ready have data recorders on vehicles today. there are thoughts to expand the data collection made by those to make the recorders. that raises and has race already, number privacy concerns so our recommendation has been that we should be studying what data should be collected, how it will be used, how do we think safety would be enhanced by that data collection, and how might it be compromised as far as privacy so i think that is a much broader question than just simply, can you record certain information because i think frankly, the answer to that question is, yes we can. ..

>> is there any evidence that drivers are paying attention? >> this goes back a little bit to the issue of social media that was raised. there are some benefits to some of these things as well. eating information from the company's websites or from social media apps that provide the instruction can get peoples attention, perhaps more so from reading through the pages of the manual. typically also when you purchase a vehicle, the dealer will go through some of the issues with you and a lot of the vehicle manufacturers will have a shorthand guide that highlight the main points of how to use the system safely.

there are several things that are being done. >> we are doing all those things. we are constantly looking for ways to communicate with owners and operators -- how their vehicles function, what features they should use and when they should use them, etc. it is always a challenge. i personally flipped through my owners manual when i get it. but i will readily admit that i am an outlier. i expect most people do not do this. >> this is a question for doctor angela. you have been talking about research that has been done and the technologies that are being installed that are safe. what does the research show about the safety, about hearing

e-mails read aloud and composing e-mails via voice. >> that is a tough question there. actually, i am no longer at an automaker. the testing that they do on their systems is proprietary to them. i can tell you that a company that is part of the alliance has made a commitment not to release the product unless it meets the guidelines. so they are testing to the guidelines. when i see a new product that might be made by gm or ford or toyota that has content in it like that, i know that it has been tested to those guidelines and that it has passed. that it has met the guidelines based on my knowledge of how they test, and that they test according to the guidelines. we will have to see what the new

guidelines are in what happens with those. what that would mean specifically is that it each of the principles and criteria that are in the alliance guidelines that would be some kind of verification procedure that is carried out with a certain number of subjects. if we used a test that would be conducted with subjects -- participants who are not employees who are normal drivers, who go through all the tests that would be performed on a new product. then the data is collected. they would watch a driving scene, they would perform the task. there i glance movements would be tracked and we would determine how long the tax was

and whether or not they met the criteria. as well as everything else. the assumption that i may, now that i'm not a part of the automakers, it meets the criteria. that is how it worked when i was there. >> would you indulge me with one more question. that leads me to ask a piggyback question on mark rhodes comment earlier. this is just a simple yes or no from each of you. you are now seeing a proliferation of systems entering, automated systems entering the car market. we have developed evaluation test -- postproduction and valuation tests of the safety vehicles. as these systems become more complex and as they become more

in tune differentiation on what to buy, i can't judge that as a buyer. a yes or no, did you foresee in any time in the near future -- being in the next five years, that we would develop a system not unlike other tests that would do a safety usability test on vehicles? >> i see that as being a possibility. you mention vehicles getting more complex. from the customer's point of view, they're going to want cars that are simpler. the more complex we make some of these devices, the less they will be inclined -- consumers will be inclined to use that system rather than one that is easy to use. hopefully that is the direction we go. >> to the question do i foresee it in five years time?

yes. i'm aware that there are some working on that already. in fact, more than one. more than one entity might end up integrating vehicle systems. >> i would also say yes. >> me too. >> yes. >> i return the panel to you. thank you. >> thank you very much. on behalf of my fellow board members, i would like to thank our panel for appearing, as well as all of the panelists who have been here throughout the day. thank you all so much for taking your time to compare informative presentations for us and to be so responsive to our questions. we really appreciate it. we have learned a great deal. to our advocates here in the audience, thank you for sharing your personal stories and your personal journeys. for those of you who are doing new things and speaking up and sharing experiences with peer

groups, and the family members who have brought so much. those who have really turned their tragedy into a lesson to share with all those -- the rest of us. we thank you for putting a human face on it. it is so important. two are magnetic -- magnificent staff. everyone has worked so hard to make this day fruitful. i appreciate your hard work and a hunter in preparation. i think that one thing we have heard today is that we really have to change the dialogue from discussion to action. we have to figure out how we addressed distractions. when we talk about distractions, we have to talk about all of them. and we are hearing a lot of that from the information in the research and the concerns of our board members. we really do need to look at how to address all distractions and

focus on attentive driving and what the countermeasures are and how we can move this into a positive conversation rather than a negative conversation. the thing that is concerning is that in the past in the past -- there were normal distractions. the challenge is now is that we have distractions competing full-time for a driver's attention. there is no limit as to what can be brought into the vehicle or put into a vehicle now. we have to get a renewed respect for the driving task and responsibilities as a driver. americans think of their cars as tools for mobility and freedom. but we know that we see over

30,000 fatalities every year on our nation's highways, and driving a 2-ton vehicle at high speeds is not a task to take lightly. it is something that needs to be taken very seriously. that is a lesson to be drawn from today's forum. taking driving seriously and putting attention back in the drivers seat where it belongs. adelaide stephenson once said that all progress has resulted from people who took unpopular positions. and i think it is important to think about the things that we are asking people to do. pay attention when you're driving. it may be unpopular to ask people to put their phones down or hang up, stop talking or texting and driving. but it can be done, and this change needs to happen at the grassroots level, in the

boardroom, in legislatures, and at the family dinner table. we have to change behavior. one company, one community and one person at a time. we can all start right now. every person raised their hand when they were asked if they had one or more cell phone, blackberry, etc. what will it take for you to do something to change behavior? if it is your own behavior, and i know that the panel before this we talked about this in terms of public health issue, if this is your diction, and we talked about smoking, look into some technology that might be your patch to help you get through this. if you are able to hang up and drive, what can you do to advance this issue?

everyone is coming from a different place to figure out what they can do to advance this issue. as i've said before, and i think unfortunately the statistics show that we will say again that no call, no tax, no updates will save a human life. we stand adjourned. [laughter] >> with the u.s. senate on break, we are featuring booktv on c-span two.

for this year's student camp competition, we asked students to submit a video telling usco what part of the constitution is important to them and whgy.ae today we are going to go with noah fatsi at midolthian high school.c the topic of your video was on "the right to bear arms." how did you choose your topic? >> we wanted to choose a topic that affected a lot of people in america. right to bear arms was part of the constitution that affects everyone. if you don't own a gun, most likely somebody near you guys. people all around you have guns for protection, hunters, gun

collectors, this was a topic that affected a lot of people who are probably important u.s. >> in your video you asked if the second amendment is a necessary right. what did you mean by that? >> we were wondering if the original 10 is still important to our society today. we asked if we are a society that needs guns at all or maybe just the right to have guns. >> can you explain the difference between the original intent of the second amendment and the current obligation to? >> we read a lot about the constitution and the right to bear arms in particular. when the founding fathers were making the constitution, they were very thorough. the right to bear arms -- the reason that was there was because they wanted the citizens to have a chance, in case the

government they put in place became too oppressive or corrupt, they wanted the citizens to have a chance to be able to overthrow a corrupt oppressive government. without guns, we would still probably be a county of england. we would have never been able to defeat the british and the our own country. >> out of the two virginia students help you? >> it is one thing reading about a shooting on the internet, but actually talking to two people that were directly affected by the virginia tech shooting, it feels a lot closer to the issue. they told us that they had to -- during the shooting they were locked in a cafeteria. they were not allowed to come

out until the campus was determined to be safe. they are really close to an issue that has to do with the second amendment, the right to bear arms. >> did your research affect your position? >> any position that i make on the second amendment, it should be well informed and educated. >> what was your favorite part about creating the video? >> getting a lot of different opinions from all over the internet and from the virginia tech students that we interviewed. also trying to figure out my own opinion, and also the members of my group, to them what they thought about it as well and what they thought about the second amendment. >> thank you for talking with us this morning and congratulations on your win. >> here is a portion of noah's video, "the right to bear arms."

>> i ask, sir, it is the right to bear arms. the best we can hope for concerning the people at large is that they be properly armed. firearms are important to americans liberties. >> you can watch the idiot in its entirety and other documentaries at her website c-span.org. you can view the conversation on our facebook and twitter pages.

the army commander then it oversaw u.s. efforts in afghanistan spoke about his experience that this weekend in washington. colonel chris toner was in charge of two provinces in the

eastern part of the country which borders pakistan. because of audio problems, we will pick up with the q&a portion and the question of whether progress achieved can be sustained once we withdraw from afghanistan. >> why don't i ask you, can we defeat the haqqani network and its affiliate groups? >> again, i speak to the momentum that we have as i left afghanistan. i would say unequivocally the answer for me, given the current situation and circumstances i had, the momentum and maturity of the afghan national security forces -- the resourcing that existed, the level of competence and the government, i would say yes. i say that from the standpoint of for any insurgency to be

successful, you have to have popular support. you have to have some sort of introduction of a conventional type force at a culminating point. there is a group of folks out there that say may be haqqani is just taking it in a neat right now. maybe they're just waiting for 2014. the opinion based off of what i see happening when i was there and the momentum that had been achieved, that is a course of action that has failure written on it. it is failure from the standpoint of -- did he wait until 2014, the tidal wave of the forces that come across is not going to hit a bunch of sand castles out there. it will hit mortar and cement in the form of afghan national security forces. i'm a bit biased. i have personal interest and i

won't apologize for that. the brigade commander there is hardly the best brigade commander in afghan dam. he was a battalion commander. when i got off the plane, there he was. it was like old times again. he had a phenomenal -- he is a phenomenal officer that expect the same out of his subordinates and soldiers. he has a phenomenally competent fighting force. his concern and my concern are the same. and it is with respect to some of the sustainability aspects, maintenance, those kinds of things, they can see themselves, no problem. but maintenance, repairing things, we've focused a lot of energy on that and they got better over time. he knows that is a place that he has to get focused.

but this is a largely competent force supported by afghan police. words will do no justice in the improvement of the afghan police 2006 and 2007. largely despised across the board. nobody wanted the police and their villages. corrupt, they would kill people, they would take from people. that has changed significantly. you have a professionalized police force, which has been an effort of the coalition of the last five years. this police force is phenomenal. they defeated -- we had four spectacular attacks that occurred, which were not spectacular -- they fizzled out online because our afghan police disrupted them and kill the attackers. just the phenomenal force led by

great fulks. you have the additional aspects of the protection force that is largely raid on the southern border of pakistan against -- it doesn't exist in hers, i was leading in a vision to get certain areas -- we free up forces to do that. but along the corridor, as it comes out of [inaudible], in this particular way, there is strong tribal support of the afghan police. as i was leaving afghanistan, it was phenomenal.

for brigade level operations were coordinating and conducting on their own. it is a great success. with them out for front, skin support. in some cases we pulled out maneuver forces and provided cadre. over 4000 patrols in addition to the other patrol we get more independent. we conducted over 4000 and never did anything independent. i would not allow it. in addition to that 14,000 or so, there were about 4500 patrols led by then. some of these patrols were pretty significant. 10 tons of ammonium nitrate were captured by the afghan police that drew their own intelligence, used their own

sources, watched the truck crossed the border, captured the truck, and the two drivers. ten times. that is about roughly 450-pounce on the battlefield. at one point afghan uniform police leader entered the kill zone and pulled out one of my soldiers that had been shot. as he was doing so, he shot himself three times. another captain and the three attackers exited their vehicles, we have great intelligence. the afghan police killed all three of them before we could do any of it. again, that would've been me in 2007. that would've been me doing all

of that. the phenomenal increase in capacity and capability of the afghan national security forces over short period of time to the level of congress -- level of competency -- they will be able to handle insurgents. assuming that that methodology continues, assuming that as i understand it -- open source -- and again, i'm not red and on anything other than that right now. the focus at this time is critically important. the last thing i would offer up to you is that the intelligence that we had on haqqani they were

suffering on resources. that was comedy on the battlefield. there is a level of dysfunction and lack of tactical military expertise that we saw that we haven't seen previously. in large part because of the leadership. >> terrific. right behind he was mark jacobson. right behind you is mark jacobson. >> i actually agree with your assessment on breaking down the operational and tactical capabilities of the haqqani network. i'm a little less convinced -- and i'm an optimist on what

we're doing in afghanistan, but i'm less convinced we been able to disrupt their ability to intimidate. weakness in the afghan's ability to generate appropriate roles of law. insurgency in the perceived as an franchise -- disenfranchisement. in terms of what was working, in terms of cooperation, what was the number one impediment to that? >> again, we have to change the environment. it relates a lot of what you're talking about. you look at guy like me, wearing a uniform is a security guy. i will tell you that -- when i

say our, the campaign plan provided by general campbell and general alan, is a continuity of effort and the abdication of all elements across our lines of effort. the folks is to focus up by the environment. i was not, in all honesty, a believer of the rule of law. as a battalion commander coming out of -- work with me on this one -- don't hold me to that quote, because i will tie it in. as a battalion commander coming out of pack two to and understanding the culture pretty well, that there was no way that they are going to buy off the judge.

they're not going to let this off to anybody. a good friend of mine, general mark martin's, was running this program and pulled me in as he does very well and puts his big arm round me and talked me through this. he convinced me that i should get after it and figure it out. what i had thought emerged in paktika was his overwhelming welcome of a structured products -- hostas of rule of law. the number one request as we traveled with the governor, is one of when am i going to get my judge out your weekend start solving the issues? there is this protective aspect. we don't want to send the judges

out there because if they are living in the economy, chances are they are going to get killed. in large part, the judges remain in host cities and [inaudible]. but they are doing trials and they are resulting in convictions, some of the numbers that they throw at you -- 51 trials in 11 months, 36 convictions. it may sound paltry, but this never existed. there were acceptance of decisions coming out of there that we saw. what was interesting to me is when we traveled around for the exterior. the folks knew it and they wanted more of it. that is a key aspect of it. haqqani realizes it is a threat to them. the other thing is that we do have a population that supports not only haqqani but other insurgent groups from the standpoint of the justice they bring. they all up to them to solve

problems and do those kinds of things. so i think that rightly so, our leaders identified this as an issue that we must address, and in an immature state, i thought she got in paktika. one of our most successful programs was the internship program that we had with both the university in paktika. these law students would come out and work with the judges, work with the governor and do those kinds of things. we kicked that off when we were over there. again, another aspect of participation from the community and acknowledgment of there being a source for solving issues at the government level. although largely she realized --

sharia law is in place. i am a believer. if that can work there, that is pretty phenomenal. >> colonel, thank you for your time today. a couple of questions. you mentioned outside supports. can you talk specifically about where they're coming from. in the past we have been told it is coming from the gulf and the level of support related on that. when you were there, did you see any willingness by the haqqani's to talk to be afghan government, anything that symbolizes they may be willing to stop fighting at some point? >> can you answer those questions? >> i wish i knew where the source was but i don't. that is -- i know there are folks looking at it way above me. i know there are efforts to try to address it. i don't know.

i suspect that the facilities and processes that existed in the days of the soviet invasion and efforts emanating out of [inaudible], are probably still in place. i suspect. we would kill or capture folks and they would have large sums of pakistani and money toward te latter part of our deployment, we started to see old weaponry.

ids didn't change, but we started to see old systems without faceplates and rifles without tripods, shooting a rifle without a tripod. i'm serious. our intelligence is getting his complaints that they were having challenges getting basics -- warheads, p. k. m., and certainly mortar rounds. the indirect fire element that we face as we went over a 12 month period of time increased by 70%. this is one of seven, 122, and

the close rifles fired indirectly. 70%. our tier one and tier two level incidents. to explain that, tier one and tier two are when you have a loss of life, loss of equipment. significant effects. we were at about 34% when we first came. large in part due to the great efforts of the paktika's. that increased 11%. we are down around 23 or 24% during those 11 months there. again, to contrast that with what i thought in 2006 and 2007, i had 200 guys come across the border and make an attack on january 10, 2007. ira member that gave for obvious

reasons. we defeated them. but i had the chileans that would get into contact with 50 or 60 people and they would maneuver. i never saw that during this to her. the most while i sought in one place at one time was great special operators supported by the [inaudible]'s. the most i saw was 13. i can remember the night it happened in i would've been happy to see 13 in 2006 or 2007. it was a fight back then and largely missed by the fact that we were focused. i'm not telling you i'm not concerned about the sanctuary of packets dan. remember, there are three elements. popular support, aspect that i put into our camp. i put popular support into the

camp. conventional force. there is not going to be tanks rolling across the border -- you know, not in my mind. but this aspect of sanctuary and the ability to recruit, train, equip, and prosecute operations out of there does concern me. again, i will contrast that with 2006 and 2007. this is all open source. there were no predator operations in sanctuary when i was over there last time. we knew what was going on. maybe two or three across the border, but that was it. elise at that level. this threat that is now posed against haqqani there, and this aspect of the loss of leadership the senior haqqani operator

captured -- it was right on the border. the intelligence that we got a there was actually link to a guy that we captured in spiro. we got him. another one of these great night operations the results in no shots fired. we pulled him off the battlefield. it led to the chief operators capture and killing of four of his deputies. ain't this a rated the haqqani capacity in terms of command control. it is a rated the haqqani command and control. that is when the accident occurred, by the way.

>> do you think that the haqqanis are reconcilable? have you seen any evidence? >> this is my personal view. i haven't seen any concrete evidence. i can't speak to intelligence. my personal view is that knowing the history of haqqani and knowing what he's trying to do, the difference between the father and the son. the suns are driving the operation right now, and i do not think that they will be reconciled to if you ask me -- i don't think that they will reconcile. and i'm not sure if they even thought about doing it if they could. i really don't know what relationship is in pakistan. i don't have any insights on

that. i can only go back to the historical analysis of haqqani and the support that they have received during the soviet era, and i would -- i'm just making an assumption. >> [inaudible question] >> it is great to see the difference between 2006 and 2007 and now. it is my view that white the coalition has done to provide the political space for the government to extend its governance of rules of law into the region, and it sounds like there has been major progress on part of the police and the judicial government. what is the next step?

to me, to solidify this, the government needs to continue to firm up its services in the provinces. what should we be doing, we being the u.s. government and the federal government of afghanistan to solidify what we have gained already? >> i will just speak to the campaign plan and where we are headed when i left. i felt that we were headed in the right direction. it speaks partly to transition. i will start with what i will say is at the end of the day, the afghans have band up and own it at some point in time. regardless of what we do, how long we stay committed, how much resources we put in there, at the end of the day they had to end up. i never felt pressure as we

begin the transition process to transition because it was time associated. to me, it was always conditions-based. this is why you see the move in the east. most conditions that we need to have there will probably be achieved towards the end, honestly, based off of what the focus is down south and the level of achievement they have there. conditions-based, and it is a conversation. i was having this conversation with my governors. i was having this conversation with my afghan national security force leaders about where we think transition can occur in paktika. largely so, along three things. security and governance and development. your point about maturing the government to the point where

they can take this is absolutely spot on. a key component of this is that the government needs to provide basic needs and services to the people. more importantly, whatever that equals, the people feel that. a lot of you have been over there before. it doesn't take a lot to influence a village in the valley and the district of [inaudible]. it is a little different atmosphere in the center of the city. with a pretty educated population there. the high rise buildings are going in. you ought to take a look if you haven't been back. it is phenomenal. the economic growth that shows confidence in what is going on. talk about competence, the increase of children in schools were over 300,000 in paktika in that 12 month period of time. our census takers said it

increased by 30,000. seventeen to 20,000. this is paktika. seventeen to 20,000 of kids. i see indicators of confidence, but by no short stretch of the imagination, there is much more work to be done. this is my opinion. there is a fragile, psychological aspect out there that folks still need to do more. they still need to feel more comfortable about where their government is going and whether security forces are going over there. the shift of resources is focusing and this conversation occurs with afghan national security force leaders on the conditions that need to be met for transition. it is at all levels. i had the afghan chief of staff

-- [inaudible]. i was fortunate to host them a couple times and share with him his vision. what a phenomenal individual who has fought in afghanistan for the most part of his adult life. he understands the people. i would tell you that my conversations with him -- my conversations with the governor's and general officer of afghan security force leaders, the campaign plan and the direction we were headed -- they were all comfortable with all of it. >> let's use the microphone for the next question. >> thank you. a couple of questions.

what is the coalition doing, if anything, to improve security for local officials and the ansf to help them help themselves and figure out the military is aiming very largely toward the established representatives at [inaudible] and the local officials as they change their tactics. the other thing is in your joint special operations that you're doing with afghan, the afghan forces, how much you have to factor in the risk of potentially tipping off the enemy in advance in the planning stages or coming up to a raid? how much of a factor is that?

how much distrust is there between forces? >> i would like to hit that last question. in my outfit, we had the trust and verify. i was very open with trust and intelligence where i work and jointly with my afghan brothers. i knew all the leaders. i knew these men were men of character and i knew i could trust them with the things that we were doing. we did watch to see if there were any indicators that we were being violated. in the 12 months over there, there were no indications that it was. this includes sharing information with their governors who have the right to know. they are governors of, they have

the right to know is governors. in fact, it is a requirement. to include special operations raids. i will tell you, the reason that we do that -- first of all, they are the governors, they should know. number two, if something that helps us -- happens, they are the ones who will help us. and they did every time. in four instances of civilian casualties on the battlefield, regardless of what the situation was, the two governors were the ones that carry the day. with our support and working together in this mutual aspect of it addressing tragic events, it resulted in no significant issues -- issues in terms of

dealing with the population. i would tell you the exact opposite occurred when haqqani killed [inaudible]. demonstrations on the streets. outward expression of no tolerance for civilian casualties. i did a bit of this when i was the commander to. i'll be honest with you. i had a great division commander. he was all about being open and getting our afghan brothers up to speed in terms of intelligence gathering and everything else. in this tour over here, what changed for me significantly was the afghan human intelligence network. the nds people routinely came in with human intelligence that we subsequently confirmed two other

[inaudible]. they let us down that path. as only afghans can do inside of their country or significant improvement in terms of intelligence capacity on a human side with the police and nds. the thing that is bringing us all together, is unlike 2006 and 2007, the army hated the police. the police hated the army. nobody trusted nds. will be at if you are in afghan border policeman. you had that kind of environment. in the environment that i came into in 2011, our provincial coordination centers had matured. we started that back in 2007. now you have the senior representation from the afghan forces to include in the nds.

and the governor's officers in a single coordination center. the best description of it is one of our task operation centers. they have all the communication, technology in their and they are sharing and coordinating intelligence information. when the nds guy comes in, and says one of our informants just told us that there is a vehicular explosive device that is moving from [inaudible]. it looks like they're going after the governors compound. that starts the sequence of events. the police now have it. the afghan national security force has it. the afghan national army general officer has it. he picks up the phone, he calls another general.

instantaneously, they are calling my headquarters. it is very quick. we were getting this intelligence in 24 hours. it allowed us to posture changed checkpoints. redesign the battlefield. in the case that it didn't occur, it was defeated. in my outfit, we were doing that. trust but verify. make sure that you're doing the right things. your first question? >> [inaudible question] >> it is largely provided by the afghan uniform police in case of the governor's and the district sub governors. of course, my charter to myself

was that don't get the governors killed. how are you going to replace them? i would say that i monitored that very closely. how do you replace these leaders? that is why haqqani is trying to kill them. i provided -- i did not provide forces to specifically protect. but i did provide information and a new but the governors were there and where they were going. haqqani did not get an opportunity to kill them. >> we are coming to the end of our time. i would like to know if there's anything else that you would like to say to some of your

experience and if you'd like to talk about the future? >> thank you for this opportunity to talk and hopefully i provided in the eye. it is only from my perspective. i can look at 2006 and 2007. if you were with me then and now, you can understand why i am a bit of an optimist. what hasn't changed over that time -- and i'd like to leave you with this -- is the commitment of great afghan patriots. i have to be careful because i get emotional when i talk about this. i described them as founding fathers of their country, like our founding fathers. these are individuals who have put their lives at, fortune, for sure -- in the case of governor [inaudible] -- that man could be making lots of money in a very

benign environment somewhere in the world. the last thing i would say is about families. it is often a challenge to watch them go out to their families and have vacation somewhere else so they could be with their families and not place them at risk. that has continued over time. there are some phenomenal individuals over there -- a lot of them. they should be our story. i've been all over the battlefield. i have fought in cities and i have fought in paktika. another common aspect of this is just a tribal elder or the family member that does, we just want this war to be over with

and we want to get on with our lives. that is what they're asking. we have to understand great risk and threat him and not to just them selves but to their families. this is the most challenging combat environment in the world. counterinsurgency is the most challenging fight in the world. there is one aspect of counterinsurgency that will be the same and has been the same throughout history. time. it takes time. time and patience. i am a realist. i understand that time is our enemy. but there are great folks over there, and if anybody can make it happen, they can. but at the end of the day, the afghans have to want it and they have it up and take it. the last thing i would share is i had a conversation with the general and the governor's, the strength of the united states was in the fact that we beat the

british and the revolution in the war. it is the fact that we stayed together afterwards. my challenge to them was, how are you going to unite afghanistan? you are the people that have to do it. history will tell us one thing. when afghans unite, look out. my hope is that this great diversity that exists in their army -- [inaudible] -- but that is going to spread throughout the country and they are going to create an awesome environment that haqqani can't do anything about. >> kernel chris toner, thank you for joining us at the institute for the study of war. for those of you who are interested in reading more about afghanistan and in particular this area of afghanistan, i commend you our