taking a neutral position, it has chosen as the previous administration did winners and losers and it is working to achieve these goals in iraq. i really think this is central. if the power of the united states is limited and the first rule has to be as in the aquatic both first do no harm. ..

>> dick teresi defined the ever-changing description of death in his controversial argument that the business of organ harvesting is blurring that line. also this weekend on book tv, former pennsylvania senator arlen specter on the split between old guard members of his former party and those supported by the tea party. sunday at 8 p.m. booktv, every weekend on c-span2. >> military historian barrett tillman presents a history of the american aircraft carrier, the uss enterprise, the most decorated military ship in u.s. history. next on booktv. commission in 1938, the enterprise was involved in 20 battles in world war ii world war ii's pacific theater, which included battles at midway, guadalcanal, and iwo jima. this is about an hour.

>> good afternoon. i'm barber. this is the poisoned pen in scottsdale, arizona. it's our pleasure today to welcome back barrett tillman who is a local author in some sense because he lives in mesa, arizona. it's all one big megalopolis, but he's actually from oregon. he was first published at the age of 15. he has written 45 books or possibly more, but the figure that blows me away is 600 magazine articles. wow. what do you do? right in your sleep? >> i've been told i laugh in my sleep. >> awesome. in any case, his works of fiction include collaboration with harold coyle and stephen coots, and he is one whole string of awards, and probably the most relevant to today is his 2091 the u.s. naval

institute general prize. he has won awards from the air force for historical writings, the north american society for history. anyway, he grew up wanting to become an aviator but his eyesight did it in. so instead, he was derailed from that envy is done the next best thing, he says, writing all these wonderful books about airborne warfare and related topics. his latest subject, the legendary world war ii aircraft carrier uss enterprise, was inspired i guess in part by a landmark book by retired author edward stafford who wrote the big e in 1962. and barrett's article in the arizona republic, the interview he did come without to say that surely the world needs a landmark book about the

enterprise every 50 years. so my question is, why? why would it have been between 1962 and now that would make it worthwhile to come back and do another landmark book about the enterprise? all yours. >> also should mention, this is the inspiration by the interests of enterprise cv-6. this paperback was published in 1964, and you can do the math, if you're so inclined, but that is the summer after my freshman year in high school. and during a cross-country train journey i read most of this book, and i was enthralled for two reasons. never one was exceptional quality of the writing. and stafford was just a wonderful author, and he is still with us. he is about 93 or 94, retired in

florida. and as he aptly describes, enterprise is absolutely essential to the way the united states pursued the pacific war in the war after pearl harbor. shortly after the end of the guadalcanal campaign, which was early 1943, and the correspondent wrote a very good contemporary book called then there was one, and that title referred to the fact that at the height of the guadalcanal campaign, which was the most closely fought air sea land campaign and the pacific war, only enterprise remained afloat of our six carriers that had combat in the pacific in 1942. the only other survivor was uss saratoga, which sustained heavy battle damage on two occasions and, therefore, missed almost

the entirety of that year. so considering that and stafford wrote a 200,000 word book about the enterprise, what is it that year, 50 years later, warrants another one? i know there's a couple of recent. number one, stafford's book is superb on the aspects of the various units, the squadrons and air groups during the entire war. but he is told me in a couple of e-mails that if he eventually would written a longer book, and it took in five years to write this one, that would include more of the ship's company. what the navy calls white hats, the sailors, between them and the commissioned officers, a chief petty officers. he really made the ship work. and consequently i wanted to

devote a good portion of my book to the noncommissioned people who were so instrumental in enterprises success. the other aspect is advancing scholarship. apart from the fact that my book includes the design and construction of enterprise, we also are in a situation where in 1962 relatively little information was available from the japanese side, and that certainly changed, i'm going to say going back a good 15-20 years, the japanese defense ministry has published a massive compilation of wartime reports from the army, navy and air force, not all of whom contributed a small part of

which have been translated yet. but over those recent decades, so much more information has come about. for instance, and transport book, one of the last chapters -- in ed stafford's book, one of the last chapters, that was thought to be the name of the, costly private who dives into the enterprise's forward elevator on may 13, 1945, and he inflicted such damage the ship was knocked out of combat for the rest of the war. well, we now know, based on research here and in japan, that actually his name was -- and one of the things that most intrigues me about writing history is that you never know what's coming at you from around the corner, or in this case, in the mail.

a little over a year ago, maybe a year and a half ago, i opened an envelope in the mail with handwriting i did not recognize, and inside was another envelope, and it said thought you might like to have this. i opened it up and there was another piece of paper that said, from the pocket of -- 14 may, 1945, and it was a paper note. in almost pristine condition. it had been folded in half, that whoever had acquired it, had fortunately kept it fully extended without additional creases and kept it in the dark for all those years. and as result of that specific incident, i resolved to find out more about the lieutenant.

and thanks to a colleague in japan who was a cadet, a midshipman i should say, at the japanese naval academy in 1945, i am now in touch with the deceased kamikaze pilot's brother in japan, and his family is so proud to know that the enterprise association recognizes the ballot that that young man, the 22 year-old pilot demonstrated as a dedicated enemy of uss enterprise. so we have former enemies who now have come together, and, in fact, enterprise members, crew members, who had picked up souvenirs, mainly pieces of the airplane and kept them, now have returned some of those artifacts to the family in japan.

so it adds a whole new commission. additionally, i've enjoy some advantages that commander stafford did not, because there's been a considerable amount of secondary material published since 1962. some of my colleagues, such as john lundstrom the road wonderful two-volume study of naval air combat in the pacific after pearl harbor, richard frank, the historian and the guadalcanal campaign, john marshall and others who did a landmark book several years ago called shattered sword, getting a brand-new perspective on the battle of midway. all of those contain additional material that was not readily available. in fact, in some cases did not exist in the early 1960s. so that sort of a long way around the block to say that

continuing historiography of enterprise is almost financing. and one of the things i have most enjoyed in researching and writing this book is getting to know more of this ship's company because i was already well acquainted with a good many of the aviators and air crewman. but what most people don't realize about the enterprise is a huge reason for the ship's institutional success, and i wanted to write a book about an institution rather than just about a warship, was the unprecedented amount of longevity within the ship's company. when enterprise was commissioned in 1938, the combined total of the ship's company and air group was between 2100, and 2200 individuals.

throughout the war it's estimated that approximately 15,000 served aboard the ship. and, obviously, there was considerable turnover, because for one thing, enterprise was a floating leadership factory, and people who gained experience either with the ship's operations or with the squadrons and air groups had in valuable information and knowledge that would be passed on when they transferred elsewhere. but to give you an idea of how much this book really is a last minute credit history, when i started writing it in 2009, there were four known plant owners, as the navy called them. that is, members of the original ship's company who placed enterprise in the commission. and one of those was able to talk to me. and his name was carl marble, and he had some wonderful stories. you will see in the book his

role in the crossing the line ceremony, an ancient custom about crossing the equally. he was cast as the royal princess 14 neptune's royal court. [laughter] get this, he said i was 19 years old and i have the best legs of anybody aboard the ship. [laughter] some of the other folks who gave me -- look at the operation, included barney barnhill who sadly is no longer with us, but he was a 19 year-old bugler who sounded general quarters and sent enterprise to were on the morning of december 7, 1941. and when i talked to barney, he said you know, i still have the bugle and i wonder what i could do with it? well, i hope that it has gone to

a suitable museum where it is placed on display. another one of my accident contacts was bill norberg back in north carolina. bill is a very impressive individual. he took to heart his advice from a succession of the ships captains and went to college afterwards and became quite a scholar himself. and his perspective was actually unique. he was the omen, which is basically a captains secretary for every commanding officer from 1941-1945, at least up until the end of the war. so he saw every captain come and go, and he knew their strengths, weaknesses. a new who was receptive to advice, those who were not. and it occurred to me in looking at the turnover among the skippers throughout the ship's

career, even though the row 15 commanding officers from 1938-1946, which included three essential hoist holders after the war when the ship was not really in commission anymore, none of the captains left a lasting mark on the ship, but to executive officers definitely did, and so many of long-term heavy officers and chief petty officers. the to executive officers were back-to-back, and in those days aircraft carriers had to be commended by naval aviators, and their execs, the number two man, also had to be an aviator. a southerner named john connell and came to the ship as the and operations officer during the guadalcanal campaign. and he was called uncle john by everybody, officers and men

alike. he was one of these rare individuals who did everything extremely well. he was a stellar scholar, at annapolis. he was a superb aviator, and his attitude was that if you are an enterprise man, it did matter how many years had passed since the war, if you needed help, look up uncle john and he would do everything possible he could to help you. the other one, his successor, was tom hambleton, and some of you diehard football fans will recognize him as navies winning football coach from before the war. and tom hambleton had been chosen by the head of the navy's bureau of aaron onyx to write and oversee the implementation of the physical training regimen for naval aviator pixel tom hambleton at a solid background

before he ever came aboard the ship. i mentioned some of the chief petty officers, and there's one in particular who sadly i did not get to know. he patched away -- passed away several years ago. the name on the ship's roster is the age been. to this day no one understands what that stands for. he was such a big brawny character that was said that the stood for bulkhead because he was that big. [laughter] bulkhead dean's primary job aboard the ship was what the navy called master of arts but basically that's a cheap of police cookies in charge of security and the shore patrol. and on one occasion in 1944, he walked into the captains office, which is up in the island, the captain was gone. there was some -- a blanket spread on the deck shooting

craps. [laughter] as you might imagine, craps and poker, which they were also doing at the same time, was not only illegal but hell no, it's illegal. so bulkhead was immediately faced a dilemma. he could bust them, and some of them or his buddy. a bit of leverage to get any really did want to haul them in, but on the other hand, they saw him and they saw him and everybody knew that everybody knew what was going on. so rather than turning around and walking away and hoping they would keep quiet about it, which was unlikely, he knelt down on one knee and said, what's the anti? and one of the campers said -- he ponied up 50 cents, and spent the rest of the day gambling. now, consider the inflation factor.

bulkhead beams $11,701,944, -- he won $17,194. that is something over $200,000 in drug money. he was such an ethical guy that he made sure he lost all $17,000 before he broke up again and said you guys get out of here. so that gives you an impression of what the quality of leadership and just downright characters who populate the good ship enterprise. on another occasion, this would've been before bulkhead's gambling not a righty, the ship is in port southeast of the solomon island to the japanese had long range patrol planes that could drop bombs there from

time to time. they celebrate anything important, but they still could drop bombs. on this one occasion, this would've been late 42, early 43, the ship's ordinance department was required to send some sorties ashore to dig up unexploded ordinance but as you can imagine, that's a pretty high risk job. those in charge of the details wandered off somewhere. they really didn't know where, and it got to be, it was long, hard, hard worker and so he said you know, we have a case of grapefruit juice back here and some of the torpedo men have pure grain alcohol. what you say they makes us some cocktails? which they did. so they consumed the torpedo juice cocktails and went back to work digging up unexploded bombs. [laughter] about that time, uncle john came

by, and he saw what he saw. you guys, good lord. he said, boys getting itchy. i will take you back to the ship and you can finish digging up the unexploded ordnance to more. well, it was quite a crew, probably six or eight guys out and not a lot of room for them in the jeep. but commander headed back up the road and he hit a bump and pitched one of the sailors out the backend. he lit on his back, not the wind out of him if he was already three sheets to the wind, so, step on the break, stop, come to a screeching halt and go back and look at this guy whose nickname was zero. i did not ask his given name to add embarrassment. [laughter] he looks over him and he says how have you been, sundquist and

zero looks up at him and says, uncle john, would you please tell my, i died in the line of duty? [laughter] so although johnson is, getting back in, to come back to the ship, that was awful john. then the commander with three stripes on his shoulder went looking for the missing incented it was loud and not pretty when he caught up with the missing officer. by mentioned those wonderful stories to illustrate, as critical as the enterprise was to america's war effort, at the deck plate level it was popular with some wonderful people, and i'm not going to say we don't have directors like that in the navy today, but i'm willing to bet that the proportion is much smaller. in fact, before i came out of today i get a phone call from

one of my genuine heroes, every tiger admiral, who among other things -- who was a retired rear admiral, a non-aviator, who went to the enterprise straight from annapolis and then as far as we know he is the only one who came back later as an aviator. he was politically incorrect before politically incorrect existed. and he said a few years ago, he said you know, with my attitude they wouldn't let me in the back door today. he is one of those who i said was a plank owner and the admirals club. was not only he astonished he made admiral, but so was able enemy. [laughter] and i just say no system is perfect. i want to get a little bit historic with you in explaining

just how critical enterprise was. at the time of pearl harbor she was one of three carriers permanent inside to the pacific fleet, and the reason she was not destroyed in the port of pearl harbor is because she was on the way back the woodpecker delivering airplanes airplanes to wake island. and the weather and another ship and the task force delayed her return. she got into perl that evening, the evening of the eighth. and that did not prevent several other aircraft from being shot down in the japanese attack, because enterprise had launched some scout bombers to search a head of the ship, and been to hawaii, and then later that evening a flight of six fighters, wildcats, was diverted ashore to pearl harbor. and as anybody who has been in a

military knows, there's always somebody who doesn't get the word, and here's six airplanes who, although their scheduled arrival had been known at some levels, the word did not get around to everyone. somebody opened fire, long story short, five of the airplanes were shot down and three of those pilots were killed. one of them was an acquaintance of mine, jim daniels, who was an incident at that time. he's the one who -- was taxing up to the flight line went he said some blind the blank marine with machine-gun opened fire on him, and missed the back of his head by about that are. so jim was one of those who often insisted u.s. mc stands for uncle sam's misguided children. [laughter] but from there on enterprise, lexington and saratoga were the

operative carriers in the pacific fleet until enterprise's older sister, a year older, came around from the east coast and for the next several months the best that we could do with our battleships, destroyed or flatlined and a submarines ineffective with malfunctioning torpedoes, was launched hit-and-run across the pacific. that changed in june 1942 when the admiral pacific fleet learned that the japanese were planning on seizing midway, which is clear of northwest of hawaii, as one of the last of the hawaiian chain. and in the two-day battle, enterprise air group sank three of the four japanese carriers committed to that battle, and the yorktown which was lost in

the battle that account for the fourth one. so it was a huge strategic reversal for the japanese, that for the aviators and the sailors aboard enterprise, it was to quote my friend dick a best who commanded the dive bombing squadron, he said it was revenge, sweet revenge for pearl harbor. the italians say it is a dish best served cold, and by june it was six months cold. and one of the recurring themes you will see in talking to enterprise veterans is midway was payback for pearl harbor, and it was felt viscerally by all hands. following midway, the japanese were forced on the defensive and it allowed the united states navy and marine corps, and later the army, to initiate the first

strategic offensive that america undertook during the war, and that was the landing at guadalcanal and solomon islands in august, just two months after midway. enterprise was there, start to finish. she was involved in two more carrier battles, eastern solomons in august and the battle of santa cruz in october. and her younger sister, the hornet, was sunk at santa cruz. enterprise was already -- excuse me, saratoga was already on the west coast having damage repaired. so that gives us back to the book, then there was one. because at the height of the guadalcanal campaign in november, december, 1942, enterprise was our only carrier operational in the pacific, and her air group shuttled back and

forth from henderson field and a couple of the other airfields upon shore. as you will see in the book, i devote a short what is the segment to the end of the guadalcanal campaign. what is enterprise had been badly damaged or even so, either at pearl harbor or at midway, or early in the guadalcanal campaign? at any one of those junctures, the and availability of enterprise would have adversely affected the united states entire strategic have built in the pacific theater of operation. so what was that close and operation. so, enterprise subsequently went home to the west coast, in washington, came out again, foster the central pacific, the marianas, and finish the war

with one of the first two full-time night air groups in u.s. navy history. that group was commanded by a different of my, the late bill martin, come countr everybody sl martin, the i stood for instrument. he became the leading advocate of the flying from carriers both authentically and defensively. and consequently one of the trends that i address in the book was out in the price was involved in developing "nightline" arlie on. but also did some of the early carrier experimentation with radar. that takes me back to one of -- olson is one of the extra and cooperative and dedicated public affairs officer of the enterprise association.

he is an interesting fellow. is in the san diego fellow. he was a violinist to as i recall, he said that in circa january 1942 he was slated for an audition with the walt disney symphony, and he was on cloud nine. well, the next thing he knows he is in the navy at radio school, going in, all he knew about radio was turned on a show. but he made it through radio and then radar school, which was a considerable accomplishment in those days. he said he was pretty proud of himself up to the point where, shortly before the ship was to deploy at the the end of 1944, all the radio and radar decks were assembled in a locker with marine guards outside.

and ahead of electronics officer said gentlemen, congratulations, you possess in valuable skills, in brand-new technology. you've worked hard to learn it and it's important, it's critical to our success in the forthcoming operations. in fact, it's so important that under no circumstances are any of you to allow yourselves to be taken prisoner. [laughter] and he said at that point, he began to wonder if maybe he shouldn't have flunked a couple of the radar school tests, data that never became a dire circumstance. one of the thing i'll a treasure, and then i'll probably open open it to questions. people have commented ever since 1938 when the navy sold enterprise for scrap, why in the world was that historic a replaceable chip not preserved?

and not even admiral halsey who wrote enterprise's like shape and 92 was able to preserve her. since then other carries have been preserved. we have the midway in san diego, yorktown, a longtime preserved in charleston. there's the hornet, intrepid, lexington, all those have been preserved. and it certainly true that a majority of enterprise veterans would've liked to seen their ship preserve, but there are a few such as allen crow man who wasn't air crewman of avenger torpedo bombers and became a very well regarded ivy league author and instructor. has said that he did not want to see his beloved ship basically turn into an amusement park. and i quote him in the book. it was a heartfelt statement

that he would not like to see soda fountains and spilled trains and ice cream droppings and screaming kids running around. and really it's hard to argue with that attitude. but to me, taking the longer view in the current generation of world war ii, sailors were gone, all that would be left really is the ship. and i think it's a terrible loss. i just wish that the navy had given it a second thought. but in the meantime, 1961, the navy commissioned a second uss enterprise aircraft carrier, the first nuclear powered carrier of all time, and she is still in commission. she is due for another deployment this year i believe, and finally will be decommissioned i think in 2013 or perhaps 14.

and at that point the enterprise legacy will be lost because the navy, since the late '60s early '70s has taken to pandering to their politicians. and a secretary of the navy once told me, and he's a naval traditionalist. he said that it's easier to get two or three or $6 billion for a nuclear powered aircraft carrier named for a president or a politician than it is named for a historic warship. so that's simply the reality of the situation. but in the meantime, the books, and some of you probably saw the history channel series, battle 360, which was a pretty good series, perpetuates the enterprise legend. and i'm so glad i started the

book wanted it, because to give you a little example, in 2005, my history of the first battle of the philippines, in which enterprise was involved, was published. and at that time 25% of the contributors already were deceased. when my previous book, "whirlwind," which is about air operations over japan, was published a little under two years ago, the figure was up to 40%. and now as of the end of last year, as far as i know, over half the contributors to the enterprise book are deceased. so it was none too soon, and i'm so gratified to see a max turnout here. i'm grateful for the each of you, and to barbara. as she said, i'm from mesa but i've come to regard poisoned pen as my home town bookstore, and i've always been well received here. barber, do you have anything to

add speakers i have something i want to talk about just for me. and always has to be about me, right? we can have an off day were i can't injured. my husband -- [inaudible] >> sort. my husband and i went to japan a few years ago. i was one in 1940 so i don't have any actual memories of world war ii and the war in the pacific, but i always assume, this is a "whirlwind," not "enterprise" kind of question that i always assumed a row she was flattened and that nagasaki similarly was completely destroyed. i didn't know that, in fact, a russian the -- hero sheen is on the north side of the infancy, and it was an original target very near, the name of which i do not recall, a different city after hiroshima. and on the day that the bomber was to drop a bomb, since

japanese didn't surrender after hiroshima, the weather was bad so they went to nagasaki. geography at microsoft is completely different than hiroshima. so what amazed me when we got there was that most of nagasaki is still standing. people died because the radiation killed them, but unlike hiroshima, the bomb did not level nagasaki. so it is still intact, a city with many ancient, you know, relics and ruins and so forth. i was interested, that's the kind of stuff that you don't, and let you go there, you don't necessarily ever find out about the differences. when you were dashed when you wrote "whirlwind," what else did you find? >> "whirlwind," on so many dashed i'm still amazed at the it include not just u.s. army and the navy and marine corps and the british royal navy, and

the thing that most struck me in researching "whirlwind," you know, americans have always said that there was a second front in world war ii, and it was along the potomac in washington, d.c. with army versus navy, army versus army air force. but in tokyo, interservice rivalry was practically a full contact sport. at the imperial navy and the japanese army cordially contested each other. they spoke to each other as little as possible, and institutionally they were so far removed, as a pilot this makes my brain hurt, the japanese army air force was heavily influenced by the french dating from about the. of world war i. so in french aircraft of that era, you carried the throttle back to accelerate, but the

japanese navy was heavily influenced by the british royal navy, which uses the common sense, the standard push to go throttle. so i couldn't help but wondering how interesting must it have been to be in a joint aviation conference when japanese army and navy pilots were hopping cockpits? it could've been the same. [laughter] >> you want to answer questions? >> yes. if anyone has questions i would be delighted to replied. yester? >> how was the navigation the pilots use early in the war before they had radar to basically guide themselves back to the ship's? after the mission, or even going out on a mission. >> naval aviators in that era, up through the end of world war ii, had what pilots called the ouija board, and it was a

plotting board about -- it would fit on a tray that was flied out from under the instrument panel, and it had a circular grooves on it. and before launching from the carrier you would plot your point of departure, and then use the circular grid to factor in the wind, which greatly was inaccurate -- which was frequently inaccurate. and then you have to set the compass of -- accordingly. then you would navigate back to the ship. it required a very high standard of navigation it in those days the navy had electronic own devices, which most aircraft could receive, but frequently admirals task group commanders

were reluctant to turn them on because the enemy could monitor them as well. so a pilot -- no pilot who was not flown out of sight of land can fully appreciate making a flight in a single engine airplane. it's quite an achievement. [inaudible] >> that's correct. they did have gyro. except after the launch heading of the ship, and then cross checked out against the compass as well. [inaudible] >> no. yes, sir. >> the electronic device you talked about was called a cd. >> yes, sir. >> they had a code set up every day so if you didn't get the day's code, you got the letter z., it might not go back to the ship. it might go someplace else. every day before they flew they

had to go get the latest code so that it was set up in the machine, they know they listen to it like on the radio, morse code maybe, maybe the letter b., we would know the letter b. was out 070 heading from the ship. you get that and then you you're going to fly back on that heading, get you right back to the ship. >> that's correct spent have to listen to that when they were out there. >> yes, sir. it was the homer, and it worked. it was a low frequency device. yester? >> after the war the navy had kind of a bit of the japanese codes, translated them. how long were those codes available during the war? >> the question regards the u.s. military's access to japanese codes before the war.

as far as i know we did not break any of the japanese military codes, maybe a diplomatic code, prior to pearl harbor, but in early 42, the pacific fleet, was called the radio intelligence unit, had broken into the japanese operational codes and were able to predict, with some accuracy, what japanese forces were likely to appear at a given time and place. and that was a huge factor in the victory at midway. and our knowledge of cryptanalysis and code-breaking fold increased from that point on, to the point where, for instance, in 1945 we knew that the japanese government was not interested in surrendering, because they were in touch with

moscow and exchanging diplomatic traffic where the japanese wanted to have moscow intervene. and that meant barring something interesting there would be an invasion of japan. and as you just heard, the atomic bombs were what convinced the emperor to intervene and end the war. >> going way back in history, do you think that the japanese were really give japan a sense of competence where they could take the pacific and do what they did? >> yeah, absolutely at it. in 1905 war between russia and japan, which both were in federal powers of course at that time, was one of the first times that an asian nation thoroughly drugged a european power. and it gave the japanese navy a

huge boost of confidence that, from the period of time, for about the next 30 years or so, we saw a deterioration and relationships between the japanese army and the navy. and navy had been satisfied with its victory over the stars lead, and the army became ever more ambitious and aggressive, and that led to basically a state of permanent war on the asian mainland with china, burma, vietnam and then, of course, in 1941 when the expanded into the dutch east indies for its petroleum wealth and the philippines. >> do you feel at all the information that was classified after the second world war has been released now? >> as far as i know any operational material has long since been declassified.

it's possible or perhaps even probable that some of the crypto material remains classified. not because of the content of the, but perhaps because of the methods used. although the geniuses who were able to decipher the complex military and diplomatic codes by hand thought they were cooking with gas, as they used to say, when they got analog computers. now there are banks and banks of extra in a computers that can crack most codes in a matter of days, if not hours. so i can understand why the crypto guys sort of the aired on the side of caution. >> prior to the war, yamamoto was very much against going to war against the united states.

it was the most influential man in the navy. the army which is quite rampant in china and they wanted a war, that was their business. the fact he actually went to war, actually try to assassinate him understand prior to the war, do you think that his initial reluctance had anything to play with his performance as leader abdel to command the navy during his war, as commander of the japanese navy? >> no, i really don't. yamamoto was an extremely astute individual. he had had two tours of duty in the united states in diplomatic capacities. he saw america's enormous industrial capacity, and there's the that famous quote that he did make in contrast to the sleeping giant quotation, which he probably never uttered, as

good as it is, he predicted with a surprise attack and the initial japanese technological and strategic advantages, he said something to the effect that i have run wild for six months after which i can guarantee nothing but, of course, midway was exactly six months after pearl harbor. yamamoto was very much a dedicated military professional. he was a warrior. he knew that japan had almost no chance of winning the war, but his orders were go to war, and he saluted smartly and carried on. >> it's my understanding that the overall japanese strategy that originated in the mid '30s in relation to the pacific war, in which they had anticipated that there wouldn't

be a war between the united states and japan at some time, and both countries practiced war games against each other on that. was that because of the huge distances in the pacific that japan felt that they could, and yamamoto followed this strategy, that if you knocked the united states back on its heels and then draw a line across the pacific, that no country could extend the supply lines further than that? and to adequately supply and replenish naval forces there, which the united states was able to do and bring the war to japan, that was their whole strategy, my understanding was, to get to that point in the pacific, fight to a draw and then have it negotiate peace. >> i think essentially that's a fair statement. the united states navy began

planning for a war with japan probably shortly after the rushmore, 1905 or six, plan orange is what was cold but my recollection is that the japanese anticipated a single decisive engagement in the western or central pacific, at which point the united states would be forced to either to back off and try to rebuild, or more likely to reach a settlement. and essentially a diplomatic settlement is what japan hoped for in 1941. you can read books and books about the japanese military psychology, and one of the things that struck me in researching "whirlwind," looking at the interviews conducted with officials after the war, for instance, in the strategic bombing surveys, japanese military professionals and some diplomats knew they could not

defeat america in a contest of industrial might. but their sense of personal and national honor was such that they thought it was there to fight and lose them not to fight. so it's a huge culture clash. and i don't think either police -- i don't think either side fully understood each other. >> in that case, that seems like a good note to end the. i'm not clear we still do fully understand each other. i'm heading off to japan begin in about three weeks, and i'll be interested to see, the economic problems they have, the tsunami, we are not going to bed with japan but nevertheless, to see. interesting to see how -- it's very difficult to i think our estimate the effect of the

samurai culture, the romans and whatever, and the major restoration sort of put a lot of those guys out of four. well, you do. i've often wondered, and, what do the people in the ira and the paramilitary and i think what do they do? what would they do it a negotiated peace? if your whole life has been about war. if your entire life has been that, and suddenly it's not. i think that's a big problem in japan was that all of a sudden you're this centuries old tradition, we are tradition, and what were they going to do with it? it's never been clear to me why they thought they had to fight the united states in the pacific. do you have, and he, what was the reason? >> i remember in 1990-91 during operation desert storm one of the war correspondents actually said it was the first time anybody had gone to war over oil, which was a pretty amazing

statement because world war ii in the pacific was all about oil. the united states had embargoed oil, shipments to japan as a way to protest and hoping to modify japanese actions in china and elsewhere. and got down to the point where the clock was running. the geostrategic lock, and japan had i think something like 18 months of oil reserves, after which they would be unable to conduct operations to so the decision was made, we go now and occupy the dutch east indies with its petroleum wealth, and try to hold the line thereafter. >> seventy-one years, and i finally learned that. wonderful. >> the other reason was the dutch went along with that, with the embargo. if they had chosen oil, japan would have been fine but they would have --

[inaudible] >> really, when you think about the cost of the cruise ship thing that just happened and credible. almost within two months of the titanic. and the same issues are involved, personal heroism, with the enough lifeboats? i love the fact that they're still not enough lifeboats. and there's a very interesting new book out, i'm not recommending that you read necessary but it was again something he sort of learned what after, that some, at least one, of the first class lifeboat from the titanic launched and the people in it, just a very small number of first class passengers including an english aristocrat and his wife who refuse to pick up anyone in the water. so a lot of people died. it isn't necessarily that much different. so, you know, i guess maybe the

funding that writing history is nothing really changes. it just sort of the false. i did want to finish that by saying, this may be his best seller but, in fact, it is as far as i know his best seller. it has already reprinted at his polish of the they sold out the entire first edition. you didn't know that. >> wow. [applause] >> breaking news here every time. the supply side and i'm sure you learned that writing all this no tradition, the supply set off my decides who wins and who loses. it really does because you can't fight, we cannot sell books without books. so that we are. in any case, barrett, thank you very much equate had a long friendship together, and it's really a pleasure to see all the come out and celebrate enterprise with there. i'm going to ask them to go get little wooden table over there and sit it out ask all of you if you be kind enough to fold

enough to fold up your chairs and clean them up against the wall, and then visit within. thank you all for coming very much today. >> for more information visit the author's website, btillman.com. >> herschel loveless some of the upcoming book fairs and festivals that are happening across the country.

>> it's been nearly 10 years since the release of robert caro's third volume of the years of lyndon johnson, and in just a few weeks, thef