things you see in asia certainly and around the world and the arab league and so forth is regional organizations are now becoming fairly event important. my sense is a nation at the obama administration has come to a very conscious strategy of kind of picking the multilateral platforms that it wants to see

play a major role and others that he would like to see were marginalized. and so in asia, east asia summit has moved front and center especially on asian security issues were trying to build a platform called the transpacific burger shape. so i would say they bought into regional multilateral organizations. at least asia, very strongly that what the real strategy behind that. it's not multilateralism for the sake of multilateralism. it's had to dance multilateralism organizations? >> just as a quick coda. what is interesting in this arab awakening in terms of looking for partners, who it is that we would be working with the arab league, which was particularly an organization that has become imports and -- >> as i recall that the shoes come and multilateralism tenet

be fined as the united nations. i would say this administration looks to me a site to be little frustrated with the u.n. security council. i think secretary clinton made a strong negative statement about the utility of the u.n. security council. do you foresee in the new mentioned that they might undertake and i ran straight without u.n. security council. let me just ask. >> obama, one of his signals was getting the russians and chinese for u.n. security council resolution on iran that he posed how sanctions. >> my question is where do you see the trend going for its greater attention to the u.n. security council or lesser attention? >> i just think that obama's vision is that the multilateral order. the united states will still play a leading role, but he recognizes that the name of the

game is changed and he has to engage the powers whether it be china or india and it plays inevitably a major playing field for this engagement with raising powers. it's going to be the security council. and i don't think you have any choice about that because they're eventually shifting the power. i think you even agree that the dave says bush -- george w. bush george w. bush style unilateralism essentially over and the desire to have legitimacy for military interventions is very strong surgeon in this administration. but i wonder whether it will be that different simply because the way the government is shifting. >> it was also bill clinton knew what to war without

authorization when you couldn't get it. and i was in response to which he said, not that i'm supposed to be responding, but the trend of most u.s. american presidents as you can summarize the policy is get the u.n. security council resolution when you can come up which you can't cannot find another way to legitimize it. whether it is nato, the arab league. and so come out with sam has to sure obama is anymore theoretically committed to u.n. security council then past presidents have been. gary. >> thanks. jerry mitchell and i read the mitchell report. i want to build on the two questions that bypassed weird one at the outset and the last one about grades. you asked at the outset, what's

the purpose for the added goal of pragmatism, which i think is actually pretty interesting question. so, you have described obama as a pragmatic progressive for the other way around. put them in context with people with whom i have a little bit more historical days. and if you want to think about this while you are filled and other questions, great. if he is a pragmatic progressive, what is eisenhower's brand? what is the big sins and what is ronald reagan? >> do you want to mall or do you want to answer? >> will take up brief crack and all insert after grade and through then through question is where through is obama has done better than most world war ii

presidents. one is adaptiveness. so i think he can do progressive pragmatist and i prefer the term or the gipper list, but there started to say for the same coin. i think the way but she's recognizes a vision which i think he believed even more than those candidates and certainly articulate with more forcefulness than most candidates in the modern era he realized quickly wasn't going to have to make a lot of progress on all of them. a chapter that my colleagues wrote, but then a big fan of is the chapter on the road stage. we talk about iran and the little about north korea today but basically obama figured out pretty quickly in the first six months that his effort to reach out a hand for those that have clenched her fist wasn't being taken up. for north korea to need a nuclear weapon in iran so the presidential election he quickly pivoted have used the u.n.

security council the fact that the world saw him as having a genuine effort to reach out and became a very effective or that to the list. so i will come back to that, but i think he is a fast learner as well as the other thing. >> i'm going to go out on the limits and sure obama would rather be known as a progressive pragmatist than a look at freelist. just my guess here. >> judith fox. with good reason visit of netanyahu, how would you judge his concern about enron's nuclear capability? >> i think i've are deviants. the iran issue. it's only about israel's

security. it is as much as a world order issue. and the critical importance is as non-proliferation and the order he is trying to shape. but when it comes to israel, you know, the president had a theory of the case. we haven't remarked doneness since the internal working of foreign-policy and new palm administration. but this is a president who drives foreign policy. he is more directly involved in determining the foreign policy of the country than any president since richard nixon. that is one place we have to go for the hands-on engagement. he had. the case, which proved to be wrong. gary is the case is the united states needs to rebuild its

relationships and reputation in the muslim world because vacation to words in the muslim world and that is important for american interests. [inaudible] and for israel to favor with the arabs. and they expressed by something that would be good for israel because they could bring the arabs around to prepare to engage with israel. it was the wrong theory of the case. by the way i should add.com he thought he could take care of israel's concerns by needing israel's security requirements 100% and he always did that. you know, you got what they cared about was security. what he didn't understand is that they really cared about was affection. they wanted to be loved.

it had 16 years of unalloyed affection with bill clinton and george w. bush. and now, this president is turning away from them and going after the other woman and they didn't like it. and they didn't like it. the west wing didn't like him and israel. in fact, obama is standing after his cairo speech and it only started to recover -- actually now up around 50, 55% vindicate their speech in the united nations, which is kind of diametrically opposed to the cairo speech. he embraced the israeli narratives of israel's history, whereas in the current speech he wrote the palestinian number. so essentially what happened was ha